

ISLAMKUNDLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN · BAND 83

William J. Griswold

The Great Anatolian Rebellion

1000 - 1020 / 1591 - 1611

KLAUS SCHWARZ VERLAG · BERLIN · 1983



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Griswold

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ISLAMKUNDLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN · BAND 83

herausgegeben von

Klaus Schwarz

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Abbreviations Used in Endnotes

AET	Ali Emiri Tasnifi
AKDAĞ-1	M. Akdağ, <u>Celâli İsyamları</u>
AKDAĞ-2	M. Akdağ, "Celâli İsyamları..."
AKDAĞ-3	M. Akdağ, "Karayazidji"
ALDERSON	A.D. Alderson, <u>The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty</u>
ALLEN	W.E.D. Allen, <u>Problems of Turkish Power...</u>
AMASYA TARİHİ	Amasyalı A.H. Hüsameddin, <u>Amasya Tarihi</u>
ANDREASYAN	H.D. Andreasyan, "Bir Ermini Kaynağına göre <u>Celâli İsyamları</u> "
ANON-1	Anon, "Abaza Pasa"
ANON-2	Anon, "Canbulad"
ARAKEL-1	M. Brosset, <u>Collection d'historiens Arméniens...</u>
ARAKEL-2	M. Brosset, "Des historiens Arméniens..."
ARGENTI	P.P. Argenti, <u>The religious minorities of Chios...</u>
AV	Archivio di Stato (Venezia)
AYNI ALI	Aynî Ali Efendi, <u>Kavanin âl-i Osman</u>
BAKHIT	M.A. Bakhit, "Aleppo and the Ottoman Military..."
BARKAN	O.L. Barkan, "The Price Revolution of the sixteenth century..."
BAUSANI	A. Bausani, <u>The Persians...</u>
BAYERLE-1	G. Bayerle, <u>Ottoman Diplomacy...</u>
BAYERLE-2	G. Bayerle, "The Compromise at Zsitvatorok..."

ABBREVIATIONS /continued/

BELIN	M. Belin, "Du Régime des fiefs militaires..."
BIRGE	J.K. Birge, <u>The Bektashi order of dervishes</u>
BOSWORTH	C.E. Bosworth, ed., <u>Iran and Islam...</u>
BRAUDE & LEWIS	B. Braude and B. Lewis, <u>Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire...</u> , I.
BRAUDEL	F. Braudel, <u>The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World...</u>
BURINI	al-Hasan al-Burini, <u>Tarādjim al-acyān...</u> (MS)
CARALI-1	P. Carali, <u>Alī Bāshā Jānbūlāt</u>
CARALI-2	P. Carali, <u>Fakhr ad-din II, principe del Libano...</u>
CARTWRIGHT	J. Cartwright, <u>The preachers travels</u>
CHODZKO	A. Chodzko, <u>Specimens of the Popular Poetry of Persia...</u>
COOK-1	M.A. Cook, ed., <u>A History of the Ottoman Empire...</u>
COOK-2	M.A. Cook, ed., <u>Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East</u>
CSP-FOREIGN	R.B. Wernham, ed., <u>Calendar of state papers, XXIII</u>
CSP-SAMANCAS	M.A.S. Hume, <u>Calendar of letters and state papers...III</u>
CSP-VENICE	H.F. Brown, <u>Calendar of state papers... pertaining to Venice, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII</u>
DANIŞMEND	İ.H. Danişmend, <u>İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi, III</u>
DARKOT	B. Darkot, "Kilis"
DAVIES	D.W. Davies, <u>Elizabethans Errant...</u>
DELLA VALLE	G. Havers, trans., <u>The travels of Sig. Pietro della Valle...</u>

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

DJUVARA	T.G. Djuvara, <u>Cent Projets...</u>
DON JUAN	G. Le Strange, ed., <u>Don Juan of Persia...</u>
EVLIYA	Mehmet Zilli Evliya Çelebi, <u>Seyahatnâme</u>
FEZLEKE	Kâtib Çelebi, <u>Fezleke-i Tarih-i Osmani...</u> , I
FUGGER	F. von Klarwill, <u>The Fugger News-letters...</u>
GÖKBİLGİN	T. Gökbilgin, "Hasan Pasa Sokulluzâde..."
GOODWIN	G. Goodwin, <u>A history of Ottoman architecture...</u>
GOR	J. von Hammer-Purgstall, <u>Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches...</u> IV
de GROOT	A.H. de Groot, <u>The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic</u>
GÜÇER	L. Güçer, XVI-XVII asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda hububat meselesi...
HADŽIBEGIĆ	H. Hadžibegić, "Rasprova Ali Cauša..."
HBZ	A. Hasanbeyzade, <u>Telhis-i tac üt-tevarih</u> (MS)
HILL	G.F. Hill, <u>A History of Cyprus...</u> IV
HOLT	P.M. Holt, <u>Egypt and the Fertile Crescent</u>
IBN ĞUM'A	H. Laoust, <u>Les gouveneurs de Damas...</u>
İNALCIK-1	H. İnalcık, "Harir"
İNALCIK-2	H. İnalcık, <u>The Ottoman Empire...</u>
IORGA	N. Iorga, <u>Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches...</u>
JENNINGS	R. Jennings, "Urban population in Anatolia..."
KARPAT	K. Karpat, <u>An inquiry into the social foundations of nationalism</u>



ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

KKT	Kâmil Kepeci Tasnifi
KNOLLES 1603	R. Knolles, <u>The generall historie of the Turkes...</u>
KNOLLES 1687	R. Knolles, <u>The Turkish History</u> , I
KOÇUBEG	W.F.A. Behrnauer, "Koğabeg's Abhandlung..."
KORTEPETER	C.M. Kortepeter, <u>Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation</u>
KUNIHOLM	P. Kuniholm, "The Aegean dendrochronology project"
KUNT	İ.M. Kunt, "Ethnic Regional (Cins) Solidarity"
LADURIE	E. LeRoy-Ladurie, <u>Times of feast, times of famine...</u>
LAMMENS	H. Lammens, <u>La Syrie, précis historique</u>
LELLO	O. Burian, <u>The report of Lello</u>
LEWIS	B. Lewis, <u>Istanbul</u>
LITHGOW	W. Lithgow, <u>The totall discourse...</u>
MALCOLM	J. Malcolm, <u>The history of Persia...</u>
MANTRAN-1	R. Mantran, "Ahmad I"
MANTRAN-2	R. Mantran and J. Sauvaget, <u>Réglements fiscaux ottomans...</u>
MARITI	G. Mariti, <u>Istoria di Faccardino...</u>
MASSON	P. Masson, <u>Histoire du commerce française...</u>
MD	<u>Mühimme defterleri</u>
MDZ	<u>Mühimme defterleri zeyl</u>
MEDICI	Fondo archivistico Mediceo
MENAGE	V.L. Ménage, "Devshirme"
MENZIL	<u>Menzil defteri</u> No. 4108

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

- MINADOI A. Hartvvell, The history of the warres between the Tvrkes and the Persians...
- MINGANA A. Mingana, "List of Turkish governors..."
- MONSHI R.M. Savory, Transl., History of Shah 'Abbas...
- MUHIBBI F. Wüstenfeld, Fachr ed-din der Drusenfürst...
- NAFF & OWEN T. Naff and R. Owen, Studies in eighteenth century Islamic history
- ORHONLU C. Orhonlu, "Murad Pasa, Kuyucu"
- PAKALIN M.Z. Pakalın, Osmanlı tarih deyimleri... sözlüğü, I, II, III
- PARRY & YAPP V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp, ed., War, Technology and Society...
- PASTOR L. Pastor, The history of the Popes, XXIII
- PEÇÜYÎ I. Peçüyî, Tarih-i Peçüyî
- PITCHER D.E. Pitcher, An historical geography of the Ottoman Empire...
- PURCHAS S. Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas his pilgrimes..., VIII
- RAFEQ-1 A.-K. Rafeq, Bilād ash-Shām wa Misr...
- RAFEQ-2 A.-K. Rafeq, "The revolt of Ali Pasha Janbulad..."
- RELAZIONI E. Alberi, ed., Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti..., I, II, III
- RELAZIONI-SYRIA G. Berchet, ed., Relazioni dei consoli veneti nella Siria
- ROBSON C. Robson, Newes from Aleppo...
- RONDOT P. Rondot, "Djānbūlāt"
- SALIBI K.S. Salibi, "The Sayfā's and the eyālet of Tripoli..."

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

SALIGNAC	T. de Gontaut Biron, <u>Ambassade en Turquie...</u>
SALISBURY-1	M.S. Giuseppi, <u>Calendar of the Manuscripts...of Salisbury</u>
SALISBURY-2	E. Salisbury, ed., <u>Calendar of the Manuscripts...</u>
SANDERSON	W. Foster, ed., <u>The travels of John Sanderson...</u>
SANJIAN	A.K. Sanjian, <u>The Armenian communities in Syria...</u>
SARUHAN	M. Çağatay-Uluçay, <u>XVII asırda Saruhan...</u>
SAUVAGET	J. Sauvaget, <u>Alep...</u>
SCHNEIDER	S.H. Schneider, <u>The genesis strategy</u>
SHAW	S.J. Shaw, <u>History of the Ottoman Empire...</u>
SHIDYAQ	T. al-Shidyaq, <u>Kitāb-i akhbār al-acyān</u>
SHERLEY	E.D. Ross, ed., <u>Sir Anthony Sherley...</u>
SIMEON	H.D. Andreasyan, ed., <u>Polonyalı Simeon'un seyahatnâmesi</u>
SORANZO	A. Hartvvell, <u>The Ottoman of Lazaro Soranzo...</u>
SPO	State Paper Office
STEENSGAARD	N. Steensgaard, <u>The Asian trade revolution...</u>
SÜREYYA	M. Süreyya, <u>Sicill-i Osmânî...</u>
TANSEL	S. Tansel, <u>Yavus Sultan Selim</u>
TEKINDAĞ	M.C.Ş. Tekindağ, "Canbulat"
TKA	Topcular Kâtib Abdülkadir, <u>Tarih-i âl-i Osman</u> (MS)
TESTA	I. de Testa, <u>Recueil des traités...</u>
TREVOR	H.R. Trevor-Roper, "Fernand Braudel, the Annales, and the Mediterranean"

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

UZUNÇARŞILI	<u>I.H. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi III/1, III/2</u>
VASITI	<u>Vasiti, Telhisat der ahd-i Sultan Ahmad Han (MS)</u>
WITHERS	<u>R. Withers, A description of the Grand Signori's seraglio...</u>
WOOD	<u>A.C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company</u>

Orthography

Standard modern Turkish spelling has been used throughout this work except for such Anglicized words as pasha, Shiite, and so on. The Turkish alphabet is almost perfectly phonetic, but certain letters have a peculiarity of their own.

c	as	j, in <u>celâli</u> : jelali
ç	as	ch, in <u>çelebi</u> : chelebi
ğ	as	a lengthened vowel: <u>ağa</u> : a-a
ı	as	the u in <u>succeed</u>
j	as	zh in gendarme
ö	as	ö in German
ş	as	sh in <u>şer'i</u> : Shariat
ü	as	ü in German

Arabic titles follow the standard of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. Ottoman geographical terms follow modern Turkish orthography; Persian and European, their respective spellings and English transliterations.

Preface

More than sixty years ago J.H. Kramers, in the first edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam (II, p. 761), wrote of a late-sixteenth-century Anatolian rebel named "Kara Yazadji:"

The inner history of this rebellion, which continued until its bloody suppression by Murad Pasha in 1605, has not yet been sufficiently studied. It does not seem unreasonable to seek religious, pro-Shi'a motives behind it, as a name like Shahwerdi suggests. On the other hand, the moment was very favourable for a rebellion, the bulk of the Othmānli power being then occupied in Hungary at the siege of Kaniza.

Kramers' assertions still have validity, though one could enlarge and clarify some of the important issues he raises about these massive revolts, commonly called the Celālî (Djalālî) rebellions. The Ottoman government in Anatolia was weakened to the point of rebellion at that time because of factors other than poorly managed sieges. Changes in the landowning (timar) system, the paucity of leadership, and the effect of the European price revolution, to name but three well-known factors, played important roles in the breakdown of Ottoman governmental machinery in those days. The growth of population and a drop in average temperature throughout Anatolia may have played important roles in setting the stage for rebellion, though scholars still search for the data to prove or disprove these conditions. We have not enough documentation of



original sources classified and available to prove religious (particularly Shia) motivation of these rebellions.

But the subject, as Kramers pointed out so many years ago, "has not yet been sufficiently studied." Curious it is that though the Celâli rebellions are referred to in many articles and in all major histories of the Ottoman Empire, only two monographs on the subject have been written. A. Tveritina, a Soviet specialist, published a general study of the social qualities of the rebellion in 1946, and Mustafa Akdağ, using many Ottoman sources, carried the rebellions to about their halfway mark. The present work attempts to encompass the entire rebellion on the political level, from the battle of Mezö-keresztes in 1005/1596 when the already flourishing Celâlîs received a tremendous boost in trained manpower, to the founding in 1018/1609 of the Sultan Ahmed mosque, symbolizing for the contemporary Ottomans, at least, the end of the Great Celâli movement. This study has been greatly enhanced by much fundamental scholarship in the past twenty years by important Turkish researchers like Omer Lütfi Barkan, Halil İnalcık, Lütfi Güçer, Cengiz Orhonlu, and recently İ. Metin Kunt, as well as translations of important works like R. Savory's recent translation of Eskander Beg Monshi's history of Shah Abbas.

The present work, a restructuring of my doctoral dissertation, outlines the basic political aspects of the Celâli rebellions in the context of their internal Ottoman and interregional relations. My research brings me to two conclusions. First, the Celâli rebels wanted to reenter

the Ottoman governmental system, not to tear it down or replace it with separate states. They figured their long-term interests coincided with those of the Ottoman government in İstanbul, not with Shah Abbas in Isfahan or with European powers. The Celâlîs differed from previous Anatolian rebellions in that they could effectively fight against massed Ottoman armies due to technological changes in the warfare of the eleventh/seventeenth century. The Ottomans had increasingly to rely on musket men, not cavalry, either foot soldiers (known as sekban) or their mounted counterparts, the levends. Conversely, with plenty of dismissed or fugitive musket men available, the Celâlî rebels could hold their own against Ottoman forces to the point they could demand high office and great power--but always within the Ottoman system.

The second conclusion concerns the attempt by Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha, the Kurdish emir of Aleppo, to establish a state in northern Syria. Clearly the precipitous downfall of the Canbulad family after the battle of Oruç Ovası indicates the inadequate plans and battle strength of Ali Pasha, but it does not identify him with the Celâlîs of Anatolia. Ali's symbolic retaliation against the Ottoman government for the slaying of his uncle, his direct contacts with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, his north Syrian tribal connections and localized power structure, and his attempt to build a protective ring about the Aleppan region with the clear intention of developing the trading possibilities of the port of Iskenderun are all features which put his struggle on a different level from

those of the Celâlis like Kara Yazıcı, Deli Hasan, or Kalenderoğlu Mehmed. Ali Pasha and the Canbulads of Kilis came within a sword's length of establishing a Kurdish state in Aleppo, independent of the Ottoman Turks. That Ali's plan for a state had real possibilities of success proved attractive to his Syrian colleague, Ma'noğlu Fahreddin, whose headquarters lay south in Beirut. A decade after Ali Pasha's execution, Fahreddin followed the same pattern--and succeeded to the point that some historians assert the Ma'noğlu experience established the foundations of the modern state of Lebanon.

Both rebellions, the Celâlis and the separatist movement of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha, thoroughly shocked the Ottoman ruling elite and forced important political changes--at least for the time of the rebellion. The fear-some nature of the rebellions and the almost miraculous success over them by the elderly grand vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha brought forth a feeling of grateful relief among the Ottomans in Istanbul, who watched the erection of the great Blue Mosque as symbolic of a remarkable victory. With time, however, the mosque memorialized the continuing refusal of the Ottomans to recognize the changes which new economics and new technologies had wrought.

Acknowledgments

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I Interregional Diplomacy and the Battle of Mezö-keresztes

In the years following the death of Süleyman the Magnificent in 974/1566, the Ottoman state expanded west to Cyprus and the North African coastland, clashed in the north against the Christian Habsburgs, and jabbed east into Safavid Persia. Although the Ottomans conquered Cyprus and Tunis (and suffered the famous defeat at Lepanto) a series of Pyrrhic victories in Persia seriously weakened the political cohesiveness of the Anatolian heartland. Changes in military technology, extraordinary demands on war-weary troops, and the drying up of the sources of war booty rapidly changed a dynamic state into a static power. A changed mood in Europe, following the victory at Lepanto, created a climate among Christian leadership for a new anti-Muslim crusade south along the Danube River.

1. *The Persian Wars to 998/1590*


Anatolians had long experienced war in the eastern region of their peninsula. Even before the victory at Çaldıran against Persia (920/1514), the Ottoman Turks had developed a political fear and theological repugnance for the Turkoman and Caucasian tribes which made up the new Shia state of Persia. After the victory at Çaldıran the Ottomans found that the vast areas they occupied in the east chafed under their centralized rule.¹ Nests of Shia sympathetic to the Safavid dynasty remained in Anatolia throughout the reign of Sultan Süleyman.² The expansion of his armies tended to unify local hatred rather than dissipate it. Along both sides of the frontiers after Süleyman's peace of 962/1555 Shia groups felt afflicted by the rule of the Ottomans. For the government, expensive



provisioning caravans had to be outfitted annually--a long, dangerous, and often disastrous funnelling of Ottoman treasure to regions east of the Black Sea. The far-seeing grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha established political arrangements with the Uzbeks east of Persia with which to balance the growing and dangerous Safavid power.³ But adherence to balance and realism, the keys to Sokollu Mehmed's foreign policy, appealed to few of the ruling elite in Istanbul. When he was executed, a new war party took power.⁴

Evidence exists that by 988/1580-1581 the eastern Anatolian Shia had mobilized for a kind of holy war against the Sunni Ottomans.⁵ When internal Persian political unity dissolved among squabbling Turkoman and Caucasian tribes, the new Ottoman war party saw an opportunity to stabilize and reinforce their rule in the east. Under the direction of Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha, Ottoman armies rolled in huge numbers after 986/1579 to attack the leaderless Persians. In four years of extraordinary effort a series of important forts were taken, from Kars to Erivan, and from Tabriz to Ganja to Darband, on the west coast of the Caspian.⁶ An Ottoman link-up with the Uzbeks to form an enormous trans-continental bridge of Sunni states from the Danube to India's Moghul Empire appeared inevitable. Such a result would, of course, halt the growth of the Persian Safavids.

The Ottoman victories, however, came at great cost. Not only did Grand Vizier Siyavuş Pasha admit in 996/1588 that the total Ottoman revenues were a third less than the expenditures, but the capture of vast areas of Shia terri-



tory embittered the divided Safavid Persians who vowed they would return to retake the captured lands.⁷ The Ottomans could hardly ignore such signs of discontent. As the lines of communication stretched farther to the east, Safavid partisans incessantly attacked their flanks.⁸ Each winter took its inevitable toll as thousands of Ottoman soldiers, tons of valuable war material, and numberless animals succumbed to the seemingly endless military demands. The sultan's forces could not establish real political stability in the newly occupied lands. But as long as the Safavids were divided against themselves the Ottomans could remain.

Then, in 995/1587 the Persians acknowledged as shah a man who became one of the greatest leaders in their history, Shah Abbas I (d. 1038/1629). The then sixteen-year-old monarch clearly recognized his weak position between the inexorable Ottomans and the expanding Uzbeks. He very wisely decided to bow to superior strength. In 998/1590 he sued for peace at Amasya in Ottoman Anatolia. Abbas felt helpless, frustrated. His lands had already been twice invaded from the east by the Shaybanid Uzbeks. Yet he had to accept this loss in the west. For the time, therefore, he turned toward the Uzbeks--but he never forgot what the Ottoman Turks had obtained, nor what they had forced him to sign away at the Peace of Amasya.

2. *The Wars in Europe to 1000/1591-1592*

Both Europe and the Ottomans felt a growing sense of the inevitability of open conflict in the latter tenth/

sixteenth century. The Ottoman capture of Cyprus from Venice (979/1571), followed closely that same year by their defeat at Lepanto and then the successful reoccupation of Tunis (982/1574) in North Africa, actually extended Ottoman sea power into the western Mediterranean. Turkish ships sailed along the French and Spanish coasts at will; Turkish pirates scoured the southern European coasts for slaves and booty. Yet the Ottomans followed a generally defensive maritime policy. The same disquietude which provoked their occupation of Cyprus and Tunis continued: Christian corsairs attacked their galleys, the Dalmatian Uskoks violated their shipping throughout the eastern Mediterranean, and the Duke of Tuscany preyed on their commerce.⁹ The Turks realized that Venice had accepted a demeaning treaty in 980/1573 when they gave up Cyprus. They also knew the Christian world would certainly attempt, at an opportune moment, to recapture the island.


Through the eyes of Christian statesmen, the Ottoman sultan symbolized a malignancy in southeast Europe. Spain especially feared Turkish naval expansion and the possible reestablishment of a Muslim power in Granada. Directly and indirectly the King of Spain supported anti-Ottoman piracy in the Mediterranean. Some in Christian Europe felt the time had come for a direct land attack on the Ottomans. According to the zealous comments of European ambassadors at the Porte, not only had the Ottoman defense structure considerably weakened in the region of the Danube, but the Empire was "falling apart."¹⁰ Foremost in this kind of thinking was the Pope himself.

Clement VIII, elected in 1592, began almost at once to stir up loyal Catholic sentiment for a crusade against the Ottomans.¹¹ Anti-Muslim activities seemed operable for three reasons. First, the French connection with the Turk, since 942/1536 a counterpoise to the Habsburgs, had weakened considerably. The uncrowned Henry of Navarre, aspiring to be King Henry IV, had to spend his time and energy occupying Paris and unifying his kingdom rather than attacking the Habsburgs like his predecessors. Second, with France embroiled in a religious civil war, Imperial Habsburg armies could more easily muster and march south-east, intervening in Hungarian and Balkans politics, exerting pressure on the Ottoman forces, at the same time imposing a strict counter-Reformation regimen on all Christians, dissident Catholics as well as Protestants.¹² A third argument for the success of an anti-Ottoman policy: the Persian Safavid state, thought Pope Clement, would be counted on to help against the Turkish sultan, a policy which by the turn of the Christian century would include an embassy to Isfahan of the celebrated English Sherley brothers.¹³ The maritime strategy of the Pope included Catholic Portuguese, Uskok, and occasional Maltese and Tuscan pirates to turn a strong vise on Ottoman shipping and military effectiveness in the Arabian Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. On land the Shia Persians could command the Fertile Crescent, cutting off Syria and the Holy Places (and possibly Egypt) while the armies of well-trained Habsburg mercenaries would pour south toward the ancient city of Christian emperors, Constantinople.

The Habsburgs for their part, though not possessed of inexhaustible resources, devised a variety of methods to offend and provoke the Ottomans. They knew of the severe weaknesses brought on the Turks by the eastern campaigns against the Persians. Habsburg generals for years had built defensive fortresses at points where Ottoman weakness might be exploited. For example, the Austrians moved settlers into the border areas where they acted as constant irritants to the Ottomans. And in the border regions with Ottoman Hungary, the Habsburgs deliberately caused a festering of human misery which could only lead to open war with the Turks.¹⁴ Supporting these Habsburg border settlements, well-trained mercenaries from Italy, Germany, and the Spanish Netherlands reacted to even slight Ottoman affronts, escalating the antagonisms, purposely afflicting the always bellicose Ottoman frontier guards.¹⁵ Along with excellent training, the soldiers of Christian Europe possessed technologically superior weapons: muskets of greater accuracy and cannon of greater fire power. They also made extensive use of the pike which, in the sixteenth century, had become a standard European weapon against attacking cavalry, a technique which the Ottomans never imitated.¹⁶

If by 1000/1591-1592 the Christian Habsburgs felt confident enough to capitalize on Ottoman weaknesses, the Turks had every intention of expanding Islam into the Abode of War, the region of the infidel Europeans. The arguments of the war party in the sultan's Divan convinced Sultan Murad III of the righteousness of their cause. In the east the Persians had accepted the dictated peace at Amasya in





998/1590, while the Uzbeks were keeping the young shah totally occupied in his northeast regions. In Hungary, the border situation had verged on war for years. Unlike the Balkans, where Ottoman rule had been accepted by virtually all parties, the laws established by Sultan Süleyman in Hungary had never been given much chance of success. The Habsburg commanders purposely (and in obvious violation of the terms of the treaty) made life miserable for both Christians and Muslims in the region.¹⁷ The Turks responded in kind, their own commanders disregarding the treaty to carry out forays against the infidels, both in cities and rural areas, often in direct disobedience to the sultan's orders.¹⁸ The Habsburgs almost always withheld sending the annual tribute and other required donatives which, although encompassing a relatively small sum, amounted to a symbolic snub which the Ottomans could not ignore.

Within the Ottoman Empire an economic argument for active warfare also prevailed. Retention of the eroding regions of Walachia, Transylvania, and Moldavia held high priority, for Istanbul counted on the important flow of meat and various cereal grains to help feed their capital city as well as income from the tax base established in those rich agricultural lands. A successful war against the Habsburgs would bring security to the region. For the hard-pressed Ottoman treasury an increase in territories would bring an increase in general revenues (not to mention the immediate absorption of war booty) to meet the growing demand for cash. The need for high value coinage appealed



to more than a bookkeeper's objectives: the devaluation of the Ottoman akçe in 992/1584 caused the daily-wage soldiers, especially the powerful kapıkulu (slave troops) to demand salary increases commensurate with the inflationary trends of the time. When increases were refused, the Janissaries rioted fearfully. Two years after these bloody upsets the sipahis of the Porte (special mounted daily-wage soldiers in Istanbul) rioted. Then the Janissaries twice again rose up, in 997/1589 and 999/1591, and the sipahis once again in 1001/1593.¹⁹ A new source of internal trouble arose when musket men, mustered out after the end of the Persian wars in 998/1590, became vagabonds in Anatolia, seeking and doing mischief. The government could best solve this problem by channeling all these dangerous but well-trained men into the more useful pursuit of war--in Hungary.²⁰

The final argument was theological. Not only had the Habsburgs insulted the Ottoman sultan by suddenly attacking the Croatian border troops near Sisak on the Kulpa River, the Christians had occupied Muslim territory, had murdered thousands of the sultan's soldiers, and had enslaved his people. The issue could not be viewed simply as a political matter: the Ottomans through holy warfare must reconquer the land and chasten the peoples. Like their gazi ancestors, the war-party of the Ottoman Divan determined to triumph in God's war with their swords.²¹

3. *How the New Warfare Affected the Ottoman Land System*

In the late tenth/sixteenth century the Ottomans felt the impact of a changing economy. The increase in the cost of all goods, due to inflation, resulted not only from the often cited "European Price Revolution" which accompanied the increase in Spanish silver production from the New World, but also from an increase in the general Mediterranean population, with corresponding demands on the available goods and resources.²² An Ottoman loss of territory, such as Hungary, Walachia, or Transylvania, would tend to increase the price of goods in Istanbul. After the devaluation of 992/1584, the standard Ottoman akçe no longer bought the same quantity as in the past, an act frustrating not only to the Janissaries and sipahis of the Porte, but also to the ordinary re'aya (non-military) of the cities.²³

The perplexed government searched everywhere for acceptable sources of revenue. Now that the expansion of the Empire had virtually ceased and booty seldom filled the treasury, the only constant source of revenue was the remaining re'aya, peasants as well as merchants, since the askerî (who made up the military and religious leadership) lived tax free. A far less plentiful source, the foreign merchant, varied in amount due to supply and demand factors, as well as the venality of a particular local tax collector.²⁴

To gain new sources of revenue within the Empire the government began to tamper with the ancient land-tenure or

timar system.²⁵ Vacant timar holdings could be sold to non-askerî who possessed great wealth. These would then rent the arable plots to the peasants resulting in a guaranteed fixed income for the state. The sale of such lands, though eventually leading to the demise of the Ottoman social and political system of the previous two centuries, made fiscal sense when considered from the point of view of changing modes and costs of warfare.²⁶

Simply put, it now cost more than in previous decades to do battle with the infidel. By mid-century pitched battles with cavalry charges occurred less frequently on the Ottoman borderlands with Austria. Although horsemen were sometimes needed, increasingly long, tedious, and very expensive sieges were accomplished by men specializing in mining and sapping.²⁷ Needed also were musket men, sharpshooters, and mobile infantry. The demand for infantry not only led to a renewed call for Christian boys in the Balkans (to replace the Janissary infantry lost in the battles) but also to recruit jobless Muslim lads into provincial militia.²⁸ Called sekbans, these men received daily wages, were trained to operate muskets, remained under the command of their local captains, and were mustered out as soon as their services ended.²⁹ Where the Ottoman cavalry was at a severe disadvantage against the Habsburg pikes and devastating musket fire,³⁰ the sekbans could rapidly learn effective measure both for attack and defense. The costs for such individuals, though low, had to be multiplied by the scores of hundreds needed to equip and complete the

battalions to face the equally or better-equipped Habsburg troops.³¹

For the timar-holders the new Hungarian wars proved an extraordinary burden. Anger spread when their customary units were broken up and men received assignments at such duties as fortress-making and road building.³² Though part of the sultan's askerî forces, they felt anger at leadership not sensitive to their needs.³³ Officers above the sancakbeyi (provincial lord) level were of the sultan's slave household, and these often originated as Christian devşirme (collected levies) from the Balkans, or their sons. Strong internal loyalty existed among these elite leaders of the Ottoman general staff, who sympathized more with the people and problems of the European region than those of Anatolia.³⁴ In the capital, Anatolians had a reputation for being "bad soldiers," according to a foreign contemporary, and were maligned by the elites as "natural Turks," unlike the kapıkulu slaves of the sultan.³⁵

The Anatolian cavalry man on duty in Hungary faced severe morale problems. He knew his homeland suffered famines and plagues.³⁶ For almost twenty years his region suffered certain unpredictable agricultural conditions which, with the political unrest and economic squeeze, adversely affected his peasant re'aya, the basic taxpayer. Earthquakes destroyed certain regions of Anatolia: in 1000/1592 central Amasya was rocked;³⁷ in 1004/1595 a particularly bad earthquake damaged a huge area in western Anatolia;³⁸ and Amasya was again struck in 1007/1598 with a severe tremor. Many Anatolians fully expected that the

Muslim year 1000 heralded the Last Days before the end of the world.⁴⁰

The Anatolian timar-holder knew his world had changed almost beyond recognition. His long absences at war, as well as the economic imbalances, had allowed a series of local uprisings to occur which could not easily be controlled by the limited local constabularies. Since the end of the Persian wars in 998/1590 certain armed bandits, in groups of twenty-five or fifty--or more--and called by the government "Celâlis,"⁴¹ increasingly added to the insecurity of life on the peninsula. With all this, the average landholding sipahi had to keep himself within narrow margins of tolerated behavior. The government sought any excuse to remove him from the land register rolls in order to sell or rent his valuable real estate for much-needed cash income. Not only might his lands be sold, but his horse also, thus totally incapacitating him for important military duties.⁴² On occasion (often for sound military reasons) the regional commanders demanded that Anatolian cavalry men winter in the Balkans or Hungary instead of returning home. Though this infuriated the hard-pressed Anatolians, they had to curb their anger lest they be declared rebels and lose their lands.⁴³

4. Open Warfare and Internal Tensions

When in 1001/1593 the Ottoman-Habsburg tension escalated into open warfare, no one on either side realized it might last thirteen years. After a disastrous loss at the

Kulpa River in 1001/1593 the war party in Istanbul demanded a counterstroke, while the victorious Habsburgs increased their military advantage. Austrian armies moved to capture Ottoman territories along the Danube. In 1004/1595 the city of Esztergom/Gran in central Hungary fell to the Christians. The Ottomans counterattacked, and by 1005/1596 Sultan Mehmed III's forces took the city of Eger/Erlau. The Ottomans had thrown every available man and animal into the conflict.⁴⁴

Against the heavily armed Habsburg forces, traditional tactics using lightly armed Ottoman horsemen proved a considerable disadvantage.⁴⁵ At the siege of Esztergom/Gran the Austrians beat off the most persistent Ottoman cavalry countercharges with their superior armor. Replacement horses for the Turks were in short supply not only because of the terrible costs of the Danubian warfare but also because of the demands on Anatolian horse stock made by the Persian wars which had ended only five years before.⁴⁶ All the while, the Ottoman counterattacks tended to demand even more extensive use of the overworked cavalry personnel than before.⁴⁷

With the escalation of battle in Hungary and decreasing numbers of Ottoman victories, Ottoman leadership began to witness rising tensions among the sultan's forces. The always-needed Janissary infantry men appeared to receive favors over the landed sipahis. In 1003/1595 some Janissaries refused to appear for spring muster, but were not disciplined. That same year, the sipahioğlans, the elite of the slave elites, received sufferance to muster

six months late. In the battle in 1005/1596 for the city of Hatvan, two important kapıkulu viziers utterly failed their duty: Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, whose laggard troops came too late to relieve the defenders, and Mehmed Pasha, the son of Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha, who fled with his troops from the battle.⁴⁸ Both men received warnings and admonitions, but were later reinstated in their leadership roles.⁴⁹

If the slave troops received indulgence, the landed cavalry got more than their needed discipline. So great were the demands made on the cavalry by the Ottoman leadership that the horsemen finally refused to march with the grand vizier's forces in 1001/1593, an impertinence which the commander-in-chief, Koca Sinan Pasha, accepted on condition that they arrive by 24 Zi'lhicce/20 September--after the harvests--but he clearly threatened to remove their names from the land register rolls if they failed to meet the new time schedule.⁵⁰ Such audacity by the timarli sipahis was not forgotten by the sultan's leadership.

Tensions among all the Ottoman forces continued to rise as each attempt to achieve victory in Hungary failed. Due to the extraordinary cold during the winter of 1002/1593-1594, the field commander, Koca Sinan Pasha acceded to the demands of his cavalry that they winter in Belgrade instead of mounting an attack.⁵¹ In 1003/1595 a cavalry unit became intractable, refused to attack, and murdered its commanders.⁵² Morale sank to the depths when the news came in 1004/1595 that Visegrad had fallen to the Christian enemy due to the treachery of a Janissary (who became a

Christian priest) making futile all the previous bloodshed and treasure.⁵³ The army felt intense indignation when, in the same year, two overzealous bureaucrats held up an Ottoman retreat at a Danube bridge in order to collect the sultan's canonical one-fifth of booty taken in battle. Seeing the bottleneck, Michael the Brave's Walachian forces moved in their artillery and lacerated the Ottoman troops, killing thousands.⁵⁴ Unquestionably, by 1004/1596 both the leadership and the ranks of the Ottomans needed a decisive victory, an opportunity to leave the field with honor, perhaps even to extricate themselves from an unwinnable war.

5. *The Firâris of Mezö-keresztes (1005/1596)*

Major defeats such as the one at the Danube River only added to the determination of the Ottoman slave elite, who resolved to triumph over the Habsburgs. After months of slow Habsburg movement, increasing successes, and avoidance of pitched battles, the two armies met in the extraordinarily cold autumn of 1005/1596.⁵⁵ The place was just west of the city of Eger/Erlau in the plain of Mezö-keresztes. Due to the seriousness of the Habsburg invasion, the Ottoman troops had demanded the recently enthroned Sultan Mehmed III to tent on the battlefield and lead his army.⁵⁶

Beginning on 2 Rebi'ülevvel 1005/24 October 1596, the battle lasted for three days. After the first day the Habsburgs clearly held the field and one Ottoman general, Ca'fer Pasha, fought bravely but retired with his spent forces westward toward Pest.⁵⁷ The field commander, Damad

Ibrahim Pasha, for some reason placed the Anatolian cavalry on the sultan's right, a place generally reserved for the native forces (in this case the Rumeli or European cavalry), who would naturally be expected to fight more tenaciously in their homelands. The next day's battle lines showed that the stronger of the Austrian wings faced the Anatolians who were inferior in armament if not in bravery. During this day's battle, which again went badly for the Ottomans, the sultan became so frightened that he too fled to the rear in an oxcart, leaving his tents and his command to his brother-in-law Damad Ibrahim Pasha.⁵⁸ Just at nightfall the Habsburg troops could be seen headed toward the Ottoman pavilions, where they began to gather up Ottoman booty. The cavalry, particularly those from Rumeli, had already retreated south to save what they could.⁵⁹

About the middle of the third day the entire momentum of battle changed. At an opportune moment the tardy commander of the relief armies at Hatvan, Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, brought up his Tatar cavalry for a reckless counterstroke against the Austrians. Noticing that the enemy forces, against the specific orders of their commander, had found their way to the sultan's tents and were busy carrying off whatever loot they could grab, Sinan Pasha brilliantly attacked with a sharp thrust of his mobile, mounted Crimeans.⁶⁰ The surprise was complete and the carnage swift as the thousands of Christians, unable to regroup, were slaughtered almost to a man.

The ambition of the kapıkulu general equalled the victory he had wrought. Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, confident he could now run the entire Ottoman Empire, dashed impetuously into the sultan's tent and virtually demanded the seals of the grand vizierate.⁶¹ Mehmed III, stunned by the close call on his life and the quick turn of events, impulsively bestowed the office on Sinan--though the seals of the office could not be found for another day or two.⁶² Significantly, the Ottoman cavalry were in such short supply the army could not tow away the valuable mass of more than ninety cannon left behind by the defeated Habsburg troops.⁶³

The bizarre ending of Mezö-keresztes, a victory which Mehmed III considered the greatest battle of his reign, actually presaged policies which would affect the Ottomans long after the sultan's death. The newly appointed grand vizier first paid a debt to his Tatar cavalry by awarding the khanate to Feth Giray.⁶⁴ Then Cağalazade Sinan Pasha took an action which constrained thousands of Ottoman askerî to lives of rebellious outlawry, an action which some historians have marked as the genesis of the Great Celâli movement in Anatolia.⁶⁵ While the remaining troops stood in review, Grand Vizier Cağalazade Sinan delivered an announcement: in order to preserve discipline, all those not present at muster that day were henceforth to be considered firârî (deserters), to be apprehended, executed, and (most important to the Ottoman treasury) their possessions and lands forfeited to the government.



From the beginning the decision had a dubious justification. Unquestionably during the battle thousands of warriors, particularly the cavalry of Rumeli, had deserted the field of conflict out of fear of the Austrians. However, the line between cowardice and strategic retreat had never been carefully defined or clearly understood during the battle. Not only had the sultan himself fled, but also Cağalazade Sinan Pasha. Good fortune alone had allowed him to become distinguished rather than disgraced.⁶⁶ Ironically, the orders cancelling the timars had not arrived in the various provinces before the sultan removed Cağalazade Sinan Pasha from office. He had served only one month.

The disinterested observer (like the Ottoman cavalry men of the time) must assume that the government aimed more at alienating valuable lands than punishing cowardice. The order could easily have been countermanded by the next grand vizier, but it was not. It struck not only those who fled the battlefield at Mezö-keresztes but all malingerers who had not appeared for battle at all. A Firârî Defteri (Register of Deserters) named specifically scores of zeamet holders, not just those timars valued at 2,000 to 4,000 akçe, but those having 20,000 to 50,000--in other words, important military officers and provincial leaders who possessed very valuable (and disposable) lands for a government hungry for quick taxable income.⁶⁷

The impetuous Cağalazade Sinan did not consider the significance of his decisions, nor could he have realized how the edict would force thousands of seasoned veterans to massive rebellion. Most fled to Anatolia, though in some

cases their families remained in Rumeli. Anatolia, bordering on Persia, had for decades swarmed with rebellious bands or Celâlîs with whom firârîs could find refuge and employment of their services and talents. Many, particularly in eastern Anatolia, favored a diminished Ottoman rule. The shah of Persia represented asylum if the Ottoman government decided to obliterate the Celâlîs, or possible employment if the Shiite needed armed men to retrieve his lands lost a decade before. In view of the continuing Ottoman struggle against Persia, Cağalazade Sinan Pasha's order represented a very serious error in judgement which soon became evident. The firârîs quickly fled south from Hungary, probably via Thrace, crossing at Gallipoli to a new life in Anatolia. Among the firârîs who fled Mezőkeresztes for Anatolia some had previously held high positions and may have taken on Celâlî leadership roles. Most, however, appear to have been timar-holding cavalry men, who, with their retainers, possessed expertise in logistics and tactics which could supplement the already well-developed Celâlî forces.

6. The Ottoman Response to the Celâlîs


Warfare in Europe continued for a decade after Mezőkeresztes. The Ottomans could gain no clear-cut victory over their perennial Christian enemies, but steadfastly refused to change their military methods or political objectives. They spent great sums of money for new weaponry (mainly mustkets, cannon, and powder from abroad) and

sacrificed men and animals, continuing the traditional Ottoman methods of warfare. The few victories they won produced next to no booty; they retrieved some old areas but lost others.⁶⁸ Their losses aroused bitterness among the troops, especially the landholding sipahis who felt increasing indignation at the pressures of continuous warfare coupled with the simultaneous growth of lawlessness and poverty in their homelands. The kapıkulu too felt bitterness over fiscal irresponsibility and the inflation in prices which annually netted them a loss in real wages. Now committed to the error of Mezö-keresztes, the Ottomans tried vainly to curb the rising violence in Anatolia in the traditional manner. They sent out small battalions of local soldiers which the militarily superior bands of Celâlîs could easily disperse. Dissident local alaybeyis (captains) who had gathered sekbans for service in Hungary could now find a place for their unemployed musket men. With each Celâlî leader's victory more wandering re'aya in search of employment joined the ranks to share the booty. The most egregious Ottoman error after Mezö-keresztes was to misinterpret the depth of despair in Anatolia and the extraordinary spiritual malaise and physical poverty epidemic in the peninsula.

Still the Ottoman government felt no particular compulsion to face the Celâlî movement squarely. Many in high leadership roles sincerely felt that the Divine Power had chosen not to intervene negatively after the ending of the Holy Year 1000, as had been forecast by the astrologers and poets.⁶⁹ The sultan's Divan in Istanbul looked anxiously

for another Mohács victory in Europe, or a quick Çaldıran in Persia, to bring back the successful days and the glory of five decades earlier. At such a time money and booty, land and power would again fill the Ottoman treasury, and the infidel rulers of the earth would pay their subservience to the Shadow of God on earth. Such arguments ignored the growing poverty, the famine, the flight of all classes from the Anatolian provinces and cities to new, safer locations. The drying up of the tax base affected the central bureaucracy quite as much as the lawlessness in Anatolia. While concentrating on Europe and, later, Persia, Ottoman leadership failed to recognize the danger of Celâli leaders who excelled in standard Ottoman warfare, possessed clever (in some cases brilliant) generals, and whose reasons for struggling seriously against the Ottomans appealed to many who were native to the peninsula. Even a few prominent Ottoman pashas turned to the Celâli movement in order to attempt a return to former personal glories and transform a system gone bad.

Only after ten critical years did the Ottomans realize the true nature of the Celâlis. Neither religious traitors, nor founders of a new, breakaway state, these rebels mixed cunning, self-centered leadership, and the desire for unlimited power with a demand for security, income from lands, and rank within the Ottoman system for themselves and their followers. And they were prepared to sacrifice thousands of lives in order to achieve their goals.



II The Rise of the Great Celâlis

Ottoman hopes for a quick victory in Europe were frustrated through fiscal and technological incapacity, increasing violence among the sultan's troops in the capital city, and the presence of ever-growing bands of experienced but jobless common soldiers in Anatolia. The government slowly recognized the varying degrees of leadership potential among the rebel leaders on the peninsula. The army of the best known early Celâli leader, Kara Yazıcı, defeated almost every Ottoman attempt to contain his power. After making him a sancakbeyi in Amasya and Çorum the government dismissed Kara Yazıcı, who fled the area pursued by an entire Ottoman army, was momentarily defeated, and then died of natural causes.

With Kara Yazıcı's death what appeared as a single menace split into many. Counteractive Ottoman armies proved either incapable or unwilling to contain and crush the various rebel forces. Government policy vacillated from conciliating the Celâlis and absorbing them into the Ottoman armies, to frontal attacks. Conciliation often led to revolts of angry land-owning cavalry from Anatolia; the frontal attacks seldom succeeded, and often brought the government greater tragedy.

The people of Anatolia remained immobilized. They were stunned by fear, by loss of commerce and livelihood, and by physical insecurity. Many fled to walled cities. In 1012/1603 a boy-sultan, Ahmed I, was enthroned, whose juvenile decision to fight a Celâli army completely miscarried. Then, while Celâlis roamed freely in Anatolia, the Persians attacked, staggering Ottoman defenses in the east. By 1015/1606 the Ottomans in Hungary, through political agreements more than military victories, ventured a change in policy: peace with the Christian Habsburgs. Only in this way could the government control the otherwise unmistakable drift toward partition in Anatolia.

1. Kara Yazıcı, the First Great Celâli

The first trained Ottoman soldier to demonstrate how dissident but experienced Anatolian musket-bearers could be unified into armies of exceptional effectiveness was a Turk named Abdülkadir, better known by his nickname, Kara



Yazıcı, the Black (or dark) Scribe.¹ The Venetian consul in Aleppo, Vincenzo Dandolo, described Kara Yazıcı as being "short, [with] black skin, and a lame left hand," and asserts he received his nickname from a position he held as scribe for a pasha of Aleppo.²

Kara Yazıcı's earliest notoriety thus appears to have occurred in Syria.³ He first persuaded his superior, the Emir Derviş, the sancakbeyi of Safed, to resist official transfer by force--doubtless using transient sekbans and levends (horsemen) against the unsuspecting replacements. According to the late Professor Mustafa Akdağ, Kara Yazıcı's name was recorded for the first time in Ottoman sources as a subaşı (police officer) of the sancakbeyi Kâsim Bey of Divrik.⁴ The historian Naima states he began his askerî career as a division commander of musket men (sekban bölükbaşı).⁵

From the bits of information certain significant details about Kara Yazıcı and his role in the Great Celâli revolts come clear. First, he was obviously at the center of a very important and relatively new method of warfare, something the Ottomans needed and supported: trained musket men. Second, his position was, according to Professor İnalçık's explanation of the role of the bölükbaşıs, "the real master and organizer of these soldiers, comparable to the condottieri of medieval Europe."⁶ Third, he moved upward from a tax-paying Muslim re'aya to that of tax-free askerî, a significant change in status which would occur far less commonly in later years, but the possibility of which would remain attractive. Kara Yazıcı had a reputa-

tion for successful military command. He doubtless moved easily among the various Anatolian levels of society. He seems to have possessed a very attractive personality, drawing loyal men by selling the services of his armed divisions to various sancakbeyis. Consul Dandolo states that he hired a group of 300 arquebusiers (i.e., sekbans) to help the sancakbeyi of Jaffa keep his position against a new appointee of the government.⁷

During the Hungarian Campaign of 1005/1596, in which the battle of Mezö-keresztes took place, Kara Yazıcı remained (perhaps in Sivas or Malatya) as a deputy to his sancakbeyi. The government then ordered him as a peace-keeper to the Tarsus-Silifke region to put down some obstreperous sohtas (students). While on this security campaign, he received notification that his sancakbeyi had lost his office, and that as a consequence he and his men were dismissed. Figuring he had no hope of gaining a high post in the train of another Anatolian timar holder, Kara Yazıcı united with one of the many rebel sekbans bands, quickly becoming a Celâli chief.⁸ His reputation grew as he attracted many dissidents, not only the firâris of Mezö-keresztes, but angry sipahi (cavalry) officers of the devşirme (slave troops) who, after the rebellions of 1001/1593 in İstanbul, could no longer remain where the Janissary infantry ruled supreme.⁹ His motto, "from every beard, a hair," implied a kind of egalitarian tyranny as he assaulted villages and pillaged to obtain the necessary provender for his Celâli army.¹⁰

Three years after Mezö-keresztes, Kara Yazıcı's rebellious activities reached such a point the government in Istanbul reacted by sending an armed force against him. Several important reasons justified the assignment of a large Ottoman army against these Anatolians. First, the lack of security for the property and lives of the re'aya demanded counter-measures. A flood of wealthy immigrants poured into Istanbul complaining of the shocking insecurity of Anatolia; the poorer Anatolian Turks and Christians could only complain through their local kadı.¹¹ Second, the presence of outlaws from the famous muster of Mezö-keresztes required some follow-through on the government's part. Thirty thousand firâris, well-trained in warfare, might stimulate a general Anatolian rising, not uncommon in Ottoman history, but very awkward in times of difficulties with the Habsburgs and their allies in Hungary. Moreover, the law of the sultan should be carried out: firâris were not only to lose their land-holdings but their lives as well. Third, the rumor of a threat of an attack in the east by the young Shah Abbas of Persia was causing Istanbul great concern. The Venetian consul in Aleppo, Giorgio Emo, wrote on 12 December 1599, "surely, this year the Persians will go to war against the Ottomans."¹² Campaigns against the Celâlis could then be combined with a strengthening of the border fortresses against the Safavids. In Istanbul the sultan's Divan determined to put down the Celâlis. Hüseyin Pasha, the beylerbeyi of Karaman, received the sultan's commission at this time to inspect the region and bring order to the areas inhabited by Kara Yazıcı.

Hüseyin Pasha proved a poor choice to break the forces of the Black Scribe. After a few months in the field, startling news came to Istanbul: the Ottoman commander from Karaman had refused to fight and had, indeed, decided to join Kara Yazıcı and the Celâlis rather than enforce Ottoman rule in the region.¹³

Hüseyin Pasha was at that time the highest Ottoman official to have turned against the sultan. He had long been associated with the Palace in Istanbul. He had held high posts, at one point serving as beylerbeyi of Habeş (an east African post which included the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina). One European contemporary heard he was a second or third generation Ottoman who became frustrated because of poor treatment by the viziers of Murad III and Mehmed III.¹⁴ Consul Dandolo says he had been illegally jailed by Ottoman authorities and forced to bribe his way to freedom, becoming so poor in the process that he could not pay his debts. Dandolo concluded that the injustice of the system and the powerlessness of his position drove him to join the rebellion.¹⁵ There may have been other reasons. In any case, Hüseyin Pasha determined to fight the Ottoman ruling circles from his own power base in Karaman. He offered to join Kara Yazıcı who accepted the proposal.


The two generals joined in a battle in 1008/1599 to defeat a small government force near Maraş.¹⁶ The Ottomans responded by sending a much larger army under Mehmed Pasha, the son of the venerable grand vizier, Koca Sinan Pasha, with orders to cleanse Anatolia of both Hüseyin Pasha and Kara Yazıcı.¹⁷ As the rebel pair became more dangerous

their rebellion increased its contagion. Rumors all the way to Aleppo suggested the two Celâli leaders might join forces with Shah Abbas of Persia.¹⁸

Such an interregional alliance was premature at this time. The two rebel leaders during the spring of 1008/1599 aimed at establishing a relatively inaccessible position in eastern Anatolia in which to wait, while larger, more important rebellions (such as those which continued in Transylvania and Walachia) could drain the interest and strength of the central authorities.¹⁹ At such a point the government would be reduced to parlaying, at which time the Celâli leaders and their subaltern officers would be readmitted, along with their armies, into the Ottoman system.

