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Rachel Simon

LIBYA BETWEEN OTTOMANISM AND NATIONALISM

The Ottoman Involvement in Libya during the War with Italy (1911 - 1919)

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Note on Transliteration

Names and terms relating to the Ottoman administration were rendered in the modern Turkish script. Due to technical difficulties, diacritics have been omitted from Arabic terms, except for the Bibliography. Place names are often written according to the accustomed Western form.

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INTRODUCTION: LIBYA IN THE LATE OTTOMAN PERIOD

1. The Situation in the Empire on the Eve of the Italian Invasion of Libya[1]

Libya formed part of the Ottoman Empire in the period 1551-1911. The Ottoman administration there was weak because of Libya's remoteness from the imperial capital, Istanbul, and its relatively minor military and economic importance. Only senior officals and commanders and little manpower were sent there from the centre of the Empire and, from the very beginning, the regime based itself on local elements. In the years 1711-1835, the government in Libya was in the hands of a local dynasty - the Qaramanli. From the time of the return of the Ottoman army and administration to Libya in 1835 up to the Italian invasion in October 1911, the Ottoman authorities sought to strengthen ties with the heart of the Empire and to raise Libya to the level of more advanced regions.

In the period before the Italian invasion of Libya, the Ottoman Empire underwent important political changes and experienced internal and external upheavals. On 23 July 1908, a revolution led by the Young Turks took place. The revolution's objectives were the return to the Empire of a constitutional-parliamentary regime, the granting of political liberties to its citizens, and the recognition of equal status of the various religious and ethnic groups. The revolution aimed to end the centralized and autocratic regime of Sultan Abdül Hamid II (1876-1909). On coming to power, the Sultan had fulfilled his promise to grant a constitution and parliament. However, in February 1878, the constitution was suspended and parliament dissolved on the pretext of the war with Russia in the Balkans. When the war ended, the constitutional-parliamentary regime was not restored, and Abdül Hamid II ruled by means of a government and advisers.

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As a result of the national awakening in the Empire, which started among the Christians in Greece and the Balkans, Abdül Hamid II tried to unite the Moslems residing in the Empire. He also sought to strengthen the position of the Empire among those Moslems who were not under his rule by means of fostering a pan-Islamic ideology. His propagandists called on the Moslem world to support the Ottomans in their struggles with Europe, emphasising the religious aspects of the conflict. Moslem refugees from Christian states were favourably received and Moslem Ottoman groups suspected of separatist tendencies (such as Arabs and Kurds) received special attention: Abdül Hamid II tried to enhance his following among these groups by bestowing titles on their chiefs and granting them positions of honour; he even invited them to Istanbul, thus turning them into exiles and hostages.

The Hamidian regime looked upon the European states with hostility and suspicion. These states (mainly Russia, England and France) often supported national struggles within the Empire and had a long history of involvement in it. Under Abdül Hamid II, the Ottomans strengthened their ties with Germany because it was a source of Western know-how and technology and provided no danger of political intervention. Germany granted the Empire important aid both militarily (in training and equipment) and economically (in mobilizing funds for industrial and communication projects, the opening of markets and planning). In this period, Italy was not seen as a power that threatened the Empire, although its interests in Libya, which were known, worried the Empire.

Despite the Islamic character of the regime, its centralization and the suppression of any separatist and liberal tendencies, Abdül Hamid II continued to implement reforms in the army, administration, economy, education, transportation and finance. His reforms were not only intended to advance the Empire, but also to strengthen his direct rule over the whole system. The Sultan's activities, however, did not satisfy Ottoman intellectuals who were striving for a progressive state with a constitutional-parliamentary regime. Their demands for the return of the 1876 Constitution were unceasing. Opponents of the regime who were not imprisoned, exiled or put to death, escaped to

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Europe or Egypt. In exile and underground, these circles planned the return of the parliamentary regime, and some even demanded the deposal of Abdül Hamid II. The exiles in Europe were mainly intellectuals, some of them non-Moslems, who advocated liberal and secular principles and called for a decentralized government. The underground within the Empire mainly included members of the army and the administration, as well as students who wanted a centralized Ottoman state and who pressed for the application of their demands rather than emphasizing their ideological dimensions.

The 1908 revolution was carried out mainly by those forces within the Empire that were united in the Committee for Unity and Progress (CUP); they were also known as the "Young Turks". The revolution did not lead to the immediate deposal of Abdül Hamid II, but it did restrict his powers and brought about a constitutional-parliamentary regime. At the beginning of the Constitutional period, the CUP did not head the regime, but preferred to direct the state from behind the scenes. The abortive Islamic counter-revolution of 13 April 1909 ("31 Mart Vakası"), however, brought about the deposal of Abdül Hamid II and the strengthening of the Young Turks' direct rule.

The policy of the Young Turks was characterised by their commitment to a strong centralized government, and their championing of accelerated Ottomanization and Turkification of the state while developing regional pan-Turkish ties. In spite of the nationalist character (with strong Ottoman-Turkish emphasis) of the policy of the Young Turks and the fact that some of them held liberal and secular views, the pan-Islamic tendency in Ottoman policy strengthened and served to counter-balance separatist and nationalist tendencies within the Empire and fortify the latter's ties with the Moslem world. The prevailing conception was that the Turkish element and an Islamic attachment provided the most stable basis for the Ottoman state. However, in spite of the centralisation of government by the Young Turks, separatist-nationalist movements grew in strength, and not only among non-Moslems. A national awakening was by now underway among the Moslems and was most evident in the rise of the Arab national movement. Among the reasons for this trend were the relaxation on

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political activity and strengthened contacts among politicians and intellectuals from various parts of the Empire, both attibutable to the renewal of parliamentary life.

The Young Turks suffered severe setbacks in their foreign policy. Shortly after the revolution in October 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been administered by Austria since 1878. At the same time, Bulgaria declared independence and Greece annexed Crete. The Ottoman government protested in vain to the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin (1878) which had guaranteed territorial integrity of the Empire. The position of the European powers on these issues, should have served as a warning to the Ottoman Empire during the Italian ivasion of Libya.

2. Population

There are no exact data on the population of Libya in the late Ottoman period. A large part of the population was nomadic, living in regions where effective government rule was weak; no reliable and comprehensive census was taken. The population of the western province -- Tripolitania -- was estimated to be between 800,000 and 2 million; that of the eastern province -- Cyrenaica -- was estimated as between 190,000 and 500,000.[2]

Only a small part of the Libyan population was urban-based. Urban centres were situated on the coast and in commercial and administrative centres in the hinterland on the main trade routes to Equatorial Africa. Most of the population belonged to tribes that were, in turn, part of larger groups. There were many differences among the tribes in each province. Most of the Cyrenaican tribes were nomadic and divided between a number of large associations.[3] The two dominant groups in the South were the Touareg and the Tibbu.[4] The population of Jebel Gharbi in central Tripolitania was mainly Berber; they belonged to the Ibadi Moslem school and were, in the main, settled farmers.[5] By contrast, most of the population, except for that

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in the south, was of Arab descent, belonged to the Maliki school, and was nomadic.

3. Society and Economy

A clear correlation existed in Libya between economic occupation and pattern of settlement, as well as social and political association. This influenced the reactions of the population to the Italian occupation and the latter's ability to impose its authority.

Most of the population of the Tripolitanian coast, Jebel Gharbi, and to a lesser extent the Cyrenaican coast, was agricultural. The main agriculatural region was Jebel Gharbi, which was dotted with small villages whose population was attached to the land. There was an annual exchanged of produce between north and south: grains for dates. This interdependence was strong, and any halt in the barter trade had serious implications for the nutrition of the entire population. Whereas agriculture in the oases was based on spring water, most of the remaining agricultre was dry farming. Periods of drought, such as that in the years 1908-10, severely hit the population and, at such times, the population found itself in need of substantial external aid; many preferred to emigrate, mainly to Tunisia and Egypt.[6]

This socio-economic structure was vulnerable to prolonged military activity and economic boycotts which severely disrupted seasonal agricultural activity and caused a chain reaction throughout the country. An attack on settlements, their occupation or destruction, was likely to lead to the collapse of the population's resistance. This population was split into numerous small units of villages and tribes with no comprehensive regional or religious leadership. Loyalty to tribal associations or to the Ibadiyyah was not comprehensive or absolute: fragmentation was widespread and obedience to the chiefs of associations or the Ibadiyyah was not total. Consequently, there was no supreme leadership that was recognized by all of the Tripolitanian population. Ancient personal, tribal,

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territorial and economic rivalries persisted even during the struggle against the Italians. Such a situation harmed the population's ability to resist the Italians; indeed, it was further manipulated by external powers, such as the Italians, Ottomans and Sanusis.[7]

The population of Cyrenaica was mainly nomadic, raising camels and sheep and providing services for caravans. The population was split into numerous and often hostile tribal units. Since the Cyrenaican population led a life of wandering rather than limited settlement, it was more difficult for it to be defeated by a direct attack at its base. The vulnerability of this population lay in its water resources and caravan routes: their destruction or occupation could force even the Cyrenaicans to bend to a foreign authority, albeit at a slower pace and with greater effort than in Tripolitania. Nevertheless, in spite of the great fragmentation, the Cyrenaican tribes were loyal to the Sanusi order. Consequently, despite splits lower down, unity prevailed at the top, and this made their submission to any foreign authority a difficult task.

Libya was an important transit point in trans-Saharan trade between Equatorial Africa (the area of Wadai-Borqu-Darfur) and Europe.[8] Important trade routes which crossed eastern and western Libya were also the best routes to penetrate Libya. The Libyan population benefited from the services rendered to the caravans in trade centres along the routes, and supplied camels and their drivers. Another important source of income was provided by caravan robberies and the collection of protection money. This trade, which continued until the beginning of the twentieth century, gradually deteriorated for political and economic reasons. The Turkish-Italian war, brought total and prolonged disruption to Libyan coastal towns and Equatorial Africa. Consequently, the trans-Saharan trade stopped for a long period. The deterioration and eventual cessation of international trade harmed both the big merchants and the suppliers of services to the caravans. The trade on the eastern route was developed in the nineteenth century by the Sanusiya who based their economic power on it. The ups and downs in this trade had important implications for the

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status of the Sanusiya during its expansion in the nineteenth century and when it led the struggle against the Italians in Cyrenaica.[9]

Italian and Ottoman ships regularly frequented the Libyan ports of Tripoli and Benghazi, and to a lesser extent those of Misurata, Khoms and Sirt. Libya's trade with Europe was mainly conducted with Great Britain, including the latter's colony of Malta. Extensive trade was also conducted with Italy, France, and the Ottoman and Austrian Empires. In addition to African goods, the trade with Europe also included Libyan products, which were mainly exported to Britain: hard barley for the production of whisky and esparto grass for the production of high quality paper. Part of the agricultural export went through the primary stages of industrial processing, but most of the manufactured goods were for local consumption, or were exported to Equatorial Africa, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. These products included hides, carpets, sponge, metal utensils and jewellery. The two latter products were mainly produced by Jews, who also played an important role in domestic and foreign trade, banking and money-lending.[10]

European economic penetration of Libya was limited because of obstacles placed in its way by the Ottoman authorities and the country's poor economic state. Italy controlled most of the foreign economic activity; its government and numerous public figures saw this as a way of penetrating and controlling Libya by peaceful means. The Italians concentrated their efforts on acquiring land and establishing economic enterprises and banks.[11] European governments that attempted to investigate Libya's natural resources and archaeology were met with Ottoman suspicions and objections; they feared that these were the first steps towards military control.

Libya's backward economy, its primitive dry farming and great dependence on imports, especially during periods of drought, were all impedimental during periods of war. The Libyan population did not look on trade with neighbouring states as foreign trade, yet its existence was dependent on it. During World War I, the closure of Libyan borders with Tunisia, Algeria, and especially with Egypt, was one means of

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economic warfare, and it hit the population hard. The latter was left without food, arms and ammunition and, as a result, its ability to resist the Italian conquest was severely harmed. The Italians exploited the permanent trade routes and dependence upon well and spring water in the desert in order to subjugate the population.

4. The Sanusiya

A. The History of the Order[12]

The Sanusi order was established by Sidi Muhammad b. `Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Hasani al-Idrisi, who was born in 1787 in a village in the vicinity of Mustaghnem, Algeria. In 1821, Sidi Muhammad went ot study in Fez, Morocco, in Madrasat al-Qarawiyin, and joined most of the Sufi orders, which were active there. He turned down a request from the Moroccan Sultan Mulay Sulayman to serve in his court, and returned to Algeria in 1829 to teach grammar and jurisprudence. On the eve of the French occupation of Algeria in 1830, Sidi Muhammad left the country. He went to Cairo and studied at Al-Azhar University, where he quarrelled with many `ulama' (Moslem clergy) who denounced his views. He then moved on to Mecca where he became a pupil of Sidi Ahmad b. Idris al-Fasi, who strived to unite all Moslem religious orders. In 1837, Sidi Ahmad died, and his followers divided between Sharif Muhammad b. `Uthman al-Mirghani, who later moved to Sudan, and the Sanusi. The followers of the latter, who were mainly nomads, called themselves "Muhammadiyah", indicating their yearning for Moslem unity. At this time, the Sanusi established his first zawiyah (religious compound) near Mecca. Quarrels with local `ulama' led to Sidi Muhammad's departure from Mecca in 1838 for Cyrenaica.

The move to Cyrenaica can be seen as a turning point in the history of the Sanusiya because its growth started there. This region had several important advantages for Sidi Muhammad: other orders and `ulama' that might have been able to harm his standing hardly operated there; the region was mainly inhabited by Bedouin, amongst whom he had

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already worked successfully in the Hijaz; and it was an important trade junction, and therefore there were good chances for the spread of the Sanusiya in the wake of the caravans, in the same way that Islam had spread in Africa. In 1843, the first Sanusi zawiyah in Cyrenaica was established, Zawiyat al-Bayda', near the tomb of Sidi Rafi` al-Ansari, one of the Arab conquerers of Libya and a follower of the Prophet Muhammad. The order started to spread in Cyrenaica, Fezzan and the neighbouring regions. In 1846, Sidi Muhammad returned to Mecca and established 12 zawiyahs in the Hijaz. Thanks to contacts made during the Pilgrimage season, his ideas spread to faraway places in Asia and Africa. He also established a network of speedy messengers and was kept informed on events in the Moslem world in general, and in the Sanusi network of zawiyahs in particular. In 1855, he returned to Cyrenaica, where a year later he established a zawiyah in Jaghbub, which until 1895 served as the centre of the Sanusiya: the leaders of the order sat there and the central scholarly institutions were situated there. At this time, the Zwayah tribe from the Kufra region in the south initiated contacts with the Sanusiya. This warlike tribe was ready to stop caravan pillaging and give the Sanusiya one-third of its property in Kufra. Relations with the Kingdom of Wadai in Equatorial Africa also strengthened, thanks to the Sanusi acquaintance with the local Sultan. Sidi Muhammad died in 1859 in Jaghbub where he was buried.

The leadership of the Sanusiya passed to the first-born of the founder, Sidi Muhammad al-Mahdi (b. 1844). Until 1882, three of the order's dignitaries acted in his name. By then there were already 38 zawiyahs in Cyrenaica and Sirtica, 18 in Tripolitania and Fezzan, 17 in Egypt, 13 in the Arabian Peninsula and others in north and central Africa. The number of Sanusi followers was estimated as between 1.5 million and 3 million. Beside Muhammad al-Mahdi stood his brother, Muhammad al-Sharif, who was responsible for the educational system and the organization of the Sanusiya. In 1884, Muhammad al-Mahdi rejected the call of the Sudanese Mahdi to join forces in a Jihad (Holy War) against the Egyptian-British forces because he regarded him as a false Mahdi. In 1895, the centre of the Sanusiya moved to Kufra, an oasis and an important caravan junction. This move increased the order's

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ability to control the south and preach there. The number of zawiyahs in the Equatorial African kingdoms grew rapidly, as these states came under the influence of the Sanusiya. The transfer of the Sanusi centre to the south was a result of its wish to be nearer to its main scene of activities, as well as its wish to keep out of the reach of the Ottoman authorities. A further southern advance resulted in another shift of the order's centre to Qiru in 1899. Resistance to French penetration from the Chad Lake region was directed from Qiru and fierce battles were fought between the French and local Kingdoms and Sanusi forces. Muhammad al-Mahdi died suddenly in 1902 and was buried in Kufra.

The Sanusi leadership passed to Muhammad al-Mahdi's nephew, Sidi Ahmad al-Sharif (b. 1873), who headed the order until 1917. Ahmad al-Sharif was the eldest member of the Sanusi family, while the sons of Muhammad al-Mahdi (Idris and Rida') were still juniors, incapable of leading the order in difficult times, politically as well as militarily. Following a heavy defeat by the French in late 1902, the Sanusis withdrew, and their centre returned to Kufra. French penetration strengthened following the Anglo-French treaty of 1904, which gave France the Zinder-Chad region.

The dangers posed by the European powers which confronted the Sanusiya brought about an improvement in relations between it and the Ottoman authorities and enabled Ottoman penetration of Tibesti (in 1910) and Borqu (in 1911).

B. Religious Principles

The principles of the Sanusiya were consolidated by its founder; those who followed him dealt mainly in spreading his ideas. Sidi Muhammad wrote nine books, three of which have special importance for an understanding of his doctrine.[13] A summation of the principles of the Sanusiya can be found in his book Iqaz al-Wasnan fi al-`Amal bil-Hadith wal-Qur'an (The Awakening of the Sleepy in the Worship in the Hadith and the Qur'an). In his opinion, every Moslem must obey

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Allah, the prophet Muhammad and the `ulama'; the Qur'an and the Sunnah alone are the basis for the believer's life. Sidi Muhammad often based himself on Ibn Taymiyah, and rejected Taqlid (blind, unquestioning imitation and adaptation), Ijma` (consensus on a legal question), and Qiyas (deduction by analogy). His purpose was to unite all the religious orders and abolish all causes of friction by returning to the sources. His doctrine combines orthodoxy and Sufism. The aim of the Sanusiya was not unity with Allah, but closeness to the Prophet. It was decided that, in order to reach this objective, a need existed for study, training and intention, but not ecstasy. Thus the dhikr (the ceremony of incessant repetition of words and formulas in praise of Allah) of the Sanusiya is not ecstatic, and is not accompanied by music or dancing. The desire to unite all orders and to be close to the Prophet finds expression in the first name of the order during the Hijazian period: Al-Tariqah al-Muhammadiyyah (The Muhammadan Order).

As for political thinking, the Sanusiya called for an Imamah -- a supreme Islamic governing body. With regard to Dar al-Harb (The Realm of War), the order asked the Believers to quit a region which was not under Moslem rule, and also called for Jihad. The demands, however, were conditional on the political situation: the Sanusiya sought to Islamize the unbelieveres, but claimed that the individual should live in a Moslem society in order to be a complete Moslem. The Sanusis rejected ways of life that contradicted the Qur'an and feared Western military, political and cultural power. In the late-19th century, they fought the French in Equatorial Africa, but had not until then initiated violent conflicts. Their spheres of influence were closed to foreigners; even the Turks did not know them well, feared them and spread unfounded rumours about them.

The Sanusiya called for a modest life style and distance from daily pleasures: alcoholic drinks were forbidden, as were smoking and coffee. On the other hand, the drinking of strong and sweet tea was encouraged to sharpen the senses. Coquetry in dress and housing was condemned.[14]

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The position of the Sanusiya did not arise from a knowledge of its principles and their preference for these over those of other orders, but from its integration in the infrastructure of saint worship (marabutism)[15] and social and economic involvement. There was a long tradition of saint worship in the region. The population believed that the saints, their tombs and their relatives had unique virtues and the power ("barakah") to bless and curse. At times, the saints had an above-average religious knowledge, but their sanctity derived from personality and background (usually closeness to the Prophet) and not wholly from their knowledge. The Sanusiya did not fight this concept; rather, it tried to adapt it to its needs and to eliminate it as an independent phenomenon unrelated to it. For this reason, numerous zawiyahs, including the first one in Cyrenaica, were established next to the tombs of saints. The tomb of the order's founder in Jaghbub also became a holy place that attracted many believers. The masses exchanged local Murabutism for Sanusi Murabitism, and this spread to the members of the Order, its institutions and lands. At the same time, the level of general and religious ignorance among the Bedouin decreased, thanks to the educational activities of the Sanusis in their zawiyahs, where the neighbourhood children could study. Another characteristic of the Sanusiya which attracted the Bedouin was its simplicity in worship and daily life.

C. Organization

The Sanusi order was headed at first by its founder, who was followed by his first-born and later by the eldest male of the Sanusi family. While the founder was alive, most of the functions were in his hands, but from time to time he delegated power according to the needs. The organization became wider and more institutionalised during the life of Sidi Muhammad al-Mahdi. In the first 23 years of his leadership, a council of three of the order's dignitaries acted in his name because of his youth. When he became the real leader, a council (majlis) worked with him, and among its members was his borther, Muhammad al-Sharif, who was responsible for education and

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organization.[16] These people, however, were advisers, and the final decision rested with the leader.

This latter group of advisers represented the highest level of the members of the order who were called "dignitaries" (khawass). The regular full members of the order were the "brothers" (Ikhwan): those Sanusis who were educated in Sanusi madrasahs and received the final "polish" in Jaghbub. They lived in the zawiyahs. Most of the followers were "affliates" (muntasibun): the masses who hardly knew the Sanusi principles but who were personally loyal to the order and its representatives. They received the blessing of the Ikhwan, paid taxes and fought under the leadership of the Sanusi head.[17] Only a few hundreds were well-versed in Sanusi doctrine; most of the followers did not know what distinguished the Sanusiya from other orders and their loyalty had personal, tribal and mystic characteristics.

The leaders of the Sanusiya used to send out trustworthy "brothers" to spread the doctrine and to establish new zawiyahs -- when they were asked to by tribal chiefs. The Sanusi leaders saw to it that these messengers did not accumulate much power: they were usually sent on specific assignments and the head of the order himself directed the important negotiations with the tribal chiefs who were invited to him. In addition, dignitaries from the entourage of the Sanusi leader were often sent to visit various zawiyahs, bring orders and oversee activities.[18]

At the head of each zawiyah stood an "overseer" (Muqaddam), who was responsible for all activities that took place, and who was directly subordinate to the Sanusi leader. Among his activities were teaching, directing prayers, judging his men and arbitrating rival tribes. The "deputy" (Wakil) of the Muqaddam helped in the economic sphere: the economic management of the zawiyah and the collection of taxes from the Bedouin and the merchants, etc. Once every year, during `Id al-Adha (Feast of Immolation), all the heads of zawiyahs and their deputies were summoned to the Sanusi centre to discuss the spiritual, political, military and economic situation of the order.[19] Another means of strengthening central control over the zawiyahs, which kept

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the leader and his subordinates up-to-date, was the postal service developed by the Sanusiya. This service made use of the caravans, which were directed by followers of the order. In times of urgency, however, special envoys were also sent out. Jaghbub was the centre of this communication network, which included regional distribution centres.[20]

There are no accurate data on the military strength of the Sanusiya. Most of the population in Cyrenaica and Fezzan, and many in Tripolitania, were followers of the order. The zawiyahs were built in such a way that made it possible for members and followers alike to defend themselves in them: they often had an independent source of water and arms were stored there. On the eve of the Turkish-Italian war, the Ottomans estimated that the Sanusis in Libya had between 15,000 and 100,000 rifles.[21] By the time war broke out in late-1911, the Sanusis had gained some military experience from their battles against the French in Equatorial Africa. There was, however, a significant difference in the size of the combatant forces, their equipment and the intensity of the fighting.

D. The Spread of the Sanusiya

The Sanusiya was based on a network of zawiyahs, which were the cultural, social, economic, political and military centres of the regions in which they were situated. The zawiyahs were established on land which was granted to the order by the dominant tribe in that district. Following a request by the tribal chiefs to establish a zawiyah on their territory, land, manpower and materials for its building were supplied by the tribe. Quite often zawiyahs were established around a central well or springs, or at a main crossroads. Such a location gave the zawiyahs great economic value. Many of them were established on caravan routes to central Africa, mainly on the eastern one in Cyrenaica.[22] Thus, in addition to their economic strength, they dominated the only lines of communication in the desert -- a position of much military importance in wartime. Since zawiyahs were established on land which became private Sanusi territory, it was

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regarded by rival tribes as neutral ground, to which they were ready to come for arbitration. This social function, in turn, increased the standing of the order among neighbouring tribes.

Marabutism had greatly enhanced the acceptance of the Sanusiya in the tribal society. Saints had been a common phenomenon in the region for ages, but the Sanusiya was the first Sufi order which created a complete system based on this element, combined with the tribal structure and the socio-economic system. Numerous zawiyahs had been established next to holy places, and in this way the Sanusiya adopted the views, life style and worship of the tribal population for its own consolidation and advancement. This involvement strengthened the Sanusiya and the tribal system which was uniting aroung the order.[23]

Most of the Sanusi chiefs in Libya were of Maghrebi origin. The Bedouin acknowledged the Sanusis' religious expertise, but valued most of all their ability to grant "barakah" and this was the source of Sanusi influence and power in the region. The population expected the Sanusis to be active in spiritual as well in material matters. Following increased involvement of the Sanusiya in military affairs during the struggle against Italy, this pattern of relations changed and, as a result, when the Sanusiya failed militarily, its position among the tribes also deteriorated. The Sanusi involvement in the tribal system was not familial: most of the Bedouin were endogamous, and the Sanusi envoys did not marry into them. One of the main exceptions to this rule was the Sanusi family itself, whose members often married the daughters of tribal dignitaries. Consequently, the members of the Sanusi family held an especially strong position in their mothers' tribal sphere of influence,[24] in addition to the overall status of the Sanusi order.

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E. The Economic Position of the Sanusiya

The establishment of a new zawiyah increased the real estate of the Sanusiya. All lands, buildings and agricultural and industrial property were the public property (`umumi) of the zawiyah and did not belong privately to the leader of the order or to the order as a corporate body. The local Sanusi chief directed all the affairs of the zawiyah, while the supreme leader did not have any direct involvement in its management. The revenues of the zawiyah were used primarily for its own needs: only what remained after the expenses of the zawiyah had been taken care of, was turned over to the central treasury and spent according to the general needs of the order at the time. The Sanusiya took care of all needs of its dignitaries, members and their families, including when envoys were sent on various missions. At a later stage, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the revenues from certain zawiyahs were reserved for members of the Sanusi family whose mother's family was dominant in that region.[25] Many zawiyahs had extensive agricultural farms which were cultivated by manpower provided by neighbouring tribes who also paid an annual tithe to the order.

Thanks to the location of numerous zawiyahs on the trans-Saharan caravan route, the Sanusiya controlled a large part of this trade, especially in eastern Libya. The zawiyahs provided the caravans with services, such as water, food and lodging, as well as protection. Thanks to Sanusi influence over tribes that were loyal to it, caravans could pass in safety through regions which were infamous for tribal attacks on caravans and the extortion of protection money. The tribes came to respect Sanusi protection of trade in its spheres of influence and did not harm caravans which were approved by the Sanusiya. The entire eastern route of trans-Saharan trade fell within the Sanusi sphere of influence and it was considered safer than the western routes. Consequently, the volume of trade was greater there and it continued for a longer period of time. Because there was no access to Ottoman or Western power in the Sanusi-controlled territories, the eastern route was ideal for trade in goods that were forbidden under laws imposed by Western powers on the Ottoman Empire and Africa i.e.

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slaves and ivory (of cubs and female elephants). The Sanusis collected large revenues that accrued from their monopoly over tea and sugar at a time when the drinking of sweet, strong tea became popular in the region where alcohol, coffee and tobacco were forbidden. A transit tax was collected by the Sanusis at special customs stations along the caravan routes. Prices of goods were fixed in the zawiyahs, where the economic activities were planned.[26] There are no definite data on the wealth of the Sanusiya, but its economic power was great, and this in turn strengthened its political and military might. The Turkish-Italian war severely damaged one of the main sources of Sanusi economic power -- trans-Saharan trade. Later, trade with Egypt and agricultural work were also harmed. These developments had serious implications for the military-political capabilities of the Sanusiya.

F. The Relations between the Sanusiya and the Ottoman Authorities

During the nineteenth century, relations between the Ottoman Government and the Sanusiya were tense. The Sanusis rejected the Ottoman world-view and life style and tried to distance themselves from the latter. The Sanusis were not, however, ready to fight the Ottomans whom they looked on as a Moslem power, even though, according to the Sanusis, the Ottoman Empire deviated from the correct path. Most of the Sanusi effort was made in the struggle against infidels in Equatorial Africa and in spreading Sanusi influence among the Bedouin and African tribes. The transfers of the Sanusi centre from Jaghbub to Kufra (in 1895) and to Qiru (in 1899) were a result of the Sanusi desire to expand its influence in the Sahara and its wish to keep out of the Ottomans' reach. The Ottoman authorities were eventually forced to recognise Sanusi mastery over wide areas inside Libya and even granted tax exemption to zawiyah property. Such treatment was in accordance with Ottoman policy in various regions — post factum recognition of the authority of local strong elements over whom the government could not enforce its rule, yet which were ready to accept an abstract Ottoman sovereignty. Political developments at the beginning of the twentieth century including the French penetration from the south and the Italian invasion in the north, as well as

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changes in the Ottoman and Sanusi leaderships, brought about a certain rapprochement and cooperation between the Sanusis and the Ottomans. Yet in spite of this, the Sanusi leadership continued to oppose Ottoman influence in thought and life style, and prevented direct Ottoman involvement in the administration of the Sanusiya and the territories under its control.[27]

Sultan Abdül Hamid II tried to harness the entire Sufi structure for his own purposes and use it within the framework of his pan-Islamic activity, under the control of a specially appointed head (Shaykh al-Turuq). The Sanusis opposed all attempts at integration within such a network because they had reservations about many aspects of Ottoman policy and the institutionalized clerics. Nevertheless, a Sanusi representative resided in Istanbul in order to maintain some kind of contact with the central Ottoman authorities, as well as to propagate Sanusi ideas.[28]

The Sanusis' greatest doubts about the Ottomans surfaced in the mid-19th century and were a concomitant of the strong European influence over the Ottoman regime; it was a time when the Sanusi order was in its initial stages of development and when its leadership was most zealous and determined to maintain the doctrine fully. This period was marked by the strong position taken by the Sanusiya and by Ottoman attempts to win the order over to its side. The government made its most significant overtures to the Sanusiya at this time. In 1856, Sultan Abdül Mecid issued an order (firman) that exempted zawiyah property, which was regarded as an endowment (waqf) of the order, from government taxes (dara'ib), and allowed the Sanusiya to collect religious taxes (such as zakah) from the population living in the vicinity of the zawiyahs, even when they lived on state lands. The Ottomans faced strong opposition when they tried to change their taxation policy in Libya, and to apply it to the property of the Sanusiya and its followers. The Bedouin refused to pay the Ottoman tax collectors because they viewed this as double taxation: their first loyalty was towards the Sanusiya whom they regarded as the supreme political authority. One reason why the Ottoman Government wanted to change this situation was that most of the arable lands were filled

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with zawiyahs in a short period of time and, as a result, were tax exempt. In addition, most of the revenues which the State could derive from the regional and international trade in Cyrenaica went to the Sanusiya because it controlled the caravan routes.[29]

One feature of Sanusiya support was that most of its followers were Bedouin. In contrast to other orders in Libya (and elsewhere) whose activity was concentrated in urban areas, Sanusi support in towns was weak and the behaviour of its representatives there was exceptional. Because of their economic activities, the Sanusis had to have some representation in the centres of power but in these areas the Sanusiya was not regarded as the supreme authority and had to maintain good relations with the Ottoman administration and even obey it to a larger degree than the Sanusis in the hinterland of Cyrenaica.[30]

The Sanusiya opposed the application of Ottoman administration in the territories under its control. As long as the Sanusis did not want it, the Ottoman Government could not force itself upon them. The Sanusis would neither raise the Ottoman flag, nor commemorate the Sultan's name in prayers. The Ottoman authorities sent envoys, usually people accepted by the Sanusi leadership, to try and strengthen ties with the Sanusiya, but to no avail as long as the Sanusis did not feel the need.[31] The Sanusis, at the moment of their expansion, preferred to maintain proper relations with the Ottomans, though from a distance. In 1895, when the Sanusis moved their centre from Jaghbub to Kufra, the Ottoman regime tried to draw them in to its struggle against European penetration of Equatorial Africa. A Sultanic order issued in Istanbul ordered the authorities in Libya to honour the Sanusi leader Muhammad al-Mahdi and his representatives, as well as the privileges granted to them.[32] The Sanusis did indeed take a line in Africa that was acceptable to Abdül Hamid II, but they did this not in his name, but in the name of the Sanusi order and Islam.

French and British expansion in northern and Equatorial Africa harmed Moslem sovereignty and trans-Saharan trade. This led to the growing importance of contacts between the Sanusis and the Ottomans,

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whose Empire constituted the sole independant Moslem power in the region. The danger of French expansionism was the main factor in Sanusi readiness in 1909 to come to a political and military understanding with Istanbul. This move followed a series of painful Sanusi encounters with the French in Wadai which often resulted in Sanusi defeat. The Sanusi leadership subsequently asked the Governor of Cyrenaica to appoint an Ottoman representative in Kufra, which was the Sanusi centre at the time. Such a move meant that every French penetration of the region was a direct encroachment upon Ottoman sovereignty. In summer 1909, the Ottomans appointed as their representative in Kufra a local tribal chief who was loyal to the Sanusiya and who had wide influence in Cyrenaica. The Ottoman flag was raised in Kufra, deomonstrating Ottoman sovereignty, but otherwise Ottoman intervention was minimal. The Sanusiya also requested the dispatch administrators appointed by the Ottomans to districts in Equatorial Africa which were subordinate to Kufra: Ayn Qalqa, Dur and Qiru.[33] Another step designed to strengthen the Ottoman position in the south was the decision of the Ottoman authorities in Benghazi to send the district engineer to Kufra in order to locate and plan a camp for the Ottoman army there.[34] In another development, in spring 1911, the Sanusi leader -- through a Cyrenaican member in the Ottoman parliament -- expressed feelings of respect and loyalty towards the Sultan, and in return the latter passed on his deep appreciation to the Sanusi leader.[35] An Ottoman presence was regarded as essential by the Sanusis only when both faced a common enemy, but they opposed such a presence in places where no immediate danger threatened. Thus the Sanusis neither permitted the appointment of an Ottoman representative, nor the hoisting of a flag in Jaghbub.[36] In late-1910, Ottoman units reached Ayn Qalqa in Wadai and the district was proclaimed Ottoman.[37] This penetration was, however, short-lived: following the Italian ivasion of Libya in late-1911, the Ottomans concentrated their troops in places where the main danger to their sovereignty lay, and Ottoman forces in the south withdrew to the north.

Although the Sanusis were prepared for limited political and military cooperation with the Ottomans at the beginning of the

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twentieth century, the Sanusiya refused to allow the Ottomans real involvement among its followers and in its territory, and this did not change even during the struggle against Italy. Sanusi reservations about the Ottomans did not amount, however, to a refusal to recognize the Ottoman Sultan as the "Leader of the Believers" -- they merely rejected many Ottoman policies and did not want them to influence Sanusi followers. The Italians were therefore mistaken when they interpreted Sanusi reservations about the Ottomans as meaning sympathy for Europeans and support for their penetration of the region. The Sanusis viewed the Ottomans as the lesser of two evils and felt that the common denominator -- Islam -- bridged the differences. The incorrect Italian estimate of the situation in this matter, as in some others, proved to be their uncoming following the invasion of Libya.

* * *

The Sanusi organization in North Africa in general and in Cyrenaica in particular was of a united and almost independent structure and was administered according to Islamic law. It strived to broaden the sphere of Moslem sovereignty. The power of the order derived from its control over a vast economic system. Its hold over the population, whose knowledge of Islamic and Sanusi principles was vague, derived from the adaptation of Marabutism to the order's benefit. Thus the Sanusiya became the supreme authority for its followers in spiritual and material affairs alike. It sought to cut itself off from external elements which it regarded as spiritually destructive. When its position and the Moslem existence in the region were endangered, the Sanusiya knew how to fight back and distinguish between issues of primary and secondary importance. The Sanusis were ready to cooperate with the Ottomans and other external elements on the basis of a limited common denominator in order to remove the greater danger. The Ottoman-Sanusi cooperation to resist the French dating from the late-nineteenth century proved that the hostility between the two was not fundamental and that the Sanusiya was ready to compromise when Moselm independence was threatened.

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5. The Ottoman Government in Libya

A. Administration

Moslem pirates headed by Turgut Bey occupied Tripoli in 1551 in the name of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman hold over Libya widenend and governors, administrators and soldiers were sent there. Effective Ottoman administration existed, however, only in the settled coastal areas and to a lesser degree in Jebel Gharbi. Consequently, local strongmen -- and since the mid-nineteenth century the Sanusiya too -- were able to consolidate their independent authority and act as the real government. In 1714, the local Tripolitanian chief Yusuf Qaramanli, whose influence stretched to Cyrenaica and whose family had its roots in Anatolia, overcame the Ottoman Governor. This dynasty ruled Libya until 1835 when, following internal rivalries, the Ottomans managed to restore their rule. However, it took them a long time to consolidate their authority in the hinterland, and this benefited the simultaneous expansion of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and Fezzan.

Ottoman Libya was divided into two administrative regions: Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Tripolitania (Tarablus al-Gharb) was a province (eyalet/vilayet) headed by a governor (vali) who was aided by a provincial council (meclis-i kursi eyalet). His subordinates took the rank of mutasarrıf and kaymakam and they, too, had their regional council. The status of Cyrenaica (Barqah) underwent numerous changes; from 1888 it was a district (mutasarrıflık) headed by a mutasarrıf directly dependent on Istanbul. However, on matters of army, posts, customs and justice, the vali of Tripolitania was also responsible for Cyrenaica.[38]

On the eve of the Italian invasion of Libya, the province of Tripolitania included four districts (sancak), each headed by mutasarrıf, which encompassed 21 subdistricts (kaza) headed by kaymakam and 23 regions (nahiye) headed by a müdir. The district of Cyrenaica included five kaza and nine nahiye.

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Governors of Libya with the ranks of vali and mutasarrıf were appointed by an imperial order from the Ministry of the Interior in Istanbul and came from various Ottoman provinces, not always from Arab ones. The lower ranks were usually filled by veteran administrators with long experience in Libya or other Arab provinces, and to these were added local dignitaries from influential families and tribes in the districts to which they were appointed. Appointments to intermediate and lower ranks were made on the recommendation of the vali or mutasarrıf, and with the agreement of the administrative council and the approval of the Minister of the Interior. However, the recommendations of the governors and the requests of the local population that local personalities also be given the rank of sancak bey (so that people acquainted with local affairs would serve for a long period of time) were not taken up. The main reason for this refusal lay in Ottoman fear that local power centres would be created. Following the Young Turks revolution in 1908, many positions in Libya were filled by CUP supporters, and those identified with the old regime were removed from key positions. This led to protests in Libya against the appointments: it was claimed that the newcomers were unsuitable and had no knowledge of local languages and affairs. Once again, the appointment of local administrators was demanded, but the government did not grant such requests and there were no substantial changes in administrative appointments in Libya.[39]

The administrative policy in Libya of both the Hamidian and the CUP regimes was to appoint people with suitable qualifications, on whose political behaviour the regime could rely, and whom at certain times the authorities preferred not to see at the centre of political activity. Neither the old nor the new regimes could dispense with the services of oppositionary circles among the senior and intermediate ranks of the army and the administration since the reservoir of qualified manpower was limited. As a result of advanced education, contacts with Europe, and a comprehensive view of state issues, many administrators and officers held views which were more progressive than those of the Sultan and his entourage. The regime believed, however, that it could rely on many of them if they could be isolated and removed from the centre of power and kept under constant

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surveillance so as to prevent them from uniting and seizing power through a military coup d'etat. Libya was one of the remote and isolated regions chosen for this purpose during the Hamidian period and even earlier. The Young Turks followed the same policy after 1908 and exiled their opponents to Libya. Groups of a few hundred men were sent to Libya as exiles or political prisoners, mainly following abortive coup attempts and political trials. Those prisoners who were thought to be the most dangerous were sent to the remotest parts of Libya. Nevertheless, in spite of the risk, prisoners were temporarily released -- because of their high professional value -- to serve in the administration or the army. Together with progressive administrators, they tried to realize modernistic ideas in the fields of Libyan education, administration, economy and society. Yet, despite their devotion and serious work, they did not succeed in bridging the cultural-organizational gap that existed between themselves and the local population. During the Hamidian period, those exiles who were Young Turks kept in close touch with the colonies of exiles in Europe and even planned a military coup under the command of the then military commander of Libya, Receb Paşa, but the plan did not materialize.

The Ottoman administration in Libya tried to establish regular patterns of inspection, but these were not carried out satisfactorily. Low-ranking administrators had to visit a district capital once a year and the provincial governor had to make an annual march of inspection across each province. These instructions were followed only rarely due to the deficient security situation, which deteriorated further due to this negligence.

Administrative councils (meclis-i idare) were established in Libya in the 1840s in the three upper ranks of the provincial administration. These councils were headed by the district governor and their members came from among the administrators and local dignitaries, who acted as advisers on administration, finance and legislation. The provincial council, which sat in Tripoli, was to convene for forty days annually to discuss problems raised by the vali. The councils approved administrative appointments, inspected

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public order, discussed land disputes, controlled financial affairs and requested government support in times of need. The councils were manned by the traditional representatives of the population as well as by the new generation, including administrators and judges, but these bodies did not have real authority and could only advise in a priori defined fields.[40]

The central government in Istanbul had only limited control over the activities of the provincial administration in Libya. Although the governors had to dispatch periodic reports, there was no control over their accuracy. In this respect, Libya was no different from other Ottoman provinces. During the Hamidian period, personal and slanderous reports ("jurnal") were sent to the Sultan by Ottoman officials from Libya as from other regions;[41] they included political defamation and did not deal with professional qualification or functioning. Personal hatred was quite often the basis for these reports and, therefore, their reliability was low. Local Libyan dignitaries often sent petitions to Istanbul against senior administrators, but these dealt with specific individuals and events and were not intended for continuous follow-up.[42]

Following the Young Turks revolution, press censorship eased and criticism of the local government sometimes appeared in Libyan newspapers.[43] Demands were raised by intellectuals and in political circles regarding the nature of a favourable administration and they made their views public. When such criticism overstepped itself, the regime closed newspapers, made arrests and exiled opponents. Complaints about improper administration and embezzlement were voiced by Libyan delegates to the Ottoman parliament,[44] but these were of a sporadic nature and at times came from interested parties. Parliamentary control over the administration in Libya was neither consistent nor thorough and lacked long-range influence due to the remoteness of the region and the short existence of the constitutional-parliamentary regime there (1908-11).

The administrative system tried to improve itself. Following instructions from Istanbul to all the provinces, committees were

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established in Tripoli and Benghazi in 1909-10 to check the public service. These committees were headed by the district governors, and included heads of departments, judges, municipal councillors and representatives from the public. They discussed the administration, police and judicial system, and customs. They concluded that the administration was basically sound, but that there was room for improvement, including the cessation of discrimination against the Arab element. The response to the last issue was that, since the language of the administration was Turkish, administrators had to be fluent in it and many Arabs were not.[45]

B. Finance

Taxes which were in force in the rest of the Empire were also current in Libya, but administrative reforms, including those of the taxation system, usually reached Libya after a delay. It was difficult to implement new tax regulations there due to the traditional difficulties encountered in collecting taxes from nomads and inhabitants of remote regions, who rejected the intervention of a supreme external authority. In a country such as Libya which was difficult to penetrate and hard to rule, a large part of the population was exempt from taxes. For some inhabitants this exemption (from 1835 onwards) was in exchange for military service, which was defensive in nature. In this manner the authorities refrained from anforcing laws, which were almost impossible to carry out anyway due to the opposition of the population. Such a policy operated mainly with regard to the kuloğlu (descendants of yeniçeris [regular infantry] and local women) until 1892, when a regulation abolishing this privilege and declaring a general conscription was issued.[46]

Another sector that was tax-exempt was that of the Sanusi order and its followers.[47] Consequently, most of the Cyrenaican population was exempted from financial burdens imposed by the state. From time to time the Ottoman regime tried to abolish this privilege and collect taxes in Cyrenaica, but this ran into stiff resistance from all the parties concerned.[48] The upshot was that the authorities did not

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succeed in undermining the position of the Sanusi order on an issue of wide governmental concern.

The authorities used the income it collected from the tithe, taxes on real estate, cattle, palms, wells, metals, notarized documents, inheritance and stamps for the needs of the local government in Libya. Income from the customs, ports, post, telegraph, tobacco, salt, alcohol and fishing went to the central treasury in Istanbul. The main items of expenditure were the army, the gendarmerie and the departments of the interior and treasury. Most of the defence budget was financed by the central treasury, whereas the gendarmerie and police were paid for out of local incomes. The army's expenses were subtracted from the payments transferred from Libya to Istanbul. In addition to the regular taxes, special levies were imposed as part of an imperial or regional enterprise.[49]

An attempt was made at the beginning of the twentieth century to reorganize the taxation system in Libya. An imperial order of 1901 called for the implementation of land regulations in Libya.[50] Since it was feared that the population would oppose this change, which meant the broadening and deepening of taxation, the authorities tried to reach an arrangement by trickery: in exchange for military service and new tax regulations, which would bring in an income tax (vergi), a high personal tax (the total sum of which did not diminish during the years in spite of the decrease in the number of the population) would be abolished. At first the population agreed because of the promise of facilities, and the arrangement was approved by the administrative council. But shortly afterwards the real price of the reform became clear, and the population protested because it feared a dangerous precedent on the issue of conscription. There were violent protests which the army forcibly suppressed and people were arrested and exiled.[51]

Since the tribal-nomadic population resisted taxation, quite often it was found necessary to use the army and the gendarmerie to help in tax collection. At times, however, soldiers used these campaigns for personal gain and confiscated goods for their own use. A

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common method of enforcing laws and tax collection involved the taking of hostages from among the chief agitators and their relatives who were usually the local dignitaries. Such action generally resulted in the swift payment of taxes, but following the release of the hostages the situation reverted to what it had been previously.[52] The authorities in Libya believed that only by using arms would they be able to make the tribes pay taxes and obey the government, and that any other policy towards them was pointless.[53] It was quite often the region's elders and dignitaries who fixed the tax rates for the population under their control, and they exempted their relatives, friends and those ready to give bribes.[54] Within the framework of tax system reform, the Governor of Tripolitania appointed in 1902 tax-collectors (tahsildar) instead of relying on the customary method of collection by local dignitaries. This step was undertaken not only to improve tax collection, but also to weaken the political and economic power of the dignitaries. The governor specifically ordered that taxes should be collected from all the population. But the wide dimensions of the problem and the constant budgetary deficit meant that local dignitaries continued to do the collecting.[55]

The obstinacy of the population was not the only reason for difficulties in tax collection. The region occasionally suffered from severe drought, as in 1908-10. The authorities temporarily suspended the collection of the vergi in the Sancak of Fezzan and the kaza of Ghadames, which were both badly hit.[56]

In theory, there should have been a surplus of income over expenditure in Libya. But in practice, there was a constant budgetary deficit, caused by incomplete collection of taxes and the fact that large sums remained with the intermediate ranks. This situation mainly harmed administrative and military personnel whose salaries were reduced and in constant arrears.[57] When the regime decided to collect taxes energetically, the results were immediate and positive, but even on these rare occasions most of the income went on debt repayment. Consequently, there was hardly any money left for salaries and for development. This explains why the military and administrators often used their status to take bribes and illegally accumulate property --

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their legitimate income was inadequate and unreliable. The soldiers often used their power in order to live at the expense of the population, especially when they were stationed in the hinterland where the senior ranks could not properly supervise their activities. It became customary in some districts for the population to give the soldiers their needs in kind or in money. An order from Istanbul explicitly forbade this custom but the soldiers ignored it and continued to press their demands on the population. Despite protests, the authorities did little to halt the phenomenon.[58]

The defective operation of the tax administration in Ottoman Libya caused a constant budgetary deficit which harmed security, development and the functioning of the administration and the military. The local government found it difficult to act in an authoritative and efficient manner which led to the further strengthening of the local strongmen. The latter exerted great power over their followers and the Ottoman regime never managed to undermine it; indeed, it even strengthened this group's power when it found it necessary to include them in the administration. The lack of sufficient budgets to properly administer and develop Libya also led to the intervention of foreign elements, mainly Italian, an internal Libyan affairs. The defects in the Libyan military infrastructure caused by lack of funds and planning, as well as the poor functioning of numerous military personnel, facilitated the Italians in their invasion of Libya.

C. Development

In the late-Ottoman period a number of development projects were undertaken in Libya. Wide-ranging plans were also drawn up, but most were not realized due to lack of backing from Istanbul, budgetary deficits and shortage of time. Most of the projects were in the provincial capitals of Tripoli and Benghazi and included a water network, sewage and municipal cleaning services, port development, improvement of roads, schools, clinics, and various public buildings. Provincial development plans barely progressed beyong the primary

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stages. A number of committees were set up to examine development needs in the fields of industry, agriculture, trade, communications, education, health and transportation, but their recommednations were not put into practice.[59]

By comparison with the general situation in Libya, the communications network was of a fair standard. For internal security reasons, Abdül Hamid's policy emphasized an efficient and reliable communications network all over the Empire. Tripoli had been connected by submarine cable with Malta and from there with Europe, including Istanbul, since 1906. An internal telegraph network, operated by a British company, connected all administrative centres in Libya. In Derna (eastern Cyrenaica) there was a powerful telegraph station, which connected with Istanbul. However, the large distances and damage caused by man and nature made the condition of the network unstable and it needed constant maintenance and military supervision. In Libya, as in other parts of the Empire, many of the communications personnel were CUP members. Such involvement strengthened their influence over the region's administration because they were spread across Libya and controlled the sensitive information system.[60]

D. Education and Culture

It was customary in the Ottoman Empire, as in other Moslem states, for cultural, social and welfare activities, including education, to be operated by religious endowments and not by the state. But changes in the social and political thinking of the Ottoman leadership in the nineteenth century also brought about changes in this sphere. During the Hamidian period there was substantial state penetration of education and health. Welfare services remained to a large degree in the hands of the waqf, which continued its activities in other fields as in the past, and were run in parallel with institutions established by the state and foreign elements.

Modern education started to penetrate Libya in the Hamidian period. The state established military, civil and vocational schools.

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Political exiles, who were sent to the remotest parts of the provinces, taught in numerous schools. A large part of the administration sympathised with progressive circles in the Empire and was ready to employ exiles and even political prisoners to teach in state schools. Most of the education, however, was of traditional Moslem content. There were also Jewish and Italian schools. Following the Young Turks revolution, CUP members in the army and the administration in Libya set up schools and classes for children and adults where the emphasis was on Turkish language and history. They also volunteered to teach in the new establishments, where the education was often free, and the various groups that made up the population flocked to them. On the eve of the Italian invasion there were nine government schools in Tripoli, including a girls' school, with a total of 1,350 pupils. Also in Tripoli were a teachers seminar, eight Moslem traditional schools, and Jewish, Italian and French institutions. Government schools also operated in Benghazi, Zawiyah, Aziziya, Khoms and Gharyan.[61] In regions under Sanusi control, the order supplied the education, which was traditional and Moslem.

There was little traditional education in Libya and even less modern education. This had direct implications for the country in peace and war: partial and complete illiteracy made development difficult in peace-time and hindered the organization of resistance in war-time. There was little readiness to absorb new ideas and the ability to use modern technology was virtually nil. An educated minority did exist, created primarily by foreign education (Italian in particular), and strove for cultural, social, economic, and even political change.

Up to the time of the Young Turks, only an official or severely censured press was allowed in Libya. In addition, there were a few internal organs run by the exiles. All these papers were limited in circulation and influence. Following the 1908 revolution several new dailies and periodicals in Arabic, Turkish, Italian and Hebrew were published in Tripoli and sharp criticism of the Ottoman regime in Libya was occasionally voiced in them.[62]

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E. Army and Security

A major assignment of the governors of Libya was to ensure internal and external security. For most of the late-Ottoman period, security in the border regions was maintained, with the exception of French penetration in the south. On the other hand, internal security was shaky for most of the period. The main cause of this was the small number and poor efficiency of the security forces who were responsible for a wide district which was mostly hard to penetrate. In addition, the tribes were very independent and held many types of illegal arms. Furthermore, most of the state military forces were stationed in the coastal towns, especially in Tripoli and in the regional administrative centres. In the countryside, however, the influence of the army was marginal. In those districts where the Sanusiya was in control, security was better for those tribes and travellers that were acceptable to the order. The capability of the Ottoman authorities to enforce the rule of law in Cyrenaica was very limited and the deterrent measures that they could use were few. The police force was small, some of its members were old and poor, many were closely connected with the population, and they could not arouse much respect.

The army and gendarmerie were stationed in the administrative centres and strongholds from where they went out to guard roads, caravans and state installations. When inter-tribal conflicts grew too violent and people were killed, and when there was fear of a blood feud, the army was sometimes sent in to establish order and to enforce peace. The governors knew that their real control in the hinterland was weak and that they could hardly enforce their authority over the tribes. This is one of the reasons why the governors seldom made surveys of the countryside, and this in turn led to the further deterioration of internal security.

The serious security situation in the countryside had negative implications for Libya's economy. Tax collection ran into many obstacles, villages were attacked and caravans required armed escorts and special arrangements with tribes along the routes. The fact that

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the legitimate government could not act in vast areas of Libya was seen by foreigners and especially by the Italians, as facilitating a possible invasion. Later, however, the Italians realized that the authority of both the Sanusiya and the tribal chiefs made it difficult for any foreign element to penetrate their territory -- be they Ottomans or Italians. The friction between the Ottomans and the Sanusi-controlled population turned into close cooperation in the face of a conqueror (be he French or Italian), who was seen as being of greater danger because of his religion, nationality and foreign characteristics.

1. Manpower

In the late-Ottoman period the Ottoman army in Libya was organized as a separate military unit (Tarablus Garb Firkası) which was not part of the regular imperial structure of territorial armies (ordu). On the eve of the Italian invasion of Libya, the Ottoman armed forces included four armies and three independent units, and one of the latter was stationed in Libya.[63]

The infantry, which formed the largest part of the armed forces in Libya, was divided into four brigades of four battalions each and a special fusilier brigade. The number of soldiers stationed in Libya quite often fell below the required level due to budgetary pressures, remoteness from the centre of the Empire and more pressing military requirements of higher priority elsewhere. Thus, a large number of soldiers was transferred to Yemen to suppress a rebellion that broke out shortly before the Italian invasion of Libya. New soldiers, however, were still sent to Libya when veterans were released. Some 6,000 soldiers should have been stationed in Tripolitania and 2,500 in Cyrenaica, but on the eve of the Italian invasion there were in Libya some 5,000 soldiers, and most of those were infantrymen. In addition to the infantry, there were two cavalry brigades of five squadrons each. Here, too, there were deficiencies in numbers: instead of 800 men in Tripolitania and 250 in Cyrenaica, there were in 1911 only some 270 and 80, respectively.[64]

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Service conditions in Libya were difficult, especially in Fezzan, due to the region's remoteness and isolation, its rebellious tribal society and the harsh climatic conditions. Soldiers who served in Libya were promised a special, larger pension on their release, but more often than not there was a considerable delay in their discharge. Soldiers also suffered from chronic delays in receiving their salaries.[65]

2. Local Conscription

The regular army in Libya was based on recruits from other parts of the Empire, Arabs as well as non-Arabs. The population of Libya, as with some other regions, was exempt from conscription due to difficulties in penetrating the united tribal structure, the population's rebelliousness, and the great social and cultural differences that separated this population from that of the centre of the Empire. There was, however, a small number of local soldiers in the Tripolitanian unit who were recruited on a personal basis. In addition, there existed until 1892 the special formation of the Kuloğlu. In exchange for military duties, that mainly included patrols and regional defence, the Kuloğlu were made tax-exempt. Some of them received a formal military training in the military academy in Istanbul and served as officers in their own unit.[66] In this way the authorities harnessed for the benefit of the state the military potential of a group of paramount influence in an important region, and even imbued them with the characteristics of a modern army.

Most of the Libyan population held arms illegally and was involved in offensive and defensive military activities, but only at the command of their tribal chiefs and for their own goals, and not as part of a state army. This activity was quite often aimed against the Ottoman Army and at preventing the state from interfering in its internal affairs and forcing economic and military concessions such as taxation and mobilization. The population vehemently opposed general mobilization because it wanted to maintain its independent power base.

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The governors and the military commanders in Libya, as well as the central government, were well aware of the military might concealed within the Libyan population and were interested in incorporating it in the army in the form of regular soldiers, despite all the difficulties.[67] To achieve this, it was necessary to cancel the special arranagements regarding the Kuloğlu and to apply the general conscription law to the entire Libyan population, using the same criteria as in the rest of the Empire. In 1892, 1897-8, 1901-3 and 1908 serious attempts were made to realize these aims: first, the Kuloğlu unit was abolished, and later on steps were taken to recruit the population and train it. In parallel, the authorities started a wide-ranging propaganda campaign to persuade the population to accept conscription. Religious dignitaries, tribal chiefs, and military and administrative personnel called upon the population to get ready to rebuff invasion attempts; it was hinted that the main danger came from Italy. The population was promised that military service would be limited in time and that Libyans would not be forced to serve outside their country. Despite the frequent attempts of strong and resolute governors, who otherwise succeeded in their activities in Libya, the authorities failed for a long time to apply the conscription law in Libya. The population was stubborn and violent in its opposition. It was impossible to recruit it because of its independent character and because it was well-armed. The authorities could not use the limited regular army at their disposal to enforce the conscription law; it would have meant neglecting regional security needs.[68]

The Young Turks revolution of 1908, stood for equality to all citizens. This principle was also applied to conscription, regardless of religion.[69] Following lengthy deliberations and careful preparation, the conscription order was read in public in Tripoli in early-1911, and shortly afterwards in Benghazi, too. Not long after this, the authorities began preparing to apply the conscription order for those born in the years 1885-90. It was decided that only those born in 1890 would be mobilized for full military service, and that the rest would do only basic training and be transferred straight into the reserve forces. Conscription in the district of Tripoli began in May 1911. As was customary in the Ottoman Empire only 10% of those

eligible were actually recruited: 262 men (including 64 Jews). The regime faced violent resistance to conscription in the tribal regions, but the resoluteness of the governor and the military force at his disposal enabled him to achieve his aim. The governor, aware that conscription was being forced upon the population, advised his officers to incite a spirit of national feeling among the new recruits and convince them that they represented the last Ottoman stronghold in Africa which was threatened by Italian designs. The officers therefore tried to treat the local conscripts — Moslems and Jews alike — with understanding and patience, in order to make it easier for them to come to terms with the radical change in their lives.

It was also decided in 1911 to establish a reserve (redif) brigade of 12 battalions with 16,000 men. Up until the Italian invasion 3,400 men were transferred to this brigade, which received arms and ammunition from Istanbul.[70]

In 1911 it was decided to establish a camel patrol unit to protect the southern border of Libya from French penetration, but the Ottomans did not have enough time to realize this plan.[71]

In the late-Ottoman period the gendarmerie in Libya was also reorganized and strengthened under the command of a British officer, W.H. Deedes, who suggested increasing its strength from 700 to 1,500 men and including 50 camels and four armoured cars in the three battalions in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan.[72] This plan was only partially realized.

The years 1910-11 saw important organizational operations in Libya to increase the military capacity of the population as part of the Ottoman army. In spite of the short period from the beginning of the operations up to the Italian invasion, the security forces in Libya improved and relations between the local and Ottoman elements within them strengthened. The fear that was engendered about the consequences of this process was apparently one of the reasons which hastened the Italian invasion of Libya.[73]

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3. Arms and Fortification

A committee of military experts, set up in Istanbul in 1880, decided that the standard personal armament of the infantry would be the Mauser and of the Cavalary the Carbine.[74] These arms reached Libya after a long delay.[75] Until 1908, the military unit of Libya mainly had old Mertini and Remington rifles. The authorities began to replace them with the old model of the Mauser, but only after that had been exchanged in Yemen for the more modern model. Approximately half a year before the Italian invasion large quantities of old arms and ammunition, including 9,500 rifles, were removed from Libya. In September 1911, there were some 15,000 old Mauser rifles of the army and 13,000 Martini rifles of the gendarmerie in the whole of Libya. On 20 September 1911 -- the eve of war -- the Ottoman Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, ordered an additional 12,500 Mausers and ammunition. The consignment was sent to Libya in the arms ship Derna which reached the port of Tripoli on 25 September 1911. Its arrival was, for the Italians, a "casus belli".

It is difficult to estimate the amount of arms held illegally by the civilian population. The arms were acquired in various ways: spoils of various armies, theft and smuggling from accross the border. These privately owned arms included modern as well as very old weapons. Ammunition was acquired in a similar way, although some was produced by the population. It has been estimated that the population had from 100,000 to more than 200,000 weapons.[76]

Even though these estimations are inaccurate, it does nevertheless seem that the population had more arms than the state security forces. This is one explanation why it was so difficult for the Ottoman authorities to enforce their will over the local tribes. However, it should be remembered that the military unit of Libya was under one central command: even though Libya was divided into two provinces, it was one unit for all military purposes. The civilian element, on the other hand, consisted of dozens of tribes and hundreds of factions, all of whom were hostile not only to the external Ottoman regime, but also to one another. It was only in Cyrenaica, thanks to

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the moderating influence of the Sanusiya, that intra-tribal hostility did not find open expression. Consequently, the state security forces did not face a popular, united and well-armed military force, but a disunited one, and one whose internal rivalries a wise regime could manipulate for its own benefit. This is exactly what the Ottomans did, and what, later on, the Italians were also to do.

The fortifications around Tripoli and along the rest of the Libyan coast were few and their guns were mostly old. On the eve of the Italian invasion there were in and around Tripoli 56 guns emplaced in seven posts. The maximum range of these guns was 5.5 miles. By comparison, Italian naval guns had a range of 7 miles. In the summer of 1911, a high-ranking military committee was set up to plan the re-fortification of Libya. The Italian ivasion, however, halted these plans from the outset.[77]

4. Navy

Contact between the centre of the Empire and Libya was mainly through the Mediterranean. The structure and composition of the Ottoman Navy and its extensions in Libya comprised one of the vulnerable points in the Ottoman military disposition prior to the Italian invasion. During the Hamidian period the navy was not a fighting force and its antiquated ships were kept anchored in the Golden Horn in Istanbul due to the Sultan's fear of a rebellion. Following the Young Turks revolution, the authorities tried to rehabilitate the navy by training capable manpower and equipping it with modern ships and arms. The modernization of the navy was mainly based on British training and equipment. British admirals guided the naval reforms and new warships were ordered in Britain, paid for mainly through a wide popular effort. When the Turkish-Italian War broke out, Britain temporarily delayed the supply of torpedo boats to the Ottomans in order to protect its neutral stand. This served as a precedent to the seizure of two Ottoman destroyers by Britain when World War I broke out.

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At the outbreak of the Turkish-Italian War, there were 63 warships in the Ottoman Navy displacing 85,027 tons, 536 guns and some 10,000 men. The Italian Navy had 294 warships with a displacement of 540,917 tons, 1,688 guns and some 26,000 men. Most of the Italian ships were modern; their guns were more advanced and had a greater range than those in the Ottoman Navy. In spite of Ottoman attempts to improve the navy, it was treated as a marginal extension of the land forces: ministers responsible for the navy came from the land forces and the commander of the navy lacked experience in naval warfare.[78] During the Italian invasion there were only two Ottoman navy ships in Libya: the arms ship Derna, and an old gunboat. The ports of Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as others along the coast, were neglected and run down. Development planning was in its initial stages.[79]

When the Turkish-Italian War broke out, the Ottoman Navy did not pose any problem for the Italian Navy because the latter was both quantitatively and qualitatively superior. The Italians faced almost no resistance when their ships shelled Libyan coastal towns and, later on, other parts of the Empire. The Ottomans never managed to break the Italian maritime blockade, and this made it very difficult for the Ottomans to send in men and military and civilian supplies to reinforce the Ottoman-Arab camp. The Italians stopped and seized Ottoman and even foreign ships which were suspected of carrying men or equipment in support of the Ottoman war effort. Only a few small boats managed to slip through, but they did not change the situation significantly.

* * *

On the eve of the Italian invasion there existed in Libya an organized military force of some 5,000 men, and a few hundred more in the gendarmerie and police force. These forces were mostly stationed in the coastal towns and administrative centres accross the country, and their extensive dispersal weakened their effectiveness. These forces had at their disposal some 40,500 rifles, most of them old. The fortification of Libya, including its sea coast, was defective and too inadequate to stop an invasion. The delay in the rehabilitation of the

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Ottoman Navy and its clear inferiority to the Italian Navy weakened any chances it might have had of stopping the Italian invasion and breaking the blockade on the Libyan coast. However, despite the limited Ottoman military force in Libya, its old weapons and poor fortifications, together with Libya's isolation from the centre of the Empire, the situation of Libya was by no means a desperate one because of the military potential of the local population. This freedom-loving population had considerable quantities of weaponry at its disposal and until 1911 it used them for its own tribal-sectarian interests. Until the beginnings of European penetration, these interests often ran contrary to Ottoman state interests. During the Turkish-Italian War, however, the Europeans seemed to pose the greater danger and the population was ready to cooperate with the Ottoman Empire, but only through the mediation of the local leadership. Another obstacle to mobilizing the Libyan masses was the lack of an elementary military training and the use of different fighting tactics from those of a regular army. This had partly changed during 1911. Due to the balance of power between the Italians and the Ottomans and the almost total impossiblity of sending in Ottoman reinforcements, cooperation between the Ottomans and the local population became indispensable in the face of a common danger. Mutual concessions, earlier refused, were eventually necessary. In time, therefore, the population was ready to place itself under Ottoman military command, and the Ottomans came round to recognizing the authority of tribal and Sanusi chiefs and supplied them with large quantities of modern arms. Only such a cooperation could have delayed the Italian penetration of Libya.

F. Political Activity

As a result of the remoteness and isolation of Libya from the centre of the Ottoman Empire and Europe, its low educational level and its closed tribal structure, there was almost no political activity on a regional, country-wide or imperial level: neither in the provinces, nor in Libya as one unit, and not on the Ottoman, pan-Islamic or pan-Arab level. Only a few Libyans made contact with foreign countries voluntarily (due to studies or business) or involuntarily (due to

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exile and arrest). The exile to Libya of opponents of the Hamidian regime resulted in some political awakening in those regions to which the exiles came. Such an awakening did not reach districts under Sanusi control. However, due to the wide social differences between the population of Libya and the exiles, the latter's influence was not great, and this became evident following the Young Turks revolution.

1. Parliamentary Representation

During the first constitutional period (1876-78), two deputies represented Libya in the 130-man Ottoman parliament which was elected by the provincial and district administrative councils. Libya was represented by Mustafa al-Hamdani and Sulayman Qapudan. Their election did not arouse much interest in Libya, and was, in fact, arranged between the authorities and the local leadership.[80]

Immediately after the Young Turks revolution the new leaders decided to hold parliamentary elections. During the election campaign, political activity among the local Libyan population increased and it took an interest in affairs in the rest of the Empire and in changes in the government system. Its attitude to the development was, however, different from that of Ottoman and military officials stationed in Libya. The Ottomans, many of whom were CUP members, usually supported the planned changes in the government and the administration. The local population, on the other hand, debated at length whether the suggested reforms were in line with Islamic law (shari`ah). The Libyans regarded equality between Moslems and non-Moslems as especially undesirable. Three political parties emerged in Tripoli:

1. The National Party (Vataniya) led by Shaykh `Umar al-Mislati. This was the largest party with a wide local membership.
2. The Unity Party (Muttahidun), including mainly conservative-minded officers.

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3. The Progressive Party (Taraqqiyun) led by Shaykh `Ali Hayat Efendi, the chief clerk in the local Moslem law court. This party was very close to the CUP.

In Benghazi there was an organize d CUP group of Ottomans, as well as an Arab Party (Al-Hizb al-`Arabi).[81]

On 17 December 1908, the first session of the Ottoman parliament opened in Istanbul. Of its 280 deputies, eight were from Libya:[82]

The Sancak of Tripoli: Hajj Yusuf Paşa Zade Sadiq; Farhad al-Zawi; Mahmud Naji al-Arnawuti.
Sancak Jebel Gharbi: Sulayman al-Baruni.
Sancak Khoms: Mustafa b. Qadarah.
Sancak Fezzan: `Abd al-Qadir Jami.
Mutasarrıflık Benghazi: `Umar Mansur al-Kahya; Yusuf Shatwan.

The CUP took pains in Libya, as in the rest of the Empire, to get its candidates elected to parliament and to any other positions. All the Libyan deputies were established representatives of social and religious groupings in their districts, and the acceptance of CUP authority was often merely an ideological cover.

Those elected in 1908 continued to represent Libya in the Ottoman parliament after the Italian invasion. The 1912 elections were also conducted in Libya in those regions under Ottoman-Arab control, and representatives for the occupied districts were also elected. The following were elected in 1912 to represent Libya in the Ottoman parliament:[83]

The Sancak of Tripoli: Farhad al-Zawi; Mukhtar; Mahmud Naji al-Arnawuti; Shafiq.
The Sancak of Fezzan: `Abd al-Qadir Jami.
The Sancak of Jebel Gharbi: Sulayman al-Baruni.
The Mutasarrıflık of Benghazi: Yusuf Shatwan; `Umar Mansur al-Kahya; `Abd al-Qadir `Anani.

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During their short period as members of the Ottoman parliament, the Libyan deputies did not distinguish themselves: they were inexperienced in political affairs that fell outside their sphere of interest. One of the few occasions when the Libyan deputies initiated a parliamentary investigation occurred in late-1911 when the deputies of Tripoli, Naji and Sadiq issued a memorandum in which they blamed the previous government for neglect which enabled the Italian invasion. Nevertheless, the political activity during elections, party life and their mere activity and presence in Istanbul created a feeling of Ottoman unity among part of the Libyan population.

2. The Implications of the Young Turks Revolution on the Political Life and Government in Libya

There were several phases in the reaction in Libya to the 1908 revolution and the ideological and functional changes as well as the new leadership which it brought forth. The initial reaction was one of joy and enthusiasm, but soon afterwards doubts set in and violent conflicts broke out. Such conflicts stemmed from the varied cultural and social character of the population and the insufficient knowledge and understanding in Libya concerning the nature of the revolution and its implications for Libya.

There were several reasons for the initial rejoicing in Tripoli following the 1908 revolution. The Young Turks, for their part, were pleased to see their political hopes beginning to materialize. The local population was pleased about the amnesty, which they regarded as general, and they took the slogans of freedom and equality to mean an absence of any authority and also as greater local involvement in government. When the realisation dawned on them that they had misunderstood the meaning of the revolution and began to feel its immediate implications on the administration in Libya, they rebelled in Tripolitania and there were stirrings in Cyrenaica.[84] The differing reactions of the native population had their origins in the high concentration of CUP supporters in Tripoli and the more conservative and religious population in the remote regions.

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In the three years of CUP rule in Libya the regime attempted to bring about general mobilization, spread nationalist Ottoman education and develop the region and improve its security. Improved education and increased political activity in clubs and in the press raised political consciousness and the feeling of connection and identification with the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the tribal and religious basis continued to be a factor of paramount importance for identification and loyalty, as was evident during the war.

6. European Interests in Libya

A. British and French Interests

During the late-Ottoman period, European states, with the exception of Italy, were interested in Libya as a transit region and border district, whereas Italy desired Libya itself. Libya's border to the east was shared with Egypt, which was defended at that time by Britain, and in the west with Tunisia and Algeria, which were under French rule. In the south were African kingdoms (Wadai, Bornu and Kanem) into which France was penetrating. The paramount British and French interest in Libya was connected with protecting the countries they governed.

Libya's borders were not marked. Desert or mountainous terrain made demercation difficult. As long as these districts were under Ottoman administration, the central government did not deem the exact demarcation of inter-provincial boundaries to be necessary, especially not in unsettled regions lacking natural sources where there were only limited prospects for state exploitation. The situation changed with the French occupation of Algeria (1830) and Tunisia (1881) and the British penetration of Egypt (1882) and Sudan (1898) even though Egypt was formally still part of the Ottoman Empire.

The territorial controversy between the Ottoman Empire and Britain regarding the Libyan-Egyptian border focused on the Bay of

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Solum and the oasis of Jaghbub. Solum had a primitive but well-protected port of great importance to western Egypt. Jaghbub, meanwhile, was an important economic centre on the caravan route from the Mediterranean to Equatorial Africa and to Egypt. However, its major importance since the mid-nineteenth century lay in the emergence there of a Sanusi centre which influenced the population in Cyrenaica and in Egypt. In the period under review, there was no joint commission to demarcate the border; sovereignty was determined by facts on the ground. In 1907 the Ottomans reinforced their small garrison in Solum. On 7 November 1911, following the outbreak of the Turkish-Italian war, the British moved army units into Solum and thus materialized their previous demand for Egyptian sovereignty over the bay and the port.[85] In this action the British took advantage of the difficult military situation of the Ottomans, whose army was forced to retreat from the coast due to the Italian invasion, and which, because of its limited numbers, was in no position to allocate forces for defence against a country that had previously declared its neutrality in the conflict. As far as Jaghbub was concerned, the situation was more difficult: the Sanusis rejected the existence there of any external forces, Ottoman or British. Jaghbub remained in the control of the Ottoman-Arab camp throughout the conflict. The Libyan-Egyptian border issue was finally resolved in 1925, within the framework of a British-Italian agreement, according to which Solum was included in Egypt, and Jaghbub in Libya.

In the border region between Libya, Tunisia and Algeria were trade routes -- between the Mediterranean and Equatorial Africa -- which both sides wanted to control. Following the return of Ottoman rule to Libya in 1835, there was a slow Ottoman penetration southwards: they reached Ghadames in 1863 and Ghat in 1874.[86] Ottoman plans to fortify the disputed border area with Tunisia with towers did not materialize. After lengthy debates, an agreement concerning the Libyan-Tunisian border was signed on 19 May 1910, but only a part of the border was actually demarcated on the ground until the Italian invasion.[87] The border between Libya and Algeria was not fixed at that time. Following the Italian invasion, the French occupied the oasis of Janet on 27 November 1911.[88]

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The aim of both Britain and France -- even though it was not pronounced overtly -- was to move the common border with Libya so that regions in the latter would gradually be annexed to its neighbours. An immediate and complete division of Libya among its North African neighbours was deemed impossible due to the lip service that was paid by the European powers to protecting the integrity and sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, and also because they recognized Italian interests in Libya.

Libya's southern region was most disputed. Here, local chiefs, Ottoman, Sanusi and French forces were locked in struggle. In the late-nineteenth century, the Sanusiya started to penetrate into central Africa, the number of its followers there increased, and the Kingdom of Wadai came under Sanusi control. These Moslem and African elements were then faced with the French occupation of Equatorial Africa. This developed into an international issue when, in the wake of the Fashoda incident, a British-French treaty was signed on 21 March 1899 dividing the region between the two, and France felt itself free to proceed north of the Chad Lake region.[89] The fact that this treaty harmed the Ottoman Empire -- which had no part in it -- did not seem to bother the European powers; indeed, at times there was even latent criticism that the Ottomans were not complying with an international treaty.

The location of Libya's southern border was never clearly defined because of its remoteness from the foci of power and the poor knowledge of the terrain. The sides tried to establish facts on the ground. Ottoman military forces reached Ayn Qalqa in late-1910 and declared it to be Ottoman. The number of Ottoman soldiers was, however, inadequate to protect Ottoman interests, along the line for a lengthy period. Following the Italian invasion of Libya, the priorities of the Moslem warriors changed and they concentrated their forces in the north, thereby enabling the French to increase their penetration from the south.

Despite incidents in the border regions, especially in southern Libya, the Ottoman Empire did not suspect British and French

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activities vis-à-vis Libya. The Ottomans assumed -- rightly -- that these poweres had no direct interests in Libya itself. Even though their activities in the border regions were a nuisance, there was no actual danger to Ottoman sovereign rule in Libya from either Britain or France which ruled over many more prosperous areas in Africa.

B. Italian Interests in Libya

1. The Motives for the Italian Penetration into Libya

Libya was the focus of Italian desires. Politicians, intellectuals and journalists openly declared their national feelings and political-military expansionist aims. The Italian state saw itself as carrying on the traditions of the Roman Empire despite the fact that it was united only as late as 1861 and at the beginning of the twentieth century it was not a leading power. Italian emigration to America was on a large scale and backwardness, especially in the south, was marked. Those with vision hoped to return Italy to its former greatness by making it again an empire. They believed that size would be followed by power and glory. Such people considered it to be a historic right and national obligation to apply Italian sovereignty in regions where the Roman Empire had ruled.[90] Unfortunately, most of these areas were already in the hands of other European states that Italy dared not provoke. Consequently, the areas that Italy considered as permissible for expansion were very limited. The Italian penetration of Ethiopia began in 1879 and continued until it was stopped in its tracks by a defeat at Adowa in 1896. The Italian leadership sought to erase this blow to its pride fifteen years later when, on the fiftieth anniversary of the unity of the state, it occupied Libya.

Italy wanted to be an empire not only because it considered this to be its historical right and because it regarded itself as a noble nation, worthy of greatness and equality on a par with other powers, but also because it hoped to solve a number of distressing internal problems. Italian politicians were well aware of the fact that, while

the Appenine Peninsula had been formally united in 1861, a fealing of national unity did not yet prevail. Mutual suspicion and internal conflicts were a common feature. The political leadership wanted to channel excess aggressive divisive energy into a foreign war which would increase the individual Italian's pride in his homeland, which would divert his attention away from his distress, and which would unite the population. It was said quite explicitly that the blood that was shed would glue the separate elements into a united and proud nation. The war was also designed to defend the national honour. The view current in Italy at the time was that "a nation, like an individual, does not live by bread alone; the honour of the flag, the reputation of its army count for something... Today we find it necessary to occupy Tripoli in order ot preserve our prestige abroad and in our own eyes". Another feeling current on the eve of the invasion was that the mission of the army and the navy was to fight and that modern and lethal weapons and skilled soldiers should not remain idle. Such a feeling was most pronounced with respect to the Itaian Navy, which was viewed as the finest in the Mediterranean, and the Italian leadership wanted to see what its capabilities were in war conditions.[91]

An acute social problem that the leadership hoped to solve through creating an empire was that of large-scale emigration to America, which reached over 650,000 in 1910. In 1911 Argentina tightened up its sanitation requirements for emigrants' ships and thus made emigration more difficult because greater expense was demanded. Libya was seen by the Italian leadership as providing an ideal settlement region for those wishing to emigrate: it was close to Italy, had a comfortable climate, the coastal terrain was good, and there was only a sparse local population. It was claimed that if Libya could be incorporated into the Italian sphere of sovereignty, migration to it would be considered an internal matter, and produce from it would belong to the Italian state.[92] The fact that in the remote past some regions in Libya had been renowned for their fertility, added to the enchantment of the "Promised Land".

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Italy needed markets and cheap sources of raw materials for the development of its own economy. The empire would also solve this problem. Such hopes, however, were based on poor information — mainly fables and only a few hard facts. Before 1911, Libya's agriculture was primitive, its industry was poor and much of its territory empty. The Ottomans themselves were prevented from investigating many of Libya's resources by the security conditions, the scarcity of funds, remoteness, the difficult climate, and natural and social conditions. Despite their own incompetence, the Ottomans were insistent on preventing foreigners from touring the country out of fear that surveys by foreigners would be the first step towards occupation. The little that was known on Libya derived from a few travel books that were limited in their geographical and subject content and coverage. Up-to-date information was supplied by a mission of the Jewish Territorial Organization (JTO) which toured northern Cyrenaica in summer 1908 and which concluded that the region was unfit for large-scale European settlement. The Ottoman authorities also very rarely permitted explorations by archaeologists and minerologists. However, some were allowed to operate as late as 1911.[93]

2. Peaceful Penetration: Economy and Culture

The Italians tried at first to penetrate Libya peacefully through economic and cultural activities, and thus to occupy Libya from the inside by means of numbers and economic might. The Ottoman authorities were aware of this and acted to prevent wide-scale settlement by any foreign element; they also made it difficult for such elements to buy land. Italy tried to pursue its policy throught the offices of the Banco di Roma, which opened its first Libyan branch in Tripoli in 1907. A large part of the bank's capital came from the Vatican and it also received credit on favourable terms from the Central Bank of Italy. The bank acted in Libya as a covert government agency for economic activity. This is clear from the kind of transactions in which the bank was involved, coordination between it and the government, and the personal friendships and relations between its directors and senior politicians. Although Ottoman land laws prevented the bank from buying land, it did acquire real estate from borrowers

who were unable to repay their loans and who had to give up land that they had given as an assurance. In order to deepen its penetration in forbidden spheres, the bank bribed influential local leaders. The bank's total investment in Libya until the invasion was between 3 and 5 million dollars.[94]

Italy wanted to develop industries and services in Libya and was angry that it was not immediately allowed to start to implement its plans, having instead to participate in tenders like other competitors. The reconstruction of the port of Tripoli headed its list of priorities and it did not win the tender. Italy took first place in the field of maritime transport: the Italian maritime company, which was connected with Banco di Roma and which received annual financial support from the Italian Government, sailed regularly between Libyan and Italian ports.[95]

There was not a large Italian presence in Libya before the invasion: about one thousand people held Italian citizenship, and most of these were Jews who had been living in the region for generations. There were few Italian workers in Libya and they were not content with the low salaries: they were on an equal footing with the local population and did not enjoy privileged treatment similar to that given to other Europeans.[96] Much of the Italian economic penetration of Libya was achieved with the aid of Jews who held Italian citizenship and who wanted to advance their own positions in Libya and, at the same time, Italian interests.