Both rebel leaders recognized the military value of cooperation at this time, though there is evidence (particularly in view of later events) they did not share mutual confidence. Their combined forces now included about 20,000 sekbans.²⁰ They moved southeastward from Maraş (possibly because of Kara Yazıcı's earlier Syrian connections) where they decided to fight their battles from behind the walls of ancient Edessa, known to Ottomans as Urfa, on the main caravan road between Aleppo and Diyarbekir--and Persia. The Ottomans quickly moved against them, dispatching Sinapaşazade Mehmed Pasha in Muharrem 1008/late July 1599.²¹

What began as a pitched battle between an Ottoman army under Mehmed Pasha and the Celâlis turned into a siege of at least two months.²² Beginning about Rebi'ülâhır 1008/



October 1599, Mehmed Pasha brought a large force with some twenty-one artillery siege guns, as well as troops, from Aleppo against the Urfan walls.²³ He also ordered troops from Damascus, not all of whom were entirely loyal, since they included "renegades from Greece, Albania, Slavonia, and Hungary" which may have included firâris.²⁴ Most of his troops, however, were Syrian Arabs and Kurds, whose antagonism for the Urfa rebels could not be expected to last for an extended period of time into the winter months. Mehmed Pasha made little headway against the Celâlis, who managed to thwart attacks by probing actions against the besiegers. The siege took its toll of rebels, however, and Ottoman historians assert the lack of bullets proved so great the Celâlis had to melt down kuruş (coins) to continue their defense.²⁵

Though the siege strained the rebels, winter weather began to make the Ottoman tactics ineffective. The Arab and Kurdish troops of Damascus began to complain to the Ottoman commander. According to Consul Dandolo, Kara Yazıcı had many friends among the Syrian Arabs, especially the Damascus forces who remembered his earlier, popular service there. The Damascenes persuaded the serdar (commanding general) Mehmed Pasha to compromise his stand. He should settle for the capture of Hüseyin Pasha, the Karaman beylerbeyi, who was a well-known member of the Ottoman elite (and more vulnerable to Palace retribution) and allow Kara Yazıcı his freedom--or, at least, break off the siege.²⁶



For reasons about which one can only speculate, the proposal appealed to Kara Yazıcı, who accepted. Possibly the two rebel chiefs were socially incompatible. Hüseyin had followed a much more traditionally acceptable path to Ottoman leadership, and may have thought he could receive official pardon. Doubtless Kara Yazıcı, in a position to bargain for high gains, saw his own advantage clearly enhanced.²⁷ Whatever the reason, Kara Yazıcı delivered Hüseyin Pasha to his captors and the "exquisite tortures" awaiting him in Istanbul, a public spectacle which was viewed by the Sultan Mehmed III and many visiting dignitaries.²⁸

Kara Yazıcı, meanwhile, endeavored to repair the walls of Urfa in preparation for the inevitable return of the Ottoman forces. He had not yet inveigled the Istanbul government to buy him off with high office. In the spring of 1008/1600 the serdar Mehmed Pasha again gathered enough Anatolian troops to march against Kara Yazıcı, who now decided to leave Urfa's security and advance north.²⁹

Now the cat pursued the mouse. Kara Yazıcı headed for Sivas, constantly outmaneuvering and avoiding the Ottoman armies.³⁰ In one encounter the wily Celâli succeeded in wounding Mehmed Pasha in the left arm. Through the spring of 1008/1600 the constant moving, sniping warfare continued, with little chance of a complete Ottoman victory, yet with no softening of the sultan's commands to eradicate Kara Yazıcı. In yet another skirmish, Mehmed Pasha was again wounded, this time in the leg, after having his horse killed from under him.³¹ Heading toward Çorum in Şevval

1008/April 1600, Kara Yazıcı demonstrated tactical brilliance, and his wounded opponent, Sinanpaşazade Mehmed Pasha, showed military as well as physical incapacity. The dynamism of the Ottoman forces had by this time been drained.

In Istanbul, the sultan's counsellors decided to bribe Kara Yazıcı if they could not defeat him. After considerable debate in the Divan, the government sent the Black Scribe the official designation of sancakbeyi of Amasya. It was far to the northwest of Urfa and Diyarbekir--and away from any possible accommodation with the Persian Shah Abbas. The agreement brought immediate relief to the Ottoman Anatolian armies. Kara Yazıcı entered Amasya about Zi'lhicce 1007/June 1600 and remained there six months.³²

How Kara Yazıcı intended to act at this point remains unclear. Ottoman court historians, writing much later, alleged that he considered himself an independent sovereign.³³ The contemporary official Ottoman documents do not substantiate such adventure or pretension. If he had thoughts of founding a dynasty, he had no well-established Anatolian family tradition to assume the lines of authority after his demise.³⁴ The sources mention only a brother, Deli Hasan, and a son named Küçük. He had no special religious convictions or reputation by which to gain a local following against the Ottoman dynasty, particularly in the region and city of Amasya. His military success more than his name attracted followers. Quite as possible as these treasonable aspirations, he may have accepted the sancak of Amasya fully intending to assume the perquisites and carry

out the duties of a legitimately appointed sancakbeyi in the Ottoman provinces. After all, his success depended to a large extent not only on himself alone, but also on his followers, who stood to gain by his ability to merge them, as well as himself, back into the Ottoman system, a position which certainly would have appealed to the firâris of Mezö-keresztes.

While Kara Yazıcı solidified his position in Amasya, the Ottoman government wrestled with the growing Celâli crisis throughout Anatolia. Reports now poured into Istanbul concerning the worsening security conditions throughout the peninsula.³⁵ Trade lines in the great east-west caravan roads had been disrupted. Political unrest upset the morale of the Janissaries and Sipahis in Istanbul because of the abysmally poor showing of Sinanpaşazade Mehmed Pasha at the siege of Urfa.³⁶ Many complaints arose concerning the serdar who, during the siege, was reputed to have allowed his soldiers to act like rebels more than an Ottoman army, stealing from the storehouses of the re'aya and then demanding taxes besides. When a witness to the Urfa events, the beylerbeyi of Sivas, came through Istanbul on his way to Hungary, he astounded the sultan's Divan with his view that the real danger in Anatolia came not from the Celâli Kara Yazıcı but from the vizier Sinanpaşazade Mehmed Pasha.³⁷ Consequently, Grand Vizier Damad İbrahim Pasha decided to relieve the wounded Mehmed Pasha in Şevval 1008/ April 1600 as commander of the eastern forces.³⁸ To placate the opposing faction in the Divan he also removed Kara

Yazıcı from Amasya and transferred him further west to Çorum.³⁹

Just as Kara Yazıcı's activities in Amasya had not been without suspicion, so too in Çorum his presence aroused criticism.⁴⁰ Whatever he may personally have wished, the unruly armies and commanders under his orders spent their time not keeping the peace but pillaging. When in the summer of 1009/1600 the central government ordered the Celâlf leader to put down a new rebellion of students in İçel (far south, on the Mediterranean coastland), his sekbans refused. Desperate for food in a time of continuing famine conditions, they systematically plundered the helpless re'aya in the region.⁴¹ The Ottomans could only conclude that since pardon of a Celâlf leader failed to bring order to Anatolia, the use of force must bring security. The grand vizier now ordered two armies to proceed against Kara Yazıcı, who had moved his ever-hungry armies southward.

The two Ottoman armies did not at once succeed. The first army, marching east from Üsküdar under Hacı İbrahim Pasha, the former beylerbeyi of Aleppo, arrived near Kayseri, losing twenty-two cannon and hundreds of men.⁴² The coming of winter in 1009/1600-1601 made continued investment of the city unprofitable. In Cemaziyülâhır 1009/December 1600 the Black Scribe and his legions moved further west, blockading the vital Anatolian trade lines.⁴³ The snows of Anatolia now froze men's plans as well as their movements.

For the Ottomans the next few months provided a needed respite to survey their gains and losses. In Europe their policies had recently proved successful. On Rebi'ülevvel 1009/September 1600 the strategic Hungarian center of Kanizsa fell to the Turks. Then the Poles, fighting for the moment with the Ottoman sultan, crushed Michael the Brave's Walachian rebellion.⁴⁴ In Receb 1009/January 1601 Sigismund Bathory became Prince of Transylvania. Bathory was another Christian whose hatred for the Austrian Habsburgs outweighed any religious qualms about a Muslim political alliance. Yet bad news kept filtering into the city of Istanbul of increasing Persian attempts to ally with important Ottoman enemies. In Şaban 1009/February 1601 Catholic priests had travelled to Shah Abbas' realm, and two months later a Persian emissary stopped at Rome to visit Pope Clement VIII.⁴⁵ Moreover, as part of a continuing internecine struggle for power within the Crimean Tatar ruling family, some dissident relatives of the Ottoman-supported Tatar khan (chief) had fled their homes. They sought refuge within the Islamic world, but among the enemies of the sultan. To make matters worse, in mid-summer 1010/1601 the well-known Damad İbrahim Pasha, grand vizier and commander of the Hungarian armies, died and left an empty place in the Ottoman ruling elite, to be filled, unfortunately for the sultan, by a series of incompetents.

By Zi'lhicce 1009/June 1601 the second anti-Celâli army, this one under the former beylerbeyi of Baghdad, Sokolluzade Hasan Pasha, marched west from Diyarbekir, searching for Kara Yazıcı, his brother Deli Hasan, and the

Celâli legions. Hasan Pasha made far better preparations than had Hacı İbrahim Pasha a year before. Most of his armed force consisted of levies from among the Kurds and Arabs of the east, including the troops of İmadiye in northern Iraq, Cizre in Diyarbakir province, Tripoli in Syria, and Kilis, the home of the Canbulads, in northern Aleppo province.⁴⁶ For almost four months Hasan stalked his enemy, carefully avoiding an ambush or a trap. Finally on 12 Safer 1010/12 August 1601, near Elbistan, southeast of Kayseri, Hasan Pasha quick-marched to catch the Celâlis off guard.⁴⁷

In a pitched battle, at a place then called Sepedlû, Kara Yazıcı for the first time lost a major battle, as well as the twenty-two cannon he had won six months earlier at Kayseri. Moreover, thousands of his Celâli comrades were killed. The survivors fled north via Sivas and Amasya to the Canik mountains near Samsun, to try to reform their decimated ranks.⁴⁸ The victory struck a resonant chord in Istanbul where the people celebrated with feasting.⁴⁹ Hasan Pasha pursued the Celâlis north, then stayed the winter of 1010/1601-1602 in Tokat.⁵⁰

Without question a severe, possibly crushing, blow had been dealt Kara Yazıcı's Celâlis. During the long winter they had time to reflect and prepare. The activities of the Celâlis in the following year indicate the loss of a driving spirit. For some reason (possibly a battle wound) Kara Yazıcı, so long the tireless warrior, became incapacitated. He circulated the rumor that he would return to Aleppo and Tripoli in Syria, but he actually planned to set

out across the Black Sea, possibly for the Crimea, to join some friendly Tatars.⁵¹ However, he never left his mountain retreat. At about forty-eight years of age he died, apparently of natural causes.⁵²

In many ways Kara Yazıcı's career established the pattern for the Great Celâlis of the next decade. In life he had a reputation for daring, tireless energy, and of liberality, one who shared everything he owned with his soldiers. He may have been deeply religious; he is known to have told his followers that God had promised him greatness--but he seems to have asserted nothing more than this.⁵³ Above all, his associates knew him as a man of pride and ruthlessness. His sacrifice of Hüseyin Pasha at Urfa signified a realistic, quite brutal, assessment of his own future, an action which his cohorts seemed to agree was justified. At his death his lieutenants, Şahverdi, Yular Kaptı, and Tavl Halil, cut his body into pieces and buried the remains in separate places. They assumed the Ottomans would try to desecrate the body of such a charismatic figure in a public spectacle.⁵⁴ To his brother Deli ("crazy") Hasan now fell the leadership of the remaining Celâli army, not because he expected to continue a dynasty or to found a secessionist state, but because Deli Hasan was the foremost leader. As Professor Akdağ pointed out, Kara Yazıcı

neither issued fermans nor founded a corps like the Janissaries, and never chose for himself a grand vizier....The sealed and signed documents relating to Kara Yazıcı that were found in [the possession of captured followers] have proved that such assertions about his desire for independent power are fictitious.⁵⁵

His revolt, and those of his successors in central Anatolia, represented not a radical secession from the state but a continuation of the Ottoman land system into which new names of ownership were added to the old.

2. Deli Hasan and the Use of Celâlis in Rumeli

Kara Yazıcı's brother Deli Hasan was "younger but a better fighter," according to the contemporary Venetian consul Dandolo.⁵⁶ From the time of his brother's death to his own execution, Deli Hasan fought continually, first to recapture the momentum lost at Sepedlû, and later as an Ottoman general against the Habsburg enemy in Hungary.

The development of strong lines of authority among the old Kara Yazıcı band needed only a short time to develop. In mid-spring of 1010/1602 the Celâlis rode south toward Amasya and Tokat, heading apparently toward Aleppo.⁵⁷ They planned to meet with other Celâlf leaders, among them Rüstem and Karakaş Ahmed in Amasya. These latter had been members of Kara Yazıcı's earlier group, had fallen out with the Black Scribe, and like so many Anatolian Celâlis, made a good living selling their military services to any who had the cash to pay, in this case the Emir of Tripoli, Seyfoğlu Yusuf.⁵⁸

By Zi'lhicce 1010/May 1602 Deli Hasan reached Tokat, gathering other Celâlis. On the way south he ravaged towns and defeated two Ottoman pashas sent against him, one of which was the victor of Sepedlû, Sokolluzade Hasan Pasha.⁵⁹ With too few men to fight, Hasan Pasha luckily escaped to

the Tokat castle, but his baggage train was intercepted by Deli Hasan's soldiers.⁶⁰ According to the Venetian consul Dandolo, the Celâlis took five million pieces of gold, numerous tents and military appurtenances, as well as the entire harem of Hasan Pasha, leaving only four very miserable old women to make their way to Tokat castle.⁶¹ The defeat of Hasan Pasha triggered the usual response in Istanbul: the incumbent serdar was relieved and a new commander, Husrev Pasha, assigned to fight the Celâlis.⁶²

Meanwhile, Deli Hasan sacked and burned the suburbs of Tokat.⁶³ The rebels wanted Hasan Pasha and so laid siege to the city. Very probably they yearned to revenge Kara Yazıcı's defeat a year before. Killing the old Pasha was not easy, however, for the son of the former grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha could not be tempted out of safety's range. The newly-arrived replacement, Husrev Pasha, could not immediately take office for fear of Hasan's fabled temper.⁶⁴ However, the Celâlis somehow learned of his custom of sitting in one place each day, and on a morning in Zi'lhicce 1010/June 1602 a sekban sharpshooter shot and killed the general.⁶⁵ After his death Hasan Pasha's Celâli enemies lifted their siege of Tokat and left for more favorable places to pillage.⁶⁶

The death of Sokolluzade Hasan Pasha added new difficulties to the Ottoman security forces in Anatolia. Hasan Pasha, about sixty years old at the time of his death, had been "a man of presence, great justice, and courage, and esteemed the best soldier of the sultan."⁶⁷ He had served three sovereigns, was the son of one of the greatest grand

viziers in Ottoman history, and like his father, was cut down while serving his master. His successor on the battlefield, Husrev Pasha, found even less success in dealing with the Celâlis.

For the rest of the year 1011/1602 the Celâlis kept Anatolia in a frightful state of civil disturbance. In Safer 1011/July 1602 Deli Hasan's expanded force moved south to Çorum. In Rebi'ülevvel 1011/August 1602 they gave a stinging battlefield rebuke to Husrev Pasha, then moved west toward Ankara, defeating or eluding all Ottoman armies sent against them.⁶⁸ Deli Hasan besieged Ankara and extorted 80,000 gold kuruş (an enormous sum) from the citizens.⁶⁹ Many of the wealthy re'aya fled to safer places like Istanbul or even Rumeli (Europe) where they joined others from past years, raising continual complaints to the government. To the successful Celâli chief's side now came hundreds, even thousands, of the flotsam of Anatolia, eager to serve, win, and share in the spoils.

Not only those jobless and hungry who wanted to join a winning side, but also some of the Ottoman sultan's trusted allies joined Deli Hasan as a means to further their own objectives. Particularly was this true of the sons of the Tatar khan of the Crimea, where a serious struggle for power had left Gazi Giray Khan's brother, Selâmet, and a grand nephew, Şahin Giray, little choice but flight.⁷⁰ Selâmet Giray's need for a trained army to help him gain the khanate (as brother to the incumbent he was legally the heir-apparent) might be satisfied with help from the Celâlis.⁷¹ On their part, the Celâlis were grateful for

the increased notoriety and additional strength the refugee Tatar forces gave to their movement.⁷²

The Ottomans responded by appointing yet another commander against the Celâlis. To replace Husrev Pasha they dispatched Hafız Ahmed Pasha who, as quickly as he arrived, found himself besieged in the castle at Kütahya, in western Anatolia. After a couple of months of siege, during an unseasonably rainy period, the rebel army gave up. Deli Hasan moved south to Afyon Karahisar for the winter.⁷³

Government schemes during the winter of 1011/1602-1603 moved toward catastrophe in Anatolia. The Divan leadership in Istanbul, due to Celâli successes in Anatolia and their inability to decide on a firm policy, changed from confronting the Celâlis to conciliation. Celâlis probably had sympathizers in high places in Istanbul. Deli Hasan's late brother Kara Yazıcı had earlier cooperated with a nephew of a former Şeyüislâm, Sun'ullah Efendi.⁷⁴ Deli Hasan himself felt confident enough to send his chief lieutenant, Şahverdi, to inquire about an accommodation and position in the Ottoman system, such as that accorded Kara Yazıcı at Amasya. The mediator in these arrangements was a high-ranking officer of the Janissaries, the turnacıbaşı. Such an apparent relationship with criminality brought sharp protest from among various Anatolian landholding cavalymen who were temporarily stationed at the capital. These askerî possessed lands which were being laid waste and whose way of life was being torn apart by the government's weakness toward the Celâlis. Thus did the elements for a violent military revolt merge in Receb 1011/January 1603.⁷⁵

In a way, the Sipahi Zorbaları (cavalry rebels) revolt provided a bloody three-month forum during which a new policy concerning the Celâlıs could be articulated, if not determined. Occurring almost exactly ten years after a similar revolt of the sultan's slave cavalry (who had complained of financial irregularities), the Anatolian land-owning cavalry voiced a deep frustration against the sultan's counsellors for several reasons. They felt no justice at all in a policy by which Celâlı rebels like Kara Yazıcı should be placated by elevation, not only to askerî status, but high office. As responsible agents for peace in the Anatolian hinterland, these cavalry people disliked the growing power of Janissary troops who merged imperceptibly into the power structures of Anatolian cities, usurping the positions of tax collectors and involving themselves in local business and commercial dealings.⁷⁶ But most of all, the sipahi warriors felt the decision-making powers in the Palace had fallen into the hands of extra-legal retainers: eunuchs and gypsies and the two powerful eunuchs of the Harem, Gazanfer Ağa and Osman Ağa, as well as various viziers and subaltern officers whose views, accepted by the vulnerable sultan, led to defeat on the battlefield and demoralized citizens at home. By Ramazan 1011/February 1603 the sipahi of Anatolia took control of affairs in Istanbul, forcing the execution of the two hated ağas of the Harem as well as other reforms.⁷⁷

The grand vizier at first endeavored to mollify the Anatolian sipahis while working to restore order in the capital city. He executed several alleged riffraff in the

Palace to satisfy the rebels. By Ramazan 1011/February 1603 he curried their favor even more by appointing a former grand vizier, Cerrah Mehmed Pasha, as commander against the Anatolian rebels. Two weeks later, however, he adroitly moved against the ringleaders, countermanded his earlier orders, and replaced Cerrah Mehmed with a more forceful fighter (and more reliable ally), Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, the hero of Mezö-keresztes.⁷⁸

As grand vizier, Yemişçi Hasan Pasha by 1011/1603 faced increasingly serious external threats which forced him to soften his policy toward the Celâlfs, despite the pressure on him in Istanbul.⁷⁹ Serious disagreements had arisen with the Persian state of Shah Abbas.⁸⁰ This, coupled with the increasing incidence of Anatolian Celâlf brigandage, necessitated Hasan's walking a fine political line. In this spirit, and not from his belief in the righteousness of their cause, Yemişçi Hasan Pasha bestowed on the Celâlf Deli Hasan the official designation of beylerbeyi of Bosnia in Zi'lkade 1011/April 1603.⁸¹ At the same time the grand vizier Hasan ordered the Janissaries of Istanbul to smash the power of the Anatolian sipahis in the capital city in a bloody and long-remembered butchering.⁸² More than 4000 angry sipahi cavalry men fled to Anatolia, many to join the very Celâlf rebels they had sacrificed so much to eliminate.⁸³

Deli Hasan, now Deli Hasan Pasha, became a loyal Ottoman general.⁸⁴ Ordered by the grand vizier to join Lala Mehmed Pasha in Eszek, on the Drava River, he moved in Zi'lkade 1011/April 1603 with 10,000 curiously attired

troops across Gallipoli to Rumeli and the Habsburg enemy.⁸⁵ The khan of the Tatars, Gazi Giray, refused to fight with these former rebels (who had welcomed his disloyal brother Selâmet into their ranks) and left the region for the Caucasus on 30 Zi'lkade 1011/May 1603.⁸⁶ The more practical Ottomans immediately pressed the former Celâlî troops into action.

Throughout the rest of 1011/1603 and into 1012/1604, Deli Hasan Pasha led his troops in battle against the Christians. On 3 Safer 1011/14 July 1603, at a battle for Pest, some 6000 former Celâlîs gave their lives.⁸⁷ Later, Deli Hasan Pasha became involved in a fracas at Gallipoli, but received a pardon, along with a transfer to Temeşvar as a beylerbeyi.⁸⁸ Neither Hasan nor his troops made good friends at this new post. By 1013/1605 he fled to Belgrade.⁸⁹

Apparently Deli Hasan Pasha had not been entirely loyal to the Ottomans. The historian Naima states he held treasonable correspondence with representatives of Venice and the Pope.⁹⁰ In Bosnia he allegedly offered the vital castle of Rasna for 100,000 gold pieces. Similarly, while in Temeşvar he sent treasonable messages to agents of the King of Spain and the Pope.⁹¹

Whatever the reason, the Istanbul government changed its policy toward Deli Hasan and his effective aid to their war aims in Europe. Possibly at the suggestion of the commander of the Balkans, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, Deli Hasan was condemned at the end of 1014/April 1606, along with his "brother's son, Küçük Bey."⁹² From Deli Hasan's viewpoint,

however, he met his death not as a common Anatolian rebel but as an Ottoman general, a member of the sultan's askerî, a man of honor and stature.

The policy of conciliating and siphoning off Celâli armies to the Balkans did not greatly diminish their power in Anatolia. Many rebel leaders remained at large, and neither lenient government policy nor severe armed force could effect the needed change. Only a re-evaluation of the basic Ottoman commitment to constant war against the Habsburgs would provide the strength to restore order in the Anatolian homeland.

3. The "Great Flight" Increases, 1012-1015/1603-1606

Months before Deli Hasan had made his colorful march as an Ottoman Pasha to the Hungarian front, Anatolian rebels increased in strength and their decentralizing objectives became clearer. Although the official policy declared a peace with the Celâlis, the ceremonial placing of the Ottoman horsetails in Deli Hasan's hands did little to decrease, and in many instances increased, the establishment of local centers of brigandage.⁹³ From these centers they issued forth to attack the helpless, aiming ultimately at forcing the government to include them into the Ottoman system. For the peasant and urban re'aya of Anatolia the increasing lawlessness added to their frustration and insecurity. It provoked, willingly or unwillingly, increasing anger at the central government represented in the provinces by the sancakbeyi and the kadis.

Public security in Anatolia at the end of the eleventh/sixteenth century depended in particular on the sancakbeyis. Local law-breakers did not specifically concern the central government until a situation appeared so out of hand as to warrant more direct intervention such as sending a müfettiş (inspector) or even a small police force. Unlike early European feudalism, the local Ottoman bey (lord) did not apprehend, judge, and execute his judgment of local criminals. Rather, each sancakbeyi within the eyâlet, responding to the requests of the district kadıs and any subsequent orders of the grand vizier, brought local felons to the kadı for justice based on the Muslim Shariat code and the kanuns (sultan's decrees).⁹⁴ Under extraordinary circumstances (as already seen in the case of Kara Yazıcı) the local force received aid from high government inspectors and occasionally even from armed forces commanded by generals from Istanbul. In the case of the Anatolian rebels after Mezö-kereszttes, and especially after Deli Hasan, the government treated the Celâlîs both as common criminals, with appropriate demands on the local sancakbeyis to bring the offenders to justice, and as enemies of the state, for which they would commit central government armies to smash the rebellion.

Unlike foreign enemies, such as the Habsburgs or Safavids, the Anatolian Celâlîs, particularly the masses of sekban musket men and levend cavalry represented an important potential of trained personnel. In certain circumstances they could be reinstated in the Ottoman ranks, and used to absorb the shock of the foreign enemy attacks. At

such a time the chances were good that Celâli sekbans in Ottoman garb and paid Ottoman cash would perform as well as any other mercenary troops. But such a policy toward rebels did not induce rootless Anatolians to pursue peaceful activities. Quite the opposite, the policy attracted the jobless into roving bands, on the assumption that, whether Celâli or Ottoman, as musket men they would be paid. Such a policy might have worked if the Ottoman enemy had continued to be only the Christians of Europe, in which case certain losses on the field could be made up by reconstructed Celâlis such as Deli Hasan and his troops. But if the eastern front should also erupt, the damage to life in Anatolia would be severe. Thus when news of fighting for the city of Tabriz came to Istanbul in 1012/late 1603, the central government's policy of "peace with the Celâlis" seemed absurd.

About the same month Deli Hasan left for the Habsburg front, the Safavid Persians attacked and captured the Ottoman-held city of Tabriz, opening an old and serious wound in the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁵ Since his accession to the throne, Shah Abbas had successfully defended his state in war against the Uzbeks, long time allies of the Ottomans on the east of Persia.⁹⁶ The Persians at Amasya in 998/1590 had never accepted the peace dictated by Istanbul. Abbas looked constantly to the time when he could retake what he felt was his traditional land stolen by the Ottoman sultan. Now the time seemed right.

Thus, through a constellation of external political events and traditional Ottoman policy toward the rebels of

Anatolia, armed terrorism exploded on the peninsula.
Celâîf bands struck at all re'aya, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, sparing only large villages and well-protected cities. Small hamlets in particular, being physically vulnerable and sources of needed supplies, received the hardest blows. Among official records the following typical complaint occurred, lamenting the destruction and asking help from the authorities in Istanbul. Dated late 1012/ about April 1604, the directive speaks of

several hundred horsemen and musket men [sekbân] including [the names of twenty-four, such as Arslan Gazioğlu, Ali and Mehmed Çavus, and Sarı Mehmed...and Köroğlu] who, like brigands [emsali eşkiya ile] came to the province, pillaged the goods of the poor, burnt their houses, killed more than 200 men, ran off with the young boys and virgin girls, and stole more than 50,000 sheep, goats, horses, and good camels, and took the stores of barley, wheat, oil, honey, and other commodities; then they captured more than 300 men, torturing them night and day.⁹⁷

Besides such generalized physical attacks on well-to-do provinces, many of the unpaid, jobless sekbâns went from village to village demanding "taxes" in addition to the demands (often as larcenous) made by various Ottoman tax-gatherers.⁹⁸

What occurred was a "Great Flight" (Büyük Kaçgun) from the farms and villages to the security either of a walled city or inaccessible mountains. This movement of masses of people almost immediately affected agricultural output. Lands lay fallow for the period of time the Celâîfs raided and the peasants hid--which most often was during the growing season. Land left unproductive often resulted in famine conditions as did scorched earth activities prac-

ticed by both the Ottomans and the Persians. Possibly as important as the man-made catastrophes visited on the Anatolians were the severe climatic changes leading to unseasonal cold, flooding, and drought in various parts of the region.⁹⁹ Whatever the causes, thousands of Anatolians began to flee their villages, fearful of the cold and the famine, but more fearful of the brutal and murderous gangs which terrorized their lives.

The "Great Flight" of people from the rural areas most often ended in cities with protective walls, areas which had already experienced phenomenal population increase in the earlier decades.¹⁰⁰ In most cases the moderately well-off and the poor planned to stay behind the protective walls only as long as the Celâlıs remained in the environs. Anatolian peasant farmers were bound by law to return to their lands. Besides, they could not afford the costs of life in the city, particularly since most came with little money, such wealth as they had being tied up in land and cattle. But the wealthy urban dwellers could emigrate. Many did, especially to Istanbul and Anatolian cities like Bursa and Ankara, where they put constant pressure on the sultan's viziers to rid the region of the Celâlı evils.¹⁰¹ Among some cities of Anatolia, commerce virtually ceased for months at a time. Business, except for what one could sell to refugees, was miserable. Without the loyal military protection of official Ottoman armies, the region appeared to be ready for disintegration from the Empire.

When in 1012/1603 Sultan Mehmed III died, the Sword of Osman was girded on a young and impressionable boy.

Ahmed I was not yet fourteen years old, and at the serious meetings of his counsellors (most of the viziers were his father's or grandfather's age) he felt pressed to lead his Empire (through their wise generalship) to victory over the Habsburg and the Persian enemy. As for the rebels of Anatolia, their importance was played down, their successes largely ignored. Grand Vizier Yavuz Ali Pasha seemed to realize their potential danger, however. While looking for his own symbolic victory on the Hungarian front, Yavuz Ali assigned an experienced and competent general, Cağalazade Sinan Pasha to fight the Persians--and the Celâlıs. It proved to be a large order--and a fateful one.

Sinan Pasha, the hero of Mezö-kerezsztos, former grand vizier and successful grand admiral of the Fleet, hoped to smother most of the Celâlı bands on his way to the Persian front. The Shah of Persia, he thought, was by far the more important enemy. Cağalazade Sinan's main objective, as he left on Zi'lhicce 1012/May 1604 for the east, was not to root out minor rebels but to win a decisive victory in the Azerbaijan region.¹⁰² Two weeks afterward, the news came that yet another major Ottoman-held city, Erivan, had fallen to the Shah. The Turks learned clearly enough that victory over the Persians would be costly indeed.¹⁰³

While Cağalazade Sinan marched east, Grand Vizier Yavuz Ali assigned several other small armies to trap Celâlı groups. Most important was the former beylerbeyi of Aleppo, Nasuh Pasha, to be commander against the Celâlıs of western Anatolia.¹⁰⁴ Appointed on 20 Ramazan 1013/11 February 1605, Nasuh, with the beylerbeyi of Anadolu,

Kecdehan Ali Pasha, spent the rest of the year in a series of vain attempts to lure the Celâlis into battle.¹⁰⁵ At the same time, two other armies had been dispatched to Anatolia to wipe out the Celâlis, an Anatolian army under Üveyspaşaoğlu Mehmed and a European army which had been redirected to the Anatolian region. In order to obtain the requisite troop strength, the commanders of these three armies expropriated whatever forces they could from any source available. This not only meant obtaining untrained and ill-disciplined irregulars, but also good soldiers from one another's armies. In what was by this time a conspicuous example of the breakdown of Ottoman coordination, Nasuh Pasha's army was trounced by a powerful army of brigands led by one of Anatolia's most famous Celâli leaders, a true successor to Deli Hasan Pasha.

Tavil Halil was known by his nickname (Tavil means "long" or "tall.") though his given name was Halil.¹⁰⁶ Tavil generally prowled the regions of Tokat and Amasya, having been one of Kara Yazıcı's lieutenants. Now just a few days' march southeast of Afyon Karahisar, he drew his troops into a trap at a bridge crossing near a city called Bolvadin.¹⁰⁷ Nasuh Pasha had massed his artillery to stop any attempted crossing as the battle commenced in the fall of Cemaziyülevvel 1014/September 1605. The clever Tavil, much experienced in hit-run tactics of the Celâli armies, audaciously made a frontal attack with his cavalry dashing across the bridge despite the dangerous cannon. The surprise succeeded brilliantly and soon the Ottoman police action became an Ottoman rout. The commanders, Nasuh and

Kecdehan Ali, fled for their lives, and the people of Bolvadin suffered capture, burning, and a sack by the victorious Celâlıs.¹⁰⁸ After pausing for a day or two, Nasuh Pasha in a fury executed his partner, the Anadolu beylerbeyi Kecdehan Ali Pasha, alleging that the lost battle was Ali's fault. Then he journeyed quickly to Istanbul to take his case directly to Sultan Ahmed I, not yet sixteen years old.

Still grimed and smelling of battle, Nasuh Pasha pushed into a meeting of the Imperial Divan to report the defeat and incapacity of the late Kecdehan Ali, and his own analysis of the defeat at Bolvadin. The bureaucracy, he stated, particularly those responsible for supplying the armies, had failed in their duties. The general command staff had given conflicting commands; most important, the sultan's close advisors lacked a common policy against the Celâlıs. When he had finished he dramatically offered his sword and his neck in acceptance, not of the blame for battle loss, but in service of his master.¹⁰⁹ Nasuh's arguments (not to speak of the sensationalism of the moment) so impressed the young sultan that he immediately gave orders for ships to be made ready so he might follow Nasuh's suggestion to travel personally to Asia Minor and command the Ottoman forces like his gazi forefathers. Ignoring the pleas of his more temperate advisors that the season was late (it was already Receb 1014/November 1605) and the journey was dangerous (the major Ottoman forces were either in the Persian area or the Danube), the excited young monarch looked forward to a battle with the rebel enemies of

his Empire. Even the sudden death of his mother, Handan, caused him to pause only one day in the capital to pay his filial respects.¹¹⁰ On 2 Receb 1014/13 November 1605 Sultan Ahmed left Istanbul with his troops and a fleet, headed across the Marmara Sea to Bursa (to save the time a land march would have taken) and prepared to do battle.

The counsellors were right. The journey was ill-planned and fraught with danger. Tavi Halil, the Celâli leader, had marched north from Bolvadin and camped near Bursa, only a few days' march (via Iznik) from Istanbul. Sultan Ahmed, along with Nasuh Pasha, arrived with his forces at the former capital of the Ottoman Empire, proving no surprise for the Celâlis who merely retreated out of reach. The weather became "exceedingly fowle" and the prospects of fighting Tavi's force very quickly changed from adventure to reality. Rather than launch a military attack, Ahmed visited the tombs of his ancestors. Within a week he became dreadfully ill from drinking the snow waters of Ulu Dağ.¹¹¹

About this time several hundred Celâlis came forward to seek entrance into the Ottoman forces and ask Ahmed's pardon, which he gave, thereby adding to his own forces. Already the kaymakam (pro-tem governor) in Istanbul, Sofu Sinan Pasha, had offered Tavi the eyâlets of Aleppo, Anadolu, and Sivas, an enormous portion (more than half) of the peninsula. Had Tavi been interested in establishing a separate state he might have accepted, but he refused the bid, doubtless because of its impractical nature. When Tavi refused and remained at large the sultan dismissed

Sofu Sinan Pasha while continuing to conciliate the startlingly powerful Celâlis.¹¹² He also went back to Istanbul on 16 Receb/27 November. As a Venetian reported, "Ahmed was happier in his garden than in Anatolia, where wolves prowled, where the people ate grass and stinking corpses of fallen horses and camels in their hunger, and asked for alms from those riding by."¹¹³ Sultan Ahmed I never again led his troops into battle.

At home in Istanbul the boy-sultan continued the policy of conciliating the Celâlis. Although he had removed Sofu Sinan Pasha from office because of allegedly too personal an interest in Tavil's activities,¹¹⁴ Ahmed continued to deal with the Celâli chief, finally offering him again the opportunity to be a governor.¹¹⁵ In a letter of 30 December 1605, the French Ambassador Baron de Salignac wrote that Tavil Halil finally accepted a beylerbeylik, that of Baghdad, along with twelve sancakbeyliks for his top officers. This by far exceeded the previous offer, and equalled the prize won by Deli Hasan in Bosnia. Tavil agreed to pay his requisite taxes and to cease warring against the central government. Many of his followers accompanied him on his long trip east--far from Istanbul--and took their places as loyal Ottoman land-holders.¹¹⁶

The policy of absorbing Celâlis into the Ottoman system appeared to be working--to an extent. Earlier in the year two very important Celâli leaders and their forces had joined the Ottoman army of Cağalazade Sinan Pasha on the Persian front: Karakaş Ahmed, an old associate of both Tavil and Kara Yazıcı from their early days in Amasya, and

Zülfikar Pasha, formerly of Teke.¹¹⁷ Now Celâli leaders moved both socially and politically from Muslim Turkish peasants to loyal Ottoman askerî, their followers filling the ranks of the sultan, manning the siege machines to fight against the Persian and Habsburg enemies, and partaking of the perquisites of the ruling Ottomans. There was, however, one overriding problem.

4. *The Three-front War*

By the end of the year 1014/1605 the seriousness of the Ottoman position became apparent: they faced a three-front war; in Europe, in Persia, and in Anatolia. The Anatolian Celâlis, despite the "Celâli Peace" reconciliation policies, flourished still with greatest impertinence. Several Celâlis possessed enormous extralegal power: Kalenderoğlu Mehmed, Kara Said, Kınalı, and Cemşid continued their depredations at the same time sending messages to the central government petitioning reconciliation and a position within the old Ottoman system.

Curiously, though much had collapsed over the years, the old régime still appealed to the Celâlis as a known system of security. Celâlis planned no permanent withdrawal from the Empire or even the establishment of a temporary provincial state, though such elements of parochial individualism undoubtedly underlay some of their popularity among the jobless and homeless wanderers. The fundamental elements for an independent Celâli state neither existed nor arose out of necessity. The archival records indicate

no Celâlf leader coined his own money, had his name read in the Friday prayers, established a governmental bureaucracy, or arranged ambassadorial relations with foreign states. No Celâlf ever united with another for more than a short time and then only as a matter of convenience. No unifying ideology or agency (as the Christian Church provided Balkan rebels) bound the Celâlfs together as believers. Celâlfs, therefore, provided the Ottomans with their most perplexing dilemma. As long as Ottomans refused to make peace with their external enemies, either the Habsburgs or the Safavids, they would need massive armies on the field. As long as Ottoman armies and their leaders expected total victory in war, the Ottomans would not be able to face the serious challenge of the Celâlfs at home. As long as Celâlfs roamed the land, Anatolia would suffer its continuing civil chaos, which could only lead to eventual partition or absorption, in part, by the Persian shah.

On the second, or Hungarian, front, the Ottomans by the end of 1014/1605 had begun to make some positive advances in their decade-long struggle with the Habsburgs, in contrast to the lamentable losses to the Celâlfs and Persians. When they captured Visegrad (Cemaziyülevvel 1014/September 1605) and then, less than a month later, Esztergom/Gran (Cemaziyülâhır 1014/October 1605) they gained important bargaining power. Their alliance with the new Transylvanian prince, Stefan Bocskay, put into their hands a more effective control over Habsburg military power in Hungary. Some of their warriors, like the Ottomans of the previous century, invaded even the Austrian heart-

lands.¹¹⁸ With Ottoman face thus saved Sultan Ahmed and his advisors finally decided they could seek peace without overwhelming victory nor the unconditional terms Ottomans had always demanded in the past. On 4 Muharrem 1015/13 May 1606 the grand vizier Lala Mehmed Pasha, shortly before his death, appointed a venerable and tough devşirme, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, as Ottoman representative to peace talks in Hungary.¹¹⁹ The Habsburg plenipotentiaries met with the Ottoman peace mission for six months, working out the bases for a treaty. In the end, the Treaty of Zsitvatorok (Receb 1015/November 1606) brought the thirteen-year-old Ottoman-Habsburg war to an end.¹²⁰

The third front for the Ottomans, that with Persia, proved by far the most long-lasting. Shah Abbas, mature, clever, and the master of a well-organized army and bureaucracy, had fought his eastern battles with the Uzbeks successfully. By 1011/1603 he began to turn westward toward the western boundary he had reluctantly accepted in 998/1590.¹²¹ He proposed alliances against the Ottomans with any who would help him, including not only disaffected Ottomans but also the Christian European powers, the Muscovite czar, Boris Gudunov, and even the pope, Clement VIII.¹²²

On their part, the Ottomans continued their pressure, the supreme field commander Cağalazade Sinin Pasha besieging various Persian fortresses but with only limited success. After several severe checks during 1013/1604 the Ottoman commander decided to winter in Van. The army of the shah surprised him at one point and forced him to flee

by ship across Lake Van to Adilcevaz and thence northwest to Erzurum.¹²³ Gathering his forces together in the summer of 1014/1605 he battled inconclusively with the elusive Persians. By early fall Cağalazade Sinan had extended his communication lines too far and fell into a Persian trap. On 25 Rebi'ülevvel 1014/9 September 1605 near Lake Urmiye he suffered a great defeat.¹²⁴ Here he lost most of his weapons, the all-important road to Tabriz, and his temper. During a rash moment he executed a very important Kurdish tribal leader and head of an important family in northern Syria, Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha of Kilis. This execution touched off the most serious rebellion of the time, one which aimed ultimately not at reconciliation with the Ottoman government like the Celâlis, but at establishing a sovereign state with its capital at Aleppo.

III The Canbulads of Northern Syria

With the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 922/1516 the Turks inherited special regional problems, among which were difficulty of control by Istanbul of the diverse ethnic groups. Syria lay more than thirty days' march southeast of the Ottoman capital. As the decades passed the sultan's governors encouraged various groups, including tribal chieftains, locally based Janissaries, and the urban nobility (eşraf) to balance one another's power. As for the non-Muslim people in Syria, the Ottomans allowed a relatively independent life. Important concentrations of foreign concessionaires added to the complex mixture of peoples and faiths.

To administer Syria smoothly the Ottomans divided it into three major eyâlets (provinces): Aleppo, Tripoli, and Damascus. The Ottomans controlled Syria by manipulating four interrelated political organizations: Ottoman officers and their armies sent from Istanbul by the Porte and responsible expressly for order in the eyâlets; urban elites, both Muslim and non-Muslim, particularly those in the commercial sphere; foreign officials (who played a greater role in Aleppo and Tripoli than in Damascus); and, most important, local Syrian emirs (chieftains).

In pursuit of their policies the Ottomans allowed the emir of Kilis, Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha, to keep not only hereditary possession of a reasonably small area of northern Syria, but to become beylerbeyi of Aleppo. This tended to upset the balance of local powers in the region, but was partly occasioned in 1012/1603 by the renewed war with Persia. The summary execution of Hüseyin Pasha, judged to be disobedient to the Ottoman field commander, precipitated one of the Empire's most serious rebellions.

1. Ottoman Control of Northern Syria

The Ottomans governed north Syria primarily by means of a beylerbeyi stationed in Aleppo, appointed from among the kapıkulu (slave) officers of the sultan. The beylerbeyi (governor-general) assigned to a province followed established legal procedures. His main objective included the preparation of soldiers and supplies for the

Ottoman armies and the execution of the sultan's orders. To aid his governance he was assisted by officers appointed from Istanbul, particularly the defterdar (treasurer) who acted independently but in consonance with the beylerbeyi's objectives. Additionally the various sancak (regional) lords came together to determine policy in divan (council), for the beylerbeyi was ultimately responsible, with his officers, for peace in the province. Each governor-general enjoyed a remarkably short tenure of office; otherwise, it was thought, he would become corrupted.¹ Such quick turn-over inhibited long-term policies and, in this century of economic imbalance, beylerbeyis tended to enrich themselves as quickly as possible. Though the collection of taxes could often be manipulated by the beylerbeyi for his own advantage the responsibility for remission of taxes to Istanbul lay with the defterdar, who spared no one, regardless of rank or religion, in his duty to the sultan. The jailing of local chiefs for tax evasion in Syria was not uncommon.

The government also appointed kadıs at the important locations in Syria, judicial officers who appear generally to have held to higher ethical standards than the governors-general. These men tended to stay longer in their positions or received alternating assignments over a period of years.² Along with these bureaucratic askeris, dozens of lesser civil servants filled the offices of the government, serving the needs of the armed force to keep the peace in the Dar ül-Islam. One even notes the occurrence of re'aya, particularly wealthy non-Muslims, as sub-

ordinate officers of the beylerbeyi, the most famous of which was the Aleppan commissioner of customs (gümrük emini), an Armenian, in the early eleventh/seventeenth century.³

North Syrian beylerbeyis held responsibilities of great interregional importance. For example, although the major power center of the region was Aleppo, which held seniority over the provinces of both Damascus and Tripoli, Damascus had responsibility for road security for the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, and Tripoli administered several ports on its coastline, including the port of Tripoli itself.⁴ Moreover, the government had to contend with the traditional patterns of nomadic life including the tendency of nomads to consider extortion and banditry an affair of commerce. Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomans, along with many varieties of Islam within these ethnic groups, had to be controlled with care. Bedouin cavalry, well-known for its swift effectiveness, could quickly become a danger to the Ottoman peace.⁵ The most effective governance came through balancing local interests and powers, the success of which often meant the difference between a beylerbeyi's advancement in rank and his quick fall from favor.

North Syria's geographic importance was not lost on the Ottomans. Through Aleppo a major military supply route ran east from Istanbul to the Mediterranean port of Payas/Dörtyol and on toward Persia. The beylerbeyi of Aleppo also controlled the Amanus and Taurus mountain passes, of utmost importance to the Ottomans for supplies of soldiers and munitions to the east.⁶ The Damascus beylerbeyi's

responsibility for the Muslim pilgrimage included upkeep of the major north-south Syrian roads. Economically the most important of all, Aleppo and Tripoli connected the European sea lanes with the great silk (and earlier spice) trade of Persia. These produced, except during war with the Safavids, fortunes for many merchants and constant revenues for the Ottoman treasury.

To carry out all of these responsibilities and specific military requirements of the land and human resources of the north Syrian region the Ottoman governor-general commanded an impressive force. In the early eleventh/seventeenth century, the beylerbeyi of Aleppo controlled as many as nine sancaks.⁷ The geographically large eyâlet of Damascus consisted of fifteen sancaks and 4000 soldiers and Tripoli, the smallest, had only five sancaks with 3000 soldiers.⁸ We know little about the quality of these armies except for scattered reports. The Venetian consul in Aleppo, Allesandro Malpiero, said that in 1005/1596 the north Syrian soldiers were excellent and their mounted musket men (levends) were "believed to be the best in the army of the Grand Seignor."⁹ Yet they presented problems to the Ottomans since as returned veterans from wars in Persia or Europe they could, if idle, easily upset the civil peace.

To help keep order in the cities the Ottoman government established Janissaries, the slave infantry which originally derived from Christian tribute boys, in the main north Syrian centers. The number of Janissary troops assigned to Aleppo expanded at the end of the earlier wars with Persia in 998/1590. With new opportunities for trade

on the roads leading to and from Aleppo and Damascus foreign as well as domestic merchants demanded more internal safeguards from regional nomads and riffraff. The veteran Janissaries could act as government policemen, far less involved (it was assumed) in local political issues than were the local constabularies. The Ottoman government often assigned unpaid Janissaries who had rebelled against the sultan to cities like Aleppo or Damascus, allowing these veteran infantry men to enter commercial undertakings on the local scene or help collect taxes.¹⁰ By 1008/1599 the Damascus Janissaries in Aleppo had become well nigh uncontrollable and were therefore replaced by a new group of kapikulu slaves from Istanbul.¹¹ Unaccustomed to such treatment the two groups soon clashed to determine who, in fact, would keep the peace and collect the taxes. The Janissaries established a patronage system among their members and supplemented their ranks, when needed, with their sons or local appointees.¹² Most important, these Janissaries both reflected and participated in local business interests and conflicts, particularly between the two major cities, Aleppo and Damascus. By the end of the tenth/sixteenth century minor incidents between the two cities with the addition of these veteran soldiers began to take on the aspect of interurban warfare. In Zi'lhicce 1010/May 1602 a report from Aleppo mentioned that the Janissaries of the two cities were "at war with one another....Those of Damascus came into Aleppo murdering all the Janissaries they could find, and then most of the women and children in their houses."¹³ Clearly, the power to

make and enforce policy in north Syria did not reside alone in the Ottoman beylerbeyis and their officers.

A second group through which the Ottomans manipulated power in the major north Syrian cities were certain elite non-military re'aya peoples who controlled urban commerce and, through this control, took part in the political decisions of the region. In Aleppo, free-born Muslim men of importance made most of the vital decisions which affected the commercial life of the city. These were the self-styled descendants of the Prophet (eṣrāf) who increasingly struggled against the growing power of the "Sultan's mercenaries" as the Janissaries were known.¹⁴ The Ottomans required the kadı and his bureaucracy to regulate this complex society of urban guilds and tradesmen as well as the regional agricultural community. The Muslim city-dweller possessed rights to complain about injustices, to suggest alternative political actions, to demand security of person and property. Because the kadı, like the defterdar, was appointed by Istanbul, men recognized his relative impartiality and justice. Very often citizens availed themselves of these rights, refusing to accept unreasonable actions of the Ottoman governors or the Janissary police force.

Non-Muslim city-dwellers also were protected by Islamic law, and possessed certain rights and privileges. The Armenians particularly took advantage of these opportunities in Aleppo to live comfortable, productive, and politically powerful lives. About the same number of Armenians lived in Aleppo as Eastern Orthodox, there


being about 12,000 Armenians to 16,100 Orthodox in 1026/1617.¹⁵ However, Armenians monopolized the silk trade of Aleppo, and the renowned Armenian merchant family of Petik held high office for decades in the port of Tripoli.¹⁶ Jews also had businesses, homes, and the protection of the Ottoman law. The Italian Pietro della Valle mentioned seeing a Jewish synagogue in Aleppo "fam'd for fairness and antiquity."¹⁷

The power of the re'aya of the cities, both Muslim and non-Muslim, came from their successful commercial interests and the enormous tax revenues received from north Syria by the Ottoman government. Aleppo predominated, being "the principall Mart of that part of Asia for Silkes, and sundry other Commodities."¹⁸ Long caravans carried these "Silkes, and sundry other Commodities," meaning spices, to numbers of warehouses in Aleppo.¹⁹ Every year one million gold solidi were traded in silk and wool alone, and in 1005/1596 that number reached two million.²⁰ During the year 1012/1603 between 500 and 1000 mule-loads of silk entered Aleppo according to the English merchant-soldier, Sir Anthony Sherley.²¹ In Damascus, on a slightly less scale, the famous covered market thrived with a variety of goods, as well as the services rendered by that city for the all-important annual pilgrimage to Mecca and the consequent repair of roads and bridges. Tripoli, too, though a much smaller city, dealt in more trade even than did the port at the capital city of Istanbul, most of Tripoli's goods coming or going to Aleppo.²² The Ottoman government surely

did not underestimate the enormous importance of north Syrian trade and revenues.

A glance at the kinds of goods bought and sold in north Syria gives an impression of the great importance the region had for the Empire, the Europeans, and the Persians. For centuries, of course, spices had come through the Perso-Arab Gulf to Europe through Aleppo. Braudel mentions the snow water and ice trade in 982/1574;²³ in 988/1580 Tripoli dealt in lead and tin, the former for bullets and the latter for casting cannon for the Persian wars then in progress.²⁴ In the 1000's/1590's the pepper trade flourished.²⁵ In 1005/1596 the Venetian bailo (commercial attaché) wrote of the English trade in guns and powder, doubtless used to fight the Christian Habsburgs in the Danube region.²⁶ Even after the outbreak of war with Persia in 1012/1603 an Englishman saw "five hundred, and sometimes a thousand mules laden of silke to Aleppo" from some Persian city.²⁷ Obviously, as a modern European historian has pointed out, rather than decreasing, trade in the late eleventh/sixteenth century in the eastern Mediterranean region was on the increase.²⁸

Regionally, the farmers of north Syria produced a variety of agricultural crops in an arid but fertile soil. Olive trees grew in villages between Aleppo and the port of Iskenderun.²⁹ The French ambassador in 1014/1605 saw grapes, wheat, and fruit, as well as olives, in the region.³⁰ Rice also was grown for local consumption.³¹ Since availability of water generally meant crop irrigation the Orontes, Biqa^c, and Jordan valleys supported varieties



of truck farms. Visitors to Aleppo commented on the famous underground aqueduct which brought water to the fountains and gardens there.³²

Obviously, the eşrâf elite who controlled this commercial and agricultural treasure felt keenly the demands made by the Ottoman government. Taxes and extraordinary imposts always came as "an outrage." Wartime, and particularly the often unsuccessful results of Ottoman wars, invariably brought higher taxes. Special taxes fell on trade, on homes, and on individuals to produce certain specific results. For example, in 982/1574, one of each sixteen houses in Aleppo had to pay for a camel loaded with flour for the armies; in the same year one of each twenty-five houses had to pay for two bricklayers, and so on.³³ The government tapped private wealth for special imposts. In 996/1587 the Venetian bailo in Istanbul commented that foreign merchants were required to pay thousands of ducats to help pay the soldiers in Aleppo.³⁴ Unfortunately, the line between "regular expenses" and extortion was easily crossed.³⁵ Such demands always affected the local merchants of the region; they infuriated the foreign commercial interests.

The third important role in the north Syrian economic and political functioning of Ottoman power was played by the foreigners in the region, particularly the merchant community. These "urban bourgeoisie" lived for the most part in Aleppo, and of these, the most important in Aleppo were the Venetians.³⁶ Venice had begun its commercial interests in Syria more than a century before, under the

Mamluks, and continued to trade with the Ottomans after the conquest. About 957/1550 Venice moved its mercantile center from Damascus to Aleppo, which they considered the terminus of the caravan routes from the Mesopotamian region.³⁷ Venice kept strong ties with the Ottoman government even after the Turks captured the island of Cyprus from them in 979/1571.

Venice suffered, as did all the Europeans, from the restrictive trade practices of the Ottomans. No cash was officially allowed to flow out of the Empire; only barter could take place, in order to keep as much precious metal within the borders as possible. Of course, with unrealistic demands came an increase in bribery, a form of income-extension which, by the turn of the century, had advanced almost to a quasi-official system within the total economy.³⁸ For its own interests Catholic Venice tended to work against Catholic Spain and the Pope. Venice watched other European merchant states with great care, and only grudgingly accepted their presence. Venice's greatest profits came from trade in cloth of all kinds--gold, silk, wool--for which privileges they paid the Ottoman government large customs revenues.³⁹

After the victory of Lepanto, not only Venetians but other European mercantile states competed for the rich trade of the north Syrian region. Europeans no longer feared Turkish naval power as they had previously. The French had established trading stations in Aleppo and since 942/1536 had held certain traditional rights to trade with the Ottomans.⁴⁰ By the end of the tenth/sixteenth century

two new European merchant groups pushed their way into the Aleppan trade marts: the English, who established their Levant Company in 989/1581,⁴¹ and the Dutch, who by 1006/1597 entered Tripoli harbor under French colors.⁴²

The foreign "urban bourgeoisie" at the turn of the tenth/sixteenth century felt some excitement over the possibilities of trade in the eastern Mediterranean. Few, if any, realized that England's new East India Company would eventually siphon off almost all the spice trade from north Syria and the Ottoman Empire. None could perceive that the trade of Aleppo and Tripoli would deteriorate and move eventually to Izmir (on the west coast of Anatolia), or that by 1029/1620 Dutch and English merchants would supply most of Europe's need in silk directly from the Far East. At the turn of the century, most international forecasts for north Syrian commerce indicated a continuation of the ancient trade routes through Aleppo from the Persian Gulf, and perhaps directly through the Persian shah.⁴³

The shah of Persia was one foreign dignitary who had no official representation in northern Syria. Not that Abbas the Great was disinterested. Even after 1012/1603, when the Persians renewed their war with the Turks, "silk became the main Persian export."⁴⁴ Obviously, the Persians even at a time of crisis needed to find outlets for this valuable export wherever possible. The normal exit to Europe was Aleppo, where not less than five major routes moved the precious commodity from Isfahan.⁴⁵ The Armenian community of Julfa, just north of the Araxes River in Azerbaijan, had close connections with their confreres in

the Armenian merchant community of Aleppo.⁴⁶ Long before the war a relationship existed between the two Armenian Christian communities of Julfa and Aleppo, to the advantage of both the Persian and Ottoman revenue collectors. Up to the outbreak of hostilities, trade had expanded greatly among the silk merchants, with a constant growing demand from Europe. Although the war caused Shah Abbas to explore new trade routes to the west (particularly through Moscovy) the old Aleppan route still proved attractive.⁴⁷ The thought must have crossed the minds of the Syrian merchants and local governmental officials that an alternative regime to that of the Ottoman's government in Aleppo might provide greater profits for all concerned--and especially for a local prince.

The fourth power center through which the Ottomans exerted their control, and in many ways the most important, were the traditional chieftains, the local emirs whose tribal systems had for centuries practiced self-aggrandizement as a matter of course. The Ottomans early on recognized the tendency of these local chiefs to seek power over their rivals. Rather than endeavor to neutralize such a tendency the government gradually fashioned a policy of relative local autonomy. They divided the region carefully to aid a surveillance policy. Because geography (high mountains, narrow valleys, deserts) tended to thwart easy access and aided local insurgents, the Ottomans soon relinquished direct control over the various desert Arab and Kurdish tribes. They decided to allow local autonomy but determined that no single ruler should control simulta-

neously the cities of Aleppo, Damascus, and Tripoli. They bestowed offices on tribal leaders, they demanded taxes and soldiers for their wars, they rewarded loyalty, and they punished rebellion. Beyond that, the Ottomans left Syria in the hands of the local leaders as long as those leaders remained relatively powerless.

Actually, the Ottomans consciously and systematically cultivated discord among the hereditary possessors of Syrian lands and flocks. Most uncontrollable (yet, from the Ottoman standpoint, least dangerous) were the nomadic chieftains of Palestine and the desert regions. These generally fell into line with bribes or quick police action. More difficult were various heterodox religious groups such as the Nusayri and the Druze, both living far away in their mountain hideouts. Occasionally the government sent troops or issued fetvas (legal rulings) to demonstrate its continued opposition to such schismatics.⁴⁸ Yet for the Ottomans the potentially most explosive problems in Syria arose from the political power of the dozen or so major dynastic tribe systems. These groups owned great areas of land. They traditionally fought one another to expand the power of their leaders at the expense of the vanquished chieftain. To a selected few of the emirs of these tribes the Ottomans bestowed honors and offices in an attempt to keep them in a kind of political equilibrium. This included conferring hereditary rights of property on some, or the administration of a city and its wealth on others. Such a policy did not affect the two largest cities, Aleppo and Damascus, the governing of which the Ottomans kept clearly (and tightly)


in the hands of a kapıkulu (slave) officer. But small cities like Baalbek, al-Ajlūn, Nāblus, and Palmyra were much more easily governed by a local emir like Mūsa ibn al-Harfūsh in Baalbek, or the Tarabya family of al-Ajlūn, the Talims of Palmyra, and the Shihābs of the at-Tayim Valley.⁴⁹ Even more important were such families as the Maʿans of the Shūf, the sons of Canbulad in Kilis, and the powerful Sayfā family of Tripoli.

Around 1000/1592 the Ottomans decided to assign Tripoli to the very crafty, aggressive Turkoman chieftain in the Akkār region, Yūsuf ibn Sayfā (Seyfoğlu, in Turkish).⁵⁰ The Ottomans took this action thinking that Yusuf could control the region against more dangerous chieftains in the region. He could also use his strategic position on the eastern Mediterranean to gain financial reward by control of the foreign trade and merchants in Aleppo. Yusuf felt confident because he could now build up local power without too much interference from Ottoman inspectors. He could assign troops for his own purposes and increase his fortune from the revenues of the land tax assessments and especially the wealthy port facilities. Moreover, he could pass the whole estate on to his sons, with the prospect that they might even expand their power, given the right opportunity.

Seyfoğlu Yusuf, however, faced many difficulties. Just as Damascus and Aleppo rivaled one another in their trade relations, so also the port city of Tripoli had rivals in Beirut and İskenderun (known to Europeans as Alexandretta). With the assignment of Tripoli to Yusuf the

Ottomans obviously determined to raise Tripoli over the other north Syrian port cities. The merchants of Aleppo quickly recognized Seyfoğlu's objectives and feared his growing power even within the Ottoman domain. "Yusuf is more master of Tripoli than the [Ottoman] pasha himself," was said of the emir.⁵¹ To thwart Yusuf, the Aleppans about 998/1589 requested of the Ottoman government the right to use the port of Iskenderun since it was much closer and more convenient.⁵² The move seemed appropriate because the Persian war had ended, and silk could more easily resume its lucrative place in the Aleppan trade system through Iskenderun than Tripoli. Not all the foreign merchants agreed with this, calling Iskenderun "a deserted beach," and complaining about its swamps, bad air, and fever (malaria).⁵³ The native Aleppan merchants brought enough pressure, however, so that the Ottoman government established Iskenderun as the main port for Aleppo, taking trade and revenues away from Tripoli--and from Seyfoğlu Yusuf.⁵⁴

Iskenderun possessed some advantages for the domestic and foreign merchants of north Syria. It lay only three caravan days from Aleppo; foreign traders found the shorter trip thereby lessened the chances of highway robbery by local nomads or Celâli bands. True, Iskenderun had certain inconveniences, for no port facilities and few warehouses existed.⁵⁵ This lack had little effect, however, since most trade was in relatively small cargoes of nonperishable goods, like silk and leather. Moreover, the government paid very little attention at the outset to Iskenderun;



Ottoman bureaucrats and military personnel avoided the place if possible due to its reputation for fever. Its natural harbor was not as large as Tripoli's, but it was adequate and could accommodate and protect most European commercial fleets.⁵⁶ Why then, after only a few years of use, did the Ottoman government suddenly deny the right of main port privilege to Iskenderun, and, in 1001/1593 restore prime status to Tripoli?

Several factors may have caused the government under the grand vizier Koca Sinan Pasha to downgrade Iskenderun. The change may have had something to do with the outbreak in 1001/1593 of war between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. Illicit trade through Iskenderun to Aleppo might have easily occurred. The numerous European merchants in Aleppo might have been more conveniently taxed through Tripoli. Habitually, the Ottomans tried to keep local chieftains from too much power. As the power of Ma'noğlu Fahreddin waxed, so the power of Yusuf Seyfoğlu could be maintained by opening up Tripoli.⁵⁷ Whatever the reason, trade from Aleppo continued, but mostly to Tripoli, and through Yusuf's hands.

The port of Iskenderun was not completely closed. It continued on as a very minor, secondary port facility. The Venetians used it as much as possible, for they were less troubled by official requirements there than in Tripoli.⁵⁸ Because of its reputation for "bad air and fever" the Ottomans for the moment felt such a minor, limited operation provided no particular danger.⁵⁹ Yet, in 1015/1606

the Ottoman government suddenly and completely closed Iskenderun to all trade, foreign and domestic.⁶⁰

The highest officials, even the grand vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha himself, gave utterance that Iskenderun would not be opened, regardless of some enormous bribes offered by several ambassadors of major European states.⁶¹ The port, the Ottoman government discovered, had become part of a master plan to aid a flow of European arms to a rebel emir in north Syria. It was a source of mischief and, in fact, extraordinarily dangerous. The Ottomans took every step to stifle this European connection quickly and completely as possible.

2. *Tuscany, the Grand Duke Ferdinand I, and Syria*

After the fall of Famagusta city and the island of Cyprus to the Ottoman Turks in 979/1571 all Catholic Europe blazed with Christian anger. The fall of the great Venetian island outpost in the eastern Mediterranean was an important economic and spiritual blow to the Catholic powers of Europe. The eastern Mediterranean appeared to have become forever an Ottoman lake. What had before been a difficult trip for Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land and the Holy Places now became a series of confrontations and extortions from the Turks. The power of the Muslim Turk in the region appeared invincible.

Yet, scarcely two months after Famagusta's fall the Battle of Lepanto (16 Cemaziyülevvel 979/7 October 1571) infused unbounded joy to the same Catholic powers which had

lost so much hope at Famagusta. Lepanto ended, says Braudel, "a genuine inferiority complex on the part of Christendom."⁶² Plans were made to invade Turkish territory: north Africa (Algiers and Tunis), Egypt, Syria, the island of Rhodes, a re-invasion of Cyprus, and the Greek Morea. The Pope, Pius V (d. 1572), and the Habsburg Admiral Don Juan began dreaming seriously of delivering the Holy Land to Christendom.⁶³

Because Lepanto indicated a certain softness in the Ottomans, groups of seagoing brigands and pirates began to make more audacious raids on Turkish installations and fleets. Often enough these Europeans found the Ottomans remained every bit as powerful as before Lepanto, and they received severe beatings. But the English and the Dutch elbowed their way into the Mediterranean, and by 1019/1610 European piracy had become systematized on an official basis.⁶⁴ The Duc de Sully of France openly admitted the French government supported the pirates.⁶⁵ Since both the Venetians (after Cyprus) and the Ottomans (after Lepanto) had lost in naval supremacy, the rise of piracy, along with the increasing invasion of Ottoman port cities, caused much concern to the sultan and his advisors in Istanbul.

One of the Mediterranean's ubiquitous pirate forces, the Knights of St. Stephen, conducted their raids under the general supervision of the Medici Duke of Tuscany. The duke, Cosimo I, made plans to turn the deteriorating naval conditions after Lepanto to his own advantage. Florentine merchants already could be found in various parts of Europe and the East.⁶⁶ Cosimo, vying with the Duke of Savoy for

power, supported and sheltered pirates in north Africa and the eastern Mediterranean against the Turk.⁶⁷ On his death in 1574 Cosimo passed to his eldest son Francesco the possibility of expansion at the expense of the Ottoman sultan.

Unfortunately for Florence the new Duke's only lasting fame was his advancement to the status of Grand Duke by his liege lord, Rudolph II of Habsburg, the Holy Roman Emperor. Otherwise, Francesco ruled disastrously, spending most of his time living high off his birthright. Some of his bureaucrats, and his younger brother Ferdinand, continued the pressure on the Ottoman Empire which Cosimo had begun. In fact, in 991/1583 the Ottoman government made strong protests over Tuscan piratical activities against Turkish installations, putting pressure on the Venetians since they, the Ottomans held, were responsible for peace in Levantine waters.⁶⁸ In 1587 the playboy Grand Duke Francesco died (mistakenly poisoned by his wife) and his serious and ambitious brother Ferdinand became Grand Duke. The new Tuscan monarch had well-served his apprenticeship for many years; now he had his opportunity to carry on the expansive plans laid earlier by his father.

Ferdinand I (d. 1609) began immediately to strengthen his naval capacity. He built up a fleet based in Leghorn to prey on Turkish shipping lanes. He improved the harbor facilities at Leghorn and the river city of Pisa. He made canals and other improvements in Tuscany. He improved the scope and power of his ships, cooperating with the English in 1604 by outfitting ships in England which had previously been fabricated in Amsterdam.⁶⁹ He planned his own school

of navigation with English shipwrights (procured illegally in the guise of passengers on a visit to Italy) and other shipbuilding experts who had left England for his exciting prospects and profits.⁷⁰

In Braudel's words, upstarts like Tuscany had now tended to replace the tired giants like Venice as the pirate power on the eastern Mediterranean.⁷¹ Ferdinand immediately began to use this power. He enlisted his own state fleet as well as the service of his Knights of St. Stephen. These marauders, feared only slightly less than the Knights of Malta, dedicated themselves to the pious obligation of killing Muslim Turks and capturing their ships for booty--a percentage of which they shared with their sponsor, the Grand Duke Ferdinand. Actually, Ferdinand could not control the actions of these warriors, whose red cross-marked sails scoured the north African and Syrian coastlands.⁷² By 1008/1599 the Knights attacked and "made a violent attempt to wrest Chios from its Moslem overlords," but they were able to remain there only temporarily, a storm at sea preventing the landing of further troops, and the local Jews (who realized their fate if the island were to be turned to the mercies of the Roman Catholic Tuscans) aiding the Turks in fighting off the invaders.⁷³ Not dismayed, Ferdinand battled Turks wherever he found them. For example, in Şaban 997/June 1589 he took sixteen ships in battle with the Ottomans, and in 1011/1602 he captured three galleys.⁷⁴ Probably during this latter battle the English adventurer, Sir Thomas Sherley, fell captive to the Turks on the Greek mainland where he had gone

with a Tuscan landing party.⁷⁵ In 1017/1608 Ferdinand massed a huge fleet at Leghorn, ostensibly to rid the north African region of Turkish pirates, and that same year his Knights of St. Stephen captured a Turkish pilgrimage fleet off the coast of Rhodes.⁷⁶ By this time Europe suspected, and the Ottomans knew, that Ferdinand had made plans of a far more serious nature than simple piracy, with a high-ranking officer of the Ottoman government in Aleppo.

Aside from his extralegal activities Ferdinand worked closely with the Catholic powers of Europe for mutual advantages against the Ottoman enemy. His legal and official relations with the Porte in Istanbul passed through the government of France. France, for her own profit, charged him a five percent ad valorem tax on all official Tuscan transactions.⁷⁷ Indignant at having to pay such an added tax, he endeavored to obtain his own capitulatory agreement with the sultan in 999/1591, offering a bribe of 20,000 ducats, but in vain.⁷⁸ He continued to press for these privileges in 1001/1593, but still the sultan (and his viziers, who were well counter-bribed by the French and Venetians) refused.⁷⁹ Finally, in 1013/1604 the Duke received a license from the Turks: to sell English gunpowder in Istanbul!⁸⁰ His desires now whetted by this crust thrown to him, he tried in 1014/1605 to send a Jew, Ibrahim Benazor, as an intermediary to establish trade agreements. Again he was refused.⁸¹ Obviously, if Ferdinand could find another method to enter Turkish trade, legally or illegally, he would adopt it.

Just why did Ferdinand desire to enter Ottoman commerce? First, he did have some religious concerns, including the melioration of the condition of Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land. Second, he followed a policy of economic "free trade" by opening a free port at Leghorn to sell and receive stolen Turkish goods.⁸² Third, he needed legal capitulations from the Turks to obtain needed wheat, and to undercut the Venetian market in cloths, particularly silk.⁸³ But most importantly, the Tuscan monarch sought to utilize his many important friends. Duke Ferdinand had long known and worked with the reigning Pope, Clement VIII (1592-1605), who supported Tuscan objectives in the Middle East. The Pope followed a forward policy against the Ottomans, sending messages of good will to Shah Abbas of Persia with hopes that the shah would help lower the power of the Turk. Moreover, Clement offered subsidies to the Holy Roman Emperor, urging Rudolph to support a coalition of Italian cities against the Turk in a kind of crusade.⁸⁴ This excluded Venice, of course, which still supported Ottoman interests. Clement even gave specific permission for Christian governments to transport arms to regions where local Christians and dissident Muslims might fight against the sultan, such as in Syria.⁸⁵

For the Duke of Tuscany, Syria began to take on a special importance. Harking back to his days in Rome, Ferdinand renewed an old friendship with the Patriarch of the Roman Catholic Maronite Uniate Church in Lebanon and wrote him exploratory letters.⁸⁶ He already realized the value of the ports of Tripoli and especially Iskenderun for

commercial purposes. He sent Florentine envoys as intermediaries to explore possibilities of some kind of arrangement with local Syrian leaders. The best known of these emissaries was MichelAngiolo Corai, a Syrian Christian (probably Maronite), an experienced dragoman who spoke more than a score of languages and who understood the complications of Syria and the ultimate objectives of Ferdinand of Tuscany.⁸⁷

The Tuscan duke saw the importance of regional solidarity for his plan. He entertained international visitors at his Florentine court, including the famous English Sherley brothers, of whom Robert remained a guest of the court from 1592 to 1597, and Anthony became a close companion.⁸⁸ Though we have no clear evidence, the Grand Duke probably sent inquiries to the shah of Persia for some kind of support for a mutually beneficial policy in Syria. We do know a Florentine merchant named Victorio Speciero met Sir Anthony Sherley in Baghdad in 1007/1598. Speciero is representative of many Florentines who roamed the regions east of Aleppo (on his way, he told Sir Anthony, to China) in search of trade, profits, and possibly European opportunities to undermine Ottoman power.⁸⁹

The principal objective of the Grand Duke Ferdinand appears to have been the invasion and recapture of Cyprus.⁹⁰ Along with other Christian princes, Ferdinand felt the island should be repossessed by Christians, though not necessarily by the Venetians. The possessor of Cyprus could control the trade lanes of the rich Levantine spice and silk trade from Aleppo, as well as the all-important

Christian pilgrimage route to the Holy Land. King Philip III of Spain, moreover, promised to acknowledge Ferdinand as "King of Cyprus" if he were to capture the island.⁹¹ As Christian King of Cyprus Ferdinand could cut off the Ottoman fleet which annually sailed from Egypt to Istanbul. He could reduce Muslim pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of Islam and at the same time increase Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land. He might even repossess that important place for the Christian world. He could aid the political position of the Maronite Catholics in the Lebanon. Finally, working through Cyprus and Aleppo, Ferdinand, with the shah of Persia, could move against the Ottoman Empire in its most vulnerable spot, helping to bring the Ottoman power down once again (as at Lepanto) and open for Europeans the ancient trade routes to the Far East---in Tuscan hands.

The keystone to any Levantine edifice was an independent Levantine puppet state, one whose strings Ferdinand would control. He must possess Iskenderun for the Knights of St. Stephen and his own Tuscan fleet. He needed a local, pliant ruler on the eastern Mediterranean coastland who was totally independent of the sultan of Turkey. After much searching (possibly by MichelAngiolo Corai and others like him) Ferdinand thought he had his man in the person of a venerable, well-respected emir from the tiny north Syrian town of Kilis: Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha.

3. The Origins of Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha

Little is known about the Canbulad family before the rise of Canbulad ibn Kâsım, called al-Kurdi, the Kurd.⁹² According to one report Canbulad was educated in the Saray (Palace) school, probably in the early years of the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent.⁹³ He rose not as a Christian devşirme, however, but traditionally traced his ancestry to the line of Saladin and the Ayyubids⁹⁴ and to the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad.⁹⁵ His fame and usefulness to the Porte came when he cleaned out certain brigands in northern Syria. For this service and his aid in the Cyprus campaign of 979/1571 the Ottoman government awarded his family the sancaks of Ma'arra and Kilis as an ocaklık or hereditary possession.⁹⁶ Though not unique for a Syrian chieftain the reward was generous and represented considerable respect by the Porte for Canbulad.

The Syrian towns of Kilis and Azaz, northwest of Aleppo, along with the city of Ma'arra, held important and strategic points in the security system of the Ottoman southern flank. In the tenth/sixteenth century Kilis lay on an important thoroughfare for the silk trade from Aleppo to Ayntab, Urfa, and eventually Persia.⁹⁷ In 1018/1609 it possessed an income of over half a million akçes.⁹⁸ According to Evliya Çelebi, by 1082/1671 it possessed some 4660 houses and 2170 shops.⁹⁹ Thirty mosques provided prayer facilities for the Sunni Muslim faithful, of which at least one was built by Canbulad ibn Kâsım in 970/1562; of the three public bath houses Evliya Efendi saw, one bore

the name and the benevolence of the Canbulad family.¹⁰⁰ Kilis also played a strategic role on the military road for northern Syria, sending taxes and troops almost annually to support the Ottoman commanders. In either direction along the great east-west axis, the government transported munitions from the sea by way of Payas/Dörtyol to the eastern campaigns, or by land from Baghdad to the west, through Kilis. No doubt the Porte realized this strategic importance, and was willing to make considerable concessions to keep it loyal to the central government.

When Canbulad ibn Kâsım died in 979/1572 his lands passed to the administration of two of his sons, Hüseyin and Habib.¹⁰¹ Hüseyin began his career as a sipahi guardsman in Damascus, and initially inherited the position of Emir of Kilis.¹⁰² For some years he alternated his position as emir of the ocaklık with his brother Habib.¹⁰³ Hüseyin fought with the Ottoman armies as part of his duties in eastern Anatolia and Georgia in 986/1578 against the Persians.¹⁰⁴ In 989/1581 he became emir of Aleppo where he may have made enemies and probably incurred debts.¹⁰⁵ Two years later, however, he fought as second in command of the Ottoman forces with Cağalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha when the Turks captured Erivan from the Persian shah, Muhammad Khodabanda.¹⁰⁶ For some reason the Porte after this time removed both Canbulad brothers from Kilis, and gave the administration of the ocaklık to one Dev Süleyman.¹⁰⁷ Because he owed the Ottoman treasury great sums, the government jailed Hüseyin Pasha in Aleppo, and confiscated and



sold all his personal property at a very reduced rate in an apparent attempt to wipe out his power.¹⁰⁸

When he was finally released from prison Hüseyin resolved to leave Aleppo and return to Kilis to begin again to build whatever power he could but never to yield to anyone trying to displace him from an office rightfully his. Hüseyin first reclaimed his hereditary lands by driving out Dev Süleyman with the use of loyal sekbān (musket men) troops. The Ottoman government, aware of this illegality, felt it wiser to allow Hüseyin to retain his ocaklık as long as he kept the peace and paid his taxes.¹⁰⁹

As a Kurdish emir, Hüseyin Pasha exemplified the most important attributes of leadership: "He was a bold man, a master of politics, one who attracted followers and became wealthy...brave, imposing, and endowed with generosity, respectful of the ulema and the pious Muslims."¹¹⁰ He studied astronomy and astrology and was known for his wisdom. He received criticism when he increased the tax burden on his people to pay his sekbān troops, but was praised for providing needed security using these daily-wage musket men.¹¹¹ His possessions stretched out in the semi-arid region of more than 800 square kilometers, including rich lands, dozens of villages, and the two major towns of Kilis and Azaz. His total income amounted to about 803,000 akçes per year.¹¹² He rose high in the estimation of the Porte and, according to one authority, Istanbul may have considered him for a vizierate.¹¹³

By the year 1009/1600 Hüseyin had many acquaintances among the leaders of the Ottoman Empire, and an important

position in a sensitive area. He possessed an independent army of well-trained musket men, as well as the traditional levies he could expect from his Kurdish tribesmen and the Turkoman and Arab troops in the Syrian region. Very naturally, such a man might hope for greater power if given the right opportunity.


This opportunity presented itself in the year 1007/1598. According to an Arab source, when the well-known Celâlî leader, Kara Yazıcı, rode up from the south via Sidon and Tripoli to Aleppo, Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha summoned him to Kilis.¹¹⁴ It may not have been a particularly friendly meeting since some of Dev Süleyman's troops (who had earlier usurped Kilis from the Canbulad family) now served with Kara Yazıcı's sekbans. While the Celâlî and Hüseyin discussed matters, the Celâlî band created a disturbance against which the beylerbeyi of Aleppo, Hacı İbrahim Pasha, sent out a force. Kara Yazıcı immediately went north to Samsat on the Euphrates River northwest of Urfa.¹¹⁵ Before he left Kara Yazıcı may have proposed some kind of support to the son of Canbulad, possibly a trade of Celâlî help to attain greater power in northern Syria for Kilis' support of the Celâlî movement in Anatolia. Such a proposal was not entirely out of the question.

That Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin had great ambitions was well known. He possessed power through the Arab, Kurdish, and Turkoman tribes of the region as well as the sekban troops he paid well and promptly. He had only to achieve again the position of governor of Aleppo and he would be the supreme military power in northern Syria. However, several

important Syrian rivals stood in his way, among whom were the chieftains Ma'noğlu Fahreddin of Mount Lebanon, Mūsa ibn al-Harfūsh of Baalbek, the very powerful Seyfoğlu Yusuf Pasha of Tripoli, and, of course, the Ottoman-appointed beylerbeyis of Aleppo and Damascus. Control of Aleppo, nonetheless, would establish the foundation for a certain regional autonomy, a most attractive possibility.

Aleppo was immensely wealthy.¹¹⁶ As the capital of an eyālet it controlled widespread lands which brought in an extraordinary income. The tax revenues for the Kilis area were over three-quarter million akçes annually; for Aleppo and all its constituencies, taxes amounted to over 3.6 million akçes.¹¹⁷ Kilis had 17 zeamets (large land areas) and 96 timars; Aleppo city had 62 zeamets, 295 timars.¹¹⁸ These figures tell only of the dirliks (revenue-grants) held by the askerî class. We have already seen the enormous fortunes made in the city by the re'aya merchants. The total number of inhabitants of the city varied from 200,000 to 400,000,¹¹⁹ and although the common language was Arabic, one could also hear the mercantile languages of Italian, French, Spanish, English, German, Armenian, and Dutch, plus Persian, Hindi, and even Uzbek.¹²⁰ Though these merchants mostly traded in imported silk, Aleppo in 991/1583 had its own silk farms worth 400,000 akçes in annual gross receipts.¹²¹ Control of such wealth would make Hüseyin a powerful man indeed.

The Kurdish emir of Kilis, therefore, did nothing overt to jeopardize his position with the Ottoman sovereign. He made no commitments to the Celālî Kara Yazıcı.



He paid his taxes dutifully (though one wonders with how much ardor), campaigned against Kara Yazıcı at the Urfa siege, and let events play into his hands.

By 1012/1603 political antagonism among several warring parties in the north Syrian region became uncontrollable. The supreme commander of the Ottoman forces in the east, Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, complained to the Porte that the son of the great Koca Sinan Pasha, Mahmud Pasha, had taken over Damascus by force, had refused his duties, and revolted.¹²² The central authorities immediately dispatched Osman Pasha (known as Hoca Hasmi, the "teacher's enemy") to Damascus as a replacement.¹²³ This pasha, with direct orders from Istanbul, threw the luckless Mahmud Pasha into jail and restored order in Damascus. Hoca Hasmi Osman's next act, according to the contemporary chronicler Hasanbeyzade Ahmed, was to remove Nasuh Pasha, the incumbent Ottoman governor of Aleppo, and replace him with (mirabile dictu) Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha, the emir of Kilis.¹²⁴

The story of how Hüseyin Pasha achieved this propitious and very welcome advancement offers an excellent example of the concessions the Ottoman government was prepared to make before 1015/1606 in order to carry on the three-front war against the Habsburgs, the Persians, and the Celâlis. It also demonstrates how a local Syrian chieftain could gain power by manipulating local aspirations, the greed and incompetence of the sultan's kapıkulu officers, and his own considerable leadership abilities.

In 1008/1599 the Ottoman government called upon its loyal servant, Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha, to send money and lead his tribal warriors to campaign in Anatolia, against the Celâli Kara Yazıcı at Urfa.¹²⁵ While Hüseyin Pasha carried out his duties for the Ottoman sovereign some 150 km northeast of Kilis, a rebel sekban named Rüstem, one of scores of rebel leaders in Anatolia, attacked the power-center of the Canbulad family.¹²⁶ The security officer left in Kilis by Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin, Kethuda Aziz, quickly sent to the beylerbeyi of Aleppo, Harami ("Outlaw") Ahmed Pasha, for aid. Kethuda Aziz's small constabulary proved unable to defend the city against the Celâli Rüstem. In the ensuing battle Aziz was killed and the city of Kilis pillaged. Upon returning from the Urfa siege, Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin was understandably shocked at the weakness and inefficiency of the Ottomans, particularly the governor (or, in his absence at his battlefield station, his kaymakam) of Aleppo. Within a short time Hüseyin captured and killed Rüstem, and set to work for the next few years restoring order and rebuilding his city.

In 1012/1603-04 the Ottoman government appointed Nasuh Pasha as governor of Aleppo.¹²⁷ Nasuh Pasha inherited a very explosive situation in the north Syrian capital. In the previous year, Damascus Janissaries had attacked the city of Aleppo, murdering men, women, and children. Nasuh had received his Aleppo assignment with explicit orders to clean up the mutual antagonism and bring order between the two cities.¹²⁸ He appears to have struck a sensitive nerve from the beginning, for within a short time the soldiers of

Damascus had again travelled north to the gates of Aleppo to lay Nasuh and his city in a state of semi-siege. Nasuh, realizing he could muster only 600 men, frantically sent messages for help while preparing for an attack by 2000 Damascene soldiers.¹²⁹

The most obvious source of help was the chieftain of Kilis, Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha. The emir, busy but loyal, responded at once, sending his nephew Ali Pasha with a corpus of troops.¹³⁰ Ali Pasha's large army of remarkable well-trained and effective sekbans immediately changed the balance of power. In one night the Damascene soldiers disappeared from the city walls, fleeing south. Nasuh Pasha, with Canbuladoğlu Ali, caught them at the village of Kefr Tai the next morning and thoroughly defeated them.¹³¹

Given the usual laws of military comradeship and appreciation, it would appear the Ottoman governor of Aleppo should have felt appreciation to the Kilis emir for having saved Aleppo from another sack and probably Nasuh's position as beylerbeyi. However, Nasuh Pasha had noted the size and capability of nephew Ali Pasha's army--only a portion of the total Hüseyin Pasha possessed--and felt that Hüseyin posed a problem equal to that of the unruly soldiers of Damascus. He had reason to fear the rising power of the son of Canbulad after he conversed with some of the routed Damascene army, and became strongly convinced that, as an Ottoman leader, he must now humble the Kurdish emir of Kilis. The Ottoman policy of balancing the Syrian powers took precedence over trust or appreciation for battle

favours. Nasuh Pasha's solution seemed simple enough: he would simply nullify Hüseyin Pasha.¹³²

When news came to him that he was a marked man, Hüseyin Pasha immediately went on the offensive. He notified his intentions to the supreme Ottoman commander in the eastern campaign, his old friend and comrade-in-arms, Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, then preparing for battle on the Persian frontier.¹³³ Hüseyin quickly prepared his loyal levies and sekban troops. When Nasuh Pasha heard of Hüseyin's communication with the eastern commander, he decided to attack Kilis directly before receiving any possible contrary word from the serdar of the east, the man whose word commanded them all. Somewhere south of Kilis, Hüseyin intercepted the beylerbeyi's troops and gave them a sound trouncing. While Nasuh retreated to find more troops, a message arrived from the commander-in-chief Sinan Pasha, with the contrary order Nasuh had expected. The directive ordered Nasuh to resign his post and desist in his battle with Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin.¹³⁴ In Nasuh's place as governor of Aleppo the serdar had appointed the emir of Kilis.

Nasuh Pasha did not give up easily. He refused to leave his seat of authority. If Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin wanted Aleppo he would have to wait for confirmation of the serdar's order from Istanbul. Nasuh Pasha's ostensible reason for not giving up his office was his interpretation of the Ottoman law. After receiving the directive from Sinan Pasha on the eastern front, he had sent at once to Istanbul for instructions. Though the commanding field general had given the order for his removal, even this

order had to be confirmed, and could always be countermanded by the sultan, the then-dying Mehmed III.

Nasuh based his appeal on a legal issue: whether an owner of an ocaklık, a hereditary tribal governor, could in fact be legally appointed as governor of an eyâlet. The answer came from Istanbul in Nasuh's favor: "The assignment of a governorship to the holder of an hereditary ocaklık is contrary to the law."¹³⁵ This quite correct reply made Nasuh's position legal, so he prepared to fight Cağalazade Sinan's order and the emir of Kilis before resigning. He reportedly exclaimed, "If they had assigned a black slave to the governance of Aleppo, I would have obeyed, but I will not obey the son of Canbulad."¹³⁶

Meanwhile, the commander-in-chief had ordered Hüseyin Pasha to take his position as governor in Aleppo.¹³⁷ A week later the son of Canbulad came to north Syria's capital with a large army to claim his office.¹³⁸ Intercepting Nasuh Pasha at the village of Heilan, just north of Aleppo, Hüseyin forced the angry kapıkulu officer to withdraw to the city walls. Here the now desperate general prepared for a siege sometime after Safer 1013/July 1604.¹³⁹

Both leaders resolved to win the struggle. The beylerbeyi Nasuh Pasha, an enterprising and aggressive opportunist, strove to curb the growing power of Canbuladoğlu, a mature, traditional, Kurdish leader with an eye open to every possibility for expansion. Simultaneously, Nasuh Pasha could undermine the power of his kapıkulu rival, the venerable commander-in-chief Cağalazade Sinan, in order to attract the attention of the power elite

in Istanbul. As for the emir of Kilis, he determined to challenge the bothersome Nasuh on the field of battle. Canbulad Hüseyin had little more than the authority of the serdar of the Ottoman armies of the east. He realized his appointment was questionable, if not illegal, and based largely on friendship. Yet much was at stake: he had worked and waited for years for the opportunity to retake the political leadership of Aleppo and northern Syria and the enormous prestige and wealth accompanying it. To keep his power he had, of course, to fulfill certain conditions of his office, but these merely involved the sending of men and a great quantity of money to aid his friend and mentor, Cağalazade Sinan, on the continuing Persian campaign.¹⁴⁰

The siege of Aleppo castle by the emir of Kilis may have lasted a month and a day, or more than four months.¹⁴¹ Canbuladoğlu's investment consisted of mining, countermining--and waiting. At one point the Kilis emir diverted the water supply and stopped the entry of food grains into the city. Without a relieving counterforce, Nasuh's position within the walls became untenable. Yet it was not Nasuh or his soldiers who felt the suffering. The greatest burden fell on the re'aya inhabitants of the city. The great business and commercial center slowly halted its activities. The covered market shut down, the foreign warehouses stood empty. Shortages of food soon resulted in a price inflation of terrible proportions, most damaging, of course, to the poor.¹⁴¹

Finally, the kadi of Aleppo, Mahmud Sharif, proposed a cessation of hostilities to both sides.¹⁴² The order by

the commander-in-chief was indubitable, and the Ottoman law made the serdar's word absolute in all matters in his region of the continuing warfare. In his weak position, Nasuh Pasha by now agreed to a truce, but only if Hüseyin's sekbans promised to honor his person and his property. If Hüseyin were treacherously to attack the disarmed Nasuh, the sekbans would support the former beylerbeyi.¹⁴⁴ The musket men swore to this, and the two generals laid down their arms as the gates of the city opened to let life begin again.

With Nasuh gone, Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha now exercised undisputed control of Aleppo.¹⁴⁵ He appears not to have planned any political separation of his region from the Ottoman Empire. The government accepted him as a faithful servant in his military and fiscal obligations to the sultan.¹⁴⁶


A year passed. During this time a series of defeats of the Ottoman forces on the Persian front began to have serious consequences. On 16 Zi'l-kade 1013/5 April 1605 the serdar Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, the wartime comrade who had made Hüseyin's success in Aleppo possible and to whom the new Aleppan beylerbeyi owed a very special debt, summoned the armies of Syria and Anatolia to a major battle against Shah Abbas.¹⁴⁷ For some reason Hüseyin Pasha only dutifully responded by sending a few detachments of Kurdish foot soldiers who arrived at the staging area in Muş in the summer of 1014/1605. The beylerbeyi appears to have gathered soldiers very slowly;¹⁴⁸ when he and his strong force did arrive, it was after the significant battle had been fought

with--and lost to--Shah Abbas' army. According to an Ottoman historian, Hüseyin Pasha had sat "in Aleppo, cross-legged, doing nothing, while enemies roamed the land, far and wide."¹⁴⁹ More likely, he was busy consolidating his fledgling north Syrian hegemony.

4. *The Battle of Lake Urmia, 1014/1605*

In 1012/1603 Persian forces of Shah Abbas the Great invaded the lands lost to the Ottomans at the Peace of Amasya in 998/1590. The main thrust of the Persian reconquest appeared northwest, to Azerbaijan and the central Caucasus mountain region west of the Caspian Sea. Tabriz fell on 15 Cemaziyülevvel 1012/21 October 1603, and a winter later the Turks surrendered the castle of Erivan.¹⁵⁰ The Ottoman weakness which allowed this shocking outbreak of hostilities and failures appears to have resulted from several sources: the continued Celâli activities throughout Anatolia, utilizing armies such as those of Deli Hasan and Tâvil Halil;¹⁵¹ the European wars which sapped the strength of the Ottoman armies and their supporters at home; poor leadership on the eastern front (before Cağalazade's appointment); and inadequate logistical support. The swift Persian conquest of the two major Azerbaijan cities pre-saged a long and bitter war, to be borne mostly on the backs of the peasant re'aya of eastern Anatolia and northern Azerbaijan.

Both the Turks and the Persians practiced scorched-earth tactics in this total war. After the fall of Tabriz



the Ottomans retreated, pillaging and burning the entire region north toward Erivan, while the Persians pressured them westward. The Ottomans, plagued by long lines of communication, took what they could locally and destroyed the rest. This almost at once produced conditions of local famine which lasted the rest of the decade.¹⁵² The pursuing Persians then deported whole villages and towns, following a strategy developed years before by Shah Tahmasp, and indicating clearly the serious intentions of Shah Abbas, whose smaller armies required some countermove to thwart the massive Ottoman power. Julfa, a city north of the Araxes River, as well as other cities in the region, were stripped of their entire populations, Muslims as well as non-Muslims, in a vast population transfer.¹⁵³ The shah generally selected men and boys from the Christian towns and villages for forced conversion to this ghulam or slave troops, similar to the Ottoman kapıkulu Janissary system. The Armenians of Julfa, facing either death or a new home in Isfahan, walked hundreds of kilometers southward, forced by the relentless soldiers of the shah during the winter of 1013/1604-05.¹⁵⁴ The Ottomans, meanwhile, showed their determination by appointing as serdar the highly respected and seasoned field commander, Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, on 4 Ramazan 1013/25 January 1605. He marched eastward to Muş where he began gathering an imperial army.¹⁵⁵

Both Cağalazade Sinan and Shah Abbas now formed strategies for the winter of 1013/1604-05. Cağalazade followed the logic of two decades of warfare in the Ottoman style. He was a former serdar of the east, having served in 993/

1585 against the Persians.¹⁵⁶ At Erzurum he prepared an army of 40,000, whose aim was to thrust implacably into Azerbaijan and retake Tabriz by sheer power of cannon and musket fire.¹⁵⁷ Though the season was late he decided to march north to Kars. At Hasankale he accepted a large force of former Celâlis under Karakaş Ahmed Pasha who had served as a lieutenant of the famed Celâlf, Kara Yazıcı.¹⁵⁸ He made Ahmed Pasha the beylerbeyi of Çıldır on the promise he and his troops would remain loyal in battle. It was a sign of the times that Cağalazade Sinan had to use so many troops lacking in discipline, training, and the experience of battle. As for Shah Abbas, he kept his fewer troops far away from the Ottoman mass, knowing well that he had about a fifth as many forces. Backing off, moving further south and east, he kept Cağalazade Sinan extending his lines of communication into a region of total desolation: no food, no villages, no cities, no people--and the onset of winter.

Cağalazade Sinan may have expected the cold weather to hold off, but by Kasım günü (November 8) his soldiers began to request their right to retire to winter quarters.¹⁵⁹ The serdar refused, hoping to catch the Persian army in a mass formation. The weather, however, became increasingly cold, and Cağalazade's soldiers harder to control.

Finally, the serdar realized it was too late in the season for the battle he had looked for, and that he must retreat. He sent letters of reconciliation to Shah Abbas, hoping for some kind of moral victory, but the Shah obstinately--and wisely--refused. Sinan then decided to visit his son Mahmud Pasha, who was beylerbeyi of Shīrvān, far to

the east near the Caspian coastland.¹⁶⁰ His intentions may have been honorable, and he may have planned a massive pincers movement against the Persians. The shivering Ottoman army did not accept such reasoning, however. They rebelled, led by the Janissaries who refused to go any further, demanding to return to winter quarters. Immediately, Cağalazade retreated toward Van through high mountain passes, pushing the heavy equipment and losing many men and animals along the way.¹⁶¹ Shah Abbas, far enough in the rear to view the catastrophe but not close enough to fight, followed the Ottomans, his own armies terribly affected by the bitter cold. It appeared to many Ottomans that Cağalazade had procrastinated, letting Abbas get away without a fight, but Abbas' tactics of avoiding confrontation tended to allow the Ottoman armies to defeat themselves.¹⁶²

When they reached Van, in the safety of the city walls, the Ottomans realized the Persians had followed them to the city. After about forty days the Persians turned east and returned to Tabriz.¹⁶³ Cağalazade then dispatched a small force, hoping to catch the Persians off guard and to capture Nahçıvan. But the unusually cold winter, the lack of supplies, the absolute desolation of the region due to the mutual scorched-earth policy, as well as an alert Persian force, defeated the Ottoman battalion.¹⁶⁴ The commanders then decided to wait for spring.

In the spring of 1013-14/1605 the two armies set forth again, the Ottomans determined to retake Tabriz and the region of Azerbaijan, the Persians continuing their Fabian tactics of hit and run. In Zi'l-kade 1013/April 1605 one

part of the Ottoman army pushed almost due east. Quickly and unexpectedly, Shah Abbas moved his army north and west with great speed, and by Muharrem 1014/May 1605 had caught many of the horses of the main Ottoman army grazing in the meadows near Van, fattening up from the hard winter. Without their horses the cavalry were momentarily helpless. Cağalazade managed to re-form his remaining battallions and marshall his lines for battle--while he himself remained safely within Van's walls.¹⁶⁵ When the Persians attacked the almost horseless cavalry of Cağalazade, his army could do little. The Shah inflicted a severe defeat, and Cağalazade Sinan Pasha now fled with his important officers in a boat across Lake Van and took the road back to Erzurum.¹⁶⁶

The Ottoman serdar Sinan Pasha now frantically determined to end Abbas' might. He ordered every available force for another, more massive attack on Tabriz, and announced plans to winter--after the expected victory--in Ardabil.¹⁶⁷ Troops came to him from Iraq, Anatolia, from northern Syria, including a contingency of Kurds from Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha in Aleppo.¹⁶⁸ Nasuh Pasha, having been dismissed by Sinan Pasha from his post as beylerbeyi of Aleppo, committed large levies of Kurds from the Baghdad and Shahrizor districts.¹⁶⁹ Nasuh himself was assigned to fight (and perhaps momentarily neutralize) the Celâlıs in western Anatolia.¹⁷⁰ In less than four months Sinan Pasha was able to prepare 50,000 fresh soldiers, their beasts, and equipment.¹⁷¹ As on previous occasions, many of these were not trained imperial forces but former

Celâlis, loyal to the Ottomans now that they had been pardoned, but neither battle-trained nor disciplined.

Shah Abbas, meanwhile, prepared his army, sending his general, Allahverdi Khan, with 25,000 Kızılbaş cavalry and three or four Persian divisions.¹⁷² Cağalazade began his glacier-like movement eastward in the fall of 1014/1605 with cannon and infantry in the lead, cavalry in the rear. Shah Abbas marched north from Tabriz, placing his men well to the east of the marching Ottomans, but clearly in contact. Both commanders realized the approach of winter, very close again to Kasım günü, and the cold which would affect the fighting capacity of the soldiers.¹⁷³ Cağalazade marched southeast, across the northern shore of Lake Urmiye, to the main road between Tasuj (on the lake shore) and Tabriz.¹⁷⁴ Abbas' troops filtered in and out of the hills which line the valley down which the Ottoman army marched, unaware of their presence so close by. Abbas apparently felt this valley was not a particularly good place to attack, but by mistake one of his groups revealed their position, and the Ottomans saw a large force of Persians--in their rear.¹⁷⁵

On a day sometime between 4 and 9 Receb 1014/15 and 20 November 1605 at about noon, Cağalazade's infantry and artillery inexplicably wheeled around to attack what it presumed was the entire Persian army, the mass battle for which the Ottoman serdar had waited so long.¹⁷⁶ His cavalry, nearest the enemy and led by the former Celâli leader Köse Sefer Pasha, had been warned of the Persian's ability to distract and deceive. "Do not hurry," Sinan Pasha had

admonished his officers, "go easy and do not advance too far."¹⁷⁷ But Köse Sefer and his division dashed ahead, anxious to attack the Persian force. The Ottoman challenge seemed successful, even if disobedient, until Köse Sefer Pasha's horsemen tired.

About this time Allahverdi Khan signalled by smoke for attack, at which time two or three other divisions of the Persian army attacked the Ottoman flanks.¹⁷⁸ The Turkish serdar became understandably confused, and realized he was being enveloped. His irregular troops and former Celâlis fought well, taking great casualties, but they too became unable to organize for a counteroffensive.¹⁷⁹ By sundown the carnage was immense and Cağalazade's remaining forces faced a powerful Persian army. The Ottoman defeat had been only partial, but if he were not to be completely routed, Cağalazade Sinan needed to muster every resource for the next day.

The serdar of the Ottomans retreated to his official tent, somewhat west of Tasuj, intent on regrouping for a counterattack at daybreak. The shah, realizing the great danger of an Ottoman army with its artillery still intact, backed off for the night.¹⁸⁰ Some Kurdish beys, looking for guidance and instructions, came to the grand vizier's tent. They assumed, when told Cağalazade was sleeping, that he was not, in fact, in camp.¹⁸¹

Somehow the word spread that the serdar had fled the battle, perhaps based on his previous behavior the year before at Van. The Ottoman troops panicked.¹⁸² Two thousand kapıkulu Janissaries, immediately striking their tents,

marched for safety to Van.¹⁸³ Karakaş Ahmed Pasha and his remaining Celâlis disappeared north. The rest of the army, marching in complete disarray, left the serdar's cannon, his pavilion (he apparently sleeping within), and the treasury in their haste to flee from the Persians. On being notified of the catastrophe, Cağalazade had no alternative but to follow or be captured by the Safavid shah. He rode to Van on a fast horse, leaving to Abbas the booty and treasury of the entire eastern campaign, sixty cannon, and the more than 20,000 Ottoman officers and men already dead or, when captured, executed by the Persians.¹⁸⁴

The first wave of fleeing Kurds from the battle at Lake Urmiye intercepted the army of Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha, riding up from Aleppo, near Van. They reported to Hüseyin that the battle with the Persians had been lost and the serdar had fled. After consultations the Aleppan commander decided to return to Van: if Cağalazade had indeed lost, it would be far better for the Ottomans to regroup their forces at Van and make a fresh start next spring. Hüseyin knew his Kurds had given him only a partial report, but he apparently thought a discreet retreat wiser than a valorous but unsuccessful attack.¹⁸⁵ At Van, Hüseyin Pasha and his numerous forces from Syria grimly awaited his old friend, the defeated serdar, Cağalazade Sinan Pasha.

When Cağalazade's army, many of the wounded carried on pack animals, arrived in Van, the serdar was stunned to find the numerous and able troops of Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin camped nearby.¹⁸⁶ At that moment Cağalazade Sinan Pasha exploded in wrath. After all the effort he had expended to

gain the high post of beylerbeyi of Aleppo for Hüseyin Pasha, here was his reward! After years of service to five sultans, after having been a successful Grand Admiral of the fleet and hero of one of the great battles of Ottoman history, after having twice commanded the eastern armies against the Persians and having fought side-by-side with the emir of Kilis, after being grand vizier--he had lost it all. Completely disgraced, he would face a severe inquisition and, with neither friends nor supporters in Istanbul, would more than likely be executed by the boy Sultan Ahmed. for malfeasance. The disaster might have been avoided if one man with his troops had arrived in time.

Immediately Cağalazade ordered Hüseyin Pasha to the palace at Van. The chronicler quotes his words: "You were given the vilâyet of Aleppo on condition that you would reach and unite with the army punctually. How is it you arrive like this after we returned? Why did you not reach us when the enemy attacked us?"¹⁸⁷ The Kurdish leader offered insufficient excuses and Sinan Pasha ordered his immediate execution.¹⁸⁸

The precipitate act proved to be one of the gravest mistakes of Sinan's career, the second major error he committed which cost the Ottoman Empire enormous treasure and blood to rectify.¹⁸⁹ Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, the senior ranking commander of the sultan, had ordered the death of the most powerful political and military leader of northern Syria. With one stroke he had shattered the strength of the Ottoman southern flank, opening the possibility not only of successful Celâli expansion in central Anatolia but

a separatist movement in Syria. The troops loyal to the slain Hüseyin Pasha now absolutely refused to fight, struck their tents, and began the trek back to Kilis and Aleppo. Cağalazade Sinan Pasha did nothing to stop them. He dismissed the rest of the army for the winter, and retreated to Diyarbekir, where he died three months later: some said of a fever, others of grief, or even by his own hand.¹⁹⁰

For Abbas the Great, the victory at Lake Urmiye returned to Persian control the regions lost so ignominiously at the Peace of Amasya. He immediately moved to recapture Ganja and Shīrvān, thus restoring the old boundaries established by Süleyman the Magnificent and Shah Tahmasp in 963/1555. Ganja fell on 28 Safer 1014/5 July 1606, and Tiflis shortly thereafter.¹⁹¹ Shīrvān took a bit longer, after several months of siege, on 2 Rebi'ülevvel 1016/27 June 1607.¹⁹² Simultaneously the Persian shah established closer relationships with the several enemies of the Ottoman sultan: the Europeans, to whom he dispatched ambassadors seeking a continuation of Habsburg pressure on the Danubian regions; the Celâlîs, who learned that his borders were open to any who wished to fight the Ottomans; and possibly to the nephew of Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha, who was even then planning retribution for the atrocious murder of his uncle.¹⁹³

IV Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha and the Kingdom of Syria

With the death of Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha, political power in Syria could revert to the Ottomans, devolve upon a representative of the Canbuladoğlu family, or dissolve into the myriad of quasi-balanced tribal groups and local organizations which existed before Hüseyin's careful establishment of a Kurdish power base in Aleppo. Very soon after Hüseyin's troops returned from Van a three-way power struggle began among Hüseyin's bold and charismatic nephew, Canbuladoğlu Ali; Seyfoğlu Yusuf Pasha, the powerful emir of Tripoli; and the badly shaken but still powerful Ottoman government. Ali Pasha now moved to establish a Syrian state with himself at the head, supported publicly by political arrangements with local emirs and leaders. Secretly, he determined to obtain help from certain chosen Celâlis of Anatolia as well as two potential interregional allies, the Shah of Persia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany.