The Italians had been very active in the field of education in Libya since 1876. By 1911 there were twelve Italian schools (including a high school) in Libya. The education there was free of charge and, in addition to Italian language and literature, Arabic, Hebrew, arithmetic, history, geography and various crafts were taught. Many of the pupils were Jews, as were the founders of the schools and some of the teachers. These schools were regarded as the best and most advanced in Libya and they gave rise to competition which contributed to the advancement of local education.[97] As well as spreading Italian civilization through education, agitators were sent to Libya, and to

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Egypt to work among Libyan students at Al-Azhar University. The Dante Aleghieri society also participated in this cultural offensive. Propaganda also came from the Italian press, which had been published in Tripoli since 1909 and which was heavily subsidized by the Italian Consulate.[98]

Before the invasion the Italian consular corps in Libya included a consul general in Tripoli, a consul in Benghazi and agents in Derna and Khoms. These representatives and their many aides took an interest in all developments in Libya and reported in detail to Rome on political, military, economic and social affairs. They were eager to heighten tensions and conflicts between the Ottoman authorities and the local population, as well as to whip up support for Italy. The Italians hoped to take advantage of these feelings when they occupied Libya. The Italian Government realized that its last Consul General in Tripoli, Pestalozza, was contributing through his quarrelsome personality to a deterioration in relations with the local authorities in Libya and to unnecessary tensions. He was withdrawn in July 1911 whilst on home leave in Italy. Thus when war broke out, there was only an acting consul, Carlo Galli, in Tripoli. A short time before the invasion, the Italian Ambassador in Istanbul was replaced and on the eve of the invasion only the chargé d'affaires, Giacomo De Martino, was resident in the Ottoman capital. At the same time, the Ottoman Ambassador to Italy was absent from his Rome post.

3. Italian Political Stands Regarding the Occupation of Libya

In March 1911 an Italian government was formed. At its head was Giovanni Giolitti, with Antonio San Giuliano as Foreign Minister. Both supported the popular movement for the occupation of Libya. In the summer of 1911 the Foreign Minister made it clear that the peaceful penetration of Libya was just one method of total occupation: "If we cannot occupy Libya through its economy, they will force us to occupy it... Italy feels itself young and vigorous".[99] Most political groups in Italy supported the occupation of Libya, even by military means.

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A large minority of Republicans believed that it was worthwhile penetrating into Libya because of its fertile terrain, but they regarded peaceful penetration as a "meaningless gesture". They held that Italian rule in Libya was indispensable for political equilibrium in the Mediterranean, that it would improve Italy's position vis-à-vis its allies in Europe. They believed, furthermore, that Italian rule in Libya would enable the government to protect Italian communities in North Africa and would increase national consciousness. They felt that the opportunities for an invasion were running out, and did not consider it to be a breach of moral or political principles.[100] Within the Catholic Church there were circles that supported the war because they hoped that the Italian state would be sufficiently weakened to enable the Church to increase its standing.[101] Among the Italian Socialists, who until the war had supported the Giolitti Government, there were many who opposed the invasion (Benito Mussolini was among them). They called for a general strike in protest against the war, but this failed. There were, however, those among them who suppported the war and who claimed that it would subject the army to the proletariat, and that a war against the Ottomans would in fact be a war against rich and exploitative Europe.[102]

The influence of those circles that opposed the war was marginal. The general atmosphere was characterized by nationalist enthusiasm and a strong desire to establish an empire, without considering the anticipated difficulties in Libya or the restrictions imposed by international treaties.

The Italians were quite open about their aims. They were strongly expressed in the press, but politicians were careful not to pronounce them openly so as not to harm relations with the Ottoman Empire, as long as Italy did not actually start making military preparations. There was no confrontation between the government and the press as regards the invasion of Libya. Declarations which the former could not make in public were expressed behind closed doors and in secret correspondence. From the spring of 1911 Italian journalists in Libya agitated their home readership with tendentious and distorted descriptions of the failures of the Ottoman authorities, tensions

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among the local population, and the bad situation of Italians in Libya. Such descriptions contradicted the reports of non-Italian consuls in Libya which said that, prior to the invasion, the region was generally calm and that Italian citizens were not being harmed.[103] In Italy, however, no-one questioned the reliability of these reports, especially not the policy-makers, and they served to give a further push towards occupation.

4. Italian International Lobbying for Approval of its Interests and Penetration into Libya

The French occupation of Algeria and Tunisia severely hit the Italian imperialist programme. However, when the European states had finished establishing themselves in the region, they moved over to support for the Italian claim that it, too, had the right to establish an empire. That European consent was given was also due to the fact that no government other than Italy had a clear interest in Libya. As a result Italy could be sure of European backing. The European powers confirmed Italy's right to act freely in Libya in a series of bilateral agreements. Italy, for its part, undertook not to prevent the other states from acting in regions and spheres where these powers had interests.

France and Italy agreed in 1902 to make the western boundary of Libya the border between their spheres of influence in North Africa in accordance with the map that accompanied the 1899 Anglo-French Treaty. It was also agreed that both would remain neutral if the other party was at war in the region.[104] Britain and Italy also agreed in 1902 that the former would have no interests in Libya. Also, in the event of a change in the status quo in Libya, it was agreed that Britain would ensure that unless such a change contradicted existing treaties, it would be coordinated with Italian interests. For its part, Italy promised that it would not act against Britain in the Mediterranean region.[105] Germany and Italy, which were already allies, agreed in 1887 that Italy had justified interests in Libya and that it was its right to prevent France from invading Libya by opposing France in Libya and in Europe, in cooperation with Germany.[106] Italy's second

ally, Austria, gave it a free hand to do in Libya as it wished when the two parties renewed their treaty in 1902.[107] Italy reached agreement with Russia in 1909 regarding Libya and Russian interests in the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.[108]

These agreements reveal long-term Italian planning with regard to its penetration into Libya. They include an approval of Italian rights in the region and European agreement not to disturb Italy in its attainment of these rights. Nothing is said explicitly in these agreements on the way in which the Italian interest in Libya is to be achieved or whether a military occupation and the application of Italian sovereignty come within the general consensus. Italian suspicion, especially of France and Germany, comes out clearly in these agreements, as does its wish to obtain mutual guarantees from all possible parties to neutralize European opposition to its activities in Libya.

When the European powers discussed and approved the Italian interest in Libya they completely overlooked the fact that Libya was part of the Ottoman Empire. Such approval was in violation of international treaties signed by the European powers in which they recognized the right of the Ottoman Empire to independence and guaranteed its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Before and after the Italian invasion of Libya the powers did not try to resolve the contradiciton of their recognition of the Ottoman Empire and their support for Italian policy in Libya. Until the outbreak of World War I the powers were not ready to accept a complete division of the Empire because they wanted to maintain the existing European balance of power. Consequently, they continued the fiction of guaranteeing the integrity of the Empire, but only where it did not contradict their own interests. The Ottomans, too, preferred this approach; it had its political and economic advantages. The Ottomans could not afford a confrontation with Europe because they were militarily weak, suffered from numerous internal problems, and were dependent on Europe in economic, military and political affairs.

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Despite being equipped with the agreements it had with the powers regarding its rights in Libya, Italy was anxious to re-confirm their positions and received sympathetic and supportive responses. It was made clear beyond all doubt that the powers would not prevent Italy from carrying out its scheme. Furthermore, the Europeans would admonish the Ottomans for their insolence and would make the fighting more difficult for them.

The timing of the Italian invasion was influenced to a great extent by Italian fears of upheavals in the political structure in North Africa. Italy was afraid that another country might occupy Libya and that its position in the Mediterranean would be weakened following the sending of the German ship "Panther" to Aghadir, Morocco, on 1 July 1911. The ensuing conflict consolidated the French position in Morocco. The German-French cooperation over Morocco led Italy to believe that the same pattern might repeat itself in other regions, including Libya, and that therefore its last chance to act in Libya had arrived. The danger of Germany occupying Libya was not real; its activity there was very limited. The Ottoman Empire denied rumours of a deal to lease Libya to Germany. Despite all this, Italian fears concerning its freedom of action in Libya persisted and planning for the invasion took on an extra urgency.[109]

On 26 July 1911 Italy complained to Britain that Germans were buying land in Libya easily, whereas Italians were being prevented from doing so and were also being prevented from obtaining the concession for the development of the port of Tripoli. Italy warned Britain that it intended to take steps to put the situation right. Britain's position was that "if it really was the case that Italy was receiving unfair treatment in Tripoli... and should the hand of Italy be forced... [Britain] would, if need be, express to the Turks the opinion that, in face of the unfair treatment meeted out to Italians, the Turkish Government could not expect anything else".[110] Italy put forward another argument for invasion: although it could not object to France establishing itself in Morocco, it considered it to be its right to examine to what degree its interests, and the Mediterranean equilibrium, would be injured and how it could balance the situation

through its activities in Libya. Britain's answer to this was in the negative; it regarded the demand for compensation as dangerous because of the negative and long-range implications it might have on international politics.[111] In an internal directive of 19 September 1911, the British Foreign Minister, Edward Grey, stated his government's position: "It will be tiresome if Italy embarks on an aggressive policy and the Turks appeal to us. If the Turks do this, I think we must refer them to Germany and Austria as being allies of Italy. It is most important that neither we nor France should side against Italy now... If Italy showed that the Turks were not treating her as well as others in Tripoli, we should tell the Turks that any action Italy took to defend her interests had been brought by the Turks upon themselves. We must hope that before Italy does anything, the Turks will have done something to enable us to give this answer, if the appeal is made to us".[112]

Such favouritism towards Italy stemmed from the minor consideration paid in Europe to guaranteeing Ottoman rights. Britain also hoped that in exchange for supporting Italy, it would gain a better return -- militarily, politically and economically -- than it was possible to get from the Ottomans in exchange for supporting them. Britain did not even try to restrain the Italian tendencies, and took care only to protect those of British and Maltese nationality in Libya.

France, too, reacted positively to Italian demands. On 12 September 1911 it stated that Italy could rely on France unconditionally and that France's sympathy was on Italy's side. It was also promised that France would not float any more new Ottoman loans until the Tripoli issue was resolved.[113]

On 26 August 1911 the Russians also promised Italy that they would not oppose its activities in Libya, provided that the situation in the Balkans did not change.[114]

On 28 September 1911 Italy explained its objectives to Germany, stating that it had to act lest France should lay claim to Tripoli.

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The German Foreign Minister, who had already thought that such a fear existed, suggested that France should give Italy assurances with regard to the Tunisian-Libyan border. Both the French and the Ottomans accepted this suggestion, but an Italian ultimatum was handed over to the Ottoman government before it was possible to plan such guarantees.[115] After it received European political backing for its invasion of Libya, Italy had only to find a casus belli, and this it did not find difficult to do.

5. Italian Arguments Justifying the Invasion and Considerations Regarding its Timing

All the Italian arguments brought force post factum to justify its plan are no more than futile pretexts which Italy would not have dared to raise in regard to any European state or a region under European rule. It was not these pretexts which determined the timing of the invasion. One of Italy's main claims in justifying its occupation of Libya was the bad treatment by the local authorities and population in Libya of Italians living there. There were few facts to back up this claim, however, and even then not all of the examples cited occurred in Libya or near to the time of the invasion.[116] The Italians complained a great deal that the authorities were putting obstacles in their way. The main target of their criticism was the governor and military commander, Ibrahim Paşa (1910-11), who was an energetic governor and who did much to strengthen Libya. The activities of the Ottoman regime in Libya were not motivated by hostility to Italy or any other power, but out of a keen concern for the position of the Ottoman Empire in Libya. The protection of Ottoman sovereignty, however, was interpreted by Italy and the other powers as being against their own interests.

The timing of the Italian invasion was influenced by military considerations as well as by the Moroccan crisis and the conclusion that peaceful penetration was not advancing Italian rule over Libya to the extent that it wished. The military forces in Libya underwent a total reorganization: the authorities began to conscript the local population and to integrate it into the army. Plans to establish a

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reserve force and improve the gendarmerie had been drawn up and were under way. The Italians believed that a force of 40,000 men would suffice to overcome the Ottoman force in Libya which could not be reinforced due to the planned maritime blockade. Italy feared that the balance of power might alter if the Ottomans carried out a quick military reorganization.[117] Italy therefore protested when more soldiers and arms were sent to Libya; it saw this as changing the balance of power in the Ottoman favour, despite the fact that since Libya was an Ottoman province, the Ottomans had the right to send there as many soldiers as they wished.

On the orders of the Italian military command, the Italian Navy, which had been blockading the Libyan coast even before war broke out, allowed the Ottoman arms boat "Derna" to pass through and unload its cargo in Tripoli. The unloading of the weapons after the Italian ultimatum had been conveyed to the Ottomans was, in Italian eyes, a casus belli that gave Italy the right to start hostilities.

6. Warning, Ultimatum and Declaration of War

The arguments justifying the Italian penetration into Libya did not usually speak of "occupation", but used vaguer formulas that emphasized the Italian right to be and act there. Only on the eve of the invasion was the conquest of Libya explicitly mentioned.

On 23 September 1911 the Italian chargé d'affaires in Istanbul, De Martino, brought a letter of warning to the Ottoman Grand Vezir, Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa.[118] In this letter the Italian government called on the Ottoman government to ensure the safety of Italians in Libya; the danger to their security came from officers and Moslem clergy -- CUP agents -- who were inciting zealous mobs against Italy. Italy also claimed that because of this danger some of its citizens were leaving Libya. The Italian Government considered that the arrival in Libya of Ottoman warships carrying soldiers, arms and ammunition posed great danger to its nationals. Italy feared an outburst of Moslem extremism in Libya which the Ottoman Government would be unable to prevent even if it wanted to. The Italian note termed the situation as being grave.

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It also warned against possible developments, but it did not call on the Ottoman Government to take any specific steps and did not threaten an Italian retaliation. Hints were contained that the Italian chargé d'affaires gave the Grand Vezir a verbal warning that the Italian Government might formulate definite demands with regard to Libya. According to this version, De Martino stated that Italian public opinion wanted an Italian Protectorate in Libya for political, economic and geographic reasons.

On 26 September 1911 the Ottoman Government passed its reply to this note to the Italian Embassy in Istanbul. It defined the Italian complaints as futile. The Ottomans stressed their ability to maintain order and security in Libya and stated that all the necessary steps were being taken.[119]

The Ottomans tried to bring in representatives of the European powers to mediate in a conflict which they did not want to develop. They also wanted to assure the Italians that there was no intention of harming them. The European governments, which had already promised Italy their support, politely avoided involving themselves. Germany alone communicated to Italy on 26 September 1911 that it looked favourably on the Ottoman offer to grant Italy all desired economic concessions short of a monopoly.[120] At that time, the Ottomans were not aware of the fact that the powers had already committed themselves to standing by Italy and supporting its claims. The powers, however, denied rumours that there was any kind of coordination between them and Italy with regard to Libya.[121]

The Italian ultimatum to the Ottoman Government on Libya was sent from Rome by the Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, on 26 September 1911 and was handed over to the Grand Vezir on 28 September at 14.30 hours. Reports from those who were present indicate that at first the Grand Vezir did not realize that it was a an ultimatum and did not attach much importance to it. When the significance of the document became clear to him, he immediately ordered a special government meeting.[122] The Italian ultimatum described the situation and the response that the Italian Government would take; Italy left the Ottoman Government

no choice but to accept it. The Italian invasion of Libya was not influenced by Ottoman agreement or refusal. It was a fait accompli. The document referred to numerous previous Italian complaints regarding disorder and neglect in Libya and contained the demand that this region should enjoy progress like other North African states.[123] Italy considered a change in the conditions in Libya as vital to its interests due to the small distance between it and Libya. Italy believed that its patient attitude over Libya had not been correctly understood and that numerous obstacles had been placed before its attempts to act in Libya. The Italians declined an Ottoman offer to discuss the granting of economic concessions, claiming that previous experience had proved that it was not possible to rely on such offers. They maintained that incitement against Italy and its citizens had increased in Libya on the initiative of Ottoman officers and officials, thereby endangering all foreigners in the region. Italy also warned against the arrival of military shipments which aggravated the situation even further and made it necessary for the Italian Government to take steps to prevent the anticipated dangers. Italy believed that the only solution to the problems in Libya was its military occupation by Italy. It was the Italian Government's hope that the Ottoman Government would order its authorized representatives in Libya not to resist, so that the necessary steps to carry out the occupation will not face any difficulties. The ultimatum ended by stating that future agreements to be signed by the two governments would determine the final situation in Libya.

The Italian ultimatum did not leave before the Ottoman Government any alternative with regard to the Italian plan towards Libya, because the invasion was not conditioned by an acceptance or refusal of any Italian demand. The Italian chargé d'affaires in Istanbul demanded that the Ottoman Government reply within 24 hours from the time the ultimatum was presented, otherwise the Italian government would be compelled to take immediate steps to carry out the occupation.[124] The Italian ultimatum did not mention any specific event (with the exception of the arms ship "Derna", and this was only hinted at) as lying behind the change in Italian policy towards Libya and the Ottoman Empire. The sole justification was that Italy could not

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tolerate in its proximity a backward country at a time when Italy itself had no freedom of action there and when the security of its citizens and their property were not being safeguarded. The real reasons for the invasion were not mentioned in the ultimatum: Italy wanted to be an empire, the only region considered suitable was Libya, and it seemed to Italy that this was its last chance. The real situation in Libya and Ottoman sovereignty there were considered by Italy to be of secondary importance.

The Ottoman answer to the Italian ultimatum was delivered on 29 September 1911, but did not reach the Italian Foreign Minister within the specified time;[125] in any case, the answer would not have satisfied him. It explained that the Ottoman Government could not be held responsible for a situation which had developed during the rule of the previous regime. It stated that the Young Turks regime had not shown any hostility towards Italian initiatives; every request had been dealt with separately and sympathetically. The Ottoman Government had suggested an arrangement based on economic concessions, defined only by the honour and supreme interests of the Empire and treaties with other powers, and these could not be revoked unilaterally. As for public order and security in Libya, the Ottoman Government stated that there had not been any hostile incitement and propaganda against foreigners in general, nor against Italians in particular. Ottoman officers and officials in Libya had been ordered by their government to ensure law and order and they did this loyally. The Ottomans also said that only one military consignment had reached Tripoli at that time, that it had been sent a few days prior to the 26 September 1911 ultimatum, and that no soldiers had been sent. The Ottomans stated that as a result, the population had been calmed.

The Ottomans neither accepted nor rejected the Italian ultimatum. They suggested continuing the same pattern of relations, giving a vague promise of a more sympathetic attitude on future Italian requests, but not at the expense of national interests or previous commitments. There was little difference between these promises and previous Ottoman policy. On the military level the Ottoman Government had even sounded apologetic in tone: it was not stated clearly and

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unequivocally that Libya was Ottoman territory and that its sovereign government was authorized and even obliged to keep security forces there in order to maintain law and order. It was also not pointed out that the government was empowered to forbid foreign economic or cultural activity contrary to the national interest -- as defined by the government -- and that it was not the business of foreign powers whether this had any influence on the advancement of the region. However, the superior military might of Italy and the threat it posed to the Ottoman standing in Libya forced the Ottoman Government to be cautious so as not to arouse Italian hostility and thus bring down upon itself a military attack. This response was natural, given the pattern of relations between the Empire and the European powers: the Ottomans felt themselves to be dependent on Europe in many matters, and thus it was not customary for them to put forward their demands in a resolute manner.

The Italian Government had apparently known that an Ottoman answer could not reach the Italian Foreign Minister within the allotted 24 hours. It was, however, punctilious with regard to its own timetable: on 29 September 1911 it announced that, as of 14.30 hours on that day, the two countries were in a state of war. The Italian declaration of war stated that the lack of an Ottoman response was further proof of a lack of will and the powerlessness of the Ottoman Government to act to protect the rights and interests of Italians in Libya. The Italian Government considered itself forced to protect its rights, interests and honour. It stated that all future events would be interpreted as resulting from the behaviour of the Ottoman authorities. An official and public Italian announcement on the state of war and the imposition of a maritime blockade on Libya was made on the same day.[126]

In addition to the official correspondence, the Italian Government had also ennumerated its complaints in a semi-official publication. The accumulation of these complaints, it stated, had led to the invasion of Libya.[127] The claims include events which did not even occur in Libya. The incidents cited which did take place in Libya are summarized as: an Italian who had been killed in Derna and another

who had either been killed or had committed suicide -- both events had occurred a long time before the declaration of war. The other complaints were very general in nature: the lack of freedom of action, refusal to grant economic concessions, prevention of land acquisition by the Banco di Roma and limitations on archaeological and minerological surveys. The Italians condemned the Ottoman authorities for not paying heed to the complaints of Italian consuls about the attitude towards their citizens. They also denounced the Ottoman Government for its hypocrisy, lack of will and powerlessness to guarantee law and order. The Ottoman press was also blamed for its negative attitude towards Italian demands. The Italian claims and complaints do not suffice to justify the declaration of war; the opposite was the case: once the Italians had decided to act, it was not difficult to find excuses to serve as a pretext for the invasion.

A semi-official Ottoman response provided a much clearer and resolute reply than the official answer.[128] It refuted the numerous Italian complaints and went to the heart of the matter: "Such incidents occur every day in almost every country. It is only when they occur in Tripoli that political capital is made out of them". It was further stated that: "...the Italian action is due to the desire to realize the long-standing political aspirations of Italy with regard to Tripoli, and if it has not been provoked by anything the provocation has not been any action or inaction of the Turkish Government, but the prospects of a speedy settlement of the Moroccan crisis". The document refuted Italian complaints regarding concessions: it stated that in 1903, Italy had demanded the automatic transfer of all concessions. It said further that in the Ottoman Empire it was forbidden for institutions such as banks to buy land and that was why Banco di Roma had been forbidden from doing as such. The Ottoman Government ended by noting that it had tried to clarify the exact nature of the Italian complaints and the compensation that Italy was demanding for -- what Italy considered to be -- the injury to it and its citizens, but that the only Italian response had been the ultimatum and the declaration of war.

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This semi-official Ottoman response, which was only made public after Italy's declaration of war, painted events in their true colours. It represented a shift in policy: Italian extortion attempts were now laid bare. The Ottomans, in exposing Italian hypocrisy, had also exposed the Europeans' position towards the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Government believed that it could mobilize European public opinion and thus arouse the conscience of the governments too, but although public opinion in Europe was often in favour of the Ottoman-Arab camp during the ensuing struggle in Libya, the position of the governments was more pragmatic. They sided with might, and the side closer to them politically, culturally and socially.

* * *

A comprehensive development drive had been initiated by the Ottomans in Libya before the invasion as a result of local pressure. In the late-Ottoman period, education had been improved and expanded, and the number of people involved in Ottoman politics and with an awareness of international affairs had increased, mainly in the coastal regions. The local and Ottoman leadership had tried to find substitutes for the deteriorating trans-Saharan trade, and to develop natural resources and local industry and increase foreign trade -- all this while ensuring that the revenues remained in Libya. In order to strengthen internal and external security, important initiatives had been undertaken: reorganization of the security forces, local mobilization, establishment of a reserve force, improvement of the gendarmerie, planning of armaments and partial demarcation of the borders. The strengthening of relations between the Ottoman authorities and the Libyan population, and especially with the Sanusiya, was aimed at accelerating the consolidation and advancement of the entire region. Such activities, which never progressed beyond the initial stages, had the purpose of turning Libya from one of the most backward and marginal parts of the Empire into an advanced and developed region, even if not the most central and important one.

The Italian invasion of Libya did not stem from the real situation in Libya but from Italian imperialist and nationalist

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desires. Italy had the full backing of the European powers in its invasion of Libya, despite the fact that all were signatories to treaties with the Ottomans which were supposed to protect the Ottoman Empire from such a danger. The invasion completely changed life and the course of development in Libya. The territories under Italian occupation were administered in line with Italian interests alone, and most of the country was embroiled in a lengthy war that weakened the population and stopped the development and progress that had just started.

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CHAPTER ONE: OTTOMAN POLITICAL STANDS REGARDING THE WAR IN LIBYA

1. The Situation in the Empire During 1911-19[1]

On 26 September 1911 the Italian Government sent an ultimatum to the Ottoman Government. Italy declared that in order to realize its demands -- to protect the security of its citizens and their property and to advance the region -- it was occupying Libya. The Ottoman Government was requested to accept the ultimatum within 24 hours from the time that the ultimatum was handed over to it. Meanwhile, Italian military and naval units had been readied for the invasion. When the demands were not accepted, Italy declared that a state of war existed between it and the Ottoman Empire -- on 29 September 1911. It then placed a blockade on the Libyan coast. The Italian landing in Libya began on 4 October 1911 in Tripoli. Following the conquest of the coastal towns, the advancement came to a virtual halt. The Ottoman Army retreated into the hinterland and organized the resistance to the Italian occupation in cooperation with the local population. The Italian Government, certain of a quick victory, declared as early as 5 November 1911 that Italian law was in force over the whole of Libya. However, the occupation was slow and took twenty years to complete.

The Italian declaration of war led to the resignation of the Ottoman Government of Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa on 30 September 1911 and the establishment of a new government headed by Said Paşa. The Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, who was one of the heroes of the 1908 revolution, served in both governments. The war in Libya hurt the prestige of the CUP which was blamed for having followed misguided domestic and foreign policies which had made the invasion possible. The liberal opposition was strengthened; to prevent it from seizing power, the CUP brought about the disbanding of parliament in January 1912 and made every effort to ensure that most of the CUP candidates would win the elections. Nevertheless, political unrest continued, and

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following liberal opposition to legislation and the CUP's autocratic tendencies, the Grand Vezir resigned. A new government was formed on 22 July 1912 by Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, one of the heroes of the 1877-78 war with Russia. A number of former Grand Vezirs participated in the new government, but the CUP did not, although it continued to dominate the parliament. In order to put an end to this anomaly, the government disbanded parliament in August 1912 in order to hold new election while the CUP was out of the government, and while its organ "Tanin" was closed and its activity limited.

While the war in Libya continued at a slow pace, talks were held in Europe between Ottoman representatives and those of the European powers, but without the participation of Italian officials. The Ottoman Government repeatedly declared that it would not make any concessions. The Italians, whose success in Libya was very limited, tried to put pressure on the Ottomans by widening the scope of the war to the eastern Mediterranean. During April and May 1912, Italy occupied the Dodecanese and tried to enter the Dardanelles. In addition, some Ottoman ports, including Beirut, were bombarded. These operations, besides causing the Ottomans heavy injuries, aroused strong fears among the powers. The result was increased efforts to solve the crisis. In the summer of 1912, unrest and disturbances in the Balkans increased, with the Balkan states cooperating against the Ottomans. The First Balkan War broke out on 8 October 1912. The inability of the Ottoman Empire to fight on two fronts and the fact that the Balkans were more important to the Empire than was Libya persuaded the Ottoman Government to agree to end the war in Libya. Agreement was reached on 15 October 1912 in Lausanne and it was approved in nearby Ouchy three days later.

Once the peace treaty had been signed, most of the Ottoman Army left Libya and part of it went off to fight in the Balkan War. In spite of the cease-fire in the Balkans and ongoing peace negotiations, the war was renewed in June 1913 (the Second Balkan War). It ended following a series of agreements, in September 1913 - March 1914. During the Balkan Wars, two events occurred in Istanbul that strengthened the position of the CUP. First, soldiers under the

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command of Enver Bey attacked the Prime Minister's office on 23 January 1913 in protest at Ottoman policy on the Balkans. The Minister of War was killed in the raid. This incident brought about the resignation of the government and the appointment of Mahmud Şevket Paşa as Grand Vezir and Minister of War. The CUP once again took part in this government, but its main power still lay behind the scenes. Cemal Paşa, a CUP leader, was appointed army commander in the Istanbul region, and this enabled him to put pressure on the government and supervise its activities. Second, on 11 June 1913, Mahmud Şevket Paşa was shot dead against the background of Ottoman policy in the Balkans. In the aftermath of the murder the CUP seized the reins of power; Liberal leaders were arrested and some were even sentenced to death; their party was outlawed. CUP members and followers now held key positions in the new government: Said Halim Paşa, the brother of the Egyptian Khedive, became Grand Vezir. In February 1917, Talat Paşa, a member of the CUP "Triumvirate" (Talat, Enver and Cemal) that ruled the Empire during World War I, took his place. Following the murder of Mahmud Şevket Paşa and up to October 1918, Enver was Minister of War. Then the CUP Government resigned as a result of the Empire's defeat in the war.

Viewed against the bakcground of the situation in the Empire in general and in the Istanbul region in particular, and in view of the severe problems caused by the wars in the Balkans, the CUP was the only power capable of leading the state. It had organizational capacity, manpower and a political platform. Furthermore, the CUP took pains to neutralize the main opposition. The need to reconstruct and modernize the army brought about increased activity from its German instructors who were chosen mainly for political reasons (i.e., the fear of deeper penetration of the veteran European powers, France and Britain, which had a long tradition of intervention in the region). Enver held Germany in high esteem — a consequence of his stay there as a military attaché in 1911. These connections explain why there was close cooperation between Germany and the Ottoman Empire during World War I. The reconstruction of the navy, on the other hand, was handed over to British instructors. Two destroyers ordered in Britain were partly paid for by a national effort and were to have been delivered

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in August 1914. In spite of the increased military and economic involvement of Germany in the Empire, the Ottoman administration and public still had feelings of sympathy for Britain and France.

The Ottoman Government's decision to side with Germany during World War I was mainly by Enver and his circle. It was also brought about by British mistakes and British and French cooperation with Russia. Enver, with the sole knowledge of the Grand Vezir, initiated secret negotiations with Germany which resulted on 2 August 1914 in a defence treaty between the two states, this only a few days after war had broken out in Europe. The treaty became known to the other ministers only after it had been signed; nothing was revealed to the public at the time. It was Britain that gave the pretext for the overt political and military change of direction when, on 3 August 1914, it announced that due to the state of war it was seizing for the use of the British Navy the two destroyers that had been built for the Ottomans. This aroused great anger among the Ottoman public. At this time two German destroyers reached Istanbul, having previously bombarded French targets in North Africa. In order to silence European protests against the entry of the warships of a belligerent into the Straits, the destroyers were formally handed over to the Ottoman Navy and given new Turkish names, although in practice they remained under German command and their crews were not changed. On 29 October 1914, after obtaining the permission of Enver and the Minister of the Navy, Cemal, the German destroyers bombarded Russian ships and targets in the Black Sea causing heavy damage. Following this attack Russia decalred war on the Ottoman Empire on 2 November 1914, and three days later Britain and France did the same. After its declaration of war, Britain took further anti-Ottoman measures: Cyprus was finally annexed to the British Empire and, in December 1914, Egypt was cut off from the Ottoman Empire and declared independant and a British protectorate. The pro-Ottoman Egyptian Khedive, `Abbas Hilmi, was deposed and Husayn Kamil was appointed Sultan of Egypt. As a result of these steps, there were now two enemy territories not far from the centre of the Empire commanding important sea and land routes. On 11 November 1914, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Britain, France and Russia. This was followed by the fatwa (legal opinion) of the Jihad,

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issued by the Şeyhülislam (the head of the Ottoman Moslem clergy), which called upon the Islamic world, and especially those living in enemy territories, to unite under the leadership of the Ottoman Caliph and participate in the Holy War against the enemies of Islam. The Young Turks made political-military use of the pan-Islamic concept which was developed in the Hamidian period and whose implications stirred hopes in the Ottoman Empire and Germany, and great fear in Britain and France, in whose colonies many Moslems lived.

During World War I the administration of the Empire was in the hands of three CUP leaders: Talat Paşa, Minister of the Interior and from February 1917 Grand Vezir; Enver Paşa, Minister of War and the chief architect of relations with Germany; and Cemal Paşa, Minister of the Navy, who however spent most of the time in Syria and Palestine since he commanded the 4th Ottoman Army.

One of the main aims of the 4th Army was to attack the British in Egypt. In January 1915, a large Ottoman force advanced toward Egypt through the Sinai Peninsula but was driven back by the British on the Suez Canal. The Ottoman command in Palestine did not succeed in arranging a second campaign against Egypt and only managed some small-scale incursions. Ottoman plans to fight Egypt on three fronts (Sinai, Cyrenaica and Sudan) did not materialize; only on the Libyan front did Ottoman forces fight against Egypt.

In late-May 1915 Italy joined Britain, France and Russia in the war. The result was that since the Ottomans were now at war with Italy, they did not have to conceal their hostility towards the Italians in Libya any longer, and from summer 1915 their activities against Libya and Egypt increased.

In parallel with these developments, the enemies of the Ottoman Empire had been holding secret talks since early-1915 concerning the partition of the Empire. The main agreements that came out of these negotiations were the London Agreement (26 April 1915) and the Sykes-Picot Agreement (16 May 1916). These negotiations were held at

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the same time as those held by Egypt's High Commissioner, Sir Henry MacMahon, with Arab leaders from Ottoman territories. From the correspondence between MacMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, Husayn the Hashemite, the latter and his followers concluded that the British had promised the establishment of an independent Arab state under Hashemite rule in all of the Arab world. Following this promise and generous British support with money, arms and instructors, the "Arab Revolt" broke out on 5 June 1916, and Husayn declared himself King of the Arab lands. His army included a few hundred Bedouin and Ottoman officers of Arab origin. Militarily, this force conducted mainly nuisance raids in the Hijaz and trans-Jordan towards Damascus. The political influence of this revolt on Arab nationalism and regional developments after World War I was much greater than its military influence on the battlefield.

In the years 1917-18 most of the non-Turkish regions were severed from the Ottoman Empire and European armies reached Anatolia and the Straits. On 8 October 1918, the CUP Government headed by Talat resigned and a new government was established in which the influence of the CUP was limited and the "Triumvirate" was not included. On 31 October 1918 the Mudros cease-fire agreement was signed; it specified severe political and military restrictions on the Ottoman Empire, which surrendered unconditionally. A few days later, on 2 November 1918, the "Triumvirate" fled the country and never returned. These three CUP leaders died within a few years. The Ottoman Army laid down its arms and the Powers (with the exception of the USSR) started to enforce agreements which they had concluded during the war. The Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) ended the state of war between the Ottomans and the Powers under tough conditions for the Ottomans. In the negotiations after the war, the sovereignty of Italy in Libya was finally approved.

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2. The Turkish-Italian War

There was strict censorship on all publications in the Ottoman Empire under the CUP and during the war. Periodicals and newspapers that published views hostile to the regime were closed down, but often reappeared immediately under a different name. There was no significant difference between the official and public government position and those put forward in the press, public meetings and parliament regarding the war in Libya. However, there was a contrast between the declared policy of the government and more moderate and realistic government positions which were only aired behind closed doors.

A. The Causes of the War

1. The Guilt of the West

In signing the Treaty of Berlin (1878) as well as later agreements, the European Powers recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and undertook to protect it. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century Italy reached bilateral agreements with the other European Powers that gave it a free hand in Libya, which was at that time under Ottoman sovereignty. While the Powers were ready to recognize Italian rule in Libya, Italy was in return ready to recognize the interests of the Powers in other regions. Although these agreements had been reached in secret, rumours reached the Ottomans who began to suspect the existence of an understanding concerning Libya between Italy and the Powers. But even if the Powers had not signed agreements with Italy, the Ottomans would still have had serious arguments with them. The Ottoman Empire viewed European recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity as a guarantee of its security. The Italian invasion of Libya was a clear violation of these principles, and since the European powers took no steps to bring about an Italian retreat, the Ottomans felt that they had been deceived and betrayed. Furthermore, the European Powers behaved amicably towards the aggressor -- Italy -- and made it clear

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to the Ottomans that they had to reconcile themselves to the reality and accept the realization of Italian interests in Libya.

Ottoman grievances stemmed from two issues: the secret agreement of the powers to the invasion and the overt encouragement which they gave Italy throughout the war. The Ottomans believed that had it not been for the sympathetic European position, Italy would not have dared to act aggressively in violation of international treaties. The Ottoman Government knew, however, that it was still in need of European political and economic support and could not therefore afford to enter into a serious conflict with Europe from which the Ottomans would have emerged the major victims. Consequently, public criticism by the Ottoman Government of the West was relatively mild; ministers blamed the Europeans with responsibility for the invasion only during closed government meetings and in private conversations with Western ambassadors in Istanbul, but no official, public protest was issued. Official spokesmen were therefore restrained in their announcements, but the press did not feel itself to be constrained. Since there was strict government censorship on news and views, the publication of criticism on the European position towards the Italian invasion of Libya could be seen as the result of a tacit government agreement.

Despite the Ottoman leadership's belief that the European Powers were capable of protecting Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity, there were those who doubted European readiness to fulfill obligations. A short while before war broke out, the Grand Vezir, Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa, was of the opinion that the Powers could prevent an invasion. In a conversation with the German Ambassador in Istanbul on 11 September 1911, he said that Italy might attack Libya if the Powers did not veto it. He believed that secret agreements existed between the Powers and Italy regarding Libya, but he did not think that the strengthening of Italy would be to either side's benefit. It was quite clear to him that at the decisive moment the Powers would not prevent an Italian move.[2] The Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, told the German Ambassador when war broke out that the Empire was aware of inter-European agreements that would allow Italy to act in Libya and that would leave the Ottomans powerless.[3] He felt that the

West had betrayed the Empire although it had introduced far-reaching political, social and economic reforms, some of which had been forced upon it by the West. The Powers were not ready to help the Empire in time of need and when the interests of the Ottomans and a European nation clashed. The minister argued that although the Ottoman regime was constitutional, parliamentary and liberal, and that the army was not involved in politics, the West was forsaking it.[4] Mahmud Şevket Paşa later told the British Ambassador: "...England and France were responsible for the war, and a word from either would have been sufficient to stop it". The Ambassador reported that within the Ottoman leadership it was believed that these two European Powers had given Italy a free hand in Libya.[5] During governmental and parliamentary discussions the opinion was expressed that Europe would not make the slightest effort for the sake of the Empire and would instead try to solve the crisis in Italy's favour. At a secret parliamentary meeting held on 18 October 1911, the new Grand Vezir, Said Paşa, stated that the blame rested with the "Eastern Question": Ottoman policy had not found favour with some European powers in the past, and as a result none was ready to help the Empire in its present situation; there was a tendency toward supporting Italy.[6]

Although the Ottoman administration usually argued that the West did not prevent the war, there were some who went even further in their accusations. The Foreign Minister, Asım Paşa, told the British Ambassador in the summer of 1912 that in his view the Italian Government had been persuaded by the French Ambassador in Rome, Camille Barrère, that if it did not annex Libya, Germany would. The Ottoman minister believed that the French purpose in this was to weaken the "Triple Alliance" (Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy) by embroiling one of its members -- Italy -- in an endless war. The minister stated, however, that his countrymen still believed that there was some sense of justice left in Europe and that the Powers should impose their will on Italy to bring about a peace which would not humiliate the Ottomans.[7] It is true that on the eve of the invasion of Libya there were rumours in Italy concerning German plans regarding Libya (due to the Aghadir incident), but German activity in Libya was limited. Previously, both Germany and the Ottoman Empire had

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denied similar rumours, but they did not blame another party for spreading them. It is possible that the criticism of France in the summer of 1912 was caused, inter alia, by the difficulties the Ottomans were encountering in mobilizing funds in France at a time when Italy, too, was trying to raise funds there in order to cover its growing expenses caused by the war. An early hint regarding the French position and an Ottoman attempt to explain it through the European balance of power had already been provided in summer 1911. The Ottoman Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, Sayf al-Din Bey, reported to his government that in the view of the French Ambassador to Rome, Italy was entitled to some kind of compensation in the Mediterranean following French-German negotiation on Morocco and the French-Italian agreement of 1904.[8] There was, however, no outright accusation. Another hint concerning the part played by France in a possible conspiracy with Italy against the Ottomans can be seen in the words of Salih Bey, the chief of the Grand Vezir's bureau. According to him, the Ottoman Government first became aware of the Italian ultimatum indirectly -- from a report by the Ottoman Ambassador to Paris -- even before the ultimatum reached Istanbul. Since the ultimatum was known of in Paris before it was presented to the Ottoman Government, the latter concluded that the Italian and French Governments had coordinated their positions on the invasion of Libya.[9] These accusations represent an exception to the general Ottoman line of argument against the Powers; but they were neither presented officially nor announced publicly during the war period.

The Ottoman ministers did not make public their views concerning the responsibility of the Powers for the Italian invasion of Libya, and their accusations were not usually far-reaching. They did not explain clearly why the "betrayal" had taken place, apparently because such explicitness might have removed the basis for cooperation with Europe. The press, however, was not inhibited and mirrored what Ottoman politicians and public figures thought. Many of the references in the press were accurate: they claimed that there was no substance to the international treaties guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, that nothing was being done in order to enforce their implementation, and that this truly

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reflected the attitude of Europe towards the treaties and the Empire. The Ottomans saw the invasion of Libya as being not an exceptional event but, on the contrary, as part of a general attitude towards the Empire in which international agreements to keep the status quo were designed primarily for the benefit and interests of the Powers, not for the Ottomans. So long as the territorial integrity of the Empire was imperative because of the European balance of power, the Empire did not face any danger of splitting up. However, when the cutting off of a part of the Empire did not shake this balance but in fact served to compensate one element of it in view of the achievements of the others, Europe did not object.[10]

2. The Errors of the Previous Government

a. **Political Errors**

The Italian invasion of Libya led to the resignation of the government of Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa and the establishment of a government headed by Said Paşa in Istanbul. Various political figures, including members of parliament, blamed the previous government, and especially its head, with direct responsibility for the failures which brought about the Italian invasion of Libya. The CUP blamed the government, but was also blamed by its own political enemies for the situation. In spite of the establishment of a parliamentary committee of investigation to find those responsible for the invasion, no one was officially blamed and most members of Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa's government were absolved.

Even before the invasion of Libya, voices were raised in accusation against the Empire itself, blaming it with responsibility for the deep Italian penetration into Libya and its increased appetite. A "Call to Ottoman Patriots" issued in mid-September 1911, stated that the frequent administrative changes in Libya proved to the whole world how unimportant the region was to the Ottoman Government.[11] It was further claimed that although the various treaties signed by the Empire were designed to protect it, they in fact enabled Italy to penetrate into Ottoman territories and start

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large-scale and undistrubed economic activity. Thus, for example, Italian engineers made a minerological survey of the Libyan hinterland and it was later claimed that this was a disguise for the planning of a military invasion. On another occasion,[12] it was stated that since the return of the 1876 Constitution the Ottoman Government had followed a naive policy of exaggerated amity towards the Powers, granting opportunities on a wide scale for foreign penetration and activity in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Government was accused of not taking any real measures when it was confronted with this growing economic penetration.[13] This situation was not characteristic of Libya alone; foreign penetration there was no greater than in other parts of the Empire. Various surveys were even conducted in a more radical and comprehensive manner in other regions. Furthermore, administrative changes in Libya were not more frequent than in other Ottoman provinces. Nevertheless, it is true that by comparison with other districts Libya was neglected and backward, mainly due to its remoteness, isolation and demographic composition. These, however, were not the factors that caused the Italian invasion.

The campaign against Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa's government was conducted by two Tripolitanian Members of Parliament, Sadiq and Naji immediately after the war broke out. The two composed a long and detailed memorandum reviewing the political and military errors of the Ottoman Government which led to the invasion. They demanded that the Grand Vezir, Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa, be charged with negligence. In mid-October 1911, this memorandum was handed over to a special committee for examination of its accusations.[14] But this committee never reached the stage of drawing conclusions regarding the responsiblity for and causes of the invasion. Most of the memorandum dealt with military errors which, in the authors' view, were the direct result of a misguided policy: abandoning Libya to the Italians.

The authors of the memorandum looked upon the removal of the Governor of Tripolitania, Ibrahim Paşa (1910-11), who was a resolute governor and a devoted military commander, as a grave error. He had been very active in strengthening the military position of Libya and

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had made the political and economic penetration by foreigners, especially by Italians, very difficult.[15] It is true that the governor was removed partly as a result of Italian pressure. Yet at the same time the Italians removed their Consul General in Tripoli, Pestalozza, an abrasive personality who had often come into conflict with the Ottoman authorities. The memorandum also blamed the government for not acting swiftly enough to appoint a successor and for leaving the whole region in the hands of an unsuitable acting government. Sadiq and Naji argued that this administrative situation facilitated the Italian penetration of Libya.[16] The claim that Libya was administratively and militarily derelict was an exaggeration; but at the same time the Italians had nevertheless succeeded in forcing the removal of a governor and military commander whom they regarded as a serious opponent. Italian self-confidence thereby increased and they were strengthened in their belief that right was on their side and that they could invade Libya and do there as they wished. It should be remembered that the Ottomans did appoint a new governor for Libya — Bekir Sami Bey — who had served for a long period of time in Tripolitania, but war broke out shortly before he was scheduled to leave Istanbul for Tripoli. In the Ottoman Empire, the absence of a governor from his district even for a period of a few months was quite normal; it was not regarded as a sign of negligence.

The main charge against Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa was that although he had known from his service as ambassador to Rome and from the reports of the governor of Tripolitania and the new Ottoman ambassador to Rome about Italian activities in Libya and the preparations for an invasion, he had not initiated any preventive measures. Even when the situation deteriorated due to the Morocco crisis and fears about Libya's position increased, it was claimed that Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa was not taking any measures to strengthen Libya and the ties between it and the centre of the Empire; nor did he order Ottoman ambassadors in Europe to clarify the Ottoman position on Libya to the Powers.[17] This claim was based on some wrong assumptions. Italian plans to peacefully penetrate Libya were known to the Ottoman authorities and action had been taken to prevent such penetration. As regards the military invasion, however, there was no definite information, only rumours.

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Italian preparations for the conquest of Libya were secret and became known only when the invasion had actually started. The Ottoman Government, through its representatives in Libya, had taken a number of steps during 1911 in order to strengthen the military and administrative position of Libya and its connection with the Empire improved. Despite diplomatic activities in Europe and in Istanbul the Ottaman Government did not manage to set the Powers against Italy, not because of Ottoman inability or lack of initiative, but because the Europeans sided with Italy and disregarded the interests and well-being of the Ottomans.

The Sadiq-Naji memorandum mentioned a suspicion of betrayal by the former Grand Vezir, but neither reasons nor proof were produced to show that Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa intended to abandon Libya. One possible reason was mentioned, however, in a private conversation between Naji and the German Ambassador: it was claimed that the handing over of Libya to Italy was the result of a collusion between Italian and Ottoman "Freemasons".[18] This claim was based on the suspicion that numerous CUP members had used the secrecy of Freemasonry during the Hamidian period to conceal their underground activity. Many senior CUP members remained Freemasons even after the 1908 revolution and kept close ties with members abroad. The secrecy of the Freemasons led many to try to prove that an international conspiracy existed in which the CUP was involved. Later the Mayor of Rome (another Freemason) was also accused of collusion and calls were even heard of a Jewish conspiracy.[19] No proofs were brought forward to support either the betrayal or conspiracy theories.

The Sadiq-Naji memorandum complained about wide-scale neglect of Libya by the central government which weakened the province and its connection with the centre. It was pointed out that in the four years preceding the war there had been a severe drought in Libya that resulted in terrible hunger. The memorandum said that even after recurrent requests by reprsentatives of the local population, the Ottoman Government had sent almost no aid, in spite of parliamentary approval for such aid. Consequently, many people had emigrated to Tunisia; others had been hunger-stricken; some had died.[20] Other

reports, as well as speaking of a grave drought also note that it lasted a shorter time than was claimed and ended by 1910 and that emigration was not on a large-scale. Furthermore, the government did in fact send grain and money to help the population but this aid was not evenly divided in Libya; it mostly went to favourites of the administration.[21]

The memorandum argued that the government should have appointed to the administration in Libya those officials and officers who were well acquainted with the ways of life and language of the local population and that local dignitaries should have been appointed. The government, however, had preferred to appoint its favourites and those who bribed it. Thus, the memorandum argued, the Ottoman authorities had failed to draw the population closer to them and carry out the necessary reforms.[22] This claim, too, is inaccurate. Although there are no complete data concerning the manning of various posts, the existing information shows that many senior officials were natives of Arab districts or had served in them prior to their coming to Libya, while the middle and lower ranks were often manned by local people. Bribery had reached epidemic proportions in the whole of the Ottoman Empire due largely to the delay in the payment of salaries and their low level. It cannot therefore be claimed that the administration in Libya was much worse than in other regions, although of course its remoteness did make reforms that much slower. It can be said, nevertheless, that the local leadership, including the authors of the memorandum, sought a much deeper local involvement in government which would have brought with it political and economic benefits.

Some political elements blamed the CUP with responsibility for the invasion. The CUP, however, dismissed this claim. Talat Paşa, one of the top CUP leaders, emphasized in his memoirs that in Ibrahim Hakkı Pasa's government there were only three CUP members and they were not responsible for foreign or military affairs. He stated further that he himself and Cavid (the Finance Minister) resigned from the government before the invasion and could not therefore be held responsible for the developments that caused the war.[23] In this situation it was easier for the Young Turks, together with the

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opposition and Libyan Members of Parliament, to demand the establishment of a new government which would not contain members of the previous government. The CUP could thus comply with public pressure and demand the punishment of those responsible for errors.[24]

Nonetheless, although it was not a CUP government the public regarded the Young Turks as the power behind the scenes. This apparent contradiction can be clarified by examining the patterns of CUP activity at the time. In spite of its great power, the CUP refrained for a long time (until the "coup d'etat" of Enver in January 1913) from exercising its power in the government and instead acted behind the scenes when most of the ministers, including those in senior positions, did not come from its ranks. This behaviour apparently stemmed from a feeling that its members were not yet qualified to rule the country openly through the existing political system and this led the CUP to make use of the prestige and experience of veteran statesmen who were close to it in ideology. In so doing the CUP was able to direct policy on the course that suited it, but at the same time to wash its hands of any responsibility in time of distress.

During the Turkish-Italian War the course of the Young Turks' policy was questioned and the reforms initiated by the CUP seemed to the public to be one of the main factors which brought about disaster because they enabled and encouraged foreign customs and citizens to penetrate the Empire. Such penetration increased the desire of the Powers to actually rule over the Empire. As a result of this development, the war led to a drop in the CUP's popularity and strengthened its political rivals.[25]

The CUP for its part regarded the Italian invasion as a provocation to its very existence, not only as an act of aggression against the Empire. The CUP regarded the war as an attempt to conspire against its political and social policies whose implementation in the Empire Italy opposed.[26] An examination of Italian policy shows that the invasion was primarily meant to occupy Libya. But it is also true that the Italian Government rejected the political might and militant nationalism of the CUP which made European penetration of the Empire

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very difficult. Italy had hoped that the Ottoman regime would weaken, come to its senses and not oppose further penetration.

b. Military Errors

Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa's government was accused of making many military errors which enabled the Italians to invade Libya and which caused the Ottoman defeat.[27] A frequent claim was made that in spite of the tremendous importance of a large, strong navy to protect the links between the centre of the Empire and outlying districts as well as the long coasts, the navy was neglected. The Ottoman's maritime inferiority to Italy meant that the latter was given a free hand in the whole of the eastern Mediterranean. The Italians later put a stop to almost all Ottoman attempts to infiltrate Libya from the sea and they also bombarded Ottoman ports outside Libya, an action that the Ottoman Navy was unable to prevent. It was further claimed that the existence of foreign instructors (mainly British) had weakened the capability and motivation of the Ottoman Navy.[28] But the truth was that Ottoman naval inferiority derived mainly from the prolonged negligence during the Hamidian period. Since the Young Turks revolution various governments had tried to rehabilitate the navy by ordering modern ships, updating existing ones and training crews. In order to bring the Ottoman Navy up to Western standards, lengthy training under the supervision of European experts and the acquisition of modern ships in European shipyards were necessary. The three years between the Young Turks revolution and the Italian invasion did not suffice to complete the process of modernizing the Ottoman Navy.[29]

Most accusations were directed at the military power in Libya itself. The first article in the memorandum which was presented to the Ottoman Parliament concentrated on the reduction in military manpower in Libya. It was claimed that during the Hamidian period some 15,000-20,000 regular soldiers had served in Libya, in addition to some 40,000-50,000 local fighters from the Hamidian units who received military training. It was also said that under Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa's government there had been grave negligence, that the budget of Libyan

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units had been cut, that local fighters had not been trained and that many regular soldiers had been transferred to Yemen to put down a rebellion and that they had not been replaced. The cavalry had also been reduced to about half its previous size.[30] The numbers mentioned in the memorandum are inaccurate and are much higher than the optimal situation during the Hamidian period when there were no more than 10,000 soldiers. There was a drop in numbers, but it was gradual and had already started in the Hamidian period, not in the years before the Italian invasion. Soldiers were indeed transferred to Yemen, but similar stansfers were also made from other Ottoman districts; it was not a case of scheming against Libya. In late 1911 the organized and trained Ottoman force in Libya numbered some 5,000 men. During the Hamidian period there was no extensive local force, apart from the Kuloğlu units which were disbanded in 1892.[31]

Another accusation concerned the non-mobiliztion of the Libyan population. It was claimed that since the renewal of parliamentary life in the Empire, the Libyan people (al-sha`b al-Tarablusi) had demanded that the central government should recruit it into the Ottoman Army and it sent numerous memoranda to press this issue. The Ottoman Parliament finally allocated some money to finance the operations of a recruitment committee, but it was sent to Libya long after it had been approved. The memorandum claimed that the committee only succeeded in mobilizing 3,400 men out of 16,000 men of recruitment age. The others, in spite of recurrent pleas, were not even mobilized as volunteers and this dampened their enthusiasm for enrolling in the Ottoman Army. Another claim was that the government had neglected the establishment of the reserve force (redif) in Libya.[32] However, although it is possible that a section of the local Libyan leadership understood the need for local mobilization for the Ottoman Army, most of the population opposed it. From the late-nineteenth century all Ottoman governors of Libya who had tried to recruit the local population had become entangled in lengthy conflicts with the population, and these had often developed into violent outbursts. Only in 1911 did it become possible to mobilize the population. It should also be taken into account that the recruitment method in the Empire was to enroll only about one-tenth of those

eligible. The Ottoman authorities wanted to put an end to the use of volunteer soldiers who held various kinds of arms and did not take orders from the state army command, but whose loyalty was primarily to pheir tribal chiefs. This is why the local governors tried to abolish the volunteer units and to keep within a military framework only those actually recruited.[33]

The Sadiq-Naji memorandum also objected to the composition of the army in Libya, following the removal from it of Arabs. It claimed that while the designs of the Italian enemy necessitated the posting of Arab (including local) officers well-versed in the local language and customs to lead the population in times of need, the government had removed Arab officers from the region and had instead stationed a limited number of substitutes who lacked the proper qualifications. As a result, the local population, which was armed and trained, could not function properly because of poor communications with the Ottoman command and lack of real acquaintanceship.[34] Existing data do not show whether the number of Arab officers in Libya dropped more in the Constitutional period than in the Hamidian period. But it is clear that during the Turkish-Italian War Arab officers and officers who had served in Arabic-speaking districts were stationed in Libya. Descriptions of the war note that tribal and Sanusi chiefs who served by the side of Ottoman officers mediated between the Ottomans and local fighters. Difficulties in communications stemmed mainly from differences in military conception.[35]

The army's equipment in Libya was also criticized. The government was blamed for the fact that more than 40,000 Martini and Schneider rifles which had been in use in Libya during the Hamidian period were removed from Libya on the pretext that it was necessary to acquire more modern arms, but no modern weapons were sent. Data on arms in Libya shows that the total number of arms held by the Ottoman Army during the Hamidian period was less than that mentioned above, and that the number of rifles taken out of Libya in order to re-enforce the army in Yemen or to be replaced did not exceed 10,000. Shipments of modern arms reached Libya, albeit infrequently, until the very eve of the Italian invasion. There were not great numbers of arms in Libya

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and most of what there was needed updating, but the memorandum tended to exaggerate on this issue, as on others.[36]

It was also claimed that the Hamidian regime had missed no opportunity to send arms, including heavy weapons, to Libya in spite of the many political obstacles whereas the Constitutional Government, which did not face similar difficulties, nevertheless refrained from arming Libya although the parliament was not parsimonious in granting arms permits and providing the necessary funds to that end. Again, however, the claim is not well-founded. Heavy arms in Libya were few and old, and even during the Hamidian period the authorities had not sent in new shipments on a regular basis. Furthermore, during the Constitutional period wide-scale planning for the fortification of Libya was undertaken but time did not permit such plans to be materialized.[37]

The last accusation in the memorandum concerns intelligence. Here it was claimed that the government had not given sufficient warning to the administration and army in Libya, nor had it ordered measures to be taken, nor had it supplied the necessary finances and equipment to prevent the invasion.[38] Yet clear information concerning military preparations for invasion reached the Ottoman Government only a short time before war broke out and thus came as a surprise to all. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the population and government in the Empire in general and in Libya in particular had not forseen -- and for a long time at that -- a possible Italian invasion; it was its timing that took all by surprise. The short period of warning did not make it possible to send in large supplies of military equipment and personnel. Nevertheless, the arms boat "Derna" did manage to reach Tripoli from Istanbul and its cargo was hastily distributed among the army and population.

The debate on the causes of the invasion had two foci: blaming the West and self-castigation at the political and military levels. There was some truth to each, and each added a little to the possibility of a war breaking out in Libya, but all in all they were secondary factors. The European Powers were not the cause of the war

and could not stop Italy if they had wanted to, which they did not. The errors of the Ottoman Empire were also not the real causes of the war, although they made the Italian invasion easier. The Empire was neither in the political position, nor had the military might to deter an invasion. Only the European balance of power prevented further gnawings at Ottoman territory. Italy wanted to establish an empire and all means were fair means as long as this end was achieved. That Europe did not want to prevent Italy from achieving its aim, and that the Ottomans were unable to stop it, only made the decision to invade and the invasion itself easier for Italy.

B. The Obligations to become Involved

1. The Religious Connection

Libya, which prior to the Turkish-Italian War was a remote and forgotten region isolated from the centre of the Ottoman Empire, suddenly turned into an Ottoman and international focus of interest. This quick change in the region's importance led many Ottoman statesmen, officers and intellectuals to state repeatedly that Libya was an inseparable part of the Ottoman Empire, bound to it by strong and varied ties. Much emphasis was placed on the close religious ties uniting the whole of the Moslem world which obliged all Moslems and especially the Ottomans, to protect Libya -- a Moslem region harmed by non-Moslems. Even official spokesmen of the CUP used this argument, although the founders of the movement -- before it eventually took power -- had been inclined to secularisim. This change of view was part of a process which followed the 1908 Revolution. When it reached power the CUP felt the need to compromise and relax its political positions. One expression of this change was the continued use of the traditional religious outlook in order to avoid unnecessarily increasing internal friction. Moreover, the religious concept was better understood by the population than were modernistic national ideas. Consequently, the regime regarded Islam and the Caliphate as unifying factors for national consolidation.[39]

The war was usually defined as a Holy War (Jihad, Jihad muqaddas) and the warriors as participants in a Holy War (mujahidun). These concepts were real: the battle was viewed by political leaders, intellectuals, citizens and fighters alike as a war of Islam against Christianity and the new Crusader policy.[40] These expressions were also used by the population of Libya.[41] Enver Bey and other volunteer officers too, stated that Islam was the main factor which motivated them to volunteer and fight in Libya; they regarded it as the realization of their religious and moral duty.[42] Members of Parliament also used religious terms in their debates and publications on the war, as did members of the ruling Ottoman dynasty.

The religious connection was the most common and best understood link among the inhabitants of the Empire, including Libya. Religious intellectuals went so far as to claim that there could be no Ottomanism without Islam and that the relationship between the Moslem and non-Moslem world should be viewed as a permanent religious struggle.[43] The Ottomans believed that the whole Moslem world was on their side -- morally and economically -- in their struggle in Libya and they called on it to support them.[44] The number of non-Ottoman Moslem volunteers who joined the fighting in Libya was not large but the moral support of the Moslem world in the Empire was great. Furthermore, in some countries, notably India, Egypt, England and South Africa, collections were made for the fighters in Libya, large sums of money were handed over and proclamations of support and encouragement were often voiced. It was repeatedly emphasized that despite the many ethnic and linguistic differences among the Moslems it was necessary to bridge the divisions and differences by recognizing the exclusiveness of Islam in order to realize common interests.[45] The religious character that was given to the war was also brought about by Italian steps: the Catholic Church and the Pope blessed the Italian fighters and praised God for helping them to replace the Crescent with the Cross in Libya. Symbolic Christian actions in Libya during the war and the continuous involvement of the Vatican's agency, Banco di Roma, in Libya from the beginning of the twentieth century also strengthened the feeling of Moslem unity against Christianity.[46]

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Libya was the last Ottoman stronghold in Africa. As part of the Caliphate and the only independent Moslem region in the continent, it had served Sultan Abdül Hamid II as a springboard for activities elsewhere. Libya's fall into Christian hands could therefore stop such Moslem-Ottoman expansion and hasten Christian-European activity in Africa. It was feared that such a development would create a feeling of political and religious worthlessness among the Moslems in Libya, Central Africa and even in other confrontation regions of the Moslem world. This fear was partly responsible for the Ottoman-Sanusi cooperation against French expansion in Equatorial Africa; it also highlights the importance of religious rivalry at the time, and especially to the Sanusis, who had previously had reservations about connections with the Ottomans due to the latter's Western and secular tendencies. The loss of Libya to Christianity was regarded by Arab and African Moslems as a betrayal both of them and of Islam. The Ottoman leadership aware of the negative effect that such feelings might have on the position of the Empire and the institution of the Ottoman Caliphate, was moved to appear and act as the defender of the Moslem world.[47]

2. The Ottoman Connection

A distinctive current in the Young Turks policy was the development of an Ottoman national identity based on the accelerated Turkification of the population. A feeling of mutual responsibility toward all the components of the Ottoman homeland was not prevalent among all the populace, but it was often raised by intellectuals and politicians who supported the concept of Ottoman nationalism. The importance of this framework was that it included non-Moslems whom the Moslem religious connection did not include. Numerous statesmen stressed the Ottoman national connection. In the Sultan's speech that opened parliament soon after the war started, it was stated that it was the obligation of the entire population to unite in the interests of the whole Empire, its integrity and well-being.[48]

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CUP members and their press took the same line. Its expression came to the fore at CUP congresses which were convened during the war. Speakers emphasized that all those living in the Empire were in the same boat; the population was therefore obliged to protect the integrity of its homeland, the prerogatives of the Caliphate and the national honour, even when it came to a small, remote region. The entire nation (millet), Moslems and non-Moslems alike, was defined as soldiers who were in protection of the homeland (vatan) which was facing a common danger.[49] The CUP mobilized numerous volunteers to fight in Libya and to help the casualties. It spread manifestos, held public meetings and organized wide-ranging activities in its clubs across the Empire in support of the struggle. The CUP also went to pains to stress that this was not limited, factional activity but instead a national undertaking that bridged ideological, social and economic barriers.[50]

The declarations of encouragement and support by Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals to the population of Libya often emphasized that Libya was an integral part of the Ottoman homeland and were often couched in nationalistic terminology.[51] The speakers quite frequently used the combination "religion and homeland" (din ve-vatan). There was no disagreement about the fact that for most of the population the religious connection was the most important and best understood component of the relationship. By bringing these two links together, the speakers apparently tried to strengthen the national link and make it more acceptable by presenting it as parallel and equivalent to the religious link. This gave a religious aspect to the national connection and thus strengthened its position among the Moslem population. On the other hand, this linkage could have weakened the authenticity of the national connection among the non-Moslem or non-religious population, which was accustomed to view the Ottoman state as a Moslem one, where "religion and state are twins".

In accordance with the Ottoman connection, there was a belief that any concession over Libya and the position of the Ottoman regime there could lead to the collapse of Ottoman authority in other regions in the Empire.[52] Ottoman spokesmen rarely raised this point before

Ottoman audiences in order to avoid increasing internal controversy, but they were very well aware of the possibility and were especially worried with regard to its Arab context.

3. The Arab Issue

The beginnings of an Arab national awakening and attempts to consolidate an Arab bloc in the Ottoman Parliament influenced the attitude of the Ottoman Government towards the struggle in Libya. Shortly after the Italian invasion, Ottoman statesmen, speaking in camera, said that the Empire could not surrender over Libya -- an Arab region -- lest it cause a collapse in all the Arab districts under its rule.

In a conversation between the British Ambassador to Istanbul and a former Grand Vezir, Hilmi Paşa, the latter said that "the government here, which is already being accused of being too Ottoman and too much inclined to neglect the interests of the other races of the Empire, especially the Arab, could never agree to relinquish an Arab province to a Christian Power. It would mean the rising en masse of all the Arab provinces of the Empire against the Government".[53] A similar opinion was voiced by the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Asım Bey, to a Romanian diplomat. The latter "had gathered... that there was a difficulty which appealed to Moslem instincts about making any surrender in Tripoli, arising from the fact that quite independently of the Senoussi sect, there were groups of Arabs there who were prepared to dispute the title of the Sultan to the Khalifate, and the abandonment of an Arab province by Turkey would probably be the signal for the raising of claims which would disturb the Islamic world".[54] The Ottoman Foreign Minister had also expressed this view to the British Ambassador in Istanbul: "...Turkey could not propose a cession of her territory, which would bring about a general upheaval in her Arab provinces which would give encouragement to Greece and Bulgaria".[55] Russia too, was aware of the Ottoman position following a conversation between its Foreign Minister and the Ottoman Ambassador in Petersburg. The Ambassador stated that his country would never agree to an arrangement under which it would be obliged to separate

itself from one of its Arab provinces in return for financial compensation. The Ambassador stressed the negative implications that this move would have on other Arab regions in the Empire.[56] This delicate situation was also explained to France by the Ottoman Foreign Minister who told the French Ambassador in Istanbul that his country rejected a cease-fire because it feared it would lose phe esteem of the Arabs: any arrangement that did not protect the Ottoman future in Libya and the status of the Arabs there would be regarded as a betrayal of Islam and the right of the Ottomans to the Caliphate and this might have negative effects on the Empire and the Moslem world.[57]

The Ottoman government's fear was not without foundation. At the start of the war the representatives of the Arab bloc in the Ottoman Parliament had already stated that if Libya surrendered, the Empire might also lose Syria, the Hijaz and Iraq. This aroused great concern among the Arab deputies.[58] This feeling probably hastened the separate coalescence of the Arab deputies in parliament, in the CUP and in the Party for Decentralization.

The longer the war dragged on and the more evident the need became to reach some kind of an agreement with the Italians, the greater was the Ottoman Government's fear that its image among the Arabs would be destroyed; it thus felt obliged to explain its stand, especially to the fighters in Libya. As with its previous expressions on the subject, so too in summer 1912 the government did not discuss its position in public. The Ottoman Government wanted to send a mission to Libya to mollify the Arabs there and persuade them to agree to the proposed arrangement. The Italian Government was highly suspicious of Ottoman covert intentions and feared that such a mission would be used to encourage the local population to continue its struggle against Italy.[59]

Fear of Arab reaction was one of the reasons why, on the face of it, the Ottoman Empire did not surrender Libya to Italy but instead granted autonomy to its population and pulled out the Ottoman Army, leaving behind only a symbolic Ottoman presence. Even after the peace

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treaty with Italy had been signed, the Ottoman Government tried to maintain its relations with the Arab population of Libya, giving as a pretext its wish to mollify them and persuade them to obey the Italian authorities.

4. The Resistance Capability

There is a marked contrast between the public declarations of the Ottoman Government and the actual governmental and military appreciations as expressed in closed discussions and private and secret reports regarding the capability of the Ottomans to resist the Italians in Libya, the prospects of the former to win the war and their readiness to fight to the end. The official Ottoman position -- which was the only one advocated in public -- expressed absolute confidence in Ottoman ability to overcome the Italians and refused any compromise or concession. Until the signing of the peace treaty with Italy, there were only self-assured announcements in the Empire with regard to Ottoman achievements and chances in the struggle. Information from behind the scenes shows that the belief in the desirability of the struggle was not unanimous.

The local fighters in Libya were the most insistent about continuing the fight against the Italians even if Ottoman military-political backing was not forthcoming after Ottoman concessions. Their enthusiasm spread to the Ottoman Army in Libya, part of which had gone there voluntarily, deeply convinced of the necessity of the struggle and confident in their ability to win the battle. According to post-war reports, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the Commander of the eastern front of Cyrenaica, had reservations about the way the campaign was being conducted; soon after reaching the region he came to the conclusion that the struggle was futile. When he realized that he could not change the course of the campaign and saw that the situation was static, he thought it preferable to move the emphasis to the European front which was the more important and decisive for the fate of the Empire.[60] Although these evaluations did not find expression in contemporary sources, the fact that Mustafa

Kemal differed from Enver Bey, the Commander of Cyrenaica, was already known during the war.[61]

Senior military men in government and elsewhere were aware of the campaign's futility and the impossibility of reaching a decisive victory. Gazi Muhtar Paşa, a renowned Ottoman commander who did not hold a government position when the war broke out, expressed his reservations at the start of the campaign. He stated that since there was no possibility of sending reinforcements to Libya, any attempt to protect the region was futile.[62] Two ministers with distinguished military backgrounds, the Minister of War Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the Minister of the Navy Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, were the only ones who immediately acknowledged in camera that there was no chance of winning and that it was better to make efforts to reach a cease-fire as soon as possible. According to the British Ambassador in Istanbul, a similar view also prevailed in the army, even though there were officers who volunteered to go and fight in Libya.[63] The Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, was in a difficult position because he headed his ministry before and after war broke out, and a certain degree of blame for the poor military situation in Libya and the Empire as a whole was attached to him. Apparently for that reason, the Minister of War was not eager to stress his reserved professional opinion, which was out of line with the enthusiasm and self-assurance that characterised the public position, especially as expressed by CUP members in the government.[64] The German Ambassador in Istanboul took an even more extreme view than his British counter-part with regard to the isolation of the Minister of War. According to him, senior officers dissociated themselves from the views of the minister and even held him responsible for the army's unpreparedness.[65] When hostilities in the Balkans broke out in summer 1912, Mahmud Şevket Paşa's feeling strengthened that the campaign in Libya was a lost cause and only made it more difficult to concentrate all efforts on the main battle in the Balkans.[66] This was one of the reasons for his resignation from the government on 9 July 1912.

Said Pasa, who was appointed Grand Vezir when the war broke out, also doubted Ottoman capability to resist when he came to power, and

he sought ways to end the war. Even before he had completed the formation of his government, he had begun to examine with the German Ambassador the possibilities of ending the crisis by establishing an "occupation provisoire".[67] Later on, Said Paşa expressed the hope that after gaining the confidence of parliament, he would be able to end the war as soon as possible.[68] According to the German Ambassador, the Foreign Minister-designate, Asım Bey, was also in favour of a prompt peace. The CUP, which supported the war vociferously, apparently got wind of these tendencies among senior cabinet members and started to examine the possibilities of forming a government more to its liking.[69]

From statements made by the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris on the eve of the signing of the peace treaty, it can be seen that the Ottoman Government was ready for an arrangement but feared the negative effects that this might have on the army, the harm it would do to the seemingly good position on the Libyan front, and the harm it might do to the morale of the Ottoman Army fighting in the Balkans.[70]

The Ottoman Government was aware of the fact that it would eventually have to seriously negotiate peace terms with Italy. It thought, however, that in order to achieve convenient terms for the Empire the government should be strong and that there should be a balance of power between the belligerents. The governmant regarded its own unquestioned strength and stability as being a necessary condition for achieving good terms; it could not be dependent on electoral and regional considerations of Members of Parliament. Here is one of the main reasons for the amendments in the Ottoman Constitution which were drafted in summer 1912 in order to strengthen the position of the government.[71] The government viewed as necessary a public show of unbending decisiveness to protect the honour of the religion and the homeland, and absolute confidence in the ability of the army to win in Libya and the readiness of the whole Ottoman nation to join in a lengthy effort to achieve this end. All this was done in order to try and convince the enemy that it really faced an equal opponent that was ready to fight to the end.[72] Senior politicians and professional military men in particular nevertheless realized that such pretensions

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were futile; yet for reasons of foreign and domestic prestige and out of fear of negative political reaction within the Empire, they refrained from making their views public and concealed them from the public until the last moment.

C. Violations of International Law

The diplomatic protest was one method adopted by the Ottoman Government to make its feelings felt about Italian activity in Libya, which the Ottomans defined as a violation of international law. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry sent numerous appeals to the governments of the Great Powers and friendly nations, protesting about various Italian actions and calling upon the recipients to pass these protests on to the Italian Government. The Ottomans hoped that these governments would take action to reverse the situation and support the Empire. However, the basic position of the Powers was support for Italian activities in Libya and such protests fell on deaf ears. The responses to the Ottoman appeals were vague. There was no change in the general direction of European policy.

The first Ottoman protests were lodged against the Italian invasion of Libya. The Ottoman claim was that the Italians had violated the international rights of the Empire in Libya; the Powers were requested to use their influence with the Italian Government in order to restore the situation to its former state.[73] A second wave of protests was sent following the unilateral Italian declaration of sovereignty over the whole of Libya on 5 November 1911, at a time when Italy held only a few places along the Libyan coast. The Ottoman Government vehemently protested against the annexation which it regarded as invalid from a legal and factual point of view. To the Ottomans, the annexation was an absolute violation of the most basic principles of international law and of international agreements in which Italy and the other European powers had undertaken to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Empire. Since the annexation was announced before Italy actually seized most Libyan territory, the Ottomans claimed that in practice the declaration was

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an empty one, in addition to its being illegal.[74] Another protest on the same subject was issued following the ratification of the annexation order in the Italian Parliament on 25 February 1912.[75] More protests were sent when Italy threatened the Empire and struck it in regions outside Libya. This happened following hints of a planned penetration into the Dardanelles[76] and the bombardment of Beirut.[77] The Ottomans interpreted the latter act as a sign that the Italians were despairing of taking Libya by military means and as an attempt to pressurize the Empire in other regions, which would harm not only Ottoman but European interests as well, and that as a result the external pressure on the Ottomans to concede victory to Italy would increase.

The Empire also protested against Italian actions which harmed its fighting capability. The Italian naval blockade was a severe obstacle to the sending of reinforcements to Libya. Foreign states reacted to the blockade only when it harmed them and when their ships were stopped, searched and men and equipment that were suspected as being destined to reinforce the Ottoman military formation in Libya were taken off by the Italians.[78] The Ottoman Empire was forced to accept the neutrality of various regimes; this harmed it much more than it harmed Italy. The most severe blow was the declaration of neutrality by Tunisia and Egypt, at a time when the latter was still actually part of the Empire. As a result, the transfer of men and equipment, which could have contributed to the military effort of the belligerents, was stopped. Although the Ottoman Government did not protest about the legitimacy of Egypt's neutrality, it did express its opposition to the fact that it halted the transfer of foodstuffs and cut off telegraphic connections.[79]

Other protests were directed to international bodies and complained about injuries to and maltreatment of non-belligerents. An especially strong protest was sent following the massacre in the Tripoli oasis (20-23 October 1911) when, following an attack on Tripoli by Turks and Arabs, the Italian Army slaughtered dozens of civilians, including women and children, in the oasis lying next to Tripoli.[80] There were also protests against cruel methods of

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warfare,[81] such as aerial bombardment and the use of dumdum bullets, especially when clearly identifiable Red Crescent installations were hit. These breached international conventions on war. The Italians were also accused of poisoning wells. The Europeans generally responded to all these protests with a mere confirmation of their arrival; sometimes a promise was added to try and bring the matter up with the Italian Government, but nothing substantial was ever done.

* * *

The governmental and public debate in the Ottoman Empire during the Turkish-Italian War centered on the causes of the war, the reasons for the Ottoman obligation to Libya, and denunciation of Italian violations of international law during the war. The debate included much criticism of external elements that had not prevented the war, and of internal elements too, especially those having a connection with the government that was in power when the war broke out; such elements had been ill-prepared to ward off the Italian attack. There was almost no attempt to make a thorough examination of the reasons for the position of the West and what the Ottoman Empire could have done to improve its standing in the world. There were no attempts to find solutions to the new situation once it had become apparent to the government that it could not push the Italians out of Libya. It contented itself with excuses and accusations. The Ottoman leadership tried in various ways to explain the Italian invasion of Libya and the failure of the Empire to ward off the attack, but it lacked a real readiness to come to grips with the roots of the crisis and the long-standing reasons for the shaky position of the Ottomans in international affairs from the political, military and economic aspects. The Italian invasion was merely one illustration of this. As long as the Ottoman leadership and public refused to make a thorough and frank self-examination, to draw the necessary conclusions and put them into force, there could be no possibility for the recovery of the state.

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3. The Inter-War Period: The Official Stand and the Position of the Empire in Libya

Under the peace agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Italy, the former undertook to pull out of Libya its military forces and all their equipment, as well as the administration. The Empire also undertook to try to persuade the Libyan population to end the resistance. The Ottomans pormised not to incite the Libyans to rebel and to stop support for their anti-Italian activities. The sovereignty of Libya was not defined, leaving it open to various interpretations according to the interests of the parties involved.

In the wake of peace agreement most of the Ottoman military and administrative manpower did indeed leave Libya. Nevertheless, Ottoman officers and soldiers and substantial quantities of military equipment were left there, especially in Cyrenaica. This was regarded by the Italians as a breach of the peace agreement, and they often raised the issue. The agreement allowed the Ottomans to maintain some agencies in Libya: a special representative of the Sultan (na'ib al-Sultan) and his entourage were sent to Libya shortly after the war ended. In addition, the Ottomans were allowed to appoint an Ottoman judge (qadi) in Libya to deal with all Moslem religious issues in the region. Italy feared that through the civilian Ottoman representation and especially through the religious channel, the Ottoman involvement in Libya would continue. Consequently, they tried to place various obstacles in the path of the Ottoman representatives in Libya. As time passed, the Ottomans increased their attempts to re-establish their position in Libya as a result of changes within the political and military leadership of the Empire.

A. The Reaction to the Italian Protests

The official position of the Ottoman Government was that it had put a complete stop to its involvement in the struggle in Libya. The clearest proof of this was, according to the government, the evacuation of the Ottoman Army from Libya and tne renewal of

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diplomatic relations with Italy. On 16 November 1912, the Ottoman Embassy in Rome issued a memorandum on the pull-out of the Ottoman Army. This document contained an argument that was emphasized later on: although most of the army had left Libya, it was possible that a few soldiers had privately decided to remain in Libya, and that it was not in the power of the Ottoman Government to force them to leave. The Ottoman Government had promised to act through its official representatives in Libya to remove the guns and the ammunition that had been left contrary to orders. The government had also expressed the fear that since it was the expressed intention of the leader of the Sanusiya to continue the struggle against Italy, he might seize Ottoman military equipment against the government's wish.[82] The position taken by all official Ottoman elements during the period from the end of the Turkish-Italian War to the entry of Italy into World War I was that the explicit orders given to the Ottoman Army in Libya were to leave immediately with all men and equipment; whoever was left behind was defined as violating orders and was expelled from the Ottoman Army.

In early-1913 the Grand Vezir stated that four Ottoman officers and 200 soldiers at the most remained in Libya. He claimed that the Italian impression that their number was greater derived from the fact that numerous local inhabitants wore Ottoman military uniforms which had been supplied to them during the war by the Ottoman Army.[83] The Ottoman Government, which had attempted to minimize estimates of the size of the Ottoman forces left in Libya, was soon forced to withdraw from this position in the face of numerous proofs to the contrary provided by the Italians. As a result, the Ottoman Government announced on 20 March 1913 that Ottoman officers and soldiers in Libya were remaining there contrary to orders and were no longer conncected with the Ottoman Army.[84] The Italians, however, did not believe that the connection had been severed. They claimed to have proof that when these soldiers had eventually returned to the Empire they had immediately gone back into the Ottoman Army, and that their special privileges and titles had been restored; in other words, the severance of the connection was only formal and not a real state of affairs.[85]

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In mid-1913, another change became evident in the Ottoman argument: the government acknowledged that the Ottoman force in Libya was larger than had been previously believed, and that it numbered some 300 men, but that the government had no power over them. The Ottomans continued to insist, however, that those who remained did not pose any danger to the Italian Army, which numbered tens of thousands of men.[86] When the Italian authorities presented lists of named Ottoman military personnel in Libya, the Ottoman Government replied that a thorough examination had revealed that the names did not appear in the files of the Ottoman Army and that it was possible that local rebels had dressed up in borrowed Ottoman uniforms and had assumed Ottoman names and titles.[87] Only later on did the Ottoman Government take action on this matter. It was reported that the government had asked the Sultan to issue an order (firman) commanding all soldiers and officers to immediately leave the rebels' camps and to appear before the Italian authorities in order to be sent back home.[88] It was not reported, however, that this firman was ever issued and sent to Libya, or that it had any influence whatsoever. The Italians continued to press their complaints on this issue until they declared a state of war in Libya in summer 1915.[89]

In the same way that the Ottoman Government publicly dissociated itself from those members of its army who had chosen to remain in Libya, so it also vehemently denied Italian claims that Ottoman officers and soldiers were continuing to infiltrate into Libya to aid the rebels. Members of the Ottoman Government, and especially Enver, who became Minister of War in June 1913, repeatedly declared that they understood Italy's demands and said that the prohibition on the entry into Libya of Ottoman troops was being respected.[90] Indeed, until the outbreak of World War I, there was no substantial Ottoman infiltration into Libya, but the situation changed even before Italy entered the war.