Reacting to this extraordinary danger the Ottomans made peace with the Habsburgs and called upon their most venerable (and feared) general, Kuyucu Murad Pasha. Murad Pasha demolished Canbuladoğlu Ali's army, thus ending the Aleppan's hopes for a sovereign state. Sultan Ahmed temporarily pardoned Canbuladoğlu Ali, but later ordered his execution.

1. *The Origins of Ali Pasha's Rebellion*

With the defeat and death of Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, the Ottoman government made no major moves toward reconciliation in the east. It steadfastly planned to continue the Persian wars, though the sultan no longer wished to sacrifice everything for a victory.¹ Calls went out in Zi'l-kade 1014/spring 1606 for a new eastern campaign to retrieve lands lost in Azerbaijan to the Shah. The government moved Nasuh Pasha from Aleppo to Baghdad as serdar against two of Tavi Ahmed's sons who had usurped power

there, and appointed a new Persian serdar: Ferhad Pasha, a former bostancıbaşı and Ağa of the Janissaries.²

For Aleppo the Porte appears to have assigned a former Janissary Ağa, Hüseyin Pasha, as kaymakam to replace the recently executed Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin.³ The serdar, Ferhad Pasha, sent Hüseyin with 1000 musket men via the strategic city of Adana.⁴ Ferhad planned that Hüseyin intercept and execute the pasha of Adana, Cemşid, who had rebelled against the sultan.⁵ Cemşid, learning of this move, surprised the former Janissary Ağa and his troops, and killed him. This news undoubtedly pleased Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha in Aleppo, who previously had written Cemşid as a friend, urging the Adana governor to poison the Istanbul appointee at a banquet. Ali Pasha now continued the Canbuladoğlu family rule in place of his murdered uncle, but without Istanbul's authorization. The government, far too busy with more immediate matters, accepted this usurpation for the moment.

As unofficial master of Aleppo, Canbuladoğlu Ali envisioned a far larger sovereignty than just the evâlet of his late uncle. He needed, first of all, the loyalty of all of northern Syria, a loyalty which included various minor powers such as small emirs and sheikhs in the south. It also included the three tribal organizations, the Maʿan emirs of Mount Lebanon, the Harfūshs of Baalbek, and, of course, Seyfoğlu Yusuf of Tripoli, a man who had long held pretensions to paramount power. Ali Pasha also desired a protective line of buffer regions in Anatolia, regions now increasingly held by Celâlis. He needed to lure these

Anatolian individualists into political alliance with an obviously successful financial and military operation. He would play on their anti-Ottoman instincts to aid him, and bribe the impecunious Celâlf leaders with the enormous resources of Aleppo. He also needed help from outside the Ottoman Empire, specifically arms and especially muskets for his paid sekban troops. Finally, he counted heavily on Persia and Austria continuing their pressure to keep the Ottomans occupied at their eastern and northwestern extremities, while the Celâlfs ate away at the center.

Fundamental to Canbuladoğlu Ali's plans was the extraordinary internal weakness into which the Ottomans had fallen. If four factors within the sultan's Palace remained constant, the door would open for his successful achievement: first, a quiescent sultanate, due to the inexperience and youth of the new sultan, Ahmed I, who was known to spend most of his time with his harem women and leave governing to his viziers; second, continuation by those viziers of the traditional heroic but disastrous policy of Holy War, both in Europe and Persia, while allowing the Empire to fall further into debt and closer to civil war; third, the rise of a new, younger group of advisors to the sultan, like the postancıbaşı Derviş Pasha, who sought speedy advancement and gained power more by intrigue than by ability;⁶ and finally, the presence of one or more relatives or very close associates in Istanbul's high places, who with well-chosen words or bribes might influence the Porte to ignore for a time the rising danger of the north Syrian rebel.

2. The Foundation of a North Syrian State

Canbuladoğlu Ali began his activities in northern Syria by avenging his uncle Hüseyin's death at Van after the battle of Lake Urmîye. Ali was widely recognized in Syria as an experienced leader, an able, generous man, whose demand for revenge appeared justified.⁷ Not only did his own Kurdish kinsmen come to his aid but many Syrians from outside his region felt drawn to him and his cause.⁸ This general acceptance of Canbuladoğlu Ali's activities regarding his dead uncle allowed him wide latitude for the development of plans which very rapidly developed far beyond tribal lex talionis. Men easily accepted his early reactions as an angry man defending his family's honor. When in Şaban 1015/December 1606 Cağalazade Sinan Pasha died in Diyarbakir, Ali Pasha's prime object of vengeance no longer existed. Yet he continued to rebel against the Ottoman state, an act which his close associates supported. They accepted his now clearly broadened rationale that he fought as a loyal Ottoman not against the sultan but against all his guilty counsellors. Going even further, in 1015/1606 he pursued a six-month strategic struggle against powerful opponents in northern Syria which paralleled his political usurpation of governmental power in Aleppo. Even this, he insisted, fell under the general heading of revenge for his uncle's illegal execution at the hands of an Ottoman official.

Ali's activities could not, of course, be ignored. The Porte reacted by sending aid and encouragement to his



natural enemy, the emir Seyfoğlu Yusuf of Tripoli. If Yusuf were successful, he could nullify the pretensions of the Canbulad family without demanding an Ottoman army to restore discipline in northern Syria.⁹ The emir of Tripoli, realizing this opportunity, began to expand his own power. He personally feared the rise of a hegemony under Aleppo and Canbuladoğlu Ali, and had long been an active agent of the Ottoman government.¹⁰ He realized he could gain personal advantage by offering military service to the sultan to put Ali down.¹¹ The government agreed, sent him aid, and gave him the rank of serdar of Damascus.¹²

Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha faced this southern obstacle by immediately moving against Seyfoğlu Yusuf in a major battle at Hama.¹³ On 16 Rebi'ülevvel 1015/24 July 1606, Yusuf's Ottoman-backed forces were badly beaten.¹⁴ Yusuf fled the battle to his redoubt in Tripoli; most of his allies deserted him, choosing to ally now with the successful Canbuladoğlu Ali.¹⁵ The Aleppan victor treated the defeated troops of Seyfoğlu Yusuf with magnanimity to gain their loyalty. He also pillaged the people of the Tripoli region to gain their wealth.¹⁶ He continued to search for Seyfoğlu Yusuf in order not just to neutralize but to nullify Yusuf's power in Syria.¹⁷ In this he needed the solid cooperation of all neighboring Syrian emirs and sheikhs, so he called as an ally Ma'noğlu Fahreddin, an important emir of the Lebanon, a man related to Seyfoğlu by marriage who possessed many important friends in the south.¹⁸ The two emirs met at the source of the Orontes River where they

planned to capture or, if necessary, kill Seyfoğlu Yusuf.¹⁹ They decided also to capture Tripoli, Seyfoğlu's capital, where lay his treasure and much of his power. Canbuladoğlu Ali sent a cousin, Derviş ibn Habib, who captured the city after a brief fight. Derviş probably seized the treasure from the inner castle, but strict orders from Canbuladoğlu Ali (to gain the benefits of mild governance and generous spirit) denied the Aleppan soldiers the rights of sack.²⁰ Many of the smaller emirs and sheikhs fell into Canbuladoğlu's hegemony, both by the logic of events and Ali's own forceful personality. Now Ali commanded more than 60,000 men, but Seyfoğlu Yusuf reconstructed his power by taking command of the Ottoman troops in Damascus.

Ali and Ma'noğlu Fahreddin marched together south to unify the region. They captured Baalbek, capital of the emirate of Mūsā ibn al-Harfūsh, a long-time ally of Seyfoğlu.²¹ They made arrangements for another prince of the house of al-Harfūsh, Yūsuf, to take power; in addition they allowed Mūsā the opportunity to work for them, but under careful scrutiny, and sent him to urge the armies at Damascus to hand Seyfoğlu over.²² Then Ali and Fahreddin marched through the Biqa^c Valley, forcing various leaders to join their union, such as Ahmed Shihāb of the valley of at-Tayim.²³ Fahreddin kept the southern Syrian coastal regions of Acre, Haifa, and Caesarea for himself.²⁴

Canbuladoğlu now petitioned the beylerbeyi of Damascus, Seyyid Mehmed Pasha, to proffer certain regions to him and his allies.²⁵ The Hawrān region, south of Damascus, he wanted for 'Amrū al-Badawī, the sheikh of the

al-Mufāridja bedouins.²⁶ He also petitioned for ibni Furaykh Mansūr bin Bekri to possess the Biqa' Valley, and a Janissary associate of Fahreddin, Keyvan, to be returned to his post in Damascus.²⁷ Even though these petitions were refused, the act showed that Ali obviously aimed to solidify his southern flank with loyal friends deeply in his debt.

Despite these arrangements aiming at political schism from the Ottoman Empire, the son of Canbulad continued to assert his loyalty to the sultan and to those of his advisors who recognized injustice. He gave a variety of excuses for not remitting taxes to Istanbul on schedule.²⁸ And because they were incapable of sending a disciplinary force, the Ottomans dispatched only a messenger, Mehmed Ağa, with a pardon from the sultan in return for a promise of good behavior and the remission of taxes.²⁹ The pardon may have appeared to Ali Pasha an open invitation to continue his rebellion.

Meanwhile, Seyfoğlu Yusuf had returned, after a circuitous flight, and prepared his force in Damascus. Hearing this, Ali Pasha moved his army with Fahreddin's to the suburbs of that great city.³⁰ They now faced the soldiers of Damascus, including the hated Janissary constabulary which had for so long pillaged the Aleppan region. Ali knew possession of the city would make him paramount in Syria, but he must have recognized that the city was important to the Ottoman government, too, being the center of the pilgrimage caravan and far from his own locus operandi.³¹ To vitiate the power of Seyfoğlu Yusuf, who remained inside,

Canbuladoğlu Ali laid siege to the city, knowing that the Damascus forces were far from unified against him.³² They fought in a very laggard manner on 27 Cemaziyülevvel 1015/30 September 1606.³³ Canbuladoğlu Ali easily disposed of the defenders, part of whom retreated within the walls, refusing to hand over Seyfoğlu Yusuf. Learning this, Ali gave orders to loot the suburbs of Damascus for three days.³⁴ The economic disaster of a city-wide sack spurred Yusuf (and his defenders) to act: he bribed the kadı of Damascus with 100,000 gold pieces--and again escaped.³⁵ The kadı brought the money, plus 25,000 more collected by the merchants, begging Canbuladoğlu Ali to accept it and give up the siege. Ali not only accepted the money but opened up Damascus to free trade with foreign merchants, possibly an indication of his plans for Aleppo later on.³⁶ In fact, he said he would not have besieged the city had not Yusuf been inside.³⁷ Three days later, without occupying Damascus, Canbuladoğlu Ali and Fahreddin withdrew their forces, again seeking the elusive Yusuf.³⁸


The two armies now marched to Hisn al-Akrad, where they surrounded the beaten Yusuf Pasha who was hiding in the castle.³⁹ Seyfoğlu asked for a truce, to which Ali responded.⁴⁰ After initial talks, each agreed to peace on Ali's own terms, and then interchanged marriages with the other's relatives.⁴¹ Now the three emirs, Ali, Yusuf, and Fahreddin, held total power in Syria--but obviously Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha was superior to them all.

Istanbul, facing both a successful Syrian rebel and enough Anatolian Celâlis to support a general civil war,

decided to accept Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha as beylerbeyi of Aleppo, but the decision was not easy in coming. About four months prior in Muharrem 1015/May 1606 Ali had posted a petition to the Porte (literally, a "List of Matters") requesting the position of beylerbeyi of Aleppo and promising a stated amount of troops. With startling brazenness (he was at that moment moving against Seyfoğlu Yusuf in Syria) he offered the services of 10,000 troops for the eastern campaign against Persia if Sultan Ahmed would make him a vizier of the Porte in Istanbul.

Even a cursory glance at the List must have made abundantly clear the Aleppan's over-arching ambition; to establish a circle of loyal land-owners and military leaders who would protect, if not join, the Aleppan regime.⁴² The huge semicircular protective zone from Tarsus in Cilicia to Yozgat, north of Kayseri, east to Çemişgezek on the Euphrates River, and southeast to Rakka, included the great Taurus Mountain passes and the major roads controlling travel from the central Ottoman regions to Persia.⁴³ The lands of these loyal supporters of Ali Pasha split the major east-west Ottoman military and commercial roads. In the hands of a non-Ottoman power such possession could slowly strangle the Ottoman land connection with Iraq, Syria, and the holy cities of Jerusalem, Medina, and Mecca.

The sultan and his advisors felt Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha had "gone too far" in his requests, but until external pressures could be relieved, there was little to do but temporize. By Cemaziyülevvel 1015/September 1606 the Porte certified Ali as governor of Aleppo, though nothing



was said about a vizierate.⁴⁴ The chaotic events in Istanbul, the peace negotiations now in a critical state in Hungary, and the ill-planned disaster of Ferhad Pasha's Anatolian campaign had brought crisis conditions to the grand vizierate of Derviş Pasha. Far better to placate the Aleppan rebel for the moment while more critical problems could be faced. Besides, who knew the Aleppan leader had not come to his senses and truly wished to be a loyal member of the sultan's subject peoples?

3. Canbuladoğlu Ali's Pretensions to Sovereignty and the Ottoman Response

In order to achieve a stable political state in Syria, Canbuladoğlu Ali needed the security of allies in Anatolia. After the defeat of Seyfoğlu Yusuf, Ali Pasha as beylerbeyi exercised undisputed supremacy over the three regions of Tripoli, Damascus, and Aleppo. However, such supremacy endured only as long as he could control the various emirs. He enjoyed the absolute loyalty only of his family, secondarily the Kurdish beys, and somewhat less the Turkomans and Bedouin Arabs of Kilis and Azaz. He now needed non-Syrian allies whose presence and power could force conformity on the fickle emirs. Finding such allies among the Celâlis of Anatolia proved a task far more difficult than his south Syrian campaign.

For some years Ali Pasha had had close relationships with several leading Celâlis of Eastern Anatolia and Baghdad. Cemşid, the former bey of Tarsus, had made Adana and its region his personal reserve.⁴⁵ Cemşid had helped

Ali Pasha some months before by eliminating the legally-appointed kaymakam.⁴⁶ Tavi Halil of Bozok, whom many in Istanbul considered Canbuladoğlu's "creature," probably received financial aid from Aleppo.⁴⁷ Actually, Tavi and his brother Maymun kept to a very independent path and sometimes worked against the Aleppan emir.⁴⁸ In Baghdad, the chief Celâli, Tavilahmedoğlu Mahmud (also known as Uzunahmedoğlu), had joined Canbuladoğlu Ali in a kind of "confederation," but like other Celâlis, saw to his own interests.⁴⁹ Ali regarded Baghdad as a safety valve since if he suffered a loss he might move there quickly to regroup. Moreover, the Baghdad rebels could keep Ottoman armies busy while Canbuladoğlu established his Syrian state.

Ali Pasha had also communicated with the Celâli chiefs of central and western Anatolia, Kalenderoğlu Mehmed and Kara Said. These men had ambitions for power centers of their own, though they must have given verbal assurances to Canbuladoğlu Ali since his followers later reported he planned to leave Anatolia in their hands.⁵⁰ The lesser Celâlis, living in small fort-like redoubts called palankas, hoped for his success, and would accept his leadership, but only as a mechanism for their own protection and security. Certain dissident Ottoman pashas appear to have given Ali support in the later years of his ambitious program. The beylerbeyi of Karaman, in 1016/1607 strangled by Kuyucu Murad Pasha, may have been an ally, as well as Yusuf Pasha, the beylerbeyi of Aydın and Saruhan, and Muslu Çavuş of Silifke.⁵¹ Ali seems to have fought against the

official pasha of Maraş for obvious strategic reasons (it lies directly north of Aleppo) and in his "List of Matters" urged this man's replacement with a more tractable person.⁵²

All the while, Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha developed his state administration, his foreign policy, and his army. Ali based his independent state on the foundations of the Aleppan beylerbeylik. Each Ottoman beylerbeyi ran his own governmental apparatus, with major executive decisions made in a divan of generals and other officials. A treasury existed in the Aleppan state and we know the youthful hazinedar (treasurer) was later to become the famous rebel Abaza Mehmed.⁵³ Ali Pasha undoubtedly coined his own money, though he probably used European and Ottoman coinage in Aleppo.⁵⁴ He doubtless utilized the services of the kadıs from the Ottoman government since they acted almost independently of the political apparatus in Istanbul and could generally be expected to remain neutral. Finally, Ali Pasha had his name mentioned as monarch in the Friday congregational prayer in the mosques, the standard sign of sovereignty in Muslim societies. In all these activities he unquestionably arrogated for himself the title of sovereign leader of a sovereign state, calling himself the "Prince and Protector of the Kingdom of Syria."⁵⁵

From the re'aya merchants and foreign colonials Ali Pasha received tax revenues but few specific commitments. These two groups had much to lose if he lost, little to gain if he won. Doubtless he communicated with local Armenian silk merchants. Çelebi Petik and his brothers,

who ruled the trade, must have known Canbuladoğlu Ali's family and his interest in the Persian silk trade.⁵⁶ The foreign consuls remained strictly neutral: the French ambassador in İstanbul heard of his activities, toyed with the idea of supporting him, but rejected it, feeling it too risky.⁵⁷ The King of France, Henry IV, did not think Canbuladoğlu Ali's cause was worth jeopardizing his good relations with the sultan.⁵⁸ The Venetians and English reported nothing about helping him, though the Venetians watched and noted his movements carefully.⁵⁹ Only the Tuscans, whose merchants had no consular representation either in Aleppo or in İstanbul, openly desired to support Canbuladoğlu Ali. There were very few Tuscans.

Ali Pasha formed his army around a core of local, highly (and regularly) paid sekbans, plus feudal and Celâli levies, formed on the Ottoman model.⁶⁰ He had 162 odas (companies) each with a şorbacı (battery) of 6700 foot-soldiers (sekbans) who received three to eight akçes per day, paid four times a year, a total of more than twelve million akçes annually.⁶¹ These men received powder, wicks, and lead from a central distributing agency, whose chief was an Ağa named Cuma. Ali divided 8000 cavalry men into six divisions, with an officer named Hartavi Ağa leading the entire group. His personal suite, flag guard (he had a white banner, according to the French ambassador), and military bureaucracy also followed the Ottoman pattern.⁶² Defters (official papers and notebooks) found after his defeat indicated he possessed a systematic archive.⁶³ He possessed few large field artillery pieces,

partly because cannon were so costly, but mostly because they had little usefulness in hill fighting and desert warfare in Syria. He did capture twelve pieces from Seyfoğlu Yusuf at the battle for Damascus, but they seem to have been sparingly used, probably due to the expense of powder and ball. At the height of his power he could have defended his region with ease against a local emir or sheikh--but an Ottoman army was another matter.

Ali's military weakness proved to be not only the lack of materials, but of rigorously disciplined and well-trained men. His sekban troops held no traditional loyalty toward him or his cause, despite his success and their regular pay. Most townsmen of Aleppo distrusted or hated both him and his armies.⁶⁴ One suspects he avoided pitched battles with the Ottomans as long as he could since success came primarily from Ottoman disunity, not the loyalty and strength of Aleppo.

While Canbuladoğlu Ali continued to organize the local princes and their groups in northern Syria, the Divan in Istanbul slowly evolved a new policy regarding the Dar ül-Islam which would later directly affect the Aleppan rebellion. As Ali Pasha recognized, the Divan leadership of the Empire had long devolved on several very old men, servants of the now deceased sultans, Murad III and Mehmed III. These viziers, like Yavuz Ali Pasha (d. 1013/1604), Lala Mehmed Pasha (d. 1015/1606), and Kuyucu Murad Pasha (grand vizier from 1015-1020/1606-1611) generally made and directed a conservative, traditional policy. Strongly influential in the Ottoman consultations were the müftis,

the most important being Sun'ullah efendi, who stood rigorously for the traditional policy of expansion against Persia.⁶⁵ Among the younger and less powerful was a hard-driving, devious, but important upstart, the then bostancıbaşı, Derviş Pasha. In less than a year Derviş was advanced to Fleet Admiral (Ramazan 1014/January 1606) and then to grand vizier (Safer 1015/June 1606). Six months later he became the first grand vizier to be executed by the then sixteen-year-old Sultan Ahmed I. As for Ahmed, he was accused by Europeans as "entirely given up to pleasure" in the imperial harem. His first son Osman (later Osman II) was born when he was not yet fifteen, and already he had a notorious reputation for disinterest in state affairs except (as one might expect in an adolescent with absolute power) to act impetuously, and with extraordinary cruelty. Yet the young sultan desired to direct the Empire by 1016/1607 and the English ambassador, Henry Lello, reported Ahmed had "dismissed almost all his older and more able ministers."⁶⁶ Some, however, remained to make important policy decisions.

Primary among these was Grand Vizier Lala Mehmed Pasha who by mid-1015/1606 had suddenly changed his position, fashioning a less heroic but realistic policy which no amount of adolescent absolutism could alter. The earlier, reluctant probing for peace with the infidel Christian Habsburgs on the Hungarian front now became more purposeful and direct. With the fortunate retaking in 1014/1605 of Visegrad and Esztergom/Gran, the Ottomans achieved a psychological sense of strength from which they could

deal at any peace negotiations. No longer able to ignore the Anatolian rebellion, nor the loss that same year suffered at the hands of Shah Abbas at Lake Urmiye, the Ottomans faced the Habsburgs realistically. They would meet the European enemy to talk peace on an equal basis. In Safer 1015/June 1606, doubtless with Lala Mehmed's concurrence, the sultan directed a high ranking vizier, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, to negotiate a treaty in the Hungarian village of Zsitvatorok.⁶⁷ However, in Safer 1015/June 1606 Lala Mehmed died and was succeeded by Derviş.

In İstanbul the Divan and the new grand vizier Derviş Pasha determined that Turkish armies now should make every effort to win back earlier losses to Shah Abbas in Azerbaijan. The loss of Ganja and Shīrvān after the Urmiye defeat effected a great loss to Ottoman prestige, particularly since certain religious interests (the Shah was a Shiite) as well as political issues were involved. With the Ottoman burden in the Danube relieved by the peace negotiations, the Persians might more easily be defeated and their haven for the Celālīs neutralized. Derviş Pasha rigorously carried out this policy, to the point of sending forth an entirely new (and, as it turned out, unprepared) army to the east.⁶⁸ However, any successful eastern campaign depended on the loyalty and support of Syria, which now meant Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha in Aleppo, whose huge tax income could help pay the wages and strengthen the Ottoman serdar and his troops in the East. In Zi'lhicce 1015/March 1607 the government ordered Ali to send 2000 men, but no one really expected him to respond.⁶⁹ The news of the com-

plete failure of Serdar Ferhad Pasha and his entire anti-Celâli and anti-Persian campaign was no doubt acceptable news to Canbuladoğlu Ali in Aleppo.

Very suddenly, however, the political situation changed in Istanbul. In Şaban 1015/December 1606 Ahmed I executed Derviş Pasha (for lese majesty) and appointed in his place Kuyucu Murad Pasha, the elderly veteran who only a month before had signed the important treaty of Zsitvatorok with the Habsburgs. Murad Pasha immediately, but secretly, changed Derviş Pasha's objectives, recognizing Canbuladoğlu Ali and the Celâlis as far greater immediate dangers than the Persian shah--who had in any case taken about all the territory he could easily absorb west of the Caspian Sea.⁷⁰ The new grand vizier determined to ignore the Persians, neutralize Baghdad, lure the Great Celâlis away from Canbuladoğlu Ali, and march as soon as possible toward Aleppo before Ali could obtain aid from any interregional source and establish his sovereign state. Murad Pasha publicly accepted Canbuladoğlu's payment of taxes and his protestations of loyalty.⁷¹ Doubtless Ali Pasha thought he could easily continue his leisurely pace, while another traditional grand vizier puttered about the dissolving institutions of the Empire. In Istanbul, however, the new grand vizier secretly spent half a year collecting arms and supplies, while overtly appearing to do nothing.⁷²

4. *The Interregional Dimension of Ali Pasha's State*

For Canbuladoğlu Ali's plans to succeed he realized he must obtain non-Ottoman allies. He needed interregional recognition of his sovereign state and he needed funds which could come as short term loans or from increased trade over a long period of peace. He may have turned both west and east.

We do not know if Ali Pasha ever communicated with Shah Abbas of Persia.⁷³ For many years the shah had offered an open-door arrangement for rebels fleeing from the Ottomans in Anatolia.⁷⁴ Abbas must have heard, soon after the incident, of Canbuladoğlu Ali's anger at his uncle's murder. Several foreign diplomats asserted that Ali Pasha communicated with Shah Abbas, sending him gifts as evidence of political interest and personal generosity.⁷⁵ Neither Ottoman nor Persian sources mention any such communication which, in any case, the shortness of Ali Pasha's rule would have kept from bearing fruit. Yet the closeness of the relationship in 1007/1598 between various Persian emissaries and the Syrian-Christian dragoman, MichelAngiolo Corai, makes clear the possibility that a Persian-Syrian relationship might have grown in time.⁷⁶

It was from the west, however, that Ali Pasha received his firm offer of interregional support. Ferdinand I, the Duke of Tuscany (d. 1609), strongly wished to reconquer Cyprus for Christendom and control (if not conquer) the Holy Land.⁷⁷ He needed trade connections through Aleppo and its ports, as well as the trading rights a capitulatory

power--such as Venice, France, or England--enjoyed at the Porte, but which were as yet denied him. He needed a safe, useful harbor on the Levantine coastland: like Iskenderun.⁷⁸ After initial contacts, sometime after November 1606 the Grand Duke sent a noble Tuscan, Hippolito Leoncini, to Aleppo to represent the official Medici policy. Leoncini knew the requirements of the Florentine merchants, and he knew the intentions of Pope Paul V and the King of Spain. Accompanying him to Aleppo came a remarkable (and typical) Levantine dragoman, MichelAngiolo Corai, a Christian born in Aleppo.⁷⁹ For the previous several years Corai had acted as a Syro-Persian intermediary for several governments, including Tuscany and the English Sherley brothers. In this capacity he had lived in Persia at the court of Shah Abbas since 1008/1599; he had close contacts with Janissaries in Aleppo.⁸⁰ In Zi'lkade 1006/June 1598 he had come with Sir Anthony Sherley to Aleppo, where the party stayed until Safer 1007/September 1598. His position was primarily as translator for the Sherleys and Shah Abbas. He feared no man, he said, for he secreted all his important documents in a special compartment of his musket.⁸¹

The two Christian representatives came by ship to Iskenderun laden with gifts, and a proposal for an alliance.⁸² The Tuscan ambassador proposed a treaty of thirty articles to Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha in which the first capitulum clearly enunciated its purpose: to establish a League "to lower and eventually destroy as far as possible, with the help of God, the Ottoman Empire, and to increase

the power of the House of Canbulad, and particular to raise our self."⁸³ The League would include the signatories, as well as Pope Paul V, the King of Spain, Philip III, and other Christian princes and potentates.⁸⁴ The Europeans' first objective was to conquer Jerusalem.⁸⁵ Almost parenthetically they affirmed they would "begin the activities [of war] without delay."⁸⁶ The Treaty itself made no mention of numbers of European soldiers, quantities of munitions, or fleets of ships to aid Canbuladoğlu Ali,⁸⁷ saying only that "provisions and help will arrive at the right time."⁸⁸ Ambassador Leoncini did supply a separate section promising 1000 musket barrels and five cannon.⁸⁹

The majority of the Treaty itemized the most-favored status of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. It promised Canbuladoğlu Ali's personal intervention in Jerusalem and exempted Christians from pilgrimage taxes--for a "reasonable" sum paid annually by the Tuscan Duke.⁹⁰ It allowed free trade at Aleppan ports--doubtless Ferdinand had Iskenderun in mind--and specifically authorized the Tuscan sale of contraband (meaning pirated) goods. To the Tuscans it proffered privileges of living anywhere they wished in Ali's realm, and allowed Christians to build a church (probably in Aleppo) for Roman Catholic worship. It promised all Tuscan disputes to be judged according to Florentine law--following the ancient Ottoman millet institution. For the Aleppans it pronounced Canbuladoğlu as "Prince and Protector of the Kingdom of Syria"--but nothing much else. Even his money was to be regulated by the Tuscans, a great advantage to the Florentines who would

profit from all coinage exchange with other European and Middle Eastern states.

On analysis, the Treaty, similar to other European capitulatory arrangements, demonstrates an obvious inequality. For Canbuladoğlu Ali some of the concessions seemed minor, but taken as a whole they made him a servant of Tuscany. He placed the control of Christian pilgrimage and taxation in the hands of the Tuscans. The sectarian direction of Jerusalem's Christian religious practices would also fall to Roman Catholic Tuscany (though Ali's Gregorian Armenian merchant princes may have had second thoughts about papal predominance in the Holy Land).⁹¹ As for regulating foreigners, he could control a Florentine judiciary; and even a Catholic Church building for foreigners to worship in would pose no problem. One wonders, however, if he considered the magnitude of generalized Ottoman and European reaction to organized Tuscan piracy in the eastern Mediterranean, or the sale of contraband goods in Syria. How would the Aleppan state fare when Tuscany reserved all rights of precedence in trade and politics? What kind of pressure would the more prestigious European powers of Venice, France, and England put on a Syrian-Kurdish chief-tain who was so closely tied to the Florentines?

For the Tuscans, the Treaty extended their new imperialism. They realized the vulnerable position of the Aleppan state and saw the possibility of an alliance not between equals but between a technologically advanced state and a geographically valuable area. Syria they would use as a mid-staging ground in an interregional trade relation-

ship originating in Persia, transported to Aleppo (and later Cyprus), and ending in Leghorn and Europe, with enormous profits for the Duke of Tuscany or, as he would then be known, the "King of Cyprus."

5. Ottoman Victory at Oruç Ovası

In the execution of his new strategy, Grand Vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha possessed qualities peculiarly suited to the possibilities of total defeat or total victory. In his seven decades of service to five sultans (he was over eighty years old) he represented the traditional devşirme warrior class, a Serb with the fanaticism to lead his troops to the limits of their endurance for Islam and the sultan. His reputation for deceit, craft, and treachery always preceded him.⁹² He had had long experience in Anatolia, having served in many provinces as beylerbeyi: in Karaman (993/1585); in Syria where he had administered Damascus in 1002/1593; and in Aleppo.⁹³ He may have known Canbuladoğlu Ali personally, and certainly had dealt with family representatives in Kilis. Murad Pasha recognized the importance both of success and surprise. Another year of Ottoman weakness would allow the Celâlis to consolidate permanently their Anatolian rule, possibly with direct aid from Shah Abbas, and place the heart of southeastern Anatolia in the hands of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha. Even if Ottoman spies had not learned of Ali's relationship with the Duke of Tuscany, which is unlikely, the abortive Tuscan invasion of Chios (in 1016/1607) would have caused Murad

Pasha considerable alarm. His own armies, with short-fused tempers at best, had to be kept moving and fighting before winter began. Fortunately, in the temperate Mediterranean region of Cilicia, as the days approached Kasım günü (November 8), geography would allow more time for warfare than in eastern Anatolia.

To surprise the powerful Aleppan would demand secrecy and planning. Throughout the year 1016/1607, even until the battle in which Ali was defeated, no mention exists of Canbuladoğlu as a disloyal person nor any reference to his rebellion in the official Ottoman correspondence.⁹⁴ Despite the Ottoman chroniclers, who years later call him a Celâli, his name in the contemporary documents is only once linked with the rebels, and this almost two years after his defeat.⁹⁵ Undoubtedly many of the reports concerning Ali's rebellion have been lost. The obvious omission of his name, during his period of open rebellion, in documents pertaining to Aleppo which still exist, leads to the conclusion that Murad Pasha for good reasons chose not to treat Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha as he did such common Celâli leaders as Kalenderoğlu, Yusuf Pasha, Cemşid, Tavi Halil, and the others.⁹⁶

Publicly, Kuyucu Murad Pasha's eastern campaign for 1016/1607 differed little from those of preceding years. He utilized the power of the Ottoman army to put down local Celâlis as he marched toward the Persian frontier from Üsküdar. He had two important advantages over the ill-fated campaigns of the recent past: he had the use of all the Ottoman armies including the Rumeli (European) forces

because of the peace he had personally negotiated at Zsitvatorok, and he was himself the focus of political and military power in the Empire, sadrazam (grand vizier) as well as serdar (commander-in-chief). Where Ferhad Pasha the year before had to hope for action by the central authorities in Istanbul, Murad Pasha was himself initiator of all action. Where Ferhad Pasha had to supplicate, Murad Pasha would demand.

Though not entirely reliable, the Ottoman armies Murad Pasha commanded represented years of training and discipline. For his most trusted troops on this campaign he depended on the Danubian veterans and their famous general Tiryâkî Hasan Pasha. The Anatolian soldiers were another matter, for almost all had Celâli connections of some kind. These he placed under Maryol Hüseyin Pasha, also a general with long experience in the European theater. He used two former Celâli commanders to back up these troops, but both men had proven their loyalty. One was the Maraş beylerbeyi Zülfikar Pasha; the other was Karakaş Ahmed Pasha, who had battled loyally to the end of the catastrophic defeat at Lake Urmiye. The Janissaries from the beginning caused Murad great concern.⁹⁷ They had to be paid promptly and he had constantly to deal with their outbursts against the sipahis. He willingly coaxed them along, for as musket men they played an indispensable role.⁹⁸ They could, with a strong hand, follow orders and hold their position in battle. The Janissaries excelled in patrol activities, scouting parties with small squadrons striking on rebel

palankas and redoubts while the cavalry and artillery continued its march.⁹⁹

The grand vizier also had a logistics problem, keeping his army of thousands fed and in fighting trim. For months the bureaucracy of the sadrazam had been secretly directing orders to the various kadıs and sancakbeyis and beylerbeyis on the line of march: for men; for munitions of war; for money; for thousands of camels, oxen, and horses to transport the army's heavy equipment; for food grains; for road repairs; and for bridges to be made ready.¹⁰⁰ Of course, orders were also issued to all loyal Ottoman timar-holders (including those who pretended loyalty, such as Canbuladoğlu and the Celâlı leaders) to aid the serdar or suffer the consequences.¹⁰¹

On mid-Rebi'ülevvel 1016/about 10 July 1607, the grand vizier Murad Pasha left the area of Üsküdar and Haydarpaşa Çayır for the east.¹⁰² The army, described in some detail by the Topcular Kâtibi Abdülkâdir, appeared a ponderous organization which flowed more like a glacier than a stream.¹⁰³ From Üsküdar to Maltepe to Tuzla to Gebze (following much the same route as today's modern highway), the forces of Murad Pasha marched eastward toward Konya. The weaker rebels who feared his justice came out at once to ask forgiveness and express loyalty. Skillfully, Murad Pasha bestowed indulgences on some in order to let the news be spread abroad that those who were truly repentant would be forgiven, although for the most part the dangerous Celâlîs were routed out and executed. The pasha put to death more than 100 of the followers of Deli Ahmed, the

rebellious beylerbeyi of Karaman, known to be a close associate of Canbuladoğlu Ali.¹⁰⁴ A special patrol captured Kumkapılı, a Celâli who had been disturbing the area for the previous three or four years.¹⁰⁵ At Afyon, Murad promised high office to a famous Celâli chief named Akmirza, who came to the serdar's tent to claim his reward, kissed the old Pasha's hand, and was that moment beheaded. As the army travelled, the news of the severity and cruelty of the sadrizam ran ahead of Murad Pasha's swift-moving cavalry and Janissary units sent to search out the rebels. No one, however, knew his real purpose in making this campaign.¹⁰⁶

Arriving at Konya, Murad Pasha for the first time explained the cause for secrecy, the haste, and the severity of the march. He announced his objective: not to retake lands lost to Persia, for which purpose the army had ostensibly been called, but to eradicate the power of the Aleppan rebel chief, Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha.¹⁰⁷ He had hastened to arrive deep in Celâli country in order to avoid counterattacks from Canbuladoğlu or his Celâli allies. The severe treatment of all suspected of rebellion was meted out to keep his flanks free and to establish Ottoman discipline. Although the army now faced an unpalatable duty, the prospect of spending the winter months in Aleppo might sweeten the experience.

The grand vizier proceeded to make whatever arrangements he needed to gain an agreement with the dangerous Kalenderoğlu Mehmed. This Celâli leader, still in the west of Anatolia, had for some time bargained for a position

within the Ottoman governmental structure. Kalenderoğlu and his associate, Kara Said, had recently proposed to join the grand vizier and the Ottoman army.¹⁰⁸ Murad Pasha, however, had no intention of diluting his army with several thousand brigands loyal possibly to Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha of Aleppo. He skillfully played on Kalenderoğlu's aspirations to be a member of the sultan's fief-holders, and bestowed upon him the office of sancakbeyi of Ankara, hoping to forestall an attack on the Ottoman troops from the rear. To make doubly sure of the Celâlîs' faith, Murad dispatched a brigade to watch Kalenderoğlu's activities and report.¹⁰⁹ By neutralizing the most powerful Celâlî of Anatolia, the grand vizier insured his victory over the most dangerous Ottoman enemy of the time, Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha.

Murad Pasha left Konya after having written final orders demanding the loyalty of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha in Syria and of Cemşid, the master of Adana and Tarsus, the strongest of the Celâlîs in Cilicia.¹¹⁰ Control of Adana meant control of the Taurus mountain passes, an essential military protective barrier of the north Syrian region of Canbuladoğlu; to surprise the Aleppan required a sudden southerly attack through the narrows of the Cilician Gates.

The Ottoman army marched to Larende where it stayed seventeen days cleaning up the areas of the southern coast lands. Then it moved north to Ereğli, to Ulukışla, and to Çiftehân.¹¹¹ Somewhere in the pass at a place near Taş Köprüsü (Stone Bridge) north of modern Pozantı, Cemşid waited at a redoubt called Tekir Beli, with two to three

thousand sekan musket men stationed at both ends of the bridge.¹¹² According to Vasiti's account, Murad Pasha's army attacked the bridge head-on at Tekir Beli. The chronicler somewhat vaguely explains the Ottoman success in smashing through a seemingly impenetrable area, laconically relating that Cemşid's soldiers had not the courage to resist.¹¹³ Quite possibly as good a reason was the sight of an Ottoman army of 40,000 to 60,000 forcing its way, regardless of losses or expense, through the mountain passes and over the bridge. Frightened and undisciplined, Cemşid's force broke and fled. The serdar's divisions routed the Celâlis, Cemşid's strength quickly toppled, and, more important, the rebel buffer northwest of Canbuladoğlu no longer existed.

The Ottomans poured through the Cilician Gates toward the plains below and to the city of Adana. They arrived just in time to take into custody a large amount of money from Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha (probably as payment for Cemşid's loyalty) which had arrived in Adana the night before. Murad Pasha's force cleared Adana of rebels, executed more than 500 of Cemşid's men, and gathered up the supplies needed for the coming attack.¹¹⁴ Murad determined to force the Aleppan out into the open by dividing his strength which lay in the sekbans' extraordinary musket fire-power. He gathered his cavalry and artillery and began moving eastward.

For his part, Canbuladoğlu Ali, on hearing the news of Cemşid's loss (not to speak of the treasury), must have realized the weakness of his position. After waiting

almost six months, he had finally received authorization to appoint the fifteen sancakbeyis he had requested in his "List of Matters."¹¹⁵ He had not, however, had time to consolidate these positions. For example, his appointee as beylerbeyi of Maraş, Haydar Bey, had not replaced Zülfikar Pasha, whose loyal army lay waiting north of the Taurus Mountains.¹¹⁶ Ali may have counted on help from the east, particularly from Tavilahmedoğlu Mehmed of Baghdad. But the long Ottoman siege there (from Muharrem to Rebi'ülâhır 1016/April to July 1607) by Nasuh Pasha, plus the subsequent murder of Mehmed in Baghdad, neutralized any eastern help to the Syrian army.¹¹⁷ The Aleppan southern flank at Damascus had been seriously weakened in Muharrem 1016/April 1607 when Ali's hated enemy (and son of the murderer of his uncle) Cağalazade Sinanpaşazade Mahmud was appointed beylerbeyi there.¹¹⁸ Military aid from Tuscany was still six to ten months away. Ambassador Leoncini, at that moment on his way to Leghorn, would return about spring of the coming year, and then with only 1000 musket barrels and five cannon.¹¹⁹ Moreover, the Tuscan Duke's unsuccessful invasion of Cyprus in Cemaziyülevvel 1016/August 1607 had led the Ottoman government to tighten naval security in the eastern Mediterranean. What Canbuladoğlu apparently did not know was the appointment of Kalenderoğlu Mehmed as sancakbeyi of Ankara, and the lack of any countervailing loyal Celâli force from central Anatolia.

Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha now announced his position to his men: he had legal rights as beylerbeyi of Aleppo and a powerful army; he remained loyal to the Ottomans and wanted



to serve only Sultan Ahmed and no one else; and the serdar should keep his distance or he "would taste the strength of his army."¹²⁰ This was not bluff. He purposely determined not to intercept the grand vizier's march east of Misis, assuming Kalenderoğlu Mehmed would attack the Ottomans from the rear soon after they entered the mountain passes of Payas/Dörtyol. The most advantageous place to fight the combined Ottoman imperial armies of Rumeli and Anadolu was at the pass at Bakras. Ali Pasha ordered his sekban musket men to fortify the pass, the only road the serdar's army could travel on its way south from Payas to İskenderun--and Aleppo.¹²¹ On the first of Cemaziyülâhır 1016/late September 1607, Kuyucu Murad Pasha left Adana with the main body of his troops for Aleppo, crossing the Ceyhan River at Misis.¹²²

The rather inconclusive contemporary reports concerning Murad's strategy against Canbuladoğlu state that the serdar left Adana toward Aleppo as if he were going via Bakras Pass and then took a "different road" to the pass called Arslan Beli.¹²³ In a letter to the French ambassador the Ağa of the Janissaries, Halil Pasha, mentioned Murad Pasha's decision to go to Aleppo "taking the road to Kayseri in order for it to be the most efficacious."¹²⁴ Topcular Kâtibi Abdülkâdir, also an eye-witness, makes the statement that Murad Pasha went through the pass of Arslanlı, "with the Payas road remaining in the rear."¹²⁵ If one postulates the Ottomans feinting south toward Payas, moving quickly north on the present Osmaniye-Bahçe road, toward Kayseri, and then moving east through the pass known


today as Nurdağ geçidi, or Gavurdağı Pass, the strategy of Murad Pasha becomes clear. Murad, by doubling north could easily make contact with the southbound beylerbeyi of Maraş, Zülfikar Pasha. The grand vizier sent orders for Zülfikar to secure the eastern side of Arslan Beli. He also ordered a group of over 1000 under Topal Yusuf, then on his way from Diyarbekir, to make contact with Zülfikar Pasha and unite with him.¹²⁶ The serdar had nothing to fear from the eastern approaches, since Nasuh Pasha remained in Baghdad, neutralizing any of the force of the Tavilahmed sons. He had only to keep news of his eastward movement from Canbuladoğlu until he could march south to reach the plains north of Kilis.

The exhausting northern march, with over 100 cannon and thousands of troops, over a distance almost 100 km farther than by the expected southern route via Payas/Dört Yol, must have caught Canbuladoğlu and his officers totally off guard. A Celâli ally might have stalled or even neutralized such a move, but Kalenderoğlu Mehmed and his Celâli forces were far to the west, near Ankara. One can understand Ali's sudden change of plans, his being forced to march east then north to seek out his enemy rather than wait for Murad to cut the road to Aleppo. He would fight his final battle not on familiar ground in the mountains of Bakras (near modern Belen) but in the plains of Kırıkan, or somewhat east, near the Afrin River.¹²⁷ Murad Pasha, by this tactic, now had flanked the Aleppan, and was marching south with his weary troops in the direction of Kilis. Ali Pasha quickly ordered his forces from the fortified hill

country--where his sekbans were most effective--to fight the grand vizier on ground very adaptable to the use of field artillery.

Leaving Bakras, Canbuladoğlu Ali had to ride quickly to intercept the Ottoman forces before they took his city.¹²⁸ According to Vasiti, Canbuladoğlu Ali finally established his base camp in a wide area east of the Amanus mountains known even today as Amik, near Lake Amik.¹²⁹ The Syrian leader moved 5000 to 6000 sekan musket men to where the rest of his infantry and 20,000 cavalry waited.¹³⁰ He now realized very clearly the grand vizier's intentions.

Murad Pasha had gambled and won. When the Maraş patrol troops from the north met the grand vizier at a spot somewhere in the foothills of modern Kırıkhan at a place then called Güvercinlik he knew his plan had worked.¹³¹ Exuding confidence, he gave the order to Zülfikar Pasha to make desultory contact with the enemy¹³² while he and his weary troops halted for three days at a place called Dereme.¹³³ While the main Ottoman army rested and prepared for the coming battle (they had force-marched more than 200 km from Adana, through high mountain passes), the patrols of Zülfikar Pasha advanced to the enemy lines.¹³⁴ On the second of Receb 1016/23 October 1607 contacts increased to a pitched battle in which the Ottoman sancakbeyis of Kostendil and of Selanik were wounded. In the skirmish, however, Cin Ali Bölükbaşı, a very important aide of Canbuladoğlu, was killed, and several important prisoners fell captive. From these prisoners the Ottomans extracted information concerning Canbuladoğlu's general



objectives, information which conclusively indicated his treasonable desire to establish a sovereign state.¹³⁵ Murad Pasha then ordered probing patrols to search out the strength of the rebellious forces. His own army amounted to about 75,000 men; Canbuladoğlu Ali had about half that number.¹³⁶ The place where the two forces would face each other was a narrows, opening out onto a plain, surrounded by mountains on the west and the Afrin River on the east, a place called the Meadow of the Ritual Fasting: Oruç Ovası.¹³⁷

The chroniclers relate that the next morning, on 3 Receb 1016/24 October 1607, the two armies prepared to meet each other in battle.¹³⁸ Canbuladoğlu at the last moment may have proffered his respects to the Ottoman commander by a letter, and even came before his massed troops offering to speak with Kuyucu Murad Pasha. The grand vizier refused.¹³⁹ Very probably Canbuladoğlu, realizing his almost two-to-one disadvantage, wished to avoid battle and continued to the last moment to send letters of loyalty as a cloak for his very real military weakness.

Suddenly the wild battle began, with charges and countercharges by both sides. The Maraş beylerbeyi, Zülfikar Pasha, absorbed the first shock of the enemy attack. The account in Vasiti gathers its own momentum as he recalls the give and take of the two forces.¹⁴⁰ At the end of this second day of fighting, neither side could claim a victory, but clearly the Aleppan force held a strong position and, for the time, the upper hand. At this moment Canbuladoğlu may have claimed himself "King of Anatolia."¹⁴¹

The field commander of Rumeli, Tiryâkî Hasan Pasha, now suggested a plan to capitalize on the overwhelming artillery superiority held by the Ottomans. He would hide the large calibre cannon in the midst of the battlefield, on the hillsides of the narrows. The infantry and cavalry then would slowly retreat toward the narrows, encouraging the rebels to follow after them, fanning out to the right and the left. The cannon would then fire on the exposed enemy flank.¹⁴²

Hasan Pasha's plan worked to perfection. After fighting until about midday, the Ottoman troops feigned flight, dividing into two parts, enticing the rebel soldiers into the trap. Suddenly, fifty cannon, which Murad had loaded with powder (rather than shot) opened fire with a deafening din. The smoke so filled the narrow defile that neither the rebel forces nor the Ottomans could see their leaders.¹⁴³ By now the rebels had spent their reserves, and the fresh Ottoman troops and cavalry from Rumeli regrouped to counterattack with musket and cannon shot. Unable to see their officers, the rebel soldiers began to panic and flee. The Ottomans furiously attacked the enemy and with rifle shot and sabre cut the rebel lines. Canbuladoğlu with his white banner was nowhere to be seen. The secondary commanders lost control of the Aleppan sekbân musket men. Some of the mounted troops began to turn from the valley, riding toward the plain, thus exposing more sekbân, who in turn followed, and then more cavalry. Soon the whole army was in flight, cut down wherever found by



the pursuing Ottoman cavalry which took prisoners by the hundreds, then thousands.

The pursuit continued, the Ottomans relying on their sabre-wielding horsemen.¹⁴⁴ Down to the wide plain they all came, to the pavilions of Canbuladoğlu at Amik, in a mad dash that gave no thought to a cause or a leader, but only to the saving and the taking of life. Canbuladoğlu Ali, caught in the *melée*, could do nothing to rally his undisciplined forces. He too fled toward the east.¹⁴⁵

At the scene of battle, near the serdar's tent, mass executions began and lasted until far into the night. Few received clemency. The old vizier ordered a pyramid of 20,000 heads built in the area facing his victory pavilion.¹⁴⁶ Piled nearby lay more than 700 rebel standards, among them the white banner of Canbuladoğlu Ali, to be displayed later in a victory parade in Istanbul.

6. *The Amnesty of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha*

Though he fled Oruç Ovası, Canbuladoğlu Ali did not at first recognize the totality of his defeat. His major Syrian allies escaped the serdar's wrath: Seyfoğlu Yusuf seems not to have fought at the battle; Ma'noğlu Fahreddin had probably remained aloof from the activities, having parted from Canbulad after the Damascus campaign.¹⁴⁷ Ali Pasha went first to Kilis where he gathered up his family and the next morning he rode south to Aleppo.¹⁴⁸ He entered the city freely, placed several hundred loyal troops inside the inner castle with members of his family

and their household servants, along with enough provisions to last for two years.¹⁴⁹

Then Ali Pasha turned east. Preceding him, a Kurdish group under Borazan Bey united with a unit of Tavilahmedoğlu's Baghdad army.¹⁵⁰ MichelAngiolo Corai fled toward Persia, probably with a group who had been involved in the Tuscan treaty arrangements.¹⁵¹ Ali, no doubt thinking he would return soon, took the road south to Bira with 2000 troops and set off down the Euphrates River.

Help from the rebel armies in Baghdad did not materialize. The two sons of Tavi Ahmed no longer held power in Mesopotamia, and Ali's 2000 men were no match for the Ottoman armies.¹⁵² According to a European source, Ali now realized the seriousness of his plight. He may have sent messages to the Persian shah, offering himself and his troops as allies. If this were so, it was a desperate move. Service with the shah would only save his life. He would probably never have a chance to rule again.