Ottoman arms and ammunition left in Libya could not be taken out except with the cooperation of those Ottomans who had remained behind as well as the local rebels themselves, who were naturally not inclined to part with such equipment. The Ottoman Government usually

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downplayed the importance of this equipment, at times even completely denying its existence.[91] Although the Italians continued to complain, it eventually became clear to them, too, that following the Ottoman Army's departure there was no real chance of evacuating the equipment. Despite the fact that the Ottoman Army needed the equipment left behind in Libya for use on other fronts, especially those in the Balkans, the Ottoman Army was motivated through and through by the feeling that it had fought a Holy War in Libya which it had been forced to abandon, and therefore wanted to continue to render support to the rebels in Libya, even if it was only by providing them with arms.

Another frequent Italian claim was that there was a continuous rebellion by the Libyans in general and the Sanusis in particular. The Italians claimed that the Ottomans were not acting vigorously enough to bring the local population to order. The Ottoman Government repeated its declared opposition to the continuation of the rebellion but stated that it was not the source of the rebels' support and could not stop it. It also expressed its readiness to send various emissaries to persuade the rebels, and especially the Sanusis, to end the rebellion. Although the Italians rejected these proposals, fearing renewed direct Ottoman involvement, they did want the spiritual-religious influence of the Sultan-Caliph to spread to the Sanusis so that through this religious authority the rebels would be persuaded to lay down their arms and accept the new political order.[92]

The Italian Government also protested against various Ottoman actions connected with Libyan refugees. Italy opposed their settlement in Syria, fearing that they would incite the local population to organize subversive activities against Italian targets and nationals. Italy suggested solving the Libyan refugee problem by absorbing them in Italy, but this was rejected by both the refugees and the Ottomans; the latter continued to regard themselves as responsible for the well-being of the refugees.[93] Italy often protested against the activities of refugees and Sanusi emissaries in Syria and Anatolia, where they spread propaganda and raised money for those fighting Italy

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in Libya. The Grand Vezir said that the monies were for religious charity and not for political or military purposes, but the Italians were not convinced.[94] The Italians feared that behind these activities were hostile intentions that were known to the Ottoman authorities, which might even be encouraging them. The Italians were unable, however, to produce substantial proof to back up these suspicions. As a cautionary measure the Italians tried to prevent the strengthening of relations between the Ottomans and the Libyan rebels; this was the main reason for Italian opposition to Ottoman plans to send conciliation missions to Libya: their members might indeed try to persuade the rebels to stop fighting, but on the other hand they might encourage them to continue the rebellion.

* * *

The official Ottoman responses to the various claims put forward by the Italians with regard to continued Ottoman involvement in Libya, during a period of peaceful relations between the two states, were evasive and, at time, false. The political and military circumstances made it difficult for the Ottoman Government to use its authority to change the situation, but usually it did not try to do so and from late-1913 onwards had planned means to renew its involvement in Libya.

B. Ottoman Official Representation in Libya

Under the peace agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Italy, the former had the right for official representation in Libya. On 15 December 1912 the ceremonial appointment of the Sultan's representative (na'ib al-Sultan), Shams al-Din Paşa, took place in Tripoli in the presence of Italian military units and local dignitaries. The representative read out Sultanic orders concerning the declaration of peace, his own appointment and the guarding of Islamic religious law in Libya on all religious issues, including personal status and religious endowments (waqf).[95]

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The Ottomans wanted to keep open a channel of influence in Libya, but the Italians were strongly against such involvement. Consequently, after the appointment of the Sultan's representative, the Italian authorities in Libya made it difficult for him and his entourage to carry out their mission. The Italians frequently protested against the contacts of the representative's first secretary, Mansur Shatwan, with local dignitaries: they feared that Mansur might incite the local population against them. This suspicion grew due to the respected position of the Shatwan family in Libya, one of whose members was imprisoned in Benghazi for hostile activities. Another brother, Yusuf, was active in Istanbul in the Pan-Islamic League, which was a vehicle for pan-Islamic activity inside and outside the Empire. Italian opposition to Mansur grew to the point where he was ordered to stop working and leave Libya. The Ottomans opposed this decision, stating that as first secretary he was employed by the Ottoman Government and it alone should be the recipient of any complaints that could lead to measures against him.[96]

The Italians did not allow the Ottomans to appoint a judge in Libya, although this had been agreed upon in the peace agreement. The Italian restrictions were never final, nor principled; they always related to specific points: at first they claimed that the hostilities in Cyrenaica had no ceased and that cooperation there between the Ottomans and the rebels was continuing. Later on they brought up a legal argument: whereas the candidate for the position of judge belonged to the Hanafi school, most of the population in Libya was Maliki. The Ottomans, who used to appoint Hanafi qadis in all their provinces, whether Hanafi or not, agreed according to custom that the qadi would have local Maliki deputies (nuwwab) who were acquainted with the local customs and dialects and who would take on most of the actual judicial work. The Ottomans said that in fact there were no substantial differences between the four legal schools with relation to basic religious principles. They also said that there was nothing in the religious law relating to the appointment of a qadi who belonged to a school different from that of the majority of the population. The Italians, however, were unmoved. As a result, the Ottomans continued to propose candidates for the position of qadi of

Tripoli, but none was approved by the Italians.[97] The main reason was that the Italians were reluctant to allow additional channels to be created for renewed Ottoman penetration into Libya. Furthermore, the Italians feared that religious personalities would serve Ottoman chances of involvement and influence in Libya even better than civil representatives.

* * *

The official Ottoman position was that the Empire had completely cut itself off from Libya politically and militarily, that it recognized the Italian authority there, and that it dissociated itself from the rebellion. Nevertheless, various measures taken by the Ottoman regime showed that many of its members had not reconciled themselves to the political change and tried to help the rebels, although they usually did this in secret. An indication of the perplexity can be found in Ottoman administrative terminology. Despite the Ottoman-Italian peace agreement, Libya continued to be defined in official Ottoman documents as a "favoured autonomous province" (vilayet-i muhtara), a term reserved for Egypt, Samos and Lebanon -- districts that were undoubtedly under Ottoman sovereignty but which had a large degree of administrative autonomy. Jurists of the Ottoman Government said that the Sultan had indeed granted autonomy to the two Libyan provinces, and that Italian protests were therefore unjustified.[98]

C. Ottoman Aid to Libya

Outwardly, the Ottoman authorities attempted to absolve themselves from responsibility for the continuous rebellion in Libya. The Ottomans claimed that the war had been renewed by the Arab people which had been unified during the struggle and which now led the campaign independently.[99] But in fact, the Empire continued to support the combatants in covert ways. The most common method was for the Ottoman Government to transfer through the Sultan's representative a monthly grant in the sum of 60,000 Ottoman pounds to the families of

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the fallen, to pensioners and their families.[100] Given the close relations between the population in the region under Italian control and the rebels, it was very difficult to prevent the transfer of part of this financial aid to the rebels.

Further proof of support but of a different kind can be found in the diary of the Ottoman Grand Vezir and Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa.[101] On 28 April 1913 he noted that a few thousand gold coins had been sent in the Sultan's name to the leader of the Sanusiya who, he wrote, was continuing his war against the Italians. The minister noted that the money had been sent by the Sultan — in his capacity as Caliph of all the Moslems — to aid those in need within the framework of his religious obligations. Although no other facts are available on Ottoman aid in this period, it would be reasonable to say that if Mahmud Şevket Paşa, who had been sceptical about the results of the Turkish-Italian War, approved of this aid, then so did Enver Paşa, who succeeded him as Minister of War in June 1913. Enver was greatly interested in the rebellion from the period that he served in Libya, and he tried to use his good relations with the local population and the pan-Islamic organs which he had helped establish in order to benefit the struggle.

* * *

During the period between the Turkish-Italian War and World War I, the Ottoman Government made attempts to explain its actions and faults relating to its involvement in Libya — usually following Italian complaints. In contrast to the war period (1911-12), there are no official or press statements concerning the link between the Empire and Libya and the obligations of the former to the latter, nor are there any overt expressions of the Empire's aspiration to regain its sovereignty over Libya. Nevertheless, some overt and covert activities of the Empire could be interpreted as meaning that for some government circles the involvement had not ceased: Libya continued to be considered as an Ottoman district, with the Sultan's official representatives receiving regular government financial aid, and the army remnants there continued to be looked on as part of the Ottoman

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Army. This tendency was strengthened when Enver was appointed Minister of War: he had a special relationship with the region and realized that it would be possible to harness the anti-Italian struggle in Libya to pan-Islamic activity to produce an Ottoman initiative against the enemies of the state.

4. World War I: The Alliance with Germany and the War in Libya

The Ottoman Empire's support for Germany during World War I did not derive from a planned political process. The alliance was a result of partial measures taken by both parties, and both wanted to obtain from it the maximum political and military benefits. One puropose of the alliance was to exploit the Moslem religious factor in the war effort by uniting all th Moslems under the banner of the Ottoman Caliph and inciting those Moslems under enemy rule.[102]

The Ottoman Minister of War, Enver, led those in favour of an alliance with Germany. Enver believed in Germany's military superiority over the other powers and was interested in cooperation with it. Nevertheless, he opposed German dictates to the Ottomans, or the subordination of the Ottoman Army to German command. Although the Ottomans were initially dragged into anti-Russian activities in the Black Sea, it was Enver who later on decided upon the principal military moves, and these, at times, were contrary to German views.

Both the Ottomans and the Germans were interested in activities in Libya for ideological as well as military reasons. This line of action was pushed forward by Enver who continued to seek the region's liberation from Italian occupation. The German Emperor Wilhelm, who saw himself as one of the "Protectors of Islam", was among those who pressed for the political-military use of Islam through Jihad. Even though the religious factor did not alwyas have a central place in the thinking of German statesmen and its military, they believed — as did the other European powers — that it was of central importance for the Moslems.

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The declaration of the Jihad, issued by the Ottoman Empire on 14 November 1914, was distributed all around the Moslem world. Because of the Empire's political connections it was made clear from the outset that the Jihad applied only to the enemies of the Empire, and not to the whole "Realm of War"; thus, the Jihad was not aimed at Germany or Austria, which were in alliance with the Empire, nor Italy, which until May 1915 maintained a position of neutrality between the two camps.[103] Because of Italy's relatively late entry into the war, the Ottomans were unable to openly incite the population of Libya against the Italian regime and, consequently, subversive activities were initially limited against Britain alone.

Italy, however, remained suspicious of the Ottomans despite the full diplomatic relations between the two. It was particularly wary of the motives behind measures that Enver was trying to advance and which, on the face of it, were designed to appease. In order to calm Italian fears, Enver made numerous soothing declarations. On several occasions he also sought to send delegations to Libya (some of which were to have been headed by his brother Nuri) in order to remove the obstacles with the Italians, to persuade the Sanusis to return prisoners-of-war, to end hostilities, and to make peace with Italy. The Italians, suspicious of Enver's intentions, refused to let any Ottoman delegation into Libya.[104] The Ottoman leadership acknowledged that various actions were being undertaken against Britain, which was at war with the Ottomans, and that if Ottoman agents in Libya were acting against Italy, then they were doing so of their own accord or because of British instigation and bribery. Italy, however, was convinced that the Ottomans exerted a strong influence on the Libyans and it asked them to use it to persuade the rebels to end their objections to Italian rule. Italy preferred communications between the Ottoman regime and the Libyans to be through the Sultan's representative who resided in Tripoli and who was under Italian surveillance, and not through independent delegates. The Ottomans, not wanting to arouse Italian suspicion, acted as if they were ready to agree to this.[105] They asked the Sultan's representative to pacify the Libyans over the declaration of a Jihad because it had aroused strong

feelings in the Libyan population and revolts broke out again in Tripolitania.[106]

The population in Libya, and especially the Sanusiya, took the call for a Jihad at face value — to fight all the enemies of Islam. In Libya it meant fighting primarily the Italians, but also the British and the French. The call for a Jihad fell on fertile ground militarily, politically and socially and spread through Libya. The Ottomans were pleased but did not want to endanger their seemingly good relations with Italy and provoke the Italians into a military reaction that would enlarge the Ottoman front. The Ottomans were therefore forced to act against their true intentions and calm Libyan enthusiasm.

On 2 December 1914 the Sultan's representative read out a cable to the Moslem clergy of Tripoli from the Grand Vezir which stated clearly that the Jihad was only aimed against those Christian powers which were at war with the Ottoman Empire (Russia, France and Britain); it did not include Italy, with which the Empire continued to have cordial relations and which was an ally of the Empire's allies (Germany and Austria).[107] Such declarations soothed Italy which hoped that the Moslem clergy, whose influence over the population was considered to be great, would be able to prevent a deterioration in Libyan-Italian relations and might even manage to improve them. However, the influence of the urban clergy in Libya was much smaller than that of the religious orders and especially the Sanusiya; the latter supported the rebellion even before the Ottoman declaration of Jihad. Consequently, the Ottoman cable had very little influence on the population.

Ottoman activity until mid-1915 continued on two parallel courses: attempts at reconciliation with Italy, and the dispatch to Libya of secret agents to incite and organize the population against Italy and Britain. Following Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Ottomans' enemies, the Empire tried for a while to hide its hostile intentions, but this was done with the sole purpose of gaining time. Thus, for example, Enver denied information that the Ottomans

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had spread circulars in Cyrenaica stating that Italy's entry into the war gave the Ottomans the right to attack it in Libya.[108] After a short while though, the Ottomans ceased the camouflage and delay tactics, and their propaganda (orchestrated with Germany) took on an overt and violent nature.

Britain, not Italy, was however the main enemy of both the Ottoman Empire and Germany because of its international status and its authority in Egypt. The struggle against Britain in this region culminated in the Ottoman-Sanusi invasion of Egypt in late-1915. Despite the fact that it was not carried out at the same time as the Ottoman invasion of Egypt from Palestine and the Sudan and did not succeed in inciting a large-scale popular rebellion in Egypt against the British, it did force the British to concentrate a large number of troups in the Western Desert. This was the main contribution of the invasion to weakening the enemy force. The invasion failed on two counts: it did not achieve its proclaimed goals, and a number of senior Ottoman officers were taken prisoner. It was these officers who switched loyalties and became dominant figures in the anti-Ottoman "Arab Revolt". But in spite of the invasion's failure, Ottoman-German support for the rebels in Libya continued, and Ottoman-Moslem incitement spread through Africa reaching the Maghreb to the north-west and Darfur in the Sudan to the south. The conspiratorial work in the French Sudan, however, was a failure from the very start.[109]

Once the Ottoman Empire and Italy were at war with each other, the Sultan's representative and his staff were returned from Tripoli to Istanbul (late-August 1915). Even before he had left, the Ottomans had made sure that they had another representative in Libya: according to a secret Sultanic order of 6 May 1915, the head of the Sanusiya, Ahmad al-Sharif, who was entitled to use the title "paşa", was appointed commander of the Moslem forces in Libya, with the rank of "vezir".[110] This appointment, as well as others which followed, shows that despite the Ottoman-Italian agreement the Ottoman Government continued to look upon Libya as an Ottoman province to all intents and

purposes, with its governors and commanders being appointed by Sultanic order.

With the exception of the first months of World War I, the period was not notable for Ottoman declarations concerning Libya, but was marked more by actions. The Ottoman Empire had set in motion large-scale activity using a small number of agents. Considerable financial aid and military and civil equipment were sent in. The Ottoman-German strategy assigned many important goals to Libya. They regarded it as an excellent springboard to penetrate French and British Africa because of its geographical proximity and the religious, social and economic ties between Libya and these regions. The Ottomans hoped to strengthen their influence throughout the Islamic world with the cooperation of the Sanusiya, which was influencial in many parts of that world. Besides using Libya as a vehicle to achieve wider regional aims, the basic objective was never abandoned -- the liberation of Libya from Italian occupation and its return to the sphere of Ottoman sovereignty.

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CHAPTER TWO: OTTOMAN INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA

1. The Bringing-in of Men and Equipment

A. The Turkish-Italian War

The declared position of the Ottoman Government during the whole of the Turkish-Italian War was that the Empire was obliged to devote all its means, including manpower, arms, armaments, military and civil material and finance, to the struggle in Libya. However, senior government members, including the Grand Vezir and the Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs, expressed their private opinion that the Ottomans stood no chance of winning the war and that it was better to end it as speedily as possible. Such a view of things determined the attitude of Ottoman decision-makers on the issue of reinforcing the Ottoman-Arab military force in Libya. The concrete support that came to Libya from Istanbul was small not only due to objective difficulties (such as the distance of the battleground from the centre of the Empire, the naval blockade that Italy placed on Libya, and the neutrality and military situation along the Libyan borders declared by France and Britain immediately when the war broke out). The Ottoman authorities viewed as wasteful the dispatch of additional fighters and equipment to continue the futile struggle in Libya. It was thought to be most undesirable in view of the severe economic situation in the Empire and more immediate and serious dangers in the Balkans. The Ottoman Government thus faced an internal contradiction: its public declarations and the policy it actually followed did not match one another; it faced in two different directions. The government was able to fulfil public expectations by passionate declarations, mass-meetings and donations in aid of the fighters while the information concerning the actual conditions of the front were scant and censured. The army, however, was not ready to accept artificial substitutes; numerous young officers, graduates of modern military institutions in the Empire and Europe were not ready

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to surrender without putting up a fight since they were convinced of their army's ability to win and were deeply imbued with a feeling of national purpose.[1]

A few dozen Ottoman officers were insistent on joining the fighting in Libya. They were even ready to disobey their superiors, whom they tried to convince of the necessity of supporting the population of Libya. Most of the volunteering officers gathered in Istanbul from where they went to Libya. There were those among them who came from other regions in the Empire and from Europe, to which they had been sent as attachés or for studies. Enver Bey was among those who pressed for reinforcements to be sent to Libya. Several young officers, including Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), discussed with Enver ways of joining the fighting in Libya. Enver also discussed the issue with the Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa. Because of the security problems involved, the latter opposed the transfer of military forces to Libya. Nevertheless, he was aware of the fact that these zealous and patriotic officers would not easily sacrifice a part of their homeland. After lengthy discussions the minister and the officers agreed that although military forces would not be officially sent to Libya, individuals would be allowed to volunteer and to infiltrate. The officers also talked the matter over with senior CUP leaders, including the former Minister of the Interior, Talat, and explained that they were resolved to go to Libya even if the Empire was unable for military and economic reasons to launch a wide-spread offensive there.[2] Following several gatherings in Istanbul and other places, Ottoman officers started to infiltrate into Libya. It was possible to penetrate Libya through Egypt and Tunisia by land, as well as by sea; there were numerous breaches of the Italian naval blockade.[3]

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1. The Egyptian Route

The policy of the British authorities in Egypt was to use all means in order to prevent the passage of men and military equipment to the belligerents in Libya.[4] Despite the neutrality that Britan forced upon Egypt, numerous Egyptians did succeed in helping the Moslem fighters in Libya. The British did not try to prevent the transfer of medical equipment and aid or economic support for widows or orphans and non-belligerents, but the Egyptians were not satisfied by this. Mass meetings and money-raising efforts in aid of the Moslems in Libya were called for all over Egypt. In addition, Egypt also served as a route for the transfer of money to Libya from the rest of the Ottoman Empire and the Moslem world.[5] There were also quite a few Egyptians who volunteered to fight alongside their Libyan brothers, but popular support in Egypt for the struggle in Libya went beyond this and consisted of economic and military support, as well as considerable help given to Ottomans trying to infiltrate Cyrenaica through Egypt. The sympathy in Egypt for the struggle in Libya encompassed the highest echelons (including the Khedive `Abbas Hilmi and Prince `Umar Tusun), the National Party, and the man-in-the-street. Of special importance was the good-will of the Border Police who did their utmost to get around their British commanders so as to make it possible for the Ottomans to infiltrate.

At the beginning of the war period the Egyptian authorities allowed individual Ottoman officers not in military uniform or carrying arms to cross the border into Libya, believing that the rules of neutrality permitted the passage of individuals. The Ottoman volunteers exploited this loophole and split into small groups or individuals. Since civilians could cross over to Cyrenaica legally with transit permits, many Ottomans declared that they were merchants or farmers going on business and their declarations were not usually checked. The officers sometimes dressed up as clergy or bedouin and joined small groups led by experienced caravan drivers who took them by remote routes. As a result, men and equipment passed through to the Turkish-Arab camp despite the official ban.

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Recurrent Italian complaints about Ottoman infiltration through Egypt and the British fear of the spread of Moslem agitation in Egypt were the main reasons behind the decision of the British authorities in Egypt to institute stricter border controls. They did not want the Italians to patrol along the Egyptian coast and check caravans on the Egyptian side of the border. In mid-December 1911, the British decided to make the collaboration between the Egyptians and the Ottoman infiltrators more difficult. All the local camel-drivers in the Cyrenaican border region, except for those stationed at the oasis of Siwa, were replaced by some 110 policemen whose headquarters were in the coastal zone. This force, which was under direct British command, manned seven posts and patrolled the coastal zone from Alexandria to Solum and occasionally went out on pursuit. The British decided to halt the movement of camel caravans to and from Libya unless they had a written permit from a British officer and a detailed certificate of transfer. The British also decided to stop the civil use of the Egyptian military telegraph which the Egyptians and Ottomans had utilized to coordinate the infiltration.[6] In addition, controls in the Suez Canal were tightened up to prevent the penetration of Ottomans from Palestine and the Red Sea region to Egypt.

The British justified this stiffening in the enforcement of the neutrality rules by reference to Ottoman infiltration into Libya that had turned from an isolate and exceptional occurrence into a regular and organized process which, as such, was a violation of the second paragraph of the fifth Hague Convention dealing with the passage of troops, and not of the sixth and seventh articles dealing with the passage of individuals.[7] When the Ottoman Government complained to the authorities in Egypt about what they regarded as unnecessary restrictions, the British replied that the passage had been forbidden only to the military and that there had not been a hardening regarding bona fide merchants and the passage of regular commodities to the civil population. The British also said that the telegraphic connection had been only partly and temporarily stopped because of misuse and that after a short while the restrictions had been lifted.[8] Some Egyptians resented the severe border controls. The Khedive `Abbas Hilmi complained to the British Foreign Minister Edward

Grey about the hardships that the war was imposing on his country, and he raised as an example the high cost of maintaining an additional police force at border posts. The British replied that neutrality was the only suitable policy in the situation since the Ottoman Navy was incapable of protecting Egypt against an Italian invasion.

Despite these obstacles, the smuggling of men and equipment from Egypt to Libya did not cease. In addition to local Egyptians who helped with the passage of Ottoman officers into Libya, some Ottoman intermediaries were sent by the CUP to Egypt to coordinate activities. The CUP took special care to ensure that these were suited to their task, knew Arabic and were experienced in organizing pan-Islamic activities.[9] The British were aware of these activities and ordered the Ottoman intermediaries to leave Egypt.

Although only a few dozen Ottoman military men passed through Egypt into Libya, their influence was great; they were able men whose feeling of a common fate was passed on to the local fighters. The infiltration started a few days after the beginning of the war and continued throughout the period of the war. Among those who passed through were Enver, Mustafa Kemal, Sulayman al-`Askari and `Aziz `Ali al-Misri, as well as two religious leaders: Emir `Ali b. `Abd al-Qadir (the son of the Algerian rebel against the French who went into exile in Damascus) and Shaykh Sharif Salih al-Tunisi, a pan-Islamic activist.[10] The collaboration of the Ottoman officers and the Egyptian smugglers resulted in the safe crossing of most volunteers. There were, however, a few Ottomans who were caught, one of the famous of them being Niyazi Bey, a hero of the 1908 revolution.[11]

The smuggling of arms, ammunition and other equipment to the Moslem fighters in Libya was of great practical importance and boosted morale. For the smuggling of contraband the Ottomans made use of local caravan drivers who were accustomed to disregarding the Egyptian-Libyan border, most of which was not marked out on the ground. Despite the Italian naval blockade, small boats did manage to infiltrate Cyrenaica: cargoes were quickly unloaded onto remote jetties near the border and were reloaded onto camels where it was

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disguised as regular merchandise, mainly grains.[12] There is little extant information on this subject and it is impossible to determine the exact amount of arms and other equipment that was smuggled in like this; but it is clear that great quantities were brought in, including several types of weapons and many bullets and shells. Although the British tried to prevent this contraband, the lines of communication improved towards the end of the war period and sophisticated equipment was used, including communications systems and motor cars.[13]

Money transfers proved to be a great source of aid. Since money was not regarded by the British as contraband[14] no measures were taken in Egypt to prevent money transfers to Libya, even when it was evident that it was intended for the fighters. The money came from the Ottoman Government and private individuals and organizations in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and the Moslem world. Some of the money was used for civilian purposes, such as support for the families of the fallen and medical aid; and some was used for military purposes, including the procurement of equipment for the army and payments to the fighters.[15]

2. The Tunisian Route

The infiltration route into Tripolitania through Tunisia was longer than the Egyptian route and passed through non-Ottoman regions little known to most Ottomans; this made the detection of the volunteers much easier. However, the main problems arose not in Europe, but in crossing the Mediterranean and in Tunisia itself. The Italians suspected that ships going to Tunisia might be carrying men and equipment destined for Libya and, as a result, the Italian Government decided that it had the right to search civilian ships. The Italian Navy, which enforced the naval blockade on the Libyan coasts, started to stop ships and examine their contents. The European states, which did not object to the blockade, protested about their ships being stopped -- France especially. The Italians were mainly suspicious of Red Crescent missions and believed that they included fighters disguised as medical personnel. Consequently, doctors and nurses had to put up with numerous obstacles during their passage, although their entry was permitted on principle.

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France, like Britain in Egypt, had declared a state of military preparedness along the Tunisian-Libyan border; Tunisia itself remained neutral. France also sent military reinforcements and coastal patrol boats to the border region to prevent the local population from aiding the fighters in Tripolitania and helping the infiltration into Libya. The French troop concentration was primarily aimed at preventing agitation by the border population which might in due course turn from resistance to the Italian invasion into resistance against the French.[16] In Tunisia as in Egypt the Libyan fighters and the Ottoman and foreign volunteers were warmly welcomed and received much help from the local population. French preventive measures made penetration difficult but could not put an end to it. The French Government continuously reinforced the infantry and cavalry units along the Tunisian-Libyan border and forbade the passage of all military men and equipment. The French stated that infiltration could not be totally prevented because of the length of the border, which in most parts was not marked and which was not closed by natural or artificial barriers. The French further claimed that the local population sympathized with the Moslem fighters in Libya and with their goals, were connected to them by family and religious ties, did not recognize the political borders between the two countries, and would continue to do their utmost to aid the fighting.

France, like Britain, had to differentiate between the infiltration of individuals and troops. Since the infiltration through Tunisia was less than that through Egypt, the measures taken to prevent it were less vigorous and resulted in numerous successful crossings. The French Government stated that the fifth Hague Convention prohibited the establishment and passage of fighting units in neutral territory but did not forbid the passage of individuals when it could not be ascertained that they acted as part of a military organization. As regards contraband, the French stated that the import and passage of arms through Tunisia had been forbidden in 1883 and that the war in Libya did not therefore necessitate any change or stiffening of regulations. The French had also forbidden the transfer of foodstuffs to the belligerents, but permitted free trade across the border between civilians. However, it was impossible to ensure that

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food or other merchandise did not eventually reach the belligerents. Italy did in fact protest about the lenient French approach which enabled the passage of necessary equipment to the Moslem fighters.

In spite of French efforts there were numerous penetrations into Libya across the long desert border. Ottomans, Maghrebis and Europeans infiltrated and weapons, ammunitions, food, money, gold and other equipment were smuggled in.[17] Among the better known personalities who used this route were Ali Fethi (Okyar), who had been military attaché in Paris and who became the acting military commander on reaching Tripolitania, and Halil (Kut), Enver's uncle. Public figures, religious personalities, merchants and the simple folk assisted in the passage of men and equipment through Tunisia and these activities were partly financed by the Ottoman authorities.[18] The infiltration route usually led through Tunis-Sfax-Gabes-Mareth-Médenine-Ben Gardane-Zuwara. Some went through Dehibat further south, or used the many small and hidden jetties along the coast. Zuwara on the western Tripolitanian coast served as an advanced Ottoman supply and communication post which prevented the Italians from hermetically sealing off the land and sea routes to Tripolitania.[19]

* * *

The passionate declarations of the Ottoman Government concerning Ottoman obligations to saving Libya, an excited public, and the devotion of young Ottoman officers to the national and religious principles upon which they had been raised — all these made it possible for the latter to join the fighting in Libya despite the reservations of several senior Ottoman statesmen. The Ottoman regime's supply to Libya of combat means as well as civil equipment and finances, though limited in measure, was of great material and moral help to the fighters. The geographic and social conditions prevailing in the border regions also facilitated smuggling.

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B. The Inter-War Period: Dissociation and Reformation

When the war in Libya was ended, the Ottoman Government's official policy was to completely dissociate itself politically and militarily from Libya while maintaining religious ties with the local population and its Moslem institutions. The Ottoman authorities often declared that they were being faithful to this policy and were following it meticulously, but as time passed they were forced to admit that they were facing serious difficulties in implementing their undertakings, especially in Cyrenaica. They did state, however, that they never deliberately attempted to violate their obligations. During the inter-war period there was an almost complete break between the Ottoman Government and the rebels in Tripolitania, but, strong political and military links were maintained with the rebels in Cyrenaica. The Ottoman regime made great use of the religious ties in order to strengthen Ottoman influence and involvement in Libya through existing institutions and new ones which were established especially for this purpose.

1. The Departure of the Ottomans from Libya

Following the end of the Turkish-Italian War, the departure of the Ottoman Army from Tripolitania was orderly and swift. When the Tripolitanians realized that they could not prevent the Ottoman departure they tried to postpone it so as to be able to collect as much military equipment as possible. Most of those departing from Tripolitania gathered in a camp near Tripoli after leaving the hinterland; many left during the night and secretly to avoid harassment from the local population. Most departed Tripoli on 8 December 1912 and 13 January 1913. They included 4,298 military and 880 civilians, as well as horses and cannons. Neşet Paşa, the supreme Ottoman commander of Tripolitania, left with the January sailing. A comparison of statistics from the start of the war shows that most of the troops left Tripolitania.[20] Small groups had earlier left through Tunisia, but that departure was disorderly and hasty and included those who wanted to reach the Balkans as quickly as possible. This group included Fethi Bey, the acting commander of Tripolitania.[21]

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From the start of the war the Ottoman involvement in Cyrenaica had been deeper. As a result, the leaderships of both Moslem parties (the Ottomans and the Sanusis) were more eager to continue their common struggle against Italy, notwithstanding the international obligations of the Ottoman Government. The Ottoman force in Cyrenaica was smaller than that in Tripolitania, but its contacts with the local leadership were stronger — a result of the personal abilities of the Ottoman officers who served there, and of their connection with the Saunsi leadership, around which the entire tribal population of Cyrenaica had rallied. Consequently, the Ottoman command in the region decided to leave most of the troops in Cyrenaica and to continue the common struggle in partnership with the Sanusi leadership and the local tribal population. The Ottoman commander of this front, Enver Bey, left for Istanbul in early-December 1912, but his ties with the region were not severed until the end of World War I. Enver's departure was coordinated with Italian representatives, and he briefed the Sanusi leadership on the reasons that compelled him to leave. He promised, however, that the region would not be abandoned. Enver appointed as regional commander `Aziz `Ali al-Misri who was left with some 800 Ottoman officers and soldiers.[22] The Ottoman presence in Cyrenaica shrank to about one-half of this size in June 1913 when `Aziz `Ali and some 400 troops left the region. Individual Ottomans left on their own, too, leaving behind a force of some 300-400 troops.[23]

2. The Bringing-in of Men, Equipment and Money

The Ottoman Government denied Italian charges and British reports concerning the continous infiltration of Ottoman military into Libya, especially to Cyrenaica. However, even according to the most serious accusations, no more than a few dozen Ottomans penetrated Libya during the inter-war period. Most reports did not give any identifying details but only general data; only very rarely did the Italians and the British support their accusations with lists of names and the ranks of officers and soldiers, but in these cases the Ottoman Government claimed that these names were not included in the army registers.[24]

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Information on arms smuggling to Cyrenaica is more varied and the Italian accusations and British reports include more details. The British were very conscious of this problem: they feared that as well as the smuggling of weapons and other military equipment into Libya, large quantities of contraband might find their way to Egypt and that this would in turn enable an armed rebellion against the British authorities. This view also took into account the fact that contacts between the fighters in Cyrenaica and the Ottomans were mostly through Egyptian nationalists, including members of the National Party. Despite all the British efforts to the contrary, arms and military equipment were smuggled into Cyrenaica by sea and land, disguised as foodstuffs. The cargo included revolvers, field and mountian guns, ammunition of various types and spare parts for the repair of defective arms.[25] In order to avoid total dependence on external supplies and to overcome temporary shortages of arms and ammunition caused by obstructions to smuggling, the fighters in Cyrenaica established workshops for the production of ammunition and the repair of arms. These workshops were operated by local inhabitants aided by foreigners (mainly Egyptians and Ottomans).[26]

The religious connection provided a means by which the Ottoman Government could legally channel funds to finance the activities of its representatives there, as well as to those appointed by it in the religious administration and for institutions connected with the Moslem endowments. Under its agreement with Italy, the government was allowed to support relatives of fallen army personnel and pay its pensioners in Libya. The Ottoman Government, not content with these channels, tried other means as well. Thousands of gold coins were sent to the Sanusi leadership on behalf of the Sultan in his capacity as Caliph (instead of in the name of the government) so that this could be explained as support from religious motives for the Moslem population of which the Caliph was the supreme religious head.[27] Financial help derived mainly from the Ottoman Government, as well as local initiatives across the Moslem world. There were continuous reports throughout the whole period on the flow of money and foodstuffs into Libya, mostly without any quantitative details. These smuggling operations were mainly conducted by means of the land route

through Egypt, but the sea route, well-known by now for the smuggling of men and arms, was also used.[28]

Apart from the months between late-1912 and early-1913 when the rebellion in Tripolitania was going on, there was almost no smuggling of arms through Tunisia to Libya; but the influx of money and foodstuffs continued unabated. Towards the end of this period there was renewed infiltration to Tripolitania of opponents to the Italian regime among the Tripolitanian exiles and foreign volunteers.[29] The assumption that there was no large-scale and serious Ottoman activity in Tripolitania is also confirmed by a statement of the Ottoman Senator of Jebel Gharbi, Sulayman al-Baruni, who resided in Istanbul after escaping from his homeland in March 1913 following the failure of the rebellion he had headed. According to him, the Ottoman Government did not fulfil the obligation it had given to support the rebels in Tripolitania and had ended its involvement in the region.[30]

3. Pan-Islamic Activity

Following the strengthening of Enver's position in the Ottoman leadership in 1913, there were increasing signs of an institutionalization of the Ottoman organization for the support of the rebellion in Libya. Since the Ottoman Empire had formally ended its involvement in Libya, including the rebellion, this organization's aims took the form of giving humanitarian aid and strengthening religious ties. In March 1913 a special committee for the affairs of Cyrenaica was established by the CUP in Istanbul. Among the members of this committee were senior CUP figures who were among its policy makers; their presence gave added weight to the activities of the committee and speeded up the implementation of its resolutions.[31] At the same time, the CUP's emphasis on Islamic aspects grew, as did its readiness to come to an agreement with the Arabs. Another organization that was established at this time was the Islamic Benevolent Society (Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i İslamiye) whose Secretary General was Prince Said Halim (who became Grand Vezir in June 1913).[32] The purpose of this society was to engage in charity work and to consolidate religious belief among all Moslems.

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On 27 September 1913, the CUP-established Pan-Islamic League (PIL) officially began its activities.[33] This organization was also referred to as the "Patriotic Benevolent Society" and the "Islamic Benevolent Society". The headquarters of the society were in Istanbul in the vicinity of the central CUP club. Its honorary president was an Ottoman Prince and its Secretary General was Yusuf Shatwan Bey of Benghazi. In its administration were prominent Islamic propagandists from the Empire and the Moslem world, as well as Egyptian, Tunisian and Indian nationalists. The declared goal of the PIL was to spread and deepen Moslem consciousness, improve youth education and strengthen ties among the Moslems. The covert political aims of the PIL became evident soon after its establishment when Yusuf Shatwan called on his co-religionists to sacrifice everything in order to save Libya. The PIL appointed those present at its founding ceremony to propagandistic jobs in their countries of origin. It decided to spread its ideas with greater emphasis in regions that were not under complete Moslem sovereignty. The PIL took a special interest in developments in Libya due to Enver's special relationship with it and the composition of the league's membership, many of which were in one way or another connected with Libya.

The PIL served as a vehicle for the Ottoman Government and the CUP leadership to implement their political and military goals in regions where they felt they had been legally prevented from interfering due to Ottoman diplomatic relations with these countries or the sovereign powers that actually ruled there. It was thus possible to explain subversive activities in friendly countries as the actions of an independent society which was not under the authority of the government; in fact, the society received generous help and backing from the Ottoman regime whose representatives held positions in its administration. A considerable part of the financing of the PIL's activities came from state sources: its budget was financed mainly through a tax of one mecidiye, which was imposed on Moslem pilgrims going to Mecca,[34] and senior statesmen donated sums of thousands of Ottoman pounds.[35]

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The PIL hoped to establish branches throughout the Ottoman Empire and the Moslem world in order to rally the Moslems around its goals, one of the more concrete of which was to increase aid to the fighters in Libya, and especially to the Sanusis. Some of the Sanusi leaders took part in this activity, working mainly in Syria and Egypt, and relying to a large extent on the Ottoman administration.[36] The PIL occupied itself in spreading pan-Islamic propaganda and inciting the population in Libya against Italian rule. To this end it distributed in Libya and other places a letter written by the Sanusi leader, Ahmad al-Sharif, as well as Islamic songs. The PIL also gave financial support to pan-Islamic periodicals, including Jihan al-Islam (the World of Islam) in Istanbul edited by Yusuf Shatwan.[37]

Following the signing of an alliance for defence and military cooperation between Germany and the Ottoman Empire in August 1914, the activities of the PIL became more rigorous. It was incorporated into subversive and instigatory efforts in enemy territories, especially after the official entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war and the declaration of the Jihad. The PIL's apparatus, which had already been active for about a year before World War I started, was exploited by the Ottoman Government to spread propaganda within the Empire and especially outside it. Italy joined the war only in May 1915, so incitement and subversion against it were carried out clandestinely up until then; formally, the PIL's activities in the Eastern Mediterranean were diverted solely against the British.

* * *

In the inter-war period the Ottoman presence in Libya shrank; the few that remained were concentrated mainly in Cyrenaica. Infiltration and the inflow of aid to the rebels greatly decreased, but from both the conceptual and practical points of view there was no genuine dissociation. As Ottoman activity in Libya declined, so the local leadership's independence and influence grew. With the strengthening of Enver's position in the Ottoman regime in 1913, pan-Islamic activity gradually increased in scale with the aim of deepening Ottoman involvement in Libya. When World War I broke out, the Ottoman

Empire had at its disposal the necessary tools for the renewal of its involvement in Libya, and Islamic subversion took on greater prominence.

C. World War I

1. Teşkilat-i Mahsusa

On 5 August 1914, three days after the defence and cooperation pact between Germany and the Ottoman Empire had been signed, the Ottoman Minister of War, Enver, gave a secret order to establish the Teşkilat-i Mahsusa (the Special Organization).[38] This organization was a mixture of an intelligence service and a network for subversion and sabotage behind enemy lines and was under Enver's direct command. The organization was built up on smaller groups which had been active since 1903 in several regions of the Empire; Enver and his followers coordinated the various phases of its establishment. Numerous Teşkilat-i Mahsusa activists fought in Libya during the war with Italy and at that time called themselves Fedai Zabitan (Self-sacrifying Officers). The early organizations and Teşkilat-i Mahsusa itself were not institutionalized bodies integrated in the regular state administration, and were financed by special budgets. The organization's activists were nominated directly by Enver according to their personal loyalty to him, their performance, qualifications and suitability for the special tasks marked out for them. Teşkilat-i Mahsusa was not subordinate to any government or parliamentary control or the restrictions which are customary for a public institution or the civil service. It was thus possible for the Minister of War to order operations which a regular organization would not have been allowed to do. The widening of activities during World War I nevertheless demanded a certain institutionalization and Teşkilat-i Mahsusa came to be regarded as a sub-department in the Ministry of War (İdare-i Umur-i Aktar-i Şarkiye -- the Department for the Affairs of the Eastern Countries). This department had a special status by comparison with other state departments as regards financing, manning, priority of activities and command.

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The tasks of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa were to protect internal security against subversion by hostile and separatist elements, in the Ottoman Empire and to prevent collaboration with the enemy; to train agents to establish underground cells in British and French (and later also Italian) colonies, as well as in those regions within the Ottoman Empire which they feared might be conquered during the war (such as the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq); to instigate Turkish Moslems in Central Asia and Russia; and to engage in unconventional military operations such as guerrilla warfare and the destruction of enemy front lines.

One of the most important assignments given to this organization was to ensure that the national-ethnic components of the Ottoman Empire kept their loyalty to it. It was feared that Arab nationalists who were in exile in Europe or who were operating clandestinely within the Empire would initiate foreign intervention in order to realize their political goals, or that foreign powers would be the driving force behind similar activities. The adoption of the resistance movement in Libya by Teşkilat-i Mahsusa integrated well with the organization's goals: Ottoman support for this Moslem-Arab liberation movement, which was of several years standing could increase Ottoman prestige among the Arabs and throughout the Moslem world. In addition, this could light a spark among the Moslem population in Egypt, the Maghreb and other African regions under British and French domination which had turned into enemies of the Ottoman Empire. Other operational spheres of the organization were the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia and the Caucasus, but the main success, albeit not total, was in Libya. The activities of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa continued in various parts of Libya during the whole war period with varying degrees of cooperation from the local population.

The common thread running through the various activities of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa was their Islamic character; the pan-Turkish or Ottoman factor came second. The early overt organizational expression of pan-Islamic activity was the PIL. The network which this society began to lay down in the Empire and the Moslem world was integrated with the intelligence and subversion system of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa.

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The founder of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa and its first commander (1914-15) was Sulayman al-`Askari, an Ottoman officer who fought in Libya in 1912 and who was killed in Iraq in 1915. Another of the early leaders of the organization was Eşref Bey Kuşçubaşı, around whom grouped the first ring of Ottoman intelligence and subversion experts in the Arabian Peninsula in 1903. During his activity there and in Cyrenaica (1912) Eşref became known for his strong ties with the Bedouin. Eşref's closeness to Enver (they served together in Libya) led to Enver's decision to appoint him to reorganize Teşkilat-i Mahsusa, and he eventually became its commander. The political department of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa was headed by senior CUP members Dr Bahaettin Şakir and Midhat Şükrü (Bleda). Ali Baş Hamba, the exiled Tunisian nationalist, and Dr. Ahmad Fu'ad, the Egyptian nationalist, headed the Department for the Affairs of the Eastern Countries in the Ministry of War, which served as the organizational and administrative base of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa.

Most of the senior agents of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa were Turks. Heads of regional cells were often not of Turkish origion; it depended on the region for which they were responsible, but they were Turkish speakers and had links with the Ottoman Empire. Dominant among the chief activists of the organization were statesmen, clergy, professionals and guerrilla experts. Some 700 of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa's members ranked as "Brethren" (Ihvan) -- representatives in various regions to whom propaganda material and operational instructions were forwarded. A much larger number, estimated by 30,000, were considered supporters who could be operated by the "Brethren". Among those activists connected with involvement in Libya were Nuri (Killigil), Enver's younger brother who participated in the war in Libya (1912), was sent to organize the rebellion there (1915-18) and who was later transferred to the Caucasus; the Libyans Sulayman al-Baruni and Khalifh b. `Askar; the Egyptians `Abd al-`Aziz Shawish and Muhammad Farid; the Tunisian Salih al-Tunisi; the Iraqis Ja`far al-`Askari and Nuri al-Sa`id; and the Lebanese Druse Shakib Arsalan.

Teşkilat-i Mahsusa was financed by a secret budget in the Ministry of War which was under the personal responsibility of Enver.

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Another important source of financing were German gold consignments which reached Istanbul by way of the members of the German military mission and embassy. It was estimated later that some 4 million pounds of gold of German origin were used for military and propaganda purposes.

European powers attached great importance to the political and military implications of the pan-Islamic connection, but after the war ended it became evident that many had overestimated the political power of Islam. Britain had feared most of all the negative influence of Islamic incitement of the Moslem population in its colonies, especially in India. Germany was convinced that political manipulation of Islam was an excellent means of inciting the Moslem peoples against a mutual enemy. The German Ministries of Foriegn Affairs and War, in cooperation with experts on oriental affairs, urged the Ottomans to take an aggressive pan-Islamic course. The Germans channeled money and military, transportation and communication equipment for this purpose.[39]

Teşkilat-i Mahsusa sought to instigate Moslem populations living under the rule of non-Moslem enemies. It hoped both to help in the liberation of these peoples from Christian rule and at the same time to make things difficult for the enemies of the Empire and Germany and force them to deploy large military forces and military equipment in regions far removed from the European theatre of war. Since Libya answered all the requirements of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa, its territory became the base for subversive and intelligence activities in Egypt, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb.[40]

2. The Bringing-in of Men, Equipment and Money

The first signs of a considerable increase in the entry into Libya of Ottoman officers and propagandists, as well as arms, ammunition and money were already evident a few weeks after the defence and military cooperation pact between Germany and the Ottoman Empire had been signed (2 August 1914) and even before the latter was at war with Britain and France (November 1914) and Italy (May 1915).

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At first, the Ottomans denied this activity; they claimed later that it was aimed only against Britain; eventually, although the infiltration was not denied, its true dimensions were kept secret. This activity continued throughout the period of the war; there were several changes in the routes used, transportation means, frequency, scope and the composition of the travellers and equipment.[41]

During the first phase (August 1914-October 1915) most of the infiltration into Libya was in small steam-boats, most of them Greek-owned. The boats departed from moorings on the south-western Anatolian coast and from Piraeus, Greece, and unloaded men and equipment in eastern Cyrenaica near the Egyptian border. Only a few boats were sent to Tripolitania in this phase. Some Ottomans took the regular ship service to Egypt from where they infiltrated to Libya as did the Tripolitanian leader Sulayman al-Baruni, who entered Cyrenaica through Egypt in late-August 1914 in order to lead the local insurrection. The first groups were composed mainly of Ottoman officers who were to organize the rebellion in Cyrenaica. In March 1915 Nuri (Killigil) arrived, having been appointed Ottoman commander in Cyrenaica. Some of these officers were Arabic speakers or had participated in the Turkish-Italian War. The emphasis was on the selection of distinguished and professional officers (such as gunners and wireless operators) and not on regular soldiers who could be recruited and trained in Libya. Large amounts of money and gold flowed in.[42] Apart from arms, ammunition and other military equipment, foodstuffs and clothing started to arrive in Libya. Foodstuffs became very vital items following the tightening of controls along the Egyptian-Libyan border in order to prevent smuggling of any kind -- even of foodstuffs, whose free transfer had not previously been prohibited. The prohibition was aimed at weakening the Sanusis and at forcing them to stop their hostilities against the Italians and later also against the British.

In June 1915 the first German submarines reached Istanbul. In late-August 1915 the German Navy started to move submarines into the Mediterranean Sea Command, and in the next few years some were used to bring men, equipment and money to Libya, as well as to shell enemy

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boats and forces. Logistic support to the Ottomans was not high on the list of German priorities and when submarines were required for the war in the North Sea (as, for instance, in March 1916), this led to an immediate decrease in activities on the Libyan front. Weather conditions also influenced sailings and the months of December to March were considered to be the most dangerous in the Mediterranean off the Libyan coast. The ports of origin of the submarines which departured to North Africa were mainly Pola and Cataro on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, but they also reached Anatolia to pick up men and equipment. The planning and operation of these transfers was generally carried out by Germans; senior Ottoman officers were only rarely involved.

From late-October 1915 (the eve of the Ottoman-Sanusi invasion of Egypt), German submarines began to frequent the east Cyrenaican coast (mainly Solum, Marsa Bardiya Sulayman and Mara'isa). They brought Ottoman and German officers, arms (including guns), various equipment, money and presents for the local dignitaries, particularly the Sanusi leaders. The submarines also attacked boats of the Egyptian Coast Guard and enemy cargo ships.[43] In late-December 1915 the submarines started to make more calls at western ports (in the region of Tubruq and the eastern Bay of Sidra) following the widening of the Sanusi sphere of influence at Italian expense. Until March 1916, when the region of Solum was retaken by the Egyptian Army, the port of Solum was one of the submarines' main destinations. Following its fall and the pursuit by the Egyptian Army of the remnants of the Sanusi forces headed by Ahmad al-Sharif, the use of anchorages in eastern Cyrenaica almost ceased and the submarines made more stops, and in growing numbers, in the region of the eastern Bay of Sidra (Marsa Yahudiya, Zuwaytina, Awjila, and Marsa Suluq). Preference was given to small submarines because of their superior manoeuvrability at sea and on shore. Although their cargo was limited in size, the flow of men and supplies was not affected since their calls became more frequent and they were often followed by larger cargo boats.

In mid-1916 German boats and submarines started to call at the port of Misurata in Tripolitania. In addition to the regular supplies,

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special equipment was sent to set up a large wireless station on the Misuratan coast ("Mirr Station") and smaller ones inside the country. Following a short temporary halt, the submarine service to Misurata was renewed in October 1916. Sulayman al-Baruni, who had been appointed as Ottoman regional commander, took up his post at about this time, and around him rallied the Ottoman forces that had been forced to leave Cyrenaica following the opposition of the new Sanusi leader, Idris al-Sanusi, to their presence in his sphere of influence. In the period between 1917 and 1918, the German submarines which called at Libyan ports mainly frequented Misurata (especially from May 1917) and to a much lesser extent Zuwaytina Bay. After May 1917 the port of Sirt, to where Ahmad al-Sharif had moved, was also a stopping-place. The calls at Misurata were fairly regular with submarines coming every two or three weeks. As time passed the equipment sent came to include armoured cars and light planes; personnel and material were also sent to set up an ammunition factory. During 1917-18 the German submarines and ships called only rarely at the anchorages and ports in Cyrenaica, where the leadership had passed into the hands of Idris al-Sanusi. In November 1918 (after the cease-fire of Mudros) one more submarine reached Misurata, bringing wireless equipment, money, gold and ammunition. The submarine crew discussed with the local Ottoman command the evacuation of the Ottoman and German forces, and eight men left when the submarine sailed. Afterwards, no more German boats reached Libya and the Ottoman and German forces which were left behind were evacuated by the Italians in June-October 1919.[44]

It is difficult to accurately establish the amounts of money and gold that the Ottomans and Germans sent to Libya, but they were considerable. When amounts were mentioned, they ran into thousands of gold pounds; boxes filled with notes and coins are reported as having been sent. Rifles were unloaded in their thousands, bullets in their hundreds of thousands, as well as hundreds of sub-machine guns and dozens of various types of guns. For much of the war period, Russian arms and ammunition taken as war booty by the Germans in Europe were transferred to Libya. Despite the numerous complaints lodged regarding the poor quality of this equipment, its transfer was not stopped.[45]

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The total number of officers, propagandists and professionals sent to Libya during World War I was only a few dozen, but since they were experts in their fields and, more important, because they controlled the distribution of arms, ammunition, foodstuffs and money, their influence was disproportionate to their numbers. Some of the Ottomans came to Libya only for short spells and on specific assignments, such as inspection tours, training, the establishment of wireless stations, and mediation missions between local rivals and between local people and foreigners. The main importance of Ottoman penetration at this time lay in maintaining good relations with the local population and in constantly inciting them so as to cause a serious nuisance to the enemies of the Empire who would be forced to concentrate large forces on the front. Ottoman investment on this front was not particularly great because the Germans paid most of it; yet even though not all the supplies were used in fighting, the British were forced to allocate large sums for the region at the expense of the European front. Another contribution of this involvement was that the regular shipments and the military training of Libyans helped in the strengthening of local power centres.

During the World War period the Ottoman Empire had at its disposal for involvement in Libya the large and strong navy of Germany. By contrast with previous periods in which the Italian and British navies ruled the seas in the region and limited Ottoman infiltration routes into Libya, during World War I the Ottomans could put in at almost any anchorage or port in Libya. With the exception of limited zones under Italian or British rule, the Ottomans used any anchorage which was in the vicinity of forces loyal to them. When the Ottomans realized that regions held by Idris al-Sanusi were hostile to them, they stopped their landings there; the absence of a sympathetic population was the deciding factor. Thanks to the regular and secure sea service, the Ottomans were able to bring to Libya the number of men they wanted and, even more important, military equipment and money in amounts far exceeding those transferred since the resistance in Libya started in late-1911. The insurrection in Libya was thus much more intensive during the whole of World War I and the Italians were unable to renew their offensive against the rebels so long as the

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latter were supported by the Ottomans and the Germans. The use of this route had its impact on military operations: the timing of the Ottoman-Sanusi invasion of Egypt in late-1915 was influenced to a great extent by the arrivals of submarines at Solum a few weeks earlier.

2. The Ottoman-Libyan Cooperation

The degree of Ottoman involvement in Libyan resistance to Italian rule varied. There were some 5,000 Ottoman soldiers and officers and a few hundred civilians there in the first year (October 1911-November 1912), dropping to several hundred during the inter-war period, and even less during World War I. Whereas in the first period most of the military and administrative personnel were in Libya on military or civil service, later on most of the Ottomans were volunteers who regarded their activity in Libya as a lofty national and religious mission. Their numbers, control over equipment and money, the backing they received from the Minister of War and their personal and professional qualifications — all these were important factors in their integration in the local leadership and fighting force.

When the rebellion against the Italians started, the sole organized and sizeable military force of the resistance was the Ottoman Army which was joined by local volunteers who accepted the supreme authority of the Ottoman command. Although it was necessary to establish an intermediate stratum between the Ottoman command and the tribal leadership, there was no intention of completely abolishing the Ottoman command; it remained in position mainly because of the fact that it was accepted that the Ottomans were the rulers. When most of the Ottoman military and administration left Libya, the situation changed completely and the political, military and administrative leaderships moved into local hands despite the fact that this carried with it large-scale internal fragmentation; whereas there had been a reluctant acceptance of the Ottoman regime's authority, there was no such similar consent to abide by the authority of a local leadership.

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Once this change from a central focus of authority to a decentralization of power had taken place, there could be no going back: the local leadership was ready to receive Ottoman aid, including equipment, money, advice and technical services, but refused to give up its new status as the supreme authority in the region. Ottoman involvement in the years 1913-18 was characterized by repeated attempts to re-enter the local system and to subordinate it once again to the Ottoman regime.

A. The Turkish-Italian War

1. Tripolitania

When the Italians invaded Libya in early-October 1911 there was neither a governor nor a military commander in Tripolitania because Ibrahim Paşa, who had fulfilled both functions, had been transferred in summer 1911. Those who were appointed to replace him did not reach Tripoli because of various delays.[46] As a result, the senior military commander in Tripolitania during the invasion was Munir Paşa, the commander of the reserve division. Munir was about seventy years old at that time and he was barely capable of commanding a fighting force.[47] The acting governor and military commander of Tripolitania was Neşet Paşa who had earlier served in the Hijaz and Syria and who came to Libya in 1908 where he became chief-of-staff. He was about forty years old with combat command ability. He was accepted by the local population and knew the region well, partly because he had been the head of the Turkish committee in charge of the demarcation of the border with Tunisia. In addition to Turkish, Neşet also knew Arabic, French and German and was thus able to hold direct contacts with both the local population as well as foreigners.[48]

Because of Italian military superiority in arms and manpower, Munir ordered the Ottoman army to retreat from Tripoli where the supreme headquarters of Libya (including Cyrenaica), as well as most of the military force, had been situated. The retreat was carried out before the Italian landing of 4 October 1911; out-of-date static

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artillery and police forces whose job was to protect the civilian population were left behind. Among the opponents of this step was the commander of the artillery, most of whose equipment was left behind in Tripoli. He was convinced that the Ottomans could have pushed back, or at least checked, the invaders.[49] Following the retreat from Tripoli a new general headquarters was established in Aziziya and advance headquarters and regional posts were set up throughout Tripolitania, in line with the changed deployment of the army and in cooperation with the local volunteers.

a. The Integration of the Volunteers in the Fighting Force

The mobilization of the Tripolitanian volunteers was primarily organized by two of the regional deputies to the Ottoman Parliament: Sulayman al-Baruni from Jebel Gharbi, and Muhammad Farhad from Zawiyah.[50] The governor and deputy of Fezzan were responsible for recruiting volunteers from Fezzan and beyond the southern border. The Ottoman authorities recognized the important roles played by Baruni and Farhad and expressed their appreciation in public.[51]

Some of the volunteers reached the general headquarters of Tripolitania in Aziziya and the rest reinforced other strongholds. The arrival of numerous local volunteers made the recovery of the Ottoman garrisan possible: Ottoman commanders exploited the lull in the Italian momentum immediately after the landing in order to mobilize, organize and train the volunteers to consolidate the military positions and to curb the withdrawal to the hinterland. Baruni's support was of special importance due to his religious influence over the Ibadi Berber population to which most of the inhabitants of the central mountain area belonged. Because of his great influence Baruni was appointed during the war both as the governor of Jebel Gharbi and as commander of the local volunteer unit.[52] The recruitment of volunteers was carried out using religious and nationalistic slogans, including calls to protect Islam and the Ottoman homeland and to demonstrate loyalty to the Sultan.[53] The volunteers arrived at the Ottoman headquarters in ceremonial parades with their traditional chiefs -- tribal, village and religious shaykhs -- at their head.

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The fighting units consisted of ordinary troops and volunteers. Every group of volunteers was headed by its traditional chief; above the tribal command were Ottoman officers and NCOs. The general tendency was to appoint to positions of command military men of Arab origin or with command experience over Arabs -- in any case, they had to have advanced military knowledge.[54] Many young officers had found it difficult to impose their authority on the local volunteers who regarded their traditional chiefs as the supreme authority. Consequently, the Ottoman command found it necessary to seek the cooperation and good-will of the tribal shaykhs so as to use the reserves of volunteers to the utmost.

When the volunteers reached headquarters they underwent basic instruction and training by Ottoman officers.[55] As well as the practical training, each volunteer received a guidance booklet in Arabic with instructions on the use of arms and on behaviour at the battlefront. The volunteers took these booklets with them to battle. Nevertheless, the influence of the training on the volunteers was not great: the training lasted only a short time and there was a significant difference between the fighting methods of an ordinary army and tribal warfare which was characterized by quick attack and immediate retreat with booty. The efficiency of the booklets is also doubtful: most of the tribal population was illiterate. The volunteers arrived with weapons of various types, some of them outdated. In addition to the private arms, many volunteers were given weapons from the stocks of the Ottoman army.[56]

In many camps a division existed between the ordinary army and the volunteers, despite the fact that they operated as a united force. Regular officers and soldiers were housed in shelters and tents, separated from the volunteers who slept in their own encampments in tents or on the bare ground, each tribe and group together according to its origin.[57] The volunteers preferred to stick together in their tribes and not to mix with other tribes or the Ottomans on the social level, in spite of the fact that the units were composed of members of several tribes and Ottomans. Thus the volunteers' contacts were for the most part with their own tribal members and chiefs, yet they

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remained in proximity to volunteers of other tribes and to Ottomans, and for many of them this was a formative experience.

Military cooperation at the senior level took the form of "war councils" in which both Ottoman officers and tribal shaykhs participated. These meetings were held daily or on special occasions to plan future battles or settle problems. The meetings were held at a central place, sometimes at the local mosque, in order to discuss the situation at large and to analyze past battles (such as the Turkish-Greek War or the Russian-Japanese War) in order to draw conclusions and plan the continuation of the battles in the region.[58] Some of the Ottoman officers regarded these councils as a means of giving the local leadership a feeling of partnership and equality in the command. The deliberations provided a way of acquainting the local leadership with notions of modern military thinking and planning, while Ottoman officers became more familiar with local ways of thinking and warfare and the effects of inter-tribal and religious relations on military and political developments. Another method of strengthening solidarity and the feeling of might was the holding of colourful military parades with the participation of the high command and the shaykhs; public prayers were another method.[59]

It is difficult to accurately establish the number of local volunteers due to their high mobility and their habit of returning to their villages and encampments during the agricultural seasons or during pauses in the battles. However, it has been estimated that there were between 20,000 and 30,000 volunteers in Tripolitania during the Turkish-Italian War.

b. The Formation of the Forces

The military force in Tripolitania was divided into two flanks: the right flank (sağ cenah), which included the coast and northern Tripolitania; and the left flank (sol cenah), taking in the southern region from Yefren and Gharyan to Fezzan. The general headquarters was in 'Aziziya on the right flank and all other headquarters were subordinate to it.

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1. `Aziziya

The general heaquarters of the Ottoman-Libyan force in Tripolitania was established in `Aziziya, some 60 kilometres south of Tripoli. The scope of its command extended from the region of Khoms in the east to the Tunisian border in the west, and from the Mediterranean sea and the Italian trenches in the north to Fezzan in the south.

On 16 October 1911 Neşet was appointed as governor and military commander of Tripolitania; Munir remained in command of the reserves and stayed in Tripolitania until March 1912 when he returned to Istanbul because of ill health. The Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, decided to transfer the command to young officers, graudates of the military academy and members of the Young Turks, because he believed that Munir was incapable of undertaking offensive and large-scale military operations. The Ottoman regime tried to publicly hide the professional reasons for these changes in the command so as not to harm the morale of the army and the public (it would have been tantamount to an admittance that the earlier postings had been mistaken). The Chief-of-Staff and deputy commander was Ali Fethi (Okyar) who, after the outbreak of war, infiltrated to Tripolitania. He was considered an excellent officer with both outstanding military and political qualifications. His participation improved the Ottoman position, and they went over to a planned offensive. There were at least twenty officers in `Aziziya, most of them graduates of the military academy in Istanbul, the others educated in France. The number of regular soldiers in this headquarters stood at several hundred. Not all the volunteers camped in the vicinity of this headquarters; many of them were directed to other posts in the neighbourhood of their villages and tribal encampments, or according to military needs.[60]

2. `Ayn Zara

An advanced headquarters commanded by Ali Fethi was established in the `Ayn Zara oasis, some 10 kilometres south-west of Tripoli. The Ottoman Army held this post until 5 December 1911 when most of the men retreated to `Aziziya. Most of the volunteers who reached this place came from the vicinity (Awlad Sulayman from the Sirt region headed by Shaykh Sayf al-Nasr, Aziziya tribes headed by the Kaymakam Shaykh `Ali Tantush, those from Sirt headed by `Umar Muntasir, Urshafana tribes and `A'ilat al-Mansur), but some came from farther south, from the Tibbu and Touareg tribes.[61]

3. Suani Bani Adam

This advanced headquarters was some 20 kilometres south of Tripoli and held its ground until the end of the war. Some of the officers who retreated from Tripoli and `Ayn Zara arrived at Suani Bani Adam. The commander was cavalry officer Muhieddin who served directly under Neşet and who was his deputy. Muhieddin knew Arabic and was involved in the life of the local volunteers and even served as an arbitrator in their quarrels. He took special care to maintain order the cleanliness in his camp and set an example in this respect. The deputy commander was the commander of the cavalry squadron, İshak Fenerli, who was of Georgian origin, a CUP member and a friend of Enver. Infantry and artillery units as well as some twenty officers were also in the camp.[62] This headquarters was responsible for the post of Funduq Bani Ghshir and for numerous volunteers from Misurata, Awlad al-Sayf and Nawa'il.[63]

4. Zuwara and the Western Coast

Zuwara was among the few places on the coast that remained in Ottoman hands. This headquarters was responsible for a stretch of some 80 kilometres along the Tripolitanian coast to the Tunisian border. It played a large part in smuggling men, arms and supplies from Tunisia to the Ottoman-Libyan forces. The camp commanded by Muhammad Musa Bey, an elderly officer, a graduate of the military academy in Istanbul and

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a man of great military knowledge and experience who was a relative of Imam Yahya of Yemen. Thanks to his personality, origins and training Musa had great influence over the local volunteers; he was described as patient and reticent, and insistent on discipline and the exact carrying out of his orders. He knew how to impose his authority on regular soldiers and local volunteers alike and used to train them by himself. His garrison was disciplined, orderly, and uniformed. The wide reconnaissance network which he operated in the whole region provided him with plenty of information on all developments. The duties of the head of the civil administration (kaymakam), which were previously held by a local notable, were transferred to the military commander who thus held supreme authority. In summer 1912 he had to return to Istanbul and the command passed to his deputy. The military staff included six officers, five of them Ottomans and one Fezzani.[64]

A number of small posts, including Farum, Sidi `Ali and Sidi Sa`id, were subordinate to the headquarters in Zuwara.[65] There were three medium-sized headquarters:[66] the oasis of Zawiyah was commanded by an Arab and became the centre of the district (kaza) of Tripoli headed by a local kaymakam who was aided by regional notables; the oasis of Zanzur, where the command changed several times and was at times in local hands; and Qasr `Ajaylat, which included both Ottoman and local officers.

5. Khoms and the Eastern Coast

When the war broke out the governor, Şefik Bey, was appointed as head of the local fighters (mujahidun) and was aided by some local shaykhs. Later on he was replaced by Halil (Kut), Enver's uncle and a graduate of the military academy in Istanbul who infiltrated into Libya through Tunisia. The regional headquaters at the hill of al-Marqab was taken by the Italians on 28 February 1912 and the headquarters moved to the vicinity of Mislata. The region of Jebel Tarhuna and its volunteers, who were commanded by their chief Ahmad Mura'id, was subordinate to this headquarters. Volunteers came from Misurata, Fezzan, Ghadames and the Touareg tribes also gathered in this region.

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Another region which was under the control of Khoms was Misurata, commanded by Nuri (killigil), Enver's brother. The command in Khoms was widely supported by the local dignitaries, among them Nuri and Bashir al-Sa`dawi, whose purpose was to involve the population in the struggle and to operate the regional administration. Emir `Ali, the son of `Abd al-Qadir, stayed in Khoms and in Misurata for a while. He came to Libya in order to incite the population to join the rebellion. The number of volunteers in this region was great and among the large tribes that joined the resistance was Awlad Sulayman, one of the strongest tribes in the Sirt region.[67]

6. Jebel Gharbi

This mountainous region in central Tripolitania on the Tunisian border was of special importance during the struggle against Italy since the local conditions made guerrilla warfare easy. In addition, one of the local personalities who exerted a great influence on the population's participation in the resistance came from this region: Sulayman al-Baruni, the Ibadi leader and deputy to the Ottoman Parliament, was appointed as mutasarrif of Jebel Gharbi and commander of the volunteers. There were some important rear headquarters in the region. The Yefren-Zintan area was under the military command of Yusuf Jamal and the mutasarrif was Musa Qarada, both local dignitaries. An important headquarters with a large arms store was in Gharyan. Numerous volunteers from central and southern Tripolitania reached Gharyan where they underwent basic training and were then sent to advanced posts. The command here was in Ottoman and local hands. The local fighters in this region had a certain influence on military appointments, and at time Baruni had to take into consideration the volunteers' demands and appoint their shaykh. The headquarters in Nalut on the Tunisian border was also included in this region.[68]

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7. Fezzan

The mobilization of volunteers in Fezzan was conducted by the mutasarrif Sami Bey and the parliamentary deputy of Fezzan Jami Bey, who sent thousands of volunteers northwards to the general headquarters in 'Aziziya.[69] The heads of Fezzan's districts and local shaykhs did the actual recruiting of the local population, as well as that in regions beyond the southern border in tropical Africa (for example, Wadai and Ayn Qalqa). Among the important groups who volunteered were people from Tibesti, Tibbu, Touareg and Sinaun. Some women fighters from Fezzan volunteered too, in addition to family members, who sometimes accompanied the fighters. During the Turkish-Italian War no battles took place in this region since the Italian Army did not manage to penetrate the country's interior. The importance of Fezzan to the struggle in this period laid in its being a reservoir for zealous fighters who volunteered to fight the Italians despite the fact that the region was in no immediate danger. The population also sent them large quantities of supplies.

* * *

The regular Ottoman force in Tripolitania numbered more than 4,000 men and accounted for some 15 to 20 percent of the total number of the fighting force in the region. Due to their size, their qualifications and the fact that many Ottoman commanders were veterans and experienced in Libya or in other Arab regions, the involvement of the Ottoman Army in the struggle was deep and its influence over the volunteers was considerable, even though they relied on local leaders. The Ottoman Army in Tripolitania had an advantage that made its contact with the local population easier: it had a certain experience in command over the local population from which recruitment was carried out in summer 1911. There were thus local regular recruits who underwent basic military training and served in ordinary military units, in addition to the numerous volunteers. This combined force managed to halt the Italian advance into Tripolitania a short distance from the coastal towns and villages. Despite the fact that the Moslem military force was a combined one, the units at the lower level were

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separated into Ottoman regular soldiers and local volunteers according to tribal affiliation, and were under different commands. However, they did cooperate in battle. Both had a common goal and they coordinated their activities to achieve it without giving up their distinctive characters. As long as the severe fighting continued and there was no fundamental transfer of power from the Ottoman to the local elements, such cooperation was quite successful. Misunderstandings due to different world views and behaviour became more evident as time passed, and these conditions changed.

2. Cyrenaica

a. **The Integration of the Volunteers in the Fighting Force**

Benghazi was the centre of the mutasarrıflık of Cyrenaica until its occupation by the Italians on 18 October 1911. In it resided the civilian and military leadership: mutasarrıf Murad Fuad Bey, military commander Şakir Bey, and the commander of the Gendarmerie, Muhammad Hayri Bey. This leadership took good care of security and order, on the eve of the Italian occupation, especially with regard to foreign inhabitants. Following a warning from Istanbul and in order to reinforce the local defence against the Italian occupation, the Ottoman authorities in Benghazi distributed arms from the army stores to the population in Benghazi and its vicinity.[70] Following the Italian occupation, the general headquarters of Cyrenaica moved eastwards to `Ayn al-Mansur near Derna from where it was quite easy to keep in touch with Egypt and the centre of the Empire. The regular army numbered some 1,000 men. By contrast with earlier periods, the administrative centre moved to a different location from the military one -- to Merj in the central Cyrenaican mountains.

Due to its limited force, the Ottoman Army in Cyrenaica felt that in order to halt the Italian advance it was absolutely vital for the regular army to cooperate with the local population. An understanding with the Sanusiya was given special weight when it came to mobilizing the local volunteers in Cyrenaica because of the great influence of the Sanusi order. Before and during the war, the political and

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military position of the Sanusiya had determined the attitude of the Cyrenaican tribes. Consequently, both Ottomans and Italians took pains to gain the support of the Sanusi order. Italian hopes had been nurtured on Sanusi reservations about the Ottoman regime, but this phenomenon, although very conspicuous during the nineteenth century, gradually disappeared in the twentieth century when the Sanusis were pushed out of tropical Africa by the French. The demands of the Turkish-Italian War greatly increased the Sanusi-Ottoman cooperation, but it was never a complete partnership. The Sanusis gave a positive response to the Ottoman call to fight the Italians at the very start of the war and this cooperation increased as the struggle developed. The Sanusi shaykhs were not content with just calling on the population to join the Jihad: the also organized the tribes by means of the Sanusi zawiyahs and their heads. Thus, supra-tribal unity was achieved and the zawiyah network and its extensive communication system was used for the benefit of the war effort.

The local volunteers who numbered some 20,000 were of paramount importance in the struggle against the Italian occupation of Cyrenaica.[71] Because of their size and due to extensive tribal break-up, the Ottoman command had to devote a great deal of attention to the tribal structure and to allocate increased manpower to command the volunteers, taking into account their unique social structure. The Ottoman officer Eşref Bey Kuşçubaşı, who had gained experience in negotiations with Bedouin from his service in the Arabian Peninsula, was made responsible for coordination between the army and the local volunteers. In addition to his duties as military commander of the `Awaqir tribe, Eşref also handled wider coordination, gathering the tribal chiefs, the militia (muhafaziyyah; mufarrizah) commanders and Ottoman officers in "war councils" in order to discover tribal and Sanusi opinion on current affairs and to plan future moves. Eşref was responsible for the appointment of Ottoman officers who were the senior commanders of the tribal force; he also settled inter-tribal disputes.[72]

In addition to the many details about tribal volunteering, including names of tribes and their traditional leaders and number of

volunteers, contemporary sources also described the structure of the force:[73] "Family" (`A'ilah) was a group of some 10-20 fighters headed by their chief who took the rankd of onbaşı (corporal). It stayed in one tent which was provided with a cleaner. The "Tribe" (Qabilah) consisted of a few "families" numbering some 50-200 fighters, headed by a junior shaykh with the rank of yüzbaşı (captain). With him were two Ottoman officers, one of whom was responsible for administration. The "Zawiyah" consisted of "tribes" headed by a senior shaykh with the rank of binbaşı (major). He was subordinate to an Ottoman officer and two NCOs. The reconnaissance units of the militia were commanded by an Ottoman officer. The actual build-up of the force followed this model, but many details on junior ranks are lacking and it is difficult to ascertain whether the size and hierarchy of the units always followed the model.

Two Cyrenaican deputies in the Ottoman Parliament, Yusuf Shatwan and `Umar Mansur al-Kahya, played an important role in the recruitment of volunteers in the Benghazi region when the war started.[74] At first, part of the population hesitated about joining the Ottoman side, but following the battle of Zarira (18 January 1912) and the Ottoman victory, local loyalty increased.[75] Numerous volunteers, headed by their tribal shaykhs and the heads of the neighbouring zawiyahs, turned up at the regional headquarters. Volunteers from remote regions, such as Wadai and Darfur, also joined the struggle in Cyrenaica. The tribal and Sanusi shaykhs led the tribes in battle and were also responsible for the organizational, administrative and religious activity: they organized daily life in camp, ensured supplies, distributed salaries and officiated at public prayers. Every tribe had its own standard (sancak) with which it went out to battle, and during public ceremonies these standards were passed from the Ottoman command to the shaykhs and unit commanders. Whereas the tribal unit was administered as a separate body within the military system as regards ordinary life aside from the scene of battle, on all the strict military aspects of the volunteers' life regular Ottoman officers (and not shaykhs with honourary military ranks) were responsible. Ottoman officers also commanded mixed units comprising both regular soldiers and local volunteers. The officers were charged

with conducting the basic military training of the volunteers and settling inter-tribal disputes.[76]

The sympathetic rear was vital for the continuation of the resistance not only as a source for volunteers, but also for the daily supply of foodstuffs to the military camps and the zawiyahs where the soldiers and volunteers stayed. Villages and Bedouin encampments in the vicinity of military centres, as well as those even further away, organized caravans which brought all the army's needs. Since the zawiyahs were quite often established on caravan routes and the Sanusiya was involved in the desert trade, the Sanusi support for the resistance proved to be of great help in the struggle against the Italians in both the military and civil aspects.[77]

b. The Formation of the Forces

1. `Ayn al-Mansur

In `Ayn al-Mansur, some 15 kilometres east of Derna, the Ottomans established the general headquarters of Cyrenaica, as well as the headquarters of the three regional commands (the southern, western and eastern). Following the withdrawal from Benghazi the Ottoman Army was reorganized and the command passed into the hands of young officers some of whom belonged to those Ottoman volunteers who infiltrated into Libya following the Italian invasion. Most of the veteran Ottoman military and civilian leadership returned to Istanbul at an early stage of the war, paving the way for drastic changes in the leadership in Cyrenaica. The general headquarters at `Ayn al-Mansur was established on the arrival in Cyrenaica of Enver (1 December 1911); he was appointed as both mutasarrif and military commander of Cyrenaica. There were some 40 officers and 400 regular soldiers in the camp.[78]

Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) took over the eastern command on 11 February 1912 and was also the commander of the camp of `Ayn al-Mansur (12 March-24 October 1912). The latter camp was distinguished by its cleanliness and order; yet strictness was not at the expense of military activity. Mustafa Kemal organized regular military activity

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in his district which was based on sending out reconnaissance units which were responsible for specific areas and for guarding the camp on certain days.[79]

There were marked differences in behaviour and military concepts between the Commander-in-Chief of Cyrenaica (Enver) and the commander of the eastern front (Mustafa Kemal).[80] By contrast with Enver's pompous and bombastic style, Mustafa Kemal was distinguished by the simplicity of his soldier-like behaviour. Enver enjoyed entertaining in great pomp neighbouring tribal and Sanusi shaykhs who honoured him because of his position as Commander-in-Chief, as well as because he was the Sultan's representative in Cyrenaica and the fiancé of an Ottoman princess. Mustafa Kemal did not participate in such lavishness. He was preoccupied with the struggle against the Italians, had reservations about the static situation on his front and demanded an offensive. When Mustafa Kemal realized that the resistance was being carried out in a futile manner and that he himself was unbale to change its course, he saw no justification for remaining there. Whereas at the beginning of his activity in Cyrenaica it was almost impossible to persuade him to rest even when he was injured, towards the end of the war he did not turn down medical advice and left the front for Europe to receive treatment for eye disease. However, his personal and military disagreements with Enver were the main reasons for his departure.

Although Enver repeatedly denied rumours which spread during the war concerning his political and military ambitions, he apparently tried to consolidate his position among the Cyrenaican tribes.[81] It was said that he intended to marry into the Sanusi family and that he wanted to establish an Arab Caliphate under his leadership, especially if the Ottoman Empire withdrew from Libya. The fact that during the war he issued paper money which bore his signature further increased suspicions about his political aims. Although the move was brought about by the scarcity of Ottoman and European coins, it was interpreted politically, since according to Moslem concepts the issuing of money was a prerogative of the ruler. When the peace agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Italy was signed, Enver was

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placed in a difficult position because right up until the agreement he had repeatedly announced that the Ottoman Army under his command would continue the struggle until the last drop of its blood. Following reports from Istanbul and talks held with representatives of the Italian Army, and despite previous promises, Enver decided to leave Libya. He came to realize the difficulties in winning the struggle in Libya and, as the focus of political and military attention shifted to the Balkans, he rushed there; yet he never neglected or forgot Libya. Enver passed the military command to `Aziz `Ali al-Misri who was the commander of the post facing Benghazi. Enver visited Jaghbub in order to explain his position to senior Sanusi representatives, and then returned to Istanbul.[82]

2. Regional Headquarters

The first Ottoman regional headquarters was established near `Ayn al-Ghazal, west of Tubruq. Its first commander was Ibrahim Edhem Paşa who left Aleppo for Libya when the war broke out and reached the camp three weeks later. Until Enver's arrival in December 1911, Edhem led the resistance to the Italians in Cyrenaica. He succeeded in establishing close contacts with neighbouring shaykhs, while his good relations with the Sanusiya greatly contributed to Sanusi support in the struggle and the participation of the local population in the resistance. Thus, the first seeds of Ottoman-Cyrenaican cooperation were sown at an early stage in the war; when Enver and his colleagues arrived, the ground was already prepared. When Mustafa Kemal reached Libya he stayed at first in the camp opposite Tubruq, and (according to him) initiated the change to offensive activity. The officers in this camp were both Turkish and local; one of the latter was `Abd al-Qadir Bey, a deputy representing Cyrenaica in the Ottoman Parliament. Serving under these officers were tribal and Sanusi shaykhs who were directly responsible for volunteers from the tribes of `Awaqilah, Salaliyah, Awlad Maryam, Manifah, Shahin, Ghith and Bara`isah. The Sanusi shaykhs came from neighbouring zawiyahs and carried flags bearing Isalmic slogans which they took to battle.[83]

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When the war broke out the British took the port and castle of Solum and annexed them to Egypt. The Ottoman force stayed on a nearby hill under the command of a volunteer officer from Morocco.[84] From then on Egypt held Solum, except for a short period during the Sanusi-Ottoman invasion of Egypt in late-1915.

Following the Italian occupation of Benghazi the administrative centre of Cyrenaica moved to Merj. This created an anomaly: the head of the administration (the mutasarrıf, Enver) did not reside at the administrative regional centre which, for the first time, was geographically separated from the supreme military headquarters. However, Enver did direct the entire civilian administration from his camp in `Ayn al-Mansur; only limited importance was attached to the official centre at Merj. In Rajma near Merj was the regional headquarters where Ottoman, European and local officers, as well as soldiers from Yemen and local volunteers, were stationed.[85]

Another regional stronghold was established some 12 kilometres from Benghazi. For most of the war period it was under the command of `Aziz `Ali al-Misri who previously had served in Yemen. There were some 10 Ottoman officers and 500 regular soldiers; most of the fighting force was made up of volunteers from neighbouring tribes.[86]

* * *

During the Turkish-Italian War there were some 1,000 Ottoman military personnel in Cyrenaica, most of them stationed in `Ayn al-Mansur and near Benghazi. They cooperated with more than 20,000 local volunteers and accounted for 5 percent (at times even less) of the total fighting force. The importance of the local volunteers for the success of the struggle in Cyrenaica was much greater than in Tripolitania due to the smaller size of the regular army and the unique Sanusi-tribal relations which made external manipulation difficult. Nevertheless, Ottoman involvement amongst the volunteers was deep. Such involvement was helped by the close personal ties which developed between the supreme command, and especially Enver, and the local dignitaries, whom he entertained in his tent. In Cyrenaica there

were several officers of Arab origin and others who had previous experience of operating amongst Arabs and Bedouin, and this made it easier to strengthen relations. The structure of the fighting force in Cyrenaica at this early stage in the rebellion led the Ottoman command to rely heavily on the local population not only at the fighting level, but also at the senior command and administrative levels. These positions were given to tribal shaykhs, amongst whom there was considerable fragmentation, and to a united and unifying element -- the Sanusiya. Since the Sanusiya had already previously held numerous leadership, administrative and command positions, the increased dependence of the Ottoman regime on the Sanusiya strengthened the latter's status as the de facto ruling force amongst the population of Cyrenaica.