The response from the shah, not long in coming, stunned Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha. The shah had many soldiers, it said, and no need of Ali Pasha and his men.¹⁵³ Ali now rode north up the Tigris to Mosul, Mardin, and Diyarbekir, heading for Malatya. Saying he would take course toward the Porte, his actions indicated he now had to rely on his own personal charisma and any influence his family might have with the young Ottoman sultan.¹⁵⁴

Murad Pasha meanwhile marched leisurely toward Kilis, where he confiscated all of Ali Pasha's enormous land holdings and what remained of his treasury.¹⁵⁵ He appointed

officers whose loyalty was unquestioned for the various important positions of authority in the region.¹⁵⁶ On 17 Receb 1016/8 November 1607 Murad Pasha arrived in the environs of Aleppo and camped outside the walls to begin the process of disciplining the city.

The Aleppans capitulated at once, and the serdar's soldiers arrested and summarily executed all those guilty of association with Ali Pasha and his treason. The inner castle, however, proved to be a stumbling block. Although the Ottomans attacked it on three or four occasions, it remained impregnable.¹⁵⁷ Murad Pasha then determined to take it by strategem. He appealed to the inhabitants, particularly to the wives of Canbuladoğlu, to accept his promise of liberty and be spared the misery of an assault.¹⁵⁸ The besieged finally accepted the offer. The remaining soldiers and Ali Pasha's family filed out, to be divided into two groups.¹⁵⁹ A few of Ali's relatives may have been spared, but the sources all agree that Kuyucu Murad Pasha ordered the immediate execution of all the rest.¹⁶⁰

On 14 Şaban 1016/4 December 1607 Murad Pasha established winter quarters for the Ottoman army in Aleppo.¹⁶¹ The grand vizier faced various problems. Locally, he made changes in governmental personnel while dispatching soldiers in his continuing war against Celâlîs. His main force kept watch for any resurgence of Canbuladoğlu, possibly from Baghdad. For Sultan Ahmed, in Istanbul, Murad was not to return home. In a letter of praise for Murad Pasha and his victorious army, the young monarch informed the grand vizier that he should remain in Aleppo for the win-

ter.¹⁶² The sadrazam was neither to pursue Canbuladoğlu through Anatolia nor return to the capital, but was to remain in Syria, ridding the region of Celâlîs and making ready to recapture the lands recently occupied by Shah Abbas of Persia.

During the winter of 1016/1607-08 the grand vizier issued orders to assemble troops to march east the next spring. Among many of the emirs and sheikhs of Syria who responded, Ma'noğlu Fahreddin now felt confident enough to march with his troops to Aleppo, as did Seyfoğlu Yusuf.¹⁶³ Both men presented what turned out to be acceptable excuses to Murad Pasha, who provided them with robes of honor on condition they have their quota of troops and money to fight in Persia the following spring.¹⁶⁴ The Ottomans thus re-established order in Syria in the old manner, assuming the Syrian princes would now keep their commitments. After all, the Syrians might have to fight a combined invading Celâlî force of the Tavilahmedoğlu brothers in Baghdad, Kalenderoğlu and Kara Said in the west, and Muslu Çavuş along with Yusuf Pasha in the southeast, all led by Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha, whose location and objectives still remained unknown.

Ali Pasha by this time had no intention of leading new armies. After his disappointment in Baghdad and the cool response from the Persian shah, he threw his fortune to the strength of his family name and his personal influence with the sultan, which seems to have been considerable. He sent his uncle Haydar ahead of him to inquire as to the possibility of reconciliation.¹⁶⁵ While he journeyed by himself

west via Malatya to Eskişehir, a message and a faint hope came to him. Totally unknown to his friends and relatives in Istanbul, he stopped suddenly at Pazarcık, a small hamlet in the eyâlet of Hüdavendigâr, near Bursa. Camped nearby were the armies of the Great Celâlîs.

On 9 Ramazan 1016/28 December 1607 Ali Pasha began a series of consultations with the Celâlî chiefs.¹⁶⁶ He met first with Taviî who, after hearing Ali's proposal, refused to serve under him.¹⁶⁷ He then sought out Kalenderoğlu Mehmed and Kara Said, men who by their failure to aid him had led him to his present position. Powerless, he learned the Celâlîs were now involved in serious negotiations with the grand vizier to return to high Ottoman posts. In the prolonged discussion that followed, the Celâlîs welcomed Ali to their ranks but exacted conditions which he could not accept.¹⁶⁸ They probably refused his demand for total command over the Celâlîs. Besides, had not Kalenderoğlu been treacherous when he had accepted the sancakbeylik of Ankara rather than help out his cause by attacking Murad Pasha's army from the west? Utterly spent, Canbuladoğlu, with only four associates, two of whom were small boys (probably relatives), broke out of a room in which he had been semi-incarcerated for five days¹⁶⁹ and fled to İznikmid, none too soon.¹⁷⁰

The government--and this included Ahmed I himself--was very anxious to have Canbuladoğlu in Istanbul and not abroad making mischief. The sultan planned to use Ali Pasha as a decoy to lure in the great Celâlî leaders from Anatolia.¹⁷¹ Not only did Ahmed send a kethuda of the

Palace to fetch Haydar, Ali Pasha's uncle, but the Imperial bostancıbaşı went with a large naval vessel to take Canbuladoğlu's envoys to İstanbul.¹⁷² After receiving his official pardon, the envoys returned to İznikmid in three large ships,¹⁷³ where they received the startling news that Canbuladoğlu yet remained with the Celâlis near Bursa.¹⁷⁴ The bostancıbaşı, whom the French ambassador reported as being deeply involved in the negotiations, travelled inland to find Ali Pasha, who was even then riding hard after his escape from Kalenderoğlu.¹⁷⁵ The two met, Canbuladoğlu boarded the flagship, along with the Ottoman officials and his companions on the long trip from Syria.¹⁷⁶ The three galleys sailed from the shores of Asia Minor.

Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha arrived in İstanbul on 27 Ramazan 1016/16 January 1608. In the words of a Venetian eye-witness, Ali

disembarked at the [sultan's] kiosk with the noise of greetings from artillery fire and a very large crowd. As soon as the sultan heard about the arrival of such an important subject, he held a divan ceremony in the kiosk within his own Palace. In addition to all the pashas [of the Porte] he asked the Müfti [Hoca-Sadüddinzâde Mehmed Çelebi Efendi] to come also and even the kadı asker. And for a long time he discussed the affair to this point: whether they were to receive him [Canbuladoğlu] and accept his word of faithfulness, or to consider him a rebel, one who had the temerity to be called a king in his own Empire, had become lunatic, and fought against one of the [sultan's] generals. In the latter case they would have him executed. It is said that although the Müfti tried with much logic to convince the Sultan to have him executed, the opinion of the others gained the soul of the sultan. Without making his intentions known he [Sultan Ahmed] went immediately outside the kiosk where he was introduced to Canbuladoğlu, who was dressed in a coat in the Hungarian manner (all'ongaro) of green velvet, lined

with ermine and an [ermine] collarpiece which extended down the back. He [Canbuladoğlu] was guided to the presence of the sultan, kneeled, and kissed his feet, and asked his pardon.¹⁷⁷

For a week the young Ahmed, now seventeen years old, questioned the famous Aleppan pasha. Ali must have played his role well, for the sultan treated him with great splendor, much to the dismay of several members of the sultan's Divan. Ali lived for a time in the saray of the former grand vizier Derviş Pasha, just across from the Palace.¹⁷⁸ Asked why he had rebelled, Ali Pasha replied, "I am no rebel. But around me gathered evil ones, from whom I could not escape, so that I led them in their revenge against your troops. Now I am in flight as one laden with guilt. If you forgive, then it will be worthy of you; if you punish, you will surely be within your rights."¹⁷⁹ This argument, though somewhat specious for one who had made a treaty with Tuscany to "lower and eventually destroy the Ottoman Empire" was accepted, temporarily at least. The sultan gave him robes of honor and Canbuladoğlu received every courtesy.¹⁸⁰ To bestow honor (and demand obedience) the sultan ordered Canbuladoğlu's two young associates to be placed in the Palace School with a suitable allowance.¹⁸¹

According to the French ambassador, however, many among the ruling elite remained in disagreement with the sultan's policy toward the former rebel, and several openly demanded his death.¹⁸² Ali's presence as a guest of the sultan had flushed out no Great Celâlis from Anatolia to seek a similar pardon. Increasingly under suspicion, Ali

Pasha appeared headed for the Seven Towers, where execution of important prisoners took place.¹⁸³ We do not know how long he remained in Istanbul, but he must still have had such influence with the sultan that the government finally wrote orders to transfer him to Temeşvar, in Rumeli, as governor there.¹⁸⁴

As beylerbeyi of Temeşvar, Canbuladoğlu Ali apparently did nothing treasonable, but the ruling elites there did not accept his rule any more than they had acquiesced to Deli Hasan Pasha four years earlier.¹⁸⁵ Some sources say the Janissaries plotted against him, that he was in danger of being murdered. After a year in office on Muharrem 1018/April 1609 he fled from Temeşvar to Belgrade, where he sought security.¹⁸⁶

Canbuladoğlu remained free in Belgrade. In the summer of 1018/1609 the grand vizier Murad Pasha finally returned to Istanbul from the last Great Celâli wars. Here he learned that the former Syrian rebel was still alive.¹⁸⁷ Murad now ordered the arrest of Ali Pasha and imprisoned him for several months in the castle of Belgrade where the former beylerbeyi of Aleppo received the official death sentence.¹⁸⁸ Apparently Ali successfully pressed for an appeal, for it was forty days later that the executioner strangled him with a bowstring.¹⁸⁹ According to the French ambassador, Canbuladoğlu Ali died about 5 Zi'hicce 1018/1 March 1610.¹⁹⁰ To prove his death, the government (as was customary) ordered his severed head publicly displayed in Istanbul.¹⁹¹

7. Northern Syria after Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha

Grand Vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha ordered sweeping changes in northern Syria so that there should be no repetition of the kind of rebellion which Canbuladoğlu had attempted. After the massacre of the Aleppan sekbans and the important followers of the Syrian leader, Murad Pasha confiscated all the Canbulad property in Kilis and Aleppo in the name of the sultan. This meant all the lands previously owned by Canbuladoğlu now reverted to the sultan, to be distributed as the Porte wished. The income from these lands would immediately be removed from the region to the central treasury.

The Arab-speaking lands south of Aleppo, however, continued under the ancient Ottoman system of divide et impera. After suitable apologies, men like Seyfoğlu Yusuf and various emirs and sheikhs became supreme arbiters of local government. No longer did they act as timar holders, responsible to the government and to the re'aya for their deportment. As long as they remitted their taxes and kept the peace, the government left them pretty much alone. As was occurring elsewhere in the Empire, the Syrian timar system had lost its former importance, and timar holders as a class were disappearing.¹⁹² No longer did local princes have to face the Ottoman land assessor and other bureaucrats who (for better or for worse) had balanced the restrictions of the government with the greed of the landowners. Now the local emir might subjugate his people with

little interference, as long as he controlled his charges and the assessed taxes found their way to the central government.

Almost as soon as he was pardoned by the Ottomans, Ma'noğlu Fahreddin began to intrigue with the Grand Duke of Tuscany.¹⁹³ The possibility of a separate state in Syria, so vainly sought by Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha, grew in the mind of Fahreddin. The model might still be followed. After all, there was the matter of the unused armor still in Medici hands. Ambassador Hippolito Leoncini, still holding the now unneeded 1000 musket barrels and five cannon for Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha, began to correspond with the Lebanese Druse chief. The Grand Duke still wanted Cyprus, and could use a Beirut-based Ma'noğlu as well as an Aleppo-based Canbuladoğlu Ali. Within a few years a new Treaty of Alliance, almost identical with that of Canbuladoğlu Ali, tied Tuscans and Levantines together once again.¹⁹⁴ Fahreddin accepted as much help as he could without causing concern in Istanbul. As his flourishing port at Beirut began to take the shape of a state, the new grand vizier, Nasuh Pasha, felt considerable alarm about Fahreddin's activities, even more than had Murad Pasha.¹⁹⁵ Eventually Fahreddin's emirate became too difficult to control and the Ottomans compelled the Druse leader to flee for three years' exile in Florence. Later Fahreddin returned to develop a flourishing agricultural and trading region, considered by some to be the nucleus of the modern state of Lebanon.¹⁹⁶

The merchants of Aleppo, meanwhile, felt less concern over the demise of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha than the loss of Iskenderun as a port. Kuyucu Murad Pasha must have learned from Canbuladoğlu's Aleppan documents how Iskenderun would be used for Tuscan trade, and the intimate connection of Persian interests with the Aleppo silk trade and industry. He immediately ordered the port completely shut down, and remained absolutely adamant that it be removed to Tripoli, despite heavy pressure from the ambassadors of Venice, England, and France.¹⁹⁷ Seyfoğlu's Tripoli thus became again the official port for Aleppo.

In the years following Oruç Ovası, rebellions occasionally sprang up in the areas of Canbuladoğlu Ali's Syria. As late as 1022/1613 the Ottoman records show activities of "former rebels of Canbuladoğlu" in the Ayntab area.¹⁹⁸ Yet these never developed into anything dangerous to the Empire. What remained of Canbuladoğlu's family left Kilis, and by 1040/1630 had taken up domicile in the Lebanon. During the eleventh/seventeenth century they converted from Sunni Muslim to Druze. The family of Canbulad, or Jumblatt as it is often transliterated from modern Arabic, rose to prominence among the leaders of the Lebanon, a role they have played to the present time.¹⁹⁹

V The Celâlî Rebellion of Kalenderoğlu Mehmed

The successful conclusion of the campaign against Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha in Aleppo did not rid Anatolia of the menace of rebellion. The Great Celâlîs, though considerably weakened, continued to press for acceptance of themselves and their followers into the Ottoman system. A hard-line policy of confrontation of the Celâlîs had been formed by Grand Vizier Derviş Pasha who, although inept as a leader, realized the futility and danger of trying to fight both Persia and the Celâlî armies. An ill-fated campaign of 1015/1606 under Ferhad Pasha failed to clean out nests of Celâlîs, due less to poor military strategy than to the lack of coin to pay and supply the troops.

While the new grand vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha attacked Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha in Syria, the strength of the Anatolian Celâlîs could only be diluted by offering them official status. The city of Ankara was assigned to the most powerful Celâlî, Kalenderoğlu Mehmed, who was frustrated when the *kadı* and the citizens of Ankara resisted his entrance. After a futile attempt to storm the city, Kalenderoğlu moved west to Bursa where he tried once again to pressure the sultan into giving him a *beylerbeylik*. By spring of 1017/1608, Murad Pasha began his march up from Syria to obliterate the power of Kalenderoğlu. Meeting near Elbistan, Murad defeated the Celâlîs, and Kalenderoğlu and his surviving troops fled to Shah Abbas.

In the following months, the grand vizier moved to strike down the last of the Anatolian great Celâlîs. Throughout the next spring and summer in Istanbul, by stealth and trickery, Kuyucu Murad successfully eliminated the last rebels without moving his army from the capital. The sultan, to memorialize the success, began building a great mosque in Istanbul, while in Anatolia people began to rebuild their farms and their cities.

1. A Major Change in Policy

During the bitterly cold winter of 1016/1607-1608, Kuyucu Murad Pasha and his forces remained scattered in Syria and eastern Anatolia, allowing the Celâlîs almost a free hand on the peninsula. The rebels used the almost six-month period to gain whatever tactical or political



advantages possible, while Murad Pasha spent the time repairing his battered army for the coming campaigns.¹

Kuyucu Murad Pasha aimed to weaken the smaller rebel bands by separating them from the Great Celâlis, Kalenderoğlu Mehmed, Kara Said, Tavi Halil, and the others. To some he bestowed sancaks, to others robes of honor and momentary security. He planned in the spring of 1017/1608 to send an army eastward under Sinanpaşazade Mahmud to protect his eastern flank and the possible union of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha with the rebels of Baghdad.² In the summer he planned to march west, toward Istanbul, where he would confront the Celâlis. If his plans worked, he would isolate the Great Celâli leaders, fight them group by group, establish trusted officers in their regions, and then return to Istanbul to fight his enemies within the Palace organization.

Although Murad Pasha deserves credit for the tactical success of this plan, the basic policy of total war against the Celâlis resulted from strategy developed by the grand viziers of Sultan Ahmed who had preceded Murad in office, in particular, the grand vizier Derviş Pasha. Ottoman historians uniformly consider Derviş Pasha detestable, violent, and corrupt.³ After having been Admiral for only six months, he was appointed grand vizier over many more experienced officers. In his six months as sadrazam, Derviş made a startling number of enemies. Stories abounded of his personal cruelty: he was vain, secretive, and solitary.⁴ In order to obtain his office, some alleged he poisoned the incumbent grand vizier, Lala Mehmed Pasha. He

supposedly obtained the dead sadrazam's personal fortune, left the two sons destitute, and used the money to pay the army.⁵ He disagreed with the policies of the müfti Sun'ullah Efendi, and procured his dismissal.⁶ Despite this reputation, he conscientiously tried to reform some of the bureaucratic abuses, one of which was official procrastination.⁷ Another problem he faced, fiscal imbalance, proved his undoing, because he chose to tax the wealthiest class in Istanbul, which also possessed the most political power.

Concerning interregional relations, Derviş followed his late predecessor, Lala Mehmed Pasha. Mehmed Pasha had initiated (Safer 1015/June 1606) the important negotiations for peace in Europe. Derviş Pasha continued these talks during his tenure of office and saw their successful conclusion. In Anatolia, he identified the Celâlis, not the Persians, as the greater enemy of the Empire, and made careful plans to coordinate an attack against them. To sustain these policies he needed additional sources of income and soldiers.

The procurement of sufficient money, or better, fiscal balance, was the overriding, single most difficult problem for the Ottomans at this time. They simply could not obtain enough revenues for their ever-expanding expenditures. True, after the monetary devaluation of 992/1584 prices generally levelled off, but the three-front war always demanded more cash than the Porte could acquire.⁸

Normal sources continued to produce revenue. Taxes and tithes, the cizye (non-Muslim head tax), and customs

revenues on foreign goods all yielded the amount legally specified in the Kanunname (Law Code); but revenue sources, especially in the Aegean coastal area and in central Anatolia, where the Celâlîs ruled, had declined precipitously in the years since the time of Kara Yazıcı. The Syrian revolt of Canbuladoğlu Ali denied millions in gold to the central treasury.

The entire economic system seemed out of control. Trade was crippled, farmers left their lands, refugees glutted the streets of the major cities, many wealthy persons fled--but many remained and became wealthier. Some Christians and Jews, the middlemen of foreign and domestic operations, often appeared to flaunt their wealth.⁹ The elite re'aya in the cities, Muslim and non-Muslim, ostentatiously built lavish homes, invested in lands, but also put their wealth in easily liquidated forms: jewels, furs, gold. There was not a pasha, not a molla (high Islamic judge), not an infidel in Istanbul, it seemed, who did not profit from the buying and selling of power and influence in the highest places.¹⁰

Derviş Pasha's decision to tax the wealthy--even to the extent of a cruel public execution of a prominent Jewish merchant, and a 1000 akçe annual balcony tax on every house in Istanbul--resulted in an upsurge of anger at the grand vizier by the rich elites. Particularly he affected the high-ranking ulema (religious leaders), whose vast wealth appeared particularly vulnerable to Derviş Pasha's ubiquitous tax inspectors.¹¹ The almost child-like accusation of "crypto-Christian practices" (after a picture

of the Virgin Mary was "found" in his quarters, and after a Jew "admitted" to the kapıcı that he had built a subterranean tunnel for Derviş Pasha, running from the palace of the grand vizier to that of the Imperial Saray) persuaded the sultan, not yet seventeen years old, that the former bostancıbaşı and confidant of two years had to be executed for lese majesty.¹² Two days later Sultan Ahmed repented of his impulsive act (he had demeaned himself by throwing Derviş's body to the street dogs in an act of imperious brutality), but one questions whether, under the circumstances, the boy-sultan could have found any other solution, given the constellation of power in Istanbul at the time. Success of such reforms as instigated by Derviş would require political genius and strength of character; Ahmed was neither very bright nor very strong. He retired to the hunt and his harem.

Before his precipitous fall, however, Derviş Pasha committed an entire Ottoman army to the extermination of the Celâlis. The grand vizier, forced by his many enemies in the Divan, dispatched the army earlier than he wished, and for this reason the eastern campaign of 1015/1606 had neither proper preparation nor experienced leadership. But unmistakably it reflected a more clearly defined policy which, with adequate funds and forceful support, might have succeeded.

In late summer the sultan ordered horsetails, symbols of the commanding officer of an imperial campaign, to be placed on the eastern army staging grounds at Üsküdar, while messengers carried announcements for men and arms to



be made ready. Both a sense of realism accompanied the announcement--to obliterate the Anatolian Celâlis--and of unreality: to attack Persia, retake all the lands lost by Cağalazade Sinan Pasha at Urmiye, and particularly to capture the cities of Shīrvān and Ganja, almost 2000 km to the east, on the Caspian Sea!¹³


2. The Campaign of Deli Ferhad Pasha

According to the Ottoman chroniclers, Deli Ferhad Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman forces in the east, utterly lacked competence.¹⁴ Some thought him slightly mad (deli), a man who at one time joined the sipahis throwing stones at his own pavilion (in protest against tardy pay), saying that he too had been a sipahi of the Porte, and could stone a tent with the best of them.¹⁵ If, however, we accept the report of Topcular Kâtibi (chief secretary of artillery) Abdülkadir, who accompanied Ferhad on his campaign as an administrative official of the artillery force, Ferhad Pasha was by no means mad.¹⁶ In fact, he did an adequate job with the materials given him, attended his duties loyally in spite of the uproars and revolts of his troops. He achieved notable success in the early stages of the campaign, but failed when İstanbul did not supply adequate troop payment.

Ferhad Pasha and his army left Üsküdar on the last of Rebi'ülevvel 1015/5 August 1606, marched eastward to İznikmid and Yenişehir. Here in the early days of the campaign the Janissaries impudently gathered at his tent to

demand their lezez payment.¹⁷ The pasha had money to pay his troops, and the army marched without incident to Eskişehir, Bovladin, and then Konya. Ferhad then moved northeast, deep into Celâli territory, periodically dividing the army into smaller probing units and sending them against nests of Celâli bands.¹⁸

About Cemaziülevvel 1015/September 1606 Ferhad Pasha camped at Kayseri, waiting for the army pay caravan which was to arrive from eastern Anatolia and Syria. He also hoped for the treasury coming north from Egypt.¹⁹ He expected that the beylerbeyi of Aleppo, Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha, as well as other emirs and officials in the eastern regions, would pay their usual dues. By now Ferhad Pasha had gone too far east to be able to obtain direct help from Istanbul, and he could order no more loyal troops to duty from the local areas. He had decided to winter in Kayseri, due to the lateness of the season, but his daily-wage soldiers became increasingly anxious for their pay.²⁰ If he marched rapidly east he might be able to link up with Nasuh Pasha at Diyarbekir, but in so doing he would extend his lines and suffer a possible ambush by the omnipresent Celâlis. As time passed he realized no treasury would come from Canbuladoğlu Ali in Aleppo. Ferhad faced a dilemma. He and his army had great respect for the prowess of the Celâli leaders and did not look forward to a pitched battle. His Janissary troops could recall the massacre of 2000 of their forces after Nasuh Pasha's disaster at Bolvadin only a year before.²¹ Yet, the serdar had his orders. He knew he must continue.



The commander-in-chief moved slowly, deeper toward Ereğli.²² The army now entered the territory of Çemsid in Adana, and daily expected a sharp attack from the east. The bad news, however, came from the west, at Konya from which they had just left. Part of the Great Celâli army of Kalenderoğlu Mehmed, led by Kara Said, had attacked the city.²³ The Ottoman altı bölük halkı (paid slave cavalry) which had been left to guard the area, had counterattacked successfully in a bitter encounter and momentarily drove off the rebel division. All was not lost. Yet the army of Ferhad Pasha, extended, seemingly surrounded, and short of pay, began to question the whole operation.²⁴

Shortly after the Konya battle in Cemaziyülevvel 1015/September 1606, Deli Ferhad received another command from Grand Vizier Derviş Pasha: continue eastward at a rapid pace and unite with Nasuh Pasha against Shah Abbas, in order to stop the Persians from further invading Ottoman territory. When Ferhad read this directive to his troops and ordered that it be carried out, his slave soldiers rioted, refusing to obey.²⁵ Ferhad, never a forceful leader, yet a realist, recognized his chances of surviving the rioting Janissaries. He acceded to the army's demands. Determined now to forestall more troop rebellion (and possibly the desertion of his non-slave troops to the Celâlis), he pulled back his probing forces, and marched west to Konya, where he planned to obtain the necessary funds to regenerate the campaign.

The return to Konya, however, further extended rather than solved Deli Ferhad's problems. Unlike a grand vizier,

the serdar of the east followed but could not innovate policy. Ferhad did not, for example, bribe the Great Celâlis as Kuyucu Murad Pasha a year later, offering a sancak for a promise of good behavior. This may have resulted from choice, but it reflected as well the Celâlis' general method of operating directly (often through personal emissaries) with favorable leaders in Istanbul. Ultimately, the grand vizier, in consonance with the sultan and the advice of the sultan's Divan, made such decisions. Ferhad Pasha, though important as a serdar, held proportionately less power. Since he had to pay his men, Deli Ferhad expended all allocated funds--he could demand only the tax revenues of Anatolia for the eastern campaign--and then requested help from Istanbul. Though his position was desperate, he could not demand revenues from, say, Rumeli or approach the sultan for private assistance. He was, in fact, totally dependent on how successfully the grand vizier could gather enough money from his various sources to pay the delinquent salaries of the slave soldiers, a task in which Derviş Pasha, as grand vizier, was singularly unsuccessful.

When in Konya the slave troops immediately demanded their masar pay for the year 1015. Ferhad Pasha argued again with his rebellious officers and men that they should continue the fight for the sultan and the Empire and go on toward Persia.²⁶ This they absolutely refused, saying the rebels were too numerous and their own forces too weak. Helpless, faced with mutinous and frightened troops, Ferhad

sat inactive in Konya for two months, his army immobilized.²⁷

With the passing of Kasım günü the troops began to press for total retreat to the west, while the serdar stalled, hoping to obtain money from Diyarbekir or help from İstanbul.²⁸ Because of the open antagonism of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha in Aleppo and his line of allied buffer states, the region east of Kayseri to Diyarbekir was enemy territory, and no Treasury caravan could be brought through without the protection of several divisions of troops. Even the central government provided little help. In İstanbul the forces opposed to Grand Vizier Derviş Pasha began to push for his dismissal. Personal problems now took precedence over the public good. Ferhad could expect no help from a man fighting for his life. No alternative remained to the serdar than to order another retreat--from Konya. By now the weather turned very cold and the pack animals weakened. With difficulty the army reached Karahisar-ı Sahib (modern Afyon-karahisar), and finally the city of Bursa where the Janissaries received orders to stay until spring. Then the final order came. The unfortunate Ferhad was dismissed as commander-in-chief. Replacing him was the vizier Mustafa Pasha. Mustafa went at once to Bursa to put the fortress in order and repair the outer defenses for an expected attack by the Celâli Kalenderoğlu Mehmed.²⁹

The campaign of Ferhad Pasha need not have failed so ignominiously. The next year the new grand vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha proved the validity of the thesis that the

eradication of the Celâlîs must take priority over an invasion of Persia. Ferhad Pasha's lack of success came first because he had almost no military or financial support from the central government for a campaign against the Celâlîs, and second because the government made unrealistic demands in initiating another Persian campaign. Caught in a web of antagonism and hatred aimed not so much at himself as at his superior, Ferhad lacked the troops, the money, the ammunition, and the artillery to carry out his orders. He also lacked the freedom of political action allowed only to a grand vizier. One can clearly understand the effect of such action by remembering that in 1016/1607, only a year later, Murad Pasha would buy off Kalenderoğlu in order to more easily attack Canbuladoğlu Ali in Aleppo.³⁰ From the campaign of Ferhad Pasha, his successor would gain valuable knowledge: how to give financial and logistic support to his forces, how to search out and divide off the strongest of the Celâlîs and weaken the rest, and how to limit the campaign objectives to the realities of the time.

Deli Ferhad Pasha's eastern campaign of 1015/1606, though a military failure, marked the beginning of a specific military operation against the Celâlî leaders and their Anatolian brigand armies.

3. *Kalenderoğlu Mehmed and the Sancak of Ankara*

The new Ottoman strategy against the Celâlîs differed from that against Canbuladoğlu in the same way that the two rebellions differed from each other. The Celâlîs were

widespread, Canbuladoğlu centered at Aleppo. The Celâlis sought a position within the Ottoman establishment, while Canbuladoğlu sought a sovereign state exclusive of the Ottoman. One must not exclude the possibility that a successful Celâli rebellion in Anatolia might have broken the peninsula into several petty sovereign states, but the Celâlis in 1016/1607 had not advanced in their political sophistication to realize such ambitions without external aid. Even the most powerful Celâli of the time, Kalenderoğlu Mehmed, never considered himself a sovereign; like all the other Celâli leaders he endeavored to bring just enough pressure to bear on the Ottomans to enable him to accept with honor a high station in the Empire.³¹

Neither official records nor court historians mention Kalenderoğlu Mehmed before 1001/1592.³² A Venetian bailo heard he had begun his labors as a stablehand.³³ According to Naima, he served as çavuş (messenger) to several beylerbeyis, and as mütesselim (a lieutenant governor and/or tax-collector) to several sancakbeyis.³⁴ Ottoman records give no reason for his becoming a rebel.³⁵ In 1012/1603 Cağalazade Sinan Pasha may have given him the position of sancakbeyi, but a year later Mehmed apparently refused Sinan's request to serve in Persia.³⁶

Historians call him variously Kalenderoğlu Mehmed Pasha,³⁷ ibn Kalender,³⁸ and Kalenderoğlu Piri.³⁹ Other than Professor Bernard Lewis, no historian in recent times has spelled his name Kalender oğlu or asserted that his surname is Mehmed Ağa--the title implying a religious tincture to the man or his rebellion.⁴⁰ When he fell in dis-



favor, the official communications of the government called him simply Kalenderoğlu, with an appropriate epithet;⁴¹ when he was in favor he was called Mehmed Pasha.⁴² His first important rebellion occurred in 1014/1605 when he went to Saruhan in western Anatolia and defeated the beylerbeyi of Anadolu, after which he remained in the area, committing acts of brigandage.⁴³ The Ottomans were unable to send effective forces against him, so he began to consolidate his position.

After Tavi Halil left the area of western Anatolia in 1014/1605, Kalenderoğlu became the paramount Celâli leader, and his reputation spread through the area.⁴⁴ The attack on the troops of Ferhad Pasha at Konya in 1015/1606 represented one of Kalenderoğlu's early attempts against a large Ottoman army. He decided, however, not to take on the whole of Ferhad Pasha's army, weak and retreating as it was, but to go north instead to Geyve for a short while.⁴⁵ His center of activities, and possibly his hopes for a permanent Ottoman position, lay in the southwestern eyâlet of Saruhan, where he remained throughout the bitter winter of 1015/1606-1607.⁴⁶

When in Şevval 1015/December 1606 Sultan Ahmed executed Grand Vizier Derviş Pasha and appointed Kuyucu Murad Pasha, the famous old warrior was still in Belgrade, where he had remained since the signing of the treaty of Zsitvatorok. He was able to return to Istanbul to take full charge of affairs only by Zi'l-kade 1015/March 1607. During the interim, Sun'ullah, the venerable müfti (the şeyhülislâm) guided Ottoman state affairs. Sun'ullah

Efendi pressed hard for a resumption of the war against Persia. The government dispatched the combined forces of two beylerbeyis and a former beylerbeyi against Kalenderoğlu. Once again the Ottomans undertook to fight a determined army with a force called up hurriedly without any serious planning for the tactical difficulties of fighting Celâlîs on their home grounds. On 18 Ramazan 1015/17 January 1607, at Nif (near the present-day town of Kemâlpâşa in the province of İzmir), the Celâlîs met the Ottoman army.⁴⁷ In the battle which followed, Kalenderoğlu and his brigand army won an overwhelming victory.

Kalenderoğlu returned to his base near Manisa and found that the local town leaders had deemed it wiser to wait for the results of the battle of Nif than to attack the rebel camp which had been left in a very insecure state. Learning this, the rebel chief not only refused to sack the city, but sent forty-four loads of akçe as a token of his good will to the âyan and eşraf (important leaders) of the city.⁴⁸ For the rest of the winter he stayed in the vicinity of Manisa, from time to time striking at other cities in the area.⁴⁹

We know very little about the political and military organization which Kalenderoğlu established at Manisa to further his ambitions. From the results and success of the operation we must assume he had logistical and some bureaucratic expertise. The official sources offer no evidence as to the extent of his power, and he left no statement of his personal grievances or ultimate aims. But we can be fairly certain that he had an Ottoman-type military organi-

zation and expertise, since any firârîs of Mezö-keresztes and others who joined him were experienced Ottoman military officers and men. He must have had a bureaucracy similar to that of a sancakbeyi or a beylerbeyi, with a personal following of armed retainers, a treasury, archives, clerks, and a daily divan meeting in a large tent, perhaps with a personal banner flying above those of his various subordinates. We know he maintained correspondence with other rebels and with both grand viziers, Derviş Pasha and Murad Pasha. Kalenderoğlu's ability to establish a stationary headquarters at Manisa, his well-known relationship with the Manisa city fathers, and his planned extortion demonstrate that he led not an ordinary group of wandering troublemakers, but a well-organized, effective military power.

After the battle of Nif, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, busy in Şevval 1015/January 1607 with plans to eradicate Canbuladoğlu Ali in Aleppo, realized the futility of another limited attack on Kalenderoğlu. He countered the Celâli power with an offer of a sancakbeylik.⁵⁰ Again in Zi'lkade 1015/March 1607 Murad offered another sancak, not in Manisa or Aydin in western Anatolia, but in Sivas, where Kalenderoğlu could neutralize some of the Aleppan rebels' power. By Muharrem 1016/May 1607, Murad Pasha retracted the offer because Kalenderoğlu did not (or could not) control his troops.⁵¹ Besides, following Tavi Halil's example, Mehmed aimed at a much higher office than presently offered by Murad Pasha.

The month of Ramazan 1015/January 1607 began inauspiciously indeed.⁵² In Istanbul the new grand vizier had yet

to arrive from Belgrade. Asia Minor seemed alive with rebels, some approaching Bursa. Kalenderoğlu daily gained strength, gathering in the smaller Celâlî armies whose western Anatolian leaders admired his success and hastened to share in it. In the north, around Çorum and Kastamonu, Maymun, the brother of Tavil, pillaged and ravaged.⁵³ Cemşid seemed impregnable in the Taurus mountains and Muslu Çavuş held Silifke in the south. In the east Celâlîs under Tavilahmedoğlu Mahmud controlled Baghdad, and only the force of Nasuh Pasha in Diyarbekir prevented the Persian shah from moving west.⁵⁴ Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha had aroused all Syria into revolt, and it seemed the winter snows were all that could keep the rebels from gathering strength and cutting Anatolia from the Empire.

Yet the rebels maintained no collective unity. The various Celâlî armies might have united, but they did not. Nature played a part in keeping the rebels from coming together. The severe winter aggravated the problems of supply which, in any season, the rebels never adequately solved. The Celâlîs were armed men at odds with every authority, constantly on guard against both the Ottomans and each other. Their lack of self-discipline led to their rebellion against Ottoman authority; their unwillingness to follow orders made them imperfect soldiers.

In the end, the effectiveness of the Ottoman bureaucracy determined the critical difference between success and failure. Within its complicated and formal mechanism the Ottoman state harbored a loyalty to the sultan which sometimes manifested astounding bravery and almost always

worked for lawful government, regardless of the member of the dynasty who occupied the throne or the grand vizier then in power. This loyalty could be counted on by the grand vizier Murad Pasha as he went through Anatolia cleaning out the rebels, a loyalty silently but obviously manifested in official dispatches to Istanbul. For every bridge destroyed by a Celâli, a kadı report began the process of repair; for every tax collector repressing the re'aya, a notification went to Istanbul to bring the wrongdoer to the attention of the officials and have him removed. The few dishonest kadıs and venal mütesselims stand out clearly among the great numbers of worthy servants. Evidence indicates overwhelming loyalty on the part of these officials, a group to which goes the credit of strengthening local resistance to the Celâli rebellions until Ottoman armies could be redeployed and a successful policy of eradicating the rebels could be carried out. Even after the Great Celâli armies had gone and only small bands of nuisance raiders remained, the underpaid kadıs and kâtibs (secretaries) continued to administer the şer' ve kanun, the Holy Law and the sultan's justice, in Anatolia.

When Kuyucu Murad Pasha began his sweep through Anatolia, ostensibly against the Persians in Rebi'ülâhır 1016/August 1607, the grand vizier again corresponded with Kalenderoğlu and Kara Said.⁵⁵ The sadrazam feared an attack from the rear while he was marching against Canbuladoğlu in Aleppo. In this exchange of letters with the Celâli leaders the pivotal maneuver of Murad Pasha's two-year campaign may have occurred.

Financially and militarily, the Ottomans at that moment had not the power to move against the Celâlis in western Anatolia. Kalenderoğlu controlled most of the western section and in Safer/June had made an attack not more than 150 km from the capital on Bursa.⁵⁶ With Cemşid and Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha ahead of him, the serdar had to placate those whom he could not control. He directed Kalenderoğlu that if the rebel would accept the responsibilities of the office of sancakbeyi of Ankara, the position was his.⁵⁷ The Celâli accepted the honor and moved toward Ankara, assuming that Canbuladoğlu Ali would defeat the old serdar or that the Ottoman armies would disintegrate internally as had Ferhad's the year before. Most importantly, he rejoiced in the thought of the power that would now come to him and his followers.⁵⁸

In Ankara sat a kadı who cared more for the spirit of his office than he did for the letter of the official warrant in Kalenderoğlu's hand. Vildanzâde Mevlânâ Ahmed Efendi had served as ordu kadısı (chief army judge) of the Ottoman forces in Hungary, exercising considerable influence on the councils of war there. He probably knew Kuyucu Murad Pasha personally.⁵⁹ He may or may not have had recent correspondence with the serdar--but in any case, he ignored the grand vizier's warrant and refused to allow Kalenderoğlu and his men to enter the city gates.

Why did this kadı refuse to open the gates of Ankara? Was he more afraid of what the Celâlis would do to the commercial establishments of the city than how the serdar would react to disobedience on his part? Had he secretly



communicated with Murad Pasha, and did this represent part of a larger strategy to lure Kalenderoğlu into a battle with the troops the serdar had dispatched north from Konya? Or did the kadı act rather in accord with his own judgment?⁶⁰ If Murad Pasha planned to frustrate Kalenderoğlu from looting Ankara, then Vildanzâde Mevlânâ Ahmed carried out his part of the plan with cleverness. If, rather, Murad Pasha had appointed the new sancakbeyi in good faith, but planned to sacrifice the city if necessary in order to keep Kalenderoğlu from fulfilling any obligations to Canbuladoğlu of Aleppo, then the heroic but obstinate refusal of the old bureaucrat left Murad Pasha exposed and weakened in the rear of his march. Events proved that the risk of having Kalenderoğlu Mehmed doing mischief in the west far outweighed what the rebel might have done to the merchants of Ankara, particularly if the Celâli could be inveigled into remaining there for any length of time. Meanwhile, the elderly kadı, ignoring the undeniable war-rant from the central Ottoman government to allow Kalenderoğlu the governance of Ankara, excluded the Celâli chief from his post.⁶¹

Late in Rebi'ülâhır 1015/August 1607, Kalenderoğlu asked to have a meeting with the kadı to talk over matters. Vildanzâde, with a few cavalry men from the city, descended to the plains below for the conference. At that moment, the kadı may have known Kalenderoğlu's military weakness and his own strength, which lay in the walls defending the city. He also recognized the willingness of the re'aya citizens, both Muslim and non-Muslim, to defend it. The

brigands had travelled without siege cannon, and Vildanzâde expected at any moment a small detachment from Murad Pasha sent from Konya to watch Kalenderoğlu's activities.⁶² Still, with not inconsiderable bravery he explained his position to the most renowned Celâlî leader in Anatolia.

Vildanzâde Ahmed's argument in favor of his stand had logic: if the Celâlîs under Kalenderoğlu took over, regardless of how legal his position was, the sekbans and levends would quickly lose discipline and the city would suffer a sack. Under no circumstances could such ill-controlled men enter. Instead, as a compromise, he would allow thirty chosen men and a captain inside the city to gather whatever supplies they needed.⁶³ Kalenderoğlu agreed to this proposal for the moment, and selected his men, who thereupon entered the city. The rest of the Celâlîs returned to their camp a day's march away. Doubtless they began searching for siege cannon.

Although the kadı may have been privy to Murad Pasha's plans, he did send a messenger to the serdar asking for help, which indicates certain concern over the consequences of his act. The messenger, on returning with an answer from Murad Pasha, fell into Celâlî hands. He told of a treacherous act of the kadı: how the re'aya of Ankara (whom the kadı had armed especially for the task) had murdered the thirty Celâlîs and their leader. Even at that moment the government troops of Tekeli Mehmed Pasha were marching from Konya to relieve the city.⁶⁴ Immediately Kalenderoğlu ordered an attack on Ankara. Although he lacked suitable long range cannon, his force had grown recently, joined by

two more rebel armies, one under Agaçtan Piri, the other led by the brother of Taviil Halil, Maymun.⁶⁵

The assault on Ankara lasted almost two weeks.⁶⁶ Eight times the rebels stormed the city; eight times the kadı and his merchant militia withstood the attack.⁶⁷ When news came of the Ottoman relieving force, Kalenderoğlu retreated a day's march away to observe from his base camp. The troops of Tekeli Mehmed Pasha, hoping to destroy the Celâlî, did not long remain near the city, but pressed the attack on Kalenderoğlu, who had now gone to an area east of Merzifon.⁶⁸ Tekeli Mehmed should have exercised more care. Near the city of Lâdik Kalenderoğlu surprised the Ottoman pasha, soundly defeated him, but behaved most curiously toward the captured prisoners. According to the news received in Istanbul, 1200 Janissaries, after being captured and losing their weapons, were allowed to go free: either to remain and fight with the Celâlîs or to return to their Ottoman ranks.⁶⁹

Kalenderoğlu, now stronger than before, but frustrated in his desire to establish himself within the Ottoman regime, went to Bolu. Here he corresponded further with Murad Pasha, and then he suddenly turned west--eventually to Bursa.⁷⁰

The news of Murad Pasha's great victory over Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha at Oruç Ovası in Receb 1016/October 1607 finally reached Istanbul, but it brought little satisfaction. The grand vizier and his army had marched to Aleppo in Syria, where they planned to winter. Near the imperial capital of Istanbul, only a few days' march from

the Bosphorus, Kalenderoğlu's powerful Celâli army camped, openly defying the government. The kadı and citizens of Ankara, for all their heroism against the rebels, may have upset the plans of Murad Pasha, who sat isolated and immobilized in Syria for the next four or five months.

4. The Winter of 1016/1607-1608

In Istanbul the fear of Kalenderoğlu Mehmed grew intense among the people. From about 11 Şaban 1016/30 November 1607 on, the Celâlîs announced they would direct their attention toward Bursa and intended to move on to capture Üsküdar.⁷¹ In a letter to his sovereign of 6 December 1607, the French ambassador described a great fear which swept across the capital city. For the past two weeks, he related, he could not even write letters because of the alarm over the rebels.⁷² Each day the news became worse than the day before and the government, under the direction of the kaymakam (pro-tem governor) Mustafa Pasha, seemed helpless.

Fearing an invasion of Istanbul itself, the government established a form of martial law. Because of the impossibility of distinguishing Celâlîs from loyal citizens, the government gave power to the kapıcı başı (a chief Palace official) and the kadı to form investigative teams.⁷³ Every citizen became responsible for the personal recognition of his local fellow citizen, and any suspicious stranger was immediately reported to the proper authorities.⁷⁴ Ostensibly to diminish the number of fires set by

the Celâlis (who knew the ease with which whole sections of the city had been razed by rebellious Janissaries in years past), the system in reality provided an opportunity for petty tyranny on the local mahalle (district) level.⁷⁵ Officials used the occasion to steal merchandise, some made up their quotas for the galleys by impressing "unknowns" into the admiral's fleet, and so on.⁷⁶ The French ambassador felt the entire government had taken leave of its senses.⁷⁷ Preparations for defense seemed sporadic, aimless, as if the authorities had lost their reason.

Outside the city of Bursa, the Celâlis stepped up their military activities. Kalenderoğlu's armies increased as each day passed. Units of Maymun's armies came from Çorum, and a well-known Celâli named Kınalloğlu reinforced his gathering hordes.⁷⁸ Daily the rebels ravaged areas around the city, destroyed buildings, indiscriminately attacking men, women, and children, and Muslims more than non-Muslims.⁷⁹ Then came news which staggered İstanbul: Tavlî Halil, victor over Nasuh at Bolvadin three years before had now united with Kalenderoğlu near Bursa.⁸⁰ The Bursa defense collapsed; local militia melted before the rebels, who wasted no time. By the end of Şaban 1016/mid-December 1607 they launched a general assault on Bursa. A short time later Kalenderoğlu marched into the city, capturing almost all of the ancient Ottoman capital. Only the inner castle remained in Ottoman hands.⁸¹ One can only imagine the devastation to commerce and property, not to mention life, perpetrated by the attacking rebels from rural Anatolia.

Although weak and irresolute, the Ottoman government had not been completely idle. From 19 Şaban 1016/9 December 1607 requests had gone to three different sources for help: first, a call to the local troops of the eyâlet, provincial militia known as il erleri. These militia were loyal to the Ottomans and endeavored (with some success) to withstand rebel attacks until relieved by Ottoman armies. The il erleri received orders to go to the aid of the vizier Nakkaş Hasan Pasha who had been assigned to lead an army of relief to Bursa.⁸² A second, well-trained though small supply of troops had recently arrived from Rumeli, a result of the peace treaty of 1015/1606 with the Habsburgs. The majority of the European troops had already marched to eastern Anatolia (where they had fought Canbuladoğlu under Tiryâkî Hasan Pasha), so Rumeli could not be counted on to produce an abundant source of trained warriors.⁸³ Moreover, transferring troops from north of Edirne always took a great deal of time, and crossing Gallipoli to Anatolia offered opportunity for some of the assigned soldiers to desert. The re'aya of İstanbul, themselves armed by the government, provided an unusual third source of protection from the enemy. As it turned out, the idea was very impractical. According to Ambassador de Salignac, the Ottomans pressed more than 40,000 urban re'aya into service. For four days he heard detachments of them marching past his windows on the way to join the armies of serdar Nakkaş Hasan Pasha near Bursa. From his neutral position, the use of urban re'aya appeared the height of folly: a thousand well-trained soldiers could put



them all down with little difficulty. "They will die of fright before they fight," he wrote, "and witness the lack of judgement with which the battle operation is being carried on!" Two weeks later the ambassador noted that of the 40,000 sent from Istanbul to Bursa, only 6,000 arrived.⁸⁴ Not only did untrained citizens receive arms, but retired soldiers were brought back into active service and sent off by ship to Mudanya (to shorten the journey to Bursa), presumably to lead their fellows in battle.⁸⁵ According to the historian Naima, the government urged the wealthy in Istanbul to give of their personal treasure--an irony Derviş Pasha would have enjoyed--and all Janissaries and cavalry men still on the pay rolls in Istanbul received orders to report to immediate active duty on pain of death.⁸⁶

Then, almost as suddenly as the alarm had sounded, it ceased. News came after 4 Ramazan 1016/23 December 1607 that Kalenderoğlu Mehmed had moved his troops away, first to Mudanya, then southwest toward his favored region, Mihaliç.⁸⁷ Just why had the rebel gone? For one thing, the forces under Nakkaş Hasan Pasha had gained in number outside of Bursa, and the Ottomans still controlled the castle inside the city. Kalenderoğlu, hemmed in on two sides, with the eastern approach accessible to the grand vizier, decided he could not easily use Bursa as his center of Celâli raiding. Then, too, his own forces faced an increasingly severe winter. Already snow covered the land. He could more easily go west to Saruhan and Aydın, his central headquarters, to spend the season in relative comfort


and safety. Moreover, on the march south a series of comparatively defenseless cities could be forced to pay tribute or undergo a sack. Other Celâlîs would remain in the Bursa area, keeping the Ottomans on the defense, forcing them to come to terms.⁸⁸

Another reason for Kalenderoğlu's retreat concerns his relations with the Ottoman government and his position as a Celâlî leader. He had met, it will be recalled, with the defeated Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha when the latter came through the Bursa region on his way to seek forgiveness of Sultan Ahmed.⁸⁹ Naima recounts the meeting of the Celâlî and the former beylerbeyi of Aleppo, at which time Kalenderoğlu urged Ali Pasha to join in order that he might avenge the defeat of Oruç Ovası.⁹⁰ Kalenderoğlu obviously attempted here to identify Canbuladoğlu's cause with his own in such a way to strengthen his personal bargaining position and probably his preeminent position among the Celâlî leaders. The Syrian pasha disagreed and a few days later escaped, leaving his retinue of 2000 armed men with Kalenderoğlu. About this time the Celâlî chief decided to leave the siege of Bursa and move southwest.⁹¹ Even so, he made a final attempt, while in Bursa, to obtain official recognition. He sent envoys, reported the French ambassador, to the sultan to ascertain if he might be made a suitable offer for his promise to relinquish Bursa and return to Ottoman service.⁹²

Was the old Celâlî warrior tiring? Were his quixotic armies in danger of dissolving? The French ambassador mentions the disappearance of many of his men during the

severe winter prior to Kalenderoğlu's arrival at Lake Ulubad.⁹³ Or did he move away because the Bursa campaign, actually a tactic to pressure the government to give him personal power, had failed? Had he massed his armies purposely as a wedge to force the Ottoman sultan, a young boy in a time of extraordinary crisis, whose protective armies and father-figure, the grand vizier Murad Pasha, remained isolated a thousand kilometers away in Aleppo, to award him with a legitimate post? Whatever his reason, the Celâli chief marched rapidly southwest, pursued by Nakkaş Hasan who had relieved Bursa and had begun to organize the Ottoman forces to strike quickly at the Celâli.

The Ottomans followed carefully Kalenderoğlu's movements toward the west. After he left Bursa he travelled northwest toward Mudanya, then south again, moving toward Lake Ulubad (today Apolyont Gölü), apparently not at first realizing he was marching into a trap. He knew that behind him trailed the not inconsiderable force of Nakkaş Hasan Pasha. What he did not expect, west of him, was an army gathered from Rumeli and coming via Gallipoli. He could travel to Lake Ulubad, a lake which could be crossed only by a footbridge over the Nilüfer River on the northwest side of the lake. Near the footbridge stood a very well-guarded castle which Kalenderoğlu and his Celâli army could not possibly storm with any hope of easy success. The Ottomans knew this and had issued strict orders that it be guarded by armed popular militia from Kirmasti, a city nearby, thereby augmenting the regular Ottoman forces within the castle.⁹⁴



Despite the warnings, the Ottoman militia on the first day of Şevval 1016/19 January 1608 busied themselves not with guarding the castle but with celebrating the end of the month-long fast of Ramazān. Kalenderoğlu took advantage of this good fortune and slipped by the fortress unhampered.⁹⁵ With the Ottoman trap evaded, he could move where he wished. He went directly to Kirmastı, which he sacked, and then doubled back to strike at Mihaliç and wait for Nakkaş Hasan Pasha, then coming slowly west from Bursa.⁹⁶

Now it was the Ottoman pasha's turn to be hemmed in by the castle at Lake Ulubad. Kalenderoğlu Mehmed used Mihaliç to house his troops which daily would issue forth along the north shore of the lake to meet units of Nakkaş Hasan's army, returning to the comfort of the city at night while the Ottoman soldiers suffered from the intense cold on the plains. Hasan Pasha had to wait for the Rumeli reinforcements which finally arrived via Gallipoli. These Danubian veterans under Dalgiç Ahmed Pasha crossed to Çanakkale to meet their Ottoman allies.

Sometime after the first of Şevval 1016/mid-January 1608, in the environs of Lake Manyas (west of Ulubad), Kalenderoğlu and his rebels caught and destroyed the Ottoman army of Nakkaş Hasan Pasha.⁹⁷ Dalgiç Ahmed Pasha received a severe wound from which he died soon after.⁹⁸ The triumphant rebels moved south by way of Balıkesir to Aydın and Saruhan, raiding and pillaging as they went. Here they spent the remainder of the winter, while the defeated Hasan Pasha and his Ottoman army returned to


Bursa.⁹⁹ This second victory in two years by Kalenderoğlu proved conclusively that the Celâlîs could not be eradicated in their home regions without the full power of an imperial army.

5. *The Battle of Göksun Yaylası (Plateau of the Göksun)*

Kalenderoğlu Mehmed and his Celâlî leaders knew that in the coming battle season a period of great, possibly final, struggles would ensue. They had learned that the grand vizier Murad Pasha had made systematic plans for their destruction. They realized his power, not only to destroy the entire armies of Çemsid and Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha, but to establish Ottoman order by exterminating Celâlî redoubts in a broad strip from the Sea of Marmara to the Gulf of Iskenderun. When the spring grass had fed their horses once again, the Celâlîs under Kalenderoğlu began their forays into the areas of Tire and Manisa and in places along the Aegean Sea.¹⁰⁰ Knowing the strength of the serdar, Kalenderoğlu appeared satisfied staying far to the west. But as spring of 1017/1608 burned to summer, his brigand operations, out of necessity, began to increase in scope. Encouraged by no apparent activity on the part of Murad Pasha in Aleppo, he went east, ranging now into central Anatolia. Sometime during this period the Celâlî chief learned that the armies of the grand vizier expected a shipment of money from Istanbul to pay the annual army masar.

By Zi'lhicce 1016/March 1608 the Ottomans sent out directives for men in Rumeli to join the armies in the spring to accompany the chief defterdar Ekmekcizâde Ahmed Pasha (who also acted as beylerbeyi of Rumeli), chief of the armies aiding Kuyucu Murad Pasha in the coming campaign.¹⁰¹ Murad Pasha ordered the defterdar to leave with his army and escort the Treasury to Aleppo before the end of Safer/May.¹⁰² But Ekmekcizâde Ahmed, involved in private intrigues in the capital, did not leave Üsküdar until about Rebi'ülâhır 1017/mid-July 1608. The delay placed the grand vizier in a weakened position. Not only had the Celâli leaders learned of the planned march with the Treasury, but they also realized Ahmed Pasha's numerical inferiority. This was too good a chance to miss. If the defterdar marched south toward Aleppo, somewhere on the road between Bursa and Konya he might be intercepted and the Ottoman Treasury captured.

Kalenderoğlu and his forces went swiftly eastward to intercept the treasury caravan, possession of which would have been a severe, if not fatal, blow to the grand vizier in Aleppo. But they arrived too late. Spies had informed Ekmekcizâde Ahmed Pasha of the rebel moves. He fought a small Celâli army under the leadership of Tavi's brother Maymun which seems to have frightened the Ottomans severely.¹⁰³ As a result he decided to go not by way of Konya but directly east to Ankara.¹⁰⁴ Here he protected the money but provided no military strength, since his whole army sat cut off from Murad Pasha's theater of war. From Murad Pasha's viewpoint, such a loss of armed men (as



well as the money) limited his capacity to strike and emphasized Ekmekcizâde's weakness. As the Venetian bailo pointed out, the defterdar greatly feared the Celâli army of Kalenderoğlu and decided to save face rather than fight.¹⁰⁵ Thus, even though Kalenderoğlu had committed himself by thrusting deep into central Anatolia, the Ottoman armies remained split, with Murad Pasha in the south and Ekmekcizâde and the Treasury in the safety of Ankara. Chances for a Celâli victory still appeared good. Characteristically, Kalenderoğlu immediately sought out the old serdar, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, for battle.

Murad Pasha earlier had marched north from Aleppo toward Maraş on Rebi'ülevvel 1017/mid-June 1608, with an army hardly ready to fight a major battle.¹⁰⁶ His army had broken up for winter quarters after the great victory over Canbuladoğlu at Oruç Ovası. The winter of 1016/1607-1608 had proven far worse than normal. Usually rich, well supplied, and warm, northern Syria that winter provided few comforts for the weary soldiers. Famine conditions drove them to the point of eating their own dead.¹⁰⁷ Murad's remaining European cavalry, scattered from Damascus in the south to north of the Taurus Mountains, rather than prepare for battle, settled for staying alive. The Anatolian timar cavalry men took even longer to muster at their sancak flags. The beylerbeyis, ordered to gather their troops in Zi'lhicce 1017/March 1608, had by Rebi'ülevvel 1017/June 1608 still not filled their quotas.¹⁰⁸ The serdar sent directives expressing in simple and unmistakable language who should come to do battle with the

rebels.¹⁰⁹ Some officers had even needed several reminders to do their duty.¹¹⁰ By Rebi'ülevvel 1017/June 1608 the required Anatolian levies had still not arrived. The great tradition of Ottoman discipline had seemingly broken down.

The apparent foot-dragging on the part of the Anatolians occurred partly because of malingering officers and men, but primarily because of the lack of provisions for the men and animals. The extraordinarily severe winter, the late spring, the plague which killed off cattle as well as people, and the almost endless demands made by the imperial armies, quite impoverished central Anatolia.¹¹¹ Moreover, constant depredations by small Celâli bands, as well as the Great Celâli armies of Kalenderoğlu, Tavi Halil's brother Maymun, and the others, left very few supplies for the timar cavalry men--not to speak of the extensive privations suffered by the peasant re'aya throughout the region. Because of these severe hardships, the serdar ordered provisions and men all the way from Egypt, supplies which took months to come. On arrival they proved insufficient in quantity, and the men not well-trained, but they did supplement in numbers what Anatolia could not possibly provide.¹¹²

Murad Pasha now faced an entirely new set of circumstances which caused him to make important changes. He had planned to advance against Kalenderoğlu from two sides, the new Rumeli army coming from the west under Ekmekcizâde Ahmed, and Murad Pasha's own troops, aided by Nasuh Pasha from the south and east.¹¹³ Nasuh Pasha had sent word that he was held up in Diyarbekir; Ekmekcizâde sat in frozen

fear, immobilized with the Treasury in Ankara.¹¹⁴ Moreover, to neutralize Baghdad once again, the grand vizier had sent a contingency under the faithful Sinanpaşazade Mohammed Pasha against the two sons of Tavi Ahmed.¹¹⁵

The octogenarian grand vizier could now only rely on his instincts, so he patiently called in his loyal forces from Anatolia. He used again his strongest weapon against the Celâlî leaders: admission to the Ottoman elite. Unlike Canbuladoğlu Ali of Aleppo, who sought to protect an investment in tradition, land, and commerce, the Celâlî leaders like Kalenderoğlu and Tavi Halil and Maymun responded quickly to personal invitation into the Ottoman system. Sometime in Rebi'ülevvel 1017/June 1608 the serdar made Tavi Halil sancakbeyi of Bodrum.¹¹⁶ Tavi did not hold the office long, however, for during an argument in his camp he was shot to death by one of his own sekbans.¹¹⁷ Most of his followers then joined his brother, Maymun. The serdar may also have realized that, like the old Ottoman commanders in Europe and Persia, the Celâlî leaders generally sought confrontation in a showdown battle, to win heroically or lose it all. Knowing this, the crafty old Serbian devşirme moved inexorably toward the Celâlîs, hoping to catch them in a miscalculation or misjudgement--or to lose his life but preserve his honor in one last combat.

On 9 Rebi'ülevvel 1017/23 June 1608 Murad Pasha's army camped at Maraş. He allowed his men freedom to relax for approximately three weeks.¹¹⁸ While they rested, the beylerbeyi of Rum (Sivas) brought in Celâlî sekbans prisoners who told of Kalenderoğlu's intentions: to cross through

the mountain pass just west of Malatya at Göksun and attack the Ottoman forces wherever they could be found.¹¹⁹ Even now, they said, Celâli armies gathered at the northwest end of the pass.¹²⁰

Strong as they appeared, the rebels by no means possessed complete solidarity. In addition to his communication with the late Tavi Halil, appointed as sancakbeyi of Bodrum, Kuyucu Murad Pasha had sent messages to one of the most powerful of the southwestern rebels, Muslu Çavuş of Silifke, urging this Celâli to withdraw from any alliance with Kalenderoğlu and become, instead, the governor of the eyâlet or İçel on the Anatolian coast north of Cyprus. Murad Pasha thus hoped to take advantage of Muslu's independent spirit and desire for office. At a time when he seriously needed strengthening, Kalenderoğlu was unable to persuade Muslu to join him in an attack on Murad Pasha.¹²¹

Kalenderoğlu had other problems as well: not all the Celâli leaders associated with him agreed to direct confrontation with the grand vizier. According to Kâtib Çelebi, one rebel leader, Kara Said, opposed any head-on attack. It would be better, he said, to withdraw deep into Anatolia and then appear later to attack again, rather than face the old pasha in a mass attack.¹²² Kalenderoğlu's counter-argument mixed bravado with realism: if we win, we win it all; if we lose, our names will be sung in epic poems long after we are dead.¹²³ Kalenderoğlu pointed out the weaknesses of the serdar's army, most of the Anatolian levies having been lost to the severity of the winter. Moreover, the combined rebel army had to attack, he argued,

or its fragile unity would dissolve into a hundred fragments. Celâli unity derived solely from battle victory and its fruits. Celâli leadership lasted only as long as loot lasted, after which the rank and file disappeared, as ephemeral and momentary as a desert rainstorm.

From Karaman by way of Kayseri to Göksun, the Celâlis, numbering about 20,000 including foot soldiers and cavalry, moved toward the Ottomans from the north.¹²⁴ They did not realize that Murad Pasha knew their intentions, and when they marched through the Göksun Pass they discovered what they took to be the entire Ottoman army spread out from the foothills to the river, waiting for them.¹²⁵

When he learned the movements of the rebels coming from Karaman, Murad Pasha had quickly sent a small squadron of men to take the southern mouth of Göksun Pass before the rebels could come through and catch his army in the narrow defile.¹²⁶ Being undermanned, Murad sought a relatively small area in which to fight, utilizing the natural contours to his advantage. As the French ambassador later pointed out, the battle went to the force which best could command the heights above the pass, and Kuyucu Murad Pasha had a four-hour lead on his opponent.¹²⁷

Murad Pasha led an army which, though numerically inferior, enjoyed the tradition and experience of a major Ottoman fighting army: troops from Egypt, under Kansu Bey, and from all three major Syrian centers, Damascus, Tripoli, and Aleppo. Murad Pasha cleverly assigned to high rank the son of Seyfoğlu Yusuf of Tripoli, a sworn enemy of the Canbulads, and thereby enemy of the old Celâli allies of

the defeated Aleppan pretender. The emir, Hüseyn ibn Yusuf of Tripoli, proudly led the combined Syrian armies, all of whom realized the importance of loyalty to the Ottomans. The serdar also had an experienced wing under the former Celâlîs Karakaş Ahmed Pasha, now beylerbeyi of Malatya, and Zülfikar Pasha, now beylerbeyi of Ayntab. Both these men and their armies had fought as loyal Ottomans the year previously at Oruç Ovası. Yet beyond these Anatolian, Syrian, and Egyptian levies, Murad depended most on the nucleus of his army, the slave troops, both the Janissary musket men and the altı bölük halkı cavalry. In the heat of combat they would remain firm, follow orders, and die before disobeying.

When he reached Göksun Plain, crossing through Kahsar Pass,¹²⁸ the grand vizier Murad Pasha fortified the heights above the mouth of the pass with his heavy cannon and his crack slave infantry in the hills nearby.¹²⁹ The less-experienced Egyptians and Syrians he placed down below, near the stream. Here they set up their camp, and dispersed widely to receive the rebel assault as it issued from the northern end of the pass.¹³⁰ The armies of Malatya and Ayntab beylerbeyis waited, semi-hidden, at a spot near where the Göksun River debouched onto the plain, a place then called Ördekli Beli (Pass of the Ducks).¹³¹ On 22 Rebi'ülâhır 1017/5 August 1608 the Celâlîs moved through the pass, across the large expanse, and struck hard at the Ottoman troops.¹³² The Battle at Göksun Yaylası commenced.

The rebel commander aimed to achieve a quick victory, for he threw all his force at the Ottomans from the beginning. With arrows, swords, musket fire, and twenty cannon, they hit hard at the armies of Syria and Egypt. The battle now became a series of blows and counterblows as the intensity of the Celâli attack forced the Ottomans to send more and more right flank troops under the direction of the Malatya beylerbeyi Karakaş Ahmed Pasha. All during the afternoon the battle raged. Kalenderoğlu drove his forces up the foothills and was about to attack the pavilion of the grand vizier when, at great sacrifice, the cavalry of the altı bölük halkı saved Murad's life. On the point of victory the Celâlis taunted their enemies, saying the Ottomans were afraid to fight and wanted to return to winter quarters. Only when it became dark did the armies withdraw to prepare for the next day's encounter.¹³³

When the grand vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha arose the next morning he performed his prayers before the army, with the ancient banner of the Prophet Muhammad flying from the standard near his tent.¹³⁴ He had carefully prepared for the morning attack, and when the battle began again he relied on more musket and cannon fire than on the previous day.¹³⁵ The rebels continued to concentrate their attack on the grand vizier's pavilion. If they could capture or kill him the battle would be theirs. As Kalenderoğlu's wing drove onward, the old serdar came out of his tent, mounted his horse, and, in the manner of a desert Arab chief, brandished his sword around his head thrice.¹³⁶ On this signal, several hundred Janissaries hidden in the

ravines above opened fire on Kalenderoğlu's position, catching his wing in a vicious cross fire of musket and cannon.¹³⁷ This forced the Celâli chief to retreat under fire so intense that he could no longer control his forces. The retreat from his position began a general rush to the rear. The effectiveness of musket fire as well as the noise of the artillery and small arms shocked the undisciplined Celâli rank and file. The Janissaries and the slave cavalry attacked even more furiously, dashing after the now fleeing rebels.¹³⁸

So strong was the Ottoman counterblow and so quickly had the tide of the battle turned that the soldiers of Murad Pasha had little time to organize what was no longer a battle but a pursuit. Even the rebel camp on the plain was bypassed as the Ottoman cavalry dashed after the hapless rebel sekbans, now pouring into the mountains in one mad run to escape.¹³⁹ In the *melée*, Kalenderoğlu and Kara Said both received wounds.¹⁴⁰ As they rode off among their levend cavalry, frantically leaving the scene of a terrible defeat, it was Kara Said who reviled the old Celâli chieftain. "Didn't my words prove true?" he reproached Kalenderoğlu for the decision to strike directly at the serdar rather than to withdraw into the inaccessible regions of Anatolia.¹⁴¹

6. The Flight into Persia

Though the rebels had obviously lost greatly at the Göksun Plateau, they by no means had been overwhelmed as

had Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha a year before. The nature of Celâli organization precluded total commitment. Several Celâli leaders had early left the scene of carnage to flee eastward safely out of the serdar's hands. Murad Pasha immediately dispatched contingents to follow them. He wanted not only a victory but their total destruction in order that they would not gather again with the armies of Celâlis who yet remained in Anatolia and begin once again their activities.¹⁴²

Against Kalenderoğlu, now fleeing northeast, Murad appointed Dişlenk Hüseyin Pasha, the successor to Canbuladoğlu as beylerbeyi of Aleppo. As Hüseyin's assistant he appointed Seyfoğlu Hüseyin Pasha and the soldiers of northern Syria, again a clever move to demand the loyalty of the House of Sayfā.¹⁴³ He also dispatched those beylerbeyis who governed in the areas through which Kalenderoğlu would probably travel.¹⁴⁴ A second matter concerned the grand vizier: the presence in the north central part of Anatolia of Maymun, brother of the late Tavl Halil, another important Celâli leader. To cut Maymun's line of march to the east, Murad Pasha himself marched with his troops to Sivas.

As for Kalenderoğlu, he had long before established an escape road to Persia.¹⁴⁵ He did not, however, commit himself immediately to the Safavids. The sudden eastward march of Maymun from Kastamonu and Çorum was part of a planned holding action.¹⁴⁶ The two rebel armies planned to unite somewhere east of Karahisar-i Şarkî until the winter snows, expected within a month, made Ottoman pursuit diffi-

cult. For the Celâlis as well as the serdar, much depended on the results of the next few weeks. Each raced toward the Persian border to thwart the other.

Murad Pasha arrived in Sivas where he learned of Maymun's northeast march.¹⁴⁷ The old serdar set out immediately to intercept him. At one point Murad's force almost ambushed Maymun's Celâlis. The rebels had come upon a Turkoman tribe moving for the winter, and attacked this relatively defenseless group, routing them. At that moment the old pasha came upon the carnage but could not strike back at the rebels since his armament and equipment moved on a different road.¹⁴⁸ Maymun continued east, pursued by the Ottomans, finally uniting with Kalenderoğlu and his army fleeing south.¹⁴⁹ The two Celâli leaders went through Karahisar-i Şarkî, paused only to stay the night, and then moved east. By now they had gained a great distance from the Ottomans and felt they could relax. They had not reckoned, however, on the incredible tenacity of the grand vizier. The old warrior, forcing his troops and himself (carried on a litter), double-marched for six days and seven nights and moved silently into the Celâli encampment.

As the rebels bedded down their animals, unaware of any enemies within kilometers, the sudden piercing scream of a Janissary attack broke the evening's silence. In total surprise Kalenderoğlu's rebels faced complete annihilation. So quickly did they advance that the Ottoman troops suddenly found themselves in the midst of the defeated Celâli camp and the plunder of a thousand raids. The desire for booty proved more powerful than the order to

hundreds of beaten captives.¹⁵⁰ So the Ottomans began to divide the loot, giving the Celâlis time to escape, regroup, and then counterattack.¹⁵¹

Naima claims the rebels suffered total loss, but obviously the Ottomans had let slip the opportunity to eradicate the rebels.¹⁵² Murad Pasha had planned to drive all the rebels eastward, hoping to kill as many as possible before they reached the Persian border. The disappointed grand vizier, already ailing on the rugged march, returned in bitter frustration to Sivas and left the continued pursuit of the rebels to the Syrian troops.¹⁵³

Seyfoğlu Hüseyin Pasha did his work well, coming upon the fleeing Celâlis again at a spot east of Bayburd on the road to Erzurum, named Koç Maşat.¹⁵⁴ On 23 Cemaziyü'lâhır 1017/4 October 1608 he fought yet another violent battle with the still powerful Celâlis.¹⁵⁵ The Syrian mounted levends cut down the rebel foot soldiers and forced them ever closer to Erivan and the Persian Shah. Eventually, Hüseyin Pasha turned back when the Celâlis crossed into the land of Shah Abbas.

Just what Kalenderoğlu intended to do had he been victorious over Murad Pasha is difficult to judge. From information heard in İstanbul, he still had hopes of working out some kind of arrangement with Sultan Ahmed.¹⁵⁶ The French ambassador thought him sincere in wishing to avoid asylum in the hands of the Persian Shah, but he recognized his fate if Murad Pasha were to capture him.¹⁵⁷ His serious defeats by the grand vizier and the pursuing Ottomans left him no hope for negotiations with other officers of

the sultan, as he had done while near Bursa. His popularity among the Celâlis in Anatolia quickly waned. He had, therefore, only one direction in which to go--but he went reluctantly.¹⁵⁸

Kalenderoğlu's army reached the Persian border some time in Şaban 1017/late fall 1608.¹⁵⁹ According to the Ottoman chroniclers, the Persians admitted them into Kızılbaş ranks only after being rebuked by the Safavids for having been traitors to their sultan--and after shaving their beards to comply with Shiite doctrines.¹⁶⁰ The Persian contemporary, Eskandar Beg Monshi, gave a similar report, but laid great stress on the welcome accorded the rebels.¹⁶¹ The shah's emissary, Emir Guna Khan, welcomed them all, and bestowed on them gifts of all kinds, suitable to each according to his rank, plus food and materials of war.¹⁶² The pleasantries and politeness lasted, however, only a short while.

Shah Abbas quite soon began to have second thoughts about the Celâli troops, both as soldiers and as immigrants. Militarily he could use the rebels for the strength they gave to his armed forces.¹⁶³ Yet the rank and file Celâli appeared very similar in background and temperament to the rebellious Kızılbaş tribes with which Abbas had always had trouble. Not surprisingly, the Anatolians domiciled in Tabriz tended to remain by themselves.¹⁶⁴ The Persians thereupon divided the Celâlis arbitrarily into very small units and sent them to the frontiers to fight the Tatars and Kurds.¹⁶⁵ Politically, the immigrant Celâlis complicated Abbas' relations with the



Ottomans. He knew well the intentions of the grand vizier toward Persia after having made peace in Hungary. Despite his powerful but diminutive army, Abbas did not look forward to another full-scale Ottoman invasion.

Abbas now opened up new interregional political maneuvers. He sent Sir Robert Sherley, long a guest at his court, to Europe to seek military aid or urge the Catholic powers to open a western attack on the Ottomans once again.¹⁶⁶ The Christians, as usual, did little but argue the question of converting the shah's domain (and the Ottoman's, for that matter) to Christianity. Abbas also began to communicate directly with the Ottomans for some kind of an accommodation between the two Muslim neighbors. He sent an envoy to the grand vizier's camp, who received the answer, abrupt and clear: no peace would Murad Pasha ever consider without Abbas first returning Kalenderoğlu Mehmed or his head.¹⁶⁷ To give up Kalenderoğlu would breach the shah's hospitality. Even more, Kalenderoğlu at the head of his troops could be a valuable asset against the enemies of Persia. Shah Abbas decided to procrastinate at least until the next spring, sending a letter with the vague promise that Kalenderoğlu would be given up "as soon as possible."¹⁶⁸ The winter of 1017/1608-1609 had now begun. Depending on the campaign intentions of the old grand vizier the Celâli leader might or might not be sacrificed for the security of Persia.

7. The End of the Great Celâlis

For some time Kuyucu Murad Pasha had realized his enemies existed not only in Persia and Anatolia but in Istanbul as well. While resting after the rigors of his last struggle with the Celâli Kalenderoğlu, and communicating with the shah through his envoy, the serdar received orders which must have embittered him: that he remain a second consecutive winter in the field. Murad's enemies in Istanbul had persuaded the sultan to keep the serdar far from the center of power--and from the various activities they followed which he found inimical to his conception of Ottoman governance. Murad knew of these enemies, not only through spies but also by incriminating evidence from papers found in the archives of the defeated Canbuladoğlu Ali of Aleppo.¹⁶⁹ He could not possibly remain in the field. He was old, and had been fighting steadily since Şevval 1015/February 1607. Both he and his armies needed a rest.

Ignoring Sultan Ahmed's command, the old serdar returned unannounced and unexpectedly to the capital city on 18 Ramazan 1017/26 December 1608. The inhabitants of the capital rejoiced as his soldiers marched through the streets, holding proudly the 200 to 400 rebel banners, on many of which the names of the Celâlis were emblazoned in three large letters.¹⁷⁰ Kuyucu Murad had left his chief assistant, Ekmekcizâde Ahmed, with Nasuh Pasha in Diyarbekir, keeping order in the east and preparing for a summer campaign against Abbas.



In Istanbul the grand vizier announced plans for an immediate general attack on Persia. During the early days of Muharrem 1018/April 1609, the government dispatched orders and gathered troops at Üsküdar. But the serdar secretly decided not to move until he had the three or four remaining Great Celâlis in his custody. He authorized some of his trusted officers to seek out the rebel leaders. Cleverly he pitted former Celâlis against these state enemies. Against Muslu Çavuş, who had the year before been made governor of İçel, he sent the former Celâli Zülfikar Pasha;¹⁷¹ against Yusuf Pasha, a former Ottoman tax collector and governor now rebelling in the area of Aydın with 3000 to 4000 men, he sent official word of reconciliation: Yusuf would be offered the post of commander-in-chief for the present campaign to Persia.¹⁷²

Murad Pasha faced the same dilemma he had faced before: to march against Yusuf Pasha in western Anatolia would expose central Anatolia to Muslu Çavuş, entrenched as he was in inaccessible castles far in the mountains. A campaign directed rather at Muslu would leave western Anatolia all the way to Üsküdar open to raids by Yusuf. So very cleverly, Murad marshalled his troops for a "Persian Campaign," just as they had for the past six years, but in truth he did not move. The people of Istanbul knew the armies waited for their orders. The shah of Persia feared their presence, for they threatened a new eastern campaign which he could not afford. The young Sultan Ahmed lectured the venerable vizier that he had been far too severe on the Celâlis, causing some 13,000 of them to become soldiers for



the shah.¹⁷³ Ahmed urged the serdar to move at once for the east. The old man listened but he would not move.

Murad Pasha had divulged his strategy to none other than his most trusted lieutenants. Not even the sultan knew or suspected. Murad wanted the remaining Great Celâlis to relax their vigilance, to be confounded by the preparations for an eastern campaign, and the seeming lack of direction. He also wanted to keep the shah of Persia off balance, unable to attack because of lack of information concerning the intentions of the Ottomans. All during the long summer months the gathered troops stayed motionless. In Cemaziyülevvel 1018/early August 1609 a slight flurry occurred when the former Celâli Yusuf Pasha appeared to answer the summons to serve as commander-in-chief for the sultan. Yusuf entered the serdar's encampment, accompanied by several thousand of his armed followers.¹⁷⁴ In a public ceremony the sadrazam forgave Yusuf Pasha for his past indiscretions and told that because he had become again the sultan's faithful servant he would, indeed, lead the armies to victory in Persia. Still, the Ottoman army did not move.

In Cemaziyülâhır 1018/early September 1609 Zülfikar Pasha rode into camp bearing the news the grand vizier had been waiting for. After months of careful activity with his old friend and Celâli associate, Muslu Çavuş, Zülfikar had lured the Celâli leader away from his protective guard and killed him. He threw the preserved head of Muslu at the feet of the grand vizier.

Now the last act in the drama could take place. On 22 Cemaziyülâhır 1018/22 September 1609, while waiting patiently in the serdar's pavilion for his final orders to march against Shah Abbas, Yusuf Pasha was silently approached from the rear by two dumb eunuchs--and strangled with a bowstring. Yusuf Pasha was the final Great Celâli. The grand vizier announced the end of the "campaign" of 1018/1609 and publicly dismissed the army from its encampment.¹⁷⁵

The city of Istanbul now gave the old serdar another hero's welcome, rejoicing in the inexpensive cost of the campaign, and in the fact that Anatolia had been purged of the last of the Great Celâlîs by trickery rather than ruinous warfare. But the "campaign" had been even more effective than the citizens of Istanbul realized. All during the summer new sancakbeyis had been appointed to the various Anatolian provinces and disloyal bureaucrats replaced. Every day trusted officials brought scores of Celâli heads--sekbans, levends, brigands of every type--to Istanbul from all parts of Anatolia, grisly testimony to the reforming zeal of the grand vizier as well as the local commanders to keep order in their areas.¹⁷⁶

The curious (and often feared) unity between Celâlîs and Safavids broke down almost from the very beginning. When the Celâlîs proved as irascible for the shah as for the sultan, Abbas ordered them to the frontiers, mostly as siege warriors. A year later, at the end of Safer 1019/early May 1610 Kalenderoğlu Mehmed died in Persia, a disappointed man wracked with illness.¹⁷⁷ At the end, his

Celâlîs deserted him, first in small groups, then en masse, returning to Anatolia after the Ottoman governor of Diyarbekir offered a declaration of reconciliation. Fewer than 500 Celâlîs under Kara Said and a lieutenant, Kekeç Mehmed, remained loyal to the shah, who gave them the Old Celâlî's estate to share.¹⁷⁸ For his part, Shah Abbas had found the experiment with the Celâlî rebels expensive, impractical, and futile. Most of the rank and file were a rude and restless lot who had very little liking for discipline and siege warfare. Abbas well understood their desire to return again to their Anatolian homeland. As the official Persian historian put it, "They committed the unpardonable crime of eating salt [enjoying hospitality] and then smashing the salt cellar."¹⁷⁹

Yet among the Ottoman leadership some held that the Celâlîs could be reformed and used to fight against the sultan's enemies--the old argument which held such popularity in the days of Kara Yazıcı and Taviî Halil. This policy was now voiced by the beylerbeyi of Diyarbekir, Nasuh Pasha, who clothed the several thousand Celâlî escapees from Shah Abbas in a special yellow uniform and made them into an elite brigade of musket men called sarıca.¹⁸⁰ On the other hand, Murad Pasha adamantly and steadfastly refused to accept the peace overtures of the shah, demanding the extradition of the remaining Celâlî chiefs. When the old grand vizier finally died in Diyarbekir in 1020/1611, the yellow-clad warriors of Nasuh Pasha must have rejoiced in double measure: it was their chief who received



the seals of the highest office, replacing Murad Pasha as grand vizier of the Empire.¹⁸¹

After 1019/1610 an uncharacteristic calm came to Anatolia. For a decade no large-scale rebellion broke out. The executions of Yusuf Pasha, Muslu Çavuş, and Canbuladoğlu Ali, and the death of Kalenderoğlu Mehmed, plus the strengthening of loyal military forces, helped to cool the ambitions of the minor Celâlîs who yet remained. Most importantly, timar-holders remained for a time on their lands rather than on the frontiers of the Empire, and protected their interests by acting against local brigands. The death of the grand vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha and the reconciliation of Kalenderoğlu's remaining Celâlîs with the new grand vizier Nasuh Pasha relieved some of the major tensions between the Ottomans and the Persians. In the year 1021/1612 the two powers agreed to a peace at Istanbul which, in most essentials, returned Ottoman-Safavid relations--including the borderline--to what had been accepted almost sixty years before by Süleyman the Magnificent and Shah Tahmasp in the Peace of Amasya in 962/1555. For the first time in almost a decade the Ottoman grand vizier issued no orders for troops to fight the Persian enemies of the Ottoman Empire.

VI The *Celâli* Revolts in Retrospect

After the execution of the last of the *Celâli* chiefs, the Ottomans attempted to return to their traditional ways. Kuyucu Murad Pasha initiated important surveys of the Empire as the basis for what he felt was a much-needed review of the entire Ottoman system. With his death, however, the government returned to traditional political and military strategies, with ever-weakening leadership from the throne. In fact, for a half-dozen years the Ottoman royal line was in imminent danger of extinction. As for the *Celâlîs*, their influence and importance faded rapidly in the ensuing decades even though the conditions which led to their rise continued. But their imprint on Anatolian history remained as a reminder of their ability to vex even the most skillful of Ottoman generals. In our own time, both Turks and tourists alike are unaware of their existence, and of the great danger they posed to the Empire. What is remembered today is a majestic monument to the period in which they lived and the monarchy they almost ruined.

1. *Innovative and Traditional Reforms*

Following the death of Kalenderoğlu Mehmed in 1018/1609 Kuyucu Murad Pasha, with the genius and tenacity he used to defeat the Great *Celâlîs*, moved quickly to clarify for the sultan the seriousness of the chaotic conditions into which the Empire had fallen. The grand vizier ordered an evaluation of the institutional structure of the Empire, the military institution, the law and tax system, and, in recognition of the continuing difficulties in Egypt, a review of the financial system of the Nile province.¹ Murad Pasha entrusted this enormous task to Aynî Ali, the *defter emini* (Commissioner of Registers of Landed Properties). The result was a broad compilation of statis-

tics and descriptions of problems of the eyâlets of the Empire which became the standard against which later reforms and changes would be judged.²

But knowing how many soldiers were represented by how many timars, or what taxes had to be paid to ensure a military victory, helped little in solving the political and technological problems of the Ottomans--as long as victory seemed possible. Despite an easing of Habsburg pressure, the defeat of the Anatolian Celâlis, and a direct call from the Shah of Persia for peace negotiations, Kuyucu Murad Pasha marched the very next year to regain by force all Ottoman territory lost to the Safavid power. Again, as in the past, his armies were far too extended. His troops in the east could recapture only minor portions of Azerbaijan from Shah Abbas' resilient Persian armies. But Murad would not desist nor would his sovereign. Ever seeking a final victory, the persistent Old Man returned to the eastern battlefield a year later in 1019/1610 to try again.

Then Ottoman leadership changed. In 1020/1611 Kuyucu Murad Pasha died on campaign in Diyarbekir. He was succeeded by the resident beylerbeyi, Nasuh Pasha, a commander with much military experience and not a small amount of political notoriety.³ Abruptly changing the conservative Ottoman political strategies, the new grand vizier almost immediately began formal negotiations for peace with Persia, an objective which he achieved within a year. In 1021/1612 he signed a treaty with the shah's emissary in Istanbul.⁴ Nasuh carried on some of Murad Pasha's reforms, such as securing the mountain passes for Anatolian caravan

safety.⁵ He tightened up sources of revenue, much to the anger of the taxpaying merchants of the Empire, as well as the four ambassadors of England, France, Venice, and Holland.⁶ And he acted aggressively against dissension in the armed forces.⁷ Such actions, however, did not balance what appeared to be the judicial murder of many of his predecessor's old associates in order to use their personal treasuries to pay his troops.⁸ His high-handed methods alienated even his closest associates, and finally engagement to wed the sultan's daughter could not protect him.⁹ He was executed in 1023/1614 in what appears to be a reversal of political objectives as well as his personal relationship with Sultan Ahmed.

The successor to the highest vizierate, Oküz Mehmed Pasha, abruptly and unilaterally broke Nasuh's short-lived political arrangement with Persia. He reverted to the earlier practices of Kuyucu Murad Pasha and his predecessors, led Ottoman troops eastward, and attacked Shah Abbas. This victory of the war party among the sultan's advisors meant new taxes and military expenditures. It also meant jobs for idle sekbans. Doubtless some former Celâlîs and levends found employment in the Ottoman armies going east, even as some of their erstwhile colleagues, in groups of forty, fifty, or one hundred, continued to plague the Anatolian countryside.¹⁰

With the death of Sultan Ahmed I in 1026/1617 Ottoman political leadership suffered extraordinary difficulties. In a period of only six years (1026-1032/1617-1623) the 300-year-old Ottoman royal line was almost eradicated.

Ahmed I's younger brother, Mustafa I, well-known as insane, was thrust upon the throne. He was then removed and replaced by Ahmed's eldest son, Osman II. Five stormy years later, in 1031/1622, Osman fell, murdered by angry Janissaries in the first example of Ottoman regicide. The mentally unbalanced Mustafa I was again placed on the throne, shortly thereafter to be replaced by an eleven-year-old son of Ahmed, Murad IV. Murad, doubtless at the instigation of his advisors, followed the well-known Ottoman Law of Fratricide and murdered his remaining brothers, save for Ibrahim. Neither boy had grown old enough to have heirs, and by any reckoning the Ottoman line was, for several years, in danger of extinction.

Yet the basic economic structure of the Ottoman state held together. Trade was maintained in those areas not directly affected by the Persian and Celâli wars. Even in Anatolia, what had seemed utter chaos slowly began a return to something of the order of the past. The execution in 1019/1610 of the last Great Anatolian Celâli quite discernibly improved conditions for commercial traffic there. Urban activities revived, caravans received protection, and trade among the interior cities began to assume a more normal routine.¹¹ It was true that many of the physical structures in the cities had been irreparably damaged and took decades to replace. Travellers like the Armenian Pole, Simeon, witnessed many small cities in extensive ruin, with the remaining people attempting to rebuild and restore their past lives.¹² Yet though large portions of a city like Iznik lay in ruins from the Celâli wars, by 1019/

1610 the famed ceramic works began to produce thousands of cups, goblets, and particularly tiles for the building in Istanbul of the new cathedral mosque of Sultan Ahmed. In Amasya, too, traveller Simeon saw silversmiths, dyers, and other artisans reconstituting their crafts. In Tokat a thriving covered market with sales in silver and cloth continued its ancient vitality. In Merzifon the market in fruit was not totally destroyed, nor the market at Muş, where orchardists still sold quantities of delicious produce. Simeon, however, complained of inflation, saying he found the prices very high, especially fresh fruits, vegetables, and the bread of Amasya.¹³

If the battered cities of Anatolia slowly restored some of their old vitality, Simeon the Pole observed that the rural areas seemed everywhere impoverished, often desolate, in some cases ruined. The region around Muş had been destroyed; villages near Tokat had lost fifty percent of their households. In the eyâlet of Sivas large villages lay in ruin, with the only farming being done by Armenians. "It was sad to see such fertile villages in such disarray," said Simeon. He mentioned two villages, Bingöl and Engel, which had been turned into ruin by the Celâlîs, "totally abandoned, not a sound emanating from what was once a flourishing land."¹⁴ Villagers, of course, could solve some problems: a shelter might be built with some trees and mud bricks. Plowing, however, was another matter: a plowshare, long since removed by some marauder, was difficult and expensive to obtain. Animals were in short supply. In some cases local cavalry men returned to their timar hold-

ings, and a few new timarlı sipahis received appointments in Kuyucu Murad Pasha's land redistribution program. Self-interest motivated these askerî to assist the villagers in rebuilding their fields and herds. For Anatolians, life continued in difficulty and disappointment. But it did continue.

2. The Celâîî Imprint on Anatolia

Probably the main objective of the Celâîî rebels in Anatolia was to establish themselves in specific regions where they could pressure the Ottomans into allowing them and their men back into the Ottoman regime. They did not attempt to establish a breakaway state, as did Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha in Syria. The Celâîîs in their heyday sought rank, power, security, but always on their own terms. Any spirit of unity implied by these objectives came from external events and insufficient Ottoman response, not carefully conceived plans.

Celâîîs fought best in guerrilla warfare, which at least one of their number realized was their most valued tactic. Though they could (and often did) ruin Ottoman brigades with their ambush and hit-run methods, their sense of glory and a certain gambling instinct attracted them to mass attacks, to all-or-nothing strategies which often enough proved successful--but eventually led to their demise. When they lost such pitched battles they exhibited a lack of discipline and constancy which comes only with lengthy training and group loyalty.

Though the government constantly alluded to their religious infidelity, the Celâlis showed no millenarian spirit or religious motivation. Certainly no religious prophets or movements arose from their ranks. They had none of the "puritan spirit" of Oliver Cromwell's contemporary English armies, or the militant religious fervor of Gustavus Adolphus' hymn-singing Swedish Lutherans. The Celâlis more closely resembled the mercenary soldiers hired by Wallenstein or Mansfeld during the Thirty Years' War. They fought for a livelihood, for booty, for something to do, but not for religious objectives.

Nor did the Celâlis receive political sustenance from outside the Ottoman borders. No evidence exists that the Persian Shah Abbas ever sent men or money or munitions to help them in Anatolia. In fact, almost the opposite occurred: when they arrived in his land for asylum, Abbas realized their predicament in running from the sultan, their master. He allowed them to remain by accepting their assertion that they fought the Ottomans because of their "love for the Shah." This arrangement quickly wore thin, and when the Celâlis received official assurances of reconciliation with the Ottoman government to return to Anatolia, the shah and his forces made no attempt to restrain them.

Within Anatolia, no attractive patriarchal figure or leader with sustained charisma ever arose to lead the Celâlis. No well-known family existed in Anatolia around which they could or would identify. The sekbans and levends and the discontented sohtas, the flotsam of

Anatolia, sought refuge from a life they hated, not to establish a state or dynasty of their own.

A further issue which surfaced during the Celâli rebellions and pointed up the crux of a long-standing argument among contemporary Ottomans was the clouding of the division between the re'aya and the askerî, the providers and the protectors. The memorialist for Sultan Murad IV, Koçu Bey, in his Risâle (1040/1630), strongly urged a return to what appears to be an arbitrary view: a theoretical balance between workers and warriors.¹⁷ Yet Koçu Bey's logic prevails when one considers two important facts: first, the askerî class traditionally felt responsibilities for the protection of the Empire which might have been longer preserved by closer restrictions on the class itself. Allowing re'aya to continue entering the askerî class added new manpower but did not necessarily uphold the old values, or the sense of responsibility which accompanied those values.¹⁸ Second, an ever-growing number of musket men and their weapons had to be paid for in cash and on time. Sekbans and levends, always ready to respond to the highest bidder, could most easily be controlled by hiring them for military duties. Those not hired by the central government could often find work with local power sources. Certain local family leaders, known later in the twelfth/eighteenth century as derebeyis, lords of the valleys, acted in many ways as independent sovereigns. The source of money to pay the musket men ultimately was the taxes imposed on peasant farmers and merchants. Quick cash could be obtained, as Koçu Bey pointed out, by selling

timars and other lands to persons of wealth, not military capability, then administering the revenues through tax farmers. It could also be obtained by raising customs duties and other excises on goods and mercantile operations. All of this, argued Koçu Bey, augured ill for the future of the Ottoman state.

The Great Celâlf armies of Kara Yazıcı and Kalenderoğlu Mehmed had exemplified the ability of skillful bölükbaşıs to organize and exploit the newly invented techniques of musket warfare, to return somehow to power within the Ottoman system; the armies of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha of Aleppo, followed close on by Ma'noğlu Fahredden, attempted to establish a state with the aid of European money and arms. A decade later the armies of Abaza Mehmed Pasha of Erzurum attacked Ottoman forces with the object of righting the wrongs of the murdered Sultan Osman II; a century later various derebeyis established local sovereignties on the periphery of the Empire, primarily on their ability to raise private militias from local sources led by well-known dynasties. In all these cases, independent musket men made up the infantry core of the armies. The tactical change from landed cavalry forces to small arms fire, plus the availability of cash to pay salaries, put into the hands of potential rebel leaders a formidable new mechanism by which they could thwart the central Ottoman government. The Celâlf rebellions of 1000-1020/1591-1611 quite clearly identify this extraordinary change from medieval to early modern Middle Eastern warfare. Neither the Great Celâlfis nor Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha caused these latter results, but



they all imprinted memories of what might happen if the ingredients for such rebellions were again allowed to be mixed together.¹⁹

3. *The Building of the Blue Mosque*

Modern Turks pay scant attention now to the remaining memorials of the Great Celâli period or the people involved in quelling the revolts. The tomb and fountain of Gazanfer Ağa, the Chief Eunuch of Sultan Mehmed III, may oftentimes be seen by visitors, but only because it interrupts the view of the far more famous and historic Ageduct of Valens. Few know of Gazanfer, his terrible death at the hands of the Sipahi rebels in 1011/1603, or the times in which he lived. Cağalazade Sinan Pasha's name, in a modernized, abbreviated form, remains attached to a well-known avenue in İstanbul (Cağaloğlu Caddesi) where many of modern Turkey's major newspapers and books are printed. As for the tomb complex of the Grand Vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha, hardly anyone notices or cares. The only really memorable symbol built during the time of the Celâli revolts and disruption is a mosque, one of the city's most famous, named after Sultan Ahmed I, and known to the world as the "Blue Mosque." It rises above the city in awesome size--and curiously commemorates one of the least memorable "victories" in Ottoman history.

As monarchs of an ever-victorious Islamic empire, Ottoman sultans built cathedral mosques to honor their successes in the Abode of War. Such monuments to the glory of

God were paid for by the results of victory on the battlefield. Emulating his ancestors, Ahmed I determined to build a mosque--an enormous mosque. However, the young sultan had made only one military expedition: not a victory at all, but an ill-fated escapade to Bursa in his first year on the throne. There the Great Celâli Tavi Halil endangered his life, and the snow water made the young monarch's stomach ache. Subsequently, Sultan Ahmed seldom left the Palace except to hunt, certainly not take the field of battle.

Thus, Ahmed had no victory of the proportions necessary to fulfill his expensive religious and imperial monument. He therefore increased taxes to cover expenses and spent a good deal of time and effort to convince the ulema of the sacredness of his objective.²⁰ When in 1018/1609 his grand vizier, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, successfully returned from the "campaign" to extirpate the last Great Celâlis, the sultan took advantage of the occasion. He thanked God for the "victory," and proceeded to carry out his plans to construct a glorious edifice. In the month following the execution of the last Great Celâli, ceremonies for the laying of the grand mosque's foundations began.

On 9 Receb 1018/9 October 1609 the first shovelsful of earth were turned by the assembled dignitaries. Among those at the gathering were the highest officers of the Empire: the Şeyhülislâm, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, several of the lesser viziers, and members of the high-ranking ulema, all of whom symbolically turned the spade. Sultan Ahmed dug so long and with such apparent zeal he was noticed to have

perspired greatly.²¹ Ahmed continued this intense interest in his structure until the entire mosque complex was completed--the year he died, at age twenty-seven.

After nine years of extraordinary expenditures and constant regal oversight, the mosque opened its doors.²² Istanbul's citizens viewed what many still consider one of the city's most beautiful mosques. True, the plans often copied the ideas of earlier constructions, and the objective of the architect, Mehmed Ağa, was splendor and size rather than balance and precision of conception.²³ Yet the mosque today appears brilliantly placed on a significant section of the Istanbul skyline, a victory of the artists, the masons, the ceramicists, and the architect from whom it came.

Can we not suggest, however, that in the light of history the mosque represents the victory not of the sultan with whose name it is associated but rather the sacrifices of that sultan's loyal officers and his people, both urban and rural, who fought loyally and suffered so terribly during those years? Should not Ahmed have remembered those who worked to change the bankrupt policies of the past, changes which finally brought the Ottomans to success? Should there not be a mention of men like the serdar Ferhad Pasha, who loyally though impotently carried out a program which later proved successful given time and preparation? Should not some mention be made of the courage and devotion of the many kadis and timar-holders who, despite attractive corruption about them, continued to fulfill their duties, especially a kadi like Vildanzâde of Ankara who almost

single-handedly kept his city from an almost inevitable sack by the Celâli Kalenderoğlu? Is it not really the Old Pasha himself who merits much of the glory of the Blue Mosque, and not his profligate master? Does not Kuyucu Murad symbolize more effectively those askerî who dedicated their lives to the cause of the "ever-victorious sultan?" Was it not Murad whose tough spirit gained peace with the Habsburgs, smashed the incipient Syrian state of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha, and emasculated the power of the Anatolian Celâlîs?

Whatever his importance in the history of the Ottoman Empire, in the intervening 300 years the Old Pasha has been forgotten. His resting place in İstanbul is not only inconspicuous but virtually unknown. Even when he died in the early eleventh/seventeenth century the pasha's tomb complex was relegated to a small triangular space in the shadow of the earlier Şehzade mosque. Murad's final gift was not a cathedral mosque but an educational center, with a public fountain and small chapel. Today, students of İstanbul University's History Department study their past in the ancient medrese building. As for the Old Pasha's gravestone, it appears to have been removed some years ago.²⁴ His tomb building has been renovated; his bones probably molder beneath a newly constructed paved street adjacent to the tomb.

VII Bibliographic Study

The materials used in preparing this book fall into eight parts. First, archival sources, both published and unpublished. Second, contemporary chronicles from Ottoman, European, and Persian sources. Third, contemporary reports and information from both Ottomans and Europeans. Fourth, later chronologies of Ottomans and Europeans. Fifth, modern chronologies, which one might term "standard histories." Sixth, modern scholarship directly addressing the Celâli revolts. Seventh, handbooks and modern reports on general conditions in the Ottoman Empire. And eighth, a short group of works on the possibility of climatic changes during the Celâli period.

1. Archival sources, published and unpublished

The most useful source of information concerning the Celâli revolts in the Ottoman Empire is the unpublished general register (Mühimme Defteri) collections of the Archives of the Prime Ministry (Başvekâlet arşivi) in Istanbul, cited here as MD. The MD are contained in 263 volumes, dating from 961/1553 to 1321/1905. Several volumes were used in this study, particularly volumes seventy through eighty.¹ Entries in the MD concern primarily specific problems in the provinces of the Empire and their intended solution. By their nature, the MD directives do not always complete the event. A pasha is ordered to battle once, twice, even thrice, each repetition of the order being a bit stronger and clearer than the last. Then the pasha's name disappears for the time in this context. Does he arrive at his appointed station? Very seldom does the

MD tell us. Only by referring to other sources can we understand completely the activity of the officer in question. Yet from the MD we have learned the reasons for the man's tardiness, and often an insight into the social and political milieu out of which the tardiness occurred. The MD can also act as a standard guide to judge Ottoman memoirs and chronologies, foreign ambassadorial reports, travel literature, and so on. The MD's used for this book range in time from 1000/1591 to 1026/1617. Two appendices (zeyl) were used (MDZ) as well as an incorrectly classified defter (register) found in the Kâmil Kepeci Tasnifi (KKT). Of the many other collections in the Archives, the Ali Emiri Tasnifi (AET) contains several important documents pertaining to Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha which have been used herein. Additionally a Menzil Defteri (Register of Military Stages), abbreviated herein as MENZIL, proved useful for ascertaining the military route eastward across Anatolia.

Corroborative information about the Ottoman government activities comes also from European archival sources, in particular the Venetian, the Tuscan, and the English governments. Edited by E. Alberti, Le relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti (RELAZIONI) volumes I, II, and III, as well as G. Berchet's edition of Relazioni dei consoli veneti nella Siria (RELAZIONI-SYRIA) gave specific information, local color, and data. The RELAZIONI-SYRIA in particular gave useful information on the early Celâlis. Much in these Italian-language sources related to trade. Some of it was inaccurate, and often it was highly opinionated

in regard to the "imminent fall" of the Empire. The many volumes edited in English by H.F. Brown and others, Calendar of state papers and manuscripts relating to English affairs in the archives and collections of Venice... (CSP-VENICE), proved useful in corroborating certain issues raised in the chronologies. Of great value were the unpublished sources in the Archivio de Stato, Campo dei Frari of Venice, Filzas 64, 65, and 66 of 1607-1608 (AV). These pertained directly to the Celâli revolts. As for the Tuscan archives, the unpublished information found in Fondo Archivistico Mediceo in Florence (MEDICI) proved most valuable, as well as that published in P. Carali, Fakhr ad-din II, principe del Libano (CARALI-2) which documents Ma'noğlu Fahreddin's epoch and gives much needed direction to the study of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha's Syrian rebellion, in particular his dealings with the Grand Duke Ferdinand.

Ambassadorial reports in England, now held in the Public Records Office, have received proportionately greater attention by western scholars than other works already cited. Such published works as O. Burian's The Report of Lello (LELLO) provide interesting views of the Ottoman scene by English officials. Additional information can be gleaned from manuscript collections such as M.S. Giuseppe, ed., Calendar of the Manuscripts of the most honourable the Marquess of Salisbury (SALISBURY-1), and E. Salisbury, ed., Calendar of the manuscripts of the most Hon., the Marquis of Salisbury (SALISBURY-2).

2. Contemporary chronicles

Of the contemporary Ottoman chronicles, several were written by witnesses to the events about which they wrote. İbrahim Peçüvî, Tarih-i Peçüvî (PEÇÜVÎ), who died 1061/1650, saw the battle of Mezö-keresztes when he was about twenty-two years old. Vasiti, Telhisat der ahd-i Sultan Ahmad Han (VASITI), who died 1020/1611 and of whom we know very little, wrote so knowingly of the Celâli period that one believes he witnessed many events of the years 1015/1606 to 1017/1608 and particularly the battlefield activities of Kuyucu Murad Pasha, about and for whom the chronicle was written.² The Topcular Kâtibi Abdülkâdir, Tarih-i âl-i Osman (TKA), as his high office (Clerk of the Artillery) suggests, was attached to the Ottoman army on the march, probably against the Celâlîs. Hasanbeyzade Ahmet, Telhis üt tevarih (HBZ), who died 1046/1636, at one time held the post of Anadolu defterdar (Chief of the Eastern Treasury), and Volume II continues his history from the time of Süleyman the Magnificent to the time of Sultan Murad IV.