B. The Inter-War Period

Following the peace agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Italy most of the army left Tripolitania. The few Ottomans who remained in the western part of the country were absorbed in the local population and their influence was negligible. In Cyrenaica, however, the situation was quite different: the close ties that had developed between the Ottoman command and army on the one hand and the Sanusi and tribal leadership on the other, as well as the easier contacts by way of Egypt, preserved the strong relations between the Ottomans and the local population. Some 800 remained in Cyrenaica out of a total of 1,000 who were there during the war. Until 17 June 1913, the Ottoman forces were commanded by an Ottoman officer of Egyptian origin -- `Aziz `Ali al-Misri. Besides Ottoman officers and soldiers `Aziz `Ali commanded over 1,000 irregular local volunteers whom he diligently trained with the help of their traditional chiefs.

When the Italians tightened their grip on the Ottoman-Arab forces in northern Cyrenaica, the formation of the resistance's military command changed: there was no longer a permanent general headquarters in the region due to the need to move from one location to another. As a result, during this period the general headquarters was moved

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further east in order to steer clear of the Italian forces and to move closer to Egypt from whose population both the Sanusis and the Ottomans hoped to gain support.[87]

In the inter-war period the struggle against the Italians in Cyrenaica was not of prime public interest in either the Empire or Europe. Consequently, information on life in the Ottoman-Cyrenaican camp is scanty and mostly derives from Italian and British reports which mainly describe military affairs. Yet it is still possible to note several characteristics of Ottoman-Cyrenaican relations in the period, although they are less detailed and accurate than those of the previous period.

During the first half of 1913 there were some twenty Ottoman officers in Cyrenaica and the Ottoman flag continued to be hoisted in the camps. The officers tried to conceal from regular soldiers and the local volunteers alike the political changes in the region and no official information on the peace agreement was given to the fighters. There were rumors among the local population that the war had ended, but the officers and shaykhs used to imprison whoever spoke about it in public. Since most of the Ottoman force remained in Cyrenaica, the warriors did not sense any fundamental change in the overall Ottoman presence and involvement. The soldiers had not heard about the order to withdraw the Ottoman Army from Libya, although some of them knew that whoever had already served more than three years (namely, at the official end of their army service) would be allowed to leave the region. The military command, however, did not discharge soldiers on time (which was quite usual in Libya) and the local population even tried to prevent the departure of those who were released. As a result, 23 soldiers mutinied in March 1913, following which they were allowed to leave. Most of the rest, however, remained. The strengthening of relations between the army and the Sanusiya found expression in the establishment of military camps within the zawiyahs' compounds, and their chiefs were included in the staff of the military command.[88]

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Contemporary sources, and especially those of 1914-18, provide many hints about the political ambitions of `Aziz `Ali al-Misri. Even before he left Cyrenaica in mid-1913, it was stated that he planned to head an independent Arab emirate in Cyrenaica which would be led by the chief of the Sanusi order. He was also suspected of embezzlement during his service in Cyrenaica. Many of these accusations derived from a power struggle within the CUP, although it is possible that `Aziz `Ali entertained personal political ambitions.[89]

Relations between `Aziz `Ali and the Sanusiya were complicated by political rivalries and changes in military power. `Aziz `Ali represented the unofficial Ottoman demand to maintain the status of the Empire as the supreme authority in Libya. In addition, he apparently had his own political ambitions. Against this demand for political supremacy, Ottoman military might in Cyrenaica was in constant retreat following the drop in the number of Ottoman military personnel in the region, the reduction of financial support and the cessation of military supplies. The lack of military and economic backing made it very difficult for `Aziz `Ali to impose his authority on the Sanusis. Yet his dependence on them was greater than ever because the army's continued presence was totally dependent on the local population which viewed the Sanusiya as their leadership.

At the same time, there were changes in the dimension and manner of Sanusi involvement in the struggle: whereas during the Turkish-Italian War the head of the order, Ahmad al-Sharif, stayed in Kufra in southern Cyrenaica, towards the end of the war he moved northward to Jaghbub and began to personally discharge the resistance against Italy. The political ambitions of the Empire and Ottoman officers were thus liable to harm Sanusi authority especially when the former were represented by an individual -- `Aziz `Ali -- who had won extensive tribal support and who had come from a neighbouring region.

Another source of conflict were the contacts that `Aziz `Ali maintained with Italian and British representatives about reaching a settlement with the Italians in the region, something totally rejected by the Sanusis. `Aziz `Ali opposed the holding of any negotiations

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with the Italians in which he was not personally involved; he even condemned to death several officers who had been accused of treachery, namely corresponding with the Italians. By contrast with `Aziz `Ali who was negotiating with the Italians, the Sanusi leader, Ahmad al-Sharif, consistently rejected any contact with the Italians and even opposed the initiatives of the Egyptian Khedive in this respect.[90]

In June 1913 `Aziz `Ali decided to leave the region in view of the Italian expansion in Cyrenaica, at a time when the Ottoman-Arab camp was suffering from a lack of money, arms and ammunition, and at a stage when the troops were weary and relations between the Ottoman command and the Sanusiya were deteriorating. Nevertheless, `Aziz `Ali portrayed his departure as only temporary -- a short break during which he would collect money and military equipment for the resistance. The Sanusis were not convinced by these explanations; despite the tense relations between them and `Aziz `Ali they did not want the Ottoman Army to abandon the region and leave them isolated, militarily, politically and economically, in their struggle against Italy. The Sanusis tried to prevent the departure of the Ottomans by sending tribesmen to block their paths of retreat. However, `Aziz `Ali's close relations with the local population enabled him to withdraw, along with his men, but they had to leave their heavy arms behind in Cyrenaica.[91]

Following the withdrawal of `Aziz `Ali and some 400 troops, the military command in Cyrenaica passed into the hands of local officials some of whom had previously served in the Ottoman or Egyptian armies where they had gained their professional experience. However, some 300-400 Ottoman troops remained in Cyrenaica, including artillerymen headed by Najib Bey, who had been `Aziz `Ali's deputy.[92] In spite of the fact that the Ottoman flag continued to be hoisted in the rebels' camps, the struggle turned primarily into a local one with limited outside support -- mostly Ottoman and Egyptian. Foreigners continued to infiltrate Cyrenaica and Italy frequently protested, but their total number was negligible and their influence steadily declined.

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Enver, who became Minister of War in June 1913 shortly before `Aziz `Ali returned to Istanbul, once again attempted to strengthen Ottoman influence in Libya. To this end Enver made one of his loyal followers, Ömer Fevzi, responsible for Cyrenaica. Ömer Fevzi was a devoted CUP member, a zealous Moslem and an artillery officer who had already served in Cyrenaica and who had even temporarily substituted the commander of Tripolitania, Neşet, during the Turkish-Italian War. Ömer Fevzi was in close contact with Mansur Shatwan (the secretary of the Sultan's representative in Tripoli) and with `Abd al-`Aziz Shawish, a leader of the Egyptian National Party and a pan-Islamic activist.[93] However, despite his qualifications, Ömer Fevzi made little headway in his attempts to consolidate the status of the Ottoman Empire in Cyrenaica. The weakened influence of the remnants of the Ottoman Army, together with the increased role of the local population in the leadership of the struggle, aggravated the friction between both parties and, as a result, Ottoman officers in Cyrenaica requested the Minister of War to issue orders regulating relations between the Ottoman Army and the local volunteers so as to prevent misunderstandings. Consequently, Enver issued detailed orders and also appointed Ali Fehmi Bey as supreme commander and liaison officer between the Ottoman Army and the Sanusi leader. Ali Fehmi Bey, an instructor in the military academy in Istanbul, left for Cyrenaica in June 1914 and reached the region on the eve of World War I which once again changed the relationship between the Ottomans and the Sanusiya and the local population.[94] The short period of time that elapsed between the issuing of Enver's regulations and the arrival of the new Ottoman commander and the changes which started when the war broke out reduced the influence of these regulations. Despite the high esteem in which the Cyrenaican population held Enver, and his numerous attempts to consolidate the status of the Ottoman Empire in Libya notwithstanding, he did not manage to reverse the seizure of the political and military leadership by the Sanusis and the tribal notables.

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C. World War I

1. The Mission of Sulayman al-Baruni to Cyrenaica

Even before the Ottoman Empire entered World War I in November 1914 its government decided to strengthen its political and military activities in Libya. At a secret meeting in early-August 1914, at the same time as the establishment of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa, the Ottoman Government, on the initiative of the Minister of War, Enver, decided to increase support to the Arab fighters in Cyrenaica. At the same meeting it was also decided to send a senior Ottoman representative to Libya to lead the struggle against the Italians: Sulayman al-Baruni, a Tripolitanian senator and a hero of the insurrection in Jebel Gharbi in 1911-13. He was sent to Libya along with a Cyrenaican officer and a follower of Enver. They took with them large sums of money to renew the rebellion and to strenghten the status of Ottomans under his leadership in Cyrenaica.[95] This decision marked a change in the way the Ottomans operated in Libya; whereas in the past the senior commanders who were sent were Ottoman officers who were not of Libyan origin, this time a distinguished Libyan personality was chosen who had strong ties with the Ottoman regime but lacked formal military training. The choice was influenced by the increased importance of the local element in the leadership of the struggle in Libya; The Ottoman Government was trying at the same time to improve its standing in Libya by sending out a local personality who was also acceptable to the Ottomans. However, the implications of the appointment on internal power struggles in Libya had not been properly considered: Sulayman al-Baruni, the Ibadi leader of Jebel Gharbi in Tripolitania, lacked an independent power base in Cyrenaica to which he had been sent. He was hardly known there and had to struggle against the Sanusis who were well-established in Cyrenaica. The strong backing he received from the Ottomans further increased his isolation: he was seen as an Ottoman and not as a local representative.

Baruni had started organizational and propaganda measures before he left Istanbul. He instructed Ali Fehmi Bey, who shortly before had been appointed by Enver as supreme commander of Cyrenaica, to move

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westwards to Tripolitania and to lead the rebellion there. Ali Fehmi did not act as instructed and left Libya. When he reached Istanbul in December 1914, he was indicted for abandoning Cyrenaica without permission. Baruni had also ordered two Tripolitanians to go to Fezzan in order to persuade Muhammad al-`Abid, the senior Sanusi leader there, to join the rebellion. Baruni and his companions left Istanbul on 13 August 1914 and stayed for a few days in Egypt where they tried to set up a revolutionay pan-Islamic and anti-British movement. Thanks to Baruni's status as an Ottoman senator, the group was not detained by the British but was kept under constant surveillance. The British ambassador to Istanbul protested over the Baruni's activities. Baruni, aware of British opposition to his subversive activities in Egypt, hastened to wind up his affairs there before moving on to Cyrenaica at the beginning of September 1914.[96] In the last months of 1914 more officers were sent to Cyrenaica. Most were of Libyan origin, had fought in the Turkish-Italian War, and had later undergone further military training and served in the Ottoman Army and in the Ministry of War at Enver's side.[97]

The Ottoman envoys to Cyrenaica, and Baruni in particular, immediately embarked on the activity for which they had been sent: inflaming the population and training it for a rebellion against the Italians and for an invasion of Egypt. As well as handing out large sums of money to the influential personalities in the region, Baruni also sent personal letters to Cyrenaican notables which, while calling for a general insurrection against the British and the Italians, also stressed the might of the Ottoman Army, the weakness of the British and the loyalty of the Egyptian population to the Ottoman Empire. Baruni also stressed Islamic fraternity and the strong ties with the Ottoman homeland. Following this propaganda and a resultant increase in their followers, the Ottomans attempted to seize control of the concentrations of local forces and especially over camps situated in the border area with Egypt.[98]

The local notables and especially the Sanusi leadership, the position of which as leaders of the insurrection had strengthened after the withdrawal of most of the Ottomans in 1913, did not view

favourably the Ottoman attempts to bring them once again under their authority. Officers of Libyan origin who were sent to Cyrenaica were not quite suitable -- according to traditional standards -- to contest the local leadership; their personal and family backgrounds were not right, their origins (some were from Tripolitania) were against them, they were too young, and they lacked knowledge of the region. Furthermore, the Sanusis did not approve at that time (late-1914 to late-1915) of the anti-British policy that Baruni and his companions were trying to advance as part of the general Ottoman policy. The Cyrenaicans depended for their survival on free trade with Egypt where they bought most of their foodstuffs. The Sanusi leadership residing in Jaghbub and its vicinity had good relations with the neighbouring Egyptian Border Police and Coastal Guards. These friendly relations were the outcome of the Sanusi leaders' conviction that their physical existence and the continuation of the struggle against the Italians was dependent on proper relations with Egypt. The Sanusis did not want to alienate themselves from the British in Egypt. As long as this was the Sanusi stand, there could be no chance for any Ottoman plan to invade Egypt with Sanusi cooperation.

As a result of the struggle over the leadership in Cyrenaica and because of fundamental differences of opinion, conflicts between the local population and the Ottomans began to spread, isolating the latter and greatly limiting their ability to act. Neverthelss, the local population knew it was not completely free to act as it pleased regarding the Ottomans because the latter controlled large quantities of money and military equipment which once again began to flow into Cyrenaica. Any blow directed at the Ottoman leadership in Cyrenaica could have harmed relations with the Ottoman Government and stopped the large-scale financial and military supplies which the population needed to continue the struggle against the Italians, as well as to consolidate the position of regional leaders. The Ottomans were aware of the local population's dependence on them and did not want to allow such a lever to slip out of their hands; it served as an important guarantee of their personal security and the realization of their policy.

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In November 1914 there were signs of friction, the most serious of which developed around Baruni himself. Muhammad al-`Abid, the Sanusi leader of Fezzan, ordered Baruni's detention following his attempts to whip up the Tripolitanian and Fezzani population. The detention was not carried out at first, but the head of the Sanusiya, Ahmad al-Sharif, then decided to act similarly because of Baruni's propaganda in favour of an invasion of Egypt from Cyrenaica. At an early stage in this quarrel only mutual suspicions and reservations were evident; later, however, Baruni was imprisoned in the Sanusi camp of Solum; no allowance was made for Baruni's distinguished position as the representative of the Ottoman Empire in Cyrenaica. A few months after his imprisonment Baruni was released, but he was forbidden to leave the camp. The Sanusis had cut him down to size. In December 1915, Baruni hurriedly left Cyrenaica of his own accord in a German submarine. Baruni's departure coincided with the invasion of Egypt by Ottomans in cooperation with the Sanusi leadership — the assignment on which he had been sent to Cyrenaica.[99]

2. The Mission of Nuri to Cyrenaica

In order to consolidate Ottoman authority in Libya, Nuri, Enver's brother, was sent to Cyrenaica in early-1915. Nuri landed near Solum on 23 March 1915 accompanied by several officers and carrying letters and money. Nuri was chosen for this mission because of his relationship to the Minister of War, a man who was greatly liked and highly esteemed in Cyrenaica. Nuri also had a general acquaintance with Libya from his own service there in the capacity as commander of Misurata in 1912. His main means of pressure in Cyrenaica was his control over the inflow and distribution of money, arms and equimpment. All the forces that were active in Cyrenaica were aware of this, and were reluctant to cut the personal and material ties with one of the strongest personalities in the Ottoman regime.[100]

When Nuri arrived in Cyrenaica relations between the Sanusis and Ottomans were very tense because of the imprisonment of Baruni and the suspicions harboured by the Sanusi leader, Ahmad al-Sharif, towards the Turks. In early-1915 there were some fifty Ottoman officers in

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Cyrenaica, one-half of them in the Solum camp with their freedom of movement very limited. The Sanusi leader was ready to recognize the Ottoman Caliph as the head of all the Moslems, but his consent was limited to an abstract authority who had no right to intervene and decide on regional affairs. In return, Ahmad al-Sharif demanded Ottoman recognition as an independent ruler in his sphere of influence, while at the same time accepting Ottoman support to satisfy the inhabitants' needs.[101] The Ottoman concept of its relations with the Sanusiya and the local elements was quite different from that of the Sanusi leader and aimed at subordinating the local elements to its authority and integrating them in the Ottoman establishment. Within this framework the Ottoman Sultan officially appointed Ahmad al-Sharif as the Caliph's representative in North Africa with the rank of Vezir and with the authority to grant ranks and decorations. In order to harness all the Sanusiya to the Ottoman camp and to avoid this appointment from increasing internal friction within the Sanusiya and between the latter and the Ottomans, the Sultan also appointed Idris al-Sanusi (the son of the previous Sanusi leader) as Vezir whose sphere of influence extended from southern Libya and tropical Africa to the Egyptian and Sudanese borders.[102]

The differences of opinion between the Ottomans and the Sanusis over the nature of their mutual relations led to a worsening of relations between the order and Nuri shortly after the latter's arrival in Cyrenaica. This conflict, however, did not bring about Nuri's arrest — as was Baruni's destiny — apparently because of his personal status. Splitting between the two groups started to become evident in the region: following the orders of the Sanusi leader and as a result of mutual reservations, the Ottomans concentrated in a separate camp in Bir War, some 3 kilometres west of the al-Masa`id camp (near Solum) where the Sanusis were encamped. Nuri made sure that all the supplies which the Ottomans had shipped to Cyrenaica were brought directly to his camp, where there were an arms and equipment depot and a workshop for the manufacture of ammunition. Another measure adopted by Ahmad al-Sharif to weaken Ottoman influence in his sphere of influence was to despatch Ottoman officers to the hinterland to isolate them; also, in every camp where an Ottoman was stationed

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there was also an Arab loyal to the Sanusiya to supervise the former's activities.[103] The Ottomans tried to overcome their isolation by increasing the number of the local inhabitants who were loyal to them.

A slight improvement in the situation of the Ottomans in this respect took place with the return to the region of some 35 young men who were sent from Cyrenaica in 1912 by Enver in order to study in schools and the military academy of Istanbul.[104] Most were sons of local notables and the Ottomans hoped to improve their own position in Cyrenaica through them. However, their small number, age, temporary separation from Cyrenaica and acquisition of foreign habits, together with the dominance of the Sanusiya over the tribal chiefs, resulted in only a slight improvement in the Ottomans' favour. Nuri tried to safeguard the position of the Ottomans and to improve contacts with Istanbul by keeping on good terms and maintaining close ties with the German consulate in Benghazi, through which he used to send letters and telegrams to Istanbul; he also used this channel to request aid when needed.[105]

Nuri took advantage of the internal conflicts within the Sanusi leadership in order to strengthen his position and influence. Since Nuri knew that Sidi Hilal, a younger brother of Ahmad al-Sharif, felt discriminated by the Sanusi leader and wanted wider authority, Nuri incited him to recruit a private army in Egypt which would be personally loyal to him. Hilal went to the region of Sidi Barani on the coast of Egypt in October 1915 and recruited some 100 men.[106] Whereas most of the population remained loyal to the head of the Sanusi order, Hilal commanded only on a small force, but it served as a threat and nuisance to his brother's position, and as a result the Sanusi pressure on the Ottomans became less intense.

Nuri's attempts to strengthen his relations with local influential figures, coupled with his control over the inflow of money and supplies, as well as the military knowledge of the Ottomans (their numbers grew in Autumn 1915 when the regular submarine service to Cyrenaica began) all caused Ahmad al-Sharif to be increasingly

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dependent on the Ottomans. Although he attempted to make life hard for the Ottomans, isolating them and limiting their freedom of movement, Ahmad al-Sharif could not do without their services and was even forced to honour their leaders and to publicly draw them near to him.[107] Eventually, he even had to act according to their political-military line, at the core of which was an Ottoman-Sanusi invasion of Egypt from Cyrenaica. Although the basic Sanusi position was one of friendliness towards Egypt and its British authorities, an anti-British approach began to be marked before the invasion and it found expression in attacks on British vessels in the vicinity of the Bay of Solum.[108] The growing Ottoman pressure and the economic restrictions which the British forced upon the Sanusis caused the Sanusis to abandon their former policy towards Egypt and the British, and to join the Ottoman initiative against them.

3. The Military Organization and the Invasion of Egypt

Until the Ottoman-Sanusi invasion of Egypt in November 1915 there was no visible orderly military organization at the main Sanusi camp in al-Masa`id (near Solum) where there were some 1,500 men. The members of every tribe encamped and trained separately under the command of a local officer who was well acquainted with conditions in the region to which his unit was to be sent; but there was no supreme command or inter-unit coordination.[109]

Details on the invading force were provided on the eve of the invasion. Theoretically, the force was under the supreme command of the head of the Sanusi order, Ahmad al-Sharif, who in line with the Sultanic orders was the supreme political, military and administrative authority in the region. In fact, however, most of the powers were centered in Nuri's hands and he served as the supreme military commander with the officers Ja`far al-`Askari and Ahmad Mukhtar as his deputies. The more important of the deputies was Ja`far who came from Baghdad, was a graduate of the military academies of Istanbul and Berlin and served for a while in France and Bulgaria. He was considered to be intelligent, talented and brave officer who had acquired wide combat experience in the Balkan War. When he reached

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Cyrenaica Ja`far started to train the local forces and organize them for the invasion of Egypt.[110] The force was combined of four brigades of four battalions (tabur) of 400 troops each, divided into four companies (bölük) of some 100-120 troops each. Every company was made up of members from one tribe, but there were tribes which formed more than one company. Among the companies were those of Sudanese, camel riders and Sanusi students (talabah). Some of the battalions were considered to be model training units (numune) whose troops were trained for junior command duties and to fulfil special tasks. As a result of the permanent struggle and the need for stable manpower, there was a gradual move away from a force based on volunteers to one based on regular recruits. On the eve of the invasion the percentage of those recruited grew from ten to twenty out of the able tribesmen of Cyrenaica.[111]

The original Ottoman-German plan was to invade Egypt simultaneously from three directions: from the east (Sinai), west (Cyrenaica) and south (Sudan). This plan was not executed because of military and organizational difficulties. As a result the Ottomans decided on a more limited plan:

1. From the north, along the coast from Solum to Alexandria, under the command of Ja`far al-`Askari;
2. From the west, along the Jaghbub-Siwa-Cairo route, under the command of Ahmad al-Sharif; and
3. From the south, from Darfur via Khartoum along the Nile valley, under the command of the Sultan of Darfur, `Ali Dinar.

At the head of the whole operation stood Nuri who was for most of the time with Ja`far and the Ottoman forces.[112]

The invasion of Egypt from Libya took place along two main axes which were divided into four sub-axes: the northern axis took in the coastal sub-axis from Solum to Matruh which was under the command of Nuri, and included a German chief-to-staff and Sidi Rida' al-Sanusi. The second northern axis passed south of Suwani towards Daba' and

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Buhayrah and was commanded by Ja`far and his deputy Sidi Hilal. The southern axes included one that advanced towards Wadi Harun and another that advanced towards Siwa and Fayum, both under the command of Musa Bey. Ahmad al-Sharif was at first with the northern forces of Nuri and Ja`far and afterwards moved to the southern route.

The invasion started in November 1915 and its timing was determined to a large extent by the beginning of the regular submarine service to Cyrenaica which increased the Ottoman presence and the inflow of supplies to the region.[113] The Sanusis finally had to comply with Ottoman policy, including its anti-British approach, due to their political, military and economic distress. The invading forces advanced swiftly and within a few days they reached the vicinity of Marsa Matruh (more than 200 kilometres from Solum) after the Egyptian posts of Solum and Sidi Barani had been captured. The oasis of Siwa was also taken and in mid-December 1915 Sanusi units were stationed there. The occupation of the coastal region was of vital importance for the Ottomans because it made it easier for the German Navy to supply men and equipment. Because of the relatively limited number of Egyptian forces in this region the supreme military command in Cairo decided on their evacuation without making any attempt to curb the advancing invasion, with the object of preparing a large-scale offensive based on a reorganized force combining infantry, motorized forces and aerial support.[114]

The main Sanusi force, numbering some 3,000-5,000 troops was concentrated in Bu Tunis (also referred to as Bir Tunis or Hazalin), west of Marsa Matruh. The supreme command -- Ahmad al-Sharif, Nuri and Ja`far and some twenty Turkish officers -- were in this camp which was commanded by Muhammad Salih. In this camp, even in the middle of the invasion, friction between Sanusis and Ottomans was evident and there were obstacles to their attempts at cooperation. Tribal rivalries arose in these conflicts; some tribes who were opposed to the Sanusiya (such as Harbi, Awlad `Ali, `Awaqir and Ghanishat) sided with the Ottomans, but their power was limited by comparison with the tribal force that remained loyal to the Sanusiya and which was in the majority.

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The invaders received a boost when they were reinforced by numerous deserters from the Egyptian Coast Guard, as well as local inhabitants. The British looked upon this military support for the Sanusiya (in addition to the traditional religious support) as the main danger of the invasion and therefore decided to reorganize their military force immediately in order to push the invaders back and wipe out any resistance. The British realized that the numerous followers of the Sanusiya, together with growing Egyptian nationalism and opposition to the increased British authority, served as fertile ground for a wide-scale Moslem anti-British revolt that might spread to the Sudan, as well as affecting Italian and French colonies.

4. The Egyptian Counter Attack

The Egyptian counter-attack started with the battle of Bu Tunis (22-23 January 1916).[115] The Egyptians captured the camp and set it on fire. The Sanusis suffered heavy casualties and many of the dead and injured were abandoned in the field to the Bedouin. The heavy rains and flooding made conditions very difficult and both sides faced severe problems in moving up infantry, cavalry and motorized vehicles. British eye-witnesses praised the Ottoman command, singling out Nuri and Ja`far for their leadership capabilities, their success in avoiding close-range skirmishes and their slow and orderly retreat combined with attacks on the Egyptian flanks while exploiting the ground conditions.

Differences of opinion between the Turks and Sanusis also come to the fore in this battle: when Nuri warned his forces that the offensive was near, following the detection of a British reconnaissance flight over the Bu Tunis camp, Ahmad al-Sharif hurriedly removed his body-guard and his followers with their arms and equipment. In addition, a few days before the decisive battle Ahmad al-Sharif sent some 300 troops to the oasis of Siwa to halt the supply of dates which was the fighters' main food. These steps were taken without the knowledge of the Turkish command which later claimed that they were an important factor in the defeat. Ahmad al-Sharif left the main force on his way to Siwa on 6-7 February 1916. Once the Turks

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knew of his intension to retreat, they hid eight new guns so that he could not take them with him, and after he left they moved the arms to the camp.[116] At the same time the Turks received an important boost with the arrival of the Egyptian nationalist `Abd al-Rahman `Azzam who stayed in Libya until 1919 and who became deeply involved in the Ottoman political and military struggle and later also that of the Tripolitanians.[117]

Following the defeat in Bu Tunis the invading forces withdrew southwards and westwards but still held positions east of Sidi Barani. The conflicts between the Turks and the Sanusis grew worse; they derived not only from each party's demand to lead the political and military activity, but to a no lesser degree from the big difference in their behaviour and mentality. There was an on-going controversy about discipline in camp: Ja`far threatened to resign if it was not made clear to the local recruits that they could not come and go as they pleased.[118] The Turkish commanders, who were accustomed to strict discipline, were unable to imbue their command with the free atmosphere of the Bedouin who lacked military strictness and who were not prepared for camp routine at times when there was no offensive activity. Whereas the Ottoman commanders demanded planning and a constant presence in camp, the local population was accustomed to gathering when alerted for an offensive and withdrawing to their own affairs when the danger had passed. The leadership of the revolt tried to solve this problem by attaching senior Sanusi figures to the Turkish commanders in the hope that they would be able to persuade the local people to accept orders. Such moves to diversify the leadership helped to soothe tempers but did not provide a solution in the long-run. An example of these differences of opinion and to a certain success for the Turkish group occurred when Nuri forced twenty-four `ulama' from Ahmad al-Sharif's entourage to leave the battlefield and withdraw to the camp of Solum where they were kept under house arrest. This group had tried to interfere with the way that Nuri was directing the military operation; its removal was seen as strengthening his position.[119]

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Following the defeat at Bu Tunis the main force was based in Aghajiyya, some 70 kilometres south-east of Sidi Barani. Nuri, the commander-in-chief, had two brigades under him; one was under the direct command of Ja`far with 1,000 local fighters divided into four battalions under a local command; the other was under the command of Fevzi Bey and comprised 900 Awlad `Ali fighters divided into four battalions, three of which were under Turkish command. Despite complaints voiced during the battle of Bu Tunis concerning the inferior quality of the Russian rifles, these arms were once again distributed to a large number of the fighters.[120]

The Egyptian Army under the command of General Lukin attacked the camp of Aghajiyya on 26 February 1916, occupied it and captured members of the supreme Ottoman command, including Ja`far al-`Askari and Nuri al-Sa`id. The immediate gains for the Egyptians were operational and informative: the capture of the most qualified and experienced officers seriously affected the combat ability and morale of the invaders. These prisoners could supply important intelligence on the Ottoman-Sanusi force, its size, make-up, equipment, operational ability and the internal disagreements. Their capture also had long-term benefits for the British and their influence on the political and military developments in the Middle East because some of these prisoners underwent a change in their loyalty and joined the "Arab Revolt" which started in June 1916. These Ottoman officers of Arab origin realized that the Ottoman Empire had been defeated on many fronts. As long as they had faith in the power of the Empire, the political rights of its minorities and their personal chances of advancing within the system, they did not reveal any separatist rebellious inclinations. The defeats at the higher state level, as well as the personal blows they had suffered, led them to change their political-military direction. They regarded the "Arab Revolt" as an opportunity to rid themselves of the yoke of the Ottoman Empire and establish an independent Arab state in which they would fill important political and military positions. These officers considerably strengthened the professional military component in the leadership of the "Arab Revolt", which was at first mainly composed of politicians,

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and this served as an important contribution to the development of the revolt.

The defeat in Aghajiyya illustrates even more than the defeat at Bu Tunis the change in security conditions in the border region between Cyrenaica and Egypt. The Egyptian motorized units continued their pursuits aimed at removing the invading force behind the border and at reoccupying the post of Solum. Another task facing the Egyptians was to drive away Ahmad al-Sharif and his followers who had penetrated deep into the Egyptian territory and fled from one oasis to another.

5. The Reorganization in Cyrenaica and the Beginnings of the Connections with Tripolitania

Following the removal of most of the invading force from Egypt in March 1916 (except for Ahmad al-Sharif and his followers), the Ottoman-Sanusi army stayed in camps and zawiyahs in Cyrenaica at a considerable distance west of the border.[121] There are few details on the size of the force, but it had dwindled considerably and its organization was shattered. The Sanusis no longer posed a threat to the Egyptian Army and did not attempt to invade Egypt again. Nevertheless, due to Egyptian fear of an invasion and in order to remove the remnants in Egypt of the rebellious Sanusis, the Egyptian Army had to concentrate some 40,000 troops in the Western Desert, and their absence was severely felt on the European and Palestinian fronts.

The Ottoman leadership was still interested in renewing the offensive against Egypt but was aware of the numerous obstacles in its path. The Ottomans had also not relinquished their original desire to act against the Italians in Libya. Consequently, following the retreat to Cyrenaica, Nuri tried to reorganize the forces that remained in the region and at the same time to strengthen ties with the rebels in Tripolitania with which there was hardly any contact. Within the framework of this policy Nuri asked one of the local commanders in the vicinity of Tripoli to send reinforcements to Cyrenaica. This request

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was answered positively; there were a number of reasons for it. As well as wishing to strengthen the position of the rebels against the Italians, Nuri also sought to improve the bargaining power of the Ottomans against the Sanusis by strengthening ties with factors rival to the Sanusiya, whose leadership was in the process of significant political change.[122] The request for Tripolitanian aid was an early sign of a move westwards by the Ottomans as a result of their incapability to act against Egypt. There was also, however, an internal reason for this trend, namely, the growing difficulties of channeling Sanusi activity along the lines of the directives of the Ottoman Empire following the withdrawal from the political and military scene of Ahmad al-Sahrif and the consolidation of the power of Idris al-Sanusi. The Ottomans continued to maintain proper relations with Ahmad al-Sharif and, in order to raise his status in Libya, they nominated him by Sultanic order to be the Sultan's representative in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.[123] The appointment was aimed at increasing the standing of Ahmad al-Sharif among the Sanusis and at indicating that he was still the Ottomans' choice as leader for the region. At the same time, the Ottomans, showing political realism, put out feelers to Idris al-Sanusi, although they knew that his political views were quite different from those of Ahmad and their own. Nuri and his companions visited Idris in his camp at Zuwaytina while he was holding negotiations with Italian officers; his attitude to the Ottoman visitors was negative and he even held them captive for a while.[124]

The inter-dependence which had troubled relations between Nuri and the Sanusis under Ahmad's leadership further worsened relations with the Sanusis following the growth in the power of Idris. The main cause of this was that there was no identity of political and military interests between Idris and the Ottomans. Since the local population did not want to lose the money and supplies which the Ottomans had sent, and on which they depended for their survival, Idris did not dare drive the Ottomans out of the region as long as the situation persisted. Ahmad al-Sharif, who had tried to achieve his political goals through military means, acted to a large extent in cooperation with the Ottomans because of mutual political interests. Idris, on the

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other hand, had tried to improve the conditions of the population in Cyrenaica and the authority of the Sanusiya through negotiations with the Italians and the British. Ottoman support in 1916 was still vital for him, but to a lesser degree than for his predecessor; the military equipment provided him with a deterrent capability rather than for aggression and Idris needed it so long as he did not reach an agreement with the Italians and the British. For this reason Idris was much more inflexible in his contacts with the Ottomans. As early as July 1916, Idris had used these developments to isolate most of the Ottoman officers and to deprive them of the command over the forces in the vicinity of Zuwaytina -- the centre of Idris' sphere of influence. Consequently, many of the Turks gathered at the adjacent Jedabiya camp while another group, numbering some two-hundred was encamped at `Ujilat, followed Idris' orders and were isolated from the population. Idris often censored the correspondence between Enver and Nuri and controlled the reports sent to Ahmad al-Sharif. This was a source of friction between the Ottomans and Idris, whose power increased following his take-over of the sources of information. However, the strict orders that the commanders of the German submarines had received -- to deliver the money, arms and other equipment to Nuri alone -- precluded Idris' assumption of absolute control over the Ottomans. In addition, the influence of Idris over the whole population was not yet complete and as a result Nuri and his companions won the support of several tribes, the most important of whom were the `Awaqir and Sawahili. As long as Idris could not reach an agreement with the Italians he was not in a position to entirely give up exploiting the professional qualifications of the Ottoman officers and technicians; they continued to serve even in remote camps, but their numbers constantly dwindled.[125]

6. The Transition of the Ottomans to Tripolitania

As the status of the Ottomans in Cyrenaica deteriorated, so their contacts with personalities in Tripolitania increased and the pace of their transition westwards accelerated. This penetration was accomplished mainly through two routes: by sea from the ports of Cataro and Pola in the Adriatic to Misurata, and by land from

Cyrenaica. In mid-1916 German submarines started to call at Misurata. Soon after, a submarine base and an advanced German wireless station ("Mirr Station") were established nearby existing rebel camps.

In July 1916 Yahya al-Baruni landed there followed three months later by his brother Sulayman, who was appointed by the Ottomans as Governor (Vali) and military commander of Tripolitania.[126] The Ottoman Government decided once again to take advantage of Sulaymen al-Baruni's position in Libya but this time, contrary to its measures on the eve of World War I, the government was careful to send him to his clear sphere of influence. However, because of his long absence from Tripolitania, rival factors were strengthened in his former power base in Jebel Gharbi, and especially in the coastal zone. In order to strengthen its position in Tripolitania the Ottoman Government tried to satisfy the political ambitions of several elements, resulting in confusion with regard to political and administrative subordination: according to the hierarchy, Sulayman al-Baruni was subordinate both to Nuri, the supreme Ottoman commander in Libya, and also to Ahmad al-Sharif, the Sultan's representative in Libya. In fact, however, Ahmad had no real influence in Tripolitania in which the position of the Sanusiya was weak from the start, whereas the position of Idris in Cyrenaica had strengthened. On the other hand, Nuri and his followers enjoyed strong Ottoman backing and numerous conflicts concerning the leadership broke out between them and Sulayman al-Baruni.

Relations between the Ottomans and Tripolitanian notables were tightened following the visit of Ramadan al-Shitawi, the leader of the Misurata region, to Nuri at Jedabiya in late-October 1916. Ramadan received large sums of money from Nuri and returned to Misurata accompanied by eight Ottoman officers.[127] In parallel with the increased Ottoman move westwards, Nuri tried to curb the tendency (which spread among the local population in Cyrenaica under Italian pressure) to hand over arms to the Italians. Nuri promised a financial reward for whoever caught anyone who had handed over arms to the Italians; such people were tried on the spot and put to death. As a result, many chose to leave those regions under dwindling Ottoman influence and Ottoman influence was weakened even further. Another

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announcement from Nuri also resulted from local conditions: he expressed a readiness to demobilize all those local volunteers who were serving against their will.[128] Since numerous fighters had abandoned the camps as a result of the defeats and the lack of offensive military activity, Nuri preferred not to try to keep them by force but to reconcile himself to the situation so long as he was unable to initiate real offensives. He knew that if conditions improved and the offensive was renewed, volunteers would gather once again. As the abandonment of Nuri by the local volunteers increased and the position of the Ottomans weakened, so the status of Idris was strengthened and his independent contacts with Italian and British elements grew. This dual development further accelerated the movement of Nuri and his companions to Tripolitania.

The turning point in this process occurred on 10 December 1916 when Nuri and his staff moved from Jedabiya to Misurata. The consolidation of Nuri's position in Misurata was made easier by the fact that in 1912 he was the regional commander there. From his new centre of operations Nuri started to initiate contacts with local influential figures and to cement his position as military commander. He established telegraphic and telephone contacts between all important Tripolitanian centres, and numerous Ottoman signal operators were sent to remote camps. This network not only improved communications in Tripolitania but also stationed loyal Ottomans in key positions all over the region. From 1917 a few isolated Ottoman military personnel remained in Cyrenaica but their influence was negligible when compared with the growing political and military power concentrated in the hands of Idris and his followers. In this period the Ottoman invlovement in Libya was limited to Tripolitania, but even there power struggles soon broke out between Ottomans and local notables. The boundary between the Tripolitanian and Sanusi spheres of influence passed in the vicinity of the castle of Sirt, but it was not permanent and was pushed backwards and forwards according to prevailing local conditions.

From their centre in Misurata the Ottomans, with Nuri at their head, tried to re-establish their rule in Tripolitania. They sought to

win over the local population and also made retro-active salary payments to Ottoman administrators who remained. Since the Ottoman administration in Tripolitania had been based until the Italian invasion on the local element to a much larger degree than in Cyrenaica, there were many more prospective candidates for Ottoman benefits in the western then in the eastern province. Ottoman representatives frequently toured the region, distributed money and announced a Jihad against the Italians. Simultaneously, they attempted to incite the Cyrenaicans against Idris. In order to give more credibility to Ottoman declarations about a Jihad, Nuri started to act in a religious manner, realizing that the lack of religiosity on the part of the Ottomans was one of the reasons for conflicts between Ottomans and Sanusis. The sudden change in Nuri's behaviour did not arouse much credibility in both regions. His renewed attempts to intervene in Cyrenaica against Idris did not succeed and even those who had been tempted usually returned to Idris' camp.[129]

Ottoman activity against Idris and his followers was directed mainly through Ramadan al-Shitawi who operated in the region between Misurata and Sirt. Ramadan strengthened his ties with Ahmad al-Sharif who withdrew from Egypt to Libya. Nuri had started to show a clear preference for Ramadan as the central Tripolitanian figure on whom the Ottomans intended to base their regional activity. The only support with which Nuri could provide Ramadan against his Tripolitanian and Sanusi rivals was that of money and arms; his own power base was meagre.[130] This preference was resented by Sulayman al-Baruni who, following lengthy absences came to be regarded as an Ottoman representative and no longer as an authentic local leader.

Idris, for his part, continued to deal harshly with the few Ottomans remaining in his sphere of influence. In mid-1917 he placed strict controls on some twenty Ottoman officers; some were arrested. The number of those imprisoned grew in a short time, and in July 1917 Idris revealed that in the Jedabiya region he was holding some 150 Ottoman prisoners, among them 41 officers. At first, Idris preferred to keep them near to him in order to supervise them personally, but in early-August 1917 he started to exile them to the remote Sanusi centre

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of Kufra. Some prisoners died during the hot, exhausting desert journey. However, thanks to support provided by several of Idris' rivals, some Ottomans managed to escape from their imprisonment in early-1918.[131] Idris tried to prevent the infiltration of Ottomans and their supporters to Cyrenaica; in order to achieve this aim his units, in cooperation with the Egyptian Army, patrolled the Egytpian-Cyrenaican border to prevent the infiltration of hostile elements and the smuggling of anti-Sanusi propaganda.[132]

By Summer 1917 the Ottoman presence in Tripolitania had become quite powerful and Sulayman al-Baruni was able to declare that the holy Ottoman flag was again to be hoisted in the region to protect his loyal followers.[133] The German submarines, whose calls at Misurata had grown in number since May 1917, brought in arms, wireless equipment, money and Ottoman and German officers. With Nuri at Qasr Hamid nearby Misurata was the Egyptian nationalist `Abd al-Rahman `Azzam. By late-1917 there were some twenty posts on the western Tripolitanian coast with about 5,000 troops (including artillerymen) under the command of Ottoman, Egyptian and local officers. The Ottoman-Tripolitanian force held most of Tripolitania; Italian control was limited to the areas around the cities of Tripoli, Khoms and Zuwara. The Italians used propaganda and distributed various benefits to win over the local population, but their achievements were limited. They exploited for propaganda purposes information they had obtained on hunger and inflation in Istanbul and the rallying of the Arabs around Sharif Husyan of Mecca within the framework of the "Arab Revolt" against the Ottoman Empire.[134] This, however, did not direct the support for the Ottomans to the Italians.

Meanwhile, the conflicts between Nuri and Sulayman al-Baruni deepened to include personal as well as professional issues. Baruni was seen as an energetic person who did not understand anything about warfare but who insisted on directing the military activity. Nuri held him responsible for the troubles that had broken out in `Aziziya where Baruni was staying. Nuri suspected that Baruni was using for his personal needs taxes that he had collected for public purposes, as well as money sent to him from Misurata for army needs.[135] Nuri's

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ability to enforce his authority over the local elements in Tripolitania was limited. Baruni and his followers acted independently; and the German camp which had been established in Misurata was in practice out of bounds to Ottomans and local inhabitants alike. Nuri's relations with Ramadan were correct, but the latter and his followers nevertheless did as they pleased and did not pay much heed to Nuri. Their power actually increased thanks to the material aid they received from Nuri, and to the chagrin of other Tripolitanian leaders.

After a year's stay in Tripolitania Nuri and his closest aides left Misurata for Istanbul on a German submarine on 3 January 1918.[136] Nuri's departure was caused by his numerous conflicts with local notables, his inability to act in Libya to realize the goals for which he had been sent to North Africa, and because his brother Enver wanted him to lead the Ottoman struggle in the Caucasus.

7. The Mission of İshak Paşa to Triplitania

İshak Paşa replaced Nuri as the senior Ottoman representative and the supreme commander of the military forces in Libya. İshak and his staff arrived on 17 December 1917 in Zawiyah, west of Tripoli. He was a cavalry officer and had served in Suani Bani Adam during the Turkish-Italian War. One reason for his selection for this mission was his high standing among the local population thanks to his previous activity in the region. He was also regarded as trustworthy by the Young Turks and was a close friend of Enver.[137] From the day of his arrival İshak made a good impression on the population; he made a point of immediately visiting the various camps in order to mend fences between the Ottomans, the local population and within rival groups of the local leadership. He held regional meetings in `Aziziya and Misurata, for example, to which the neighbouring tribes were invited. İshak established his headquarters in Zawiyah, which was by then also Baruni's centre, in order to keep an eye on Baruni whose goals İshak considered to be dictatorial. İshak gradually succeeded in concentrating in his hands both the civilian as well as the military authority and soon became the person directly responsible to the

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Ottoman Government on Tripolitania's affairs, not only in theory but also in practice.[138]

In parallel with the strengthening of the Ottoman authority in Tripolitania, attempts continued to consolidate the position of those local notables loyal to the Ottomans. One of the figures who received much encouragement was Ahmad al-Sharif who had moved his activities to Tripolitania. In February 1918, Yusuf Shatwan Bey, a former deputy of Bhenghazi to the Ottoman Parliament and one of the leaders of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa, arrived in Misurata. He carried with him a Sultanic order appointing Ahmad al-Sharif as the Sultan's representative in the whole of North Africa. But moves to make Yusuf Shatwan responsible for Cyrenaica were frustrated by the power of Idris and the Sanusiya; Ottoman attempts at involvement there, even using a notable of Cyrenaican origin, came to nothing.[139]

To the bitter disappointment of the Ottoman Government, and in spite of the initial good impression that İshak Paşa had made on his arrival in Tripolitania, conflicts soon started to break out, caused to a large extent by the wide differences between Ottoman officers and the local population. İshak fell out not only with Baruni: the population as a whole rejected the strictness that characterised his relations with the local troops and the people. He inflicted severe punishment on Tripolitanians who surrendered to the Italians and who were later captured by the Ottomans. There were complaints about the violent and haughty attitude of the Turks towards the local population; it was claimed that the former had sometimes gone to the market-place and taken foodstuffs by force and without paying. The local notables protested against İshak's harsh attitude and even Ramadan, the closest ally of the Ottomans, eventually came out against İshak. He asked the Ottoman Government to refrain from sending to Libya any more officers like İshak lest it might increase internal friction which would impede the Empire's actions in the region. Another complaint concerned the attempts of İshak and his staff to abolish the tribal basis in the army; the local notables opposed such moves because they could have eradicated one of their main sources of power. As a result of all these developments, İshak Paşa remained

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isolated and Baruni announced that he would not return to his centre in Zawiyah so long as İshak resided there.

8. The Mission of Prince Osman Fuad to Tripolitania

The appointment of İshak Paşa was a military one par excellence; he was a veteran, an experienced officer who was close to the ruling party and to the Minister of War. Those who nominated him took his previous activities into account and hoped that he would be accepted by the local population and would be able to establish proper relations between the Ottoman regime and the Tripolitanians. However, the numerous conflicts which continued between the Ottomans and the local population even after İshak's arrival persuaded Enver that the representative of the Ottoman Government should not only have military qualifications, but should also be a respectable personality politically and one with great personal prestige. İshak was kept in Libya but his role was limited to the military sphere. In May 1918, Prince Osman Fuad, grandson of Sultan Murad V, arrived in Tripolitania as the Sultan's representative in Libya. Osman Fuad's prestige derived not only from the fact that he was a member of the ottoman ruling family, but also because his father was second in line to the throne. In addition, Osman Fuad had military training as well as political experience. Enver had hoped that these qualifications would make it easier for Osman Fuad to be accepted by the population, to organize it militarily, improve its relations with the Ottoman troops and initiate operations against the Italians.[140] In honour of Osman Fuad's arrival an impressive reception was laid on with the participation of numerous Tripolitanian notables. Absence from this ceremony was considered not only an act of contempt, but also a sign of insubordination. For this reason Ramadan sent an angry and threatening letter to another local notable (Ahmad al-Mura'id) who did not appear at the reception.

Following Osman Fuad's arrival a renewed attempt was made to strengthen relations between the Ottomans and Ahmad al-Sharif and to increase his standing among the Tripolitanian people. Officers from the prince's entourage brought Ahmad al-Sharif another Sultanic order confirming that he was the leader of the insurrection in the whole of

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North Africa -- from Egypt to Morocco -- against the enemies of the Empire, and they also gave him gold and valuable presents. Another Ottoman envoy, Yusuf Shatwan, was once again sent to Ahmad al-Sharif, while Sadik Paşa, an officer, was given the task of forcing the local population, and especially Ramadan, to obey Ahmad al-Sharif. The efforts of the Ottoman Government to strengthen the position of Ahmad al-Sharif in Libya did not succeed, and in August 1918 he left Libya for good in a German submarine, heading for Istanbul.[141] The Ottomans continued to try to take advantage of his position in order to advance their interests in Libya and in the Arab world as a whole.

A short while after his arrival in Libya Osman Fuad moved his headquarters to the hinterland region of Gharyan. This decision was based on Gharyan's centrality in relation to the various Tripolitanian forces, as well as for security reasons. The post's abandoned Italian telegraph station was renovated, making it possible to communicate with all the forces around Tripolitania.[142] Delegations of local notables started to call on the headquarters at Gharyan to express their loyalty and to consult the prince, who frequently visited other camps.

Following negotiations between the Ottoman and local military commanders and the Tripolitanian notables it was decided to reorganize the army and the administration. The reorganization of the army was based on increased local mobilization and a renewed division of manpower so that the new units would not be composed on a tribal basis. The Ottoman intention had been to strengthen the position of the Ottoman officers within the army and to weaken tribal power centres. It was hoped that this would also prevent, or at least limit, inter-tribal conflicts. The strengthening of the position of the Ottoman officers once again aroused feelings of bitterness among the local troops and the tribal leadership; the behaviour of the former was regarded as strict and haughty, and desertions of local fighters increased.

Osman Fuad tried to reconcile rival tribes and to arrange demarcation lines in order to prevent future friction. In this

connection he visited Ubirat in order to pacify the tribes of Tarhuna and Misurata and to demarcate their respective spheres of influence so that they would not transgress upon each other's territory.[143] Despite his good intentions Osman Fuad did not manage to iron out the differences between the Ottomans and the local population and between the various tribes due to the considerable difference in the ways of life and thought, tribal opposition to the idea of once again being subject to a foreign authority, and because of the permanent internal rivalries between the various factions in Tripolitania.

9. The Ottoman Departure from Libya at the End of the War

In October 1918 the conviction had strengthened among the Ottoman leadership in Istanbul that the war was coming to its conclusion and that the Empire was on the defeated side. Out of concern for the well-being of the Ottoman family, Osman Fuad was called back to Istanbul and a submarine was to evacuate him from Misurata on 19 October 1918. It was decided that his successor would be İshak paşa, who had served as military commander alongside the Prince in Tripolitania. However, because of the political and military conditions in the region, Osman Fuad's departure was delayed by eight months. Following the cease-fire agreement of Mudros and the escape from the Empire of the leading figures among the Young Turks, the new Grand Vezir, Ahmed Izzet, telegraphed Tripolitania informing the troops of the cease-fire and ordering them to stop fighting. In late-November 1918, the Ottoman Government ordered its representatives in Libya to immediately implement there all the articles of the cease-fire agreement. Osman Fuad was made responsible for the execution of these orders and he was requested to return to Istanbul, with Italian assistance.[144]

With the end of World War I the new Ottoman leadership in Istanbul sought to dissociate itself from its involvement in the lengthy struggle in Libya. In the region itself, however, the atmosphere was different. Quite a few Ottoman officers wanted to stay in Libya and fight the Italians and were even prepared to operate under a local command. The local population, too, was not in favour of

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letting the Ottomans leave. Despite the frequent and lengthy conflicts between the Tripolitanians and the Ottomans, the former recognized the high professional qualifications of the Ottoman officers and technicians and their decisive contribution for the success of the struggle against the Italians. In addition, it was very difficult for many Ottomans and local fighters alike to free themselves from the notion that the Ottoman Empire had a long-standing obligation to struggle for Moslem independence and to ward off a Christian occupation of Moslem regions; they believed that the Empire could not unilaterally dissociate itself from this obligation so quickly. The anouncement of the cease-fire created a feeling in Tripolitania that the Ottoman officers who were stationed there had the right to stay and to serve under Ahmad al-Sharif, the supreme local authority who was recognized as such by the Ottoman Sultan and about whose anticipated return there were many rumours.[145]

From late-1918, Ottoman officers, including those stationed in western Tripolitania, started to gather in Gharyan. This came about due to Turkish initiatives as well as local pressure. The local population, who opposed the departure of the Turks, decided to concentrate them in a place remote from the Mediterranean shore in order to make it difficult for them to make a quick escape by submarine. The officers were housed in the castle at Gharyan and were kept under constant supervision by the local fighters to prevent their escape. The Ottomans, for their part, felt safer when together and not scattered around in remote places. In the first few months of 1919 some of these officers, including Osman Fuad, were transferred to Bani Walid and Ubirat. Shortly afterwards it became apparent to the Ottomans and the Germans that they were in fact being held prisoner by the local population; a Turkish officer who arrived in order to arrange their return home had to leave without achieving anything.

İshak Paşa offered his services to the rebels and wanted to be commander-in-chief of the insurrection, but he did not receive an unequivocal answer because of disagreement among the rebels concerning whether or not a Turkish officer should command them; they had already had a bitter acquaintance with this grim officer. Some inhabitants

were ready to cooperate with İshak, but Ramadan strongly opposed the subordination of the Arab forces to the command of a Georgian. Ramadan eventually succeeded in convincing the other Arab commanders to reject İshak's proposal, which had not been widely welcomed in any case.[146]

Following the strengthening of Ramadan's position — he declared himself to be the head of the independent Arab Republic of North Africa — the condition of the Turkish prisoners, including Prince Osman Fuad, worsened. The Tripolitanians hoped to continue the military and economic cooperation with the Ottomans, and consequently did not want the Ottoman officers and technicians to leave, nor to sever relations with the Empire. On the other hand, there was no chance that the local leadership would subordinate itself to foreign elements: its Arab national views were starting to consolidate at the time with the active encouragement of the Egyptian nationalist `Abd al-Rahman `Azzam who was with Ramadan.

The Ottoman officers tried to escape in small groups and some managed to reach the Italian occupied zone. Osman Fuad tried to obtain British help for his own release; a freed British prisoner planned to get him out, but failed. Eventually, in March 1919, Osman Fuad and other officers surrendered to the French authorities in Tunisia who transferred them to Tripoli from where they sailed in late-June 1919 on an Italian government ship bound for Naples, and then on to Istanbul.[147] Another group of some forty Ottomans, which included İshak, gathered in Tripoli in September 1919 after managing to escape. In October 1919 the last remnants of the Ottomans left Tripolitania, thus ending the Ottoman involvement in Libya.[148]

3. Conclusion

The Ottoman involvement in Libya had several purposes; their importance varied during the various phases of the struggle. The first, immediate aim was the protection of the integrity of the Empire or, in a wider sense, guarding the "Realm of Islam" from encroachments

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by a member of the "Realm of War". In contrast with the early days of the Empire, when the Holy War was used as a vehicle to widen the sphere of Moslem sovereignty, in its last years the Jihad became a means of curbing the shrinking of Moslem sovereignty that resulted from the splitting of Ottoman regions by external Christian forces or separatism. In the first phase of the struggle there was a certain overlapping between protection of the Empire's integrity and the struggle against Italian occupation. As time passed, the struggle for liberation from the yoke of Italian occupation became the primary and self-sustaining goal. The change became evident following the Ottoman-Italian peace agreement under which the Ottomans, without explicitly saying as much, in fact recognized the loss of their sovereignty in Libya either as a result of the Italian occupation, or through handing the country over to self-rule by its Moslem population.

During the inter-war period, another Ottoman goal evolved, but the Ottomans could not declare it publicly because they feared a hostile Italian and Libyan response: the return of Ottoman rule to Libya. Since, in this period, the Ottoman Empire maintained proper diplomatic relations with Italy, and since the Ottomans handed over rule in Libya to the local population, it was not considered to be politically or militarily wise for the Empire to openly declare its desire to regain sovereignty of Libya; there were nevertheless signs that this indeed was the goal. However, as time passed and the local population grew more and more accustomed to independently conducting its own civil and military affairs, its readiness to re-subjugate itself to foreign sovereignty diminished, although it was prepared to receive Ottoman aid and cooperation.

In the first phase of the struggle, during the Turkish-Italian War, the Ottomans had a clear and undisputed supremacy in command thanks to their numerical strength and the stores of military equipment they controlled. Tradition also helped, according to which it was the Ottomans who headed the ruling, military and administrative leadership, although most positions in the middle and lower ranks were manned by local inhabitants. Even though the Ottomans during this

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phase constituted no more than twenty percent of all the fighters (and in Cyrenaica only some five percent or less), there was no objection to their leadership. Whereas prior to the war the Ottoman Army in Libya was made up entirely of troops from other Ottoman provinces, during the war the tribal population joined the struggle -- while maintaining their separate and homogeneous tribal frameworks -- under the direct command of shaykhs who accepted without question the military and political authority of the Ottomans. Due to the large number of local troops and the huge amounts of arms and other military equipment which they received from army stocks, it was in their power to cast off the Ottoman yoke, but they recognized the military and political advantages which were to be had from this cooperation and consequently did not initiate its dismantlement.

In the second phase of the struggle, during the inter-war period, the Empire dissociated itself from the insurrection, at least theoretically. Following the retreat of most of the Ottomans from Libya, its administration and army was transferred for the most part to the local population which strived to ensure its absolute authority in Libya. The Ottomans, despite the official dissociation, still wanted to influence events, but external and internal circumstances made this possible only covertly: by leverage from Istanbul and the despatch of envoys. The local population was in need of the material help from the Empire, and when it arrived they were reminded that they were not alone in their struggle. The local population, however, was not prepared to accept only occasional support while a few hundred troops would bestow upon foreigners the political and military authority. The local leadership, using all the means at its disposal, tried to prevent the withdrawal of the Ottomans in order to exploit their professional qualifications as commanders and technicians, but the system as a whole was under a local authority which stubbornly opposed any attempt to make it relinquish its independence.

In the third phase of the struggle, during World War I, the declared policy of the Ottoman Empire was to renew its overt involvement in Libya and to subject the local leadership to Ottoman authority. The alliance with Germany improved the direct Ottoman

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connection with Libya and, consequently, large quantities of supplies, including money, military equipment and foodstuffs were regularly sent to Libya. Through their exclusive control over the distribution of these supplies, the Ottomans strengthened their position in Libya to such a degree that they even temporarily succeeded in channelling the military activity of the Sanusiya against the latter's better judgement. Because of the small number of the Ottomans and the growing influence of the local notables, whose power had grown in part due to the arms and money received from the Ottomans, the latter were able to influence developments only to a limited extent. They could not turn the clock back and regain the authority of government which they had passed to the local population by proclamation and in practice and which, even before the Italian invasion, had not been totally in Ottoman hands in the hinterland. The Ottomans' freedom of action in this period was conditional on the relative strength of the local leaders in the various Libyan districts, as well as in the degree to which the interests of the local leadership and the Ottomans coincided: the war-like policy of the local leaders made them more dependent on arms and economic resources, and the Ottomans took advantage of this dependence to strengthen their own position, but their limited numbers precluded a total exploitation of this advantage for a complete take-over. It was the local population that derived most benefit from the Ottoman involvement, which supplied the Libyans with qualified manpower, military equipment and economic resources, but these advantages were not translated into political and military supremacy.

The fluctuations in the scope of human and material support which the Ottomans supplied during their involvement in the struggle against the Italians in Libya influenced the dimensions and intensity of the insurrection; but the population held its ground for other reasons too, and despite the complete halt to Ottoman involvement in Libya in the 1920s the revolt continued until it was entirely crushed in the early-1930s. The population recognized the importance of Ottoman assistance but after it took upon itself the powers of government and the responsibility for protecting its independence, it was not

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prepared any longer to subject itself to any foreign rule. Only a massive penetration could have given back to the Ottomans their rule over Libya; and this they could not afford. Moreover, feelings of independence that were running high among the Libyan population and the nationalistic ideas which started to spread in the region would have made a return of Ottoman sovereignty look like occupation to all intents and purposes, in spite of religious affinities and previous friendship.

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CHAPTER THREE: THE EMERGENCE OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN LIBYA

Most of the Moslem population of Libya opposed the Italian invasion and joined the struggle against the occupation. From the very first stages of the occupation one Italian presumption had been shown to be inaccurate: that because of internal tensions between the local population and the Ottoman regime the former would welcome the Italians as liberators from a hated, hostile and dictatorial rule. The confrontation between the Libyan population and the Ottoman regime had been based on the opposition of the tribes and their chiefs to any external rule whatsoever, as well as the rejection of various aspects of Ottoman rule, such as taxation, mobilization and corruption. When the population had to choose between Ottoman and Italian rule, and later on between self-rule or Ottoman or Italian rule, the decision went against the Italians in any case, and against the Ottomans if the alternative was self-rule. The tribes, which rejected any foreign rule, considered the Ottoman regime, which was both Moslem and quite well-known, to be the lesser of two evils when compared to an Italian occupation. Here was the source for Libyan readiness to closely cooperate with the Ottomans to the degree of accepting Ottoman military command in order to drive the Italians out.

The struggle against the Italian occupation was based first and foremost on opposition to the domination of a Christian European power in a Moslem land and over its people. Even though the religious knowledge of most of the population was not very deep, they took pride in their religion and expressed disgust at the Christians. The thought that their country would be cut off from the "Realm of Islam" was abominable and terrifying. Rumours concerning the status of the Christian rulers in neighbouring countries in comparison to that of the Moslem population further increased reservations about the Italians. In time, the insurrection took on a national colouring, but its vigour was much weaker than that of the religious factor and was

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not unequivocal. The feeling of belonging to the Ottoman Empire had increased in Libya since the return of Ottoman rule in the mid-nineteenth century, following the regime's ideological activity and its attempt to advance and develop the region. The beginnings of political activity on an all-Ottoman basis further developed Ottoman national feeling. On the other hand, the reservations about the penetration of foreigners was nothing new. The economic, cultural and political activity of the Italians in Libya on the eve of their invasion was quite aggressive and was firmly rejected by the Moslems. Yet the condition of many Italian workers in Libya was lowly and they barely managed to make a living. Consequently, by comparison with other Europeans, who were feared and honourd, Italians were despised.

During the Turkish-Italian War Ottoman nationalism was presented as a possible response to Italian occupation, but the national concept did not yet enjoy wide use in the Empire as a whole and in Libya in particular. Following the peace agreement between the Ottomans and the Italians in October 1912 and the granting of autonomy to the Libyan population by the Ottoman regime, the use of national arguments and Ottoman nationalism in particular tended to fade. As a result of the absence of an all-Libyan national feeling, the existing limited national feeling was divided among regional, tribal and sectarian loyalties, whose dimensions fluctuated according to region and period. The population hardly ever explained the motives for its struggle against the Italian occupation, but it never ceased to declare its total opposition to foreign rule. Religious (Moslem), national (Ottoman) and regional (tribal and familial) loyalties were the main ideological factors in the resistance to the Italians. The most limited loyalty was the most influential one on the behaviour of the individual, the family and the tribe, whereas cooperation was made possible thanks to the wider loyalties of the tribal chiefs, religious (mainly Sanusi) figures and Ottomans.

In addition to the ideological motivation, there were also material reasons for the struggle against the Italians. Already in the early stages of the rebellion there existed the fear -- which after a short while was proved to be justified -- that the occupation would

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harm economically all strata of local society: the farmers whose fertile soil would be seized; the urban labourers who would have to compete with manpower that might receive preferable treatment from the regime; and the local artisans and enterpreneurs who would also face fierce Italian competition. Local inhabitants who were integrated in the Ottoman administration and army were anxious lest they would be pushed aside by the Italian authorities. Although the Italians tried to draw these elements nearer to them and involve them in their new institutions, it was clear to the local Moslem population that their status within an Italian-Christian establishment would be inferior to what it had been in an Ottoman-Moslem one. The local notables were the ones who were most fearful for a change in their position; their integration within the Ottoman establishment promised to give them an important status in local government, as well as amongst the heads of the Ottoman Government in Libya. The attempts of the colonial regimes in the neighbouring countries to eliminate regional power centres served as a warning to the tribal and Sanusi chiefs about what might happen to them.

The local inhabitants and their leaders also hoped for personal and tribal gains from joining the Ottomans in the struggle against the Italian occupation. The fact that the Ottomans desperately needed the support of the local population in the struggle gave the latter and its leadership bargaining positions and benefits which they could not hope to otherwise obtain. The cooperation with the Ottomans strengthened the local notables since the Ottomans became increasingly dependent on their assistance. The ruling, administrative and military position of the notables was recognized by the Ottomans and brought them various rewards. Not only was there a boost for the prestige of the local notables; their military power was also strengthened thanks to their position in the military system and mainly due to the military equipment which was supplied to them in large quantities from Ottoman Army stocks. There was no real control over its use or its return to the Ottoman authorities and the local inhabitants often used it to their own advantage. The military cooperation also gave the notables and population valuable military experience. The economic power of the notables also increased thanks to money which they

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received and because they were responsible for most of the administration. The latter gave them control over extensive economic resources and increased the population's dependence on them. More often than not, such dependence brought with it financial gains. The position of the local fighters also improved as a result of the military equipment, salaries, uniform and food which they received. Many also sought an outlet for their energy in military activity and they received all the equipment they needed — and often more than they needed.

1. Tripolitania

A. The Turkish-Italian War

Most of the Tripolitanian population opposed the Italian occupation and some 20,000-30,000 participated in the struggle against the Italians. There were constant fluctuations in the number of local volunteers because the Tripolitanians did not consider themselves to be regular mobilized troops who were totally and constantly subject to the authority of the supreme military command. The volunteers had grown accustomed from ancient times to joining the battle or leaving it as they pleased according to the conditions prevailing on the battlefield and the agricultural season. The importance of this volunteer movement did not lie only in the absolute number of those who actually volunteered, but also in the general readiness of the Tripolitanians to fight alongside the Ottomans against the Italian occupation. The moral and material support of the local population was of special value and without it the rebellion could neither have started nor continued for some twenty years. The increased dependence on the local leadership for the development of the struggle and the organization of daily life, coupled with the military and economic benefits it received, considerably improved the position of the local leadership externally and internally. However, while the broad internal divisions in Tripolitania and the absence of a local unifying factor strengthened the position of many notables, a supreme

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leadership for the whole of Tripolitania did not emerge; this was one of the main reasons for the collapse of the rebellion.

1. Local Volunteering

As soon as the war broke out two Tripolitanian leaders started to organize the local resistance to the Italian occupation, and placed their forces under the command of the Ottoman Army. The two were Farhad al-Zawi and Sulayman al-Baruni, the deputies of the Tripolitanian coast and Jebel Gharbi to the Ottoman Parliament. Although both lacked military training and experience, they were nevertheless the senior leaders in their spheres of influence (due to their family position and personality) and were thus able to persuade the population to join the struggle. The two harnessed the tribal and religious leadership in their districts where much of the population was concentrated; as a result the support and participation of most of the population of Tripolitania and southern Libya (and even beyond the border) was ensured.

Farhad al-Zawi belonged to a Kuloğlu family in Zawiyah in the agricultural hinterland of Tripoli and was about fifty years old when the war broke out. He had received an Arab-Islamic education in Tripoli and Tunis and had also studied French and law in Paris. On his return to Libya he was appointed as a judge and later on served as Kaymakam in the district of Shati in Fezzan. The Italian invasion did not surprise him: on the eve of the invasion he had warned the Ottoman regime of the danger and had demanded that the local garrison be reinforced and its capabilities improved so that it would be ready to face a possible invasion.[1] Farhad recruited the inhabitants of the Tripolitanian coast from Zuwara to Misurata. He sent letters to the shaykhs demanding that they protect their homeland. He also personally persuaded the hesitant and the doubters to join the Ottoman camp. Farhad was the first local leader who met up with volunteers at the new Ottoman headquarters in 'Aziziya. The arrival of the volunteers stimulated and increased the Ottoman garrison and made it unnecessary to continue the withdrawal to Gharyan. The Italian decision to temporarily halt the penetration into the hinterland was exploited by

the Ottomans and the local volunteers to reorganize the combined force. During this period of time the headquarters at 'Aziziya was consolidated and more shaykhs reached it with their men. Farhad did not respond to Italian wooing; in return for crossing over to their side he was promised much money and many honours as well as nomination as Tripolitanian deputy in the Italian Parliament.[2]

Sulayman al-Baruni was much better known, even out of his sphere of influence, and his involvement in the struggle was both deeper and longer than that of Farhad. Baruni was a Berber of the Ibadi sect from Fesatu in Jebel Nefusa. He was known as a historian of North African and Ibadi Islam and also as a militant politician who was persecuted during the Hamidian period. His upbringing was traditional Moslem and he knew only North Africa and Oman — an important Ibadi centre outside Africa. With the return of the Ottoman Constitution he came back to Libya and was elected to represent Jebel Gharbi in the Ottoman Parliament.[3] When the war with Italy broke out he immediately informed the Ottomans of his support in the struggle against the occupation. He appeared in the Ottoman headquarters accompanied by fifty loyal shaykhs and promised the supreme commander of Tripolitania that he would mobilize volunteers. Within a short period of time he had succeeded in recruiting about one thousand volunteers; they participated in the first Moslem offensive on Italian posts near Tripoli (23 October 1911). In spite of the fact that he had no military training whatsoever, Baruni was sometimes referred to as the Commander of the Mountain volunteers and was even called "the Minister of War of the Mountain District".[4] The main importance of their involvement lay in the fact that they carried with them the almost absolute support of the notables in their spheres of influence and even further away thanks to their personal prestige which grew as time passed, in the wake of their political and administrative activity. Thus, for example, Farhad was well known and respected in Fezzan where he had served as the Kaymakam of Shati. The activity of Baruni as a politician and intellectual was also highly esteemed outside his limited sphere of influence.

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Volunteers from southern Libya were recruited by the Mutasarrıf of Fezzan, Sami Bey, and the Deputy of Fezzan to the Ottoman Parliament, Jami Bey. Some of the governors subject to the Mutasarrıf, such as the Kaymakam of Sokna, left for Tibesti to mobilize the tribes in the Ayn Qalqa region. Among the tribes which joined the struggle the Tibbu and Touareg were prominent. Negroes from the Sudan, the vicinity of Lake Chad and even from Ghabes also volunteered, as did women from the south.[5]

The support of men of religion in the struggle against Italy was an important stimulus in the preparedness of the Tripolitanian population to volunteer. Because of the difference in the socio-religious structure between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the integration of the `ulama' in the Tripolitanian fighting force was not as evident as in Cyrenaica since the nature of their involvement in the daily life of the population differed from that of the Sanusiya amongst the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Only a few Tripolitanians having religious influence were mentioned as actively joining the campaign, but they were not the only ones; there were many general references to the support of religious personalities in the struggle and its religious character is often mentioned. In addition to Sulayman al-Baruni, who had considerable religious influence among the Ibadis, Shaykh `Abd al-Salam Suni of Mizda and Shaykh Muhammad Suf, both of whom belonged to the Sanusiya, supported the struggle. It is true that the Sanusiya did not have wide influence in Tripolitania, but the support of the shaykhs spurred the population to action. This support attests to Sanusi identification with the insurrection from its very beginnings, even in areas that were remote from the centre of the order's influence.[6]

The leaders of the struggle against Italy also made use of the CUP structure in Tripolitania. Although the higher levels of the party apparatus were mainly manned by Turks, the rank-and-file included many local figures, many of whom had regional and tribal influence. Some of them were later mentioned as regional leaders of the rebellion, especially in Jebel Gharbi.[7] The CUP was very eager to include in its machinery in the Empire's various provinces not only Turks but also

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local figures with regional, tribal, religious or economic influence and young intellectuals. Cooperation on the administrative and party levels made tribal participation in the struggle easier and strengthened Ottoman national motivation in tribal members.

When the Tripolitanian volunteers reached the Ottoman Army headquarters they at first underwent a short period of military training by Ottoman officers and NCOs. From descriptions of the volunteers' actual fighting, however, it seems that this training did not achieve its purpose. There was nothing left for the Ottoman command but to try and channel the traditional warfare of the Tripolitanian population so that it would fit in with Ottoman military strategy. The success in enlisting the local volunteers was due almost exclusively to their traditional leaders: it was they who led the tribal units in battle and supervised the volunteers' behaviour in the camps, which were organized along tribal lines. The volunteers were ready to obey their chiefs alone, and they mediated between the fighters and the supreme command, which was Ottoman. The volunteers refused to accept an imposed leadership; at times they even demanded the dismissal of a commander and the appointment of another who was acceptable to them.[8]

The shaykhs and their men considered themselves volunteers for all intents and purposes: they joined the Ottoman Army of their own free will, were jealous of their independence and strongly rejected any attempt to intervene in their internal affairs. The volunteers had reservations about the attempts of Ottoman officers to force upon them ways of life and military order to which they were not accustomed. The local fighters were distinguished by their spontaneous behaviour and impatience: they abhorred lack of activity; it was against this background that numerous conflicts took place between them and the Ottoman command. The volunteers favoured "hit and run" tactics, and this was characteristic of the nomad population throughout the Empire. So long as such assaults were intended for pillaging, the pushing back of a rival tribe and pestering the authorities, the method had many advantages because it enabled the continued exsitence of a relatively weak force as far as manpower and military resources were concerned.

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When, however, the goal was to defeat the enemy such a doctrine could not be a fundamental component in the campaign. The differences of opinion regarding the goal and the ways of reaching it not only caused friction between the Ottoman command and the local volunteers, but also created mutualy negative images of each's motivation, fighting capacity and bravery. These images were also based on the different personal behaviour and communal character of the Ottomans and the Tripolitanians. In most cases the lack of a common language made mutual understanding even harder.[9]

Without the support of the Tripolitanian population in the struggle against Italy, the Ottoman Army would have been unable to stand up to the invaders. The balance of forces between the Ottoman and Italian armies in Tripolitania in the areas of manpower (some 4,500 against 30,000 in the first phase) and light and heavy arms for land, sea and air combat was completely in the Italians' favour. The fact that some 20,000-30,000 volunteers joined in the struggle completely changed the nature of the campaign. The Italian force was thus confronted by a rival of similar size. Although the equipment of the Moslem army was of inferior quality, this was balanced by the volunteers' acquaintance with the territory and their maintanance of objective. The whole population — even those who did not actively participate in the fighting — was united in preventing the penetration of the enemy, who was foreign to the hinterland since the region had hardly been surveyed before. The absence of local collaboration in this phase made the advance very difficult for the Italians, most of whom did not know the country's languages. In addition, the population employed guerrilla tactics to which the Italians did not have an appropriate answer. Guerrilla warfare was not part of the Ottomans' regular method of fighting and they found it difficult to uproot it in a short period of time, especially since large parts of the Moslem army were organized on the basis of tribal units commanded by tribal shaykhs. As a result, although the Ottomans did not approve of it, guerrilla warfare was found to be most effective against the Italians. Even though much ammunition was lost using this method and although the Italians were not usually pushed back, their advance was halted throughout the period of the

Turkish-Italian War. The volunteers' irregular method of fighting was complemented by the organized and planned warfare of the Ottoman Army which prevented any loosening of discipline or disruption on the war fronts when tension declined and there were lulls in military activity.

2. The Local Leadership

The insurrection in Tripolitania against the Italian invasion brought about fundamental changes in the status of the local leadership. This was a further development from the period of Ottoman rule under which the local leadership had considerable freedom of action which the regime had tried to channel to its advantage. The Italian invasion necessitated increased cooperation between the Ottoman administration and army on the one hand and the local population and leadership on the other, as well as an increased dependence on the local element. This situation considerably strengthened the traditional Tripolitanian leadership: many military and administrative functions were transferred to it thereby giving it official approval. Because of the struggle many tribesmen who participated in the campaign received arms, money and various kinds of equipment and they were thus considerably strengthened; their chiefs, in particular, could use this additional power for purposes totally unconnected with the struggle against Italy but for those associated with the traditional inter-tribal fighting so common in the region. The positions within the administration and military command provided their holders with numerous possibilities to consolidate their status in the region and within their own tribe, as well as to improve their personal and economic conditions.

Since most of the Ottoman administrators left Tripolitania after the Italian invasion, the Ottoman Government in Istanbul decided to reorganize the administration in Libya.[10] The senior administrative positions (the Vali of Tripolitania and the Mutasarrifs of Khoms, Jebel Gharbi and Fezzan) remained in the hands of outsiders who were also the military commanders in their districts[11] (the district of Tripoli was mainly under Italian occupation). On the other hand,

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almost all the positions at the middle and lower levels were transferred to local notables who in part were the military commanders of volunteer tribal units. Even before the Italian invasion many Kaymakams and Müdirs were local inhabitants, but with the withdrawal of the Ottoman administrators, the management of the whole province passed almost completely into local hands. The senior level was mainly occupied with determining policy, directing contacts with the government in Istanbul and conducting the war. The lower levels, on the other hand, were the ones that actually carried out the policy and that were in daily contact with the population, of which they were an integral part. Administrative authority and the dependence of the population naturally strengthened the position of the notables, but only in their traditional spheres of influence. The political, administrative and and military changes did not turn the junior local leaders into national leaders, but their positions within their traditional spheres were improved. They remained local, tribal leaders; the inter-tribal boundaries were not blurred or erased, and nor were the spheres of influence of the chiefs. Nor was there a growth in this period of a new strata of leaders from the tribal society: the stiff internal hierarchy did not enable a deviation from the traditional ruling patterns and leadership positions continued to be held by the governing families.[12]

One of the important advantages that accrued to the volunteers and their leaders from their cooperation with the Ottoman Army was the regular supply of modern standard arms, ammunition and other military equipment from army stocks. Until the war broke out the arms which the local population had kept were considered to be illegal. Most of the arms were obtained by dubious means (such as smuggling or pillage) and were very varied; some were old or defective. The Ottoman command supplied the volunteers with the standard arms which were used by the Ottoman Army in Libya. Although these arms were regarded as somewhat old-fashioned by comparison with those used by the army in some of the other provinces of the Empire, in Libya itself volunteers were not discriminated against and had the same equipment as the regular soldiers. Since there was no orderly recording of the arms and ammunition that were distributed to the volunteers, there could not be

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any control over their use and whereabouts. This strengthened the power of the local population vis-à-vis the Ottoman command which found it increasingly difficult to enforce its authority over the inhabitants of Tripolitania. Another result of this tremendous inflow of arms to the local population was the considerable increase in power of those tribal leaders who cooperated with the Ottomans. It was impossible to estimate the extent of military supplies or to force the notables to use the equipment for the needs of the state alone. The chiefs' considerations were based almost entirely on local power struggles and prestige. In addition, the preparedness of the local leaders ao assist the Ottomans in repulsing the Italians did not mean an automatic acceptance of the military planning of the Ottoman command. As a result, the volunteers used the power that came their way for whatever means they thought fit. Limited control by the Ottoman Army authorities over the use of the arms in the hands of the volunteers was achieved through a measured supply of ammunition. The volunteers, however, generally overcame this hurdle either by taking over ammunition stores or by producing some of it themselves.[13]

Among the important Tripolitanian tribes that fought the Italians were the Awlad Sulayman from the Sirt and Fezzan regions. They were known to be a warlike tribe not inclined to submit to authority. Consequently, in the nineteenth century they were amongst the fiercest opponents of a return to Ottoman rule. Although their insurrection in that period was crushed, relations between them and the Ottoman regime remained tense and the latter forced a partial emigration of the tribe to the Sudan in order to divide it and lessen its political-military impact. Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr, the chief of Awlad Sulayman at the beginning of the twentieth century, continued his family's tradition of armed opposition to the government and numerous rebels and brigands joined him in his resistance, which was limited to the tribe's traditional sphere of influence. Following the Italian invasion the Ottomans asked Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr to join the campaign despite past rivalry. Reservations about the Ottomans notwithstanding, the tribe -- like many others -- preferred Ottoman rule to a European, Christian and unknown one. As a result, for most of the rebellion the tribe directed its energy against the Italians while at the same

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time managing to safeguard a great measure of independence. The tribe's chief tried to obtain the most advantages possible from cooperation with the Ottomans. For example, he received financial resources from the authorities for his own tribe as well as for a faction of the Urfella with which the Awlad Sulayman were old rivals, but he did not transfer to his neighbours their part. Against this background, a violent conflict broke out between the two tribes resulting in numerous dead and injured on both sides.[14] Thus there were tribes -- opponents of the Ottoman regime -- that were ready to cooperate with it against the Italians and at the same time strengthen their own position and retaining freedom of action. As a result, individuals and groups were strengthened thanks to their proximity to the Ottomans. This phenomenon was, however, accompanied by a growing opposition from their traditional rivals who feared a withering of their own status following the introduction of a new and external factor.

In order to increase the involvement of local notables in the direction of the struggle against Italy, the Ottoman commanders set up "war councils" at the various fronts.[15] The fact that the Ottoman command often consulted the notables raised their prestige among their followers. To a certain extent these meetings influenced the operations of both parties; in any case, they came to understand each other slightly better. Any influence, however, usually remained within the senior leadership and command levels, and the masses of local volunteers could not understand the motives for the behaviour of the Ottoman command which they often interpreted as haughty, idle and cowardly. Similarly, the Ottoman regular soldier considered the local volunteer to be primitive, rowdy and irresponsible. Thus, during the whole struggle, political and military cooperation did not bring with it a genuine comradeship and previous negative images were enhanced.