The work of a Persian chronicler attached to the royal entourage of Shah Abbas, Eskandar Beg Monshi (d. 1632?), is called Tarîk-e Âlamārâ-ye ʿAbbāsî. The two-volume English translation of this standard work in R.M. Savory, trans., Eskandar Monshi, History of Shah ʿAbbās (MONSHI), provides us with what the editor recognizes as a "fluent and attractive" translation. It also provides a lively understanding of the greatest period of modern Persian history, and, for

our purposes, a gloating view of Persian superiority over the Ottomans during the Celâli period.

Syria during the time of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha also receives attention from the chroniclers. The seventeenth-century Damascene biographer al-Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Burīnī, Tarādjim al-a' yān min abnā' al-zamān (BURINI), comments on the issues connecting Aleppo with the Ottomans at this time. A portion of the seventeenth-century Syrian Muhammad al-Muhhibī's Hulāsāt al-asar has been translated by F. Wüstenfeld, Fachr ed-din der Drusenfürst (MUHIBBÎ). The author's biographical dictionary relates an important portion of the life of Ma'noğlu Fahreddin and uses corroborative material for the Canbulad family. An eye-witness to some of the later events in northern Syria and eastern Anatolia was the monk Arakel, a native of Tabriz whose chronicles, in M. Brosset, Collection d'historiens Armeniens (ARAKEL), chronicles the reaction of Armenians and others in Anatolia to the Celâli revolts in the years 1604-1610.

3. Contemporary reports from Ottomans and Europeans

Certain information concerning the Celâli revolts comes from official reports such as Aynî Ali's Kavanin âl-i Osman (AYNÎ ALI) which tells the military and tax strength of the Ottomans at the time of the Celâli rebellions. This work has been translated into French by M. Belin, "Du Régime des fiefs militaires..." (BELIN). The famous report to Murad IV of Koçubeg, his Risâle, has been translated and

explained by W.F.A. Behrnauer, "Koğabeg's Abhandlung über den Verfall des osmanischen Staatsgebäudes..." (KOÇUBEG). Some letters and other writings of the English ambassadors to Istanbul are included in volume VIII of Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas, his Pilgrimes... (PURCHAS), particularly those concerning Ambassadors Edward Barton (1588-1597) and Henry Lello (1597-1607). Some interesting letters and observations are found in Sir W. Foster, ed., The Travels of John Sanderson... (SANDERSON), and W. Lithgow, The Totall Discourse... (LITHGOW). Each of these tells of Anatolia in the period 1607-1610, the period of the Great Celâli uprisings. Two useful contemporary lists name the governors of Damascus, H. Laoust, Les Gouvenours de Damas sous les Mamlouks et les premiers Ottomans... (IBN ĞUM'A), translated into French; and of Aleppo, in A. Mingana, "List of Turkish governors..." (MINGANA), translated into English. Along with these can be placed the collection of French treaties with the Ottoman Empire compiled by I. de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane (TESTA).

A most useful non-Ottoman source for the period is the 1889 edition of the dispatches of France's ambassador to the Ottoman sultanate, T. de Gontaut Biron, ed., Ambassade en Turquie... (SALIGNAC). In this we read week-by-week (sometimes oftener) accounts of events occurring all over the Empire and of the ambassador's personal relationships and meetings with the highest ranking officials in the Empire, including the Ağa of the Janissaries, Halil Pasha, who later became twice grand vizier. Baron de Salignac

also did business with the grand viziers of the time, including Kuyucu Murad Pasha. It appears evident that not only did the French ambassador know Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha personally but may have been partially responsible in obtaining temporary clemency for the famous Syrian rebel leader.

A few Italian travel works of the time give hints or facts to add to the story of the rebellions. The contemporary English translations of SORANZO (A. Hartvvell, The Ottoman of Lazaro Soranzo), of MINADOI (A. Hartvvell, trans., The History of the warres betvveene the Tvrkes and the Persians) and DELLA VALLE (G. Havers, trans., The travels of Sig. Pietro della Valle...) put this group in an interesting category: they indicate not only the peregrinations of various natives of Italy, but the lively interest with which Elizabethan England followed the events of the late sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Another Italian, G. Mariti, Istoria de Faccardino (MARITI) gives some useful facts and observations on the situation in Aleppo at the time of the Canbulad rebellion.

4. *Later chronologies by Ottomans and Europeans*

The Ottoman Empire considered the chronicling of important events worthy of state support. Official historians, called vakanüvis (literally, annalists) gathered information in chronological form to honor the reigning sultan and his ancestors and to edify his subjects and their succeeding generations. Such compilations have

proved a boon to historians. For although these Ottoman chroniclers often copied their predecessors, and sometimes omitted important details from their works, they did have access to official records and were privy to many important decisions in the highest levels of Ottoman government. They presented, among other things, a kind of skeleton around which later scholars might flesh out the history of the period. An early seventeenth-century historian, Kâtib Çelebi, known as Hacı Halfa, wrote his two-volume Fezleke-i tarihi-i Osmanî (FEZLEKE) based on history written by writers of an earlier period, in particular HBZ and possibly TKA. Kâtib Çelebi's work extends from the year 1000/1591 to 1065/1654. Since he died in 1068/1658 he doubtless knew some of the important actors in the period of the Great Rebellion and learned from their memories of those awful years. His successor (and constant copier), Mustafa Naima, Tarih-i Naima (NAIMA), died in 1129/1716.³ He had close family ties in Aleppo, his father and grandfather having served as Janissaries in that city. Certainly these latter two must have had some association with the Canbulad family and the events of the attempted establishment of a state by Ali Pasha.⁴ Naima's history, in six volumes, carries the Ottoman story to 1070/1660. For the Celâlî period volumes I and II were used. One other Ottoman work referred to in this study is the celebrated Seyahatnâme (Travels) by Evliya Çelebi (EVLİYA). This multivolumed, often rambling work gives some comparative information, especially Volume IX, of the city of Aleppo about the year 1081/1670.

The work of the English historian Richard Knolles (d. 1610), The Turkish history... (KNOLLES 1603), provides a good example of the European view with material based on primary accounts. The later editions by Sir Paul Rycaut (KNOLLES 1687) present more extensive collections of first-hand information from Englishmen who were witness to events in the Ottoman Empire during the Celâli period and wrote of these in their often direct fashion.

5. Standard modern chronologies

Since its publication in 1829, Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall's Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches... (GOR) has served as a basic outline, in many ways the unique source, for western understanding of the Ottoman Empire from its beginnings to the nineteenth century. Volume IV of GOR tells of the Anatolian rebellions and establishes for us the general outline of the period, after which it is modified or corroborated by Ottoman and other sources. Occasionally, comments from N. Iorga, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, especially Volume III, have value.

Recent histories in English include Halil İnalcık's The Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age, 1300-1600, a short but carefully chiselled summary of the Empire including important institutional information pertaining to the Celâli period. Stanford Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire (SHAW), especially Volume I, briefly mentions the Celâli revolts. M. Cook, ed., A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730 (COOK-1) compiles the works of several

authors. Of particular use in this collection was V.J. Parry's Chapter 4, "The successors of Sulaimān, 1566-1617."

The four-volume chronology in Turkish by İ.H. Danişmend, İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi (DANIŞMEND) (which, in Volume III, NAIMA, and FEZLEKE are quoted extensively), provides a useful Turkish outline to juxtapose against GOR. DANIŞMEND also includes a useful section at the end of each volume citing the various high-ranking officers of the Empire who served under each sultan. The eight-volume history of İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı tarihi (UZUNÇARŞILI), in particular Volumes III/1 (1561-1699) and III/2 (1550-1699), provided some interesting facts, such as those concerning the building of the Blue Mosque.

A work in Arabic by the nineteenth-century Syrian historian, Tannūs al-Shidyāq, Kitāb-i akhbār al a'yān fi Djabal Lubnān (SHIDYAQ) provides some useful information concerning the region of Aleppo and Damascus in the time of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha.

6. *Modern scholarship concerning the Celālî rebellions*

The most important authority on the Celālî rebellions was Mustafa Akdağ, late Professor of History at the University of Ankara. Akdağ began his work with a doctoral dissertation, Celālî İsyanlarının Başlaması (1946), published later in the Ankara Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi. In this he confined himself to the period to 1005/1596, and sketched the basic problems of economic and social change which led to the uprisings in Anatolia. Later

his Celâli İsyanları (AKDAĞ-1) added almost a decade of historical research to the chronology and continued his interest in social and economic themes. The great value of Akdağ's work lay in the evident use of original source material, particularly from the MD in the Başvekâlet arşivi. Sadly, Akdağ never completed what he hoped to achieve: a continuation of studies of the rebellions in Anatolia to about the year 1021/1612. Fortunately he has left some useful articles in the Türk Ansiklopedisi (AKDAĞ-2) and the Encyclopaedia of Islam (AKDAĞ-3).

To my knowledge only one other modern Turkish scholar has written of the Celâli revolts as such. H. Andreasyan has translated the memories of a Polish traveller in the Celâli period in his Polonyalı Simeon'un seyahatnâmesi (SIMEON). Andreasyan has also provided an interesting perspective on the results of the Celâli movements on Anatolian villages and towns, and the role played by the contemporary priest Grigor of Kemah (ANDREASYAN).

Some non-Turkish historians have had an interest in the Celâli rebellions for more than three decades. The Russian A. Tveritinova published her Vosstanie Kara Iazydzhi--Deli Hasana v Trucii (Moscow, 1946) which covers the rebellions to about 1012/1603 and sees them as an early example of peasant revolt against landholders. Various articles on the Celâli leaders have been published in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, both the first and the second editions, especially RONDOT and MÉNAGE. The present author's "Djalālî" was published in the Supplement, second edition, pages 238 to 239, in 1981.

Several scholars have considered the activities of various contemporary rebel groups in Syria. Professor Abdul-Karim Rafeq of the University of Damascus has published various articles which give excellent background for the period of the rebellions in Aleppo. His "Local Forces in Syria" in PARRY & YAPP, and "Changes in the relationship between the Ottoman central administration and the Syrian provinces..." in NAFF & OWEN, provide important background information which is supplemented by his Bilād ash-Shām wa Misr (RAFEQ-1). This latter gives specific information about the region of Damascus in the seventeenth century. In particular, an unpublished article which Professor Rafeq read at the VIIIth Turkish Congress of History in Ankara, 1976, should be printed, for it provides an excellent focus on the Celālīs as seen from the contemporary Syrian perspective (RAFEQ-2). I have used this work extensively with the kind permission of the author. Two other authors, K.S. Salibi, "The Sayfā's and the Eyālet of Tripoli" (SALIBI), and M.A. Bakhit, "Aleppo and the Ottoman Military" (BAKHIT), present important background material for the period in Syria.

7. *General studies on the Ottoman Empire
pertaining to the Celālīs*

Fortunately, in the past three or four decades, interest concerning the Ottoman Empire has risen in the United States, a result of several factors: the National Defense Education Act for the study of esoteric foreign languages, the Peace Corps (which has turned out some first-rate



Turkish- and Arabic-speaking scholars), and the various U.S. Department of Education grants for the study of Arabic and Turkish. The interest also derives from the writing and teaching of several outstanding scholars from Europe and Turkey who have come to the United States and flourished. Presently, the doyen of early Ottoman studies is Professor Halil İnalcık, now of the University of Chicago. His numerous articles in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam (İNALCIK-1), in the many Turkish, English, and European language scholarly journals, and his own recent Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age, 1300-1600 (İNALCIK-2) have clarified many of the intricacies of the political and military institutions of the early Ottomans. In like manner Professor Kemal Karpat of the University of Wisconsin complements his compatriot İnalcık as the preeminent authority of the social and political conditions of the Ottoman state after the seventeenth century. Karpat's An inquiry into the social foundations of nationalism in the Ottoman state... (KARPAT) provides a clear view of the later institutions of the Empire and their many inherent problems in the middle and later Ottoman periods.

Much groundwork has been accomplished by Turkish scholars particularly in the period after World War II. Preeminent among these was the late Professor Ömer Lütfi Barkan who pioneered basic economic studies of the early modern Ottomans. One of these, "The Price Revolution of the sixteenth century" (BARKAN), was of great value. Another Turkish scholar, Cengiz Orhonlu, who recently died at a young age, provided us with some remarkably insightful

and carefully outlined views of subjects concerning the period of Celâli rebellions, in particular his article "Kuyucu Murad Paşa" in the İslam Ansiklopedisi (ORHONLU). Another outstanding young scholar, İ. Metin Kunt, recently published several important articles on institutions of the Empire which proved valuable for this study, especially his "Transformations of Zimmi into Askerî..." (in BRAUDE & LEWIS). Several other Turkish scholars provided much needed background for specific areas in this study. Professor Tayyip Gökbilgin's article in the İslam Ansiklopedisi, "Hasan Paşa, Sokulluzâde" (GÖKBİLGİN), as well as M.C.Ş. Tekindağ's "Canbualt" (TEKINDAĞ), provide bits and pieces useful in putting the puzzle together. A couple of remarkable books on Anatolia include L. Güçer, XVI-XVII asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda hububat meselesi... (GÜÇER), in which the author analyses the various crises of land management in Anatolia, and M. Cağatay Uluçay, XVII Asırda Saruhan'da eşkiyalık... (SARUHAN), wherein the writer sketches the early history of a region badly damaged by the Celâli rampages. Halil Sahillioğlu's article in COOK-1, "Sivîş year crises..." gave useful data.

Extensive background information can be obtained from several European writers. The work of the Dutch scholar A.H. de Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic... (de GROOT), helped greatly to explain the various European involvements with the Ottomans when the Dutch were first becoming involved with Near East trade via İstanbul and Aleppo. Military problems of the Ottomans were covered by V.J. Parry in his "Introduction" to PARRY & YAPP. Informa-

tion concerning the Armenian community in Aleppo was found in A.K. Sanjian, The Armenian Communities in Syria... (SANJIAN) and A.H. Wood covers the English involvement in Syria and the Empire, A History of the Levant Company (WOOD). The poetry of eastern Anatolia, gathered together in A. Chodzko, Specimens of the popular poetry of Persia... (CHODZKO), offers some provocative if not clear connections of the Celâlis with the minstrel hero, Koroğlu.

A general view of Persian relations with the Ottomans may be found in the English translations of A. Bausani by J.B. Donne, The Persians from the earliest days... (BAUSANI). Specific details about the Sherley brothers in Syria and Persia are in E.D. Ross, ed., Sir Anthony Sherley and his Persian Adventure (SHERLEY), and G. le Strange, ed., Don Juan of Persia (DON JUAN). The Ottoman-Safavid battle at Lake Urmiye was analysed in J. Malcolm, The History of Persia (MALCOLM).

The city of Aleppo and the Syrian region are covered in great depth in the classic study by J. Sauvaget, Alep... (SAUVAGET), as well as his collaboration with R. Mantran concerning fiscal regulations, Règlements fiscaux ottomans (MANTRAN-2). H. Lammens' La Syria... (LAMMENS), an historical analysis, has some value, as has P.M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent (HOLT), as it views Syria from the Egyptian and Mesopotamian vantage.

Many valuable specialized works have recently been published concerning the involvement of Europe with the Ottoman Empire. The most thoroughgoing survey of the Mediterranean, which includes the period during which the

Celâli rebellions took place, is F. Braudel's The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World (BRAUDEL), translated into English. A recent work complementing Braudel is N. Steensgaard, The Asian trade revolution... (STEENSGAARD), in which the author studies the involved trade relations of seventeenth-century Europe with the Ottomans. The geography of the Syrian region is discussed in economic terms in P. Masson, Histoire du commerce française dans le Levant... (MASSON), as W.E.D. Allen does in Problems of Turkish power... (ALLEN) regarding political issues. D.W. Davies, Elizabethans errant (DAVIES), writes regarding the political relations of England, particularly in Aleppo. Two Italians provide us with specific studies: one, A. Tenenti, Piracy and the decline of Venice, transl. by J. and B. Pullim (TENENTI), speaks to the naval power of Venice; the other, P.P. Argenti, The religious minorities of Chios (ARGENTI), tells of the religious concerns of the island of Chios. The island of Cyprus is given full historical coverage in G.F. Hill, A history of Cyprus, especially Volume IV.

In the European theatre, G. Bayerle, Ottoman diplomacy in Hungary... (BAYERLE-1), translates documents relating to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ottoman-Hungarian relations. M. Kortepeter, Ottoman imperialism during the Reformation (KORTEPETER), explains the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century relations of the Habsburgs with the Ottomans and the Crimean Turks.

Of the handbooks consulted, some of the most useful were the dictionary of terms by M.Z. Pakalın, Osmanlı tarih

deyimleri ve terimleri sözlüğü in three volumes (PAKALIN); the geography of D.E. Pitcher, An historical geography of the Ottomans... (PITCHER); the study of various projects to bring the Ottoman Empire to its knees in T.G. Djuvara, Cent projets de partage de la Turquie (DJUVARA); and, finally, the design and construction of the Blue Mosque in G. Goodwin, A history of Ottoman architecture (GOODWIN). Also consulted were M.Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani (SÜREYYA), and the tables (written in Osmanlıca) in H. Hadžibegić, "Rasprova Ali Cauša iz Sofije..." (HADŽIBEGIĆ).

8. Climatic changes in the Celâli period

The possibility that a so-called "Little Ice Age" of Europe may have affected the climate of Anatolia during the period under consideration has provoked study in the recent years. Some basic commentaries in this area of research have been made in the several works of E. Le Roy-Ladurie, such as Times of feast, times of famine (LADURIE). A general study by S. Schneider, The Genesis strategy (SCHNEIDER) proved of great value in understanding the theories of atmospheric scientists as they consider the climatology of places like seventeenth-century Anatolia. Professor Peter Kuniholm and his bevy of dendrochronologists at Cornell University have accepted my suggestion that the awful social malaise of the Celâli period may be at least partly connected with the severe changes in climate then occurring in regions related to Anatolia (KUNIHOLM). But in that suggestion lies a future study,

Appendix I

The following is an English translation of AET 616 from the Başvekâlet Arşivi, İstanbul. In this hitherto unpublished document¹ Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha proposes certain specific services to Sultan Ahmed I for certain undefined but obvious implicit privileges. In the upper right hand of the document, in the handwriting of the sultan, are the words, "This goes too far; is it possible to give this much?" or, possibly, "This goes too far; give what seems appropriate."

A List of Matters Concerning the Slave Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha

This slave petitions that if he is appointed to the position of beylerbeyi of Aleppo he will undertake to go with 5,000 men to the campaign called for the coming spring. Likewise, if by the favor of the sultan he is given, with the aforementioned province, a vizierate, then he promises to take 10,000 men to the campaign.

Beyond this, if he is bestowed with [several words missing] and some of his adherents [words missing] and to some of his men the offices of müteferrika and çavuş and division chief is proffered then he promises to bring twenty [thousand?] courageous men to the imperial campaign and will sacrifice heart and soul to whatever duty he is entrusted

Like his father and grandfather, if he is assigned as administrator of the Turkoman tribes of Aleppo, he under-

takes to send 200 camel units [He requests] the office of beylerbeyi in Maraş [be given] to Haydar Bey, the former bey of Aintab on the condition of participating in the campaign with 2,000 men

[He requests] the sancak of Hama² [be given] to Ebu Zeyd Bey on the condition of participating with 500 men in the campaign [He requests] the sancak of Maarra [be given] to his [Canbuladoğlu's] uncle's son Mehmed Bey, along with the rights of tax farming on the condition of participating with 500 men in the campaign

[He requests] the sancak of Uzeyir [be given] to Hüseyinpaşaoğlu Ali Bey on the condition of participating with 500 men in the campaign [He requests] the sancak of Malatya [be given] to Derviş Pasha, the former bey of Samsad, on the condition of participating in the campaign with 1,500 men³

[He requests] the sancak of Kars [be given] to Kasim Bey, a great fiefholder, on the condition of participating with 1,000 men in the campaign [He requests] the sancak of Birecik⁴ [be given] to the former sancak bey of Tedmir [Palmyra], Cuma Bey, on the condition of participating in the campaign with 800 men He [Canbuladoğlu] says that he [Cuma Bey] would participate in the campaign with more men if the office of beylerbeyi of either Rakka or Kars is given to him [Cuma Bey] in addition [to Birecik]

[He requests] the sancak of Samsad [be given] to Ali Bey, formerly of Birecik sancak, on the condition of participating in the campaign with 500 men

[He requests] the sancak of Tarsus [be given] to Elvendoğlu Arslan Bey on the condition of participating with 1,000 men in the campaign [He requests] the sancak of Boz Ok [be given] to Şehyi Bey, formerly of Birecik sancak, on condition of participating with 1,500 men in the campaign

[He requests] the sancak of Sis [be given] to Kulu Bey on the condition of participating with 1,000 men in the campaign [He requests] the sancak of Çimişgesek be given to İsa of the great fiefholders, on condition of participating with 500 men in the campaign

On the delivery of 120 camel units and the promised possessions [cattle?] the chieftainship of the Turkomans of Aleppo should be given to the müteferrika Derviş And he [Canbuladoğlu] requests that of the great fiefholders, six be made müteferrikas, fourteen be made çavuşes and 500 be given the basic rank of division officer⁵

Endnotes

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. TANSEL, pp. 31-38.
2. BAUSANI, p. 136, who indicates the origin of the Safavids was Anatolia.
3. ALLEN, p. 27. The canal was one-third built but bad weather and disagreement with the Tatar Khan prevented its completion.
4. SHAW, I, p. 182, tells of Mehmed Pasha's execution while in office by the curious practice of "an agent of the sultan" stabbing the grand vizier, the episode appearing, therefore, as an assassination.
5. R.M. Savory in BOSWORTH, p. 469.
6. V.J. Parry in COOK-1, pp. 111-16.
7. H. Sahillioğlu in COOK-2, p. 241.
8. RELAZIONI, III, p. 227, of 1583: "In the wars of Persia in which they hoped to possess the country in three months, the Ottomans have fought four years, destroyed two armies, lost great amounts of money, and earned nothing but trouble and vain expenditure."
9. TENENTI, pp. 18-19, et passim.
10. RELAZIONI, II, p. 297, before 1586, tells of losses of troops in Persia, the plague in Constantinople, the use of Muslims for the Janissary corps (rather than Christian converts), the power of the Habsburgs, lack of good Ottoman leadership, and the declining power of the sultan.
11. DJUVARA, p. 127.
12. PASTOR, XXIII, p. 273, tells of Clement's anti-Turkish League and the objectives of conquering "the whole of eastern Europe."
13. All three were Roman Catholics and supported Clement VIII's position, SHERLEY, p. 13, et passim.



14. BAYERLE-1, pp. 10-11, where the Hungarians never allowed the conquered region to remain peaceful and "the Turks felt as if they were living in enclaves established in a hostile environment."
15. V.J. Parry in COOK-1, p. 117.
16. V.J. Parry in PARRY & YAPP, p. 18.
17. BAYERLE-1, pp. 95-96, tells of Hungarian captains who threatened Christian villagers living in Ottoman territory with impalement if they dared pay their required taxes to the Turkish sipahis.
18. BAYERLE-1, p. 9.
19. GOR, IV, pp. 193, 200, 202-03.
20. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 83, of 2 August 1593: "Many here think that the sultan's anxiety for war is caused by the dread of a rising among the troops which have just come home from the Persian war."
21. PEÇÜYÎ, II, pp. 131-33.
22. BRAUDEL, I, pp. 394-418.
23. MINADOI, p. 76. He notes the Ottomans bought money cheaply in Cairo in 996/1587 and sold it for a 100 percent profit in Istanbul, i.e., 1 zecchino went for 43 maidin (akçe) in Cairo, and 84 in Istanbul.
24. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 81, in which the consul, Alessandro Malpiero, on 16 February 1596, complains about regular expenses, which are bad enough (salaries for pashas and the price of the courier to Constantinople), and irregular expenses, which are ad hoc demands made by greedy local officials.
25. For the land-tenure (timar) system of the Ottomans see PAKALIN, III, pp. 497-507, and İNALCIK-2, pp. 47-48.
26. KARPAT, pp. 48-49.
27. V.J. Parry in COOK-1, p. 121.
28. FUGGER, p. 201.
29. H. Inalcık in PARRY & YAPP, p. 200, who stresses the importance of local authorities in charge of the general enrollment.
30. As evidenced by PEÇÜYÎ, II, p. 200.

ENDNOTES, PAGES 13-15

31. H. İnalçık in PARRY & YAPP, p. 198, who says a musket cost about half the price of a horse, about thirty days' wages.
32. İNALCIK-2, pp. 48-49.
33. PURCHAS, VIII, p. 129. The writer, George Sandys, in 1610, tells of the "paucitie of Commanders, and their want of experience, some one Sanziack [bey] having under his conduct five thousand Timariots; and he perhaps but newly crept out of the Sultans Serraglio [i.e., the Palace School]."
34. KORTEPETER, pp. 213-14, and KUNT, pp. 233-39.
35. SORANZO, f. 19b.
36. KNOLLES 1687, I, p. 761.
37. AMASYA TARİHİ, II, p. 336.
38. GOR, IV, p. 255.
39. ARAKEL-2, pp. 42-43.
40. GOR, IV, pp. 195-98.
41. The term Celâli probably began as a popular term following the revolt in 925/1519 of Sheikh Celâl who, with several accomplices, stirred up Anatolians in the central triangle of Amasya, Turhal, and Tokat. A memorandum of 997/1580 in the Başvekâlet arşivi seems the earliest official recognition of the term (Divan Kalemi 997-8-C); thereafter the MD often contains references to Celâlîs until the period 1030/1620 when such usage decreases.
42. SORANZO, f. 18b.
43. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 100, letter of 20 August 1593.
44. GOR, IV, pp. 265-66. See map on p. 8 above.
45. KNOLLES 1603, p. 1068, who described the Ottoman light cavalry as "halfe naked horsemen," some thousands dying in one-half an hour's battle at Gran/Estergom.
46. SORANZO, f. 18b.



47. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 89. Alessandro Malpiero on 16 February 1596 wrote that the Syrian mounted musket men were "the best in the army of the Grand Signore. Of these every year 500 go to the war in Hungary, but the first year all went, and no one returned."
48. NAIMA, I, p. 91.
49. KNOLLES 1603, p. 1075, describes the flight of even Koca Sinan Pasha from battle in 1004/1595.
50. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 83.
51. GOR, IV, p. 221.
52. IORGA, III, p. 419.
53. NAIMA, I, p. 139.
54. NAIMA, I, p. 137; also GOR, IV, pp. 248-49.
55. KNOLLES 1603, p. 1097.
56. GOR, IV, pp. 255-56, and CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 247.
57. NAIMA, I, p. 153. See also V.J. Parry in PARRY & YAPP, pp. 219-20, fn. 1, which describes the Ottoman battle formation as translated from NAIMA, I, pp. 153-54.
58. PEÇÜYÎ, II, pp. 201-02.
59. NAIMA, I, p. 160.
60. NAIMA, I, p. 162.
61. PEÇÜYÎ, I, p. 198. Also PURCHAS, VIII, p. 320. The writer, Sir Edward Barton, the English ambassador, was forced to accompany the Sultan as a kind of hostage during the battle.
62. GOR, IV, pp. 269-270.
63. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 247, of 24 December 1596; also IORGA, III, p. 322.
64. KORTEPETER, pp. 150-52. This proved impolitic and led to a massive revolt in the Crimea.
65. Especially GOR, IV, p. 271. See below, p. 26.
66. NAIMA, I, p. 168.

ENDNOTES, PAGES 20-28

67. AKDAĞ-1, p. 188. I have seen only two folios of this defter, KKT, Divan Tahvil Kalemi, No. 347, the entire reference of which is to timars from 3,000 akçe (the lowest amount) to zeamets of 35,000 akçe (the highest recorded on the defter). All references are to land-holdings in Rumeli but do not necessarily refer to the Mezö-keresztes battle. Of the two folios, about 40 percent are zeamets, 60 percent timars.
68. GOR, IV, p. 284 ff.
69. GOR, IV, pp. 205-06.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. According to RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 111, he was a Turk (Muslim), a point supported by AKDAĞ-3, p. 594, quoting ARAKEL.
2. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 110, letter of 27 February 1602.
3. RAFAQ-2, p. 5, based on BURINI, II, p. 290 et seqq.
4. AKDAĞ-3, p. 594.
5. NAIMA, I, p. 232.
6. H. İnalcık in PARRY & YAPP, p. 200.
7. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 111. Ottoman officers in the far-off provinces often used force to continue a plush appointment by preventing the new appointee from arriving. See below, p. 111, where an Aleppan rebel, Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha supports this tactic.
8. AKDAĞ-3, p. 594.
9. AKDAĞ-3, p. 594.
10. PEÇÜYÎ, II, p. 253.
11. AKDAĞ-3, p. 595. The wealthy asserted he tried to establish a state.
12. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 108.
13. KNOLLES 1687, I, p. 779.
14. KNOLLES 1687, I, p. 779.
15. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 112.



16. Between them they had about 14,000 men, RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 108.
17. This general had a brother named Mahmud, also a pasha.
18. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 108.
19. GOR, IV, p. 280 ff., and pp. 367-70, on the treat arrangements with Austria in 1014/1605.
20. AKDAĞ-3, p. 594.
21. NAIMA, I, p. 232.
22. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 113.
23. SHIDYAQ, p. 131, asserts Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha of Aleppo came with his troops to help at this siege. See below, pp. 90-92.
24. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 105. For a description of the complicated political antagonism in Syria between Aleppo and Damascus, see BAKHIT, pp. 31-32.
25. NAIMA, I, p. 232.
26. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, pp. 112-13.
27. DANIŞMEND, III, p. 201, asserts the two were jealous of one another, quoting AMASYA TARİHİ. However, the contemporary Armenian priest, Grigor of Kemah (1595-1640) recalls (he was five years old at the time) that famine in Urfa brought on by the siege led to the decision to give up Hüseyin Pasha, after which the Ottoman armies relaxed their attack, ANDREASYAN, p. 31.
28. The Şaban 1008/February 1600 torture and execution was vividly described by an eye-witness, SANDERSON, pp. 88 and 191; it was also described by the Venetian bailo (in Istanbul) to the Doge, RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 113.
29. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 113; NAIMA, I, p. 233.
30. NAIMA, I, p. 233.
31. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 114.
32. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 114.
33. There are several such references to this. For example, NAIMA, I, pp. 246-47, quotes the Hükm-ü

ENDNOTES, PAGES 33-35

- Karayazıcı (Order of Kara Yazıcı) which he promulgated after his victory over Hacı İbrahim Pasha at Kayseri, one sentence of which states, "Punishment will be given to anyone disobedient to this order, and all who accept it will carry out its imperial implications." AKDAĞ-1, pp. 245-46, however, argues that Kara Yazıcı was not, in this exercise, establishing himself or his family as a new Anatolian dynasty.
34. If he were a black, he would perforce have had relatively recently arrived ancestors in Anatolia, either slaves or free Muslims from Africa. The possibility of a relationship with Hüseyin Pasha when the latter was beylerbeyi of Habeş intrigues but cannot be proved.
 35. Cf. AKDAĞ-1, pp. 268-71, especially vesikas 12, 15, 16, and 17.
 36. This, of course, does not mention the problem Mehmed Pasha may have had in obtaining troops, always a difficulty to a commander. However, an eye-witness says the vizier did not make the best use of his men and "hath about 1000,000 men in the feild and the rebell hath only 7,000 soldiers within the towne of valient men, who dayly breaketh fourth upone the Vizears forces and hath killed many of the janessaryes of Damasko," a letter from Thomas Freake in Aleppo to John Sanderson, 30 November 1599, in SANDERSON, p. 186. About a month later Richard Colehurst wrote a letter on 1 December 1599 which tells of 8,000 rebels in Urfa, "strounge men, very resolute. The Vizear hath been before the place this 7 or 8 weeks with 50,000 men," SANDERSON, p. 187. This would put the siege date as Rebi'ülâhır 1008/October 1599. Kara Yazıcı remained from the "summer of 1599 to the summer of 1600," according to AKDAĞ-1, p. 198. It seems that Mahmud Pasha's siege was not an active one.
 37. PEÇÜYÎ, II, p. 253. This was included in a letter to the Sublime Porte by the accused nephew of the şeyhülislâm, Çelebi Kadı, and is not necessarily an unbiased statement concerning Mehmed Pasha's activities.
 38. GOR, IV, p. 304.
 39. NAIMA, I, p. 233.
 40. According to AKDAĞ-3, p. 594, Çorum may have been his birthplace.



41. ARAKEL-2, p. 43.
42. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 115, and NAIMA, I, p. 246, who says 1000 Janissaries fell.
43. BRAUDEL, II, p. 1204.
44. KORTEPETER, pp. 175-76.
45. PASTOR, XXIII, pp. 298-99. Sir Anthony Sherley accompanied the shah's emissary. Each, however, claimed precedence over the other, and ended by negotiating separately.
46. AKDAĞ-1, p. 200. See below, pp. 90-92, for Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin's Syrian involvement in this operation.
47. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 115, and DANIŞMEND, III, p. 208.
48. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, pp. 114-15, gives the details.
49. BRAUDEL, II, p. 1204.
50. NAIMA, I, p. 293.
51. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 115.
52. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 115. MUHİBBÎ, p. 101, gives his death as 26 Ramazan 1010/20 March 1602.
53. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 115.
54. NAIMA, I, p. 295.
55. AKDAĞ-3, p. 595. The author gave no sources for these "sealed and signed documents."
56. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 115.
57. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 116.
58. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 116. For more on this Turkoman leader see below p. 74 f.
59. SALISBURY-2, p. 227, and NAIMA, I, p. 293.
60. GÖKBİLGİN, p. 329.
61. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 116. Five million in gold seems excessive. DANIŞMEND, III, pp. 212-13, relates the story of how the wife of Hasan Pasha was spared.
62. GOR, IV, p. 321.

ENDNOTES, PAGES 40-44

63. SALISBURY-2, p. 227. Simeon, the Polish-Armenian traveller, described Tokat in 1020/1611 (almost a decade later) as a large city with a grand, brick-covered market. However, though 1000 Armenian families had lived there previously, he learned the Celâli raids caused half of these to flee, SIMEON, pp. 86-87.
64. GOR, IV, p. 321.
65. DANIŞMEND, III, p. 213, quoting from AMASYA TARİHİ, III, p. 296.
66. NAIMA, I, p. 296. GOR, IV, p. 321, asserts the rebels actually took the city, which seems improbable.
67. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 117.
68. GOR, IV, p. 321.
69. AKDAĞ-1, p. 212, who quotes a Şer'iye Sicili (official court register) from Ankara that the sum was 80,000 kuruş, or 9,600,000 akçe. This can be compared with the expenditures for the first six months of 1016/1607 for the entire Empire: 202,973,744 akçes, H. Sahillioğlu in COOK-2, p. 241.
70. KORTEPETER, pp. 176-78.
71. NAIMA, I, p. 305.
72. KNOLLES 1687, I, p. 811, asserts one of the Girays led a Celâli attack on Bursa.
73. NAIMA, I, p. 306.
74. PEÇÜYÎ, II, p. 253.
75. NAIMA, I, p. 324. "The year 1603 is justly termed the 'Year of Rebellion.'" GOR, IV, p. 339.
76. See BAKHIT, pp. 30-31, where this commonly occurred in Damascus and Aleppo.
77. GOR, IV, pp. 325-27, and DANIŞMEND, III, pp. 216-17, 218-19, which relate the details of this uprising.
78. NAIMA, I, p. 324.
79. GOR, IV, pp. 312-15.
80. MONSHI, II, pp. 847-54.



81. DANIŞMEND, III, p. 219. Deli Hasan's position was mediated by the turnacıbaşı Hüseyin Ağa, NAIMA, I, p. 324. He was vested with the symbols of office: a drum, a flag, and a robe of honor, plus 400 paid kapıkulu soldiers of the sultan, NAIMA, I, p. 325.
82. NAIMA, I, pp. 307-20, gives the details.
83. AKDAĞ-1, pp. 213-14.
84. NAIMA, I, p. 327.
85. The description of the rebel bands of Deli Hasan, NAIMA, I, pp. 327-28, implies their Turkoman background. The historian states the troops were almost naked, with amulets and chains on their necks, that some of them had camel bells tied to their horses, and many had long hair and looked like women. This points up the social differences existing between those who led the rebellions (often on an equality with the Ottoman askerî), and the rank and file of the Celâli armies. Quite often (as in this case) the sources refer to the sekbans and levends as being from eastern Anatolia and Syria. AKDAĞ-1, passim, often refers to the use of "ekrad ve â'rab-ı badiye [Kurds and desert Arabs]," p. 198, as well as Turkoman troops. One should not discount the importance of the eastern and Syrian groups which played a role in the Celâli wars. As Professor Rafeq points out, "it was largely among these ethnic groups, mainly Kurds and Turkoman, that the Jelâlis rose into prominence," RAFAQ-2, pp. 16-17. One must also assert, of course, that Anatolians, from Izmir to Erzurum, played the overwhelming role in the drama, both as participants in Celâli armies and, more importantly, as victims of the terror and barbarism practiced by the rebels.
86. Sultan Mehmed III later pardoned Selâmet Giray, who in 1017/1608 was appointed khan of all the Tatars by yet another sultan, Ahmed I, KORTEPETER, p. 230.
87. GOR, IV, p. 337.
88. NAIMA, I, p. 382; GOR, IV, p. 356. Temeşvar was often used as a place of semi-exile for important figures at this time. See below, p. 153, where Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha was sent to Temeşvar after his aborted revolt.
89. GOR, IV, p. 379.

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90. NAIMA, I, p. 440. Correspondence with European enemies was not uncommon, as will be seen in the case of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha of Aleppo, about the same time. See below, p. 128 ff.
91. NAIMA, I, pp. 439-40.
92. NAIMA, I, p. 440.
93. "celâflilerle sulh oldu," AKDAĞ-1, p. 241, alluding to official and other announcements pardoning Celâlis in 1011/1603.
94. All except felonious crimes were handled by the various millets, groups defined by religion, and protected by Ottoman and Shari'a law.
95. In Rebi'ülâhır 1012/September 1603. Tabriz fell on 19 Rebi'ülâhır/20 September, DANIŞMEND, III, p. 222. See also MONSHI, II, pp. 830-33.
96. See above, p. 4.
97. AKDAĞ-1, p. 277, quoting MD75, p. 207, of mid-1011 to 22 Zi'lhicce 1012/12 April 1603 to 22 April 1604.
98. The so-called sekban akçesi, an illegal tax demand of re'aya to pay for sekban musket men attached to local military commanders, AKDAĞ-1, p. 63.
99. From the aftermath of the Battle of Lepanto in 979/1571, during which foul weather kept Don Juan from pursuing his victory, throughout the period of the Celâli revolts, the sources, both Ottoman and non-Ottoman, refer to extraordinary climatic conditions. Examples abound: 991/1583, unusual quantities of ice between the Taman peninsula and Kerch (KORTEPETER, p. 75); 994/1585, the lack of rain in the Aegean region and Istanbul (GÜÇER, p. 9); 1001/1592, the intense cold and plague in January (CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 1); 1004/1595, a terrible winter in the Danube region (SHAW, I, p. 185); 1005/1596, at the battle of Mezö-kereszttes, an unusual cold in October (KNOLLES 1603, p. 1097); 1007/1598, unusual rains near Baghdad (SHERLEY, p. 145) and in Rumeli (GOR, IV, p. 285); 1008/1599, a terrible cold in Tabriz (ARAKEL-2, pp. 42-43). During the Great Celâli heyday, rains thwarted Deli Hasan at Kütahya in 1012/1603 (NAIMA, I, p. 306); early frosts were noted in Istanbul in 1015/1606 (SALIGNAC, p. 104); and storms stopped the invasion of Cyprus by the Grand Duke of Tuscany in 1607 (MARITI, p. 66). Contemporary European sources have supplied data which indicate that in the years 1550-1850, Europe experienced a "Little Ice Age"

(LADURIE, pp. 224-26). Since climatic systems are known to be interrelated around the globe (SCHNEIDER, p. 118), and because of recent dendrochronological evidence from tree ring analysis indicating growth abnormalities during the period in question (KUNIHOLM, p. 34, suggests a coincidence of minima of the tree rings he has surveyed with the scarcity [azlık] of the Anatolian region in the sixteenth century), it appears quite possible that extraordinary climatic changes played some role in the upset conditions which led to and supported the Great Celâli revolts.

100. JENNINGS, pp. 21-57.
101. AKDAĞ-1, pp. 253-54.
102. NAIMA, I, pp. 393-94.
103. DANIŞMEND, III, p. 232.
104. Cf. below, p. 93 ff., for Nasuh Pasha's experience in Aleppo.
105. SARUHAN, p. 12.
106. Thus FEZLEKE, I, p. 290. PEÇÜYÎ, II, p. 311, calls him Tavi Avil as does the earlier VASITÎ, f. 8a. The MD generally call him Tavi, except for MDZ8, p. 120, of 28 Şevval 1016/15 February 1608, where he is called Tavi Avil (and then the name is crossed out for some reason). According to ORHONLU, p. 652, Tavi Halil came from Bozok (now Yozgat, east of Ankara), and often fought alongside his celebrated brother, Maymun.
107. It lay on the road from Eskişehir to Konya. See map above, p. 30.
108. NAIMA, I, pp. 431-33.
109. SALIGNAC, p. 5, letter of 24 November 1605 to King Henry IV.
110. GOR, IV, p. 381. ALDERSON, Table XXXIII, fn. 2, implies the sultan's mother was poisoned, not by her son but by a harem intrigue. His date of 26 November 1605 seems a week too late.
111. LELLO, p. 22.
112. GOR, IV, p. 382.
113. IORGA, III, p. 434, quoting a Relazione.

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114. NAIMA, I, pp. 436-37. HBZ, f. 307a, says Tavil wrote, accepting the eyâlets of Anadolu and Sivas, but does not mention Aleppo. Sofu Sinan Pasha authorized this transfer.
115. SALIGNAC, p. 11, letter of 12 December 1605.
116. SALIGNAC, p. 16, fn. 2. This corroborates a letter from Sir Thomas Sherley to the Earl of Salisbury on 24 June 1606, six months afterward, who noted, "Taville, the great rebel of Asia is now so potent that he has presumed to make 12 bashaws and has distributed governments of provinces to them," SALISBURY-1, XVIII, p. 177. Professor Akdağ states, without citing a source, that the name of the victor of Bolvadin in 1014/1605 was "Tavil, surnamed Ahmed" (not Halil) and that his son Mehmed took power in Baghdad with a false ferman, AKDAĞ-2, pp. 117-18. This follows the theory of UZUNÇARŞILI, III/I, pp. 106-07, who believes Tavis was the father of Mustafa and Mehmed (called Taviilahmedoğlu), who rebelled against the Ottomans in Baghdad.
117. AKDAĞ-1, pp. 223-24, tells the background of these two.
118. SHAW, I, p. 187.
119. ORHONLU, p. 652.
120. GOR, IV, pp. 393-94; NAIMA, I, pp. 455-58. The various versions and interpretations are found in the article by BAYERLE-2, p. 28, who states that a mutually satisfactory version to both parties was signed only in Rebi'ülevvel 1021/May 1612, six years later.
121. MONSHI, II, p. 825 ff.
122. Pope Clement, up to his death in 1605, seriously planned an Easter Crusade to take back the Holy Land as well as the pressure off the Austrian Habsburgs. Cf. PASTOR, XXIII, pp. 290-98, and MONSHI, II, p. 1160. Pp. 1305-07 give a translation of the Pope's letter of 9 March 1624 to Shah Abbas. A successor, Paul V (1605-1621), visited the island of Chios in 1608, ARGENTII, p. 164.
123. NAIMA, I, p. 396. See map, p. 100.
124. See below, Chapter III, p. 99 ff.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. WITHERS, p. 87, "though peradventure they be maazold [from ma'zul olmak, to be dismissed] again, before they be scarce warm in their places."
2. Aleppo and Damascus were two of the nine most important chief judgeships in the Empire, the others being Istanbul, Edirne, Bursa (in Anatolia), Cairo, Jerusalem, Medina, and Mecca (in the Arab regions). SHAW, I, p. 134.
3. SANJIAN, p. 261, mentions an Armenian, Çelebi Petik, who acted as the customs officer (gümrukemini) for the important Syrian port of Tripoli, as well as Aleppo and Iskenderun. See also de GROOT, p. 44.
4. HOLT, pp. 102-03.
5. Abdul-Karim Rafeq in PARRY & YAPP, p. 288.
6. LAMMENS, II, p. 55.
7. LAMMENS, II, p. 60. HADŽIBEGIĆ, pp. 149-50, states six, plus 4000 soldiers. The numbers varied over and within the centuries.
8. HADŽIBEGIĆ, pp. 149-50.
9. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 89. See also Abdul-Karim Rafeq in PARRY & YAPP, p. 281, who mentions the use of Kurds as timar levies as early as the mid-tenth/mid-sixteenth century.
10. BARKAN, p. 19. The "income of the military class [of Janissaries] had to be increased, if their livelihood was to be insured. Because of this the soldiers were allowed to enter fields of commerce. Thus began the destruction of military discipline."
11. BAKHIT, p. 31.
12. The child-tribute system, by this time, had lapsed into disuse. Cf. MÉNAGE, p. 212.
13. SALISBURY-2, p. 215. See also RAFAQ-2, pp. 4-5.
14. SAUVAGET, p. 196. See also A.-K. Rafeq, in PARRY & YAPP, p. 280, who quotes a contemporary Arab calling the soldiers al-Jund al-Sultānī, the sultan's troops.
15. SIMEON, p. 154, fn. 26, quoting Tavernier. The total number of Maronite Catholics was about 250,000.

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16. SANJIAN, p. 48. SIMEON, p. 153, calls him Bedik or Bedros. Also de GROOT, p. 303, fn. 40, states the family name was Karağoz.
17. DELLA VALLE, p. 277.
18. PURCHAS, VIII, p. 239, letter from George Sandys, about 1610.
19. See especially ORHONLU, p. 679.
20. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, pp. 77, 80.
21. PURCHAS, VIII, p. 501 (from Sir Anthony Sherley).
22. BRAUDEL, I, p. 351. See also WOOD, pp. 75-76.
23. BRAUDEL, I, p. 28.
24. CSP-SIMANCAS, III, p. 366.
25. BRAUDEL, I, pp. 548-49.
26. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 183.
27. CARTWRIGHT, p. 41. He was in Aleppo from 1606-1607.
28. TREVOR, p. 471.
29. DELLE VALLE, p. 280.
30. BRAUDEL, I, p. 60.
31. SHERLEY, p. 108.
32. RELAZIONI, I, pp. 217-28, of 1553. See also ROBSON, p. 16.
33. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 69.
34. RELAZIONI, II, p. 294, dispatch from Giovanni Micheli.
35. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 81, who tells of a 5 percent surcharge on Venetian merchants levied to pay 100,000 ducats to local authorities.
36. BRAUDEL, II, p. 727.
37. BRAUDEL, I, p. 548.
38. STEENSGAARD, pp. 74-81, calls the costs of protection (customs duties, risks of piracy, etc.), "Redistributive Enterprises." See also pp. 111-13.

39. MANTRAN-2, p. 112, in 991/1583, a total of 340,000 akçes annually. See also STEENSGAARD, p. 158 ff., for an analysis of Aleppo's silk trade.
40. The well-known Ottoman-French "Capitulations" of 942/1536 appear never to have been confirmed, de GROOT, p. 290, n. 31.
41. BRAUDEL, I, pp. 626-28.
42. BRAUDEL, I, p. 634, and de GROOT, pp. 114-25. The Dutch received their capitulatory rights in 1021/1612.
43. STEENSGAARD, pp. 177-87, outlines these European hopes and objectives for Aleppo from 1593 to 1615.
44. BAUSANI, p. 147.
45. MASSON, p. 377. See map above, p. 68.
46. SANJIAN, p. 48.
47. DAVIES, p. 112. It was found to be uneconomical, and H. İnalçık in COOK-2, p. 213.
48. A.-K. Rafeq in NAFF & OWEN, p. 55.
49. SALIBI, pp. 28-29; RAFAQ-1, pp. 206, 208.
50. SALIBI, p. 32.
51. LAMMENS, II, p. 71, quoting a Relazione.
52. CARALI-2, I, p. 56, and RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 76.
53. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 84. It was also known as the "Church [grave] yard of the Franks." STEENSGAARD, p. 47.
54. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 76, note by Tommaso Contarini of 11 December 1593.
55. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 107, by Giorgio Emo, of 12 December 1599. In 1597 the English had erected a stone warehouse there according to WOOD, p. 24.
56. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 85, states contrary winds made it almost unusable in the period from summertime to the end of September.
57. SALIBI, p. 32, who sketches the Ma'n-Sayfā antagonisms.
58. BRAUDEL, I, pp. 565-66.

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59. RELAZIONI-SYRIA, p. 107.
60. The possible reasons are discussed below in Chapter IV, p. 156.
61. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 456, letter of 3 April 1610. The Ottoman government reopened Iskenderun in 1612, de GROOT, p. 215, or 1613 according to WOOD, p. 76.
62. BRAUDEL, II, p. 1103.
63. BRAUDEL, II, p. 1104.
64. TENENTI, pp. 84-85.
65. TENENTI, p. 86.
66. BRAUDEL, I, pp. 341-42.
67. TENENTI, op. cit., p. 84.
68. RELAZIONI, III, p. 245; and BRAUDEL, II, p. 875.
69. CSP-VENICE, X, pp. 300-01, of 1 February 1606, and p. 385, of 10 August 1606.
70. CSP-VENICE, XI, pp. 27-28.
71. BRAUDEL, II, pp. 865-91.
72. BRAUDEL, II, p. 876.
73. ARGENTI, p. 161, who asserts, "The Jews positively preferred to be ruled by Turks, and were prepared, in moments of emergency, to fight side by side with them, in order to preserve Turkish power."
74. CSP-FOREIGN, XXIII, p. 348, and SALISBURY-2, p. 227, letter of 26 July 1602.
75. Sir Thomas, brother of Anthony and Robert, spent three years in an Istanbul jail, to be released only by the direct request of King James I on 25 Receb 1014/6 December 1605, DAVIES, p. 178.
76. BRAUDEL, II, p. 878.
77. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 69, of 24 April 1593.
78. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 45, of 10 August 1592, and p. 77, of 21 June 1593.
79. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 81, of 22 July 1593.
80. CSP-VENICE, X, p. 163.



81. UZUNÇARSILI, III/2, pp. 147-48.
82. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 44, and BRAUDEL, II, p. 867 ff., who explain the life style of the privateer.
83. CSP-VENICE, X, p. 394.
84. DAVIES, p. 103.
85. CARALI-2, p. 117. Christians normally fell under the Pope's ban of excommunication for selling arms to Muslims.
86. CARALI-2, pp. 140-41.
87. DAVIES, p. 83. The spelling of Corai's name is clearly MichelAngiolo Corai, MEDICI, f. 115a.
88. DAVIES, p. 77.
89. PURCHAS, VIII, p. 386 (from Sir Anthony Sherley).
90. CSP-VENICE, XI, p. 211, and HILL, pp. 48-50.
91. CSP-VENICE, XI, p. 211, of 3 January 1609. Doubtless the idea had been discussed much earlier than this observation.
92. SHIDYAQ, p. 132; RAFAQ-2, pp. 1-3 and table on p. 21; RONDOT, p. 443. There are variant spellings in the sources of the name, which is a composite of the Persian words cān, soul, and pūlād, steel. Ottoman contemporaries of Hüseyn Pasha spell it جان بولاد (TKA), or جانبولاد (VASITI). The historians vary slightly: thus جانبولاداغلی in Naima, ابن جانبولاد or جانبولاد دژاد in FEZLEKE, and جان بولا طزاره in PEÇÜYİ. In a letter to John Sanderson of 6 May 1607, John Kitley tells of "the rebellion of Janpolatouglic," SANDERSON, p. 265, which is a contemporary Englishman's pronunciation, and would indicate the rebel was called the "son of Canbulad" using the Turkish oğlu rather than the Persian zāde. A confirmation of this is found in a document in AET, No. 616, which uses "Canpuladoğlu." (See Appendix I, below.) The name is used in Arabic construction in the treaty signed by Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha: "hakim-i bilād-i Sūriye 'Alī ibni Ahmed ibni Cānbūlād (the ruler of the lands of Syria, Ali, the son of Ahmed, the son of Canbulad)," in AM, f. 117b.
93. ANON-2, IX, p. 316.
94. TEKİNDAG, III, p. 22.