In addition to the "war councils", local inhabitants also formed various commissions (qumisyun), which included military and administrative functionaries as well as tribal and village notables. These were not only consultative commissions, but were also involved in policy decisions and in directing the civil and military systems in

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certain areas. Through these commissions the mobilization of volunteers, equipment and arms was accomplished; they were also responsible for tax-collecting and organizing guard duties.[16]

The Tripolitanian-Ottoman cooperation during the Turkish-Italian War prevented Italian penetration into the country. The winding down of this cooperation proved to be an impediment to both sides: the Ottomans never returned to their previous status in Libya and the local population did not manage to properly organize their resistance and unify around a common goal.

B. The Inter-War Period

1. Tripolitanian Autonomy

a. Structure, Administration and Army

Following the peace agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Italy most of the Ottoman Army withdrew from Tripolitania, and by January 1913 there was hardly any Ottoman force left there. The legal status of Libya and the nature of its contacts with the Ottoman Empire had not been made unequivocally clear. In the peace agreement both parties agreed upon a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all Ottoman forces from Libya and an Ottoman promise not to support the local resistance in Libya. In addition, a religious-spiritual connection between the Empire and Libya was agreed on by means of a representative of the Sultan and a Qadi, to be appointed by Seyhülislam. Simultaneously, the population of Libya was informed by means of a Sultanic order of the granting of self-rule to the local inhabitants. Whereas from the wording of the peace agreement it could have been concluded that because of the Italian occupation the Ottoman sovereignty ceased to be the power in Libya and that Ottoman recognition of this came to be expressed in the withdrawal of all its forces and a promise to end all political and military involvement, from the Sultanic order it was understood that Ottoman sovereignty in fact continued and that the actual job of governing was left with the local Moslem population. The

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Ottoman commander of Tripolitania during the war, Neşet, informed Farhad and Sulayman al-Baruni, the two senior regional leaders of the volunteers, and through them all Tripolitanian notables, of these governmental decisions shortly after their arrival. The local response took two forms: on the one hand, there was fierce and widespread anger at the Ottomans for reaching an agreement with the Italians despite all their promises to the contrary, thus ending their participation in the war; their army was going to abandon the population. On the other hand, the local population favoured the decision to grant it self-rule. In response to the Sultanic order the Tripolitanians decided to establish a local government and to continue the struggle against Italy on their own.[17]

Following the political and military changes, a big conference of regional notables was convened in late-October 1912 in 'Aziziya. The dominant personality at the conference was Sulayman al-Baruni. Although the Tripolitanians felt injured and abandoned after the Ottoman departure, they decided not to surrender but to continue their struggle, even if single-handedly. In spite of the vocal public reservations regarding the retreat of the Ottoman Army, the Tripolitanian leadership eventually enabled it to withdraw peacefully. Although the local leadership highly esteemed the professional qualifications of the Ottomans and had not in general objected to an Ottoman authority governing Libya, so long as they were still in power there, this same leadership understood that once the Ottomans left and official recognition of self-rule in Libya was granted, there could be no going back. It was recognised that despite the de jure Ottoman sovereignty, Libya would be independent to all intents and purposes and that it would be most difficult for the Ottomans to regain their dominant position, and that the personal status of the local leaders would also be considerably enhanced because they would head singlehanded both the political leadership and the military command.

A representation to coordinate contacts between the local population and the Ottoman command was chosen at the conference in 'Aziziya. This representation helped the Ottoman Army to fulfill those articles in the peace agreement relating to the withdrawal of Ottoman

troops and administration from the region, including the sending of arms, even though this would harm the fighting capability of the local population. The damage sustained by the Tripolitanians was somewhat reduced since the personal weapons held by the volunteers were not returned; they could not be detected because they were never recorded as having been distributed. Neşet also aided the local population by supplying its leadership with the money, flour and other equipment which was in the army stocks in Tripolitania.[18]

The strong Italian hold in the Tripolitanian coastal region forced the local resistance to concentrate its main efforts in the hinterland, especially in the Gharyan and Nefusa mountains. At the end of 1912 the front-line between the Italians and the Tripolitanian rebels passed from Urfella-Gharyan-Za`tara-Mentros-Bir al-Hashab-Aziziya-Surman-`Ajaylat-`Alaliqa-Zuwara.

Following the granting of autonomy and the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from Tripolitania, the region's notables, from Nalut on the Tunisian border to Urfella in the east and from the boundary of the Italian occupied zone in the north to Jebel Gharbi and Fezzan in the south, decided to declare their country independent. The decision did not specify the country's borders, but it did declare the independence (istiqlal, or administrative independence -- istiqlal idari) of the country (bilad), sometimes using the term Tarablus al-Gharb, which at the time related to Tripolitania on its own as well as to Libya as a whole. However, from the names of those leaders mentioned and on the basis of the administrative division into districts, it is clear that the decision related to Tripolitania and Fezzan alone and not to the whole of Libya. The local leadership announced that the purpose of this organization was not to harm the Ottoman Empire but to defend the religion, homeland (watan) and independence. They also feared wide-scale Italian settlement which might create a competitive Italian labour force.

The conferees in Aziziya decided upon the establishment of a national government (hukumah wataniyyah) headed by Baruni. The region itself was divided into four districts (mutasarrıflık):[19] the Coast

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(Sawahil), headed by Shaykh Muhammad Suf b. Jum`ah of the Mahamid tribe; the Mountain (Jebel Gharbi), headed by Shaykh Musa Qaradah; the South (Qiblah); and Fezzan, headed by Muhammad Sami. Other appointments included those of governors for sub-districts (in the ranks of kaymakam and müdir), clerks, qadis and muftis. A uniformed gendarmerie equipped with old Martini rifles was established to protect the roads. Postal, telephone and telegraph networks connected all parts of the state. The administrative system was manned by tribal chiefs who were salaried by the state budget and equipped with arms and foodstuffs. Every district had its administrative council (majlis idari), the senior one being that of Jebel Gharbi. The councils were responsible for the activities of the administration and their financing.

Since the money that the Ottoman Army transferred to the Tripolitanian leadership did not suffice to cover all expenses for a long period of time, it was decided to tax the population. The administrative councils decided upon special levies on the rich, as well as tithes on the farmers and other bread winners. To these revenues were added donations from several Moslem countries (including India and the neighbouring Maghreb states). The central treasury of the state was located in Jebel Gharbi in the headquarters in `Asaba (Lossaba; 18 miles wouth-west of Gharyan) where Baruni resided.

The presence of Baruni, the principal figure in Tripolitanian autonomy, in Jebel Gharbi, the centrality of the region and the difficulty of penetrating it, all contributed to the transfer of the centre of the state to this place.[20] In addition to the mutasarrıfs, other notables were also mentioned as members of the Tripolitanian leadership by the side of Baruni, but they had no defined political and administrative functions, with the exception of the traditional territorial and tribal responsibilities. Among the well-known figures were those of the Awlad Sulayman leader, Shaykh Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr, under whose command were 4,000 of his well-equipped and armed followers; Shaykh Abu Bakr of the Bu Sayf tribe; and the Governor of Yefren, Shaykh Sasi b. Salim Hizam, a renowned warrior who strived

for freedom and independence and feared the competition of a cheap Italian labour force.[21]

Immediately following the Ottoman-Italian cease-fire, the Tripolitanian population started to get organized militarily to fight the Italians. The region was divided into two flanks: the Western Flank, headed by Baruni, who served as the commander-in-chief of all of Tripolitania; and the Eastern Flank, headed by Nuri al-Sa`dawi from Khoms. Despite numerous declarations about the unity of purpose and the need for cooperation between all the inhabitants of Tripolitania, serious conflicts within the leadership came to the surface at an early stage of the independent activity. One expression of this was Baruni's refusal to transfer to the Eastern Flank its portion of arms, equipment and money; he claimed that part of the coastal region was under Italian occupation and that only a part of the population of the independent region had joined the struggle. As a result of these differences of opinion, the brothers Nuri and Bashir al-Sa`dawi, the leaders of Khoms region, temporarily left the military and administrative leadership of the Tripolitanian state.[22] Although Baruni lacked military training, his standing in the region made people think of him as the supreme military commander. By his side operated shaykhs who were more experienced and knowledgeable about military activity and who held administrative positions, such as Shaykh Muhammad Suf, the Mutasarrif of the coast, and Sasi Hizam, the Governor of Yefren. Since governors also usually had military responsibilities, these notables tried to leave their mark on military planning and operations. The main posts were in Asaba, Rabita (Rapta), Yefren, Kikla, Mentros and Bir al-Mudakima.[23]

The military force of the Tripolitanians was estimated at between 5,000 and 15,000 troops. The army was composed of veterans of the Turkish-Italian War, including soldiers who had served in the Ottoman Army, as well as new recruits. The fighters received arms (mainly Mauser and Martini rifles), uniforms, foodstuffs and a daily salary. The various posts were usually established in the vicinity of villages on which they relied for their daily needs. Women stayed in most of these camps to assist the fighters. As during the Turkish-Italian War,

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the Tripolitanian Army included a small number of women fighters from Jebel Gharbi and the Touareg. The new recruits were trained by local war veterans and by the few foreign volunteers who remained in the region or who arrived after the Ottoman withdrawal.

The differences in mentality between the foreign and local combatants, which had already become evident before 1913, became even more conspicuous due to the small number of foreigners, many of whom were not even Moslems. Tension reached such a level that the foreign volunteers felt isolated and the Ottomans among them became fearful about wandering alone in the country. While there was a traditional reservation towards non-Moslems, the local inhabitants nevertheless had much respect for volunteers coming from countries which were not directly involved in the conflict and which did not have any moral obligations towards Libya. The Ottoman volunteers, however, were thought of as belonging to a party that had betrayed the Libyan cause, and much anger was thus directed towards such individuals. However, because of the small number of foreigners and their indispensability to the war effort and the short duration of Tripolitanian autonomy, the tension never led to serious problems.[24]

By taking with them from Tripolitania most of the heavy arms the Ottomans made it very difficult for the Tripolitanian Army to conduct the war. The almost total absence of artillery was among the factors which forced the local inhabitants to concentrate their struggle in the mountain area where topographical advantages made up for shortcomings in military equipment. On the other hand, the rebels held great quantities of light arms. Shortages in ammunition, however, forced the local commanders to be more strict with their men: they now had to forbid shooting when it was not justified, especially when used for entertainment and raising morale.[25] Once the political and military responsibility had passed into local hands, there was a clear change in the attitude to the struggle of the political leadership and commanders in the field; the more responsible and careful use of ammunition was one example. A much more significant one concerned the overall attitude towards the chances of success. In spite of the numerous public declarations about the armed struggle being the only

way to reach a solution, there were attempts to reach a political settlement. In the military sphere, the supreme command sought to wage a controlled struggle that would bring the rebels the greatest possible military and political advantages at the lowest price in terms of manpower, ammunition and economic resources. However, the concentration in the mountain region, which was a logical military decision when military and civilian conditions in Tripolitania were taken into account, made it easier for the Italians to encircle the rebels and to temporarily crush the insurrection. The unceasing internal rivalries between the tribal leaders added to the difficulty of reaching a unified policy and this in turn harmed the rebels' power to resist the Italians.

b. **Foreign Relations**

The Tripolitanian Government tried to maintain close contacts with the Ottoman Empire and to develop diplomatic relations with European states in the hope that the latter would exert pressure on Italy to recognize the Tripolitanian state. This activity started as soon as the state had been established and reveals the importance which the leaders attached to the political struggle in order to achieve their political and military objectives.

On the arrival of the Sultan's representative in Tripoli in December 1912, contact was made with Sulayman al-Baruni. After the Sultan's representative had read out in public the Sultanic orders concerning the future course of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the population of Libya, the text was sent to Baruni; contacts with him were kept up. The Sultan's representative tried to maintain correct relations with both the Italian authorities, in whose zone he resided, and with the Tripolitanian Government. After a short time he was suspected by the Italians of cooperating with the rebels in subversive acts against Italy.[26] However, there are no unequivocal references to the Sultan's representative's subversive activities -- neither in the latter's correspondence with the Ottoman authorities, nor in the Italians' own correspondence.

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In their desire to attain international recognition, Baruni and other notables sent notification on the declaration of Tripolitanian independence to heads of states in Europe, including Britain, Germany, France and Russia. These appeals requested recognition of the new state, support for its existence, protection of the rights of its inhabitants and intervention with the Italian Government in order that the latter would also recognize the independence of Tripolitania. Announcements on the establishment of the new state were also sent to the Italian Government and to the Italian military governor in Tripoli. They emphasised the decisive will of the inhabitants to guard their independence until their last drop of blood.[27] The Italians protested to the Ottoman Government; they regarded the declaration as a breach of the peace agreement. The issue was discussed at an Ottoman Government meeting. Its representative in Tripoli was instructed to give advice (the content of which was not elaborated in the government's decision) to Baruni on the problem. The Ottoman Government's resolution did not include any guidance to the Tripolitanian population about the Ottoman view as to how the Tripolitanians should act; nor was there an appraisal of their political-military course.[28]

The European states did not recognize Tripolitanian independence, did not assist its government and did not even bother to acknowledge its entreaties. However, they did not prevent Tripolitania from receiving assistance from private European individuals and organizations. Thus, for example, British medical orderlies and doctors who were sent by the British Red Crescent were allowed by their government to stay in Tripolitania and treat the population, including the fighters.[29]

c. Political and Military Activity

The decisive public announcements of the Tripolitanian Government about protecting the independence of their state and fighting the Italians until the problem was settled were made while secret negotiations were being held by Tripolitanian leaders -- headed by Baruni -- with the Italian authorities in Tripoli. Already as early as

October 1912, negotiations which had been initiated by the Tripolitanians were being held with representatives of the Italian military command in Suani Bani Adam. The Italians had previously rejected all negotiations with the rebels and now presented these contacts as showing the regime's readiness to act for the population and in cooperation with it. Negotiations -- no matter what the Italians chose to call them -- were held and they may be considered as an Italian attempt to convince the local Tripolitanian leadership to willingly accept without pressure the Italian rule.

The Tripolitanians neither recognized Italian authority nor Italy's demand that the local population accept its regime. The Tripolitanian leadership stated that there was a contrast between the Sultanic order granting them independence,[30] and the Italian royal decree annexing the whole of Libya to Italy. The Italians claimed that the Sultan, in his capacity as Caliph, did not feel that he could demand that the Moslem inhabitants of Libya surrender to Italy, a Christian state, without causing the Moslem world to rise up against him.

The Italians requested Tripolitanian representatives to come to Tripoli to discuss the region's future with the Italian military commander. Among members of the local leadership chosen for this mission was Farhad al-Zawi, one of the organizers of the volunteering and the struggle against Italy during the Turkish-Italian War in the Tripolitanian coastal zone. The delegation, which was considered by the rebels' leaders to be composed of staunch protectors of Tripolitanian independence and statedom, turned its coat on reaching Tripoli, assisting in Italian consolidation and themselves being appointed as advisers to the Italian regime and receiving high salaries.[31] These notables had felt early on that without any substantial aid from the Ottomans or another external source, the struggle of the local population was a hopeless one. Consequently, they decided to go over to the Italian side, making it easier for themselves and perhaps making it possible for them to save their own lives, as well as to benefit from senior appointments, financial gains and security. As a result of this process and further desertions later

on, the Tripolitanian leadership became denuded of prominent personalities who were influential in their neighbourhoods, while the number of those collaborating with the occupation authorities constantly increased. Italy could thus claim with a growing degree of justice that a representative part of the population supported it and its policy.

In early-1913 local units began to carry out limited nuisance raids against the Italians. The Italians did not respond with heavy blows but preferred a slow and gradual advance and consolidation of their position in the coastal region. They decided to penetrate the country and extended the railroad from Tripoli to Zawiyah, Aziziya and Gharyan, thereby facilitating the sending of troops, arms and equipment.[32] The Tripolitanian soldiers were eager to fight whereas Baruni had lingered and had not organized wide-scale military offensives. He believed that if he left the Italians alone and stayed with his forces in the mountain hideouts, then the Italians would not harass him.

Another important reason for the absence of any wide-scale and well-planned Tripolitanian military activity was the diminishing resources of the Tripolitanian state. The Tripolitanian treasury was poor in resources despite the transfer of the treasury of the Ottoman Army to the rebels and despite the taxes collected from the population. In addition, the quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment at the disposal of the combatants were limited and could not easily be replenished because the area in revolt was cut off from friendly foreign sources of support. This problem was aggravated when wide-scale military operations started and the Tripolitanian Army had no constant supply of military equipment, foodstuffs and money.

The lack of military activity caused much criticism among the troops and a growing dissatisfaction with Baruni which culminated in suspicions about his honesty and fears that he was playing a double role. Consequently, his standing as head of state was harmed; there were even a few attempts on his life.[33] The growing shortages also harmed the morale of the troops and reports -- some of which were

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tendentious -- about the sweet life on the Italian side further increased the distress in the rebel camp. The Italians, for their part, tried their best to promote the desertion of Tripolitanian fighters and in pursuance of this promised an amnesty, important positions for the notables and grants for the population. As a result, the number of deserters increased even before the real military activity started. This happened despite disciplinary measures taken by the Tripolitanian leadership, including arrests and fines. Among the deserters were many important figures from amongst the shaykhs who served as commanders and administrators. Their desertion severely affected the fighting capability of the rebels and their morale.[34]

The Italians continued to neutralise rebel posts through a mixture of military activity, bribary and diplomacy. By late-1912, Tripolitanian recruits were already serving in the Italian Army in Libya, as well as Eritrean soldiers ("Askeris"). The number of non-Italian troops in the Italian Army in Libya had gradually increased until they became its main force; the command, however, remained Italian. Local recruits knew the battlefields much better than the Italians or any other foreigners did, and their inclusion in the vanguard facilitated the Italian occupation of the hinterland, besides saving Italian lives. In addition, many local recruits were strongly motivated to fight because of tribal rivalries in those regions where they operated. The Italian Army advanced from Tripoli eastwards, capturing Suani Bani Adam (15 November 1912), Aziziya (16 November), Zliten (1 December), Gharyan (9 December), Kusabat (14 December), Tarhuna (18 December), Sirt (1 January 1913), Urfella/Bani Walid (4 February). In their advance westwards the Italians had already taken Zawiyah and `Ajaylat (4 December 1912).[35]

Baruni was aware of the grave economic condition of his government and the serious problems that this would cause the combat capability of the army once there was a real encounter with the Italians. Consequently, because he lacked military experience and was more of a politician than a commander, and apparently not believing in the chances of the Tripolitanian Army to overcome the Italians, Baruni initiated indirect diplomatic activity in Europe, as well as direct

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contacts with the Italian military command in Tripoli. He was ready to sign a peace agreement (sulh) with Italy, providing that Tripolitania would preserve its administrative independence under Italian sovereignty. In February 1913, Baruni sent a delegation to Paris and London to press Tripolitania's claim for independence and the protection of its population's rights. In the appeals to the European nations it was emphasised that the Tripolitanians did not oppose civilization, the West, reforms and Christianity and that they supported progress, justice and fraternity among peoples.[36] As with his previous appeals to European governments, Baruni failed to elicit any response this time, too.

Parallel to the diplomatic efforts in Europe, the negotiations between the Tripolitanian Government and the Italian authorities in Tripoli continued. The Italian civil authorities, which in 1911 had not expected a lengthy war and heavy casualties in Libya, following on as it did a year of difficult war, numerous victims and a heavy economic price, were interested in ending the war. As a result, Baruni's suggestions were listened to attentively in Rome. The military authorities in Tripoli were, however, interested in enforcing law and order by force of arms and not through compromise with the local population. Since the military solution was not ruled out by the Italian Government, the contacts between the Tripolitanian leadership and Italy continued at two levels: the diplomatic and the military. The negotiations were held in Tunisia, with Count Sforza from the Foreign Ministry, who had been a captive in Gharyan during the war, representing the Italians. Sforza suggested that the Tripolitanians give up the idea of "autonomy" and promised a general amnesty to those fighters who laid down their arms and surrendered. Baruni concealed the fact that these negotiations were taking place from most of his followers and had even thrown in jail those notables who had been in favour of reaching a private settlement with Italy. According to the Italians, Baruni was ready for compromise in the political sphere; it was his financial demands that prevented a settlement. Contacts continued until the beginning of the decisive battles in the second half of March 1913.[37] The negotiations broke down because of problems on both sides. Although Baruni headed the Tripolitanian leadership,

there were in fact many who opposed his intention of reaching a political settlement with the Italians. He knew that as a result of such differences of opinion it would be most difficult for him to persuade the population to accept a settlement that would not recognize Tripolitanian independence. The Italians, meanwhile, were prepared to continue with political negotiations which did not commit them to anything because the military activity, which was continuing simultaneously, was bringing important gains and the strongholds of the Tripolitanian state were gradually being encircled. As long as both sides did not feel that political compromise was a necessity, their main efforts continued to be in the military arena.

d. The Fall of the Tripolitanian State

The Italian military offensive on Jebel Gharbi under the command of General Lequio started in the second half of March 1913. The main force numbered some 5,000 troops, most of them local recruits and Eritreans, in addition to Italian officers, gunners and engineers. This force was moving westwards, and within a few days of the capture of the main rebel headquarters in `Asaba on 23 March 1913, the other posts were taken too, despite the difficult climate and terrain conditions. The rebels withdrew hurriedly to Yefren leaving behind many dead and large quantities of arms, foodstuffs, tents and other equipment. Baruni himself was injured in battle and gave up directing the insurrection. The Italian Army continued to pursue the rebels in the direction of Yefren, capturing Rabita, Mizga and Mentros (24 March), Kikla (25 March) and Sudwa (26 March). Shaykhs from the neighbourhood gathered in the latter place to proclaim their submission to General Lequio who ordered them to surrender their arms and sell to his army foodstuffs and wood for fire. He also ordered the release from prison of shaykhs who had been arrested by Baruni because of their contacts with the Italians. On 27 March, the Italian Army entered Yefren without meeting any opposition. Large stores of arms, ammunition, clothes and drugs were captured and their loss gravely affected the rebels' combat capacity. A short while later, one hundred and fifty shaykhs from the newly occupied mountain region were sent to Tripoli to express the population's obedience to the Italian regime.

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As a result of this ceremonial act, a large number of traditional leaders who had previously led the rebels were removed from their centres of power and were held hostages in Tripoli. The absence of leadrship made it easier for the Italians to enforce their authority. The momentum of attack continued with the occupation of Zintan (5 April), Fesatu (6 April), Jado (8 April) and Nalut (12 April). A second axis of the Italian army's advance on Jebel Gharbi from the west passed through Zawiyah-Bir al-Ghanam-Yefren. In this manner the Italian Army quickly captured the rebels' strongholds of Jebel Gharbi in a pincer movement. Following this operation, the Italians started to consolidate their rule in the area and started to plan the continuation of their occupation of southern Libya.[38]

Following these defeats, Baruni and Sasi Hizam fled to Tunisia and told the Italians that they were surredering. Yet Baruni still tried to save Tripolitanian autonomy and sought to open negotiations with the Italians through Count Sforza, but to no avail. After the region's occupation and the surrender of its leadership and people, the Italians saw no point in recongnizing any kind of self-rule, which was something they had rejected even before the conquest. In Summer 1913 Baruni left for Istanbul where he tried to raise new resources for the renewal of the insurrection in Tripolitania, but his achievements were minimal. His personal status was, however, respected because of his activities in Tripolitania and his membership of the Ottoman Parliament. He symbolized for the Ottoman regime its contacts with Libya and in early-1914 he was nominated as a life Senator by the Sultan because of his status as a freedom fighter.[39] Sasi Hizam, who had escaped with Baruni to Tunisia, remained loyal to the Italians, and served as their informer among Tripolitanian exiles in Tunisia. Even when World War I broke out he did not go back on his surrender and, following his refusal to lead anti-Italian rebels in Tripolitania, they stoned him to death.[40]

The creeping Italian occupation brought about the encirclement of Jebel Gharbi from the north, east and west. The Italians had fortified themselves in a new defence line: Urfella-Yefren-Temzin-Jado-Nalut, which commanded important caravan routes from Fezzan and Cyrenaica to

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Tripolitania. This development also made it easier for the Italians to keep a close watch on the northern part of the border with Tunisia and all the trade or smuggling routes into Tripolitania. Consequently, the smuggling of arms, supplies and foodstuffs to the rebels was considerably restricted. These restrictions in turn gravely affected the non-belligerent civilian population which relied on the partial import of foodstuffs. Due to these growing difficulties and an Italian readiness to amnesty those rebels who surrendered with their arms, there was a constantly growing number of local inhabitants who passed over to the Italian side without use of force. Many exiles returned from Tunisia and surrendered. However, there were rebels who refused to surrender and who moved southwards to regions that had not been occupied, such as Fezzan and Ghat.[41]

As a result of the escape of senior leaders, the submission of important shaykhs and the loss of great quantities of varied and valuable equipment, the population of the mountain region, which even during the short existence of the Tripolitanian state had had a very fragile leadership, was left with no central and fighting leadership. Consequently, troops began to surrender to the Italians and some of them started to serve in the Italian Army and administration. The rebellion in the central region of Tripolitania died out; it was renewed during World War I. The tribal divisions, lack of proper military training of the command and the troops, impoverished treasury, and growing shortages of arms and ammunition all contributed to the defeat in the first serious military encounter.[42] Against the regular and well-equipped Italian Army, which included many Tripolitanian recruits who were well-acquainted with the region and its population, the local volunteer forces who were unprofessional, divided and impoverished were unable to win in a campaign which was basically an Italian offensive launched against static posts. The local fighters were accustomed to guerrilla warfare in areas most suited to this method of fighting. When the Tripolitanians lost the element of surprise (following the use of static posts) and given the balance of power between the two forces, they were doomed to defeat. A decisive contribution to the defeat lay in Baruni's inexperience in military activity and his pessimism about its success, both of which

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led him to conduct covert political negotiations with Italy up to the very day of the main assault. The village settlement of Tripolitania also made the fighting difficult for the population: following the occupation of the villages their inhabitants had to surrender because, unlike the Bedouin, they did not have the alternative of temporarily fleeing to the desert and, after finding refuge there, returning to their sphere of influence when the danger had passed.

The split in the leadership, which stemmed from the divided village and tribal units, dogged the rebels throughout their struggle against Italy. Despite the announcements of a Tripolitanian state, a concept of Tripolitanian nationality, which could have united the population, did not exist at the time and the inhabitants remained loyal to their village and tribal leaders. Once the Tripolitanians achieved a somewhat more united leadership and when they had made their warfare more dynamic and began to exploit the topographical conditions -- as indeed they did during World War I -- the rebels once again occupied most of Tripolitania, and their lack of regular military training, poor equipment and their internal divisions no longer considerably harmed their capability.

e. The Occupation of Southern Tripolitania and Fezzan

In late-April 1913, an Italian military force under the command of Captain Pavoni moved southwards towards Ghadames in south-western Libya. Even before it had reached Ghadames, shaykhs from Sinaun and Ghadames had welcomed the approaching army to express the region's submission to Italy and enable the entry of the army into Ghadames on 27 April without fighting.[43] In late-July 1913 another Italian force left Sirt and occupied Mizda and Sokna,[44] two important locations on the caravan route between Tripoli and Marzuq.

In this region the Italians had the support of the influential old shaykh Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr, the head of Awlad Sulayman, who during the Ottoman period knew how to guard his independence. Although he moved to the Italian side he did not hesitate to go back when there was a change in conditions. His behaviour aroused the Italians'

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suspicions and it was decided to act against him in cooperation with another local notable who had surrendered, `Abd al-Nabi al-Khayr (Belkher), the former kaymakam of Bani Walid and the head of the Urfella, who had been among the followers of Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr. In order to consolidate his personal status, `Abd al-Nabi agreed to join the Italian march southwards to Fezzan, one of whose aims was to break the power base of Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr. On 13 November 1913 the latter was captured along with thirteen of his sons and followers, and all of them were exiled to Zuwara. In this region, where the Awlad Sulayman had no influence, the old shaykh was kept under strict military control which prevented him from even influencing his followers from a distance.[45] Because of this internal exile, Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr and his followers in Zuwara did not disturb the Italians until the renewal of the rebellion during World War I, but other leaders of the Awlad Sulayman who remained free continued their revolt.

The resistance to Italian rule in Fezzan was strongest in the Bu Sayf and Maghariba tribes. Two of Bu Sayf's shaykhs headed the insurrection in this region: Muhammad b. `Abdallah, who operated between Marzuq and Braq, having under his command some 1,000 armed warriors; and Sayyid Abu Bakr, whose influence was somewhat limited. Another leader in this region who had also religious influence was the Sanusi shaykh Ahmad Suni, the head of the Mizda zawiyah in Jebel Gharbi who moved southwards when the central region was captured. The insurrection in Fezzan was also supported by the tribes of Urfella (the faction opposing `Abd al-Nabi al-Khayr), Mashasha and Zintan. On the other side, the tribal rivals of Bu Sayf from the Shati region were ready to accept an Italian occupation in order to put an end to anarchy and to the exclusive rule of the Bu Sayf tribe in the region.[46]

In December 1913 the Italian military activity in Fezzan was renewed under the command of Coloner Miani whose force was made up mainly of local and Eritrean soldiers. The decisive battle took place in Braq on 13 December when the forces of Muhammad b. `Abdallah were defeated. A few days later fifteen important shaykhs were killed in

battle and this led to the surrender of most of the population. The main Italian force had stayed in the central town of Sabha until 27 February 1914 in order to consolidate and organize the government there. Numerous delegations of notables reached Sabha to surrender to Italy. These victories and a series of small-scale operations which followed them opened the way for the Italians to Marzuq which they entered without fighting on 3 March 1914. The kaymakam and the city's notables handed over Marzuq and the arms stored there to the Italians and expressed their readiness to cooperate with the new regime. The Italian flag was ceremonially raised in the citadel's square of Marzuq and the region of Fezzan was proclaimed to be under Italian sovereignty.[47] Another important Italian achievement, the last of this period, was the occupation of Ghat on 12 August 1914, shortly before the beginning of the Italian withdrawal from the region following the start of World War I and the renewal of the insurrection in Tripolitania.[48]

f. The Implications of the Italian Involvement on the Tripolitanian Leadership

The Italians consolidated their hold in Tripolitania by strengthening those local elements that supported them and by simultaneously weakening their rivals. The Italians tried to obtain the assistance of the genuine leadership of the various districts, but they often tended to promote junior leaders and weaken well-established ones. The Italians also made use of the religious influence of zawiyah heads and Touareg leaders for political and military needs. In addition to their hope of thus strengthening the Italian hold in the country, the regime also wanted to neutralize the power of the local strongmen and to ensure that the new leadership was dependent on them and at their mercy. One of the measures taken toward this end was the internal exiling of rebellious elements of strong tribes and the taking of hostages from among the leadership. Thus, for example, leaders and their supporters from the rebellious tribes of Bu Sayf, Awlad Sulayman and Mashasha were exiled to regions far from their traditional spheres of influence.[49] To the rest of the tribe's members and to the peaceful population as a whole the Italians showed

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a friendly attitude. The Italian authorities suggested in mid-1914 the return to the Awlad Sulayman of their old rights and exemption from taxes in return for protection of caravan routes in their sphere of influence after this tribe had been purged of elements hostile to the regime. The status of this tribe in the Sirtica and along the routes to Fezzan was once again recognized and its leader, Shaykh Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr, was brought back from his exile in Zuwara to the citadel of Sirt while one of his sons was officially appointed in Fezzan. The Italians took as proof of the success of their policy towards the Awlad Sulayman the fall of Nawfilya on the Bay of Sidra without resistance in Summer 1914.[50]

The growing power of the Awlad Sulayman forced the Italians to abandon another strong local element on whom the regime had been based until that period -- the Muntasir family, whose members held important positions in the local government and who had facilitated the Italian occupation of the region. The Muntasir had naturally hoped to improve their position under the new regime in return for their services. However, since the power of the family had been on the decline for some time, the Italians preferred to rely on stronger factors which were on the uprise, having obtained the most advantages possible from their support for the house of Muntasir.[51]

Another figure whom the Italians cultivated -- outside his traditional sphere of influence -- was `Abd al-Nabi al-Khayr, one of the Urfella leaders, who had been a prominent figure in the Sirtica. He was stationed by the Italians far from there, in the southern town of Marzuq, where he helped the regime to keep law and order. He succeeded there despite the fact that he was neither a native of Fezzan nor a Sanusi, and the Italians viewed favourably the fact that the dominant figure who was loyal to them in that region was directly dependent on the regime and a few of his relatives, and not on local elements.[52] The Italians exploited the traditional rivalry between Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr, the Awlad Sulayman leader, and `Abd al-Nabi, the Urfella leader, who were locked in a struggle for supremacy and influence in Sirtica and Fezzan. Both leaders fought for favours and were ready to help the government suppress insurrections in their

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spheres of influence and organize an overall offensive against Sanusi activity which was threatening the region from Cyrenaica and Fezzan.[53] The strengthening of relations with Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr was also designed to iron out difficulties with hostile elements within the Maghariba tribe; the family connection between Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr and Salih al-Atawush, one of the Maghariba leaders, proved useful.[54]

The Italians were also assisted by religious factors in their consolidation in Tripolitania. They once again recongnized Shaykh Ahmad Suni as head of the Mizda zawiyah, in spite of his previous role in the leadership of the rebellion. After Shaykh Ahmad Suni had gone over to the Italians, old privileges, including responsibility for security in the region, were returned to him and his relatives. Another result of this recognition was that many zawiyahs, including their agricultural property, were exempted from paying taxes -- a situation similar to that which existed in the Ottoman period. These Sanusi shaykhs had considerable influence over strong tribes, including Awlad Bu Sayf, Zintan and Mashasha, and once their spiritual leaders had recognized the Italian regime it became easier for the Italians to win the loyalty of these tribes.[55] The support of the Touareg chiefs, whose authority was not only political and military but also spiritual and religious, also had religious implications. They were regarded by the tribesmen as holy figures capable of granting supernatural blessings. Their support of the Italians had great political importance which the authorities were quick to utilize.[56] Another factor which influenced some tribes to support the Italian regime was the fear of French expansion into Libya from the west and the south. The Sanusis had fought against this process since the late-nineteenth century and numerous tribes had joined them, some of which in Tripolitania were not among their followers. The information from neighbouring countries on French policy there aroused strong fears in Tripolitania and Fezzan and consequently the population preferred Italian to French rule, despite their many reservations. Thus, for example, the shaykh of the Tibbu in Fezzan informed the Italian Government in Marzuq of his followers' opposition to a French penetration into Tibesti and their desire for Italian protection. The Italians -- not surprisingly -- responded

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favourably and appointed him to an administrative position (mudir) in his sphere of influence and he served them loyally.[57]

* * *

With the departure of the Ottomans the Tripolitanian population was left with no strong and unified leadership capable of directing the rebels in their struggle against Italy. The Ottoman regime, despite all the Libyan reservations, had been a unifying factor that had been especially felt in emergency situations. Within the Tripolitanian leadership each faction sought to defend and pursue its own interests. This situation made it difficult from the very early days of the insurrection to lead a united action. Shaykhs refused to subordinate themselves to rivals and did not permit their tribes to cooperate. Military units continued to be based on the tribal structure, with tribes and leaders trying to gain political and military advantages out of the war. One sign of the internal friction within the Tripolitanian leadership was the growing wave of desertions of leaders and fighters to the Italian side when they felt that the struggle was hopeless and that there was no chance for the Tripolitanian state to survive and prosper.

The rebels found it difficult to continue the struggle because their arms and ammunition stores were few and poor and there was almost no possibility to renew them. The traditional warfare of the Tripolitanians was very wasteful both with regard to manpower and to equipmemt; consequently, the local rebel commanders tried to restrain their men and conduct a controlled campaign from fortified posts. The rebels were not accustomed to such a fighting method and they tried to change it, and at times to change the military command too, the latter for personal and professional reasons. The Italian Army's superiority in manpower and equipment enabled it to encircle and capture the Tripolitanian posts quickly and easily. The Italians, who in contrast to the Tripolitanians were used to this type of war, advanced gradually and systematically and captured posts and villages. Consequently, the rebels were left with neither military bases to operate from and find refuge in, nor a friendly civilian hinterland

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which could have provided an economic support during and in between battles.

The Italians took advantage of the extensive internal divisions in Tripolitania and the readiness of the notables to cooperate with whoever was the ruling power in the region when they realized that resistance was futile. The Italians used the tactic of "divide and rule" (as the Ottomans had before them), exploiting the numerous age-old conflicts between tribes and tribal factions. The notables' loyalty was not open-ended: they were ready to cooperate with the Italians as long as the conditions necessitated this and so long as they gained benefits from it for themselves and their tribes. Once the political and military situation changed, the local leaders cast off the Italian yoke. In spite of quasi-national slogans raised by a few individuals during the short existence of the Tripolitanian state, the main consideration which directed the leaders was tribal and regional, since the concept of nationalism had not yet found widespread roots there.

C. World War I

1. The Renewal of the Rebellion

During 1914 Italian expansion in Tripolitania and Fezzan widened and by the summer of that year Italy controlled most of the important posts and junctions in the hinterland. The credibility of the limited forces in control was, however, doubtful due to their make-up. The delicate balance which during 1913-14 turned in favour of the Italian regime was completely shattered following the outbreak of World War I. Although Italy did not join the war until May 1915, the participation in it of the Ottoman Empire, the most important Moslem power, and its declaration of a Jihad against its enemies, were enough to arouse great agitation among the Tripolitanian population and to re-kindle the rebellion. News of the declaration of the Jihad had reached Libya: local activists and envoys of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa, as well as the Sanusi zawiyah network with Ahmad al-Sharif at its head, spread the

news throughout Libya and beyond its southern border.[58] The insurrection in Tripolitania was inflamed by strong Ottoman and Sanusi incitement coming from the direction of Cyrenaica and Fezzan which had good connections with the Ottoman Empire, mainly through Egypt. Thus, for example, Ahmad al-Sharif called upon Tripolitanian notables to fight the Italians as part of the Jihad under the command of Shaykh Muhammad Suf al-Mahmudi, one of the Sanusi representatives there. The latter, too, had called upon local notables to join the Jihad, presenting himself as the representative of the Sanusiya and supported by the Ottomans. He also used for incitement in the west the offices of Sulayman al-Baruni, the Tripolitanian Ibadi leader, who reached the Sanusi camp in Cyrenaica at that time, but whose main influence was in Jebel Gharbi. Although the Ottoman Empire and Italy did not formally reach a state of war until May 1915, the Libyan population regarded Italy as a Christian, hostile occupation force and as such they did not doubt for one moment that the Jihad also included Italy, especially since the propaganda that they received did not specifically point out that there were Christian states which were excluded from the Jihad.

Another factor which was an impediment to the Italian regime in the hinterland of Tripolitania was the composition of the army and administration there. Because of the limited Italian manpower at the disposal of the Italian Government in Tripolitania to govern extensive areas, Italians were stationed in small numbers in selected keyposts. The bulk of the garrison was composed of local recruits and Eritreans. In the administration, too, local notables were appointed to middle and junior posts. As a result, most of the deterrent force, the administration and control was not Italian: part of it totally lacked any interest in and understanding of the region, and the rest had personal and tribal rivalries with parts of the population over which it was stationed; it also had specific political ambitions in well-known regions. The posts were often far removed from each other and from Italian Government centres of power, and consequently the regime found it extremely difficult to send immediate support when the garrisons required it because of the bad communications, long distances and shrinking size of the army. When the rebellion in

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Tripolitania was renewed, the position of the Italian Army there had been weakened and many deserted to the rebel camp. This latter development was of great value for the rebels because those local inhabitants who had been recruited into the Italian Army and who had been integrated into its administration became a well-equipped and trained force that was aware of both the capabilities and the shortcomings of the Italians. Consequently, the rebels could use those fighting methods which gave them a relative advantage over the Italians. As long as the Italian Army was on the offensive in Tripolitania its unity was preserved; its varied composition did not prove to be an obstacle because its framework was guarded by the senior and middle command which was Italian. Offensive activity also provided generous rewards to the local recruits in the form of property and jobs. When the assault force became a garrison commanded by junior officers a relaxation was felt and the local factor tried to make economic and political gains. Once the rebellion started, the desertion of the local recruits and the capture of Italian Army camps by the rebels brought about a significant improvement in the rebel camp in both professional manpower, as well as in arms, ammunition and military and civil supplies. However, because of the tribal structure of Tripolitania, most of the booty was distributed in the vicinity of the occupied camps and, consequently, its spread across the country was not even.[59]

The insurrection had started in late-November 1914 in Fezzan. Local garrisons in southern and central Tripolitania (Sabha and Nalut, for example) rebelled and numerous posts were abandoned. As a result, a mass escape started of Italian troops towards the Tunisian and Algerian borders. The French regime across the western border was prepared to help the fleeing troops to reach Tripoli, but was not interested in letting them stay on Tunisian or Algerian territory to prepare a reconquest in order not to involve the population of those countries in the Tripolitanian insurrection and in a Jihad against France.[60] The rebellion spread quickly northwards and there were violent incidents in early-February 1915 in Bu Najm (between Misurata and Sokna). Because of the expansion of the revolt the Italians were forced to evacuate their troops from remote posts because of their

isolation and distance, even if the local troops there had not revolted. The Italian troops were returned in part to Tripoli while the rest were concentrated at a limited number of fortified posts commanding vital key positions, waiting for the "population to return to its senses".[61] Very quickly, the Tripolitanian hinterland became void of an Italian presence. The reason for this quick pull-out lay not only in internal conditions in Tripolitania, but also in Italian foreign and defence policies. The Italian Government in Rome gave precedance to the developments in the European scene even before it officially joined the war and as a result it did not feel free to allocate the required forces and resources needed to crush the rebellion in Tripolitania. The Italian army was thus forced to withdraw in the hope that when there was a general improvement in the situation, it would quickly overpower the rebelling region.[62]

However, the Italians did try to halt the deterioration in Tripolitania by non-military means. One of the common ways was through economic aid, such as providing barley to loyal groups in order to ensure their existence and continued support.[63] There was much danger in this method, because quite often the aid was passed over to the rebels by family members or pillaged by the rebels. A similar situation also existed with regard to military supplies: arms and ammunition which were supplied to local recruits and trusted village and tribal notables quite often found its way to the rebels by means of deserters or those playing a double role. The Italian economic and military aid to its recruits and collaborators strengthened their position but did not ensure their loyalty and they did not hesitate to abandon the Italians as soon as the balance changed in favour of the rebels. The Italians claimed that the rebels had forced the population to care for their needs, but in most cases there was no need for any threats or force because the population saw its aid to the rebels as being a natural thing and as its part in sharing the burden with the fighters.[64]

In early, 1915, Shaykh Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr, the leader of Awlad Sulayman and the traditional central figure in the Sirtica, once again became active among the rebels there. The fact that this prominent

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leader had stopped his collaboration with the Italians and returned to the rebel camp served as a stimulus for numerous shaykhs and inhabitants to follow suit.[65] On the Qiblah front, south of Gharyan, the main resistance to the Italians came from the tribes of Mashasha, Bu Sayf and Zintan. Among the important figures who joined the insurrection in this region was the Sanusi shaykh Ahmad Suni who, together with his brother Mahdi Suni who was operating in Fezzan, had strengthened the Moslem and Sanusi character of the struggle.[66] Another significant concentration of rebels was in the region of Nalut in western Tripolitania, under the command of Shaykh Khalifah b. `Askar.[67]

Another phase in the insurrection occured in the second half of April 1915. The growing rebellion in Fezzan under the leadership of the Sanusi representatives Muhammad al-`Abid and Muhammad Suf al-Mahmudi forced the Italians to evacuate the few southern posts that they still held. This development in turn further increased the desertion of local recruits. On the order of the supreme Sanusi command in Cyrenaica, rebel units loyal to the Sanusiya were sent to areas in Fezzan which were emptied of Italian Army forces.[68] In late-April 1915, an important battle took place in Qasr Bu Hadi (Qardabiyyah) in the Sirtica, during which local units under the command of Ramadan al-Shitawi (al-Suwayhili), who manned the fort, rebelled and deserted. The consequences of this battle were very grave for Italy and its hold on the region was further weakened. Beginning from this event the personality of Ramadan became very prominent among the rebel leadership in this region. He emerged as one of the most important figures in the Tripolitanian leadership and had the closest ties with the Ottomans until his murder in 1920. His activity as a regional leader was constantly contested by the tribe of Tarhuna, with whom the Misurata people, headed by Ramadan, had a long-standing conflict, which had gravely affected the regional cooperation during the struggle with Italy.[69]

Another prominent figure who deserted the Italian camp at that time was Abd al-Nabi al-Khayr, from the Urfella leaders, whose traditional power base was in the Bani Walid region. In the past the

Italians had taken advantage of the fierce rivalry between him and Muhammad Sayf al-Nasr which was based on the traditional conflict between their respective tribes, the Urfella and Awlad Sulayman. The Italians had tried to gain from this feud by channelling the activities of both leaders against each other in order to weaken both. Despite the efforts of the Italians, both leaders remained influential. This inter-tribal rivalry was transferred to the rebel camp and aggravated the internal friction during the struggle against Italy. `Abd al-Nabi was a prosperous man with property in areas under Italian occupation. As a result, the Italian regime tried to harm him through economic measures, such as the confiscation of his property, but this did not influence him to quit the rebels and return to the Italian side.[70] The Sanusis too, tried to deepen their penetration into the Sirtica, basing their efforts on the Urfella-Awlad Sulayman rivalry, and the Sanusiya's dependence on the latter increased. In spite of these traditional conflicts and foreign manipulation, a certain measure of cooperation in the western Gulf of Sidra was achieved and the region, with some 15,000 armed fighters, was in open rebellion.[71]

Once Italy had officially joined the war, it declared that a state of war existed in Tripolitania as of 15 May 1915.[72] Because of deteriorating security in the hinterland the Italian command decided on 21 May 1915 to withdraw the Italian Army from all posts south of Mizda. Italian attempts to improve their position in the hinterland through renewed understanding with the notables did not come off and their hold continued to weaken.[73] In this phase the rebels' assaults started to spread towards the central coastal towns creating a serious threat to the centres of the Italian regime and to Italian supplies, transport, and communication lines, as well as their water resources.[74] Consequently, in order to cut their losses, the Italians had to retreat from western Tripolitania, evacuating the central mountain strongholds of Yefren (3 July) and Gharyan (8 July), as well as the posts of Sinaun, Nalut (9 July), Ghat and Ghadames (19 July). The country was thus emptied of Italian forces.[75] At the beginning of Summer 1915 the Italians still held the coastal towns, but they were besieged by the rebels and isolated from each other. They nevertheless

managed to sustain the maritime connection. As a result of this partial blockade severe shortages of foodstuffs developed among the civil population and the military condition of the garrisons deteriorated. As the siege tightened more Italian posts in coastal towns were evacuated and by early-August 1915 only Tripoli and Khoms remained in Italian hands; the rest of Tripolitania was under the rebels' control.[76]

The more that the Italians' situation aggravated, so their cruel reprisals against the Moslem population increased. In addition, the Italians were in the habit of taking hostages from among the local leadership and keeping them under arrest in Tripoli or even sending them into exile in Italy.[77] These measures were not very useful and due to their own limited numbers the Italians could not deter the population: they only succeeded in arousing the population's hostility and its resolve to take revenge. Internal friction among the rebels made it easier for the Italians to recapture some of their strongholds, including Zuwara in early-1916 through the use of their air force and by cooperation with some local notables. The vicinity of Zuwara remained under rebel control but the Italian post there provided a serious problem for the rebels and made contacts between the rebels and supporters behind the Tunisian border more difficult.[78]

2. The Organization of the Rebels

Following the Italian evacuation from most of Tripolitania the local leaders' spheres of influence were consolidated, but during the entire insurrection period the attempts of the tribes and of the Sanusiya to increase their influence continued. The internal unity of the rebel camp was still very weak and there was no undisputed political and military hierarchy. There was, however, a division of authority and a recognition of some leaders' seniority, but even on these issues changes occurred.

The fighting rebel force in central Tripolitania to the Sirtica numbered some 14,000 armed troops, to which could be added numerous

volunteers. The commander in the western region was Shaykh Muhammad Suf al-Mahmudi whose headquarters was in Fesatu. He belonged to one of the prominent families of the Mahamid tribe in Jebel Nefusa and was the regional Sanusi representative, combining both tribal and religious influences. He was one of the most veteran and serious opponents of Italy in Tripolitania. His relations with France were, however, generally good and he tried to persuade the other leaders not to invade French-controlled territories or to incite their populations. Thanks to his respected position in the region and being the Sanusi representative, he called himself the "representative of the government in Tripolitania". Nevertheless, as early as the beginning of 1916 he was in conflict with part of the local leadership, but was still considered by many as the most senior leader in the region. Under Shaykh Muhammad Suf's command there were some 7,000 fighters, divided into three groups: the first under his direct command and the rest under Belqasem b. Kricha and Khalifah b. `Askar.[79] The latter was the principal leader in the Nalut region and kept close ties with Ghadames and Fezzan. In the Zuwara region the leadership was in the hands of `Abdallah b. Sha`ban who contested the leadership of Shaykh Muhammad Suf.

The forces of eastern Tripolitania, which in late-1916 numbered some 15,000 well-armed fighters, were under the command of Ramadan al-Shitawi from his centre in the Misurata area. The cooperation between Ramadan and Shaykh Muhammad Suf brought about the removal from the Sirtica of Safi al-Din al-Sanusi of the Sanusi leaders who operated there during the beginning of the insurrection. The removal of Safi al-Din did not result from opposition to the Sanusiya, to which Muhammad Suf himself belonged, but represented the resistance of the local leadership and population in Tripolitania to the introduction of foreign leadership to the region: any personality who did not originate from a relatively small and well-defined area was considered a foreigner, even if he came from the vicinity. In addition to his activity against the Italians, Ramadan diverted part of his energy against the Tarhuna, with whom his Misurata followers had a long-standing rivalry.[80] Another dominant family, the Sayf al-Nasr, from the Awlad Sulayman leaders, exercised their influence over the

inner Sirtica and towards Fezzan from their centre in Wadan.[81] Among the other important tribal leaders who participated in the insurrection were `Abd al-Nabi al-Khayr from the Urfella, whose centre was in Bu Najm; al-Hadi Ku`bar in Gharyan; and Ahmad and Sughayr al-Mura'id from the Tarhuna leaders, whose centre was in Ubirat.

3. The Sanusi Involvement in Tripolitania

The main Sanusi influence was in Cyrenaica and its penetration into Tripolitania was small. There were, however, many zawiyahs in Tripolitania and the moral influence of the order was marked. The Sanusiya was involved in the insurrection in Tripolitania during World War I from its very start. Sanusis were amongst those who spread the call for the Jihad across the country. They also distributed letters written by the Sanusi leaders, including the Tripolitanian representatives, and contributed greatly to the renewal of the rebellion in Tripolitania. Sanusis had also actively participated in the insurrection in Tripolitania and the chief Sanusi representatives in the west (Muhammad Suf al-Mahmudi, Ahmad and Mahdi Suni) were among the senior leaders of the revolt. In addition to those veteran leaders within Tripolitania, Sanusi forces from Cyrenaica headed by Safi al-Din al-Sanusi, a younger brother of Ahmad al-Sharif, the head of the order, participatied in the insurrection in the Sirtica. As the force of the Tripolitanian leadership grew, attempts were made to weaken the Sanusi involvement and to prevent the introduction of a foreign leadership. As a result, Safi al-Din was expelled.

There was also a Sanusi penetration into Tripolitania from the south. In late-July 1915 Sanusi chiefs penetrated into Ghadames and soon after expanded their hold in the region to include Ghat with the cooperation of notables from Ajjer. The Sanusi propaganda in the west was mixed with fierce pan-Islamic agitation during the attempt to overrun Janet (in Algeria), which was initiated by Muhammad al-`Abid, Ahmad al-Sharif's brother whose centre was in Fezzan. These activities were not in line with the opinions of Muhammad Suf al-Mahmudi, and it was against the background of this controversy, as well as because of Sanusi ambitions to deepen their involvement in Tripolitania, that the

rift between him and the Sanusi leadership deepened, despite the fact that he was one of its representatives in the region. Muhammad Suf ordered Khalifah b. `Askar (from Nalut), as well as other tribes in the Zuwara and Nawa'il neighbourhoods (all of them in the vicinity of the Tunisian border), to end their anti-French activities. These efforts among the local notables were carried out both orally and in writing and aimed at concentrating the war effort in the struggle against the Italians and on not opening up additional fronts. This tendency was also in line with the Ottoman policy at the time of not carrying out large-scale operations against the French at this early stage (late-1915), just when the Ottoman-Sanusi invasion of Egypt was to begin. However, about one year later, Ottomans and Germans became actively involved in the preparation of a local Fezzani force which was intended to attack the French.[82]

The conflicts between Muhammad Suf and Muhammad al-`Abid and the latter's ambition to widen his sphere of influence as the Sanusi representative in Tripolitania brought about an attempted Sanusi invasion from the south to the centre of Jebel Gharbi in March 1916 which was aimed at toppling the local leadership. The invading force included, besides Muhammad al-`Abid, some Tripolitanian leaders who, following their quarrels with Muhammad Suf, had been expelled by him from the region. The Sanusi attempt to conquer Gharyan failed and the Sanusi leaders from Fezzan were confronted by a hostile population. After a short while the attackers were forced to turn back and the command in Gharyan was transferred to an Awlad Bu Sayf leader who recognised the authority of Muhammad Suf.[83]

The Sanusiya took advantage of inter-tribal and intra-tribal conflicts in order to strenthen its position in Tripolitania. One of its successes in this field was the cooperation with the Awlad Sulayman who were in conflict with the Urfella under the leadership of `Abd al-Nabi al-Khayr and the Ottomans. Following violent feuds between the two tribes, the Awlad Sulayman passed over to the Sanusi. However, in spite of the changes in Sanusi policy in Cyrenaica, there was no change in the anti-Italian policy of Awlad Sulayman. The

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Sanusis also manipulated internal conflicts within the Urfella so as to deepen their hold over the tribe.

Despite all these attempts, which only partly succeeded, the Sanusi penetration into Tripolitania was not significant. The Sanusiya in Tripolitania was only one of the important factors on the scene, but not the main and unifying factor as it was in Cyrenaica. To a certain extent it even contributed to the growth of internal division in the west.

4. Tripolitanian Leadership in the Shadow of the Ottoman Involvement

Because of the changes in both the Sanusi leadership and the Ottoman position in Cyrenaica during 1916, there began a significant growth of Ottoman involvement in Tripolitania which had implications for the local leadership. Back in 1913 the independent formation of the Tripolitanian leadership had started with almost no external involvement. Although the population did not succeed in establishing a supreme leadership over all the region's tribes and villages, they did at least conduct their affairs by themselves. There were changes in this process from Summer 1916 because the Ottomans tried to re-subjugate the local leadership to Ottoman rule.

Among the Ottoman envoys to Tripolitania was Sulayman al-Baruni, who arrived in October 1916. He was nominated Governor of Tripolitania, Tunisia and Algeria under a Sultanic decree. Baruni was responsible for the influx of Ottoman-German aid to Tripolitania, supervision of the activists of the Teşkilat-i Mahsusa, most of whom were local notables, and was also expected to smooth out all difficulties among the local leadership.[84] The authority the Ottomans provided him with, as well as his status in Jebel Gharbi, made him one of the strongest figures in the region. However, because he had been away from Tripolitania since 1913, new personalities gained power and on his return conflicts arose between Baruni and this new leadership. Furthermore, he represented the resented Ottoman attempt to renew its involvement in Tripolitania. The local population benefited from this

attempt because the Ottoman Government started to make back payments of salaries to local inhabitants who had served under its administration in Tripolitania, as well as making generous donations to local notables.[85] Among the notables with whom Baruni tried to establish contact was Ramadan al-Shitawi, the dominant figure in the Misurata area which became the main port through which Ottoman-German reinforcements reached Tripolitania. In the early period, after his return to Tripolitania, there were no quarrels between Baruni and Ramadan; they developed once Baruni tried to consolidate his own position at the expense of the other leaders.

During the first phase of the renewed Ottoman involvement there were no local reservations in Tripolitania about a supreme Ottoman authority, but there were already signs of opposition to Ottoman attempts to dictate the manning of leadership and command positions among the rebels. Because of the Ottomans' important role as the channel of military and civil supplies as well as finance, the local Tripolitanian leadership did not dare oppose the Ottoman presence. However, as time passed, reservations were voiced about those who were chosen to represent the Empire, their attitude towards the population and their attempts to seize control of the resistance movement by themselves or through local collaborators.

In December 1916 the senior Ottoman representative in Cyrenaica, Nuri Bey, moved with all his staff from Jedabiya to Misurata.[86] The arrival of Nuri in Tripolitania strengthened militarily and economically the supporters of the Ottomans in the west. As a result of the Ottoman support, their followers began to gain the upper hand in the traditional internal conflicts. As a result of their control over the inflow and distribution of supplies, Ottoman influence over internal developments was in excess of that which it should have been given their numbers and popularity in Tripolitania. Because of the increased frequency of arrivals of German submarines in Misurata and of smugglers' caravans from Tunisia, the quantity of arms and ammunition grew significantly, leading to an increase of rebel military operation. In 'Aziziya, which for part of the time had been the centre of Baruni and Muhammad Suf, a central arms and ammunition

dump had been established, and regional depots were formed on the important fronts. In addition, workshops for the production of ammunition and the repair of arms were also established.[87] Just as the inflow of supplies provided the Ottomans with an important power base, their distribution in Tripolitania strengthened the position of the personalities through which this was accomplished, foremost among them in the first period being Baruni.

Not long after the arrival of Nuri friction arose between him and Baruni concerning the governing authority. The Ottomans' squandering of positions and ranks in North Africa created unclarity regarding the ruling hierarchy: whereas Baruni had been appointed by Sultanic decree to the governorship of Tripolitania, Tunisia and Algeria, Nuri was the supreme military commander who controlled the inflow of all military and civil equipment into Tripolitania, and because of his family status he was recognized by the Ottomans as the senior personality in the region. The friction between the two led to Baruni fortifying himself in 'Aziziya, removed from Nuri's headquarters in Misurata. The quarrels also took the form of mutual complaints and accusations. The fact that during 1917 the rebels at times suffered defeats at the hands of the Italian Army also increased dissension between rebels and Ottomans.[88]

On their arrival in Tripolitania the Ottomans tried to iron out differences between the local leaders and to settle inter-tribal disputes, which were often the background to friction within the leadership. Within a short while, however, the Ottomans realized that it might be possible to temporarily prevent these feuding by means of moral and material pressure, but foreign intervention was incapable of changing traditional life styles at one stroke. Furthermore, disagreement among the Ottomans themselves caused a split in Ottoman support between rival Tripolitanian factions, and this nourished the friction. This development was most evident in relations with Ramadan: at first, Baruni tried to mediate between the Misurata people, headed by Ramadan, and those of Tarhuna, but his success was meagre. From early-1917 relations between Baruni and Ramadan became tense and even

violent. Simultaneously, the friendship and cooperation increased between the latter and Nuri, who was in conflict with Baruni.[89]

5. Military Re-organization

In early-1917, a short while after his arrival, Nuri started to try and re-organize the military force in Tripolitania following the changes in the balance of power in the region. This re-organization was aimed at strengthening the position of the Ottoman officers within the local units and at the same time at diminishing the tribal division and the accumulation of military power by local leaders. A large-scale recruitment began of bachelors for active military service; married men were transferred to the reserves. The new recruits were trained by Ottoman instructors in special training camps in Misurata and Gharyan. Following the increase and improvement in both manpower and arms, encounters between the rebels and the Italians increased in September 1917.[90]

When Nuri was substituted by İshak Paşa in the supreme Ottoman command of Tripolitania in late-1917, attempts were renewed to increase local mobilization and to organize the army on a state and not on a tribal-regional basis. Consequently, the recruitment in eastern and southern Tripolitania increased and some of the recruits were sent to confront the Sanusis in the east and the Italians in the west. In order to push back Italian attacks from Zuwara, the rebels established a new post -- Jadidah -- near Zawiyah, to which soldiers from neighbouring camps were sent. This post was, however, dismantled after only a few months of its existence (in March 1918) because the commanders realized that it was not improving the military build-up of the rebels and was diluting manpower along the front.[91]

The last Ottoman attempt to seize control of the rebel camp by means of re-organization of the army occurred in Summer 1918. All fit men were called upon by Prince Osman Fuad, the Sultan's representative in Tripolitania, to enlist immediately; if they did not, their property would be confiscated. However, not all the population was called on for active service and a large part was left in the reserve

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forces. In order to make the mobilization more efficient and to plan the military lay-out without harming daily life and economic activity, on which the rebellion was dependent, recruitment quotas were imposed on the various districts. The assignment of re-organizing the army was initiated and operated by foreign officers: Ottomans, Germans and Austrians. Changes were accomplished in the coastal region, Sirt and Gharyan. In contrast to the past, this time the posting of recruits was not done on a tribal basis; they were stationed in battalions (tabur) of three companies (bölük) each, composed of eight-men groups. The battalions were commanded by some fifty Ottoman officers. In addition to the increase of the infantry, the cavalry grew as well: all those who were capable were ordered to acquire horses; every mobilized horseman received a daily salary and a portion of barley. All recruits received arms, uniform, food and daily wages.[92] The purpose of this operation was to loosen the connection between the local troops and their shaykhs who were their military commanders and who used their military power in inter-tribal feuds and to prevent direct Ottoman involvement in the hinterland. However, the strengthening of the Ottomans' position in the new military formation, coupled with the destabilizing of the status of the local notables, once again caused tension between the latter and the Ottomans. Furthermore, the troops felt bitter because they had been accustomed to close and personal ties with their commanders who were also their shaykhs; under strict Ottoman command in mixed units, sometimes with erstwhile traditional rivals, they felt themselves isolated, and consequently their motivation decreased and many deserted.[93] As a result, despite their attempts, the Ottomans did not succeed in destroying the power base of the tribal chiefs and the re-organization of the army did not last long. At the end of this period there were some 20,000 regular, trained and armed Moslem troops in Tripolitania, including cavalry and artillery. In addition, there were some 15,000-20,000 troops in the reserve of the first instance who were armed and had undergone limited military training, and some 40,000 reservists of the second instance who were armed but lacked regular military training and who were called only for special assignments and area defence.[94]

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6. Power Struggles in the Tripolitanian Leadership

Tripolitania was characterized by extensive tribal divisions which negatively affected its capability to fight the Italians in a unified way even during World War I, when the Italian occupation was in its lowest level. At the centre of many conflicts stood one of the most dominant figures in the region, Ramadan al-Shitawi, the leader of the Misurata people. Ramadan strived to lead all the Tripolitanian rebels. He was strongly backed by the Ottomans and the Germans because of his personality and command capabilities but also because his authority stretched over the main port used by them in Tripolitania. The other local leaders feared that as a result of Ramadan's close ties with the Ottomans and the strengthening of his position they in turn would be weakened and they therefore objected that his supremacy would be on their account. An old conflict which came to the fore in this period was between the Misurata and the Tarhuna people, the latter led by the Mura'id family.[95] Because of Ottoman pressure and a temporary balance between the tribes, the parties occasionally reached agreement concerning the boundaries of their spheres of influence, but whenever Ramadan's power strengthened again, he tended to ignore the understandings reached with the Tarhuna. Because the latter were residing nearer to the Italian-occupied zone and the Mura'id family had maintained friendly relations with the Italians despite the war, the hostility of Ramadan towards the Tarhuna increased and he suspected their intentions. Ramadan objected that the Tarhuna would take Italian prisoners-of-war and feared that they would be ready to return them to the Italian administration without any real political and military gains, and would be satisfied with a private financial compensation.[96] This inter-tribal rivalry was apparently the main reason for the absence of Tarhuna representatives from the welcoming ceremony for Prince Osman Fuad, the Sultan's representative in Tripolitania, which took place in Misurata in June 1918:[97] the Tarhuna feared that they might be molested if they stayed on hostile territory and under the protection of Ramadan. This conflict had also spilled-over to other tribes. The close ties between Ramadan and `Abd al-Nabi al-Khayr, one of the Urfella leaders in the Sirtica, caused

hostility between the Tarhuna and the Urfella and led to violent feuding between them.[98]

Ramadan took advantage of his senior position in order to force his will on neighbouring tribes. He confiscated camels and other means of transportation from rival and contesting tribes. It appeared that he was doing this legally and for the public benefit: the declared aim of this step was the transfer of military equipment and daily supplies to fighting forces. This action, however, weakened the capability of other tribes and simultaneously strengthened the Misurata. Ramadan also tried to impose taxes on barley and other agricultural growth out of his sphere of influence. Following opposition from neighbouring tribes to this measure he tried to enforce his will by the use of arms. As a result of these and similar activities the neighbouring tribes refrained from visiting the markets of Misruata, in case taxes would be collected from them there while in Ramadan's sphere of influence.[99]

Another conflict was related to the Awlad Sulayman and their leaders from the Sayf al-Nasr family whose influence was strong in the inner Sirtica towards Fezzan, from Jedabiya in the east to Sokna, Waddan and Hon in the south. Awlad Sulayman struggled for supremacy in this region with the Urfella tribe under `Abd al-Nabi al-Khayr, in a struggle that was both tribal and personal.[100] In contrast to `Abd al-Nabi, who had generally friendly ties with Ramadan and the Ottomans, the Awlad Sulayman strived for independence from all external factors. Nuri and Ramadan tried to win the active support of Awlad Sulayman and when they failed to subdue them to their central authority, they sent an Urfella force against them under the command of `Abd al-Nabi and a Turkish officer. There was usually a force of some 1,000 troops under the command of `Abd al-Nabi at his centre in Bani Walid, but numbers increased depending on the military needs and the economic situation. The force went to Sokna in order to imprison the Awlad Sulayman leadership. Following this, the latter withdrew to more secluded posts in their sphere of influence. `Abd al-Nabi, who suffered a defeat in Waddan, managed to temporarily capture Sokna and station a group of his men there. After a short while, however, due to

further encounters he was forced to withdraw with his force to his sphere of influence in the north.[101] Not only was he quite isolated in this southern area, but his absence from the north may have been instrumental in changing the balance of power against him. Following these and similar events the Sayf al-Nasr family finally passed over to Idris al-Sanusi's side in his struggle against Ramadan and the Ottomans.[102] The Sanusis who followed Idris became the main source of military and civil supplies to Awlad Sulayman, and exploited the internal conflict in Tripolitania to increase their penetration into the region. Awlad Sulayman continued to attack the Urfella, who were thus forced to set aside a large part of their forces in order to protect their borders, especially in the east, and to man posts against Awlad Sulayman raids. The Urfella also stationed guards to prevent the desertion of some of their members to the spheres of the Misurata and Tarhuna, fearing raids by Awlad Sulayman. As a result of these conflicts caravans of both parties were captured and camels and goods confiscated.[103] In the Urfella leadership quarrels also erupted; the faction in opposition to `Abd al-Nabi protested against dictatorial inclinations and acts of oppression by `Abd al-Nabi and Ramadan, which caused a growing dissatisfaction with the leadership. This faction passed over to the side of Idris al-Sanusi[104] who exploited this situation in order to lure people to his side.

The status of Shaykh Muhammad Suf al-Mahmudi changed during the period.[105] At the beginning of the insurrection he was considered to be one of the senior leaders of the struggle because of the position of his tribe (Mahamid), his personal qualifications and his being the Sanusi representative in Tripolitania. Following the tightening of his ties with Ramadan and the Ottomans he dissociated himself from the Sanusis of Idris and consequently lost some of his prestige among Sanusi supporters in the west. In addition, his followers began to grow doubtful about his capability of organizing the resistance efficiently and determinedly as required because of his old age. As a result, there was a growing reservation among the people of western Tripolitania -- who were not directly connected with him -- about his leadership; at times, they even refrained from putting their men at his disposal for anti-Italian operations. In the Zawiyah region the

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supporters of Shaykh Muhammad were in a minority; the majority supported contacts with the Italians. Another result of his ties with Ramadan and Nuri and his struggle for supremacy in Jebel Gharbi was the deterioration of his relations with Sulayman al-Baruni.[106] Ottoman support strengthened the position of Shaykh Muhammad and in Summer 1918 he was appointed by Prince Osman Fuad as the Mutasarrıf of Jebel Gharbi. This appointment was made on the recommendation of İshak Paşa, the regional military commander, who was in conflict with Sulayman al-Baruni. The blow inflicted on the Baruni family in this case was especially grave, since the previous mutasarrıf was Yahya al-Baruni, Sulayman's brother, whom the population rejected.

* * *

The success of the insurrection during World War I was due mainly to external circumstances and not so much to developments in the rebel camp: the deterioration within the Italian garrisons in Tripolitania; Italy's inability to allocate resources to the Libyan front because its main interest lay in the European scene; the Ottoman-German support and the Sanusi agitation. The Tripolitanians themselves did not succeed in establishing a unified leadership that would be accepted by all the region's population and which would consider the interests of the whole region above that of the individual tribe, family or village. The Tripolitanians continued their struggle against the Italians, but more blood was shed in inter-tribal feuds and in struggles for supremacy. The enormous inflow of arms, ammunition, equipment and money, at first following the capture of Italian Army camps and later due to the frequent Ottoman-German shipments, supplied the fighters with both military and economic means that enabled them to continue their struggle. As long as the war in Europe headed Italy's priorities, the rebels did not face any real danger. However, when Italy was once again able to send large military forces to Tripolitania to crush the rebellion and when the Ottoman inflow stopped, the vulnerable points of the rebels were exposed since even in this dangerous situation they were unable to unify around a central leadership. Although by late-1918 there was an attempt to establish a

"Tripolitanian Republic", it was doomed by internal feuds coupled with Italian subversion.[107]

During this period the Ottomans did not serve as a unifying factor and were not considered as the supreme authority in the rebel camp. The direct Ottoman involvement in Tripolitania, which was renewed in Summer 1916 following a break of more than three years, did not succeed in enforcing Ottoman authority over the local leadership which by then had been consolidated; its independence grew. The Ottomans were considered to be an external factor and as such were unwanted yet tolerated because of the equipment which was badly needed. The Ottomans did not constitute any real danger to the independence of the local notables because of their limited numbers; the most that they could do was to help advance some collaborators who already had a substantial power base. Even indubitable supporters, such as Ramadan al-Shitawi, went along with the Ottomans only part of the way and were not ready to abandon their freedom of action. Consequently, the internal division increased while the position of the Ottoman supporters strengthened.

D. Conclusion

During the whole period under review a central unified leadership, accepted by the whole population, was not established in Tripolitania and Fezzan, not to mention Libya as a whole. It can be said that the internal division deepened because of the growth of the military might of several tribal leaders. However, even in this situation of large-scale internal division, the rebels were a real nuisance for the Italian regime as long as the latter was unable to invest in the region significant military and economic resources, including great numbers of qualified and dedicated troops.

During the first period of the insurrection (1911-12), the Ottoman leadership had to a certain degree bridged the lack of internal unity in Tripolitania and despite all the previous quarrels with the Ottoman Government, there was a certain degree of cooperation

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between the Ottoman regime and the local inhabitants. The local leadership was quick to realize which foreign power was more dangerous to their society. In addition, as long as the Ottoman army was in Tripolitania, there was no point in fighting the Italians single-handed and not cooperating with the Ottomans. Consequently, the Ottomans led a unified Ottoman-Tripolitanian struggle and this unity was the main factor why the Italians could not crush the insurrection in 1912. It was easier for the rival Tripolitanian factions to accept the supremacy of an external party which they had already grown accustomed to considering as the ruling power than to acknowledge the seniority of one of their own. The absence of a unified leadership following the Ottoman departure (although on the face of it a Tripolitanian Government had been established in late-1912), coupled with Italian military superiority, brought about the Italian occupation of Tripolitania and Fezzan in 1913-14. The weakening of the Italian hold during the first year of World War I resulted mainly from the sparseness of the Italian garrison which was based on elements that lacked any motivation to protect the Italian presence there.

The Tripolitanian leadership, which was based on rural settlements and divided tribes, lacked an external unifying factor similar to the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica. The Sanusis did try to operate in the west too, but their influence in Tripolitania was limited due to the different social structure and the loyalty of the central mountain region to the Ibadiyyah. Lacking a central and unified leadership, the insurrection could continue only as long as the main energy of the Italians was directed towards Europe and while the rebels continued to receive great quantities of military and economic supplies. Once the Italians were freed of the campaign in Europe and the Ottomans were forced to cut all ties with Libya, the Italians managed to quickly overpower the Tripolitanian rural population. The occupation of the junctions, routes and villages left the population the alternative of either surrendering or emigrating. Consequently, most of the population accepted the Italian rule, but there were many who fled westwards and continued their struggle for the liberation of their country from outside the country. However, the end of the Italian regime in the region was brought about by international

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circumstances and not by the achievements of a Tripolitanian liberation movement.

2. Cyrenaica

A. The Turkish-Italian War

Cyrenaica, like Tripolitania, was characterized by extensive divisions, but in contrast to the situation in the west, there was a supreme unifying factor in Cyrenaica to which most of the population in the hinterland was loyal — the Sanusiya. As a result, all those internal conflicts which were so evident in Tripolitania and which prevented large-scale cooperation, were concealed in Cyrenaica; outwardly there was only subordination and obedience to the Sanusiya. However, although there was acceptance of the overall authority of the Sanusiya, the tribal division remained, as did the loyalty of the tribal population to their chiefs. Consequently, Sanusi authority over the Cyrenaican population was realized indirectly through the tribal chiefs. Thus, even during multi-tribal military operations a leader of one tribe did not command members of other tribes; every military unit operated separately as a homogeneous tribal unit under the command of its traditional leader. During the war the Ottomans relied upon this system in which Ottomans, Bedouin fighters and Sanusi shaykhs were integrated. The local military units were based on the tribal structure and were commanded by their local tribal chiefs together with Sanusi shaykhs from the vicinity of the same tribes. Above this tribal and Sanusi command were Ottoman non-commissioned officers and officers, most of whom had had previous experience in commanding Arabs and Bedouin and some of whom were of Arab or Libyan origin.

Even before the war broke out the Sanusiya had branched out from the purely religious sphere. The order had played a considerable role in the social, economic, cultural, military and political fields and it was therefore of vital importance for Ottomans and Italians alike to win the Sanusis' support. Both nations made public numerous

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declarations of support of the Sanusiya in the knowledge that the influence of such announcements would go far beyond Cyrenaica and reach Tripolitania and the whole Moslem world. Both parties tried to find favour with the Sanusi leaders by sending them presents and bestowing various honours in an effort to portray the Sanusi leaders as their supporters. Even though at an early stage of the war Sanusi support for the Ottomans was not voiced aloud and unequivocally, in practice Sanusi support was given to the Ottomans and not to the Italians throughout the war.

The conflicting Ottoman and Italian announcements regarding Sanusi support were made possible by the absence of the order's leader, Ahmad al-Sharif, from the centre of events in northern Cyrenaica. When war broke out he stayed in Kufra in southern Cyrenaica. Only by mid-1912 did he start to move northwards, reaching Jaghbub in September 1912, that is, about a month before the Ottoman-Italian peace agreement was concluded. The fact that the Sanusi leader was far from the scene of the war facilitated the spread of contradictory rumours. The Italians took advantage of this situation to arouse doubts about the credibility of Sanusi declarations of support for the Ottomans which were published in the press. The Italians claimed that these declarations were very general, only calling upon the Moslems to oppose the Christians, and lacked any explicit order to support the Ottomans against Italy. The Italians also interpreted the remoteness of Ahmad al-Sharif from the front as a sign of his objection to the war against them.[108] Even though such analyses may have contained a grain of truth, the Sanusiya did in fact provide vital support to the Ottomans against Italy and not only in Cyrenaica, but in Tripolitania as well. As to cooperation between them there is no doubt. Furthermore, the Cyrenaican population would not have supported the Ottomans without Sanusi permission, and without such cooperation the long Ottoman opposition against the Italians would not have been possible: the limited number of Ottoman troops vis-à-vis the numerical might of the local population on the one hand, and the modern and strong army of the Italians on the other hand, would not have enabled the Ottomans to confront the Italians alone and

certainly not to fight on two fronts -- against both the Italians and the local inhabitants.

A short while after the war broke out Ahmad al-Sharif started to send letters to both the Ottoman commander of Cyrenaica, Enver, and the Ottoman headquarters of Tripolitania at `Aziziya and to zawiyah and tribal shaykhs. In these letters the head of the Sanusi order called on his followers, as well as all Moslem believers, to fight alongside the Ottomans against Italy. He also sent numerous flags with Qur'anic sentences and the call of the Jihad embroidered on them in order to rouse the troops, who were considered to be "holy fighters".[109] The declarations, and especially the flags, served as proof to the fighters that the Sanusiya did support the struggle against Italy. They regarded the flags as holy objects and as having supra-natural powers in favour of the Moslems and against the Italians. The declarations were saturated with religious expressions, stressing religious contact among the fighters and the distinguished Moslem character of the struggle. Not only the leader of the Sanusiya, but also lower ranks in the order's hierarchy called upon the zawiyah and tribal chiefs to support the Ottomans in the struggle.[110]

The Ottoman authorities and Enver in particular took special care to cultivate the ties with the Sanusiya. This was reflected in letters, medals and expensive presents sent by the Sultan and senior Ottoman statesmen to Ahmad al-Sharif and other Sanusi leaders. Enver made sure to entertain each Friday at his headquarters the regional notables including Sanusi shaykhs, and he also visited the neighbouring zawiyahs. Other Ottoman officers too, including Mustafa Kemal, acted similarly, though on a more limited scale. The Sanusis, for their part, gave presents to the Ottomans, and especially to Enver, who was also given a few black women.[111] An extraordinary expression of Sanusi gratitude to the Ottomans was the naming of a renovated zawiyah in Salalu in early-1912 after the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet Reşad V: Al-Zawiyah al-Rashadiyyah. The Sultan greatly appreciated this and expressed his thanks in writing and presents.[112]

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The importance of Sanusi support for the Ottomans against the Italians lay not only in the moral influence of the order on the population, who would not have otherwise cooperated with the Ottomans; it also placed the extensive Sanusi communications and supply network at the disposal of the strugglers. The Sanusi zawiyahs which were spread all around the region served both as regional centres and as components of a commercial network in northern and tropical Africa. The Sanusi support enabled the Ottomans to depend upon this system, even though the Ottomans did not gain access to the network: when they did try to get a foothold there it was made unequivocaly clear to them that the order would not permit it.[113] In addition to their involvement in commercial life, the zawiyahs had considerable influence over the neighbouring tribes. As a result of this regional structure of contacts, both tribal and zawiyah heads were integrated into the command of local units in Cyrenaica: its direct chief commanded a homogeneous tribal unit, while Sanusi shaykhs from the neighbouring zawiyah were appointed to command a few units from the same area. The latter participated in the fighting, lifting the morale of the fighters. Without the mediation of the Sanusi shaykhs it would have been impossible to obtain the cooperation of units whose troops belonged to rival tribes, and which were cooperating only for the benefit of the Sanusiya. A clear example of this pattern of relations were the ties between the Bara`isah tribe and al-Zawiyah al-Bayda'.[114] In normal times the zawiyahs served as transit points on the trans-Saharan trade routes, where the caravans rested and equipped themselves with food and water. During the war the zawiyahs supplied similar services to the fighting forces. In an earlier period the zawiyahs had served as arms depots, although this had been in violation of the law, and the weapons were then used against the French and also against the Ottoman Government. The struggle against Italy benefited from this anti-government Sanusi initiative because the Sanusis distributed weapons from these stores to the neighbouring tribes to be used in the struggle. As time passed, caravans with food, equipment and fighters reached the battlefront from the south. The caravans used the traditional routes and the zawiyhas with the full knowledge and approval of the Sanusi leader.[115] In addition, Ahmad

al-Sharif used the order's money which was deposited in part in Cairean banks for the war effort.[116]

Because of the almost complete departure of the Ottoman administration from Cyrenaica following the outbreak of war, the regional administration was re-organized on the basis of local administrators and shaykhs of Sanusi zawiyahs. The Ottomans approved of the fact that the zawiyahs became administrative centres and that several of their members were appointed as clerks and district administrators who became part of the Ottoman administrative system and who were paid by it. Many districts in the hinterland had already been administered from Sanusi centres before war broke out, but the Ottoman Government had permitted this unwillingly since it had no power to penetrate the Sanusi-administered areas. When war broke out, the absence of Ottoman manpower and the fact that the administrative system could be operated only in cooperation with the Sanusiya led the regime to charge the Sanusi order with directing life in Cyrenaica.[117]

The complex nature of Ottoman-Sanusi relations was illustrated in the "Jaghbub incident". In April 1912, Enver sent a military force to the Jaghbub zawiyah; it included officers and administrators whose job it was to establish an Ottoman military-administrative centre. This action was opposed by the Sanusis. The British in Egypt also rejected this step, claiming that the place was in Egyptian territory. Consequently, they urged the Sanusis to actively resist this Ottoman step. The Sanusis protested against the penetration by Ottoman representatives of the zawiyah network, and especially of one of the most important of them. The Sanusi leader was opposed to the Ottoman action and asked the Ottomans not to establish a post within the zawiyah compound. As a result, the Sanusis in Jaghbub refused to supply the Ottoman force with equipment and services. When the Ottomans arrived in Jaghbub they demonstrated their sovereignty by hoisting the flag daily. By late-June, however, they had partly bowed to Sanusi demands and hoisted their flag only on Fridays, pending the arrival of Ahmad al-Sharif. Simultaneously, the latter had left Kufra and reached Jaghbub in early-September. On his orders the Ottomans

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evacuated the place at the end of the month.[118] This incident shows that only with Sanusi consent could the Ottoman Army operate inside Cyrenaica. Despite Sanusi readiness to cooperate with the Ottomans, it was not prepared to give up its independence and to allow signs of Ottoman sovereignty to appear in its sphere of influence, and especially not in one of its main centres.

The involvement and influence of the Cyrenaican deputies to the Ottoman Parliament in the war was less pronounced than that of their Tripolitanian colleagues. It was also shorter-lived and limited to the coastal towns. One of the main reasons for these differences was that these deputies represented only the coastal towns which were quickly occupied by the Italians, whereas in Tripolitania some of the deputies represented the hinteralnd and unoccupied areas. Following the declaration of war the deputies Yusuf Shatwan and `Umar Mansur al-Kahya armed the coastal population and thus made the occupation somewhat more difficult, but they found it impossible to completely prevent the Italian landing. These deputies also assisted in the first phase of the mobilization of local volunteers. Following the Italian occupation of the coastal towns, however, their involvement in the struggle inside Cyrenaica ended: `Umar Mansur went over to the Italians and Yusuf Shatwan left for Istanbul. The latter continued to represent Cyrenaica in the Ottoman Parliament but was not really actively involved in the struggle.[119] Only later, from mid-1913, was Yusuf Shatwan to be found among the initiators of pan-Islamic subversion which was directed to a large extent towards Libya.

In Cyrenaica, as in Tripolitania, most of the population fully supported the insurrection. The tribal forces that joined the Ottoman Army acted of their own free will, but came and went as they pleased. For this reason only rough estimates could be made concerning the size of the volunteer force; some put it at 20,000 men. Here, in contrast to the situation in Tripolitania, only a few names of shaykhs were mentioned, and usually it was only noted that certain named tribes had joined the campaign with their chiefs. The commander of Cyrenaica, Enver, tried to give these volunteer units a more regular and orderly character by means of Ottoman training and command. At the volunteers'

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request Enver provided them with military insignia, uniforms and hats. The Ottoman Army also provided the volunteers with arms, although in smaller quantities than in Tripolitania because the central army stores were located in the west.[120]

The characteristics of the anti-Italian struggle in Cyrenaica started to reveal themselves: a large-scale but unstable participation of the local nomadic population under the direction of their traditional leaders and in cooperation with the regional Sanusi leadership, while the position of the inhabitant was conditioned by the policy of the head of the Sanusi order. The Ottomans were the ones who determined the overall organization of the insurrection and who tried to direct the progress of the campaign. It was they, too, who supplied most of the arms, ammunition and money, but the local population and the Sanusiya also contributed much in this respect. The logistic system of the Sanusis was harnessed to the war effort, but neither the order nor the population were prepared to subordinate themselves to Ottoman authority. The population did not rebel against the Ottoman rule which allowed it much freedom of action, and almost all that was concerned with economic and social life, religion and administration came under the Sanusi authority.

B. The Inter-War Period

1. The Sanusiya in the Leadership of the Rebellion

During the period between the end of the Turkish-Italian War and the outbreak of World War I there was a gradual and irreciprocate transfer of the supreme authority in Cyrenaica from the Ottoman regime to the Sanusi order. Despite the conclusion of the peace agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Italy, an Ottoman force of some 800 troops remained in Cyrenaica headed by `Aziz `Ali al-Misri. Although the latter had strived for the leadership of Cyrenaica, in practice he became subordinate to the Sanusis.

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In Cyrenaica, as in Tripolitania, the population was informed of the Sultan's decision to withdraw from the struggle in Libya because of the Balkan War and to grant autonomy to the local inhabitants. The Ottoman commander of Cyrenaica, Enver, met for the first time in Jaghbub on 20 November 1912 (the eve of the Ottoman departure) with the head of the Sanusi order Ahmad al-Sharif. The purpose of the meeting, which was initiated by Enver, was to explain to the Sanusis the motives for the change in the political-military attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards the struggle in Libya. The Ottoman command in Cyrenaica, which until then was very close to the population, became aware of the anger and bitterness of the local inhabitants who felt themselves betrayed and abandoned to an uncertain fate. Enver wanted to iron out difficulties and to explain the international compulsions which necessitated the evacuation.[121] The meeting was also a turning point in the leadership struggle in Cyrenaica: from this phase onwards the Sanusi order and its leaders headed the resistance to the occupation from both the political and military points of view. The Sanusis regarded the dwindling Ottoman force which remained in Cyrenaica as an auxiliary force which was obliged to obey them. It was no longer a situation in which a local population responded to the call of an Ottoman sovereign to fight the Italian occupier, but rather a local leadership whose base was spiritual-dynastic and which was assisted by external support but according to its own discretion.

There are not many details extant concerning the internal organization in Cyrenaica, in comparison to the information on Tripolitania. However, the organization in Cyrenaica held out much longer, its spread was wider and its authority greater due to the centralization of the Sanusi order and the preparedness of the tribes to recognize its authority. The organization of the rebellion was based on the administrative, economic and cultural system which existed in Cyreniaca before official authorization was granted for autonomy. Following the transfer of power to the Sanusis, who were consequently obliged to confront serious political, military and economic problems, differences of opinion started to make themselves apparent within the Sanusi leadership concerning the policy to be followed. Furthermore, once the stakes were higher, power struggles

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within the Sanusi leadership began to be felt. During these two years no fundamental changes took place within the Sanusi leadership, but following the deterioration of the situation during World War I the internal friction reached breaking point and the need for a real change in the leadership made itself felt. The roots of this conflict lay in the inter-war period.

During the Turkish-Italian War the Sanusi leadership remained in Kufra and for most of the period it was absent from the main battlefront. During the inter-war period, however, most of the Sanusi leadership was in northern Cyrenaica in the main confrontation zone and, consequently, its daily involvement was greater and felt. As a result of the proximity, contacts between external factors and the Sanusi leadership increased. One result of this development was that much more became known about the attitudes of the various members of the leadership, including differences of views among them. The dwindling of the Ottoman force and the existence of the Sanusi leadership at the centre of events brought about a growing tension between the two parties, each of which considered itself entitled to head the struggle.

The Sanusi leadership in this period was composed of the third generation of the founder of the order. The order was headed by Ahmad al-Sharif who reached Jaghbub from Kufra about one month before the Turkish-Italian War ended. During the two inter-war years he moved between the headquarters and zawiyhas in northern Cyrenaica and was present at many confrontations with the Italians, although he never acted as the supreme commander. He often declared orally and in writing his resoluteness about fighting the Italians until their complete removal from the region, and he vowed to launch a Jihad throughout the country. He had sworn in the heads of zawiyahs to fight alongside him against the Italians.[122] Because the Sanusis -- and especially their leaders -- were believed to have supra-natural qualities, such as the power to bless and curse, such activities were very influential.

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The four brothers of Ahmad al-Sharif served in the regional command. Muhammad al-`Abid was the only one to remain in southern Cyrenaica in the oasis of Kufra, from where he conducted the struggle in Fezzan. He was also involved in events in Tripolitania and organized supply caravans to the north. His maternal uncle, `Ali al-Ash`ab, who had close ties with the region's population, acted with him.[123] The three other brothers were active in the north: Hilal operated mainly in western Cyrenaica while Safi al-Din and `Ali al-Khattabi in the north and the east.[124] Idris al-Sanusi and Muhammad Rida', the sons of Muhammad al-Mahdi, the previous leader of the order, were less involved in the direction of the struggle, although it was noted that they too commanded Sanusi forces in the east. They were out of the main battle zone for long periods of time. For most of 1913 these two stayed in the region of Kufra and occasionally expressed reservations about the struggle. In June 1914 Idris reached Alexandria on his way to the holy places and Sanusi zawiyahs in the Hijaz. Idris and Muhammad Rida' often expressed their desire for peace and opposition to war in letters and orally during Idris' stay in Egypt.[125] This contrast between the policy pursued by the sons of Muhammad al-Sharif and the views of their cousins increased as the struggle went on and as the military activity intensified. Idris and Muhammad Rida' were more prepared for political contacts with foreign elements in order to end the struggle through compromise. It is possible that the different policies pursued by the two sons of Muhammad al-Mahdi derived not only from different outlook and temperament, but also out of personal rivalry -- their wish to be the leaders of the order by force of being the sons of the previous leader, a role they did not inherit because of their tender age.

Each of the Sanusi leaders had influence over specific tribes and zawiyahs, usually in a defined area, over which he was responsible. Thus, Muhammad al-`Abid and `Ali al-Khattabi had much influence in Kufra and Fezzan and among the Touareg tribes, where their maternal grandfather had established numerous zawiyahs. As a result of this relationship close ties developed between Sanusi leaders and heads of zawiyahs and tribes based on origin, family and territory. This

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relationship could also be translated into economic and even military support.[126]

The zawiyah network served as the basis for the struggle of the Cyrenaican population against the Italians. The zawiyahs served as camps for the troops and as stores for arms, ammunition, equipment and foodstuffs and they usually had an independent water source. The command over the zawiyahs lay with their shaykhs, in cooperation with officers (Ottoman and local), tribal chiefs and the members of the Sanusi family who were charged with supervising certain zawiyahs; the command passed between them. The military force was based on members of tribes in the vicinity of the zawiyahs and stood under the direct command of their heads.[127] When a zawiyah was captured by the Italians or when it faced imminent danger, the force retreated to a neighbouring zawiyah and some of the fighters returned to their tribes. The Italians were aware of the great importance of the zawiyahs in the struggle and in the social, economic and political organization of Cyrenaica. Consequently, the Italian penetration into the Cyrenaican hinteraland was based on the occupation of zawiyahs along caravan routes. The Italians often destroyed the zawiyahs completely, sometimes just to fill wells, in order to prevent renewed organization in the occupied territories. The limited manpower which stood at the disposal of the Italians and the difficulties connected with the occupation made the advance slow. As a result, during 1913 the Italians occupied north Cyrenaica from Benghazi to Tubruq; their penetration into the hinterland until the Summer of 1914 was limited. With the outbreak of World War I and the renewal of direct Ottoman involvement, the nature of the activities changed and the initiative passed back to the Moslem camp.[128]

The contacts between the Sanusiya and the Tripolitanians during this period were few and were conducted mainly through Muhammad al-`Abid from Kufra. The Sanusi order succeeded more in the activities among nomadic tribes and did not manage to penetrate deep into the rural-tribal system of Tripolitania, so that only a small number of zawiyahs were established there. The most prominent representatives of the order in Tripolitania were Muhammad Suf al-Mahumudi, and the

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brothers Ahmad and Mahdi Suni. There were, however, limited supply connections between the two regions and weapons were smuggled to the Tripolitanian rebels. Generally, however, each region operated separately and the Sanusiya did not bridge them.[129]

2. Sanusi-Ottoman Relations

Within the tribal-sectarian system of Cyrenaica, an external factor of limited size found it most difficult to operate efficiently and to influence events. Ottoman officers and soldiers survived in this system only if they were ready to integrate and be subject to its leadership. Most of the Ottoman force headed by `Aziz `Ali al-Misri left the front in June 1913 following lengthy quarrels with Ahmad al-Sharif and zawiyah heads concerning the military and political supreme leadership. Although they wanted to lead the struggle the local leaders were also aware of the important professional contribution of the Ottomans and the political value of maintaining ties with the Empire; consequently, they tried to prevent the departure of Ottoman troops and other volunteers for as long as possible.[130]

In spite of the anger of the Cyrenaicans at the departure of the Ottomans, contacts with them were not severed because the Sanusis recognised the importance of the existence of a political and military rear in this struggle against Italian penetration. The contacts between the Sanusis and the Ottomans took two forms: through contacts with Ottoman personalities in Egypt, and by the sending of Sanusi notables to Ottoman centres, especially to Istanbul. There were regualr contacts, carried out mainly on a social, family, religious and economic basis, between Cyrenaica and Egypt where the Sanusiya had numerous zawiyahs and supporters within both the rural and urban communities. Within the framework of these regualr visits the Sanusis often included meetings with Ottoman personalities in Cairo and Alexandria, including the Ottoman representative in Egypt. In addition, there were meetings between Sanusis and supporters of the Libyan struggle within both the Egyptian Khedivial family and the Egyptian national movement.

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In early-1913 a Sanusi delegation, including `ulama' and administrators, left for Istanbul. They were received with great honour, hosted in the Sultan's palace and met with senior ministers, public figures from a wide circle and members of the diplomatic corps. During their visit the Ottoman financial support for the Sanusi struggle was arranged and it was decided that the support would be delivered by the Sultan-Caliph in his capacity as head of the Moslem community. The delegation also checked the condition of some 250 sons of Cyrenaican shaykhs who had been taken by Enver to study in Istanbul; they were satisfied by their circumstances and advance. The delegation left Istanbul in May 1913 after important contacts with the Ottoman regime and after reaching understandings concerning financial and military support.[131]

Sanusi propaganda was not only conducted at the Empire's centre. Thus, for example, another Sanusi delegation visited Syrian and Lebanese towns in the first half of 1914, meeting statesmen and notables. The Sanusis spoke to the population in these places about the Holy War which was being conducted in Cyrenaica under Sanusi leadership. They called upon their audiences to join them and fight the Italians; if not that, at least to support them materially. This visit was favourably received by the audiences and the local Arab press and many contributions were collected for the fighters in Cyrenaica.[132] This activity in Istanbul and Syrian, Lebanese and Egyptian towns showed that the Sanusis wanted to turn their struggle from a limited and local one to a wider Christian-Moslem confrontation, while emphasizing its special Arab character and the favourable response the campaign was receiving on both the ideological and material levels.

The Sanusis took care not to let the political and military authority drop out of their hands, but those Ottomans who wished could remain and operate in Cyrenaica. The Sanusis gladly accepted financial and military support that the Ottomans had occasionally sent by sea or by land with the few officers and soldiers who volunteered to join the resistance. Because of the limited amount of this support, it did not become a decisive factor during this period and, consequently, the

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Ottomans were not able to use it as a means to exert pressure on the Sanusis. In addition, the latter had other sources of supply, including equipment sent by their followers in Egypt or that which was left behind in Cyrenaica by the departing Ottomans. The limited military activity during this period did not necessitate a large and constant supply of military equipment. The Ottomans, for their part, were not interested right then in again widening the struggle in this region because of the Balkan War and serious domestic issues faced by the CUP regime; they wanted only to keep the war going on a limited scale in order to keep a foothold in North Africa. As a result the Empire was in no position to dictate a policy and military courses to the Sanusis by threatening to withhold military or financial support or through their presence in the region, as had been the case during the Turkish-Italian War and later on during World War I.

3. Mediation Efforts of Foreign Elements

In parallel with their slow advance into Cyrenaica, the Italians also tried to reach a political settlement with the Sanusis because they were aware of the political and military might of the Sanusis and the difficulties involved in subduing them. In order to reach a political settlement Italy acted directly, through its officers and administrators, and indirectly, through local and foreign Moslems. However, all these attempts failed during the inter-war period because the Sanusiya as an institution, and Ahmad al-Sharif in particular, rejected any contact or settlement with Italy. There were, however, some Moslems in Cyrenaica in regions not occupied by Italy who were prepared to negotiate with it and even to recognize its authority, but these were minor and insignificant elements that hoped for economic and political benefits from their ties with Italy and did not represent public opinion. The notables in the occupied areas acknowledged Italian rule and some of them tried to use family relations and other social contacts in order to help Italy in its attempts to negotiate with the Sanusis. The most active in this respect was the previous deputy to the Ottoman Parliament, `Umar Mansur al-Kahya, who went over to the Italian side soon after the invasion. He visited Ahmad al-Sharif several times during 1913, but

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these meetings never included more than polite conversation due to the visitor's position. His presents were declined as were his feelings concerning Sanusi readiness to negotiate with the Italians.[133]

The mediation efforts of the Egyptian Khedive `Abbas Hilmi had implications beyond the events in northern Cyrenaica. In contrast to his policy during the Turkish-Italian War, when the Khedive supported the Ottoman-Libyan struggle against the Italian invasion, during 1913-14 he tried to mediate between the two parties. The change in his political behaviour did not stem from the fact that he no longer opposed the Italian invasion or that he stopped supporting Moslem sovereignty in the region. The change resulted from the political-military conditions in the region at large, and in Egypt in particular, which led him to try and find another way to solve the problem. It is most probable, however, that the main purpose of this mediation attempt was not to conciliate between the Sanusis and Italy, but to win the political, and possibly the financial, support of Italy in the frequent confrontations of `Abbas Hilmi with the British authorities in Egypt. The Khedive also hoped to strengthen his influence among tribes in Egypt and Cyrenaica who were loyal to the Sanusiya, and perhaps to enlarge through this mediation the territory of Egypt.

On the initiative of `Abbas Hilmi and in full coordination with the authorities in Rome, three delegations of Egyptians, who were Sanusis or close to the Sanusi order, were sent to Ahmad al-Sharif in Cyrenaica. These attempts were accelerated in Summer 1913 when it became clear that the mediation attempts of `Umar Mansur had failed. Here, too, the conversations during the meetings between the Khedive's envoys and the Sanusis never went beyond small talk. When the Egyptians attempted to deal with fundamental issues, controversies immediately arose concerning the sovereignty issue, the holding of arms and the existence of the Sanusi army. Both parties refused to give way on these matters, and the contacts were terminated without any results. The part played by the Khedive in these contacts and the political and material gains he hoped to win were known to the British in detail. This activity served to further harm his credibility and

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the already troubled relationship which finally brought about `Abbas Hilmi's dismissal in late-1914.[134]

On the whole, the Sanusis forbade the population in the areas under their control to come into any contact with the Italians because they feared that benefits which the Italians could provide might lead astray people living under grave economic and military conditions. The Sanusis forbade the free crossing of the border to the Italian occupied zones, and those suspected of having contacts with the Italian authorities were carefully interrogated and if found guilty were severely punished.[135]

4. Sanusi-British Relations

There were deep-rooted relations between the Sanusiya and Egypt where there were numerous zawiyahs and where followers of the order resided all over the country. As a result, the Sanusi leadership found it essential to have friendly relations with the British authorities and they had frequent contacts with them, mainly at the middle and junior levels. During the inter-war period, these meetings dealt only with limited regional issues, securing calm and economic activity in the border area, and did not bring any significant results concerning the resistance to Italian rule. These contacts, however, created an atmosphere of mutual trust which had important implications for the developments during World War I. The meetings were usually informal and Sanusi leaders participated as individuals, representing themselves alone. All the Sanusi participants expressed themselves sympathetic to British policies and stressed their recognition of the authority of the Egyptian security forces to the east of the common border (although there was no agreement on its specific outline). The main British purpose during these meetings was to prevent Sanusi agitation on both sides of the border which might cause difficulties for the authority in Egypt. Because of the British obligation to Italy concerning the latter's authority over Libya, the British demanded that the Sanusis recognize Italian sovereignty over Libya and cease their hostilities. By consolidating Italian sovereignty in the region and developing friendly ties with the Sanusis, the British hoped to

prevent a French advance from the south into Libya, to Sudan, and eventually to Egypt: infiltration which the British had considered as permissible when the region was under Ottoman rule, was regarded as a breach of international law once it was operated in a territory under the rule of a European power. The contacts with the Sanusis were mainly directed by Egyptian border guards in the regions of Solum and Siwa, but meetings were also held in Cairo and Alexandria. The senior British officials in Egypt, including Britan's Agent and Consul General, Lord Kitchener, knew of these contacts and directed them.[136]

The head of the Sanusi order, Ahmad al-Sharif, apparently never met with British representatives, but corresponded with border guards and with Kitchener. He promised to honour the authority of the Egyptian Army and police and to help to settle inter-tribal conflicts along the common border. He also sent the British presents and money and even asked them to buy improved weapons for him. Such actions were clearly designed to show his willingness for good relations with the British whom he considered as a friendly power and whose status in Egypt and the Sudan he recognized.[137] His brother, Muhammad al-`Abid, also corresponded with the British from his residence in Kufra. Despite the fact that it was Muhammad al-`Abid who conducted the anti-Italian struggle in southern Cyrenaica, Fezzan and to a certain extent also in Tripolitania, in his letters to the British he emphasized his desire for peace and claimed that in this matter he disagreed with his brother, the Sanusi chief. Muhammad al-`Abid further claimed that all his Sanusi colleagues had identical views which were in contrast to the activities of Ahmad al-Sharif, and which had brought destruction on the north.[138] The claims of Muhammad al-`Abid are supported by no other evidence than his own. In view of his military activities against Italy on a very wide scale it is possible to conclude that what was written in these letters to the British did not represent his true views. His appeals to the British resulted from his desire to conduct friendly relations with them so that he would be able to concentrate all his efforts against Italy and keep the supply channels with Egypt open. Consequently, he took positions which he knew were acceptable to the British. The closest

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ties between the Sanusis and the British developed through a third brother, Hilal. He visited the border guards in early-1913 in the oasis of Siwa. During his visit presents were exchanged and a riding and shooting demonstration took place. Hilal wanted to strengthen ties with the British, to have a free crossing at the border and to be able to buy arms and equipment. The British tried to avoid arousing exaggerated expectations concerning possible aid and described Hilal as a very clever and pleasant person.[139]

The contacts with the British of Idris and Muhammad Rida' illustrate the internal disagreement within the Sanusi leadership and are significant for the continuation of this process during World War I. In their correspondence with the British they explicitly requested British rule over the oasis of Kufra and some other Sanusi sites west of the common border. As a result of such a move, most of the important zawiyahs would have come under Egyptian sovereignty and would have been joined to the Sanusi concentrations in Egypt. The main motive for this request was the ending of the protection associated with Ottoman sovereignty (although Egypt was still part of the Ottoman Empire) in addition to the fact that European powers -- Italy and France -- wanted to occupy the region: the Sanusis feared that they might interfere with their way of life. Idris and Muhammad Rida' believed that if they could not remain independent, the preferred foreign rule was that of the British given Britain's policy in its colonies when compared with that of France and Italy.[140] Having numerous Sanusi zawiyahs and followers within the borders of one country could also strengthen Sanusi influence among the population and henceforth in national politics. In June 1914 Idris passed through Egypt on his way to the Hijaz and during this visit he strengthened his relations with British figures whom he met again at length during World War I.

Relations between the Sanusis and the British during this period were friendly and did not worsen until the Sanusi invasion of Egypt in late-1915. This resulted from both parties' interest in maintaining proper relations on both sides of the border, and because of the strong Sanusi element in Egypt. Through their contacts with the

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Sanusis, the British became aware of the situation within the Sanusi leadership and the different political opinions. From these meetings the British also became acquainted with the intimate details of these leaders' characters. This invaluable information was used by the British when their political involvement in Cyrenaica increased during World War I.

* * *

The inter-war period was characterized in Cyrenaica by the consolidation of the rebels' camp under the leadership of the Sanusiya whose authority was supreme in all fields: political, military, economic and religious. Since the Sanusiya was aware of its supremacy and since the Ottoman Empire had granted autonomy to the population of Libya, the Sanusiya was not prepared to surrender the leadership positions it had won. The Ottoman Empire had announced its dissociation from Libya, but in fact left forces in Cyrenaica. The Ottoman remnants in Cyrenaica had found it difficult to adjust to the changing situation in which the local element turned out to be the supreme authority in the region. The contacts between the Sanusi and Ottoman leaderships continued but on a limited scale and the Ottomans no longer had the means of enforcing their policy on the Sanusis. The latter vehemently opposed any political settlement with Italy and rejected any attempt at direct or indirect negotiations. However, the order had to withdraw from many sites in northern Cyrenaica because of Italian military superiority and the lack of military supplies to the rebel forces. Following the occupation of Tripolitania, the Italians were able to allocate more resources to the eastern province and its final conquest was merely a question of time since, in the regional conditions on the eve of World War I, the military force of the Sanusis was on the wane.

The renewal of Ottoman involvement in Libya and the concentration of Italian efforts in Europe during World War I changed the picture in Cyrenaica. However, the continuation of the struggle with Italy and, not less significant, the mere existence of the Cyrenaicans, were dependent to a large extent on cordial relations between the Sanusis

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and the British and the existence of an open border and free trade. As long as the British did not consider the Sanusis to be a hostile factor threatening their security, they did not deem it necessary to change the situation in the border region; the Sanusi-Ottoman cooperation during World War I was considered to be such a threat and consequently brought about the closure of the border, and the growing Sanusi dependence on the Ottomans who thus managed to force their policy on the Sanusis and to invade Egypt.

C. World War I

1. Causes of and the Preparations for the Invasion of Egypt

The outbreak of World War I did not cause any fundamental change in the political-military outlook of the Sanusiya and it continued to lead the Cyrenaicans in their struggle for independence from the Italian occupation. During 1915 offensive and expansionist tendencies, which were nurtured by the Ottomans and the Germans, gradually became evident within the Sanusi leadership; all three tried to realize these aims in Egypt, but to no avail. Following these events, which were a clear deviation from the traditional course of the Sanusiya, changes occurred in the Sanusi leadership and policy. The new leadership expressed a readiness to reach a political settlement with Italy and simultaneously increased its efforts to deepen its penetration in western-Libya.

During 1915 the Sanusis pushed the Italians back to a few strongholds along the Cyrenaican coast, mainly in the vicinity of Benghazi and Derna. Because of the deterioration of security in the region the Italians sent additional forces to Cyrenacia, but this did not bring about any significant improvement.[141] Simultaneously, and even before Italy had formally joined one of the belligerent camps, there was a renewed penetration by Ottomans to Cyrenaica. For more than a year both the Ottomans and the Germans tried to harness the Sanusis to their policy and exploit the spiritual-political influence of the Sanusiya and its military and economic force in order to

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achieve their own military and political goals. The general Ottoman call for a Jihad was an abstract one whose principles were accepted without any questions by the Sanusiya.[142] The Ottomans were not content with this; they wanted to integrate the Sanusis in their offensive against Egypt which was to be conducted simultaneously from the east, the west and hopefully also from the south. Following a year of hesitation, the Sanusis agreed in November 1915 to participate in the invasion of Egypt. The result was not, however, a tripartite operation and ended in utter failure.

Up to the eve of the invasion, most friendly relations prevailed between the Sanusis and British officers and statesmen in Egypt. In their meetings with the British the Sanusis repeatedly expressed their strong desire to continue the proper and friendly relations with the authorities in Egypt and stated their opposition to agitation to invade Egypt. These friendly relations also found expression in the sympathetic Sanusi response to the declaration of a British Protecorate in Egypt and the appointment of Husayn Kamil to the Sultanate of Egypt in December 1914, following the dismissal of the Khedive `Abbas Hilmi.[143] In spite of the tightening of Sanusi-Ottoman cooperation, and in spite of the fact that following the dissociation of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire a state of war existed between the two sides, the Sanusis opposed an invasion of Egypt. This opposition was not just a lip service: a very concrete expression of the attitude was provided when one of the chief instigators of an Ottoman-inspired invasion, Sulayman al-Baruni, was held under prolonged arrest on the orders of the head of the Sanusiya. In addition, the freedom of movement of other foreign agitators was curtailed and they were prevented from having any contact with local leaders and inhabitants.[144] Even when the invasion was in progress during the occupation of the post of Solum, Ahmad al-Sharif acted as if this had been done by mistake and against his wishes, and so he sought to appease the British.

No declaration of war was made public during the Sanusi-Ottoman invasion of Egypt; neither were its reasons and goals explained. It is possible, however, to estimate the reasons which brought the Sanusis

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to change their basic position towards Egypt and the British from the development on the border region prior to the invasion. From these events one might conclude that more than religious loyalty and ideological and political identification with the Ottoman Empire, the Sanusis were influenced by economic-existential factors, although the ideological motives should not be ignored. During 1915 both the Italians and the British brought about a gradual complete closure of their borders with the territory under Sanusi influence and brought to an end the free trade across the border. This measure was taken in order to exert pressure on the Sanusis to stop their hostilities against the Italians and to persuade them to recognize Italian authority.[145] But in using this measure both the Italians and the British missed their target and, contrary to their intentions, pushed the Sanusis over to the Ottoman side. The existence of the Cyrenaicans had been based on free trade of the hinterland with the Mediterranean coast and Egypt, where foodstuffs as well as manufactured goods were bought. The ending of the trans-Saharan trade, followed by their being cut from their traditional markets in the north and the east, brought about complete dependence of the Cyrenaican hinterland on foreign aid -- Ottoman and German -- which was conditioned on obedience to political and military dictates. This is one of the main reasons why the Ottoman and German representatives in Cyrenaica, and afterwards in Tripolitania, made sure that they had complete control, sometimes through a few of their loyal local followers, over the inflow and distribution of money and military and civil equipment.[146] This status enabled the Ottomans to enforce a policy on the Sanusis that was contrary to their view and activity until then. Another factor which had some influence on the Sanusis' change of mind was the behaviour of a few Ottoman officers, headed by Ja`far al-`Askari, who had physically threatened the Sanusi leadership in order to force it to agree to the invasion of Egypt.[147] The main pressure, however, was connected with the overall economic conditions; personal issues had a minor role. During Autumn 1915 the Ottomans increased their economic pressure on the Sanusis in order to force them to obey their orders, following the improvement of the sea connection to Solum.

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Following the closure of the borders of the Sanusi-held territory and the prevention of trade with that region, the Sanusis had no way of aquiring economic resources and military equipment on any significant scale except the Ottoman-German aid. The British, who understood that this support made the Sanusis dependent on the Ottomans politically and militarily, were ready to supply the Sanusis with money and general equipment but on a much more limited scale than the other camp. Furthermore, the British were not prepared to furnish the Sanusis with arms and ammunition, except for a limited number of items which were given as personal presents to the Sanusi leaders. This attitude was dictated by their reservations about aiding the Sanusis in their struggle with Italy and by the fact that they did not want to endanger internal Egyptian security. The British tried to persuade the Sanusi leadership of the advantages of cooperation with them instead of with Ottomans, and were assisted in this purpose by Sanusi notables from Egypt, but to no avail.[148] In spite of the basic sympathy of the Sanusi leadership shown to the British authorities in Egypt, the distress in which the Sanusis found themselves forced them to give in to Ottoman dictates because they lacked any alternative economic solution.

There were those who saw a connection between the change in Sanusi policy and the character of the order's head, Ahmad al-Sharif. Later reports described him as an avaricious person eager for luxuries and some saw this as the reason for his surrender to Ottoman political pressure.[149] However, contemporary descriptions of his contacts with the British during the period do not emphasise this issue at all. The personal ambition of Ahmad al-Sharif to head an African Sultanate and Caliphate were also mentioned as reasons for the Sanusi invasion of Egypt. It was even rumoured that he had received an astrological confirmation that he had been destined to rule Egypt and that the appropriate time to bring this prophecy into effect had come.[150] Such argumentation was, however, provided a few months after the invasion and even if it had a grain of truth in it, this only served as an impetus to the policy which was followed because of heavy external pressure on the Sanusis.

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In addition to using the supply of economic and military aid to achieve political goals, the Ottomans also tried to strengthen their relations with the Sanusis by integrating them into the Ottoman establishment. Thus, Ahmad al-Sharif was appointed by the Ottomans to senior posts in North Africa, even in regions which were not under Ottoman sovereignty. Special publicity was given to these declarations, especially in periods of crisis when the Ottomans were in dire need of Sanusi political and military support. Thus, for example, such an appointment was announced simultaneously with the entry of Italy into World War I in mid-1915. As a result of these appointments, Ahmad al-Sharif was theoretically superior to the Ottoman envoys sent to Libya and this was one of the reasons for the frequent quarrels over authority and supremacy. The Ottoman backing for Ahmad al-Sharif continued even when his influence declined and the status of Idris al-Sanusi was on the rise.[151] This Ottoman policy was not the result of erroneous information but rather of the intention to try and strengthen the position of the personality loyal to them; they hoped to achieve this end by granting him titles and positions, but this did not have a significant effect on the population once it had decided that his policy was mistaken.

The intensification of Ottoman involvement and pressure in Cyrenaica was moved forward in 1915 with the integration of the sons of Cyrenaican shaykhs who had been educated in Istanbul since 1912. The general and military training of these youths, their loyalty to the Ottomans and especially to Enver, and their membership of distinguished families also strengthened Ottoman influence in the region. These young newcomers could not, however, endanger the position of the Sanusi leadership which was veteran and deep-rooted, and which stood above the tribal leadership to which these youths belonged.[151] The Ottomans also tried to operate local agents in Cyrenaica, as in other parts of the Empire, within the framework of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa. These were usually renowned and influencial figures, but the information on their activity in Cyrenaica is too limited to make possible an estimate of their achievements.[153]

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Italy's participation on the side of Britain and France in the war in May 1915 made it easier for the Ottomans to portray the British as enemies of the Sanusis. As long as Britain was only a friend, but not an ally of Italy, it ws not considered by the Sanusis as an enemy, even though the Ottomans were at war with Britain. This factor was secondary to the existential-economic one, but it did strengthen the anti-British attitude which developed among the Sanusis following the closure of the borders -- a result of British-Italian cooperation. Still, the Sanusi consent to invade Egypt was postponed for a further six months because of the traditional close Sanusi-Egyptian ties and because of the fear of the possible results of such a move.[154]

During the first year of World War I Ahmad al-Sharif continued to be the senior personality in the Sanusi leadership. Even then, however, his authority was not absolute and he could not enforce his views on the Sanusi leadership: decisions were made following general agreement and out of mutual respect for the head of the order. In addition to decisions affecting the whole order, the various members of the Sanusi family had wide authority in defined areas and on certain zawiyahs. This situation further restricted the authority of the order's head.[155] Idris al-Sanusi was acting as his cousin Ahmad al-Sharif's deputy for administrative and military affairs in Cyrenaica. This choice was apparently made in order to strengthen the cooperation between the two branches of the Sanusi leadership. At the beginning of World War I, Idris had been out of Cyrenaica, on pilgrimage to the holy places in the Hijaz and visiting Sanusis there and in Egypt. In March 1915 he returned to Cyrenaica, after meeting in Cairo with the heads of the British administration in Egypt, as well as Egyptian notables, and convincing them of his opposition to an invasion of Egypt or of the use of military means to achieve political goals.[156] The division of authority between the rest of the family was as follows: Hilal was responsible for the region between Derna and Solum; `Ali al-Khattabi for Suluq and the oases of Awjila, Jalu and Kufra; Muhammad al-`Abid for Fezzan and to a certain extent also for southern Tripolitania; and Safi al-Din for western Sirt.[157]

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The only Sanusi leader who tried to cast off the yoke of Ahmad al-Sharif was his brother Hilal, who felt discriminated against and deprived of powers which he believed to be his due. In early-October 1915, Hilal temporarily fled to Egypt, having apparently been encouraged to take this step by the Ottomans who had hoped that by driving a wedge in the Sanusi leadership they would strengthen their own position. Hilal took with him to the Barani region in northern Egypt some of his followers as well as arms and ammunition, and sought to recruit fighters who would be dependent on him personally and to collect taxes and enforce some order in the area. His followers refused to obey Ahmad and abandon Hilal, and stated that they were under the latter's orders alone. Hilal returned to Cyrenaica after a short while, but even then Ahmad had no means of enforcing his will on him.[158] As long as no serious controversy arose within the Sanusi leadership concerning the head of the order, the authority of the leader and the policy of the order, the leadership problem did not assume serious proportions and each member continued to be active in the region in which his influence was dominant. Following the failure of the invasion of Egypt the question of authority and leadership came up with renewed force, bringing changes in the order's leadership.

The great interest in the Sanusis showed during World War I by both the Ottoman-German camp and by the British resulted not so much from the military force and the spiritual influence of the order in Cyrenaica, as from its influence in other regions in the Middle East and Africa. Sanusi zawiyahs were spread over Egypt, especially in its west, and a large part of the population was loyal to the order. Consequently, the possibility existed that an order from the Sanusi chief could trigger a large-scale rebellion against the British authorities in Egypt. This fear was nourished by the general atmosphere of anxiety that existed among the British about the implications of the declaration of a Jihad that embraced all Moslems in the colonies under British rule. In this case the personal loyalty of the Sanusi followers to the head of the order was added to the general response to the call for a Jihad. It should be noted that Lord Kitchener, who was sent out in 1896 to suppress the Mahdi rebellion in the Sudan, was at the outbreak of World War I "Agent and Consul

General" of Britain in Egypt and later on Britain's Minister of War. As a result of his experience in the Sudan he was aware of the possible military and political implications of a declaration of Jihad within a zealous Moslem order. The British estimation was that the Sanusiya was capable of mobilizing some 50,000 active followers in Egypt's Western Desert, this in addition to numerous sympathisers who had large quantities of arms and animals to transport them.[159] An insurrection on these dimensions could have endangered the government in Egypt and spark further anti-British sentiments and activities among Egyptian nationalists. Consequently, the British tried their utmost to persuade the Sanusi leadership not to join the Ottomans in their military plans.

Prior to the increased military activity in northern Cyrenaica the involvement of the Sanusi leadership in the daily life of those Egyptian tribes loyal to it was limited and indirect; it was more spiritual than economic and military. Following the geographical movement of the Sanusi leadership towards the Egyptian population and as a result of the increase in the Sanusi army, the Sanusiya increased its immediate material demands and the Egyptian tribes were asked to pay taxes in money and kind (including food and means of transportation) and, later on, were even ordered to provide military support by mobilizing men and arms. This increase in demands carried with it a growing tension between part of the tribes and the Sanusiya, which broke out into overt hostility and rebellion following the invasion of Egypt.[160]

There were also, however, many positive reactions to the anticipated invasion. The British were very fearful of this tendency and especially of a phenomenon which started even before the invasion and which increased after it -- the transfer of Egyptian supporters of the order to the Sanusi army. The danger in this trend rested not so much in the volunteering of villagers and nomads, as in the desertion of Egyptians from the army and the police. Among the renowned figures who deserted was Muhammad Ahmad Salih Harb from the Egyptian Coastal Guard who was appointed commander of Sanusi forces in Africa, and who was later to become the Minister of War of Egypt. His loyalty to Ahmad

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al-Sharif did not end even when the influence of this Sanusi chief declined, and both went into exile in Anatolia in Summer 1918.[161] The joining of deserters from the Egyptian security forces, as with that of the Ottoman volunteers, greatly improved the capability of the Sanusi army, although most of the fighters did not abandon their traditional fighting methods and were not greatly influenced by Western warfare doctrines which the foreign officers continually tried to impose on the Sanusi army.

During 1915 the military organization in Cyrenaica expanded under Sanusi command. The aim of this force was, as before, the struggle against Italian occupation. A sign of a change in the political and military trends can be seen in the establishment of the main army camps in eastern Cyrenaica in the vicinity of the border with Egypt, and the way in which the army was gradually to become dependent more on regualr recruits rather than volunteers.[162] This process started in late-1914, when Ahmad al-Sharif recruited twenty men of each tribe in the region of Dafna. They were trained in a central camp which had been established there. In addition, most of the Bedouin of the Solum area were mobilized and taxes were levied on the population in order to maintain the army. Another reinforcement to the Sanusi army were the Bedouin who deserted from the Italian Army following the publication of a Sanusi decree which stated that the property of those who served the enemy would be confiscated for the benefit of the Sanusiya and the fighters. During 1915 the Sanusis started to launch reconnaissance missions into Egypt in order to find out the exact number of armed and unarmed Bedouin there who could be mobilized to support the Sanusis or who could be relied upon in other ways. On the eve of the invasion of Egypt the Sanusis started to recruit one-fifth of the Awlad `Ali who were qualified for military service; numerous armed volunteers came from the oasis of Siwa in Egypt.[163] In the central Sanusi camps of Solum and Masa`id were some 1,500 troops. The units were homogeneous and based on tribal affiliation, each tribe having its own encampment. The training was on a tribal-unit level under the command of officers who were generally acquainted with the target area of the tribe, and who were assisted by tribal shaykhs.[164]

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In Autumn 1915 the final equipping in preparation for the invasion started: arms, ammunition, equipment and food were stored in camps in the vicinity of the Egyptian border; a workshop for the production of ammunition, under German supervision, was established there, too. The army which was concentrated in the border region inside Cyrenaica numbered some 3,000-5,000 troops.[165]

2. The Invasion of Egypt and the Fall of Ahmad al-Sharif

The Sanusi invasion of Egypt did not begin on a definite and exact date or following a formal declaration of war. Its beginning was a gradual advance of Sanusi camps towards Egypt in Summer 1915 and the capture of disputed posts in the border region.[166] The penetration was undertaken in part in coordination with the British, who allowed the Sanusis to encamp inside Egypt in response to Sanusi appeals to stay there because of harsh climatic conditions and Sanusi desire to collect customs from passing caravans.[167] Volunteers from among Sanusi followers in Egypt began to gather in the camps in the border area; some came on the pretext of participating in religious gatherings, prayers and holiday ceremonies.[168] A significant acceleration of this penetration came in October-November 1915 when, in addition to the collection of taxes from Egyptian tribes loyal to the Sanusiya, Sanusi leaders started to launch inspection expeditions inside Egypt in order to mobilize supporters into the Sanusi army. The Sanusis operated there as though the region was under their authority.[169]

In mid-November 1915 a Sanusi group penetrated the area commanding the Egyptian post of Solum, allegedly against the orders of the Sanusi chief, who apologized for the incident to the Egyptian authorities and who ordered his troops to evacuate the place.[170] When similar Sanusi operations became more frequent[171] and the personal security of the Egyptian border guards was endangered, the supreme military command in Egypt ordered (23 November 1915) an evacuation of the region west of Barani in order to re-organize a combined infantry, mobilized and aerial force to push the invaders back. The Egyptian evacuation was taken as a signal for a swift and large-scale Sanusi penetration into Egypt.[172] According to Ahmad al-Sharif and other

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Sanusi personalities, the evacuation of the Egyptian Army was a temptation that the Sanusis could not resist, and they accelerated their advance. The Sanusi appreciation of the British resulted to a great extent from the respect they had for undisputed power and authority. Once it seemed that British might had been blunted simultaneously with the increase in Ottoman strength in the region, the invasion became inevitable.[173]

Following the failure of the invasion, Ahmad al-Sharif tried to explain the invasion and the role he had played in it. He claimed that the Egyptian evacuation had forced him to invade in order to enforce law and order among the Bedouin who had become lawless once they realized that no authority existed. Ahmad al-Sharif also stated that British preparations and the concentration of large army forces had compelled him to intervene with a large force in order to prevent a danger to his followers on both sides of the border. The arrest of a few Sanusis by the British further increased his apprehensions. The Sanusi chief also accused the British of attempting to bribe his followers not only in the border region, but also in the whole of North Africa. He based his claims on documents which he claimed the British had left behind when they evacuated the post of Solum, and accused Britain of collaborating with Italy against the Sanusis.[174] These claims were in part a complete fabrication or else a distortion of the facts: the gradual Sanusi invasion started without any British provocation and increased when it faced no obstacles. Most of Ahmad al-Sharif's explanations were given a long time after the event from his place of exile in Bursa, Anatolia, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. He tried to find favour with the British High Commissioner in Istanbul and claimed that he had had to obey the order of the Caliph to participate in the Jihad because to have refused would have been tantamount to heresy, or so at least the Ottoman envoys had persuaded the Sanusi masses who were finally tempted to believe in and join the war.[175] Even this explanation is faulty, since the Jihad was proclaimed about a year before the invasion and was known of in the region. However, until the invasion the proclamation did not have any anti-British influence over the local population which continued its good relations with the British

authorities in Egypt. The main reason for the invasion was the ability of the Ottomans to exert political and military pressure on the Sanusis because of the economic and military supplies which they controlled. This materialistic factor was not mentioned by the Sanusi chief, apparently because he did not want to appear as though he were a tool of the Ottomans. Once the invasion started, the Sanusi leadership acted as though it was intoxicated and aimed to widen its hold over Egypt.

The Sanusi force which invaded Egypt was estimated at between 3,000-5,000 armed troops, divided into more than 10 units which advanced separately. This organized military force was accompanied by small groups of volunteers from Cyrenaica as well as Egyptian sympathizers.[176] Since the Egyptian Army had evacuated the region and a large part of the population had a priori supported the Sanusis, the latter did not encounter any significant resistance in the first phase of the invasion and consequently advanced quickly until it was some 10 miles west of Matruh. This development, in turn, also increased the inhabitants' preparedness to cooperate with the invaders. However, as the invasion progressed, the quarrels between the Sanusis and the local population increased due to taxation, mobilization and the behaviour of the army. This process caused a gradual dissociation between the Sanusi invaders and the Egyptian population and consequently weakened the position of the Sanusis vis-à-vis the Egyptian Army in a foreign and alien region, far away from the order's traditional centres of power.[177]

While most of the Sanusi leadership had gathered in the Egyptian border region and participated in the invasion, Idris al-Sanusi had decided at an early stage (December 1915) that it was a frivolous plan which endangered the Sanusi cause. Not only did he not participate in the invasion, but he withdrew to the west with 300 of his followers.[178] During the invasion the Sanusi leadership left behind in the various posts in central and western Cyrenaica units of some 300-500 troops each in order to prevent the Italians from exploiting the invasion for the reconquest of Cyrenaica. Among the commanders who were left in the rear and who did not participate at all in the

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invasion was one of the heroes of the resistance in the 1920s, `Umar al-Mukhtar.[179] As a result of the lengthy absence of the Sanusi leadership from Cyrenaica, Idris was able to consolidate his own position among the numerous Sanusi followers there. When the defeated fighters returned to Cyrenaica without their senior leaders, Idris was the most important figure around, unscathed and his status unharmed by the failure in Egypt. Thus, he gradually increased his power until he became the head of the order.

Following the re-organization of the Egyptian Army the Sanusis suffered a series of heavy defeats during the period December 1915-March 1916, which forced them to retreat from Egypt. Only a small force headed by Ahmad al-Sharif stayed on in Egypt until early-1917. The Sanusi forces which were cut off from their human and economic sources suffered heavy casualties and withdrew in haste to Cyrenaica. Some Egyptian deserters returned to their units and several senior Ottoman officers were taken prisoner by the Egyptians.[180] The fact that the Ottoman officers tried to force regular Western warfare tactics on the Sanusis somewhat harmed the latter, since the Egyptian Army found it easier to counter these methods than fast and mobile guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, the efficient use the British had made of combined infantry, motorized and aerial forces facilitated the encirclement and driving back of the invaders who found it very difficult to evade the Egyptian Army.

The swift and heavy military blow which the Sanusis suffered at the hands of the Egyptian Army greatly damaged the prestige of Ahmad al-Sharif. Until then the head of the order had been primarily a spiritual figure, who had also been responsible for the social, economic, military and political questions connected with his followers. Before the invasion of Egypt the expansion of the Sanusiya was carried out by persuasion and preaching along with the use of its economic power to strengthen its hold over the region. Sanusi military activity had basically been defensive -- against the French penetration northward from Equatorial Africa and the Italian occupation. When the emphasis shifted from the spiritual to the military sphere, where failure is much more evident, the decisive blow

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inflicted upon the Sanusis also turned out to be a grave blow to the authority of its leader, especially since even before this his authority had not been absolute. Furthermore, the long absence of Ahmad al-Sharif from Cyrenaica during a period when the Sanusiya underwent a serious crisis, cleared the scene for the rise of his cousin, Idris al-Sanusi. While Ahmad al-Sharif was wandering around in western Egypt, a new leadership was being consolidated in Cyrenaica, and it had a completely different world view. Ahmad al-Sharif had believed that he could harness Sanusi followers in Egypt to his cause and had therefore remained there for about a year. However, the military blow had harmed his prestige in Egypt as it did in Cyrenaica and caused local tribes to accelerate their abandonment of him. To this trend was added the growing friction between Ahmad al-Sharif's entourage and the population amidst which they lived. As a result of these two processes, there were more and more occasions on which the local population made it very clear to the Sanusi leadership that if supplies of equipment, arms and ammunition could not be guaranteed to the population and if the Sanusi attitude to it did not improve, it would stop supporting the Sanusis and would go over to the Egyptian-British side, whose power and ability to give aid were extensive.[181]

The stay of the Sanusis in the western Egyptian coastal region helped the equipping of the forces. Along this coast there were numerous moorings where the Ottomans and the Germans could unload equipment without being disturbed by the Egyptian Coast Guard. Consequently, there was a significant increase in the quantities of arms in the Sanusi camp.[182] This channel was, however, only temporary and its use was ended following the Sanusi withdrawal, which started earlier in the coastal region. Because of the remoteness and isolation of Ahmad al-Sharif during his wandering in Egypt, he was not only not able to distribute arms, ammunition and money to lure the local population into supporting him, but he was increasingly compelled to depend economically and militarily on the local inhabitants. In this situation his status was further weakened since the population was aware of his total dependence on its good will to maintain him. Local animosity against the Sanusi force in Egypt increased and it was in no

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position to defend itself from the population or a possible offensive from the Egyptian Army.

Ahmad al-Sharif wandered between oases in western Egypt accompanied by several hundred Sanusi students (talabah), a tribal body-guard (muhafiziyyah) and about ten Ottoman officers.[183] Part of this entourage was sent forward by Ahmad al-Sharif to the oasis of Siwa from Bu Tunis on the eve of the battle there (21 January 1916); this move in turn harmed the military capability of the Sanusis. He himself reached Siwa about a month later. Out of some 4,000 inhabitants of the oasis, most of them women and children, some 300 joined the Sanusi force. The Sanusis did not remain in Siwa for long because Ahmad al-Sharif wanted to keep away from the Egyptian Army which at that time was busy encircling the Sanusis in north-western Egypt in order to push them to Cyrenaica. Ahmad al-Sharif and his antourage started to move to the oasis of Bahriya on their way to the oasis of Dakhla which they reached by late-February 1916. Additional Sanusi forces held the oases of Bahriya, Kharja and Farfara. From these places Sanusi envoys were sent to the Fayum, Minya and even to Aswan in order to spark a rebellion against the Egyptian regime. However, these attempts failed because of the miserable condition of the Sanusi forces, the defeat of the Sultan of Darfur `Ali Dinar in May 1916, and the increased presence of the Egyptian Army in the Nile Valley. The worsening of relations between the Sanusis and the local population due to growing Sanusi demands for manpower, food, accomodation, means of transportation and money[184] also influenced negatively the response to Sanusi incitement in Egypt, which was limited, despite the fact that Sanusi envoys had reached far into the south.

Ahmad al-Sharif and his companinons, comprising mainly Cyrenaicans with hardly any local volunteers, wandered about in Egypt rejected by its population. It was seen as a defeated element which did not pose any real security threat. The British did not hurry to act against Ahmad al-Sharif after they had defeated the Sanusi army in Egypt and chased it to Cyrenaica.

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Egyptian military preparations against the remnants of the Sanusi invaders in Egypt lasted until October 1916 and then the campaign started. The Egyptian Army first occupied the oasis of Dakhla (16 October 1916) and Bahriya (17 October 1916); the remaining Sanusis withdrew in the direction of Siwa after the local population had turned their backs on them.[185] The Sanusis stayed in Siwa during Winter 1917 but their numbers were dwindling. Relations between the Sanusis and the local population worsened here too. Because of this friction and the approaching Egyptian Army, Ahmad al-Sharif and his entourage left Siwa before it was captured and withdrew to Jaghbub, out of Egyptian territory. The oasis of Siwa, which was almost completely evacuated of Sanusis, was captured by the Egyptian Army in early-March 1917, and the population gave the Egyptian force a cordial reception.[186]

Ahmad al-Sharif and his companinos, who had fled to Cyrenaica, no longer bothered the authorities in Egypt. Consequently, the Egyptians were able to consolidate their power in the border region with Libya and gradually reduce the number of troops in western Egypt, freeing manpower for military activities east of Suez when General Allenby invaded Palestine. Even if the Sanusi invasion of Egypt did not pose a serious security threat to the government there, the fear of a deterioration due to Sanusi influence in the region obliged the authorities to allocate significant resources of manpower, arms and equipment to drive out any possible danger and to frustrate any attempt to agitate the local population. Official British sources estimated that 40,000 troops had been deployed. In order to publicly demonstrate the liquidation of Sanusi influence in western Egypt, the British decided to destroy the zawiyah in Siwa.[187] The British demolished this as well as other zawiyahs because they knew of the role of the Sanusi zawiyah network in the ruling and military structure of the Sanusis, in addition to their spiritual and economic role.

Ahmad al-Sharif and some 800 of his followers, about one-quarter of them sick, stayed in Jaghbub. Many of them deserted even before the site was abandoned on 12 March 1917 when the entourage left for the

oases of Awjila and Jalu. This refuge was also abandoned (8 April 1917) when the group headed for Fezzan to meet with Muhammad al-`Abid. At that time only some 200 undernourished people in rags remained with Ahmad al-Sharif and many died on the way.[188]

This period witnessed a serious deterioration in the status of Ahmad al-Sharif. The Ottomans, nonetheless, tried to boost his prestige by ratifying his position in the imperial administrative hierarchy and re-appointing him the representative of the Sultan in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica; they also sent medals and presents.[189] These Ottoman efforts bore little fruit because the position of Ahmad had declined to its lowest point among the population. The granting of titles not followed by any economic and military support could not improve the situation.

The rise of Idris al-Sanusi to the rank of head of the Sanusiya compelled Ahmad to move westward out of Idris' sphere of influence in Cyrenaica. In Tripolitania, however, Ahmad was confronted by a deep-rooted and self-embroiled leadership which was not prepared to accept the authority of the Sanusiya or any other external factor. From the second half of 1917 and until he left Libya in Summer 1918, Ahmad wandered around in the Sirtica, trying to manoeuvre between Ramadan al-Shitwi and other Tripolitanian leaders, and Idris al-Sanusi and his Sanusi followers. The support of Ahmad was 1,500 at the most (they came mainly from the Urfella, Fezzan, Jado and the Berber population). Because of his weakened position and his unacceptability in Tripolitania, Ahmad never received any real material help from the Ottomans such as was channelled mainly to Ramadan and the Ottoman envoys in the region.[190] This Ottoman attitude was not enough to reconsolidate the position of Ahmad, especially not in a region which had never been a Sanusi stronghold. Since the Sanusi defeats in Egypt in late-1915 he felt himself rejected wherever he went: in the Sanusi regions in Egypt because of the worsening of relations with the population as a result of the economic pressure; in Cyrenaica because of the growing influence of Idris; and in Tripolitania because of the absence of a large-scale Sanusi presence and his being a foreign element who was trying to force his way into a

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very competitive leadership system. Ahmad was no longer capable of reaching a position of leadership in Libya by his own personal efforts, and genuine substantial support was not forthcoming.

The vocal Ottoman support for Ahmad al-Sharif did not cease and towards the end of World War I it was given with the intention of taking advantage of his position in the Arab and Moslem scene to improve the status of the Empire. Following the military defeats of the Empire and its grave international position, it did not manage to implement these plans. The inability of Ahmad to regain a position of leadership in Libya, together with the assignments which the Ottomans wanted him to carry out in other parts of the Empire, resulted in his departure on 21 August 1918 from Misurata on his way to Istanbul, never to return to Libya. His status at the centre of the Empire saw ups and downs and after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk gave up the idea of making him a Caliph, Ahmad left Turkey in late-1924 on his way to the Hijaz, where he died in 1932.[191]

* * *

Ahmad al-Sharif reached the Sanusi leadership when the order was in the midst of a military struggle with the French in Equatorial Africa. At that period there was a need for a leader who could direct a military campaign, as well as carrying out the traditional spiritual tasks of the head of the order. Ahmad al-Sharif was at the time the only figure in the Sanusi family suited to the position. During the first part of his tenure of office the Sanusiya was in retreat in Equatorial Africa. As a result of this political-military situation there was a discernible deviation in the traditional policy of the order: it started to cooperate with the Ottomans in an attempt to drive the French out of Libya. The Ottomans, however, did not get a foothold in the main Sanusi centres, and cultural life, economic activity and administration in the Sanusi-held territories were left exclusively in Sanusi hands. The Sanusi-Ottoman cooperation was restricted to the sphere of security and was aimed at receiving Ottoman protection which meant that any attack on the Sanusiya would be considered to be an attack on the Ottoman Empire with which the

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European powers were tied in treaties guaranteeing its security and integrity.

At the beginning of the struggle against Italy, Ahmad al-Sharif was not directly involved in the campaign, although he supported the resistance to the occupation. Only about one year after the outbreak of the war did he arrive at the battlefront and participate directly in the struggle. His opposition to Italian rule never ceased and he rejected any attempt at a political settlement. With the departure of the Ottomans the authority in Cyrenaica passed completely to the Sanusis and they were not prepared to surrender these achievements later on. The return of the Ottomans in late-1914 once again caused a leadership problem: the Ottoman Empire wanted to subjugate the Sanusis. The position of the Ottomans in Cyrenaica resulted from the status of the Empire in the Moslem world and from the large inflow of military and civil supplies, as well as money brought by them to Cyrenaica. Most of the manpower, however, was local. The great Ottoman influence was not in keeping with its numerical strength; it resulted from its complete control over the inflow of supplies and its distribution. Nevertheless, the Sanusis maintained their independence and did not give in to Ottoman dictates so long as they were not completely at the mercy of the Ottomans. The strengthening of Ottoman-Sanusi relations in turn led to a worsening of relations between the Sanusis and an element with which they had been on friendly terms until that time, namely Egypt, where the Sanusis had numerous supporters and strong ties with the authorities. Following the British-Italian economic blockade on the Sanusis, which enabled the Ottomans to condition their own support for the Sanusis by their obedience to Ottoman dictates, the invasion of Egypt took place. The Egyptian Army, however, after using a large and combined force, managed to encircle the invaders and drive them out of Egypt. The Italians, who did not use similar tactics, were at first in an inferior position compared to the British, but later on also undertook similar measures.

The British, who feared the incitement of the Egyptian population, were not satisfied with expelling the invading Sanusis.

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They also started to work to change the Sanusi leadership and policy. The fact that Ahmad al-Sharif had been wandering about for one year in Egypt enabled the British to strengthen the position of Idris al-Sanusi as the new Sanusi leader. They also succeeded in persuading him, through Egyptian and British friends, that the well-being of the order demanded the acceptance of their proposals concerning conciliation with Italy. Since the authority of the head of the Sanusiya had not been complete even in the past and Idris was legally serving as the deputy of the Sanusi chief, a transfer of supremacy in the order from one member of the family to another was possible, especially since Idris was the dominant figure for a whole critical year and he was renowned as a spiritual personality.

3. The Rise of Idris al-Sanusi

Until 1916 the involvement of Idris al-Sanusi in political and security matters had been very limited. In contemprary sources there is no mention of a demand by him or by his supporters to place him at the head of the order because of his descent.[192] Idris had been one of the order's notables and the region of Benghazi was considered to be his special sphere of influence, but his role in shaping Sanusi policies had been marginal. The great difference between his character and that of Ahmad al-Sharif undoubtedly contributed to this situation: in contrast to the extravagant and aggressive nature of Ahmad, who preferred direct involvement, activisim, splendour and direct negotiations with local and foreign representatives, Idris was inclined to introversion, seclusion and lengthy solitary reflections. Idris refrained from close contacts with strangers and found it extremely difficult to make decisions to the extent that he often retreated and totally dissociated himself in the midst of deliberations. Idris, as well as his close associates and even strangers, were aware of these shortcomings, which made any contact with him very difficult and unpredictable.[193] It was hard to imagine a community involved in a political-military struggle operating under the leadership of a person with these shortcomings.

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In early 1915 Idris passed through Egypt; his ties with the British became closer and he met both the heads of the British command and local notables.[194] Nevertheless, he was regarded by the Ottoman Empire as a distinguished representative of the Sanusiya and loyal to the Ottomans. This was reflected in an official Ottoman appointment granted to Idris in early-1915, making him a senior Ottoman representative in Libya.[195] His ties with the British were not seen as endangering Ottoman status since all the other Sanusi leaders also had close ties with the British.

During the Sanusi-Ottoman invasion of Egypt in late-1915 Idris was appointed by Ahmad al-Sharif to be in charge of Cyrenaica[196] and did not participate in the invasion. The decree issued on this matter on the eve of the invasion also appointed Idris as the successor of Ahmad al-Sharif. This was regarded as confirmation of Idris' special position in the Sanusiya and contributed to his gradual take-over of the Sanusi leadership. Idris opposed the invasion of Egypt from its start and considered it as disastrous to the order, but at that time his influence was not enough to prevent it.[197] Idris' position in the order gradually strengthened, mainly because most of the other Sanusi leaders were away in Egypt, defeated and persecuted, far from the traditional Sanusi power centres. The contacts between the two Sanusi chiefs -- Ahmad and Idris -- were, however, maintained and the correspondence between them points to a certian degree of cooperation, despite the attempts of each one to consolidate his own position within the order and in relation to outside elements.[198] The attitudes of Ahmad and Idris to foreigners were dissimilar: because of Idris' understanding of the political-military conditions, and following a strong British pressure which was exerted on him by mutual friends, he was ready to negotiate with Italy but completely opposed Ottoman involvement and influence in Sanusi affairs; this contrasted with Ahmad's attitude. Negotiations seemed to Idris the only way out of the crisis that the order was in, and he was able to direct them with British and Italian representatives thanks to his strengthened position in the leadership. At the same time, these very negotiations and the agreements reached at their conclusion, especially their military and economic paragraphs, served to consolidate Idris'

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position in the Sanusiya. He was revealed as the only figure capable of improving the daily condition of the Sanusi followers; only with Idris were the powerful political parties that were in conflict with the Sanusiya ready to negotiate. This fact was of vital importance in the strengthening of Idris' position in the region and it stands out against his rivals' lack of success in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in reaching supremacy and in being regarded by both the local population as well as foreigners as the dominant figures, with whom agreements should be concluded. Most of his rivals were characterized by ever-increasing internal division and unreadiness to try and reach a political settlement, two trends which greatly harmed these notables. Even the extensive support which the Ottomans and Germans continued to give to Idris' rivals failed to alter this process fundamentally because new supply sources were opened up to Idris who, when the state of war had ended, no longer required similar support.

Even before the Sanusi invasion of Egypt, Idris had revealed a readiness to negotiate with the Italians on proposals for a political settlement. At that time, however, the Italians ignored Idris' proposal because they were not ready to enter into negotiations with a side that they regarded rebellious. However, the Italians demanded that when negotiations were held, Britain would be a party to them.[199] This Italian demand was a result of a hope that they would be able to benefit from the good relations between the British and the Sanusis given the fact that they had been Britain's allies in World War I.

Following the failure of the Sanusi invasion of Egypt, Idris contacted the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Henry MacMahon, and denied any responsibility for the invasion. Idris was prepared to expel from his region all foreigners — mainly Turks and Germans. Together with his cousin Muhammad al-`Abid Idris expressed his readiness to make peace with Italy and Egypt and asked for envoys to be sent to Sirt or Tripoli to negotiate the peace terms.[200] The British did not respond to Idris' feelings as long as they were busy in routing the Sanusis in Egypt. Following a series of defeats inflicted on the Sanusis in Egypt, the British began to take steps that within a year brought about the signing of agreements with Idris.

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In this interim period Idris moved between the Sanusi camps in Cyrenaica, coordinating operations against the Italians. Among the local figures who cooperated with him from this period onwards was `Umar al-Mukhtar, the shaykh of the zawiyah of Rafi` who commanded the camps in the vicinity of Derna and `Akrama.[201] Ahmad al-Sharif still had much influence in eastern Cyrenaica, in the region between Derna and Solum and approaching Kufra, but due to his remoteness and his defeats his direct involvement decreased whereas the position of Idris continued to consolidate.[202]

In March 1916, after the British had exhausted most of the military possibilities in their struggle with the Sanusiya, they started to prepare a programme for political negotiations with the Sanusiya. Idris stood at the centre of this policy thanks to his strengthened position and his former good relations with the British and undoubtedly also because of his character which was well-known to the British. The main purpose of the British was to end the Sanusi war with both the Egyptians and Italians; one of the means of achieving this end was through a change in the Sanusi leadership: the place of Ahmad al-Sharif had to be taken by Idris al-Sanusi, and the role of the leader had to be spiritual-religious in essence while all his temporal aspects had to be basically revoked. The British insisted on the principle of complete cooperation with Italy during the negotiations with the Sanusiya although they knew perfectly well that this restricted their freedom of action and delayed a quick, positive ending of the negotiations because they understood that otherwise the Italians' chances of reaching any kind of agreement would have been nil. The British were interested in negotiating only with the top level of the Sanusi leadership; dealings with minor representatives were not regarded as purposeful since the final decision rested with the head of the order.[203]

In late-May 1916 a meeting took place in Jedabiya (south of Benghazi) between Italian representatives and Idris, in coordination with the British High Commissioner in Egypt. The hopes that the foreign powers had in Idris' independence and readiness to compromise turned out to be misplaced: Idris regarded himself as being

responsible for the administration in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Tunisia on behalf of Ahmad al-Sharif whose position as supreme authority was, according to Idris, unchanged.[204] Idris raised thirteen demands which implied recognition of the independence of the Sanusiya in regions under its actual authority. Idris demanded that Italy should treat him in the same way as Britain treated the ruling Muhammad `Ali family in Egypt. He further asked to be given complete freedom of action in the hinterland, and that Italy should supply him with arms and money. He wanted all Italian troops to be withdrawn from phe whole of Libya with the exception of the cities of Tripoli, Khoms, Benghazi, Derna and Tubruq and promised that Sanusi troops would not enter these cities. He also demanded that Italy should supply him with officers if he needed them, and that it lay railways in the Libyan hinterland, that half of the revenues of the railways should be given to him, and that they should be turned over to him after ten years. He requested that Italy should protect the coasts and the borders, that all prisoners-of-war from both sides should be released and that there should be religious freedom. As for the economic sphere, Idris wanted Italy to establish factories whose workers would be local inhabitants only. He agreed that imports would come exclusively from Italy, except in the event that Italy could not supply them. Italy, for its part, demanded recognition of its complete sovereignty over the whole of Libya. During the meeting the Italians gave Idris a letter from the High Commissioner of Egypt in which he requested that no contacts be held with Ahmad al-Sharif and that Britain and Italy coordinate all their activities relating to the Sanusiya. Following the presentation of positions, Idris asked for a pause in order to consult the order's notables. He promised at the same time to concentrate all the Ottoman officers in Jedabiya and supervise their activities so that they would not be able to incite the local population.[205]

Both parties had presented their hardest opening positions. Although during the deliberations their positions did not get any closer, they agreed to meet again and try to reach a compromise. Idris demanded from the British that he be the sole representative of the Sanusiya at any negotiations and he made a special point of stressing his opposition to any contact whatsoever with Ahmad al-Sharif. Idris

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promised to continue to restrict the activity of all his political opponents and to prevent anti-British activity.[206] In this and other appeals Idris expressed his wish that the British conduct their contacts with him through their authorized representatives together with Egyptian personalities who were trusted by him, and especially Muhammad al-Sharif al-Idrisi and his son Mirghani from Luxor. These two did indeed mediate in all the negotiations with Idris from Summer 1916 and helped to decide which proposals should be presented to Idris, knowing well which views would be acceptable to him. This strategy caused the Italians to resent them; they thought that the two were hardening Idris' position. Yet their presence and involvement in fact increased the credibility of the other side in Idris' eyes and also facilitated and speeded up the negotiations to a certain extent, because of Idris' difficulties in reaching a decision.[207]

During June 1916 the negotiations between Italian envoys and Idris continued in Zuwaytina (Zwetina) south of Benhgazi. Idris' position — that he wanted to negotiate separately with Italy and Britain because they were separate nations and that there were differences in the problems between them and the Sanusiya — was not accepted. The two preferred to cooperate in order to improve Italy's chances of succeeding.[208] Britain took advantage of its close ties with Idris and its ability to exert economic pressure on him in order to strengthen their combined negotiating power. Idris himself admitted that the grave economic condition of the Sanusis was an important factor in moving the negotiations along.[209]

In late-July 1916 tripartite talks opened in Zuwaytina between Idris, British-Egyptian envoys and Italian envoys acting on behalf of the Governor of Libya. On the eve of this conference Idris summoned tribal and Sanusi shaykhs in order to coordinate his position. Simultaneously, Idris made it clear to Nuri and the Ottomans that his intention was to end the war through negotiations with both Italy and Britain. On the same occasion Idris demanded the complete subordination of all the shaykhs to his authority; consequently, he was able to claim that he represented the whole population.[210] During

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the talks with the Italians Idris presented a series of preconditions.

In contrast to the list presented in May 1916, in July the issue of sovereignty was concealed, not because of its lack of importance but because he considered it an issue of principle, not a precondition that was open to debate. The list included a demand to end all hostilities, start free trade and exchange prisoners-of-war, the application of Moslem jurisdiction in the territories under Italian rule and the return of the zawiyahs to the authority of the Sanusiya. The collection of the Sanusi-held weapons was viewed by Idris as an issue that could be discussed at a later stage when all other problems had been solved. With regard to the oasis of Kufra, which from time immemorial had been an independent region, Idris was not even prepared for any discussions. He demanded an amnesty for Egyptain troops and civilians who had collaborated with the Sanusis. During the negotiations themselves both parties discussed at length the issues of sovereignty, the military forces, the status of Idris and the exchange of prisoners-of-war.[211] Because of Idris' difficulties in holding direct negotiations, they were conducted by means of exchanging letters, and consultations between Idris and his Sanusi advisers and British representatives, whom he had previously known and relied upon.

Against the background of these negotiations was the "Arab Revolt" which broke out in June 1916 and which was soon to become known of in Cyrenaica. The revolt was mentioned by Idris as an example of necessary activity for the reconstruction of the status of the Arab nation, and he praised the British support for Sharif Husayn. Idris hoped to fulfil in the region under Sanusi influence a similar role to that of the Hashemite family in the Arabian Peninsula and the eastern Mediterranean in advancing and strengthening the Arab cause, and he strived to achieve a similar political status.[212] The examples raised by Idris during the negotiations — the position of the house of Muhammad `Ali in Egypt and of the Hashemite family in the "Arab Revolt" — clearly demonstrate that his intention was to win Sanusi

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independence under his leadership, even if at the beginning it might be under the limited aegis of a foreign power.

Despite Sanusi hostility towards Italy and the deep suspicions concerning the sincerity of its intentions, Idris was ready to negotiate with it because of the distress of the Cyrenaican population and British insistence on this. Idris had trusted the British: he believed that despite their alliance with the Italians, they would not deceive him and would guarantee his vital interests. A short while after the opening of the talks the Sanusis were greatly disillusioned. Both parties had almost reached an agreement, including one concerning the problem of an exchange of prisoners-of-war, when a directive from the Governor of Libya reached the Italian representatives stating that they had no authority to make commitments on behalf of the Italian Government and that all their decisions were simply proposals. As a result of this directive the talks were terminated leaving Idris and his companions with a feeling of bitterness and renewed distrust towards the Italians. Idris announced that he had to rethink the whole subject and consult other Sanusi notables on all the issues that had been discussed in Zuwaytina. He also stated that he had to visit the Sanusis in the border region with Egypt in order to persuade them to accept his peace policy.[213] Following this Idris left western Cyrenaica and dissociated himself from the various representatives whom he felt had deceived him. Because Idris was suspicious by nature, decision-making was difficult for him, and the Italian announcement had undermined the little faith he had in Italy and which was essentially based on the promises of the British envoys whom he trusted.

Parallel to his contacts with the Italians and the British, Idris continued to maintain contact with his cousin Ahmad al-Sharif, who was then living in the oasis of Dakhla in Egypt. The talks between Idris and the foreign envoys were known to Ahmad who pretended that it was he who had initiated them in order to establish a relaxed atmosphere for five years, during which the Sanusis could regain their strength and after which they would once again be able to attack Italy. In his many contacts with the British, Idris denied the existence of a letter

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that he was said to have written confirming this trend.[214] His negotiations with the foreign envoys did not appear to be hypocritical. Although he tried to maintain proper relations with Ahmad, Idris took care to prevent Ahmad's position from being strengthened, as well as assaults on the Italians and the British being conducted.

During the interim period between the two sets of negotiations Idris strived to persuade additional tribes to support him, and campaigned amongst Ahmad's followers so that they would end their struggle against Italy. During this period the British captured the oases of Dakhla and Bahriya in the Western Desert of Egypt (mid-October 1916) and Ahmad and his entourage retreated towards Cyrenaica which they re-entered in early-1917. Thus, on the eve of the renewal of negotiations, Ahmad was once again in Cyrenaica, but his military and economic position was not good and his ability to disturb Idris in his political activity was minimal. The grave situation of the Sanusis and the Cyrenaican population as a whole, including the internal struggles within the Sanusi leadership and their conflicts with Tripolitanians, Ottomans and Germans, moved Idris to try and reach a settlement with both the Italians and the British. Idris took care to ensure that the principles of the Sanusiya and the Cyrenaican society would not be violated and that the greatest measure possible of independence would be maintained in the region.

While Idris cemented his links with the British and Italians, the gap between him and the Ottomans, Germans and their local supporters widened. Idris tried to isolate all foreign elements, concentrate them near him, supervise their activities and take away their command authority. However, since he still needed their aid he had to maintain a certain contact with them and be careful not to arouse unnecessary animosity. As a result of these restrictions the move westwards of Ottomans and Germans increased from Summer 1916. Simultaneously, the ties between Idris and the British became even closer. In order to facilitate Idris' dissociation from the rival camp, the British expressed their readiness to grant him an annual support of 5,000 pounds sterling, a sum that was much lower than that granted by the

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Ottomans and which, in itself, would not have turned the scales. However, as long as Idris did not reach agreement with the Italians, he was not ready to make a total break with the Ottomans; the continuation of his relations with the Ottomans had strengthened his bargaining power. Furthermore, as long as a state of war existed, he would be unable to explain to his followers and the Moslem world a break from the envoys of the Caliph who were calling for a Jihad.[215]

During the first months of 1917 the contacts with Idris al-Sanusi continued, mainly through the Idrisis of Luxor. The British and Italian delegates to the negotiations arrived at Tubruq in late-January 1917; Idris himself remained in `Akrama (Lacroma), a distance of some 40 miles away. Both the Italian proposals as well as Idris' responses to them were conveyed in writing by the Idrisis and the British envoys. The Italian representatives met Idris in `Akrama only in the second half of March 1917. Under the influence of the British, Idris released an Italian prisoner-of-war during this visit. Thanks to this action and his friendly behaviour he won the sympathy of the Italians. The British made maximum use of the fact that they were able to exert pressure on the Sanusiya and that their representatives to the negotiations were accepted and trusted by Idris: he was convinced that the British, despite their being the allies of the Italians, would not dupe him into concluding agreements with Italy that might harm him and the Sanusiya. It was this reliance on British trustworthiness that finally brought about the signing on the `Akrama Agreements in April 1917.

The negotiations in early-1917 centered on four documents:

- Modus Vivendi 1: the list of Italian demands;
- Modus Vivendi 2: Idris' list of demands;
- Modus Vivendi 3: a somewhat corrected Italian version of Idris' demands;
- Modus Vivendi 4: Idris' remarks and corrections to his original demands.

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The Idrisis and the British tried to persuade Idris to approve the third document, which in fact included his original demands with some minor changes. The difficulty lay in the Italian condition that Idris should approve in principle Modus Vivendi 1. Idris, who was supported on this point by the British, thought that the Italian demands were binding and detailed to such a degree that their acceptance in principle necessitated their complete approval, something he could not do because their contents totally went against his principles. Another complication arose from the fact that in the telegram of directives on behalf of the Italian Minister of the Colonies on the eve of the signing of the agreements, the demand to approve in principle Modus Vivendi 1 was missing. Following clarifications in Rome and Tripoli with senior Italian authorities, another paragraph was included in Modus Vivendi 3 which stated that, following approval in principle of Modus Vivendi 1, further detailed and lengthy negotiations would be needed as well as an explicit mutual agreement concerning the practical implementation of the Italian demands.

The British persuaded Idris that he did not a priori bind himself to accept the Italian demands and consequently he agreed to sign the `Akrama Agreements on 14 April 1917. In return for Idris' promise to end hostilities, disperse the Sanusi army and return Italian prisoners-of-war, he was promised free trade with the Cyrenaican coast and Egypt, as well as the release of Sanusi prisoners-of-war. Idris' right to administer the oases of Awjila, Jalu, Jedabiya, Jaghbub and Kufra was upheld. However, the Sanusi request to reopen and operate the Sanusi zawiyahs in Egypt was not granted. The British fear of the political and military use of the zawiyahs as centres to agitate the Egyptian population led to their capture, large-scale destruction and severance from the authority of the head of the Sanusiya.[216]

Soon after the conclusion of the `Akrama Agreements several problems arose concerning their implementation, in addition to the status of the signatories. Idris demanded that all contacts with the Sanusiya be conducted only through him and without mediators. The British were ready to accept this, but Italy raised objections

concerning Idris' authority.[217] Italy also opposed the direct contacts between the British and someone who was defined by Italy as its subject. The British viewed this as a poor claim and badly timed. They were of the opinion that correspondence with Idris through Italy would hold things up unnecessarily. They refused to halt the practice, which went on for a long period of time and which finally brought about the agreements with Italy.[218] Another controversy arose concerning travel permits between Libya and Egypt. Italy objected to Idris supplying entrance permits from Egypt to the territory under his control. On this issue Italy had the upper hand: although Italy did not have real authority in this territory, the regulations were changed and travellers were ordered to acquire entrance permits from the Italian authorities. For this purpose, and in order to supervise the transfer of goods, the Italians established customs posts in the border region with Egypt.[219] These posts could, of course, supervise Sanusi activities and prevent subversion.

Despite these differences of opinion, both Britain and Italy wanted to strengthen Idris' position at the expense of the other elements in the Sanusiya in particular and in Libya as a whole, and at the same time to impose their authority on him. They strived to reach a situation in which Idris would be the central local authority, but they were not interested in over-strengthening him. This would have prevented his subordination and would not have left him at their mercy. The practical expression of this understanding during 1918 was that the two powers supplied Idris with limited quantities of arms, clothing, food, and money as well as instructors, but refrained from giving him means of transportation.[220] Idris was thus able to confront the other local strongmen but without endangering Italy and Britain.

* * *

The position of Idris within the Sanusi order was important thanks to his father, the previous head of the order who was surrounded by an aura of sanctity. Idris was also respected for his ascetic and scholarly personality. He was not suited to lead a fighting order which guided the whole population in the region in a

popular war of liberation against a foreign conqueror, but he had the qualifications to be a spiritual leader of a religious order which had some influence in the social and economic fields. The rise of Idris to the Sanusi leadership came about through his accumulation of power at a time when the previous leader had run out of favour following a grave military defeat and his absence in a period of crisis, when the presence of the leader of the order had been vital. The absence of Ahmad al-Sharif had in fact been tantamount to a voluntary surrender of his status during the Sanusi power struggle.

Idris gradually widened his traditional power base in the Sanusi family until his authority spread over the whole of Cyrenaica. This process became possible both because of Ahmad's absence and because the population understood that the policy advocated by Idris would bring much needed relief following a seemingly endless war, military defeats and prolonged economic distress. However, Idris was not prepared to make an unconditional surrender on what he regarded as issues of principle and when he felt that his position had improved he deliberately postponed the implementation of decisions which he had made (such as the dispersal of the Sanusi army and camps). His intention was to protect the freedom of action of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and to widen the sphere of Sanusi influence in Libya. Consequently, under his leadership the attempts to penetrate into Tripolitania by manipulating tribal friction there become evident. In contrast to his predecessor, however, he strived to win this independence neither by military means nor through collaboration with additional external forces to those already controlling the region, but through a loose political settlement with the existing power centres, without relinquishing the authority he already had in his hands.

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D. The Contribution of Ahmad al-Sharif and Idris al-Sanusi to the Struggle against the Italians

The Sanusi order in Cyrenaica, with its extensive zawiyah network and its close ties with the population, including the very special connection of the Sanusi family with the local notables, had a most significant influence over the course of the insurrection against the Italians. Thanks to the fact that the whole population stood behind a central leadership, commanded a widespread logistic system, and because of the difficulties involved in desert warfare, the rebellion in Cyrenaica lasted much longer than in Tripolitania, and without major interruptions.

In the first phase of the insurrection the role of the Sanusiya was relatively concealed as long as the senior Ottoman command stayed in the region while the senior Sanusi leadership, on the other hand, was at a distance from the scene of the battle. With the formal dissociation of the Ottoman Empire from the struggle in Libya, the leadership of the rebellion in Cyrenaica passed over almost exclusively into Sanusi hands. Nevertheless, the Ottomans tried from time to time to regain lost positions of influence. The characters of the Sanusi leaders had a major bearing on the course of events in the region.

Ahmad al-Sharif, the Sanusi leader in the early stages of the rebellion, stood for widespread military activity until complete victory over the Italians and their expulsion from the region. He kept ceremonial customs and maintained close ties with his relatives and with Ottoman and British envoys. Despite his readiness to befriend foreign envoys and receive medals, ranks and presents from them, he totally refused any compromise with Italy. Only at a later stage, when Idris was negotiating with Britain and Italy, did Ahmad agree that there was no alternative. But he regarded it as only a temporary measure forced by the pressure of regional conditions. His extensive involvement in military operations and the heavy Ottoman pressure on him brought about a disastrous deviation in the Sanusi course of activity: the invasion of Egypt. Until the invasion the Sanusiya had

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directed its wars in order to repulse foreign penetrations into the Realm of Islam: against the French in Equatorial Africa and the Italians in Cyrenaica. The invasion of Egypt was not aimed at liberating this Moslem region from the British, with whom the Sanusis were on friendly terms until the invasion and whom, even afterwards, the Sanusis did not consider to be an enemy. The Sanusis were dragged into the war by the Ottomans and the Germans; at the same time the Sanusis tried to exploit the political and economic advantages of conquest. The fall of Ahmad al-Sharif was brought about by a deviation of emphasis away from a spiritual leadership (even if it did have social, economic and military aspects) to a clear military-political line. The decisive military defeat suffered in a region that was not at all vital to the Sanusiya in its struggle necessitated changes in its leadership because the defeat was directly connected to the personality and decisions of Ahmad. He wandered for about one year in the oases of the Western Desert hoping to re-consolidate his power. Not only did he fail in this, but his absence facilitated the rise of an alternative leadership.

The change in the Sanusi leadership was not a sudden event but the result of a gradual process: Idris, who had been in Cyrenaica since early-1915 and who had opposed the invasion of Egypt from its outset, started to negotiate with Italy and Britain but at the same time was consolidating his position within the order and among the Cyrenaican tribes. While this was happening Ahmad was far away from the Sanusi centres of power. However, contact between the two was maintained and Idris continued to acknowledge his cousin's seniority. Only after the ties between Idris and the foreign powers started to influence favourably the condition of the inhabitants of Cyrenaica did the circle of those recognizing his leadership widen. At this point he demanded recognition as the sole representative of the Sanusiya.

The rise of Idris al-Sanusi was facilitated by his traditional position in the order, but resulted mainly from the situation which developed in Cyrenaica. His status as the first-born of the previous adored leader gave him much prestige, but as long as no fault was found in the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharif, no one disputed his right

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to leadership. Furthermore, Idris was known as an introvert and secluded person who found it difficult to make decisions. As such, he was not suited to lead a militant and fighting body. Following the continued military defeats in Egypt and the absence of the Sanusi chief from Cyrenaica, there was a growing number of appeals from the population, the lower ranks in the Sanusiya and foreign powers to Idris -- who was in fact the deputy of the Sanusi chief and who was present at the main scene of events -- to take upon himself additional powers. To all the afore-mentioned personal and political reasons was added his knowledge of and most friendly ties with the British who were considered to be a decisive factor in settling the crisis in Cyrenaica.

In contrast to Ahmad, Idris was by nature a person prepared to compromise and in the special circumstances of 1916-17 he agreed to a political settlement with the Italians and the British provided that essential conditions which were vital for the independence of the Sanusiya were met. This point came out very clearly in lengthy negotiations during which Idris insisted upon the preservation of Sanusi military power and the position of the zawiyahs and opposed the application of Italian sovereignty in territories under Sanusi control. In the end, believing that the order would not be harmed, Idris agreed to back down in the military sphere and over the control of zawiyahs which were out of his real sphere of influence as Sanusi leader.

After the `Akrama Agreements were signed, both the Italians and the Sanusis tried to interpret them in different ways and to implement them in the way it suited them; thus, for example the Sanusi army was not dispersed. The friction which developed against the background of these events, the agreement of the Tripolitanians to recognize Idris as their leader, and the growing power of Italy in Libya following the end of World War I all led to the crisis of 1922 and Idris' exile in Egypt. He returned to Libya only following the British occupation during World War II, first as the proposed Emir of Cyrenaica and finally as the King of the united Libyan state.

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3. Conclusion: The Resistance Movement in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica

The patterns of resistance were different in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and resulted from the character of both the population and its leadership, the degree of dissociation from the Ottomans, the involvement of the Europeans and the region's geographey. There were significant differences in the conduct of the insurrection and its intensity and power during this period.

Whereas in Tripolitania the leadership was traditionally divided and embroiled in crisis, in Cyrenaica loyalty to the Sanusi leadership bridged the tribal divisions and rivalry. Attempts in Tripolitania to establish one unified government for the whole region failed due to internal friction and the ambition of strong leaders to subjugate all other shaykhs to their authority. Inter-tribal friction was hardly evident in Cyrenaica during 1911-19, but during periods of internal strife in the Sanusi leadership or between Sanusis and Ottomans, tribal support was divided between the rival factions. This division was based inter alia on the traditional support by specific tribes of certain Sanusi leaders and traditional tensions between these tribes.

The Sanusi head did not have complete ruling authority in all the order's sphere of influence, and without the agreement of the other leadership members he could not enforce his power. Until the invasion of Egypt, fundamental differences of opinion had not been evident in the leadership, with the exception of personal controversies and the desire of some of the leaders to take more authority; there was no dispute as to the very status of the head of the order. The changes in the Sanusi leadership were made following changes in the political-military and economic circumstances and with the silent consent of the other leading members, although superficially it seemed that a certain degree of cooperation existed between the outgoing leader and the new leader. Following the changes at the top, changes also occurred in the policy of the order and these influenced the nature of the insurrection.

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The Ottoman involvement in Libya did not have any influence on the fundamental characteristics of the leadership in Libya, but it had a certain influence on its composition. The complete and swift dissociation of the Ottomans from Tripolitania at the end of the Turkish-Italian War did not bring about the establishment of a unified leadership for the whole region. The previous subordination of the population to the Ottomans as the supreme authority, together with the tradition of division and internal rivalries, were the reasons why, once the Ottoman authority had been removed, friction remained and even increased in Tripolitania, with each leader striving to reach the top. In Cyrenaica, on the other hand, in spite of the limited remaining Ottoman power, the position of the Sanusi leadership strengthened and its involvement in the conduct of the insurrection grew, as well as its control over administrative, economic, spiritual and social life. Ottoman attempts to regain leadership in Libya met with only very limited and temporary success. The renewed Ottoman penetration at the beginning of World War I was, in the first stage, in Cyrenaica, where a small Ottoman contingent had remained during the inter-war period. Cyrenaica had a consolidated leadership which did not find it too difficult to resist Ottoman attempts at domination. Nevertheless, the Ottomans did gain a certain influence due to the military and economic pressure which they exerted over the Sanusis and because the call for a Jihad fell on fertile ground. This background and the personality of the Sanusi leader during that period, Ahmad al-Sharif, brought about a situation in which the Sanusiya served the political and military goals of the Ottomans. Following the failure of the invasion of Egypt there were changes in Sanusi leadership and policy which in turn influenced cooperation with the Ottomans. The change of policy enabled a political settlement with the British and the Italians and, as a result, the Sanusi need for military supplies and money decreased. In addition, the new leadership did not want to be identified with an external power whose policy was contradictory to that of the Sanusis and which wanted to subordinate the local leadership to its authority. Since Idris al-Sanusi did not need Ottoman support he did not hesitate to isolate and drive the Ottomans out, and during 1916 most of them left Cyrenaica for Tripolitania. Thus, when the `Akrama Agreements were signed in April 1917 there were

hardly any Ottomans left in Cyrenaica. For all their trying, the Ottomans succeeded only once in enforcing their policy on the Sanusis: the invasion of Egypt. They never managed to mould a Sanusi leadership according to their wish and to subordinate it to their authority.

The conditions in Tripolitania were more suited than those in Cyrenaica to Ottoman involvement due to the extensive division. To this can be added the fact that some Ottoman envoys to the West had influence and prestige thanks to their personality and previous activity there. Because of the extensive division in Tripolitania the distribution of military equipment and money had greater influence there than in Cyrenaica and the followers of the Ottomans greatly strengthened their position as a result of the generous aid they received; the Ottomans, however, had no real control over its use. Nontheless, even in Tripolitania the real achievements of the Ottomans were negligible and limited in scope. This resulted from the relatively late return of the Ottomans to the region, the relatively limited dimensions of their involvement, the opposition of the tribes to the strenthening of one faction at the expense of the rest, and from internal rivalries and changes among the Ottoman envoys themselves. The local leaders, who were strengthened thanks to their proximity to the Ottomans, were not mere pawns. The Ottomans had influence over marginal details in the make-up and policies of the leadership of both regions, but were unable to change fundamental characteristics and impose their authority.

The insurrection in Libya had its ups and downs and its development was not parallel in both regions. In Tripolitania, the rebellion faded in the inter-war period due to divisions in the leadership, the absence of economic and military resources, the socio-economic structure and each side's methods of warfare. The renewal of the rebellion on the outbreak of World War I was influenced by external incitement by the Ottomans and the Sanusis, who called on the population to join the Jihad. The opposition of the local population to the occupation and the composition of the Italian Army in Tripolitania, which made it very vulnerable, also greatly contributed to the renewal of the rebellion. Consequently, the rebels

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were able to gain control of Italian military supplies and benefit from the military expertise of local troops who deserted from the Italian Army when the rebellion was renewed. The insurrection continued very vigorously during the World War I and the rebels were almost never forced to retreat from posts which they captured. The leaders of the rebellion in Tripolitania tried to focus the struggle against the Italians alone, and not to extend the fighting towards French-held territories. Consequently, the Tripolitanians confronted only one enemy in a restricted area: the Italian Army, whose size and ability at that time did not enable it to crush the rebellion. The internal division made the conduct of the insurrection difficult and prevented further achievements such as the complete expulsion of the Italians or the establishment of an independent state, but at least the existing achievements were not lost and the rebels did not feel that blood had been shed in vain.

In Cyrenaica the insurrection never ceased during the whole period under review, but it was weakened considerably following the extension of the struggle to another front — Egypt. Although in Cyrenaica there was a certain decline in the insurrection during the inter-war period due to the Italians' gradual penetration of the hinterland, the topography and the united Sanusi leadership prevented the resistance from breaking down. Following the defeats that the Sanusis suffered outside the zone of the rebellion and at the hands of a third party — the British — and also because of the economic boycott, significant changes occurred in the military and political thinking of the leadership. Because of the defeats, the economic pressure and because of his own character, the new Sanusi leader preferred to try to solve the crisis through political methods. However, despite the fact that most of the foreign agitators had left there were still many in the region who opposed any attempt at compromise and they were not prepared to relinquish their independence. As a result, even if the intensity and power of the insurrection declined, it was only temporary.

The resistance to the Italians was general. Opposition was not enough, however, to alter fundamental political patterns: tribalism

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continued to prevail throughout Libya, and especially in Tripolitania. The term "Libya" itself was not used by the local population and the term "Tarablus al-Gharb" usually referred only to Tripolitania (or the city of Tripoli itself). Although the concept of nationalism -- both that relating to the restriced area, as well as Arabism -- started to infiltrate into Libya, only very few in the second decade of twentieth-century Libya were devoted to the idea: the Ottoman cover may have been lifted from Libyan tribalism and regionalism, but nationalism had not yet arrived as a substitute.

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CHAPTER FOUR: DAILY LIFE IN THE REBEL CAMP

1. Administration

Following the Italian occupation of the Libyan coast in late-1911 the Libyan hinterland was cut off from the main administrative centres, including the provincial capitals of Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as some of the district capitals. The occupation affected the administration in Libya in two ways: the administrative centres were transferred to the hinterland, and most of the Ottoman administrators were replaced by military commanders and local inhabitants. As a result there was a significant strengthening of the position of the local notables. During the inter-war period the control of elected local elements over the administrative system was almost complete, while during World War I the Ottoman regime tried to re-subordinate the administration in Libya to those it had appointed.

A short while after the Italian invasion of Libya the Ottoman Government decided to move all the administration and public services in Libya into the hinterland. This decision, in fact, confirmed the situation that had developed on the ground following the retreat of most of the Ottoman Government bodies to the hinterland in the wake of the invasion. The administrative centre of Tripolitania was moved from Tripoli to Gharyan and that of Cyrenaica from Benghazi to Merj. Most of the Ottoman administrators who resided in the coastal towns and in the hinterland and who were not local inhabitants surrendered to the Italians and were sent back to Istanbul in the first months after the occupation.[1] Simultaneously, a series of new administrative appointments was made.[2] To head the provinces Ottoman military commanders were appointed: Neşet Bey was installed as Vali of Tripolitania and Enver Bey as Mutasarrıf of Cyrenaica. There was a similar pattern in the districts (sancak) of Tripolitania. To the lower administrative posts (heads of kaza and nahiye) mainly local

notables were appointed. Some of these notables had manned these posts in the past.[3] In Cyrenaica these posts were mostly manned by heads of zawiyahs who in the past had been unofficially responsible for the population in the vicinity of their zawiyah.[4] The more professional posts, such as clerks, treasurers, inspectors, and so on were also manned by local inhabitants on a much larger scale than before. In contrast to the senior appointments, which were decided upon in Istanbul, the lower appointments were confirmed by the senior officials in Libya. With the exception of these appointments, very few details exist about the administrative system during the war years and later on.

Following the peace agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Italy most of the remaining Ottoman administrators and troops left Libya. According to the peace agreement, a representative of the Sultan (na'ib al-Sultan) was posted in Tripoli and, together with a judge (qadi) from Istanbul (who was never sent to Libya because of differences of opinion between the Ottomans and the Italians regarding the manning of this post), they were responsible for the religious, cultural and social affairs of the Moslem population under Italian rule.[5] Following the signing of the Ottoman-Italian peace agreement, the Ottoman Sultan issued a decree granting the local population of Libya autonomy. Consequently, the inhabitants established two separate entities in the territory not occupied by Italy, in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

Sulayman al-Baruni, a Jebel Gharbi notable and deputy to the Ottoman Parliament and one of the leaders of the insurrection, established the short-lived "Tripolitanian state" (late-1912 to March 1913). He headed its government and resided in `Asaba, south of Gharyan. The state was divided into four districts (mutasarrıflık) which were governed by senior local shaykhs some of which gained experience under the Ottomans. Local inhabitants were appointed to all the civil and religious administrative ranks. In addition, a gendarmerie was established to protect the routes, and postal, telephone and telegraph networks were organized. An administrative

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council (majlis idari) supervised the whole system: a council was set up in each province, and the one in Jebel Gharbi was considered the senior one. There was a significant overlapping between the military and civil ranks in this system: the commanders of the military fronts also served at the head of the administration in their districts which corresponded to the traditional spheres of influence of the local notables.[6] Following the occupation of the military headquarters of the rebels in Jebel Gharbi by the Italian Army in March 1913, the Tripolitanian state crumbled and its administration collapsed, even in districts that had not yet been captured. The Italians then established a military administration in the occupied areas. They were assisted by local administrators, who were often recruited from the same circles that under both the Ottoman and independent regimes had been the local leaders and served in the state administration.[7]

In Cyrenaica, the posts which were gradually vacated by Ottomans were taken by Sanusi and tribal shaykhs. Although the Cyrenaicans did not declare independence in late-1912, as did the Tripolitanians, in practice the administrative system in Cyrenaica was much wider and more active than in Tripolitania and, in fact, continued its traditional pattern of operation which started in the Ottoman period. This system did not really suffer at the hands of the Italians, whose penetration into Cyrenaica was not deep. The administration, which was unified under the Sanusi leadership and which was based upon the zawiyah network which exerted control administratively, economically and spiritually of the territories and population adjacent to it, received official Ottoman approval of its traditional status. The internal integrity of the Sanusiya, the loyalty of the Sanusi and tribal shaykhs to its leadership (which nevertheless left a substantial degree of freedom of action in their hands), together with the difficulties encountered by the Italians in their penetration into the Cyrenaican hinterland, all enabled the administrative system in Cyrenaica to exist and function much longer than in Tripolitania, where internal division and leadership conflicts were extensive and the Italian occupation swift.

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When World War I broke out the Ottoman involvement in Libya surfaced once again in the Libyan hinterland; in the Italian occupied areas it came to an end. At the head of the local administration of the rebel camp were local and foreign figures whose ranks and authority were defined by the Ottoman Government. Since these appointments were made in part in order to solve the political needs of both the Ottoman Government and the local leadership in Libya, there were often controversies between the appointed persons whose authorities had not been unequivocally defined. Consequently, there was at times an overlapping between functions or doubts regarding their interdependence.[8] The Sultan's representative left the Italian region only in August 1915, three months after Italy joined the war and when most of Tripolitania had already fallen out of Italian control.

Ahmad al-Sharif was appointed in late-1914 by the Ottoman Sultan to be his representative and the commander of the Jihad in North Africa with the rank of Vezir. Ahmad in turn nominated his cousin Idris al-Sanusi to be his deputy and delegated powers to his brothers and cousins in Cyrenaica, Sirtica and Fezzan. The Ottomans often confirmed Ahmad's appointment, even when the Sanusiya was led by Idris, whose status the Ottomans did not recognize. On the face of it, Ahmad was by force of his Ottoman appointment the highest authority of the Ottoman Government and the Sanusiya in the whole of North Africa. In practice, however, during World War I, several people, most of them Ottomans, were nominated to a series of overlapping functions in Libya. Their authority derived from the support they were able to accumulate locally, as well as the control they held over economic and military resources, but not from the titles they were granted.

The envoys sent from Istanbul to Cyrenaica in late-1914 and in 1915 had the status of advisers and military commanders. Consequently, even while these people controlled the distribution of equipment and money and the supreme military command was in their hands, no one opposed the fact that Ahmad al-Sharif headed the system. Following the failure of the invasion of Egypt, the rise of Idris al-Sanusi and the departure of the Ottomans from Cyrenaica during

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1916, new systems were established in the region. Idris became the senior personality in Cyrenaica, but he no longer delegated widespread territorial powers to his relatives in the Sanusi family as in the past, contenting himself with granting only limited powers to commanders of posts and heads of zawiyahs and tribes.[9] In this way Idris sought to increase the lower ranks' dependence on him and to prevent the establishment of ruling claims by local notables, especially in his immediate proximity.

After the Italian withdrawal from most of Tripolitania in 1915, several local strongmen established themselves there without external assistance (they included Ramadan al-Shitawi in the Misurata region; `Abd al-Nabi al-Khayr in the Urfella region; the Sayf al-Nasr family in the Sirtica; and Muhammad Suf in the centre of Jebel Gharbi). The Ottomans tried to subjugate these elements to their authority, especially from 1916 when they were finally driven out of Cyrenaica. In September 1916, Sulayman al-Baruni, who was pushed out of Cyrenaica and who was originally from Jebel Gharbi, landed in Tripolitania. He was appointed by a Sultanic decree as governor (vali) and military commander of Tripolitania, Tunisia and Algeria, and remained in Tripolitania until November 1919.[10] In December 1916, Nuri Bey, the brother of the Ottoman Minister of War Enver Paşa, reached Tripolitania from Cyrenaica. In addition to being the representative of Enver, who was at that time one of the strongest figures in the Ottoman Government, Nuri was the military commander of the region and controlled the supplies and money that arrived in Germán submarines. Within a short while conflicts erupted between Nuri and Baruni and between these two and local notables. Nuri left Tripolitania in December 1917 and was substituted by İshak Paşa, an Ottoman officer and CUP member who had previously served in this region. İshak quickly concentrated in his hands both the military and civilian authorities and was considered responsible for this region to the Ottoman regime. The friction grew between him and Baruni and one of the results was their decision to reside in different centres: İshak in Misurata and Baruni in Zawiyah and `Aziziya. To these controversies were added conflicts in late-1917 with Ahmad al-Sharif, who arrived in Tripolitania from Cyrenaica which had passed into Idris' leadership.

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The authority of Ahmad was re-affirmed by the Ottomans and, consequently, he was on the face of it the supreme personality in the region and demanded to impose his authority. In practice, power was concentrated with the local notables and the Ottoman envoys. The status of Ahmad was marginal because the Sanusiya had only little support in Tripolitania. After numerous attempts to build up his power, Ahmad left the region for good in August 1918.[11] In May 1918 another high-level Ottoman arrived in Tripolitania, Prince Osman Fuad, who was appointed commander of the Ottoman forces in North Africa. The Ottoman regime hoped that his family prestige would gain the prince acceptance by the local population and its leadership, as well as by the Ottoman envoys. However, despite the fact that he was recognized as the Sultan's representative, he never managed to enforce his authority. The number of those struggling for supremacy reached four, to which could also be added the local strongmen. When Prince Osman Fuad left in June 1919, İshak Pasa was nominated as his substitute, but he too left in October 1919.[12]

Ottoman officials had a certain influence over the local functionaries because they controlled the distribution of supplies and money and thus contributed significantly to the consolidation of their proteges' positions. Nevertheless, in most cases the Ottomans did not succeed in enforcing their will when it came to minor appointments. The influence of the Ottomans on the activity of the local leaders, and even of those who were supported by them, was very limited. The local notables took advantage of the equipment and money which they received from the Ottomans, but the latter were unable to activate their proteges as they wanted. Apart from the invasion of Egypt, which was an exceptional event, the Ottomans could not enforce their policy on the local leadership and population.

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A. Revenues

The financing of the military insurrection in Libya as well as the civil administration and the public services came from internal and external sources. The longer the struggle continued, the more the economic situation in Libya deteriorated: farmers were cut off for long periods from their work and thus agricultural produce dropped; trade routes were blocked and disrupted; settlements were hit and captured, and the number grew of those who were killed, injured or who were bound to military activity and who left productive work. As a result of these developments and disruptions caused in the administration by the war, as well as the ever-increasing division, especially in Tripolitania, the internal sources of revenue dwindled and dependence on external sources increased: the Ottoman Empire, the Moslem world and, during World War I, also Germany, Britain and Italy. As dependence on external sources increased, so the tendency grew to make the granting of aid conditional on political-military factors, and this was true for all the foreign powers.

1. External Sources

During the whole period under review the Ottoman Empire sent money to Libya, mainly through Egypt and Tunisia. Although during the Turkish-Italian War the British had declared Egypt's neutrality concerning the war in Libya, they did not consider money as contraband and it continued to flow into Libya undisturbed.[13] There are few details about the exact dimensions of the Ottoman financial support, but it was large. In addition to information on the arrival of official Ottoman money shipments to Libya, there are details on specific laws and regulations issued by the Ottoman Government in order to finance the struggle in Libya. Part of the money came from the budget of the Ministry of War for the years 1911 and 1912, but most of the assistance was not from this source. The budget covered only the payment of salaries, compensation and pensions to those who had served the Ottomans in Libya before and during the war.[14] Another financial source was a tax which was levied in Summer 1912 on goods, services and salaries.[15] The Ottoman budget also allocated sums for

the needy in Libya[16], but it was impossible to control their use in Libya. Another Ottoman step that did not directly finance the war effort but which was intended to harm Italy economically and to increase imperial revenues was the unilateral abrogation in October 1911 of the privileges Italy had under the Capitulations Agreements. In addition to hurting Italy's prestige, this move was intended to increase Ottoman revenues from customs duties and taxes on property.[17]

All across the Empire collections were made for the fighters. Although this operation did not amount to official taxation, governors and administrators participated in it. There was much activity in this field in Egypt. A society supporting the war was established in Egypt with the participation of the Egyptian Red Crescent and personalities from the Khedivial family and from the Egyptian National Party. By late-1912 there were some EL 40,000 in the society's treasury for the benefit of the struggle in Libya.[18] The activity in Egypt continued on a limited scale after the signing of the Italian-Ottoman peace agreement and it was concentrated around the personality of Khedive `Abbas Hilmi until his dismissal in late-1914. Stepped-up controls on the Egyptian-Libyan border during World War I and the growing friction between the Egyptian population and the Sanusi leadership following the Sanusi invasion of Egypt made it very difficult to smuggle money and equipment from Egypt into Libya and to hold collections in favour of Libya in Egypt. Consequently, there was an almost total cessation of assistance through Egypt.[19] In the Moslem world many collections were made in 1912 for the fighters in Libya. The most impressive were in Afghanistan, Morocco, India and the Moslem communities in Britain and South Africa. There was almost no continuation of this activity after 1912.[20]

The Ottoman Empire continued to support the struggle in Libya even after the official termination of its involvement in the region following its peace agreement with Italy. During this period Ottoman Government money was transferred to Libya in the guise of grants by the Caliph to Moslems in need in order that the Italian Government would not be able to claim that the Ottoman Government was supporting

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the rebellion.[21] In addition, compensation, pension and welfare payments to former Ottoman citizens were transferred legally through the Sultan's representative in Tripoli, but it was difficult to ascertain the final destination of these sums. Whereas these activities assumed an air of legality and could not be said to be in violation of the peace agreement, it was difficult to make similar claims about a tax in the sum of one mecidiye which was imposed on pilgrims to Mecca and which was levied to support the struggle in Libya.[22]

Another external financial source was utilized by Sanusi envoys who were sent to raise funds in Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Anatolia and Istanbul and who were assisted in this by the local administration.[23] The response to this operation was very favourable, but there are no details as to its dimensions.

The economic hardship in the Empire and in Libya during World War I caused an increasing dependence on German assistance to finance the struggle in Libya.[24] While at the beginning of the war German support for the Empire in general and Libya in particular had taken the form of occasional assistance, which in part had been considered as a loan, soon afterwards the Ottomans put pressure on the Germans to increase the support (mainly gold) so that they could ascertain the degree to which the political-military cooperation would continue. The Germans realized that there was little chance of the Empire being able to repay its debts. However, in spite of their great economic leverage, the Germans found it exceedingly difficult to make the continuation of their assistance conditional on the acceptance of political-military dictates: cooperation with the Ottomans was important to them too, and their influence in the Empire mainly derived from their closeness to the Minister of War, Enver Paşa. Consequently, they had to comply with many of Enver's wishes, and he was deeply concerned about Ottoman involvement in Libya. The Ottomans exploited their control of the distribution of supplies in Libya to consolidate their position and that of their proteges in order to achieve political and military goals, but they did not succeed in attaining complete control over the local leadership.

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2. Internal Resources

During the period under review an extensive tax collection system existed in the rebel camp and taxes and customs duties were imposed in money and in kind. The graver the economic and security situation became and the more that internal friction increased and state institutions deteriorated, so the occasions increased on which strongmen arbitrarily collected taxes and confiscated property against official and agreed plans. The difference between tax collection and pillage became blurred, and the situation was exploited by those who wanted to settle private and inter-tribal accounts. As a result, the economic condition of several population groups deteriorated and the estrangement between them and the rebels grew.

In the rebel administration there were special administrators with specific titles who were responsible for the tax collection and the administration of the financial system.[25] These officials often used to go out on tax collection campaigns and transferred the revenues to the central treasury. At times it was necessary to use force and threats during the collection: in one case it was reported that soldiers warned the local leadership that their village will be bombed unless it paid its taxes as required. The taxes that were common in the rebel camp were of several types:

- a fixed personal tax (usually on well-established families) or a general tax on a whole village according to its size and economic condition[26];
- a tax on agricultural produce (barley, wheat, dates, etc)[27];
- a tax on consumption goods (sugar, tea, clothing, etc)[28];
- a tax on work and transport animals (camels, horses, donkeys, mules)[29];
- a tax on property (land, houses)[30]; and
- a mobilization ransom[31] (mentioned only with regard to Jews).

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In addition to the regular taxes, collections were sometimes made for special needs. Thus, for example, in 1912 the population participated in a drive to benefit the Ottoman Air Force.[32]

Part of the tax was collected in kind. This collection was mainly used for the needs of the army, but also for the benefit of the public as a whole. The level of the tax was fixed in the limit of a tithe. This kind of collection was made mainly from wheat, barley, dates and fodder, as well as from sheep, camels, horses and various foodstuffs. A regional centre was sometimes set up and the produce which was collected in the vicinity was brought there, and from that place the supplies to the army and the public were organized.[33] On one occasion it was reported that in exchange for the confiscation of agricultural produce the Sanusis gave the inhabitants invoices, on the account of the treasury in Cairo, to be paid when the Sanusis gained power there.[34] This type of taxation, as it became more and more arbitary and less regular, turned out to be the most oppressing on the civil population and caused great tension and acts of violence. It reached the point at which the population tried at times to drive the rebel forces out of its boundaries.[35] This animosity, which worsened during 1916, helped the Egyptian Army to drive the remnants of the Sanusi force out of Egypt.

Another source of finance were the treasuries of settlements that were captured. At times, following the occupation of a certain place by the rebels, the treasury which included the local taxes or various deposits, was confiscated by the occupying force.[36] Since these treasuries also usually served as pawn houses and safes, the confiscation of their contents caused a deterioration in relations between the inhabitants and the rebel army.

In the border regions, and especially between Cyrenaica and Egypt, the rebels established customs houses on the caravan routes, and duties ranging from 100% to 150% were imposed on incoming goods. Transit fees were also collected from all the goods and animals. In Summer 1917, following the `Akrama Agreements, the Italians demanded the right to establish customs houses in the Cyrenaican-Egyptian

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border region and opposed Sanusi activity in an area which they regarded as being under their sole authority.[37]

Another source of income for the rebels' treasury were foreign prisoners-of-war: in order to encourage the seizure of living prisoners, their local captors received a grant for every living prisoner they took. When the prisoners were returned to the Egyptian or Italian armies, the rebels received a high price: in 1916 one-thousand gold francs were given in exchange for every Italian who was released.[38]

Despite the detailed information concerning the varied sources of revenue, there are no definite and continuous details about the revenues themselves. Consequently, it is not possible to estimate the total revenue or each source separately. As the economic conditions in Libya worsened, the income from internal sources dwindled and the rebel camp was forced to depend to a growing degree on external support. Nonetheless, the attempts to collect taxes from the impoverished population continued and, as a result, the relations between it and the rebels worsened. Because of the changes in the rebels' geographical distribution, the changes in the economic and military activity and in the administration, the planning of a balanced budget was made impossible, especially since in most cases no qualified personnel existed for this assignment. The rebels' leaders understood the importance of this matter and tried, with little success, to act in an organized and methodical manner.

B. Expenditures

The principal expenditure item in the rebel camp, on which there are many details, was the salary paid to fighters and administrators. The troops, regular soldiers as well as volunteers, and administrators and leaders, received salaries from the organization to which they belonged. During the Turkish-Italian War, the responsibility for salaries lay with the Ottoman Government through its representatives in Libya. In the post-war period the responsibility for this field, as

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for others, was transferred to the local administrative bodies: the Tripolitanian Government and the Sanusi leadership. Following the fall of the Tripolitanian Government and the extensive division in this region, the number of local organizations there increased gradually, each separately treating the people under its control.[39]

During the whole period salary payment was made on a daily or monthly basis. The salary consisted of a cash payment to which was added a food, and sometimes a clothing, allotment.[40] The troops received the basic foodstuffs, such as grains, flour, oil, tea, and sugar, which they used as they pleased without any control. Since the food allotment was generally quite generous, the troops used to maintain their family or to sell part of it. The regular cash payment and food allotment were a significant factor in attracting the local inhabitants to join the rebel army. For this reason numerous volunteers tended to stay in camp even when they were not needed for fighting or guard duties.[41] On the other hand, economic distress which brought with it a decrease in revenues and also a diminished salary and food allotment, caused an immediate abandonment by volunteers. This process was especially evident with the troops who wandered with Ahmad al-Sharif in Egypt and whose numbers dwindled considerably when their salaries and food portions reached nil. Even senior Ottoman officers were not always secure and at times of distress they did not receive their salaries for long periods of time[42] (a situation which was quite common in other regular units of the Ottoman Army).

Because of the frequent price rises during the struggle against Italy, the differences between the various regions and the use of several currency units, it is difficult to estimate the exact buying power of the troops' salaries. It is, however, possible to get a general picture by comparing salaries and prices in specific places and at specific times. Thus, for example, in late-1911, when the daily salary of a soldier was 4.5 pennies, a dozen of eggs or 1 kg of meat cost 8 pennies, while in late-1915, when the monthly salary of a soldier was TL 1 (= 100 ğuruş), 1 kg of rice cost 60 ğuruş, and 1 kg of flour cost 80 ğuruş.[43] These and numerous other data illustrate the low level of the soldiers' salaries. It should, however, be remembered

that these salaries were not meant to maintain the fighters since they were given in addition to food allotments, and served as an incentive to join the resistance movement. On the other hand, those groups in whose services the authorities were especially interested received much higher salaries. In comparison to the soldiers, officers received real salaries and during the Turkish-Italian War the Ottoman Government decided to make a special grant, according to their ranks, to officers serving in Libya.[44] The salaries paid to local leaders were also much higher then those of the soldiers and were not at all symbolic.[45] The situation of deserters from the Egyptian and Italian armies was similar, and in order to lure them into joining the rebel army they were promised the same payment as that they received during their service in the regular army.[46] During World War I there were reports on salaries paid to soldiers in the reserves which amounted to one-half the monthly salary of regular soldiers.[47] In spite of all this, there were people who preferred not to be recruited and hired substitutes who served in their places.[48] The salaries of the administrative staff were the same as those customary in the rest of the Ottoman Empire.[49] The Ottoman Government also paid its pensioners in Libya, as well as the families of the fallen and disabled who had been in its service, according to custom.[50]

The salaries and food allotments served as an important economic incentive for the inhabitants to persist in their volunteering because of the low standard of living to which they were accustomed. However, for the Ottoman Empire and later on for the local administrative bodies, this expenditure was considered to be relatively low because of the significant gap between it and the expenses of a regular army. Other expenditures in the rebel army were also much lower than those of a regualr army (on accommodation, clothing, arms, ammunition, etc). This situation greatly improved the ability of the rebels to continue their resistance against the Italians, for whom the price of the war was much higher.

The rebels' weapons came from various sources: personal weapons which the inhabitants held and which had been obtained through buying, smuggling across the border or pillage following attacks on regular

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army units; the distribution of arms by the Ottomans following the outbreak of war from army stores in Libya and later on from special Ottoman or German shipments; and purchase of arms on a limited scale by the rebels in foreign countries. Since most of the weapons were supplied to the rebels by the Ottomans and Germans, or were plundered, there was no financial expenditure involved and thus no burden on the rebels. A certian amount of money was at times allocated for the purchase of cartridges and magazines, while gunpowder was often produced in Libya itself, just as defective weapons were repaired there in special workshops.[51]

C. Communications

At the time of the Italian invasion there were telephone and telegraph lines in Libya which connected the provincial capitals with the hinterland, Europe and Istanbul. There was, however, no connection between the Libyan and Egyptian communication systems (the latter were operable only as far as Marsa Matruh and the oasis of Siwa), nor between the Libyan and Tunisian systems; the latter only reached Dehibat. Consequently, it was necessary to use runners in order to pass news across the border.[52]

One of the first measures that the Italians took before landing in Libya was to cut it off from the rest of the Empire. In addition to the imposition of a naval blockade on Libya, the submarine cable from Tripoli to Malta was cut and the wireless station in Derna was bombed from the sea and destroyed.[53] However, within a short while, the rebels overcame this. The internal communications system was repaired and continued to function effectively. All the district centres and the new army headquarters which were established during the war were connected by telephone and telegraph lines from Solum and Derna in the east to Nalut and Ghadames in the west. In order to improve the system the rebels used Italian communication equipment which they had taken as war booty, as well as equipment brought in from Europe.[54] At the beginning of the war the rebels tried to use the Egyptian military telegraph network to pass information on to Istanbul, and they were

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assisted in these efforts by their numerous supporters in the Egyptian Army. When it became known to the British they took measures to prevent the repetition of similar acts.[55] The later repair of the wireless system in Cyrenaica enabled the regional commander, Enver Bey, to contact Istanbul directly.[56] The communication with Tripolitania improved when the post of al-`Asab was connected with the Tunisian telegraph network and, as a result, direct communication was established with Europe. There were, however, numerous errors in the telegrams, mainly due to the fact that most of the operators in the rebel camp had difficulty deciphering Latin script, which had to be written large and in block letters.[57] In addition to the telegram service, a postal service also operated. The approach roads to Libya were improved and motorized vehicles were brought into service, mainly from the east.[58]

In the short-lived Tripolitanian state there was also a telephone and telegraph system and it was operated between the various headquarters by Ottoman and local operators.[59] When the state collapsed and the Italians advanced into the hinterland, they established their own communications system there. The Italian occupation was followed by a gradual and systematic distribution of communications, roads and railway networks in order to consolidate the Italian hold and facilitate the advance of manpower and equipment. Paved roads and railways had not existed in the hinterland previously and the Italian contribution in this field was significant.[60]

The renewal of the insurrection in Libya in late-1914, the Sanusi invasion of Egypt in late-1915 and the expulsion of the Sanusis from Egypt in 1916 brought in their wake sabotage of all parties' communications networks. However, the Sanusis succeeded thanks to Ottoman and German assistance in repairing most of their defective lines, and all their posts were linked up. In contrast to the situation during the Turkish-Italian War when the Ottoman command was linked up between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, during World War I both regions were cut off from each other operationally, administratively and from the point of view of communications because of the internal division between the Sanusis and the Tripolitanian rebels. The renewed

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Tripolitanian network made extensive use of communication equipment brought in shortly before by the Italians. In addition, German assistance made a significant contribution during 1917-18 to the improvement of the network in Tripolitania and Fezzan, which was operated by Ottomans and local people. The main wireless station, which was much more powerful and sophisticated than others in the region, was established by the Germans in the vicinity of Misurata in 1917: The Mirr station, as it was known, was operated solely by Germans. It was possible to communicate from this station directly with Berlin and Istanbul, as well as the submarine bases in the Adriatic. Fortifications and gendarmerie protected the various communication stations. Around the main station in Misurata, Italian prisoners-of-war were accommodated in order to deter the Italian Army from trying to attack. When the Ottomans and Germans were evacuated from Libya in 1919, most of the communications experts left too and the operation of the networks deteriorated due to the absence of qualified manpower and equipment.[61] The existence of an extensive communications network in Libya — which had been part of Sultan Abdül Hamid II`s strategy in controlling his regime — greatly improved the coordination of the struggle; when it became defective, it had grave repercussions for the resistance movement.

D. Health Services

The physical condition of the population in Libya in the late-Ottoman period was good, and especially so amongst the nomads. Among the settled population and especially in the urban centres, contagious diseases (mainly dysentery, trachoma, skin diseases, syphilis and malaria) were very common because of the lack of proper supervision over sanitation, low standards of personal hygiene and lack of proper treatment.[62] At times the population was attacked by various epidemics, mainly cholera and pest.[63] In addition to popular medicine -- an area in which many Jews were to be found — Western medicine was also practised by military doctors and Ottoman exiles who also treated the civil population in government hospitals which were built in Tripoli, Benghazi and Khoms. Italian doctors also arrived in

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Libya as part of the Italian campaign to penetrate the country peacefully. French doctors also arrived.[64]

The outbreak of the Turkish-Italian War made the provision of medical services in the rebel camp very difficult because the hinterland was cut off from the hospitals and clinics in the coastal towns and the regular supply of medicine and equipment from Istanbul ceased. In addition, there was also a change in the kind of services which were required -- there were more people treated for rifle and stab wounds. During the war it became evident that the small-sized bullets used by the Italians caused lighter physical injuries than those caused by the larger bullets used by the Ottomans and the rebels.[65] In spite of the difficult preliminary conditions, during the Turkish-Italian War and until mid-1913 there was slight improvement in the level of the medical services in Libya thanks to the extensive external aid which the rebels received from Europe and the Moslem world. The many collections that were made for the fighters not only financed the purchase of medical equipment and medicine, but also enabled the dispatch of medical missions on behalf of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent.[66] These missions included physicians (some of them surgeons and other specialists) and nurses, and both the troops and the civil population benefited from this.

Most of the medical activity in the rebel camp was centered around Ottoman and Egyptian delegations of the Red Crescent. In spite of the great importance of the British and German activity, it was limited to the centre of Tripolitania and lasted a relatively short period of time. The activity of the Ottoman Red Crescent in Libya was financed by the Ottoman Government and donations. At least 17 physicians and 17 nurses were sent to Libya and manned hospitals in both Tripolitania (`Aziziya, Gharyan, `Ayn Zara, Khoms and Bu Ghshir) and Cyrenaica (`Ayn al-Mansur, Benghazi (opposite) and Dafna).[67] The Egyptian Red Crescent delegation manned the clinics in Derna, Tubruq and Benghazi.[68] The British mission was organized by Moslem societies and the Red Cross in Britain. It arrived in Tripolitania in February 1912 and manned clinics in `Aziziya, `Ayn Zara, Haji Khalifah, Zawiyah, Bir Zanubah and Gharyan.[69] The German Red Cross mission was sent to

Libya on the Germans' (non-Moslem) initiative and was financed by German firms that had commercial relations with the Ottomans (such as Krupp, Mauser and Deutsche Bank). The German mission stayed in Gharyan from February to July 1912 and had to leave due to the absence of an adequate budget for its maintenance. This mission established a modern and well-equipped field hospital which was transferred with all of its equipment to the rebels upon the Germans' departure. In addition to this assistance inside Libya, a society was established in Germany which enabled Ottoman officers who had been injured in battle in Libya to recuperate in Germany.[70]

Not all of the clinics were of the same standard. For example, complaints were voiced about the clinic in 'Aziziya until the arrival of the foreign missions.[71] During the war the rebels often protested that the Italian Air Force had bombed clinics despite the fact that these had been clearly marked with the signs of the Red Crescent and Red Cross. The Italians claimed that military installations had been marked by the rebels as clinics or had been housed in the latter's vicinity, and that as a result clinics had been hit when the real purpose had been to bomb military installations. The use of public buildings for the accommodation of clinics also created much confusion, according to the Italians. The Italians were also very suspicious about members of the Ottoman Red Crescent. They claimed that some of them were soldiers in disguise. This suspicion, which was not totally groundless, caused many delays in the entry of medical missions to Libya, although in principle the entry of medical teams was permitted.[72] In the Italian-occupied zones the Italian authorities took care to maintain medical services for the whole population and took steps to ensure a proper sanitary level that helped to lower the risk of epidemics. However, during the invasion itself cholera, typhoid and smallpox epidemics broke out in Tripoli and other cities because of the numerous dead whose burial had been delayed, sick people who had not been isolated in hospitals, and the failure to take proper preventive measures on the outbreak of the epidemics.[73]

At the end of the Turkish-Italian War most of the foreign medical teams left the rebel camp. The British Red Cross, however, allowed its

mission to remain in Gharyan to treat the civil population. It stayed there until the fall of the Tripolitanian state in March 1913.[74] Most of the Ottoman physicians, who were in most cases attached to the military, departed following the decision to evacuate the Ottoman Army and administration from Libya. Apparently, none of them remained in Tripolitania, but in Cyrenaica at least one military doctor stayed on and his activity among the Sanusis from the start of the war was reported in 1916. He lived secluded amongst the Sanusis, without essential medical equipment and medicine. In addition to regular medical treatment, he also dealt with "religious surgeries" -- the amputation of thieves' and smokers' hands. This was done without any adequate appliances and without anaesthetics.[75] In the inter-war period and World War I only a few Ottoman physicians entered Libya; Egyptian activity in this field was also marginal.

One of the difficult assignments of the medical teams was to try and stop infectious diseases through preventive medicine and improving sanitary conditions. This necessitated widespread information campaigns and great persistence since the population did not believe that there was a connection between disease and filth, and especially that of water resources and food; nor did they believe that insects played a role in spreading disease. One of the commanders who was aware of this problem was Mustafa Kemal, and he saw to it that order was kept, that personal hygiene was not neglected, and that the whole camp and especially dining rooms were kept clean. In spite of the difficulties the physicians had some success, but it was limited and did not last because of their own limited numbers and their short stay in the region. Infectious diseases, especially dysentery and typhoid, were common throughout the whole period.[76]

The troops, in particular the local ones, were ready to accept any treatment and strived to prove their manliness by refusing to take anaesthetics. Some, however, were prepared to accept anaesthesia during surgery, althought they complained about the side-effects. In most cases the fighters wanted to return to the battlefield immediately after receiving preliminary treatment. They were very curious about all aspects of Western medicine, especially dentistry

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and surgery using anaesthetics. The local volunteers' good health helped them to get over their injuries quickly. The treatment itself was generally provided in the clinics. Mortality was often caused by difficulties in transporting the injured from the battlefield to the clinics: there was shortage of stretchers and the terrain was not helpful. The activities of several physicians who went out to the battlefields and the encampments to provide the injured with first aid and treatment as quickly as possible was pointed out as an exceptional act that deserved praise and imitation.[77]

But as the war continued, the number of physicians and the amount of medical equipment diminished. At the same time there was a significant general deterioration in the economic situation and both agriculture and trade suffered a serious deterioration. Consequently, many people suffered from malnutrition and hunger which weakened their natural resistance to disease and injury.[78] The combination of the lack of proper medical services and the deterioration of the fighters' health harmed the fighting capability of the rebels, but their consolidation, maintenance of objective, familiarity with the terrain, and the support they received from the population enabled them to hold out for a long time.

E. Education and Culture

Following the Italian occupation of the coastal towns and the departure of the Ottoman administrators, the Ottoman educational system in Libya ceased to operate. The Sanusi educational system continued its activity in the zawiyahs in Cyrenaica and elsewhere, but information on it is scant. No details were provided on educational activity in the rebel camp, with the exception of the system established by Enver in Cyrenaica. A short while after his arrival, Enver ordered that children, especially the sons of shaykhs, should be taught by appointed Ottoman officers and intellectuals. In late-1912 there were ten boys' schools having one-thousand pupils and two girls' schools with 150 pupils in Cyrenaica. Enver also established an agricultural school and started to plan a two-year training programme

for wandering teachers who were to move from tribe to tribe and teach the children. In these schools the pupils also underwent basic military training, including shooting exercises. Enver took a special interest in the advancement of pupils in their studies. They had seasonal examinations following which the best received prizes at a public ceremony. The pupils also participated in a parade on the Sultan's coronation day.[79]

At the end of the Turkish-Italian War and with the departure of most of the Ottoman Army from Libya, some 150-250 Cyrenaican children, most of them sons of shaykhs, were sent to Istanbul on Enver's orders to continue their studies in military and vocational schools. In this way Enver sought to safeguard the shaykhs' loyalty; in a way, their sons served as hostages. Enver also hoped to train a new generation of Westernized leaders who would be loyal to the Empire and him personally. Following the outbreak of World War I many of the students returned to Libya, some of them as officers, but due to the fundamental influence of traditional forces in the region these returning youths had little impact.[80]

The network of Sanusi zawiyahs continued to function during the period, but many were destroyed by the Italians and the British because of their important role in the military activity. Because of the war and the use of most of the resources and men for the fighting, cultural activity in the zawiyahs decreased. There were, however, many who were still referred to as "students" (talabah), but this title also referred to their status in the order, and apparently this was the accepted meaning. There are very few detials on other cultural activities among the population. For example, the newspaper "Al-Jihad" was published in Enver's camp in `Ayn al-Mansur but there are no details available on its content, size and circulation. It is known that at least a part of the Sanusi leadership enjoyed music, and obtained many records from Egypt, including those of Western music. In 1917, an Italian musician and prisoner in Idris al-Sanusi's camp set up an orchestra based on local musicians.[81] Since the introduction of Western education and culture to the Libyan hinterland came quite late and rather superficially, what prevailed after the departure of

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Ottoman administration were traditional Moslem and tribal customs, beliefs and practices.

2. Economy

The Italian invasion of Libya and the lengthy struggle there caused changes in the economic conditions and a gradual but most significant economic deterioration. This development not only harmed the military capability of the rebels, but also enabled foreign powers to exert pressure upon the rebels in order to achieve political and military aims.

The Italians had preceded their October 1911 invasion of Libya by imposing a naval blockade on Libya. After the coastal towns had been captured, the naval connection between Europe and the Italian zone was renewed. The inhabitants of the interior, however, could not trade directly with markets overseas. The war caused the almost complete cessation of internal and trans-Saharan trade. Since numerous people of various professions supplied services to the caravans, the halt in international trade came as serious economic blow to many sections of the population. During World War I there was a slight renewal of trade between Libya and Germany: German submarines which arrived at Misurata in 1917-18 brought in mainly military equipment, money and men and some fabricated goods and returned with local produce (mainly oil, eggs, dates and sheep's wool).[82] The dimensions of this trade were very limited and could not be compared to those of previous foreign trade. The goods taken from Libya did not cover the huge financial investment of Germany in Libya (and the Empire as a whole) during World War I.

The large-scale military activity and the call-up of a large section of the work-force to the rebels' army for a lengthy period of time severely hit daily economic activity in Libya. Thus, many population centres suffered from the military activity and units that passed through their territory ruined tilled land and lived off the

population.[83] Whereas such harm was caused only when military units moved through settled areas or camped in their vicinity, the large-scale mobilization had far deeper and longer lasting repercussions on the economic situation. Since many people volunteered and were later compelled to enlist in the rebel force, agricultural activity was neglected.[84] There were, however, cases when the military activity took into consideration (because it had no other choice) agricultural needs and at times people were temporarily released from military service to undertake urgent seasonal work.[85] As a result of the shortage of hands, there was a significant rise in workers' salaries.[86] But since the economic resources of the people at large deteriorated, urban and rural employers found it very difficult to hire the required number of substitutes in order to produce similar amounts of goods. The mobilization of a large segment of the population also harmed security in the countryside and on the roads, which came under attack from rival tribes and robbers more frequently than before. This phenomenon reached such a serious point that at times the army was compelled to allot soldiers for guard duty on sown and grazing grounds, to prevent attacks by hostile elements in order that recruits would not fear being absent from their villages and encampments and would not contemplate desertion from military service.[87]

The turning of many zawiyahs into military command centres where Sanusi army forces were centered also made it difficult for the zawiyahs to fulfill their traditional role as the focus of regional economic activity. The regional economic importance of the zawiyahs declined also because many members of the tribes in the vicinity of the zawiyahs were mobilized, and, consequently, agricultural and commercial activity around them declined. Because of the great importance of the zawiyahs in the military structure of the resistance in Cyrenaica, they were a central target in the Italian occupation programme. Many of them were captured and often completely destroyed.[88] As a result, a growing part of the interior was left without an economic-administrative centre and with very limited economic activity.

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According to the traditional economic structure of Libya, the agricultural work was done mainly by Moslems whereas most of the craftsman were Jewish.[89] Since most of the Jewish population resided in the coastal regions which were captured by the Italians in the early days of the occupation, the rebel camp suffered from an absence of professional craftsmen. Although some workshops were established, these were for military supplies, and the rural and urban population did not benefit from them.

The prolonged war against the Italians and the traditional rivalry between tribes and leaders brought about a further deterioration in internal security conditions. Until World War I the problem had not been very serious, at first because of the control that the Ottomans still had over the conflicting actions, and later due to the extension of Italian rule in Tripolitania. During World War I the conflicts aggravated between the various groups. Their armament had improved and increased thanks to external aid and the capture of Italian arms. As a result, attacks on villages and caravans of rival elements increased. Quite often caravans carrying food to hunger-stricken areas did not reach their destination because they were captured by stronger elements on the way. Such control over the goods, and especially foodstuffs, further strengthened their position.[90] The war and the gradual isolation from neighbouring countries caused a drop in the number of available animals for work and transport. This, in turn, caused difficulties in agricultural work and in the already restricted trade and also led to a rise in the prices of animals and frequent attempts to steal them.[91] Despite the difficulties in getting supplies and deteriorating internal security, regional leaders tried to keep up the economic routine and to hold regular market days. The regional leadership used to keep agricultural produce in well-guarded underground stores, out of which the goods were taken for sale and distribution in the region.[92]

In addition to caring for the needs of the civilian population, it was necessary to furnish supplies for a growing number of unproductive manpower -- the army. The source of the supplies to the army was taxation in money or in kind imposed on the diminished

productive population, as well as equipment and money captured from the Italians or sent from abroad. As time passed, reliance on the local civilian population became more difficult due to its diminishing numbers and the neglect of various economic activities. At the same time the economic dependence on various foreign elements grew, along with political and military dependence. The reliance on the local civilian population caused growing friction and hostility between the local inhabitants and the rebel army, which led in many cases to a fall in the local popular support for the resistance movement. The fact that soldiers were taking advantage of their positions to make arbitrary collections of money, foodstuffs and animals for their private or tribal benefit further aggravated relations. However, when the system did operate properly, the military-administrative regional command did concentrate foodstuffs collected as taxes in central stores, from which goods were distributed not only to the army, but also to the civilian population.[93]

The naval blockade was imposed by the Italians at the beginning of the war to prevent troops and military equipment from getting to the Ottoman-Libyan force. Similarly, the control over Libya's land borders resulted from British and French agreement to prevent the entry of contraband to the belligerents in Libya; however, supply caravans on their way to the civilian population were not stopped.[94] The control over the western land border was greatly increased during the inter-war period following the Italian occupation of Tripolitania. During World War I the Italians, and even more the British in Egypt, made political-military use of the closure of Cyrenaica's borders: by preventing the supply of foodstuffs and other equipment to the rebels and the population at large they aimed to force the Sanusi leadership to comply with their political and military demands.[95] This economic pressure -- the starving of the population -- was used to win specific political goals: the surrender of the rebels and the imposition of a new leadership. However, despite the heavy pressure thus exerted, the Italian and British control of Cyrenaican affairs was not total. The new Sanusi leadership headed by Idris al-Sanusi demanded and won a certain degree of freedom of action so that it would be accepted by and credible to the population.

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At the beginning of the war shortages in food for the population and the army were not felt. The situation worsened as time passed because of the limitations on agricultural work, difficulties in domestic trade and gradual cessation of foreign trade. All this eventually brought about serious food shortages and significant price rises. Since some sections of the population were enriched by the war due to their proximity to foreign elements or their control over economic resources, these sectors were able to pay exorbitant prices for essential goods. This drove prices higher, especially for food and animals. Not only were processed food products, some of them of foreign-make, in short supply, but even essential items were limited or not available. Thus, at times the population and the army had to live on very meagre portions of grains, dates, snails, etc. The hunger which hit the Libyan population aggravated relations between it and the rebel army, weakened the military and political resistance of the rebels and made it easier for foreign elements to interfere and impose their will. Hunger also caused increased sickness and mortality, as well as domestic migration,[96] and this too weakened the resistance movement.

The fighters in Libya needed increasing foreign support, and when it came it was used as a means to exert political-military pressure. During 1912 the inflow was mainly Ottoman. Donations also came from the Moslem world (European organizations supplied mainly medical and not economic support). Since it was the Ottomans who controlled the supplies and their distribution, and since they commanded a well-trained, well-organized and well-equipped army, they were consequently able to keep their senior leadership posts during the Turkish-Italian War. During the inter-war period only meagre and irregular Ottoman support reached Libya and the number of Ottomans who were directly involved in the struggle declined. Foreign support from other sources also dried up. As a result of the almost complete absence of foreigners from the scene of battle and the meagre external support, the interference and influence of foreign elements decreased. Consequently, the political, military and economic control in regions which were not occupied by Italy were in the hands of local leaders. During World War I, Germany supplied most of the external aid but its

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distribution in Libya was controlled by Ottomans and their local proteges. The number of Germans in Libya was small and they had hardly any contact with the population -- of their own choosing. As a result, the influence of the Ottomans and their local supporters increased once again. However, because of the small number of Ottomans who were often at odds with each other, and because cooperation was necessary with the local leadership, the latter managed to maintain a significant degree of freedom of action. Those who found favour with the Ottomans benefitted greatly from this process, more than the Ottomans did themselves. In Cyrenaica, the British and the Italians tried through economic pressure to achieve a similar influence. In the first stage, the British suggested a financial grant to the Sanusis, but their offer was far less than the Ottoman-German support. Thus, before the heavy military blow suffered by the Sanusis following their invasion of Egypt in late-1915, nothing was done. As a result of the closure of the Cyrenaican borders which brought about an economic blockade, the Ottoman-Sanusi defeat in Egypt and a change in the Sanusi leadership, the position and influence of the British significantly increased; Italian influence also grew. These foreign elements controlled the supply routes to the Sanusis, and following the `Akrama Agreements of April 1917 they also provided economic and military aid to the Sanusis and further increased their influence.[97] Simultaneously, Idris al-Sanusi was able to disconnect himself economically, militarily and politically from the Ottomans and strengthen his own position within the Sanusi leadership because the military activity subsided and he had alternative supply sources. Thus, one economic and political dependence was exchanged for antother, and only during the inter-war period was there a certian degree of independence in parts of Libya.

Much of the money that flowed into Libya was concentrated in the hands of a few traditional notables, through whom foreign aid was channelled into Libya.[98] The fact that these leaders controlled the distribution of economic and military aid (part of which often remained in their hands) gave them leverage over the population and strengthened their position in relation to other notables. This process enriched the ruling strata and strengthened their position.

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However, it should be remembered that the Ottomans chose as their local representatives in Libya people who were already accepted as traditional regional leaders and that they did not try to cultivate an artificial leadership. Ottoman support could, of course, strengthen those competitors who had found favour with them. With the exception of misjudging the local support for Sulayman al-Baruni, the Ottomans backed the right leaders and they, for their part, tried to strengthen their personal and tribal positions.

As a result of the inflow of money from numerous sources and trade with various countries, several currencies circulated in Libya in addition to the official Ottoman currency and prices were nominated in different currencies. Although Ottoman, Egyptian and European currencies were in circulation there was at least one attempt to issue a Libyan currency: due to the absence of an adequate amount of coinage in circulation, Enver Bey, when he was the military commander and governor of Cyrenaica during the Turkish-Italian War issued paper money bearing his seal and its value was marked in Arabic and Turkish.[99] These notes aroused Ottoman suspicions that Enver intended to establish an independent state under his leadership, since the minting of coins bearing the ruler's name was one of the marks of sovereignty and rule under Islam.

3. Religion

The struggle against the Italian occupation of Libya was defined by its participants and the Moslem world as a Holy War (Jihad); its participants were holy warriors (ghazi, mujahid). The religious connection between the Ottomans and the Moslem world with Libya was often emphasized as a contact that necessitated mutual responsibility.[100] The Young Turks made the maximum use of the religious Moslem link in the struggle in Libya, in spite of the fact that the Young Turks' official ideology before they reached power stressed secular tendencies. Ruling compulsions brought about the change in the CUP's religious policy, but many Young Turks found it

difficult to bridge the ideological gap and this showed in their daily behaviour. Against this background, numerous conflicts broke out between the local fighters in Libya and the Ottomans and these reached the point where the latter's credibility was brought into doubt.

The status of the Moslem religion in Libya and of the Sanusi order in particular lent increased importance to using religious definitions with regard to the struggle. The Sanusi order was the supreme authority in most of Cyrenaica and had great influence even in parts of Tripolitania and Fezzan in the religious field and in social and economic life, as well as in security and administration. Sanusi support for the struggle from its outset, the urging of Sanusi followers to join the "Holy War", and the integration of Sanusi shaykhs and zawiyahs in the fighting force in close cooperation with the Ottomans were all very significant for the distribution and continuation of the struggle against the Italians. This cooperation was possible only if it was based on a solid common denominator -- Islam. The Ottomans were aware of this issue and especially of Sanusi prestige in Libya and other parts of the Moslem world. Consequently, close relations with the Sanusis were necessary for the Ottomans not only for them to succeed in Libya, but also so that they could use Sanusi influence during World War I for their own imperial needs, to spread the Jihad in Asia and Africa, in word and in deed.

During the struggle against the Italians the Ottomans and the local religious leaders tried to bridge controversies between the Moslem religious orders in Libya. Although the Sanusiya was the biggest and most influential order in Libya and the rest were confined to urban society (which was mainly under Italian occupation) and their influence over the rural and nomad population of the interior was limited, these orders were able to serve as a unifying factor and cooperation with them was vital.[101] The Ibadiyyah, which is a Moslem school and not an order, was of great influence in Jebel Gharbi in Tripolitania. It supported the struggle from the beginning and one of its leaders, Sulayman al-Baruni, was one of the prominent leaders of the rebellion in its first two stages.[102]

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The Italians also stressed religious issues during their invasion which made it easier for the Ottomans and the local population to present the struggle as a Jihad. Much anger was aroused within the Moslem camp by the numerous crosses which were raised in the Italian camp and in Red Cross installations.[103] However, Italy recognized the importance of the Moslem religious factor in Libya and therefore tried to portray itself as sympathetic towards Islam and the Moslem population. The Italian command ordered the troops to ensure that they behaved properly towards the population, not to desecrate mosques and other holy places and not to hurt the religious feelings of the inhabitants. The Italian regime presented the population with presents on religious holidays and senior government officials participated in public religious ceremonies. But the Italians did not hesitate to harm religious customs and Moslem sites when they regarded it as necessary for security reasons. Thus, women were forbidden to walk veiled in public places; this was justified on the grounds that some fighters had disguised themselves as women. In addition, both the Italians and the British destroyed numerous zawiyahs because of their strategic importance in the rebels' military structure. They also confiscated the endowment (waqf) money of zawiyahs and hostile religious bodies.[104] Generally, the local population was not tempted into believing that the Italians really intended to protect Islam as they claimed, and were motivated by political-strategic considerations.

The local population of Libya, though not well-versed in religious issues, was for the most part devout and as a rule fulfilled religious duties as it knew them. Such piety contrasted with the behaviour of most of the Ottoman administrators and troops. This difference in behaviour patterns and belief caused much tension and antagonism and aroused doubts amongst the local population about the true aims of the Young Turks who voiced declarations of religious devoutness but who led an un-Islamic life-style.[105] This difference in behaviour was very evident in many aspects of daily life: prayer, the drinking of alcoholic beverages, the eating of different kinds of meat and its slaughtering, smoking, and fasting on Ramadan. The local population generally kept the religious customs that it knew of whereas many Ottomans publicly disregarded them. However, during visits by

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important local personalities Ottomans used to hide the evidence of their unpious behaviour (such as wine and cigarettes).[106] When the local population disregarded religious precepts it was explained as an exception that should be condemned, even when related to distinguished figures, such as Hilal al-Sanusi.[107] There is evidence that among the local population, and especially within the Sanusi order, the judicial process was based on Islamic law and included the amputation of the hands of thieves and smokers, a punishment which was at times carried out by an expert surgeon.[108] Among the rebels it was customary to hold public prayers. When the camps were in the vicinity of settlements, the local mosque served not only as a place of worship but also as a place for communal gatherings where "War Councils" were sometimes held with the participation of both local leaders and Ottoman commanders.[109] In addition to Sanusi shaykhs who played an active part in the struggle against the Italians, religious personalities, preachers and "holy men" from Libya and the Moslem world visited the rebel camps and incited the fighters to continue their Holy War in defence of Islam in Libya and the Moslem world as a whole.[110]

Islam was an important unifying factor. It was the only common denominator among the rebels and most of their supporters outside Libya. Among the Libyan population Islam was mainly a simple belief, connected with maintaining a traditional life-style and not necessarily based on religious knowledge. Moslem opposition to Christian rule and tribal rejection of the penetration of any external force which intended to rule over the local population and its traditional leadership were the two main reasons in prolonging the struggle for up to twenty years. However, despite the fact that Islam was a unifying factor against the common enemy, it did not suffice to bridge internal divisions. In the region there was a separation between Islam as a unifying factor culturally, socially and in an abstract form politically because of its confrontation with Christianity, and between its temporal power as a political factor abolishing distinctivenes and division on a social, tribal, and linguistic basis which took an independent political expression.

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4. Conclusion

During the struggle against the Italian occupation the Ottoman command and the local Libyan leadership tried to maintain the framework of proper civil life while fighting Italy. The leaders realized that the existence of a solid civilian rear was vital for the continuation of the struggle and for its success because the rebels were dependent economically, socially and militarily on the civil population. The military command understood that the survival of the civilian basis was possible only if proper administration existed in the region. Since the fighters depended on the civilian population it was vital that the latter could live in security, continue its productive activity, and safeguard the education of a new generation as well as the traditional social, cultural and ruling norms, so that both materially and morally the continuation of the struggle would be possible. However, as time passed, it was increasingly difficult to implement these concepts.

Whereas during the Ottoman period (including the Turkish-Italian War) and in regions under Italian rule there was a professional administrative cadre which was assisted by local elements so that it could consolidate and deepen its hold, the administration in the rebel camp was manned almost exclusively by less professional local elements whose primary loyalty was to the family, tribe or religious order, and not to a wider political entity. Furthermore, these elements usually lacked professional qualifications and experience in the field in which they were employed and this harmed administrative efficiency. Because of the decisive tribal composition of Tripolitania it was impossible to establish a wide-scale locally based administration, army and government, and the units which were founded were tribal and regional and at times even hostile to one another. The situation in Cyrenaica was much better, but even there the conflicts within the Sanusi family and between rival tribes hindered common action.

The administrative machinery was employed mainly in tax collection, salary payment, distribution of supplies and internal

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security. As security conditions deteriorated, the economy declined and administrative operations were disrupted: tax collection became occasional and arbitrary, revenues decreased and administrative services became fewer and poorer. In Tripolitania the damage was especially great due to the fierce tribal rivalry. Each tribal leader was not satisfied in winning the struggle against the Italians but also wanted his tribe to overcome his tribal adversaries. They tried to acquire the economic and military resources necessary for these tasks from other tribes by plundering caravans, sown land, pasturage and the workshops of their rivals. These activities further increased internal divisions and the impoverishment of large sections of the population. The Ottoman command tried to slow down this process but encountered many obstacles because of its small number and the fact that it was an external element.

In Cyrenaica, on the other hand, thanks to the traditional loyalty to the Sanusiya and the decisiveness of its leaders, the situation in this respect was better, but even there, junior ranks in the east tried to take advantage of their position to win personal gains. In addition, there was a significant aggravation in relations with the local population following the invasion of Egypt, which necessitated a significant increase in revenues to finance the war effort. Increased mobilization and taxation hastened the impoverishment of the population as well as hostility between various tribal factions and towards the Sanusiya.

Difficulties in launching a united campaign against the external enemy became numerous, especially in the west, and dependence on foreign support increased. Deterioration was also marked in the fields of education and health, with negative repercussions for the mental and physical strength of the fighters and thus, also, for the ability of the rebels to withstand the Italians.

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CONCLUSION

The struggle in Libya erupted in late-1911 as a result of Italy's nationalist-imperialist desires into which were interwoven economic, social and religious factors. No action by the Ottomans or the local population of Libya could have changed Italy's decision to rule Libya as a first step towards the realization of its global designs. In spite of Italy's hopes, the occupation of Libya and the shift in the focus of Italian public opinion towards foreign affairs did not solve its fundamental domestic problems; the prolonged war added to them. Italian planning was completely mistaken in its evaluation of the anticipated reaction of the local population to their occupation: the source of the local opposition in Libya to Ottoman rule resulted from the rejection of any external supreme authority; this opposition did not, however, imply automatic support for the enemies of the Ottomans, as the Italians believed. The basis of the resistance movement in Libya was the local opposition to subordination to any external supreme authority. To this general feeling was added what was, in effect, the Italians' main defect in comparison with the Ottomans: their origin and religion. Because of their European origin, the Italians were different from the population of Libya culturally, linguistically and in their way of life and thinking. The existence of a small European minority in Libya prior to the Italian invasion was viewed on a different footing as long as it was involved only in economic and cultural affairs and did not seek political participation or even supremacy. The religious contrast -- Christianity against Islam -- a priori ruled out a voluntary surrender by Libya's population to Italy, especially not in those regions where the prominent Moslem religious order -- the Sanusiya -- acted as a government to all intents and purposes. Despite the fact that during this period the first appearances of nationalism became evident in the Middle East, the basic consciousness in Libya continued to be religious and tribal-regional. For this reason the struggle in Libya

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was conducted and grew on two levels; the ideological level, or Moslem opposition to Christian rule; and the day-to-day practical level of tribal and regional opposition to any external supreme authority. This two-pronged approach made unity of aim and action, as well as internal integrity, very difficult tasks during the whole period of the insurrection. Different factors pulled in both directions. However, being an early twentieth century Middle Eastern struggle against European occupation, the campaign developed new structures and means of reaction in Libya and the Ottoman, Arab and Moslem worlds.

Islam as a political factor was very much in evidence during the war in Libya. The struggle in turn gave added urgency and substance to this trend. Islam was the link best understood by most of the population and as a result much use was made of the religious element. Thus, the Moslem world outside the Ottoman Empire hurried to assist Libya, a Moslem region under the threat of Christian occupation. The political use of Islam in this war was, in a sense, the forerunner of its more widespread exploitation during World War I when a special Ottoman organization for pan-Islamic policy and warfare was set up. Whereas in Libya, and in Cyrenaica in particular, the Islamic argument had great ideological and sentimental value, its use by Ottoman politicians in Young Turk circles was purely political because of its tremendous hold on the masses inside and outside the Empire, and not because of their belief in it. The exploitation of religion for political purposes was of considerable weight as long as it was backed by a strong political entity. This tendency had a significant bearing on the support of the Moslem world for Libya as long as the Ottomans were directly involved in the struggle. With the Ottomans' declared departure in late-1912 -- even if in practice the total break came only in 1919 -- Moslem support almost completely ceased. During World War I, when the massive Ottoman involvement was renewed and the Islamic issue again took on prominence, actual support from the rest of the Moslem world was, however, insignificant. This period was marked by an Ottoman focus on rekindling the insurrection in Libya and on realising their imperial goals, including their attempts to extend their rule in Egypt, Sudan and the Maghreb. As a result, moral support from the Moslem world for Libya was forthcoming, but it was not

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translated into military, economic or political action. Each Moslem community was preoccupied with struggles in its own region, and there was little participation in the campaigns of co-religionists. The religious factor had a great hold over the fighters in Libya and influenced their preparedness to cooperate with the Ottomans — which until the Italian invasion had been regarded as an alien force -- and during the rebellion much stress was laid on the unifying religious aspect. This connection gradually became transformed into a politically unbinding religious affinity: the local population in Libya was ready to cooperate with external Moslem elements and to receive their economic and military support, but persistently refused to return to a condition of political subordination to a foreign state, until this was forced upon it by a stronger power.

Until the last days of its existence, the Ottoman Empire continued to feel a responsibility towards Libya, even when its ability to assist the resistance was limited for political and military reasons. The personal ties between the leaders of the Empire and local Libyan leaders also contributed to this feeling of obligation. This is shown mainly during attempts to bring about an Ottoman imperialist renewal during World War I and even in the early days of the Turkish Republic. This connection was one of the reasons behind the strengthening of the religious tendency in the policy of the Young Turks before 1914, although the CUP leaders themselves did not follow an Islamic life-style. Furthermore, despite the fundamental change which occurred following the foundation of the Turkish Republic, attempts were made in its early days to benefit politically from the religious and Arab ties which had been established thanks to the Ottoman involvement in Libya. In order to draw Moslem and Arab elements nearer to his policy, the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, sought the aid of Ahmad al-Sharif, the exiled Sanusi leader and a friend of the Turks. However, due to Atatürk's decision to cut Turkey off from the Moslem and Arab worlds in order to advance it on a Western-secular path, this idea was abandoned. Nevertheless, the common struggle of Ottomans and Libyans left a deep impression in both Turkey and Libya, and memories of it surface

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occasionally, accompanied by political declarations and economic undertakings.

The spark of struggle flickered for a period of twenty years in the various regions of Libya. The final departure of the Ottomans in 1919 contributed to the growing isolation of the fighters. The Ottoman defeat in World War I and the foundation of the Turkish Republic brought about a Turkish concentration, at first accepted under duress but later willingly and on principle, in the territory of Turkey itself, and no attempt was made to realize imperialist goals in non-Turkish regions. After the Turkish Republic decided that state and religion should be separated, the idea that it was obligatory for Turkey to assist Moslems wherever they were in their military and political struggles against the Christian enemy was abandoned. The isolation of Libya increased also because of Egypt's separation from the Ottoman Empire in late-1914 and this made direct links difficult between the Moslem world and the rebels since there had already been European rule to the west and south of Libya.

The Italian invasion of Libya raised fears within the Ottoman leadership that a blow at the Arab element in Libya might bring an insurrection by Arab elements in the rest of the Empire. This evaluation was based on an awareness of the beginnings of the Arab national movement who strived to disconnect itself from foreign rule. It was feared that this movement might increase its activity because of the feeling that the Ottomans were not struggling vehemently and energetically enough to defend an Arab province threatened by Christian occupation. At the beginning of the struggle, expressions of nationalism in general and Arab nationalism in particular were not in vogue in Libya. The struggle in Libya, however, aroused the interest of the inhabitants of other Arab regions who were ready to volunteer and help. Within a short while, the struggle in Libya was being presented in the Arab world as part of the general Arab struggle for independent rule. Attempts to establish in Libya political entities of various dimensions and forms were regarded by Arab nationalists as the early manifestations of Arab sovereignty. During World War I the British preferred to support the Arab national movement as a

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political-military factor in the Arabian Peninsula and northwards, but not in Libya. The British decision did not stem from the fact that the leadership in the east was superior politically or friendlier, but rather because the British intended to use this element against its enemies in the war, who were in the east (the Ottomans) and not in the west (the Italians and the French). From this political objective resulted the difference in the attitude of the British towards the Hashemites in contrast to the Sanusis, despite the fact that they had friendly relations with both groups. They supported the Sanusis too, but on a much more limited scale, after exerting pressure for a change in the Sanusi leadership. The British encouraged the political and expansionist tendencies of the Hashemites by providing money, equipment and training as well as what can be interpreted as official recognition of their independence; but they tried to curb the Sanusis, subordinate them to a European power, to disarm them and to undermine the zawiyah network. The Sanusi knew about the "Arab Revolt" led by Sharif Husayn of Mecca, who was assisted by a few former Ottoman officers of Arab origin, a number of whom had previously served with the Sanusis before being captured by the British during the invasion of Egypt. Some of the Sanusis strived to obtain similar British support and even to cooperate with the Arab movement in the east in order to liberate themselves within the framework of the liberation of the whole Arab nation. The British attitude to different population groups and their leaders in the Middle East, and its results, indicate that the Powers' policies during World War I and afterwards had a direct and significant influence on the immediate political realization of Arab nationalism to an even greater degree than the ambitions and qualifications of these leaders and the populations. When independent states and mandatory areas were established in the Arab Middle East in the post-war period, their inhabitants were preoccupied with their own internal affairs or were handicapped because of European control and, as a result, did not hurry to aid a distant group of Arab brothers struggling desperately against foreign rule. However, the insurrection in Libya continued to bother the Arab and Moslem worlds and support for it there did not cease albeit on the declarative, ceremonial and moral levels. This struggle, and Italian policy in Libya, caused severe doubts about the Arab world's relations

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with Italy during the period between the two World Wars and these contacts worsened due to the way in which the rebellion was crushed.

The gradual Ottoman abandonment of its direct involvement in Libya led to the strenthening of the local leadership in those regions which were not captured by the Italians. This area had been under Arab and Berber leadership since 1913, independent of any external power. There had been some attempts to establish an independent centralized government, even if in each province separately, though the Sanusis aimed to expand their authority to the west. These, in fact, were among the first twentieth-century independent Arab political entities that gave expression to their nationalist aspirations. Their achievements, however, were few, the duration of their existence short and they did not win international recognition. On the contrary, part of Europe ignored them and others hurried to destroy them. Nevertheless, as long as these regimes existed — both the Tripolitanian state and the Sanusi leadership — the neighbouring states and the European powers ruling there, especially Italy and Britain, had to negotiate with them and recognize, albeit temporarily, their authority over the territories and the population under their control. The local leadership was strengthened by the additional responsibilities it took upon itself in the administrative and military fields. Simultaneously, basic divisive factors continued to hinder the establishment of an overall unified feeling in Libya as a whole or at least in large districts. Similarly, a national feeling did not develop in regional areas (that is, Tripolitanian, Cyrenaican, or Fezzani) nor across Libya as a whole. Loyalty was, as in the past, to the family, tribe, association of tribes or religious organization, although the Sanusiya temporarily succeeded in extending its penetration in the west by exploiting tribal rivalries. At times some wider associations than had been customary were established, and they aimed at a mutual goal, but the traditional centrifugal tendencies were stronger than the readiness to unite and the negative mutual motivation -- the struggle against an external force — was not alone enough to create genuine oneness.

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Although the population of Libya was aware of the existence of governments and states ruling over wide districts, most of the population of the Libyan interior lived only for a short time under this kind of administration. Until the late-Ottoman period, the centres of government were on the coast and were hardly ever felt in the interior. Also, on the eve of the Italian invasion, Ottoman administration was not strong in the hinterland and large sections of it at the lower levels were manned by local figures who usually came from the strong families of the districts. Hence, the concepts of nationalism and statehood were foreign to most of the population.

The fact that the tribes and their leaders were eager to extend their authority at the expense of other tribes does not mean that they felt they had anything in common with these tribes. Consequently, tribalism and regionalism were the only meaningful political concepts to most of the population of the interior; the more abstract concepts of Islam and Ottomanism were not seen as being politically binding. Only a few leaders who came into closer contact with Ottoman and Western politics and ideas, or with some non-Libyan nationalists who were attracted to that country, were better versed in nationalist theory and wanted to implement it in Libya, or parts of it. Only these few leaders, as well as Arab leaders outside Libya, had nationalist goals in the struggle against Italian occupation. For the masses the driving force was the traditional desire to get rid of an external rule, and Christian at that, and let the tribe lead an independent life. Although the Cyrenaican tribes recognized the overall Sanusi authority, this was generally not viewed in national but religious terms. Only at a later period did some Sanusi leaders acquire some nationalist ideas, but even they regarded themselves first and foremost as a religious order.

There were three components in the struggle in Libya: the Italians, the Ottomans and the local population. The first to abandon the campaign were the Ottomans, whose involvement had come about mainly from imperialist designs and not from any special link to Libya. They wanted to protect the integrity and territory of the Empire and fulfill their role as protectors of the "Realm of Islam"

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and consequently to continue to be considered as the paramount Islamic state. Their abandonment of Libya, even if not total, was caused by grave military and political difficulties in more important regions at the centre of the Empire. These problems brought about the Ottoman defeat at the end of World War I and with it the final departure from Libya as well as the creation of a new political concept of a homogeneous Turkish state. The latter no longer felt responsible for non-Turks outside of Turkey. The Italians aimed to unite a nation and establish an empire. In order to achieve this goal, they wanted Libya. Their struggle was much more difficult and lengthy than their leaders, statesmen and ideologues had thought because of the stubborn resistance of the Libyan population to the Italian occupation, and due to a temporary absence of economic and military resources for the Italian war effort during World War I. As a result, there was during this period a temporary withdrawal of Italian rule over Libya, but gradual conquest of Libya was renewed after the end of World War I when Italy was able to use a large and combined military force. However, the political, social and economic goals which Italy wanted to achieve by occupying Libya did not materialize: Italy did not become a first-rate power, the war did not increase its social integrity and Italian emigration to Libya never displaced emigration to America. Furthermore, Libya was occupied by Britain and France in 1943 and in 1952 Libya became an independent Arab state. Thus, the short duration of Italian peaceful rule over Libya, during which it was not preoccupied in security affairs (namely, the 1930s), further restricted the advantages which Italy could derive from its rule. Whereas at the beginning of the period the Italian invasion was made possible due to backing from other European powers, its removal from Libya was due to its belonging to the defeated camp at that time, and not as a result of the demands of the local population or a successful rebellion. The population in Libya was subdued, and only political exiles, operating mainly from Egypt, continued the struggle on a limited scale. The Arab political struggle in post-1943 Libya and the establishment of other Arab states, were important factors in the UN decision not to let Italy return to Libya.

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The local element in Libya was divided and internal rivalries made the attainment of the mutual goal -- the removal of foreign rule -- very difficult. The establishment of independent rule over the whole country was indeed the desire of many leaders, but the absence of inter-tribal and inter-regional cooperation prevented the realization of this goal at the time. The success of the struggle was conditional on coordination between all the components of the struggling elements, as well as the existence of economic, military and human resources, including an appropriate leadership. As long as the Italian enemy was busy at another distant front, the local inhabitants achieved many results, some quite impressive, but not for long. During the later years under discussion, the Italians were not free to act as they pleased because of the war in Europe, while the population of Libya benefited from the support of external elements: the Ottomans, the Arab and Moslem worlds, and the Germans. With the termination of World War I the situation completely changed, and Italy was able to direct all its efforts towards Libya, while the local population had almost no external support. In such a situation the differences between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica became even more evident than before: the occupation of the former was relatively swift due to its social, political and economic structure, while in the latter the struggle was lengthy and attritional because of the internal integrity which was achieved thanks to the Sanusi leadership, even when it was headed by a hesitant leader, Idris al-Sanusi, who was absent from the region for most of the period.

The Sanusiya, which had started out as a religious order with social and economic characteristics, turned into a mainly political and military factor. Its defeat in these latter fields in the struggle against Italy had long-term implications for its hold over the population of Libya. As a purely religious order it could have survived, even if it had lost many of its temporal holds. As a political-military entity its fate was decided according to the same criteria upon which political organizations are judged. The power of the Sanusiya in Libya decreased during the 1930s following mass killings, the prohibition of Sanusi activity, the destruction of numerous zawiyahs, and the confiscation of their property (including waqf).

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Small numbers continued their political strugle in exile. Sanusi zawiyahs outside Libya continued to exist, but on a much smaller scale; the network became loose and the leadership was hardly felt. When the United Kingdom of Libya was established in 1952 under Idris al-Sanusi the effect of this severe deterioration in Sanusi integrity and hold over the population was not immediately felt politically; this deterioration contributed, however, to the defeat of the order in the long run and the consolidation of a new regime with a new basis following the revolution of Mu`ammar al-Qadhdhafi in 1969.

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NOTES*

INTRODUCTION

1. On the Ottoman Empire in the period preceeding the Italian invasion of Libya see the works of Ahmad, Lewis and Shaw.

2. Ali & Ahmed, pp. 30-36, 87-129, PRO, the Counsul in Tripoli to the Embassy in Istanbul, 8 July 1909, FO 160/26; ASD, the Ministry of War to the Foreign Office, Rome, 11 April 1912, SP, 13; Nuri & Naci, tables opposite p. 8.

3. On the tribal structure see especially the works of Agostini on Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, Peters; Evans-Pritchard; Johnson, 1973; Admiralty, Handbook, pp. 39-51; Sforza, pp. 87-181; Palumbo, pp. 9-15.

4. King, pp. 252-270; Ali & Ahmed, pp. 31-33; Cami, pp. 48-49; Admiralty, Handbook, pp. 51-54.

5. Sforza, pp. 124-139; Admiralty, Handbook, pp. 42-44.

6. See the works of Depois; Fuad, pp. 68-71; Johnson, 1973, pp. 49-52; Abul Muzaffer, pp. 33-34.

7. See Chapter Three below.

8. On the trans-Saharan trade see the works of Baier; Cordell; Johnson, 1976; Mu`in.

9. On the economic activities of the Sanusiya, see below.

10. Simon, Jews.

11. On the Italian penetration, see below.

12. Among the important works on the Sanusiya are those by Ziadeh; Italy, Sanusiya; Duveyrier; Acquaviva; Hachaichi; Depont & Coppolani, pp. 569-571; PRO, the Consulate in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 7 January 1920, FO 371/3813 (a translation of an Italian survey on the Sanusiya); An appendix on the Sanusiya, Cairo, 8 May 1914, FO 371/1965; Chanler Report, December

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* Sources are referred to by their author's name, unless otherwise indicated in the bibliography.

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1915, FO, 371/2354; MacDonnell Report, September 1918, FO 371/3805; ASD, Note on the Sanusiya, Cairo, 5 April 1905, SP, 4.

13. See especially Ziadeh, pp. 73-98; Andrews; Trimingham, pp. 119-120.

14. See n. 13 above and Depont & Coppolani, pp. 554-556; Evans-Pritchard, p. 6 notes that coffee was not forbidden, but was not customary among the Libyan Bedouin. Forbes, passim, mentions the drinking of coffee during the trip to Kufra in 1922.

15. Chèmali, pp. 62-63; King, pp. 254-255; Dupree, Arabs, pp. 114-115.

16. Ziadeh, pp. 51, 119; Duveyrier, p. 19.

17. Ziadeh, pp. 118-122; Duveyrier, pp. 4, 8; Evans-Pritchard, p. 5.

18. Italy, Sanusiya, pp. 121-124; PRO, An appendix from 15 December 1919, FO 371/3813.

19. Italy, Sanusiya, pp. 121-124; Ziadeh, pp. 116-119; Duveyrier, pp. 10-12.

20. Ziadeh, p. 120; Duveyrier, pp. 11-12; ASD, the Agency in Cairo to the Foreign Office, 5 April 1905, SP, 4; PRO, the Chanler Report, December 1915, FO 371/2354; appendix from 15 December 1919, FO 371/3813.

21. Bevione, p. 79; Lapworth, pp. 187-188; Bennet, pp. 26-27; Ziadeh, pp. 105-106; McCullagh, p. 327; Sabah, 29 February 1912; BBA, BEO, no. 290408, Dahiliye to Sedaret, 9 Mart 1327 [22 March 1911], including a report from the Governor of Benghazi.

22. Ziadeh, pp. 113-116; Evans-Pritchard, pp. 16-22; Duveyrier, pp. 21-50; Depont & Coppolani, p. 559; Hassanein, 1924, pp. 282-289.

23. Evans-Pritchard, pp. 10-11.

24. Italy, Sanusiya, p. 226; Evans-Pritchard, Waqf, pp. 844-845.

25. See n. 24 above and Evans-Pritchard, pp. 116-117; Şahbandar Zade, pp. 3-7, 42-44; Ziadeh, Libya, pp. 72-73.

26. Ziadeh, pp. 17, 113; Duveyrier, pp. 16-17; Evans-Pritchard, pp. 16, 22; Hassanein, 1924, pp. 279-289; Lapworth, pp. 132, 187-188.

27. Qub`ayn, p. 80; Feraud, p. 443; Lapworth, pp. 185-188 Times, 15 April 1911, 28 September 1911, 6 September 1913; ASD, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 14 September 1901, SP, 2.

28. Shukri, I, p. 88; Andrews, p. 122; PRO, Chanler Report, December 1915, FO 371/2354.

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29. Ziadeh, pp. 61-64; Evans-Pritchard, pp. 91-92; ASD, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 8 December 1905, SP, 4; BBA, Yıldız, Temuz 1310 [July 1894], no. 30-64-51-78; BBA, BEO no. 227986, Sedaret to Dahiliye, 10 Şubat 1325 [23 February 1910].

30. PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 27 June 1908, FO 371/554.

31. Italy, Sanusiya, pp. 184-189; Ziadeh, pp. 63-64; Sadık.

32. Ziadeh, pp. 62-64; PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 15 March 1908, FO 371/540.

33. Feraud, p. 443; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 30 October 1909, FO 160/26; ASD, the Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 18 December 1909, SP, 6; Times, 28 September 1911, 29 March 1912.

34. PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Embassy in Istabul, 18 August 1910, FO 195/2336.

35. Times, 15 April 1911; ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office 11 April 1911 and the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 24 May 1911, SP, 24.

36. ASD, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 7 May 1911, SP, 7.

37. ASD, the Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 26 May 1911, SP, 7; Tanın, 12, 13 August 1911.

38. Rossi, pp. 322-323; Nuri & Naci, pp. 66-67; Ali & Ahmed, pp. 33-44; Cachia, passim; Fuad, pp. 31-32, 44-50. For the administrative division see also the Salname s (yearbooks) of the Empire.

39. ASD, the Dragoman in Cairo to the Foreign Office, 24 June 1901, SP, 3; the Consul in Benghazi to the Vali in Tripoli, 19 April 1907, SP, 5; Dajani, pp. 161, 171-172; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Embassy in Istanbul, a copy of a letter from early December 1909, FO 160/26.

40. Ziadeh, pp. 28-29; ASD, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 5 January 1909, SP, 6; the Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 26 March 1909, SP, 6.

41. Milliyet, 14 September 1934; İttihad-i İslam, 5 March 1909.

42. The Italian and British consuls sent copies of several petitions during 1907-8; Dajani, p. 170.

43. Dajani, pp. 180-181; ASD, Report of 24 July 1911 quoting the local journal Taraqqi, 13 July 1911, SP, 13.

44. Hikmet, 8 Nisan 1326 [21 April 1910]; BBA, BEO, Sedaret to Dahiliye, no. 295363, 6 Eylul 1327 [19 September 1911).

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45. Dajani, pp. 436-438; ASD, the Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 2 February 1910, SP, 7.

46. Feraud, p. 443; Rossi, pp. 348-349; Minutilli, pp. 93-94.

47. See above on the Sanusiya and the Ottoman authorities.

48. Italy, Sanusiya, pp. 184-189, ASD, the Vice-Consul in Benghazi to the Consul in Tripoli, 11 September 1905, SP, 4.

49. Dajani, pp. 206-208; Kohn-Abrest, pp. 35-36; For the budget of 1900 See ASD, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 11, October, 23 November 1911, SP, 3.

50. Dajani, pp. 152-153; Baruni, p. 30; BBA, MVM, vol. 152, 8 Mayıs 1327 [21 May 1903], no. 155; ASD, the Vice-Consul in Benghazi to the Consul in Tripoli, 16 November 1903, SP, 4; the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 30 March 1904, SP, 4.

51. Dajani, p. 154; Lapworth, pp. 48-51; Higgid Mordecai, pp. 170-174; ASD, the Vice-Consul in Benghazi to the Consul in Tripoli, 11 September 1905, SP, 4.

52. ASD, the Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 16 March 1911, SP, 17.

53. ASD, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 24 May 1911, SP, 17.

54. Shukri, II, pp. 395-396; Fuad, p. 49; ASD, the Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 29 April 1911, SP, 17.

55. Dajani, pp. 152-153.

56. ASD, the Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 29 April 1911, SP, 17.

57. Dajani, pp. 209-210.

58. Ostler, p. 227; ASD, the Counsellor in Benghazi to the Consul in Tripoli, 22 March 1897, SP, 2.

59. Higgid Mordecai, pp. 158, 169; Rossi, pp. 319-325.

60. Abbott, p. 173; Bevione, pp. 60-61; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Embassy in Istanbul, 7 February, 17 March 1911, FO 160/28; the representative of the Eastern Telegraph Co. in Tripoli to its representative in Istanbul, 28 March 1910, FO 141/634.

61. Dajani, p. 168; Higgid Mordecai, pp. 158-161; Vischer, pp. 27-30, 146-150; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Embassy in Istanbul, 26 June 1910, FO 160/27.

62. Higgid Mordecai, p. 158; Rossi, p. 320; Simon, Europe, pp. 74-75; Dajani, pp. 173-174; Baruni, pp. 10-57. For translations from the Arabic Tripolitanian press in 1911 see ASD, SP, 17.

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63. Griffiths, pp. 27-28, 73-80; Swanson, pp. 91-94; Karal, pp. 355-357.

64. AA, Report by the Military Attaché in Vienna, 29 September 1911, Türkei 202/2; MA, Report by the Naval Attaché in Rome, 5 December 1911, RM 5/V 1040; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Embassy in Istanbul, 11 March 1910, FO 195/2336.

65. Cooke, pp. 50-53; BBA, Iradeler, Harbiye, no. 620, Cumadelula 1329 [April/May 1911], no. 54; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Embassy in Istanbul, 13, 30 June 1908, FO 195/2271; 24, 29 December 1910, FO 160/28.

66. Griffiths, pp. 73-74, 79, 102-103, 107-108, 177; Sforza, p. 124, 156-158; Naci, pp. 29-30, 53; BBA, Iradeler, Askeriye, no. 2664, Ramazan 1328 [September/October 1910], no. 7; Yıldız, no. 14-331-126-8, Report of Mir Alay Hüseyn Hüsni Paşa, 25 Ağustos 1302 [6 September 1886]; no. 14-308-126-7, Report of Vali Ahmed Rasim Paşa, 3 Mayıs 1307 [15 May 1891].

67. BBA, Yıldız, no. 14-388-126-9, Report of Vali Nazıf Paşa, 1881.

68. PRO, An official Ottoman order, 13 Şubat 1307 [25 February 1892], FO 160/92. Numerous reports on this issue are to be found in ASD, years 1897-1908, SP 2, 3, 6; Higgid Mordecai, pp. 170-188; Dajani, pp. 143-144.

69. On the conscription in 1911 there are numerous reports in ASD, SP, 17; Higgid Mordecai, pp. 185, 340-342.

70. Swanson, pp. 129-130; PRO, Report of the Military Attaché in Istanbul, 13 November 1911, FO 371/1258.

71. BBA, BEO, no. 291984, Sedaret to Harbiye, 3 Mayıs 1327 [16 May 1911].

72. Presland, passim.

73. ASD, Report of the Naval Attaché in Istanbul, 2 September 1911, SP, 13.

74. Griffiths, p. 70; Swanson, pp. 21-22.

75. ASD, Report of the Military Attaché in Istanbul, 6 January 1908, SP, 5; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Embassy in Istanbul, 7 May 1911, FO 195/2365; Baruni, pp. 208-209; Abbott, pp. 43, 251-252; Griffin, pp. 158-160; Roncagli, pp. 136-144; Galli, pp. 81-86; Times, 26-29 September 1911; The Istanbul press, October 1911.

76. ASD, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 17 February 1909, SP, 26; Milliyet, 14, 15 September 1934.

77. Rossi, pp. 319-320; McCullagh, pp. 48-51; Melli, pp. 24-25. Numerous details in MA, files RM 3/2 4327, RM 3/v 2437.

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78. Alpagot, pp. 1-16, 71-73, 78-81; Dav'er; Halpern, p. 193.

79. Dav'er, p. 1535; Tuğrul, p. 79; Halpern, passim.

80. Devereux, pp. 123-126, 135-153, 265, 272; Rossi, p. 328.

81. PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 30 September 1908, FO 371/559; 19 November 1908, FO 160/25; Ziadeh, p. 32; Ziadeh, Barqah, pp. 76-77.

82. Salname, 1327, p. 101; Dajani, pp. 170-171; Shukri, II, pp. 427-428; British and Italian consular reports.

83. Tanın, April-May 1912.

84. Simon, 1908.

85. ASD, the Vali of Triplitania to the Mutasarrıf of Cyrenaica, 8 June 1907 (translation), SP, 21; PRO, References to previous declarations concerning the border, 9 June 1914, FO 371/1967; the occupation of Solum: Kitchener to the Foreign Office Cairo, 7 November 1911, FO 371/1256.

86. Rossi, pp. 322-323.

87. Martel, passim; BBA, MVM, vol. 155, 18 Temuz 1327 [31 July 1911], no. 359 includes the names of the members of the Ottoman demarcation committee.

88. PRO, Kitchener to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 17 April 1914, FO 371/1967; Bennet, p. 17.

89. Cayci, passim; Collins, passim; Şahbandar Zade, pp. 80-102; Hikmet, 14 Nisan 1327 [27 April 1911].

90. Barclay, 1912, pp. 11-12.

91. Barclay, 1912, pp. 14-25; Cunsolo, pp. 188, 192; Askew, p. 56.

92. Barclay, 1912, pp. 12-24; Askew, pp. 24-25.

93. Gregory; Askew, pp. 7-8, 32, 41; BBA, MVM, vol. 154, 9 Temuz 1327 [22 July 1911], no. 345; ASD, the Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 28 April 1911, SP, 17.

94. Askew, pp. 28-29, 36-46; McCullagh, pp. 14-23; Malgeri, p. 30.

95. Askew, pp. 10-11, 29, 43-47.

96. Barclay, 1912, p. 40; PRO, Annual Report, 1908, Istanbul, FO 371/768.

97. PRO, ibid; McCullagh, p. 23; ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 11 January 1911, SP, 17.

98. Askew, pp. 29, 42; Simon, Europe, pp. 74-75.

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99. Askew, p. 51.

100. Cunsolo, p. 192.

101. Ibid, p. 193; Askew, p. 53.

102. Askew, pp. 43, 54, 59-60; Gottlieb, pp. 179-180; Salomone, p. 76.

103. Maltese, passim; Askew, pp. 24-39, 55.

104. Rouard, pp. 21-22, 45-49; Seymour, p. 218; Solmi, p. 228; Askew, p. 19; AA, the Ambassador in Rome to the Chancellor, 14 October 1911, Tripolis 1/12.

105. PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Italian Foreign Minister, 11 March 1902, Cab. 37/107/112; PRO, the Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Paris, 14 May 1914, FO 371/1967; Times, 3, 15, 23 November 1911; Askew, pp. 20-21.

106. Askew, pp. 15-16, 39.

107. Ibid, p. 21.

108. Ibid, pp. 21-22; Solmi, p. 231; Times, 27 September 1911.

109. Askew, pp. 41-48; Solmi, p. 231.

110. Askew, pp. 49-50; PRO, the Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Rome, 28 July 1911, Cob. 37/107/112.

111. Askew, p. 50; Cunsolo, pp. 187-188.

112. Askew, pp. 56-57.

113. Ibid, p. 52.

114. Ibid, p. 53.

115. Ibid, p. 61-62.

116. Ibid, pp. 30-39, 51-52; Barclay, 1912, p. 54.

117. Askew, p. 55; McCullagh, pp. 320-324; PRO, Report of the Military Attaché, Istanbul, 13 November 1911, FO 371/1258.

118. Askew, p. 57. Irace, pp. 3-4; Times, 25 September 1911; ASD, the Italian Foreign Minister to the Ottoman Government, 23 September 1911, SP, 7.

119. Askew, p. 58; PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 25 September 1911, FO 371/1251; Times, 27, 28 September 1911.

120. Askew, pp. 57-58.

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121. Times, 27 September 1911, citing the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris.

122. AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 29 September 1911, Türkei 202/2; Times, 29, 30 September 1911; Askew, pp. 60-61; Himmet Zade, pp. 28-29.

123. Askew, p. 32.

124. Barclay, 1912, pp. 109-111; Times, 28, 29 September 1911.

125. Barclay, 1912, pp. 111-112.

126. Ibid, pp. 112-113; Times, 30 September 1911.

127. Barclay, 1912, pp. 114-119.

128. Ibid, pp. 119-122; Times, 30 September 1911.

CHAPTER ONE: OTTOMAN POLITICAL STANDS REGARDING THE WAR IN LIBYA

1. On this period see in the works of Ahmad, Lewis and Shaw. For a detailed study of the European policies towards the war, see Childs.

2. AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 11 September 1911, Türkei 202/1.

3. AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 30 September 1911, Türkei 202/2.

4. Sabah, 25 February 1912.

5. PRO, Annual Report, 1912, Istanbul, FO 371/1812.

6. AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 19 October 1911, Türkei 202/4.

7. PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 27 May 1912, FO 371/1525.

8. DBA, the Chargé d'Affaires in Rome to the Foreign Office, 28 August 1911, 638 S.

9. AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 29 September 1911, Türkei 202/2.

10. Sirri, passim; Menteşe in Cumhuriyet, 20, 21 October 1946; Bayar, II, pp. 484-487; Talat, p. 17; Izzet, pp. 133-135.

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11. Le Moniteur Oriental, 13 September 1911.

12. Ibid, 23 September 1911.

13. Servet-i Funun, 15 Eylul 1327 [28 September 1911], p. 456.

14. Qub`ayn, pp. 55-65.

15. Ibid, p. 63.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid, pp. 63-64.

18. AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 19 October 1911, Türkei 202/4.

19. Mentes.

20. Qub`ayn, pp. 61-62.

21. Le Moniteur Oriental, 30 September 1911.

22. Qub`ayn, p. 62.

23. Talat, pp. 40-41; Tanın, 14 April 1945. The third was Hayri Bey.

24. Le Moniteur Oriental, 19 October 1911.

25. Qub`ayn, pp. 32-33; Yalman, pp. 106-107; Adıvar, p. 303; Sadi; AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Chancellor, 6 August 1912, Türkei 201/7.

26. Ertuğrul, pp. 82 ff.

27. Qub`ayn, pp. 55-65.

28. Ibid, pp. 56-57; Ertuğrul, p. 92; Mithat, pp. 237-238.

29. Dav'er, p. 1535; Izzet, pp. 135-141; AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Chancellor, 6 August 1912 Türkei 201/7.

30. Qub`ayn, pp. 58-59.

31. See above in the Introduction, on military manpower.

32. Qub`ayn, p. 59. See above in the Introduction.

33. See above in the Introduction, on local conscription.

34. Qub`ayn, pp. 60-61.

35. See Chapter Two.

36. Qub`ayn, p. 60. See above in the Introduction, on armaments.

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37. Qub`ayn, p. 60. See above in the Introduction, on fortification.

38. Qub`ayn, p. 64.

39. Yalman, p. 111; Bareilles, pp. 209-210, 260-261; Le Moniteur Oriental, 11 April 1912; AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 22 April 1911, Türkei 198.

40. Tanın, 27 January 1912, Ertuğrul, p. 28.

41. Tanın, 30 September, 3 October 1911.

42. Enver, pp. 10, 95; Yeni İkdam, 7 November 1911.

43. Beyan-ul-Hak, 14 Zulkade 1329 [6 November 1911], pp. 2416-2418.

44. Numerous reports on Ottoman Islamic propaganda and reactions to it are to be found in DBA.

45. e.g. Tanın, 27 October 1911.

46. Abbott, pp. 120-121.

47. McCullagh, pp. 42-43.

48. Tanın, 19 April, 17 May 1912.

49. Yeni İkdam, 2 October, 1 November 1911.

50. Sabah, 6 October 1911, 4 September 1912.

51. e.g. Sabah, 27 September 1911; İktiham, 5 May 1912.

52. Sabah, 30 June 1912.

53. PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 4 December 1911, FO 371/1259; Ahmad, pp. 93, 153.

54. PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 30 December 1911, FO 371/1524.

55. PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 27 May 1912, FO 371/1525.

56. Gooch & Temperley, IX, p. 360.

57. DDF, Ser. 3, III, pp. 305-306.

58. Bayar, II, pp. 461 ff. On the Arab Bloc, see also Ahmad, p. 153; Tanın, 15, 27 March 1911. On the CUP and the Arabs: Sabah, 16 September 1912; Times 9 April 1912.

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59. DDF, Ser. 3, III, pp. 333, 336. PRO, FO 371/1538 has many reports on the Italian and Ottoman positions.

60. Kinross, pp. 47, 51-53.

61. The Ottoman Minister of War, Mahmud Şevket Paşa mentions in his diary on 6 Şubat 1328 [19 February 1913] conflicts between Mustafa Kemal and Enver since the war in Libya. See Hayat, 14 January 1965, p. 14.

62. Times, 10 October 1911.

63. PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 14 October 1911, FO 371/1254.

64. PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 24 October 1911, FO 371/1255.

65. MA, Report on the war, 23-29 October 1911, RMS/1.

66. Hayat, 21 January 1965, p. 16; Ahmet Muhtar Paşa, p. 2.

67. AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 2 October 1911, Türkei 202 2/1.

68. AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 10 October 1911, Türkei 202/4.

69. AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 13 October 1911, Türkei 202/4; MA, Log book of "Loreley", at anchor in Istanbul, 15 October 1911, RM 5/v.

70. DDF, Ser. 3, IV, p. 127.

71. PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 25 December 1911, FO 371/1524.

72. PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 10 June 1912, FO 371/1525.

73. DBA, Grand Vezir to the Ambassadors, 29 September 1911 639 S/48; Yeni İkdam, 4 October 1911.

74. DBA, Foreign Minister to the Ambassadors, 2, 6, 7 November 1911, 639 S/50; DDF, Ser. 3, I, pp. 57-58.

75. DBA, Foreign Minister to the Ambassadors, 25 February 1912, 639 S/50; Times, 23-28 February 1912.

76. Tanın, 6 December 1911.

77. Tanın, 25 February 1912, 14 November 1943 (Cavid's diary, 25 February 1912); BBA, BEO, No. 314207, Sedaret to Harbiye, 13 March 1912.

78. DBA, 639 S/49; DDF, Ser. 3, I, pp. 550-551,

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79. PRO, the Ottoman Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Minister, 12 February 1912, FO 371/1527.

80. DBA, 7 November 1911, 644 S. on the massacre, see The Red Oasis.

81. DBA, 643 S.

82. ASD, the Ottoman Ambassador in Rome to the Italian Foreign Office, 16 November 1912, SP, 143.

83. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 2 January 1913, SP, 161.

84. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 25 March 1913, SP, 162.

85. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 27 August 1914, SP, 162.

86. PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 20 May 1913, FO 371/1772.

87. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 19 March 1914, SP, 162.

88. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to Foreign Office, Rome, 27 June 1914, SP, 162.

89. ASD, SP, 162 contains numerous Italian complaints and Ottoman reactions.

90. ASD, the Embassy in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 15 October, 11 December 1913, SP, 161.

91. See n. 87 and BBA, file 1027/67/6 for Ottoman orders to evacuate men and equipment from Libya.

92. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 11 December 1913, SP, 161; 3 August 1914, SP, 162.

93. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Ministry of Colonies, 14 February 1914, SP, 21.

94. ASD, the Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 30 July 1914, SP, 162.

95. ASD, Ministry of War to the Foreign Office, Rome, 15 December 1912, SP, 13; PRO, the vice-consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 16 December 1912, FO 371/1539.

96. ASD, SP, 165 (17/36).

97. ASD, SP, 165 contains numerous reports on this issue.

98. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 8 May 1913, SP, 164.

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99. Tanın, 21 February 1913.

100. BBA, file 1027/67/6 includes many references on this issue.

101. Hayat, 8 April 1965, p. 27.

102. For details, see Trumpner, pp. 14-61.

103. The fatwa was published in all the major Istanbul papers the next day. See also Tunisi, pp. 5-6, 15-16; Snouck Hurgronje, p. 278.

104. PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 25 September 1914, FO 371/1971; 21 November 1914, FO 371/1972.

105. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 2 November 1914, SP, 167.

106. PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 28 November 1914, FO 371/2009.

107. ASD, the Ministry of the Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 4 December 1914, SP, 167.

108. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 29 May 1915, AG, 153 (33).

109. PRO, the Ambassador in Madrid to the Foreign Office, 29 June 1915, FO 371/2353; Stoddard, pp. 97-99.

110. ASD, the Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Office, 28 July 1915, AG, 151; PRO, the French Embassy in London to the British Foreign Office, 29 July 1915, FO 371/2353 (an English translation in FO 371/2354), following the capture of "Olympia" near Crete, carrying 35 boxes for the Sanusis.

CHAPTER TWO: OTTOMAN INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA

1. Mithat, pp. 237-238.

2. Kutay, pp. 29-34, 87-93; Menteşe, Cumhuriyet, 23 October 1946.

3. MA, the Military Attaché in Istanbul, 12 December 1911, RM 5/v 1570 reports on people who broke through the blockade.

4. PRO, the Foreign Minister in London to Kitchener in Cairo and the latter's reply, 5, 7 October 1911, FO 371/1253.

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5. Qasim; Times, 31 October, 16 November, 22 December 1911; Tugay, p. 290; Baruni, pp. 214-215; Russel, pp. 157-158; Stoddard, pp. 81-83; Enver, pp. 12 ff; Kinross, p. 49.

6. PRO, Kitchener to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 16, 23 December 1911, FO 371/1260.

7. PRO, the Foreign Minister to Kitchener in Cairo, 17 January 1912, FO 371/1527.

8. PRO, the Foreign Minister to the Ottoman Ambassador in London, 16 March 1912, FO 371/1527; BBA, MVM, vol. 160, 23 December 1911.

9. Times, 1 November 1911; Alpagot, pp. 168-169; Mithat, pp. 237-238; Zia, pp. 87-88.

10. In addition to the references mentioned above, see Fraccaroli, pp. 228-229; Yakınlarından Hatıralar, pp. 48, 72 and the Istanbul press of late 1911.

11. PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 10 February 1912, FO 371/1527; Akşam, 25 October 1945 quoting a letter of Niyazi from the way.

12. Enver, pp. 32, 89, 100; Russel, pp. 149-156; PRO, FO 371/1259, FO 371/1260 contain several examples, as does MA, Report for 4-10 December 1911, RM 5/V.

13. Enver, pp. 32, 42, 67; PRO, Report, Cairo 17 September 1912, FO 371/1527.

14. Gooch & Temperley, IX, pp. 412-413.

15. MA, Enver's letters of late December 1911, RM 3/V refer to 25,000 Ottoman pounds sent to Enver each month. Belen, 1973, p. 126 tells about 18,000 pounds of gold sent each month to the Derna front. PRO, Report, Cairo, 12 August 1912, FO 371/1527.

16. PRO, the Ambassador in Paris to the Foreign Office, 20 December 1911, FO 371/1260; A Memorandum of the French Government, 25 January 1912, FO 371/1530.

17. Abbott, pp. 4, 165-166, 225; Baruni, pp. 178, 187, 221; Alpagot, pp. 169-171; Seppings-Wright, pp. 89-90; ASD, SP, 143 contains numerous reports on this issue.

18. BBA, MVM, vol. 162, 29 Subat 1327 [13 March 1912], no. 1019 a decision to allocate a monthly sum of 150 franc to hire houses in Malta and Tunis, for the passage of Ottomans to Libya.

19. Abbott, pp. 161-163; Bennet, p. 239; Ostler, pp. 42-47.

20. PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 8 December 1912, FO 371/1539; 16 January 1913; FO 371/1772; MA, Report for 16-31 December 1912, RM 5/v 1041.

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21. Tanın, 15 November 1912.

22. Fraccaroli, pp. 228-229; PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 21 November 1912, FO 371/1539.

23. PRO, Kitchener to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 21, 22 June 1913, FO 371/1772; Tanın, 4, 8 July 1913.

24. ASD, SP 143, 161, 162 include many details on this issue.

25. See reports from Rome and Cairo in PRO, FO 371/1539, FO 371/1965, FO 371/1772, FO 371/2003, FO 141/732.

26. ASD, Stefani Agency, 6 March 1914, SP, 17; PRO, Reports from Cairo 12 April 1913, FO 371/1772; 13 December 1913, FO 141/732.

27. The Diary of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 15 Nisan 1329 [28 April 1913], Hayat, 8 April 1965, p. 27; 14 Mayıs 1329 [27 May 1913], Hayat, 3 June 1965, p. 23; ASD, AG, 153 (33) includes a lengthy survey on "Turkish Animosity", May 1914.

28. Numerous details in ASD, SP, 161, 162; Reports from Cairo and Italian memorandums in PRO, FO 371/1772.

29. PRO, a report by the Military Attaché in Rome, 31 March 1913, FO 371/1772; ASD, the Consul in Tunis to the Foreign Office, 11 October 1914, SP, 17.

30. Baruni, pp. 446-447; ASD, a report by the Dragoman in Istanbul, 16 December 1913, SP, 21.

31. The committee was headed by Haci Adil, and among its members were Talat, Enver, Ismail Hakkı Babanzade, Halil Bey (Menteşe), Emmanuel Carasso, and Reşid Bey. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 11 March 1913, SP, 161.

32. Ahmad, p. 140; Tanın, 13 February 1913; BBA, BEO, No. 312459, 312606, 13, 18 Nisan 1329 [26 April, 1 May 1913].

33. Among its prominent members were Sulayman al-Baruni, the Egyptians `Abd al-`Aziz Shawish, Prince `Abbas Halim Pasa, `Ali Mubarak, the Druze Shakib Arslan, Sharif `Ali Haydar (the Governor of Mecca), Halil Bey (Kut, Enver's uncle), the Tunisians Sharif al-Tunisi and Ali Baş Hamba. Numerous details in ASD, SP, 21, 22, 161, 162, 165, 167; BBA, BEO, no. 1300/532, Sedaret to Harbiye, 3 Teşrinievvel 1329 [16 October 1913]; AA, Zimmermann's Memorandum, Berlin, 19 August 1914, General Staff, Türkei 18/1; PRO, Intelligence Report, Cairo, 9 August 1914, FO 141/732.

34. ASD, the Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 15 June 1914, SP, 162.

35. ASD, the Agency in Cairo to the Foreign Office, 7 April 1914, SP, 167; PRO, the Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Rome, 12 March 1913, FO 371/1638. Among those mentioned are the Egyptian Khedive and the Grand Vezir Said Halim.

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36. ASD, SP, 162 contains numerous details.

37. ASD, SP, 21; ASD, AG, 153 (33); PRO, FO 141/746, FO 141/732, FO 141/653.

38. For the organization, its structure, leadership, aims and activities see Stoddard, passim; Rustow, pp. 518-519; Bayar, V, pp. 1570-1573; Shukri, II, pp. 460-464; Ahmad, pp. 153-154, 179; Larcher, pp. 511-515; Vardar, pp. 243, 276-277; Al-Fasi, pp. 48-51; Arslan, pp. 40, 46; Avcıoğlu, pp. 60-64; PRO, Intelligence Reports, FO 371/2140, FO 371/2147, FO 371/2668, FO 371/2930, FO 371/4235, FO 141/652; ASD, SP, 167, 168; AA, WK 119/11; MA, RM 5/v 2316.

39. Trumpner, pp. 37-38, 113-122; PRO, Intelligence Rrports, Cairo, 9 August 1914, 15 October 1916, FO 141/817; AA, the Embassy in Rome to the Foreign Office, 18 November 1914, WK 3/4.

40. Stoddard, pp. 97-99; Larcher, pp. 522-534; PRO, FO 371/2671.

41. Numerous details in MA, RM 40/v 410; RM 5/V 2352, 2964, 3853, 6366-6373; PRO, FO 371/2356, FO 371/2668, FO 371/2929-2930, FO 371/3199-3202.

42. PRO, FO 371/1969, FO 371/2356; ASD, AG, 150.

43. Among the better known incidents is the attack on the British ship "Tara". See MA, Berlin, 6 January 1916, RM 5/v 6366; and works written by survivors: Gwatkin-Williams and H.R.S.

44. PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 29 June 1919, FO 371/4207; 7 September 1919, FO 371/3805.

45. Larcher, pp. 510 ff; PRO, Intelligence Reports 20-28 January 1916, FO 371/2668; MA, Report of the Commander of Submarine UC 20, 5 June 1918, RM 5/v 3853.

46. Sabah, 23 September 1911.

47. Swanson, pp. 129-130; McCullagh, p. 61; L'Illustration, 9 March 1912.

48. Abbott, pp. 134-135; Bennet, pp. 128-129; Seppings-Wright, p. 58; Sabah, 20 December 1911.

49. Abbott, pp. 134-135; McCullagh, p. 61; Times, 10 October 1911; PRO, the Vice-Consul in Tripoli to the Embassy in Istanbul, 12 October 1911, FO 195/2365.

50. Abbott, pp. 116-119; Baruni, pp. 185-189; Griffin, p. 64; Ostler, pp. 107-109, 221-226, McClure, pp. 216-217.

51. BBA, BEO, No. 297166, Harbiye to Sedaret, 31 Teşrinievel 1327 [12 November 1911].

52. Baruni, p. 217; Tanın, 2 November 1911.

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53. Baruni, passim; Abbott, p. 119.

54. Abbott, pp. 164, 199; McClure, pp. 180-181; Seppings-Wright, pp. 89-90, 100; Ostler, pp. 206, 214-215, A`van Zade, p. 140.

55. L'Illustration, 20 January 1912; Sabah, 30 December 1911; McCullagh, p. 245; Irace, pp. 158-162, 228; Melli, pp. 210-211.

56. Abbott, passim; McCullagh, p. 245; Seppings-Wright, pp. 90-91.

57. Abbott, pp. 199, 302-304; Francis, 173-174.

58. Bennet, p. 59; Francis, pp. 215-216; Tanın, 6 November 1911.

59. Servet-i Funun, 29 Mart 1328 [10 April 1912]; L'Illustration, 27 April 1912; Stoddard, p. 85.

60. Abbott, pp. 45, 49, 90-97; L'Illustration, 20 January, 9 March 1912; Tanin, 16-25 October 1911; Francis, p. 167; Seppings-Wright, pp. 59, 65; Stoddard, p. 85; Bennet, pp. 128-129.

61. Abbott, pp. 45, 49, 90; Seppings-Wright, p. 59; Theilhaber, pp. 59-60; L'Illustration, 6 January 1912.

62. Abbott, pp. 161-163, 284-285; Baruni, p. 185; Ostler, p. 115; Seppings-Wright, p. 96; Tanın, 12, 30 April 1912; L'Illustration, 10 February 1912.

63. Abbott, p. 199; McClure, pp. 180-181; Seppings-Wright, p. 100.

64. Abbott, pp. 22-23; Bennet, pp. 60-62; Ostler, pp. 29-30; Seppings-Wright, pp. 26, 28-30; L'Illustration, 6 January 1912; Tanin, 16, 30 December 1911.

65. Abbott, pp. 317-323; Seppings-Wright, p. 21; L'Illustration, 10 February 1912; Tanin, 12 April 1912.

66. Abbott, pp. 34-35, 40, 311-312; Bennet, pp. 74-75, 277; Seppings-Wright, pp. 48, 52.

67. Abbott, pp. 100, 163; Francis, pp. 195-196, 218-223; Seppings-Wright, p. 138; Shukri, II, pp. 431-432; L'Illustration, 6, 27 April, 18 May 1912; ASD, SP, 10, sub-file on Emir Ali Pasa.

68. Baruni, p. 234; Bennet, p. 229; L'Illustration, 9 March 1912.

69. Abbott, p. 163; Seppings-Wright, p. 89; Tanın, 30 November 1911.

70. Bonacci, pp. 36-47, 63-75, 152-153; PRO, Consular reports from Tripoli and Bengazi, 24-28 October 1911, FO 371/1256.

71. Tanın, 26 April, 26, 27 July 1912.

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72. During World War I he was one of the commanders of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa. Kutay, pp. 139-140; Enver, pp. 58-59.

73. L'Illustration, 20 July 1912; Le Moniteur Oriental, 26 March 1912; Zafer, 21 March 1912.

74. Le Moniteur Oriental, 17 October 1911; Times, 11 November 1911.

75. L'Illustration, 15 June 1912.

76. Ibid; Yeni İkdam, 1, 19, 24 December 1911; Sabah, 26 March 1912; Şahbal, 15 Haziran 1328 [28 June 1912]; PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 11 December 1911, FO 371/1260.

77. L'Illustration, 15 June 1912; Le Moniteur Oriental, 17 October 1911.

78. Stoddard, pp. 82, 86; Kutay, p. 140; Sabah, 21 January 1912.

79. Enver, p. 31, Bayur, pp. 49-51; Kutay, pp. 4, 131; Kutay, 1967, pp. 47, 54-55; "Atäturk", İslam Ansiklopedisi, I, p. 722; CBA, Derne Kumandani Günlük Emir Defteri, 22 May — 6 August 1912.

80. Enver, pp. 19-24, 37, 45-46; Hayat, 14 January 1965; Kinross, pp. 47-52; Yakınlarından Hatıralar, pp. 106, 110-111; Kutay, 1967, pp. 42-71; Fraccaroli, p. 227.

81. BBA, BEO, No. 300670, Harbiye to Sedaret, 14 Şubat 1327 [27 February 1912]; Senin, 28 October 1912; Blunt, p. 397; Qub`ayn, pp. 83-84; Shukri, II, pp. 442-443.

82. Le Moniteur Oriental, 18 October, 23 November 1911; Melli, p. 213; Fraccaroli, pp. 226-234; MA, Enver's letters, RM 3/v 10230.

83. L'Illustration, 20 July 1912; Sabah, 23 October, 5 December, 15 January, 9 April 1912; PRO, Kitchener to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 10 February 1912, FO 371/1529; Şahbal, loc.cit; Stoddard, pp. 85-86; Kinross, pp. 50-51.

84. Tanın, 27 January, 24 March 112; L'Illustration, 20 July 1912.

85. L'Illustration, 15 June 1912; Ertuğrul, pp. 147, 173; PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 13 February 1912, FO 371/1534.

86. L'Illustration, loc.cit; Enver, p. 31; Ertuğrul, pp. 140-141; Djemal, pp. 62-64; Stoddard, pp. 85-86, 119-120; Tanın, 17 April 1912.

87. Stoddard, p. 91; Spada, pp. 70-74.

88. ASD, the Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 12 August 1913, SP, 161.

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89. See in detail in Khadduri. There is much information about this issue in the Egyptian and European press, as well as in consular reports, but not in the Istanbul press.

90. PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 21 April 1913, FO 371/1662; report of the Military Attaché in Rome, 24 June 1913, FO 371/1772; ASD, Intelligence Report, 16 January 1915, AG, 150; Ahmad al-Sharif's letter, Al-Afkar, 9 January 1914; AA, Periodicals of Egyptian exiles, WK 11 9/11; Ahmad, p. 139; Djemal, pp. 62-64; Times, 28 March 1914.

91. See n. 23 above and Melli, p. 241; Stoddard, pp. 92-93; Mahmud, pp. 9-11; Times, 16 February 1914.

92. ASD, SP, 161 contains numerous details.

93. ASD, a copy of a letter in French from Enver to Talat, 25 September 1329 [7 October 1913], SP, 21; the Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 29 November 1913, SP, 21; a Memorandum on the "Turkish Animosity", 1914, AG, 153 (33).

94. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 27 August 1914, SP, 162; PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 26 September 1914, FO 371/1971.

95. ASD, the Agent in Cairo to the Foreign Office, 31 August 1914, SP, 171.

96. PRO, FO 371/1970 contains numerous details.

97. ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 8 November 1914, SP, 162; the Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 17, 20 October 1914, SP, 167.

98. Baruni, pp. 484-488; Tripolitania, III, pp. 386, 447-448; PRO, Intelligence Report, 12 December 1914, FO 371/1971.

99. Baruni, pp. 504-505, 525-526.

100. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 18, 30 January 1916, FO 371/2668.

101. PRO, Intelligence Report, March 1915, FO 371/2349; AA, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 6 January 1915, WK g/5.

102. PRO, Memorandum of the French Embassy in London to the British Foreign Office, 29 July 1915, FO 371/2353.

103. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 29 September 1915, FO 371/2354; June 1915, FO 371/2349.

104. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 8, 12 March 1916, FO 371/2668.

105. Tripolitania, III, pp. 651-652.

106. PRO, Intelligence Report, 26 October 1915, FO 371/2356.

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107. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 23, 26 October 1915, FO 371/2356.

108. PRO, the High Commissioner, Cairo to the Foreign Office, 17 August 1915, FO 371/2354; Gwatkin-Williams; H.R.S.

109. PRO, Weekly Intelligence Report, 23-30 November 1915, FO 371/2356.

110. PRO, Intelligence Reports 16 November 1915, FO 371/2356; 23 December 1915, 3 January 1916, FO 371/2668; Massey, pp. 137, 144-145.

111. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 12 December 1915, FO 371/2356; 9-14 March 1916, FO 371/2668.

112. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 15 December 1915, 5 March 1916, FO 371/2668.

113. PRO, Intelligence Reports for the second half of December 1915, FO 371/2668.

114. PRO, Intelligence Reports for January 1916, FO 371/2356, 371/2668.

115. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 12-25 January 1916, FO 371/2668.

116. PRO, Intelligence Report, 1 March 1916, FO 371/2668.

117. PRO, Intelligence Report, 30 October 1917, FO 371/2930.

118. PRO, Intelligence Report, 9 February 1916, FO 371/2668.

119. PRO, Intelligence Report, 28 January 1916, FO 371/2668.

120. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 27 February, 12 March 1916, FO 371/2668.

121. PRO, Intelligence Report, 15 April 1916, FO 371/2668.

122. PRO, Intelligence Report, 20 March 1916, FO 371/2668; AA, Manesmann to the General Staff, Jedabiya, 28 March 1916, WK 11 u/3.

123. BBA, BEO, Irade from 9 Haziran 1332 [22 June 1916], file 1022/67/1.

124. PRO, Report of the Supreme Command, Cairo, 21 July 1916, FO 371/2668.

125. PRO, Intelligence Reports, July-November 1916, FO 371/2669; AA, Report of the Military Attaché, Istanbul, 13 November 1916, WK 11 u/3.

126. Baruni, p. 533; Sa`id, III, pp. 319-320; PRO, Intelligence Report, 14 September 1916, FO 371/2669; MA, Report of the Naval Attaché, Istanbul, 7 December 1916, RM 5/v 2316.

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127. It is stated that he received 100,000 Pound Sterling. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 29 November 1916, FO 371/2669; 18 December 1916, FO 371/2930.

128. PRO, Intelligence Report, 15 August 1916, FO 371/2669.

129. PRO, Reports by Talbot from Tubruq, 22 February 1917, FO 371/2929; 5 March 1917, FO 141/651.

130. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 18 December 1916, 2 January, 3 March 1917, FO 371/2930.

131. PRO, FO 371/3202; Idris al-Sanusi to Ahmad al-Sharif, 19 July 1917, FO 371/2932.

132. PRO, Intelligence Report, 23 October 1917, FO 371/2944.

133. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to Foreign Office, Rome, 14 August 1917, AG, 147 citing Baruni's declaration of 3 July.

134. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 31 October 1917, AG, 147; PRO, Intelligence Reports, 11, 25 September 1917, FO 371/2944.

135. AA, Report on the Sanusiya, 5 November 1917, WK 11 u/4; PRO, Intelligence Report, 3 September 1917, FO 371/2930.

136. AA, Navy Commander to the General Staff, 14 January 1918, WK 11 u/5; ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 9 August 1918, AG, 148 citing a Firman of 29 March 1918.

137. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 21, 27 January 1918, FO 371/3230.

138. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 5, 11 February 1918, FO 371/3230.

139. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 19 April, 7 June 1918, FO 371/3230.

140. PRO, Intelligence Report, 21 June 1918, FO 371/3202.

141. AA, Admiralty to the Foreign Office, Berlin, 17 August 1918, WK 11 u/5.

142. AA, A report from Misurata, June 1918, WK 11 u/5.

143. PRO, Intelligence Report, 16 August 1918, FO 371/3230.

144. PRO, Intelligence Report, 24 October 1918, FO 371/3201; ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 28 November 1918, AG, 153 (35); MA, Report of 2 November 1918, RM 5/v 2773.

145. PRO, the Ambassador in London, 20 November 1918, FO 371/3416.

146. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 25 January, 1 February 1919, FO 371/3805.

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147. PRO, the Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 27 March, 1 July 1919, FO 371/4207.

148. PRO, the Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 7, 8, 17, 30 September 1919, FO 371/3805.

CHAPTER THREE: THE EMERGENCE OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN LIBYA

1. Abbott, pp. 115-116.

2. Ibid, pp. 116-117; Ostler, p. 224.

3. Griffin, passim; Ostler, pp. 187-188; McClure, pp. 216-217; Abbott, pp. 117-119; Baruni, passim.

4. Abbott, p. 119; Baruni, pp. 171, 217.

5. Ostler, pp. 206, 211-215.

6. Abbott, p. 119.

7. Baruni, pp. 166-168, 228.

8. Ibid, pp. 234, 427; Abbott, pp. 100-101.

9. Abbott, pp. 105-106; Seppings-Wright, p. 30; Times, 4 October 1911.

10. BBA, BEO, No. 299898, Sedaret to Hariciye, 24 Kanunusani 1327 [6 February 1912]; Tanın, 30 October 1911.

11. Vali of Tripolitania - Neşet; Mutasarrıf Khoms -- Halil; Mutasarrıf Jebel Gharbi -- Musa (earlier Sulayman al-Baruni); Mutasarrıf Fezzan -- Sami.

12. Details are mainly in Baruni, Abbott, Ostler, Seppings-Wright, Shukri and the press.

13. Abbott, pp. 34-35, 40, 119; Baruni, pp. 184, 187, 199, 221.

14. Abbott, pp. 100, 164; Shukri, II, p. 432; Tanın, 23 December 1911.

15. See Chapter Two, n. 58,

16. Baruni, pp. 166-174, 217-228.

17. The notables were informed on the agreement on 25 October 1912. The terms used for "autonomy" are: muhtariyet-i tama, muhtariyet

idaresi. The firman of 3 Teşrinievvel 1328 [16 October 1912] was published in Takvim-i Vakayi, 5 Teşrinievvel 1328, p. 1258.

18. Baruni, pp. 239-243, 252; Griffin, pp. 96-98, Shukri, II, p. 438.

19. Baruni, pp. 250, 268, 421-423; Griffin, pp. 122-123, 186-187.

20. Baruni, pp. 246-247, 258, 354-356, 391, 425, 464-482.

21. Griffin, pp. 122-126.

22. Shukri, II, p. 439.

23. Baruni, p. 258; Griffin, pp. 151, 186, 199-200.

24. Baruni, p. 437; Griffin, pp. 126-127, 186.

25. Baruni, pp. 381-382; Griffin, pp. 97-98, 147, 158-162.

26. Baruni, pp. 411-415, 501-502; ASD, a memorandum on "Turkish Animosity", 1914, AG, 153 (33).

27. Baruni, pp. 423, 429-433; Griffin, pp. 172-173; Letters of Baruni: AA, January 1913, Türkei 202/16; 25 Muharram 1331 [4 January 1913], 18 Safar 1331 [27 January 1913], Tripolis 1/13.

28. BBA, MVM, vol. 173, 29 Kanunuevvel 1328 [11 January 1913] no. 853; BBA, BEO, files 1027/67/2, 1027/67/6.

29. Baruni, p. 429; Griffin, pp. 97-102.

30. The firman did not use the term istiqlal (independence) but muhtariyet (autonomy).

31. Shukri, II, pp. 437-438; Baruni, p. 424; ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 22 December 1912, SP, 143.

32. Griffin, pp. 142-144.

33. Ibid, pp. 142-144, 166, 181; Baruni, pp. 406-407.

34. Griffin, pp. 144, 182-184; Times, 4 September 1913; Tanın, 18 March 1913.

35. Times, 4 February, 4 September 1913; AA, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 23 February 1913, Türkei 202/16; PRO the Military Attaché to the Ambassador in Rome, 19 November 1912, FO 371/1539.

36. The term used for "domestic administrative independence under Italian sovereignty" is "istiqlal idari dakhili taht siyadat 'Italiya". AA, Baruni to the German Emperor, 18 Safar 1331 [27 January 1913], Tripolis 1/13; Baruni, pp. 406, 424; Sa`id, II, pp. 503-505.

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37. Baruni, pp. 465 ff; Sa`id, loc.cit; PRO, the Minister in Rome to the Foreign Office, 7 June 1913, FO 371/1772.

38. Baruni, loc.cit; Griffin, pp. 255-256; Chierici, pp. 166, 180 PRO, Correspondence for March 1913, FO 371/1772; BBA, BEO, Sedaret to Harbiye, 23 Mayıs 1329 [5 June 1913], no. 15/85, file 1027/67/6.

39. Times, 28 March, 4 September 1913; Griffin, p. 297; ASD, the Dragoman in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 16 September 1913, SP, 161; 16 December 1913, SP, 21.

40. Griffin, pp. VII, 297; ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 11 November 1913, SP, 24; the Consul in Tunis to the Foreign Office, 4 April 1914, SP, 20.

41. Griffin, pp. 266, 274; Sa`id, II, pp. 503-505; Ciasca, pp. 339-340. PRO, the Military Attaché to the Ambassador, Rome, 31 March 1913, FO 371/1772.

42. Baruni, p. 24; Griffin, p. 283.

43. PRO, the Acting Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 3 May 1913, FO 371/1772; Times, 5 May 1913.

44. PRO, the Acting Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 18 December 1913, FO 371/1662; Times, 25 July, 4 September 1913.

45. PRO, the Acting Consul General in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 22 November 1913, FO 371/1662; Tripolitania, III, p. 21.

46. PRO, Intelligence Report, December 1913, FO 371/1965.

47. ASD, Stefani Agency, 4 March 1914, SP, 17.

48. Ciasca, p. 340.

49. Graziani, Fezzan, pp. 47-48.

50. L'Italia in Africa, Ser. Mil, I/3, pp. 86-87.

51. Ibid, p. 57; Tripolitania, III, p. 31.

52. Fezzan, I, pp. 78-79.

53. Tripolitania III, pp. 32-33, 37-38; PRO, Report on the Sanusiya, FO 373/6.

54. Tripolitania, III, pp. 25-30.

55. Ahmad was the son of Muhammad Suni, the Shaykh of Zawiyat Guru in Borqu, one of the early and important leaders of the Sanusiya. Tripolitania, III, pp. 12-13; Fezzan, I, pp. 13-14.

56. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 10 April 1914, SP, 24.

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57. L'Italia in Africa, Ser. Mil., I/3, pp. 75-76.

58. Tripolitania, I, p. 107; II, p. 223; III, pp. 303 ff.

59. Sa`id, III, pp. 46-48.

60. Graziani, Fezzan, p. 48; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 4 December 1914, FO 371/2003; the Consul General in Algiers to the Foreign Office, 15 December 1914, FO 371/2003.

61. Tripolitania, I, p. 89; III, p. 306.

62. Tripolitania, III, p. 152.

63. Tripolitania, I, p. 49.

64. Ibid, p. 54; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 8 July 1915, FO 371/2379.

65. See above n. 64 and Tripolitania, III, p. 298.

66. Tripolitania, I, p. 69; III, p. 296.

67. Tripolitania, II, p. 433.

68. Tripolitania, II, pp. 381, 418, 451; PRO, Intelligence Report, May 1915, FO 371/2349.

69. Tripolitania, I, pp. 94 ff; II, p. 223; III, pp. 325 ff.

70. Tripolitania, II, p. 217; III, pp. 149, 376; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 18 October 1917, FO 371/2944.

71. Tripolitania, III, pp. 163, 172.

72. PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 6 June 1915, FO 371/2378.

73. Tripolitania, II, pp. 278-279, 289; III, pp. 191-192, 197.

74. Tripolitania, I, pp. 255, 259, 275, 285, 364-365; II, pp. 32, 139, 213, 409; III, pp. 240, 245.

75. Tripolitania, II, pp. 21-22, 70, 85, 146; III, pp. 160, 216, 225, 697, 707; PRO, the Consul in Algiers to the Foreign Office, 20 August 1915, FO 371/2379.

76. Tripolitania, I, p. 231; II, p. 176.

77. Tripolitania, III, pp. 540-542, 559-566, 579.

78. PRO, Intelligence Report, 5 June 1916, FO 371/2669; Chierici, pp. 116-119.

79. Tripolitania, II, p. 20; III, p. 250.

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80. PRO, Intelligence Report, 16 April 1916, FO 371/2668; AA, Salame Report, Berlin, 17 November 1916, WK 11 u/3; Ciasca, pp. 363-368; Chierici, pp. 139-140.

81. PRO, Intelligence Report, 25 December 1917, FO 371/3230.

82. Tripolitania, II, pp. 442 ff.

83. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 23 March, 5 April 1916, FO 371/2668; French official report, May 1916, FO 371/2771.

84. Baruni, p. 533; Sa'id, III, pp. 321-323; PRO, Intelligence Reports FO 371/2668, FO 371/2669, FO 371/2930; a list of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa activists in Libya, 20 August 1919, FO 371/4234.

85. Sa'id, II, pp. 49-50; PRO, Talbot to Wingate, Tubruq, 22 February 1917, FO 371/2909.

86. See above, Chapter Two.

87. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 7 April, 27 October 1917, FO 371/2930.

88. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 7 August 1917, AG, 147; PRO, Intelligence Report, 3 September 1917, FO 371/2930.

89. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 3 March, 7 April 1917, FO 371/2930.

90. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 18 March, 25 May, 1 October 1917, FO 371/2936; 1, 23 October 1917, FO 371/2944.

91. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 23, 29 October 1917, FO 371/2944; 5, 25 February, 21 March, 19 April, 3 May 1918, FO 371/3230.

92. Numerous details in PRO, Intelligence Reports for June-December 1918, FO 371/3230.

93. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 12, 26 July 1918, FO 371/3230.

94. MA, Report on Tripolitania, 27 June 1918, RM 5/v 3854.
95. PRO, Intelligence Reports FO 371/2669, 371/2930, 371/3230; Sa`id, III, p. 321.

96. PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 2 August 1916, FO 371/2683; 25 August 1916, FO 371/2687.

97. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 8, 12 June 1918, AG, 152 (23).

98. PRO, Intelligence Report, 19 July 1918, FO 371/3202.

99. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 27 November 1917, FO 371/2944; 17 May 1918, FO 371/3230.

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100. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 25 September 1916, FO 371/2669; 25 December 1917, 4 January, 23 October 1918, FO 371/3230.

101. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 22 October, 10 December 1917, FO 371/2930; 3 July 1918, FO 371/3202.

102. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 30 October 1917, FO 371/2930; 7 December 1917, FO 371/2944.

103. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 27 January 1918, FO 371/3230; 1 April 1918, FO 371/3202.

104. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 18 December 1916, FO 371/2930; 21 June 1918, FO 371/3230.

105. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 16 April, 10 May 1917, FO 371/2930; 19 July 1918, FO 371/3202.

106. PRO, Intelligence Report, 22 January 1918, FO 371/3202; ASD, The Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 24 August, 10 December 1918, AG, 148.

107. On the Tripolitanian Republic, which is outside the scope of this study, see Anderson.

108. Bennet, pp. 25-26; Tanın, 8 December 1912; BBA, BEO, No. 306106, Harbiye to Sedaret, 27 Ağustos 1328 [8 September 1912], PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 14 April 1912, FO 371/1537; ASD, the Consul in Marseille to the Foreign Office, 6 November 1911, SP, 8.

109. Enver, pp. 37-38, 46; Bennet, pp. 25-29; Tanin, 17 January 1912; Sirat-i Mustakim, 5 Kanunusani 1327 [18 January 1912]; BBA, BEO, No. 307724, Sedaret to Muhammad `Abid al-Sharif, 21 Rajab 1330 [6 July 1912]; PRO, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 28 May 1912, FO 371/1537 (a call to join the Jihad by Ahmad al-Sharif); AA, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 8 November 1911, Türkei, 202/6; Bayar, II, pp. 489-491.

110. L'Illustration, 8 June 1912.

111. Enver, passim; BBA, BEO No. 306058, 26 Ağustos 1328 [8 September 1912]; MVM, vol. 159, 28 Teşrinisani 1327 [11 December 1911], no. 745; MVMIS, vo. 227, 23 Şubat 1327 [7 March 1912]; CBA, 1-B, No. 3329, 1 Temuz 1328 [14 July 1912].

112. BBA, BEO, No. 301803, 25 Mart 1328 [6 April 1912]; Tanın, 22 April 1912.

113. On the "Jaghbub incident" see below, n. 118.

114. Sabah, 12 October 1911; L'Illustration, 15 June 1912 Fezzan, I, pp. 13-14; Sa`id, II, pp. 467-468; Afifi, pp. 289 ff; Gazali, pp. 106-124.

115. Le Moniteur Oriental 20 April 1912; McCullagh, p. 327.

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116. Le Moniteur Oriental, 20 October 1911; İktiham, 25 April 1912 the sum mentioned is 1 million pounds.

117. Enver, pp. 96-99; BBA, BEO, No. 300964, Sedaret to Dahiliye, 28 Şubat 1327 [12 March 1912].

118. Afifi, pp. 289-300; Le Moniteur Oriental, 7 June 1912; PRO, numerous reports in FO 371/1535.

119. Tanın, 1 October 1911; Times, 11 November 1911; PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 15 August 1912, FO 371/1538; ASD, An appendix to a report from the Ministry of War to the Foreign Office, Rome, 23 July 1912, SP, 13 (a declaration of support by notables in Derna to the Italian commander).

120. Enver, pp. 58-59; Fraccaroli, pp. 230-231; L'Illustration, 15 June 1912.

121. Enver, p. 84; Sabah, 29 October, 12 December 1912, (Enver's announcement on the granting of autonomy -- hükümet-i muhtariye), 21 January 1913 (the election of `Aziz `Ali as an independent ruler and the establishment of an Arab Government -- hükümet-i Arabiye -- that will govern the country according to the Shari`ah, and the head of the Sanusiya will be responsible for religions affairs); Correspondence d'Orient, 15 August-1 September 1912, pp. 186-187; PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 2, 17 December 1912, FO 371/1539.

122. Tanın, 24 February 1913; ASD, An appendix to a report from the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 21 April 1913, SP, 161 (translation of a report from Tasvir-i Efkar, 17 April 1913); Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 1 July 1914, SP, 162 (a translation of a Sanusi call for Jihad, Al-Afkar, 25 May 1914); PRO, Intelligence Reports, 4, 16 January 1913, FO 141/732.

123. Tripolitania, III, p. 24; L'Italia in Africa, I/3, pp. 59-60; RRO, Intelligence Reports, 16 January, 14 July 1913, FO 141/732.

124. Sebilurreşad, 3 Nisan 1330 [16 April 1914]; PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 6, 13 June, 10 July, 11 August 1913, FO 371/1772; Intelligence Reports, January-February 1914, FO 371/1965.

125. Tanın, 3 November 1913, 18 June 1914; Times, 9, 15 June 1914; PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Offices 29 October 1913, FO 371/1662.

126. Fezzan, I, pp. 13-14; PRO, Kitchener to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 8 May 1914, FO 371/1965; ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 7 September 1914, SP, 162 (the attribution of zawiyahs in Cyrenaica to members of the Sanusi family).

127. PRO, many details in the reports from the Consul in Benghazi and the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office in 1913-14,

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especially in FO 371/1539, FO 371/1662, FO 371/1772, FO 371/2003; Tanın, 8 September 1913, 11 June 1914; Spade, pp. 110, 150-153.

128. A summary of the Italian advance in 1913: PRO, Annual Report, 1913, Rome, FO 371/2004.

129. Tripolitania, III, pp. 26, 33.

130. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 12 August, 3 December 1913, SP, 161. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, 7 September 1914, SP, 162 (the attribution of Zawiyahs in Cyrenaica to members of the Sanusi family).

131. Tanın, 12 February, 11 March, 23 May 1913; The diary of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 16 Şubat 1328 [1 March 1913], 15 Nisan 1329 [28 April 1913], 14 Mayıs 1329 [27 May 1913], Hayat, 21 January, 8 April, 3 June 1965; PRO, Intelligence Report, 18 February 1913, FO 141/732 (quoting Al-Mu'ayyid, 18 February 1913); ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 28 March, 24 May 1913, SP, 161 (the first reports on a conversation with a Sanusi delegate).

132. The delegation went to Istanbul via Beirut, Damascus, Hama, Khoms and Aleppo and possibly visited other places as well. PRO, the Consul in Istanbul to the Ambassador, 17 June 1914, FO 195/2459; ASD, the Ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Office, 17 June 1914, SP, 162.

133. PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 11, 13 March 1913, FO 371/1800; 3, 8 July, 5 August 1913, FO 371/1772. On other delegations of Moslems under Italian rule to the Sanusis: Ibid, 12, 26 May, 3 September 1913, FO 371/1772.

134. Numerous reports on this issue in PRO, FO 141/732; Sa`id, III, p. 21.

135. PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 28 December 1912, FO 371/1772; 3 June 1913, FO 371/1662.

136. PRO, Kitchener to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 27 March 1913, FO 371/1638; 7 December 1913, FO 371/1637.

137. PRO, Letters of Ahmad al-Sharif to Royle, 3 Dhu al-Hijjah 1330 [12 November 1912], another attached to Royle's report of 26 March 1913, and another to Kitchener, attached to a report of the Intelligence Department, Cairo, 17 March 1913. FO 141/732.

138. PRO, Intelligence Report, 6 November 1913, FO 141/732.

139. PRO, Royle to Headquarters in Cairo and Alexandria, 6 January, 27 February, 2 March 1913, FO 371/732. The last includes a detailed personal description as well as presents sent by the Ottoman Sultan to Ahmad al-Sharif.

140. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 6 November 1913, FO 141/732; 8 May 1914, FO 371/1965.

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141. PRO, Intelligence Report April, 1915, FO 371/2349.

142. PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 10 March 1915, FO 371/2372.

143. PRO, Cheetham to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 23 December 1914, FO 371/1971; MacMahon to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 3, 21 June 1915, FO 371/2353; Ahmad al-Sharif to Maxwell, 17 Muharram 1334 [25 November 1915], FO 371/2669.

144. Baruni, pp. 497-510. See above, Chapter Two.

145. PRO, MacMahon to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 26 February, 8 May 1915, FO 371/2353; the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 1 June 1915, FO 371/2353.

146. See above, Chapter Two.

147. Stoddard, pp. 94-95.

148. Numerous reports in PRO, FO 371/2353; Sa`id, III, pp. 26-27.

149. Massey, pp. 133-135.

150. PRO, Intelligence Report, 5 March 1916, FO 371/2668; a report on a conversation with Muhammad Musa, 18 March 1916, FO 371/2669.

151. PRO, the French Embassy in London to the British Foreign Office, 29 July 1915, FO 371/2353; Intelligence Report, 2 January 1917, FO 371/2930.

152. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 8, 12 March 1916, FO 371/2668.

153. PRO, Intelligence Report, 20 August 1919, FO 371/4234 (a list of activists in Libya according to district).

154. MA, War Diary, 21 August 1915, RM 40/v 756; AA, Nadolny, Political Division/General Staff to the Foreign Office, Berlin, 16, 29 November 1915, WK 11 u/1.

155. Fezzan, I, pp. 68-69.

156. Tripolitania, III, p. 663; PRO, Intelligence Reports, February 1915, FO 371/2349; 4 November 1915, FO 371/2356.

157. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 2 November 1914, SP, 167. See also ns. 155, 156 above.

158. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 15, 19, 21, 24 October 1915, FO 371/2356.

159. PRO, Intelligence Reports, October-December 1915, FO 371/2356. The main Sanusi centres in Egypt were in the Western Desert oases of Siwa, Dakhla, Farafra, Kharja and Fayum, in Wadi Natrun and among the tribes of Awlad `Ali, Harbi, Bara`isah, `Awaqir and Magharibah.

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160. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 15 October, 30 November 1915, FO 371/2356.

161. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 23-30 October 1915, FO 371/2356; the Italian Delegation in Cairo to the High Commissioner, 13 June 1919, FO 141/472; Stoddard, pp. 206-207; H.R.S, pp. 68-69.

162. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 10 October, 4 November 1915, FO 371/2356.

163. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 5, 6, 18 November 1915, FO 371/2356.

164. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 3, 4, 23-30 November 1915, FO 371/2356.

165. PRO, Intelligence Report, May 1915, FO 371/2349.

166. On issues connected with the Egyptain-Libyan border see PRO, Memorandom of 11 April 1916, Cairo, FO 141/653.

167. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 27 September, 29 October 1915, FO 371/2356.

168. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 22, 26 October 1915, FO 371/2356.

169. See n. 164 above.

170. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 21 October, 19-21 November 1915, FO 371/2356; Ahmad al-Sharif to Maxwell, 13 January 1916, FO 371/2669.

171. PRO, Intelligence Reports of the second half of November 1915, FO 371/2356.

172. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 24, 26 November, 10 December 1915, FO 371/2356.

173. PRO, A report of a conversation with Muhammad Musa, a messenger of Ahmad al-Sharif, March 1916, FO 371/2669.

174. PRO, Ahmad al-Sharif to Maxwell, 13 January 1916, and to Kitchener, 14 January 1916, FO 371/2669.

175. PRO, Ahmad al-Sharif to the British High Commissioner in Istanbul, Bursa, 12 June 1919, FO 371/3711.

176. Massey, pp. 131-162; PRO, Intelligence Reports, 3 November, 4, 7 December 1915, FO 371/2356.

177. See above, n. 173.

178. PRO, MacMahon to the Foreign Office, 21 December 1915, FO 371/2357.

179. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 7, 15 January, 24 February 1916, FO 371/2668.

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180. See above, Chapter Two. PRO, Intelligence Reports, November 1915-April 1916, FO 371/2668, FO 371/2669.

181. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 16 February, 1 March 1916, FO 371/2668.

182. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 23, 28 January 1916, FO 371/2668.

183. PRO, Intelligence Reports, January-October 1916, FO 371/2668, FO 371/2669; ASD, the General Staff to the Ministry of Colonies, Rome, 10 March 1916, AG, 152.

184. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 20, 30 March 1916, FO 371/2668; 5, 29 June 1916, FO 371/2669.

185. Massey, p. 160; PRO, Intelligence Reports, 18, 19 October 1916, FO 371/2669.

186. Massey, pp. 161-167; PRO, Intelligence Reports, December 1916-February 1917, FO 371/2930; Italian-British Accord, p. 184.

187. PRO, MacMahon to Talbot, 1, 4 April 1917, FO 141/651.

188. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 27 January, 18 March, 25 May 1917, FO 371/2930.

189. BBA, Irade of 26 June 1916, 1022/67/1; PRO, Ahmad al-Sharif to Idris al-Sanusi, 23 December 1916, FO 170/1064.

190. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 29 October, 20 November 1917, FO 371/2944; 14 June, 16 August 1918, FO 371/3230.

191. See above, Chapter Two. Stoddard, pp. 99-100; Shukri, II, pp. 512-515. The activities of Ahmad al-Sharif in Anatolia deserve a separate study.

192. Khalil, I, pp. 207-208; PRO, British-Sanusi relations, Cab. 44/14; Idris al-Sanusi to Talbot, 18 Jumada II 1335 [10 April 1917], FO 170/1064.

193. PRO, A report on a conversation between Talbot and the Egyptian Sultan, 20 January 1917, FO 371/651; Talbot to the British Ambassador in Rome, Cairo, 25 February 1917, FO 170/1064.

194. ASD, the Consul in Jedda to the Foreign Office, 13 October 1914, SP, 162; PRO, Intelligence Report, February 1915, FO 371/2349.

195. PRO, Memorandum of the French Embassy in London to the British Foreign Office, 29 July 1915, FO 371/2353.

196. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 8 October, 4 November 1915, FO 371/2356.

197. PRO, Idris to MacMahon, Jedabiya, 28 May 1916, FO 371/2670.

198. PRO, Ahmad al-Sharif to the "Brethren", 2 November 1916, FO 371/2931.

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199. PRO, MacMahon to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 7 May 1916, FO 371/2669; British-Sanusi relations, Cab. 44/14.

200. PRO, Intelligence Report, 11 March 1916, FO 141/653; MacMahon to the Foreign Office, 13 March 1916, FO 170/987.

201. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 7, 15 January 1916, FO 371/2668; 31 May, 8 June 1916, FO 371/2669.

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204. PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 23, 31 May 1916, FO 371/2669.

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206. PRO, Idris to MacMahon, 26 Rajab 1334 [28 May 1916], FO 371/2670.

207. Ibid; Wingate to the Foreign Office, 27 June, 23 August, 22 September 1917, FO 371/1919.

208. PRO, the Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 29, 30 June 1916, FO 371/2668.

209. Khalil, I, p. 208.

210. Sa`id, III, p. 308; PRO, Intelligence Reports, 24, 18-31 July, 3, 5, 15, 17 August 1916, FO 371/2669.

211. Khalil, I, p. 208; PRO, Talbot's report on the Zuwaytina talks, appendices D2, D3, 18 October 1916, FO 371/2670; British-Sanusi relations, Cab. 44/14.

212. PRO, Idris to MacMahon, 25 Dhu al-Qa`dah 1334 [9 September 1916], FO 371/2670; Talbot on Idris character and status, 22 November 1916, FO 371/2670.

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214. PRO, Ahmad al-Sharif to the "Brethren", 7 Muharram 1335 [2 November 1916], FO 371/2931; Ahmad al-Sharif to Idris al-Sanusi, 27 Safar 1335 [23 December 1916], FO 170/1064; Intelligence Report, 26 September 1916, FO 141/651. See also Idris' letters, ns. 212, 213 above.

215. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 4 October, 5, 29 November 1916, FO 371/2669; 1 March 1918, FO 371/3202; MacMahon to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 22 November 1915, FO 371/2354.

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216. PRO, `Akrama Agreements (English version), FO 371/2670, (Arabic version) FO 141/652. See also further correspondence FO 141/651, FO 141/652, FO 170/1064, FO 371/2929; British-Sanusi relations, Cab. 44/14.

217. PRO, Intelligence Report, 20 July 1917, FO 141/652.

218. PRO, The Ambassador in Rome to the Foreign Office, 31 May, 8 June 1917, FO 371/2929; Memorandum of the Embassy in Rome to the Italian Government (16 September 1917) and an oral note of the latter to the former (19 October 1917), FO 371/2929.

219. PRO, Wingate to the Foreign Office, 14 July 1917, FO 371/2929; 1, 6 September 1917, FO 371/2932.

220. Numerous reports in PRO, FO 371/2929, FO 170/1064, FO 371/3202.

CHAPTER FOUR: DAILY LIFE IN THE REBEL CAMP

1. Following the return of dozens of officials from Libya to Istanbul, the Ottoman regime was occupied for a long period of time in their re-posting and the allotment of compensation and pensions. On returning officials, see e.g. Tanın, 31 October, 4 November 1911 (including names, positions and ranks).

2. Sabah, 17, 28 October 1911.

3. Remond, passim; Tanın, 26-29 July 1912; BBA, BEO No. 297963, Dahiliye to Sedaret, 16 Teşrinasani 1327 [29 November 1911]; Bennet, p. 239; Shukri, II, pp. 431-437.

4. Enver, pp. 41, 96-99.

5. The condition of the Moslem population under Italian rule deserves a separate study. On Na'ib al-Sultan, see above.

6. Baruni, passim; Griffin, pp. 123-124.

7. Fezzan, I, pp. 55, 78-79, 147-149; Tripolitania, III, p. 31.
8. See above, Chapter Two.

9. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 12, 13 August 1917, FO 371/2930.

10. Baruni, p. 533; Sa`id, III, pp. 319-320. See above Chapters Two and Three.

11. On Nuri and İshak see above, Chapters Two and Three. ASD, the Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 24 August 1918, AG, 148.

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12. See above, Chapter Two. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 12 June 1918, AG, 152 (23) details names of local notables and their positions.

13. PRO, the Foreign Office to the Italian Embassy in London, 10 July 1912, FO 371/1527; McClure, p. 150.

14. Le Moniteur Oriental, 1 July 1912; Ahmad, pp. 138-139.

15. Times, 6 September 1912.

16. BBA, BEO, No. 298674, Sedaret to Meclis-i Mebusan, 15 Kanunuevvel 1327 [28 November 1911].

17. Times, 7, 19, 25 October 1911; Ahmad, p. 96.

18. Enver, p. 13; ASD, the Consul in Alexandria to the Foreign Office, 22 August, 17 December 1912, SP, 143.

19. See above, Chapters Two and Three.

20. Numerous details in DBA. See also Abbott, pp. 4-6.

21. Diary of Mahmud Şevket Paşa in Hayat, 8 April 1965.

22. ASD, Ministry of Colonies to the Foreign Office, Rome, 15 June 1914, SP, 162.

23. ASD, Memorandum on "Turkish Animosity", 1914, AG, 153 (33).

24. Stoddard, p. 59; Bernstorff, p. 159; Trumpner, p. 283. Numerous details in MA files.

25. Among the titles given to the treasurer: mudir al-mal, sanduk emini, katib-i mal, katib-i a`sar, muharrir-i emlak. Baruni, pp. 217-218, 246-247. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 22 October 1915, FO 371/2356; 20 March 1916, FO 371/2668; 22 January 1917, FO 371/2930; 5 February, 6 September 1918, FO 371/3230.

26. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 22, 24 October 1915, FO 371/2356; 20 March 1916, FO 371/2668; 31 December 1917, 12 April 1918, FO 371/3230.

27. PRO, Intelligence Report, 3 May 1918, FO 371/3230; Enver, pp. 99-100.

28. Enver, loc.cit.

29. Ibid; PRO, the Commander of Solum to the Headquarters in Cairo, 16 February 1914, FO 371/1965.

30. PRO, loc.cit.

31. The Jew, 11 January 1912.

32. Enver, p. 52; Tanın, 26-29 July 1912.

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33. Gwatkin-Williams, 1916, pp. 81-83, 88; Stoddard, p. 87.

34. PRO, Intelligence Report, 28 April 1916, FO 371/2669.

35. See above, Chapter Three.

36. PRO, Intelligence Reports, 10 March 1916, FO 371/2668; 10 March 1918, FO 371/3230.

37. Baruni, pp. 244-245; PRO, Wingate to the Foreign Office, 1, 6 September 1917, FO 371/2930.

38. Abbott, pp. 206-208; Bennet, pp. 237-238; PRO, the Consul in Tripoli to the Foreign Office, 2 August, 24 September 1916, FO 371/2683.

39. PRO, Kitchener to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 27 March 1913, FO 371/1638; Intelligence Report, December 1913, FO 371/1965.

40. Francis, pp. 191-192; L'Illustration, 20 July 1912; PRO, Intelligence Reports, 5 January, 4 February 1916, FO 371/2668. On uniforms, including hats: Enver, pp. 58-59; Seppings-Wright, pp. 28-29, and in photographs.

41. Francis, pp. 194-195; PRO, Intelligence Report, 13 February 1916, FO 371/2668.

42. AA, the Embassy in Istanbul to the General Staff/Political Division, 9 May 1916, WK 11 u/2.

43. e.g. Bennet, pp. 69, 127, 200; PRO, Intelligence Report, 13 January 1916, FO 371/2668.

44. Tanın, 25 March 1912, 15 March 1914; BBA, MTND, vol. 18, pp. 105-106, 3 Mart 1328 [16 March 1912]; PRO, Kitchener to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 5 December 1913, FO 371/1640.

45. Baruni, pp. 354-356; ASD, Turkish Animosity, 1914, AG, 153 (53); PRO, Intelligence Reports, 25 December 1915, 14 January 1916, FO 371/2668, AA, Report from Misurata, March 1918, WK 11 u/5.

46. PRO, Intelligence Report, 7 January 1916, FO 371/2668.

47. PRO, Intelligence Report, 18 March 1917, FO 371/2930.

48. PRO, Intelligence Report, 3 January 1916, FO 371/2668.

49. Dajani, pp. 209-210; Baruni, pp. 246-248; BBA, BEO, No. 300028, Dahiliye to Sedaret, 22 Kanunusani 1327 [4 February 1912].

50. Numerous details in BBA, BEO, files 1027/67/2, 1027/67/6; Abbott, pp. 168 ff.

51. Sforza, p. 258; Massey, pp. 146-147.

52. See above in the Introduction.

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53. Times, 3 October 1911; Tanin, 6 December 1911.

54. Remond, passim.

55. PRO, Kitchener to the Foreign Office, Cairo, 16, 23 December 1911, FO 371/1260; 24 February 1912, FO 371/1527.

56. Enver, pp. 32, 42, 67; Fraccaroli, pp. 224-228.

57. Ostler, pp. 62-63; Griffin, p. 45; Theilhaber, pp. 28-29.

58. See above, ns. 56, 57.

59. Baruni, p. 258; Griffin, pp. 121-122, 188.

60. Depois, Libya, pp. 50-51; Times, 7 July 1913; PRO, Annual Report, 1913, Rome, FO 371/2004.

61. PRO, Intelligence Reports, November 1915-April 1916, FO 371/2356, FO 371/2668. On the "Mirr Station": AA, Reports from Misurata, 1918, WK 11 u/5.

62. Gregory, pp. 47-49; Hildebrand, pp. 235-236.

63. The Jew, 10, 24 November 1910, 29 October 1911.

64. Dajani, p. 168; Lapworth, pp. 126-127; Rossi, pp. 320-321.

65. Theilhaber, pp. 38-40; Griffin, p. 62.

66. Times, 2, 3, 8 November 1911; Charlton, p. 4.

67. L'Illustration, 3 February, 22 June 1912; Abbott, p. 250; Enver, p. 39; Ertuğrul, pp. 12, 104; Ostler, pp. 61, 81; Yakınlarından Hatıralar, pp. 106-111; BBA, MVM, vol. 165, No. 224, 16 Mayıs 1328 [29 May 1912]; MVM, vol. 168, No. 461, 12 Ağustos 1328 [25 August 1912] includes details on the medical staff. Numerous details in the Istanbul press.

68. Afifi, pp. 289-300; Enver, p. 39; Qub`ayn, p. 83; Kutay 1967, p. 53; L'illustration, 15 June 1912.

69. Ostler, pp. 303-308; Griffin, pp. 53-66; Abbott, pp. 54, 247-250.

70. Theilhaber, passim; Abbott, pp. 247-250; Ostler, pp. 244-255; Tanın, 11, 13 March 1912; PRO, the Ambassador in Berlin to the Foreign Office, 11 January, 23 June 1912, FO 371/1529; BBA, BEO, No. 317164, Sedaret to Harbiye, 26 Teşrinievvel 1329 [8 November 1913]; Ceride-ye Askeriye, 22 Kanunuevvel 1327 [4 January 1912], pp. 797-798.

71. Ostler, pp. 174, 244; McCullagh, p. 358; Theilhaber, p. 42.

72. Times, 5 February 1912; Griffin, p. 238; McCullagh, p. 358; DBA, Correspondence in 643 S.

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73. Times, 14 October 1911; Maltese, pp. 352-353.

74. Griffin, passim; Baruni, p. 428.

75. Gwatkin-Williams, 1916, pp. 22-23; H.R.S. pp. 37-38, 92-103.

76. Abbott, pp. 70-71, 245-247, 309; Griffin, pp. 162-163, 225-226, 230-232; CBA, Derne Kumandanı Günlük Emir Defteri, e.g., order of 9 Mayıs 1328 [22 May 1912].

77. Abbott, pp. 54, 168; Ostler, pp. 81-82, 305-308; Enver, p. 39; Griffin, p. 62; Theilhaber, p. 42; L'Illustration, 15 June 1912.

78. Massey, p. 161; H.R.S., pp. 37-38.

79. Enver, p. 32, 45, 53, 99-100; Stoddard, p. 86; L'Illustration, 22 June 1912.

80. Enver, p. 100; Tanın, 12 February 1913; PRO, Intelligence Reports, 8, 12 March 1916, FO 371/2668.

81. Stoddard, p. 86; PRO, Intelligence Report, 29 June 1916, FO 371/2669; British-Sanusi relations, Cab. 44/14.

82. AA, Report from Misurata, November 1917, WK 11 u/4; MA, General Staff to Admiralty, Berlin, 24 May 1917, RM 5/v 2352,

83. Abbott, p. 312.

84. Johnson, 1973, pp. 49-59; PRO, Intelligence Report, 10 December 1917, FO 371/3230.

85. Abbott, p. 251; PRO, Intelligence Reports, FO 371/3230.

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98. PRO, Intelligence Report, 6 April 1916, FO 371/2668.

99. Enver, pp. 36-37; BBA, BEO, No. 300670, Sedaret to Harbiye, 16 Şubat 1327 [29 February 1912].

100. See above, Chapter One.

101. PRO, Intelligence Report, 24 October 1915, FO 371/2356.

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103. Abbott, pp. 120-121; McCullagh, p. 358.

104. Bevione, p. 284; Lapworth, pp. 189-190; McCullagh, pp. 81, 297-298; PRO, the Consul in Benghazi to the Foreign Office, 4 October 1913, FO, 371/1662; General Headquarters, Cairo, 1, 4 April 1917, FO 141/651.

105. Abbott, p. 265; Ostler, pp. 284-287.

106. Enver, pp. 76-77; Griffin, pp. 199-200, 237; Afifi, pp. 294, 298; H.R.S., pp. 17-20, 56-57, 85-87.

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108. Irace, pp. 178-179; Francis, pp. 183-184; Gwatkin-Williams, 1916, pp. 22-23.

109. Abbott, pp. 198-199; Bennet, p. 59; Griffin, pp. 199-200; Gwatkin-Williams, 1919, pp. 86-88, 94; Baruni, p. 191.

110. Abbott, p. 101; Griffin, pp. 123-124; Francis, pp. 195-196.

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