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95. MEDICI, f. 117b, the Arabic of which translates, "of the descendants of the estimable Abbas, God's satisfaction be upon him, from him, a legitimate descendant."
96. TEKİNDAĞ, III, p. 22. Kilis, north of Aleppo, just within the modern Turko-Syrian border, is spelled Killis or very seldom Killiz according to DARKOT, VI, p. 806. Cf. MUHİBBÎ, p. 110.
97. MASSON, p. 377. The map above, p. 68.
98. AYNÎ ALI, p. 26.
99. EVLİYA, IX, p. 361.
100. EVLİYA, IX, p. 360. See also DARKOT, VI, pp. 806, 807.
101. SÜREYYA, II, p. 67. The question of the number and names of the immediate sons of Canbulad is difficult to answer. Of Hüseyin and Habib there is specific information in MD16, No. 429, p. 223, of 10 Ramazan 979/27 January 1572, "Order to Canbulad Bey...and of your sons who are emirs of the greatest, Habib and Hüseyin." There undoubtedly was another brother, Ahmed, whose son was the famous Ali Pasha, MEDICI, f. 117b. IBN GUM'A, pp. 198-99, states that a Muhammed Pasha b. Canbulad was governor of Damascus from 1014/19 May 1605 to 1016/28 April 1607. Other brothers are mentioned in RAFEQ-2, p. 21, and the genealogical chart. See also SHIDYAQ, p. 130.
102. MUHİBBÎ, p. 110.
103. SHIDYAQ, p. 130.
104. DON JUAN, p. 148.
105. As emir, he kept the local peace, solved local problems, while the beylerbeyi, a kapıkulu officer sent from Istanbul led the troops in battle and administered the region in its official military capacity. See also SHIDYAQ, p. 130.
106. DON JUAN, p. 170. The Spanish source for his name writes "Hassain Baxa Granbulat," p. 344.
107. SHIDYAQ, p. 130.
108. MUHİBBÎ, p. 110.
109. MUHİBBÎ, p. 110.

110. SHIDYAQ, p. 130. Support of "pious Muslims" doubtless elicited a favorable response from the eşraf of Aleppo, whose identity and power derived in great part from their real (or alleged) blood-connection with the Prophet Muhammad.
111. MUHİBBÎ, p. 110.
112. AYNÎ ALÎ, p. 26.
113. TEKİNDAG, III, p. 22.
114. MUHİBBÎ, pp. 96-97.
115. See above, p. 29.
116. SAUVAGET, pp. 164-65.
117. AYNÎ ALÎ, p. 27. These figures date from 1018/1609, but did not vary significantly in a decade. For a French translation, see BELIN, p. 276.
118. AYNÎ ALÎ, p. 55. Aleppo eyâlet had a total of 104 zeamets and 799 timars.
119. LAMMENS, II, p. 64, who admits the figure depends on the source.
120. SIMEON, p. 155, mentions Arabic as the general language; LAMMENS, p. 64, indicates speakers of Italian, French, Spanish, English, German, Dutch, Persian, and Hindi, and DELLA VALLE, p. 278, tells of Uzbek speakers.
121. MANTRAN-2, p. 111.
122. HBZ, f. 305a. This is a brother of Koca Sinan Pasha's son Mehmed, who fought Kara Yazıcı at Urfa. See above, pp. 29-32.
123. The lakab or nickname of Ottoman kapıkulu often derived from some incident in the educational process at the Palace School, an event, characteristic, or ability for which the boy was well known.
124. HBZ, f. 305a, "and he said in a petition about Sinanpaşazade that he had become a Celâlî and had taken from him the eyâlet of Damascus, the abode of goodness, by means of force and many soldiers. And Hoca Hasmi, as Osman Pasa was known, was given by ferman both the eyâlet of Damascus and the authority to jail Sinanpaşazade in the castle of Damascus and to restrain all his accomplices in that area on order of a royal command. And the aforementioned Osman

Pasa came to Damascus, of a fortunate conclusion, and in accordance with the ferman secured the eyâlet and jailed Sinanpaşazade in the castle." The "Sinanpaşazade" in question was not the son of Cağalazade Sinan but of Koca Sinan Pasha, who had been five times grand vizier.

125. SHIDYAQ, p. 131. See above, pp. 29-31.
126. SHIDYAQ, p. 131. Possibly this Celâlî had served as an aide to Kara Yazıcı.
127. MINGANA, p. 517. Nasuh Pasha is the same man who figured prominently in the Ottoman loss to the Celâlî Taviî Halil and an important role in Baghdad (See above, pp. 52-54). He later (1020-1023/1611-1614) was grand vizier. He may have been a close associate of Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha at an earlier time, for MUHIBBÎ, p. 113, avers he married Hüseyin's daughter and then left her, but kept her dowry, an illegal act in Islamic law.
128. RAFEQ-2, p. 2.
129. MUHIBBÎ, p. 111.
130. SHIDYAQ, p. 131.
131. RAFEQ-2, p. 2, gives the date: mid-Şaban 1012/mid-January 1604.
132. SHIDYAQ-1, p. 131.
133. See above, p. 104 ff.
134. It came by way of Hoca Hasmi Osman Pasha in Damascus.
135. FEZLEKE, I, p. 291, "ocaklık sahiblerine tevcih-i eyâlet hilâf-ı kanundur."
136. SHIDYAQ, p. 132.
137. MD75, No. 100, states, "Order to the beylerbeyi of Aleppo, Hüseyin Pasha, may he always be fortunate, to you who have been given the right of the government of the sancak of Kilis and of the eyâlet of Aleppo.... dated the sixth day of Safer 1013 [4 July 1604]."
138. At some time near Zi'lkade 1012/April 1604, Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin wrote the commander-in-chief, Cağalazade Sinan Pasha, of Nasuh's unwillingness to give up Aleppo. The orders from the commander in

Persia were clear: if Nasuh would not give up the evâlet, an army was to be sent against him, FEZLEKE, I, pp. 267, 291.

139. No date for this siege is given in the sources. MD75 gives nine hüküm (directives) to the beylerbeyi of Aleppo from 6 Safer 1013/4 July 1604 to 20 Zi'l-kade 1013/10 April 1605. On two occasions the directives are addressed to Hüseyin Pasha, of which one tells of his promotion to governor, No. 100 of 6 Safer 1013/4 July 1604. (See above, fn. 138.) An MD catalogued in KKT, 70, p. 31, of 25 Rebi'ülâhır 1013/22 September 1604, tells of the investment of Aleppo by Hüseyin Pasha as an event of the past: "Order to the vizier Mehmed Pasha, now protector of Damascus: the province of Aleppo...was given to Nasuh [Pasha], may he always prosper...and when [the command] was given to [Canbuladoğlu] Hüseyin, may he always prosper, on the part of the commander-in-chief of the East, [Cağalazade] Sinan Pasha, the aforementioned marched to Aleppo with soldiers." Thus Hüseyin Pasha was given Aleppo about 6 Safer 1013/4 July 1604, the siege began shortly thereafter, and ended some time before 25 Rebi'ülâhır 1013/22 September 1604.
140. HBZ, f. 305a. RAFEQ-2, p. 3, states Hüseyin promised 600,000 gold pieces to the Ottoman treasury.
141. MUHİBBÎ, p. 113. This agrees with official Ottoman records. SHİDYAQ, p. 132, states more than four months. The longer period may include the period of negotiations.
142. MUHİBBÎ, pp. 112, 113.
143. SHİDYAQ, p. 132. Quite likely, Mahmud (or Muhammad) Sharîf, speaking on behalf of the Aleppan eşraf aristocracy, recognized the weakness of Nasuh and elected to save what was left of the city's commerce.
144. SHİDYAQ, p. 132.
145. The fact that the eşraf of Aleppo accepted Hüseyin does not necessarily mean they supported him or worked for his success. Time alone would prove his value to them, if any.
146. MD, KKT, 70, p. 31. See above, note 139.
147. MD75, No. 250, of 16 Zi'l-kade 1013/5 April 1605, "Order to the beylerbeyi of Aleppo, in this auspicious year you and all of the holders of timars, both great and small, in your province [be united with] the former grand vizier presently grand admiral, my

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- vizier Sinan Pasha who is my commander-in-chief in the East, that the eastern areas may be protected."
148. SHIDYAQ, p. 132, who states Hüseyin "purposely gathered the soldiers very slowly."
 149. FEZLEKE, I, p. 291.
 150. MONSHI, II, pp. 828-32.
 151. See above, pp. 39-54.
 152. ARAKEL-1, I, p. 303.
 153. MONSHI, II, pp. 859-60. Also ARAKEL-1, I, p. 279.
 154. ARAKEL-1, I, pp. 287-89.
 155. MONSHI, II, p. 858.
 156. KORTEPETER, p. 90. See also MONSHI, I, p. 445.
 157. MONSHI, II, pp. 858-64.
 158. DANIŞMEND, III, p. 235; MONSHI, II, p. 858.
 159. PAKALIN, I, p. 205.
 160. DANIŞMEND, III, p. 236.
 161. MONSHI, II, p. 860.
 162. NAIMA, I, p. 395.
 163. GOR, IV, p. 359.
 164. NAIMA, I, p. 396, and ARAKEL-1, I, p. 303.
 165. Two months earlier the serdar had sent a directive to Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin in Aleppo to bring troops, MD77, No. 21, p. 2, of 18 Şevval 1013/9 March 1605. A month afterwards an urgent demand for troops for the eastern campaign went to Hüseyin, MD75 in KKT, No. 250, dated 16 Zi'lkade 1013/5 April 1605. Assuming he received the orders, Hüseyin had plenty of time to prepare for the fall campaign.
 166. ARAKEL-1, I, p. 304, and MONSHI, II, pp. 875-76.
 167. MONSHI, II, p. 887.
 168. ARAKEL-1, I, p. 305.



169. Typical of these groups of easily accessible (and often undependable) Kurdish levies was the governor of Jazira, Mir Sharaf. Although a vassal of the Ottomans, Mir Sharaf had long been a close associate of the Safavid court, MONSHI, II, p. 894.
170. For Nasuh's battle with Tavi Halil in western Anatolia, see above, pp. 52-53.
171. SALIGNAC, p. 19. A contemporary Persian source indicated 100,000, which seems excessive, MONSHI, II, p. 887.
172. MONSHI, I, p. 887, and ARAKEL-1, I, p. 305.
173. MONSHI, II, pp. 888-89.
174. MONSHI, II, p. 893, believed the battle took place at Sufyan, farther north, but Ottoman descriptions of the battle site and Abbas' methods indicate a more southerly place.
175. The battle is well-described in MALCOLM, I, p. 539 ff. He states that a movement to the rear, for undisciplined forces "is certain of producing confusion." For an eye-witness Persian view, see MONSHI, II, pp. 888-93.
176. Thus SALIGNAC, p. 20. Standard Ottoman accounts (e.g., NAIMA, I, p. 425, say 21 Rebi'ülâhır/6 September, which, unless the winter was unseasonably early, seems too soon. ARAKEL-1, I, p. 306, states 8-12 Cemaziyülâhır/21-25 October; and Persian sources cite 24 Cemaziyülâhır/6 November, MONSHI, II, p. 888, either of which could be correct.
177. NAIMA, I, pp. 425-30, gives a description of the battle.
178. ARAKEL-1, I, p. 305.
179. GOR, IV, p. 377.
180. MONSHI, II, pp. 889-90.
181. He was actually in an opium-induced sleep states DANIŞMEND, III, p. 240. Possibly this was more medicinal than recreational.
182. FEZLEKE, I, p. 266. NAIMA, I, p. 428.
183. FEZLEKE, I, p. 266.

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184. SALIGNAC, pp. 19, 20. The Persian eye-witnesses describe in detail the booty, MONSHI, II, pp. 896-97. Among those executed were Osman Pasha, beylerbeyi of Syria, and Köse Sefer Pasha, the erstwhile Celâli, who was executed because of his "previous unacceptable conduct," said MONSHI, II, p. 891. Perhaps he alludes to Köse Sefer Pasha's life as a Celâli and brigand, or of his "constant boasting of his military prowess."
185. NAIMA, I, p. 428.
186. PEÇÜYÎ, II, p. 265, who says he had 12,000 men.
187. HBZ, f. 305b.
188. There is some difference of opinion on just how Hüseyin died. FEZLEKE, I, p. 266, says he was executed on orders of Cağalazade Sinan Pasha by beheading. This is copied almost word for word in NAIMA, I, p. 429. PEÇÜYÎ, II, p. 266, says simply that Cağalazade killed him without mentioning the method of execution. HBZ, whose account these later historians may copy since it is the earliest, says, "with severe reprimand and giving no mercy at all, he cut his neck," f. 305b. A statement by the English ambassador Henry Lello, who reflected on the story circulated among consular groups in İstanbul, was "The Bassa of Aleppo, being comanded this last yeare to go into Persia to Cigalla [Cağalazade Sinan Pasha] with all his forces left a kinsman of his, one Aly to governe in his place. at his coming to Cigalla he was strangled by order from 105 [cipher code for the sultan, Ahmed I] upon suspition he favored the Rebellis," SPO, No. 97, f. 53b, letter of 25 January 1606. A similar report was made on 29 January 1606 by an anonymous correspondent in İstanbul to the Duke Ferdinand of Tuscany, CARALI-2, p. 139.
189. The first was his decision to punish all those who failed to appear for muster after the battle of Mezö-keresztés in 1005/1596. See above, pp. 19-20.
190. NAIMA, I, p. 429. SHERLEY, p. 21, fn. 1, says he "poisoned himself by drinking powdered diamonds." The date of his death remains uncertain. NAIMA, I, p. 429, says he died 21 Receb 1014/2 December 1605. ARAKEL-1, I, p. 306, gives 15 Şevval 1014/6 February 1606, which seems late.
191. MONSHI, II, pp. 906, 909-10.
192. MONSHI, II, p. 940.

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193. SALIGNAC, p. 24.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. GOR, IV, p. 386.
2. DANIŞMEND, III, p. 245; GOR, IV, p. 384. I find no connection between Taviil Halil, the Celâli victor at Bolvadin (see above, p 53) and the Taviilahmed (or Uz-unahmed) sons of Baghdad. See MONSHI, II, pp. 839-40.
3. SALIGNAC, p. 93.
4. GOR, IV, p. 299, fn. a, from a Relazione of 1606.
5. SALIGNAC, pp. 92-93.
6. GOR, IV, p. 385.
7. CARALI-2, I, p. 139, quotes a Tuscan report that he was considered "a man of quality, from the household of the Prince of Syria, a good and resolute man."
8. SALIGNAC, pp. 86-87, fn. 2, in a letter by his assistant, Baudier, of 14 November 1606, mentions the men of high quality who surrounded Ali Pasha, assuring the Aleppan of the loyalty of the Syrian region.
9. SHIDYAQ, p. 133. See RAFEQ-2 for a description of the basic issues, pp. 8-9.
10. MUHIBBÎ, p. 115, and CARALI-2, I, pp. 89-90.
11. RAFEQ-1, p. 202.
12. SHIDYAQ, p. 133.
13. SHIDYAQ, p. 133.
14. RAFEQ-2, p. 9. According to the French ambassador, Yusuf lost twelve cannon, SALIGNAC, pp. 82-83.
15. BURINI, f. 150b. My sincere thanks to Professor Abdul-Karim Rafeq of the University of Damascus for sending me photostatic copies of this MS; SALIGNAC, pp. 86-87, fn. 2.
16. SALIGNAC, p. 86, fn. 2, in which Baudier describes Ali Pasha "taking his army towards Damascus, pillaging and ravaging that beautiful countryside." The pasha sent to help was forced to pay Ali Pasha "quite

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a good sum of denarius...in order that they might have peace and tranquility in their respective countries."

17. BURINI, f. 151a.
18. MUHIBBÎ, p. 103.
19. SHIDYAQ, p. 133, and MUHIBBÎ, p. 115.
20. GOR, IV, p. 399; CARALI-2, p. 139.
21. SHIDYAQ, p. 133.
22. RAFEQ-1, p. 202; MUHIBBÎ, pp. 105, 108.
23. BURINI, f. 151a, and RAFEQ-1, p. 203.
24. MARITI, p. 61. This was actually accomplished by Fahreddin's younger brother. Like Canbuladoğlu and Seyfoğlu, Ma'noğlu Fahreddin did his best to consolidate his power. Though what he took was illegal, he continued to send taxes to İstanbul, pretending loyalty.
25. BURINI, f. 151b; and IBN GUM'A, p. 196.
26. BURINI, f. 151b.
27. RAFEQ-1, pp. 202, 204.
28. SALIGNAC, p. 92.
29. SALIGNAC, p. 87.
30. BURINI, f. 151b.
31. RAFEQ-1, pp. 204-05, gives several reasons why Canbuladoğlu did not take Damascus.
32. BURINI, f. 151b.
33. RAFEQ-1, p. 203, although BURINI, f. 152a, states a month and a half later, mid-Cemaziülâhır 1015/ 19 October 1606.
34. SHIDYAQ, p. 134.
35. BURINI, f. 152a.
36. KNOLLES 1687, II, p. 872: "he gave free Access and Traffick unto all the Merchants of Persia and of the Indies."



37. RAFEQ-1, p. 203.
38. BURINI, f. 152b.
39. SHIDYAQ, p. 134.
40. CARALI-2, I, p. 89. Yusuf gave Ali Pasha 300,000 piastres (kuruş) according to RAFEQ-2, p. 12.
41. RAFEQ-1, p. 204. Canbulad's close relationship with Fahreddin in this campaign helped Ali's relatives find sanctuary in Mount Lebanon in the years after his defeat.
42. See Appendix I, p. 240.
43. See map, p. 119.
44. By Şaban 1015/December 1606 he was officially accepted. See AET, No. 456. SALIGNAC, p. 89, called him "governor of Aleppo" as early as a letter of 13 September 1606.
45. Tarsus had an important economic connection with Aleppo: a silkworm industry existed there, according to William Biddulph, in 1600, PURCHAS, VIII, pp. 256-57.
46. See above, p. 111.
47. SALIGNAC, p. 49, fn. 1.
48. ORHONLU, p. 652.
49. AV, filza 64, f. 81, of 27 April 1607. My sincere thanks to Professor Andreas Tietze of the University of Vienna for obtaining these documents for me. Cf. SALIGNAC, p. 117, and MONSHI, II, pp. 839-40.
50. VASITI, f. 11b. There appears no compelling evidence in contemporary sources that Canbuladoğlu Ali acted or was accepted as the leader of all the Anatolian Celâlis, an assertion often made, most recently by H. İnalcık in İNALCIK-2, pp. 50-51.
51. SALIGNAC, p. 163. Both of these became terrifying opponents of the Ottomans by 1018/1609. See below, pp. 204-06.
52. Appendix I, p. 240. SALIGNAC, p. 163, states Ali Pasha used his enmity with Maraş as a ruse, to be viewed officially as protecting his Syrian interests,

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but actually as a rebellion against the Porte. The name of the pasha is not given.

53. DANIŞMEND, III, p. 316, and ANON-1, I, p. 15. Also, de GROOT, pp. 74-75, *et passim*. Abaza Pasha rebelled in the name of Sultan Osman II, murdered in 1031/1622.
54. GOR, IV, pp. 399-400; MEDICI, f. 114b.
55. MEDICI, f. 113a.
56. SANJIAN, p. 261.
57. SALIGNAC, pp. 49, 125.
58. SALIGNAC, p. 125, and TESTA, I, p. 173.
59. This is clearly evidenced by many letters in AV, filza 64 (1607), 65 (1607), and 66 (1608).
60. GOR, IV, p. 400.
61. FEZLEKE, I, pp. 291-92.
62. SALIGNAC, p. 85.
63. This probably included tax registers, documents pertaining to port facilities, military responsibilities, all of which would later be used by Murad Pasha to nullify Syrian military and economic plans for expansion. See below, p. 156.
64. CARALI-1, pp. 68-69. His often uncontrollable sekbans began to pillage Aleppo even on the eve of the final battle in 1015/1606.
65. HBZ, f. 303b.
66. CSP-VENICE, XI, pp. 33-34.
67. FEZLEKE, I, p. 279. KORTEPETER, p. 203, says "the peace appears to be a convenient accommodation for both parties." ORHONLU, p. 652, states Murad Pasha was appointed serdar in Hungary 5 Muharrem 1015/13 May 1606.
68. See below, p. 162 ff.
69. AV, filza 64, f. 18, of 13 March 1607.



70. AV, filza 64, f. 103, of 12 May 1607. This was kept secret until the march had begun, VASITI, f. 7b. Ambassador Henry Lello referred to the abrupt change, CSP-VENICE, XI, pp. 33-34.
71. SALIGNAC, p. 117, letter of 24 January 1607.
72. AV, filza 64, f. 103, of 12 May 1607: "They have secretly kept the stables of the sultan [in Istanbul] furnished and ready with camels and other animals to serve the royal family. The purpose of such secrecy was to keep the [rebel] enemy in the dark."
73. Baudier, in SALIGNAC, pp. 409, 423, describes how Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha had communicated with the Shah, and that Ali assumed the Shah would offer him asylum if he were defeated. The Venetians heard this, too, AV, filza 64, f. 81, of 27 April 1607.
74. Kalenderoğlu Mehmet availed himself of this. See Chapter V, p. 203 ff.
75. KNOLLES 1687, II, p. 873.
76. STEENSGAARD, pp. 211-24, tells of this "dream of the Great Alliance."
77. LITHGOW, op. cit., p. 167, and HILL, IV, p. 48. See above, pp. 69-70.
78. He failed to conquer Cyprus in May 1607 which only whetted his appetite, for he lost not because of Ottoman military strength but his own inadequate logistic support, HILL, IV, p. 49.
79. CARALI-2, p. 140.
80. SHERLEY, p. 106.
81. SHERLEY, pp. 18, 27.
82. They probably arrived shortly before Ali Pasha's four-month struggle with Seyfoğlu Yusuf, Muharrem-Cemaziülevvel 1015/June-September 1606.
83. MEDICI, f. 113a. "che per abbasare e destruggere come possibil sara col divino aiuto l'Impero Ottomano & per accrescere le Potenza di Casa Giampulat & particolarmente inalzare l'inclita persona Nostra [i.e., Ali Pasha]."
84. The vagueness of "altri Potentati e Principi Chr[isti]ani" (and other Christian princes and potentates) as well as the whole tenor of the Treaty as

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something projected for the future but not based on much of anything in the past, makes it appear to have been arrived at only hesitantly and tentatively by both parties.

85. MEDICI, f. 113b, capitula no. 3.
86. MEDICI, f. 113b, capitula no. 1.
87. MEDICI, f. 71, "List of necessities," makes no commitment of any large quantity of arms except for 1000 musket barrels. The list includes:
 1. Five pieces of field artillery and spare parts;
 2. 1000 barrels (canne archibusso) for muskets which measure 5 palms...according to the design of Sig. Hipp. L.
 3. Jackets (ten)...
 4. Marble columns, both white and mixed colors...
 5. A sculptured lion...
 6. One extra-large cask of maraschino [wine]
 7. A gardner and a bombardier...
 8. 12 pistols...
 9. 2 muskets which can rotate [or that can be wheeled].
88. MEDICI, f. 113b.
89. See above, fn. 87, item nos. 1 and 2.
90. MEDICI, f. 114a, capitula no. 4.
91. Ali Pasha had no real control of Jerusalem, though in theory his word was law south to Gaza. He had no immediate means of enforcing such arrangements.
92. CARALI-2, I, p. 32, fn. 4, telling that Murad Pasha had an emir, Hüseyin Fayyad, killed for 2000 piastres, offered to Murad by the uncle of the victim. This kind of official murder was not uncommon.
93. IBN GUM'A, p. 193; MONSHI, I, p. 445; SÜREYYA, IV, p. 355, where no date is given.
94. There appears no documental lacunae to account for this. Doubtless many documents have been destroyed in the intervening three and one-half centuries. However, in the appendix No. 8 of the MD, dates inclusive of 28 Safer 1016-14 Zi'lkade 1016/25 June 1607-30 February 1608 (which includes the battle of Oruç Ovası, 2 Receb 1016/23 October 1607), the relevant documents mention campaigns against Celâlis, and against the city of Aleppo, but not a word of

Canbuladoğlu Ali himself. The relevant documents are MDZ8, pp. 1, 65, 173, 148, 168, 169, and 117, in correct chronological order.

95. MDZ8, No. 520, p. 201, of 5 Cemaziyülâhır 1018/ 6 September 1609, after Canbuladoğlu was in a Belgrade prison, mentions "the well-known Babapir Şa'ban, who was heretofore of the brigands of Canbuladoğlu (Canbuladoğlu eşkiyasından olub)" which identifies Ali Pasha as a leader of brigands. MDZ9, No. 1170, p. 460, of Zi'lkade 1019/after 15 January 1611, mentions the "celâli Canbuladoğlu eşkiyasından" (of the brigands of the Celâli Canbuladoğlu), the first time he is called a Celâli in the official documents.
96. MDZ7 ends Cemaziyülâhır 1013/October 1604, and the next set of documents, MDZ6, begins Receb 1016/October 1607, a hiatus of three years. According to Professor Abdul-Karim Rafeq, nothing remains in Syrian archives of official documents of this period, either in Arabic or Osmanlıca.
97. AV, filza 64, f. 181, of 20 July 1607.
98. AV, filza 65, f. 45, of 4 October 1607, which mentions "tension between sipahis and Janissaries makes [Murad Pasha] avoid battle with Canbuladoğlu, because he suspects that the sipahis could join him [Ali Pasha] and both would destroy the Janissaries."
99. VASITI, f. 7b, et seqq.
100. AV, filza 64, f. 103, of 21 May 1607, which states Murad Pasha planned "to kill all of [the rebels] without respect for anyone and to populate Asia [Minor] with new inhabitants, and with time to have them under obedience as it was previously." CSP-
VENICE, XI, p. 22, of 8 August 1607, describes the need for gunpowder for which the Ottomans had sent a cavuş (officer) as far as London to make arrangements for delivery.
101. MDZ8 has many of these, e.g., p. 2 of 28 Safer 1016/ 24 June 1607: "Order to all kadı offices on the road from Üsküdar to Konya, inasmuch as the serdar, authorized by the greatest, presently my grand vizier Murad Pasha, is going to leave for Üsküdar [the staging area], wherever, in the areas of your jurisdiction there are places difficult of passage, they must be enlarged and cleared out, and bridges must be repaired, and all necessary signs must be set up on the roads."

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102. TKA, f. 231a.
103. TKA, f. 230b. See map, p. 30, for the roads taken.
104. VASITI, f. 6b. SALIGNAC, p. 163, letter of 17 August 1607, to Henry IV, says the beylerbeyi of Karaman was strangled "because he was a friend of Canbuladoğlu."
105. VASITI, f. 6b.
106. VASITI, f. 7b, 8a, gives full credit to Murad Pasha for initiating the strategy against Canbuladoğlu.
107. VASITI, f. 9b.
108. VASITI, f. 7b. Quite possibly the Celâlis aimed to join or ambush the grand vizier's army from the rear during the battle with Canbuladoğlu according to SALIGNAC, p. 189, letter of 8 January 1608.
109. NAIMA, II, p. 9. Cf. Ch. V, below.
110. As late as one month before he was attacked by Murad Pasha, Cemşid was still accorded the title of bey in an imperial directive, MDZ8, p. 30, of 15 Rebi'ülâhır 1016/12 August 1607: "Order to the bey of Tarsus, Cemşid bey."
111. TKA, f. 235b.
112. VASITI, f. 9a.
113. VASITI, f. 9a: "they lost heart (cür'et edemeyüb)."
114. VASITI, f. 9b.
115. AV, filza 64, f. 145, of 20 June 1607: "The sultan has sent to Canbuladoğlu in Aleppo the confirmation of that Bassalic (pashalik), with the gift of a sword and cloak, and with a letter to be able to dispose of fifteen sanzaccati (sanjaks) to benefit his most favorite men, and he has ordered that with the great numbers of soldiers that he can afford, he should go to meet the general [Murad Pasha] and destroy the rebels. At the same time he [Sultan Ahmed] has written several chiefs of the rebels that they join the same general, telling them that he has given orders to receive them all with good will, and that [the general] will treat them well; and that they should not continue resisting with the old disobedience."



116. AET, No. 616; Appendix II; VASITI, f. 10b.
117. TKA, f. 242a.
118. SALIGNAC, p. 132. Also MDZ8, p. 148, of 14 Cemaziyülâhır 1016/7 October 1607: "Şam beylerbeyisi vezirim Mahmud paşaya hüküm ki" (Order to the beylerbeyi of Damascus, my vizier Mahmud Pasha).
119. MEDICI, f. 71, items no. 1 and 2.
120. AV, filza 64, f. 221, of 20 August 1607.
121. VASITI, f. 10b. Bakras Pass lies between Payas and Ankara in the Amanus Mountains, MENZİL 4108. I am indebted to Professor Nejat Göyünç of the University of Istanbul for this information.
122. TKA, f. 236a. An army could ordinarily move from Adana to Aleppo in twelve days according to SALIGNAC, p. 177.
123. VASITI, f. 10b. FEZLEKE, I, pp. 295-96. GOR, IV, p. 403, gives the misleading impression that Arslan Beli was near Bakras Pass (neither place is identified) and that the battle which followed was fought near modern Belen. The element of a flanking movement, mentioned in all the accounts, and which caused Canbuladoğlu Ali to alter his battle plans, becomes incomprehensible if the two armies were in almost continual contact, that is, if Murad Pasha came south via Payas. Since there is no pass parallel to the one through which the modern Kırıkkhan-İskenderun road runs, Murad Pasha's forces could only have crossed further north.
124. SALIGNAC, p. 174, in a letter of 10 September 1607, from the Ağa of the Janissaries, Halil Pasha, "prenant le chemin de Caisarja pour estre le plus beau."
125. TKA, f. 236b: "Payas yolu girü kalur."
126. VASITI, f. 10b.
127. See map, p. 143.
128. TKA, f. 237b.
129. VASITI, f. 10b.
130. VASITI, f. 10b-11a; FEZLEKE, I, pp. 295-97, gives the standard version.

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131. VASITI, f. 11a. There is no such name used today. TKA, f. 237b, called it Çamlı Boğaz or Piney Pass.
132. TKA, f. 237b.
133. Quite possibly this was the modern Hupnik Çayı (Hupnik Creek), which flows out of the mountains due south into the large basin and lake at Amik; or the Afrin River, which lies somewhat east, nearer Kilis, flowing south then west into the Lake Amik at its eastern end. See map, p. 143.
134. FEZLEKE, I, p. 295. MUHİBBÎ, pp. 121-22, states it took Canbuladoğlu two days to find out the location of Murad Pasha and his army.
135. TKA, f. 238a, and VASITI, f. 11b: "And after investigation they found that his objectives were, if the coming battle were to go to him, he would give the governments of Damascus and Tripoli and all their sancaks to his adherents, and would give the province of Anadolu to Kalenderoğlu and Kara Said as an insignificant gift to those accursed rebels, and Baghdad to the Uzunahmedoğlu [sons of Tavilahmed]. And he sent men and letters to the Shah of Waywardness [Abbas] and he also presumed the status of sultan and had the Friday prayers read in his own name. And after the battle he would journey toward Egypt with the intention of taking the Holy Cities [Mecca and Medina]."
136. SANDERSON, p. 244. AV, filza 65, f. 67, of 20 October 1607, states "Canbuladoğlu left Aleppo with 20,000 troops to defend himself against Murad Pasha" which probably refers to either the foot or the horse. MUHİBBÎ, p. 121, placed the number at 40,000, as does the standard version in NAIMA, II, p. 14.
137. NAIMA, II, p. 15. All sources agree on the name Oruç Ovası (which has no modern use) except TKA, who mentions no name.
138. There is some disagreement on this date. NAIMA, II, p. 15, states 2 Receb 1016/23 October 1607, on which the important skirmish occurred. SALIGNAC, p. 181, in a letter of 6 December 1607, dates the battle as 22 October. This also probably refers to the skirmish. TKA, f. 238a, gives the date as 24 Cemaziyülâhır 1016/16 October 1607, which seems a week too early. MARITI, p. 72, states 8 December, which may refer to the capitulation of Ali's castle in Aleppo; and MANTRAN-1, p. 267, gives December 23, which should read October 23.



139. FEZLEKE, I, p. 296.
140. VASITI, f. 13a: "Nice vechile varma gelme alma verme oldu."
141. SALIGNAC, p. 190, says he asserted himself as "roy de la Natholie."
142. SHIDYAQ, pp. 134-35. The tactic is an ancient one, often used on Ottoman troops by Shah Abbas, and indicates the lack of experience of Canbulad more than the cleverness of Tiryâkî Hasan Pasha.
143. VASITI, f. 13a-13b.
144. MUHIBBÎ, p. 121.
145. Only Ali Pasha's cavalry could escape by running off into the hills which, for many, were familiar territory. The fate of his sekbans was, for the most part, death by (relatively merciful) decapitation.
146. NAIMA, II, p. 16, and FEZLEKE, I, p. 296, who mentions a "tower" of heads. A few were saved, in particular a favorite of the Janissary Ağa named Abaza Mehmed, who served later with distinction, becoming a pasha and then a beylerbeyi of several provinces, including Erzurum. He supported the cause of Sultan Osman II and was finally executed by Sultan Murad IV for rebellion in 1041/1632. Cf. NAIMA, II, p. 240 ff. See also de GROOT, pp. 74-79.
147. Fahreddin was sancakbeyi of Safed in Muharrem 1017/March 1608, MDZ8, p. 148. NAIMA, II, p. 17, insists he fought and fled with Canbuladoğlu at Oruç Ovası.
148. CARALI-2, I, p. 143, citing MEDICI, filza 5, f. 113-17, tells that in Leghorn they heard Canbuladoğlu had escaped "with his treasure and 20,000 men." Ferdinand I, still hoping to help him, rushed his navy with artillery and muskets. The help never arrived, for they soon learned the totality of Ali Pasha's defeat.
149. MUHIBBÎ, p. 121. SALIGNAC, p. 181. Traditionally, the only conqueror to take the citadel in Aleppo by storm was Tamerlane.
150. TKA, f. 24a.
151. MARITI, p. 73.
152. VASITI, f. 17b.

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153. SALIGNAC, p. 423. Baudier, de Salignac's assistant, points out the dilemma: "He [Ali Pasha] made known his disgrace to the shah of Persia, offering to serve him with a good number of his men who remained from the disastrous ruin of his army. But the shah, who was then Shah Abbas, did not want to believe in the promise of the Turks, who were the irreconcilable enemies of the Persians...and who called [the Persians] Rafizi, which means 'heretics.' The shah thanked him forthrightly, honestly, letting him know that if he were on the defensive he would not have need of men other than his own subjects, which he estimated to be more than sufficient to fight against his enemies.
154. NAIMA, II, p. 19. CARALI-1, p. 72, states he and 15,000 men ransacked Aintab, then went to Malatya.
155. TKA, f. 240b.
156. SALIGNAC, p. 188. A directive, MDZ8, p. 117, of 14 Zi'lkade 1016/30 February 1608, tells of an alaybeyi in Aleppo named Ibrahim, an officer of the occupying army.
157. FEZLEKE, I, p. 297.
158. MUHIBBÎ, p. 121, who states 1000 retainers and family remained in the castle.
159. SHIDYAQ, p. 135.
160. KKT, No. 71, p. 137, of 10 Şaban 1017/20 November 1608 refers to the "sending of members of the family and relatives of the present beylerbeyi of Temeşvar, Canbuladoğlu Ali."
161. VASITI, f. 15b.
162. TKA, f. 242b.
163. TKA, f. 243b-244a.
164. Fahreddin surely practiced a special brand of Levantine dissimulation. He was an old associate (possibly friend) of Kuyucu Murad Pasha, CARALI-2, I, p. 19; he had become sancakbeyi of Safed by 1017/ after 17 March 1608, not six months after the battle of Oruç Ovası, MDZ8, p. 137, an office doubtless bestowed on him by the grand vizier; yet by February 1608 he was already corresponding and in the process of making his own treaty of alliance against the Ottomans with the Grand Duke of Tuscany according to CARALI-2, I, p. 145.



165. NAIMA, II, p. 18, who uses the word amm, paternal uncle, which makes Haydar another brother of the murdered Hüseyin Pasha.
166. NAIMA, II, p. 19.
167. CARALI-1, p. 87: "I'm a rebel, but you are far worse than me!" Also, MUHIBBÎ, p. 122.
168. FEZLEKE, I, p. 305: "Kocayı bozarsa Üsküdar
berisini zabt ederüz." (If he can defeat the Old Man, we can control everything this side of Üsküdar, that is, all of Anatolia.)
169. AV, filza 66, f. 27, of no date, but between February and March 1608. AV, filza 65, f. 223, of 25 January 1608, reported that Kalenderoğlu Mehmed did not find Canbuladoğlu "constant and strong toward the proposition, but accused him of trying to escape. He was retained by guards in custody. News of the arrest reached here [Istanbul]....He took resolution after having been incarcerated for five days, on the occasion of a really dark night, full of snow, having broken a little of the wall which was unguarded to escape as he did with only four of his men, and to go and give himself up to the bostancıbaşı,"
170. FEZLEKE, I, p. 299. Today, İzmit.
171. AV, filza 66, f. 27, no date, between 8-22 March 1608, Sultan Ahmed "thinking to himself that having this chief of the rebels [Canbuladoğlu Ali] in his hands all the others, by reason of negotiation, should come to an agreement, or be destroyed by arms."
172. FEZLEKE, I, p. 299.
173. AV, filza 65, f. 223, of 25 January 1608.
174. NAIMA, II, p. 22.
175. SALIGNAC, p. 191.
176. NAIMA, II, p. 22.
177. AV, filza 65, f. 223.
178. GOR, IV, p. 406, fn. c, who quotes a Relazione, possibly AV, filza 65, f. 223, that he escaped from the Celâlis with four companions.
179. MUHIBBÎ, p. 123.

180. AV, filza 66, f. 27.
181. The sources differ both on the number and the relationship of these boys. MUHIBBÎ, p. 122, says there were two nephews, Mustafa and Mehmed. SHIDYAQ, p. 135, states there was one boy, Mustafa, who was the son of Ali Pasha's brother; and GOR, IV, p. 406, says "sein Ali Pasha's kleiner Bruder." FEZLEKE, I, pp. 299-300, notes that Mustafa, one of the boys accompanying Canbuladoğlu later became a confidant of Sultan Murad IV. NAIMA, II, p. 49, recounts that later in the year 1017/1608 a scandal arose over the disposition of the properties of Canbuladoğlu Ali. The boys who had accompanied him implicated the chief defterdar, Bâki Pasha, as a usurper of public property for private gains. On their testimony (and other evidence) Bâki Pasha was jailed for forty days.
182. SALIGNAC, p. 192. Baudier, p. 424, in the same study, describes a meeting of the Ambassador, Baron de Salignac, with Canbuladoğlu: "We were such a long time at his residence where he flattered the Lord Ambassador many times, with all the compliments that one might ever want and the same was done to him [in response] by the Lord Ambassador....Someone had the sherbet brought, which among the Turks is the grandest favor and honor to those to whom they give it, and I remember watching him [Ali Pasha]: that it was simple and easy to recognize the feigned happiness which he pretended to have by his appearance, but inside was hidden a sadness and melancholy that he secretly hid." Then on p. 425: "In a grand fashion the Lord Ambassador took his leave of Lord Zemboulat, who led him down the staircase, and they left one another as good friends....And the said Zemboulat took him as far as the door of his residence; and that was the last time that they saw one another."
183. AV, filza 66, f. 27.
184. Most sources say he left almost within a month, e.g., NAIMA, II, p. 22. SALIGNAC, p. 200, in a letter of 3 March 1608, reported Canbuladoğlu still in Istanbul, living a good life, even though some 1500 men who accompanied him to Bursa were now fighting as Celâlis for Kalenderoğlu. In a letter, p. 210, of 12 May 1608, the French ambassador commented that Canbuladoğlu was made beylerbeyi of Temeşvar, without specifying a date. The official MD76, No. 217, p. 87, of Muharrem 1017/mid-April to mid-May 1608, indicates he had by then been beylerbeyi of Temeşvar.



185. NAIMA, II, p. 22, notes complaints issued against Ali, possibly his contact with a Ragusan. See de GROOT, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-86.
186. FEZLEKE, I, p. 300. The Armenian priest, Grigor of Kemah heard that Ali Pasha could not control his troops in Temeşvar, and that the Bosnians attacked him and killed him (ANDREASYAN, p. 41). SALIGNAC, p. 425, according to Baudier's account, suggests that Ali Pasha had thought, after five or six months, that his offenses had truly been forgiven. "It was then he found himself assailed and surrounded by twenty or thirty *kapicis* of the Sublime Porte, who strangled him by secret command of the sultan, who never forgets past faults."
187. PEÇÜYÎ, II, p. 334.
188. MUHIBBÎ, p. 123. SHIDYAQ, p. 135, says he died in 1020/1611 in Belgrade.
189. Quick strangulation was a preferred execution over decapitation.
190. SALIGNAC, p. 345, letter of 6 March 1610, who states Ali Pasha was executed "four or five days ago."
191. MUHIBBÎ, p. 123.
192. BARKAN, p. 23; KARPAT, p. 49; see also H. Inalcık in PARRY & YAPP, p. 201.
193. CARALI-2, I, p. 140 ff. *et passim*.
194. CARALI-2, p. 143.
195. PURCHAS, VIII, p. 240 (from George Sandys in 1611). Nasuh Pasha became grand vizier in 1020/1611.
196. Cf. CARALI-2, I, pp. 47-68, for Fahreddin's remarkable plans and accomplishments.
197. CSP-VENICE, XI, p. 456, of 3 April 1610.
198. MD80, No. 972, p. 402, of 9 Muharrem 1022/1 March 1613.
199. Many descendants of the original Canbulad still live in the Lebanon; some also live in Syria and in Turkey. On 25 Rebi'ülevvel 1397/16 March 1977 Kemal Jumlat, the most famous descendant of Canbulad in modern times, was murdered near his home at Mukhtarrah in Lebanon. Jumlat, a poet, scholar, and mystic, had since 1946 been a member of the Lebanese

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Parliament, representing the Progressive Socialist Party. He was chief of the Druze clan, a position inherited by his son, Walid. Other prominent modern relatives include Dr. Muzaffer Canbolat, a sometime member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. SALIGNAC, pp. 189, 214.
2. Mahmud Pasha was the son of Cağalazade Sinan Pasha.
3. NAIMA, I, pp. 441-49, for example, tells of many petty violences allegedly done by Derviş on his way to the top position.
4. LELLO, pp. 24-25.
5. GOR, IV, p. 385.
6. GOR, IV, p. 386.
7. "I will decapitate anyone who leaves his business until the next day!" he asserted, GOR, IV, p. 386.
8. H. Sahillioğlu in COOK-2, p. 241. In 996/1588 expenditures exceeded revenues by 33 percent; in 1017/1608 by 19 percent.
9. CSP-VENICE, IX, p. 444, letter of 21 January 1601, remarked that the Sipahis were angered that Christians and Jews wore better clothes than themselves, so the grand vizier issued an order that only Embassy and staff Christians and Jews could wear silk or Venetian cloth.
10. LELLO, p. 25 ff.
11. SALIGNAC, p. 63; NAIMA, I, pp. 451-53. Balconies were a popular vantage point to observe street activities in Istanbul without being seen, of great importance to the women of a household. The balcony also is the coolest part of the house, being built out over the street in order to catch the breezes in the hot summer.
12. LELLO, pp. 26-27; NAIMA, I, pp. 449-50. The date was Şevval 1015/December 1606.
13. TKA, f. 218b: The sultan said to him, "You have served my illustrious predecessors and are my



experienced vizier. In this blessed year I have made you commander-in-chief of my soldiers....You are to go from Anatolia on the eastern campaign and remove the evils of the shah of Persia, of bad fortune, and his brigands, and are to protect Gence and Şirvan. And the Celâli brigands of Anatolia and their evils are to be completely removed."

14. FEZLEKE, I, pp. 278-79.
15. NAIMA, I, p. 449.
16. In this study I follow the eye-witness interpretation of TKA, f. 218b ff., which differs somewhat from the standard Ottoman chroniclers.
17. TKA, f. 219b. Lezez is the salary for Şevval, Zi'lkade, and Zi'lhicce 1015/February, March, and April 1606, PAKALIN, II, p. 366. The last letter of Şevval plus the two z's of the other two months form an often used Ottoman abbreviation: lezez.
18. TKA, f. 220a, et passim.
19. SALIGNAC, p. 56. The annual treasury (hazine) from Egypt came by land via Damascus and Aleppo, RAFEQ-2, p. 4.
20. TKA, f. 221b: "Celâlis were ahead of them; and in their rear were Kalenderoğlu and Kara Said and their brigands; and it only remained possible to return to Konya."
21. SALIGNAC, p. 2. For Nasuh's defeat, see above, p. 53.
22. TKA, f. 223b.
23. TKA, f. 222b, who calls him Said Arab. NAIMA, I, p. 307, asserts that Kara Said was an aid of Tavil Halil in 1012/1603. The word kara (black, brave) and Arab (Arab, or in this case, perhaps, Negro) are used interchangeably in his name.
24. TKA, f. 223a.
25. TKA, f. 223a. The page is badly smeared on the right hand and f. 223a is smeared on the left.
26. TKA, f. 223a. Masar is the three months' salary of Muharrem, Safer, and Rebi'ülevvel 1015/May, June, and July 1606, PAKALIN, II, p. 412.
27. TKA, f. 223b.

28. After this date the annual winter encampment generally occurred. It indicated the end of the major campaign season.
29. NAIMA, I, p. 449, asserts Ferhad Pasha died of grief in Konya.
30. See above, pp. 136-37.
31. Though many historians have asserted Kalenderoğlu's regal pretensions, no specific information (save the assertions themselves) corroborates such a claim. Contrary evidence, as will be seen, seems convincing until specific information in official documents, as yet unclassified or available, proves otherwise.
32. MD70, No. 363, p. 184, of 25 Cemaziülevvel 1001/ 28 February 1592, begins: "Order to the beylerbeyi of Anadolu and the Kadı of Ankara and Murtezaabad, you are the kadı, and have written letters to my Sublime Porte, that in the aforementioned judicial district a brigand of Yassıviran, which is connected with the district, named Kalenderoğlu, has gathered seventy or eighty brigands to himself and they are going from village to village." Traditionally Kalenderoğlu was born a Turk near Ankara, but this cannot be confirmed.
33. AV, filza 64, f. 35, dispatch of 28 March 1607.
34. NAIMA, II, p. 4.
35. SARUHAN, p. 12, tells that Kalenderoğlu, after having been a close associate of Kara Yazıcı, received a good appointment to office when the latter was made beylerbeyi of Temeşvar. However, hard times and his own unwillingness to obey orders to march to battle caused Kalenderoğlu to rebel.
36. MDZ8, p. 97, dated after 22 Cemaziülevvel 1016 4 September 1607: "Order to the former beylerbeyi of Tebriz, now governor of the sancak of Teke, Mehmed Pasha: previous to this time Kalenderoğlu and Kara Said were given [official] rank and ordered to join the army. Several times directives have been sent. They have not obeyed but have recently become Celâli." [itaat etmeyüb müceddeden celâli olub] Also NAIMA, II, p. 4.
37. NAIMA, II, p. 27.
38. FEZLEKE, I, p. 292.



39. PEÇÜYÎ, II, p. 332. The word kalender, meaning a kind of itinerant dervish, seems not to have any particular religious significance in this case, despite its assumption by several scholars. See the offhand remark in BIRGE, pp. 69-70.
40. LEWIS, p. 154, whose remarks suggest but do not explain a connection between these rebellions and those of the Kalenders of Anatolia in the seventh/thirteenth century.
41. MD76, No. 19, p. 8, of 19 Safer 1016/9 December 1607, "Kalenderoğlu dedükleri la'in" (whom they call Kalenderoğlu, the accursed).
42. Cf. MDZ8, p. 60, of 25 Rebi'ülevvel 1016/20 July 1607.
43. NAIMA, II, p. 8. The chief rebel in the Aydın-Saruhan district was Yusuf Pasha. See SARUHAN, pp. 20-22, Chapter 2.
44. See above, pp. 54-55.
45. NAIMA, I, p. 461.
46. FEZLEKE, I, p. 284.
47. FEZLEKE, I, p. 284.
48. He may have had some superstitious feelings since he returned the money as a propitiatory gesture against the plague, SARUHAN, p. 15.
49. He extorted 20,000 pieces of gold from the city of Tire, GOR, IV, p. 398, fn. d, from a Relazione. SALIGNAC, p. 116, letter of 24 January 1607, says from 5000 to 6000 rebels took part in the attack on Tire. He also notes the kapudan paşa (grand fleet admiral) tried to get soldiers and four pieces of artillery near İzmir to go against Kalenderoğlu, but the soldiers refused to fight.
50. SALIGNAC, p. 116.
51. AV, filza 64, f. 59, dispatch of 11 April 1607. Lack of control of the Celâli bands constantly plagued the leadership, for they could not count on their force maintaining proper discipline, SARUHAN, p. 17.
52. SALIGNAC, p. 117, letter of 24 January 1607.
53. TKA, f. 220b. Other Celâlîs raided Sivas and Niksar.

54. It was always possible that the Celâlis of Baghdad would ally with the shah of Persia. Yet during the winter of 1015/1606-1607 such an alliance never materialized. Several reasons for this include: first, in the winter, though the shah wanted Baghdad, he could not avoid his other commitments in Georgia and the Uzbek frontier on his east. A light force might take Baghdad, but be too weak to defend it when the Ottomans returned the following campaign season. Second, Abbas did not know the Ottoman weakness; he did know Ottoman armies in the east stood ready to defend the cities and passes, an easier task than mounting an offensive. Third, Abbas' own troops, of the Kızılbaş tribes, greatly resembled Celâli brigands in their disorderly and rebellious conduct. He could never quite count on the Kızılbaş as a military force as he could his trained slave soldiers, the ghulams. An alliance with the Celâlis in Baghdad might gain a short term victory but provide him with more problems than he could readily solve. Finally, the Celâlis themselves felt relatively satisfied with this arrangement in Baghdad, feeling no particular compulsion for an alliance which might take away some (if not all) of their freedom of action. SALIGNAC, pp. 49-50, in a letter of 22 May 1606, told of an "uncomfortable" connection of Tavi (probably Tavilahmedoğlu Mahmud) in Baghdad, with Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha of Syria. The ambassador observed that the Ottomans feared this because of Tavi's suggestion the Syrian might join the rebels in opposing the sultan. As yet no strong links existed, either traditional or political, among any of the participants. Indeed, the ambassador remarked that "one could not possibly believe that these rebels could organize themselves together." Yet should they cooperate, perhaps under someone like Canbuladoğlu Ali of Syria, the problem might become even more "uncomfortable."
55. VASITI, f. 8a. See above, pp. 136-37.
56. SALIGNAC, p. 156, letter of 5 July 1607, notes Bursa was sacked and burned by rebels who killed 200-300 people.
57. NAIMA, II, p. 9.
58. NAIMA, II, p. 9. Ankara, a rich city of something over 5000 people, was a center of a thriving trade in mohair wool, with supplies of various kinds, and ready cash, all of which the Celâlis could commandeer to strengthen their position.
59. FEZLEKE, I, pp. 292-93. Vildanzâde's bravery earned him recognition from Kuyucu Murad Pasha, who



appointed the aging kadı as ordu kadısı (chief military judge) on his campaign against Shah Abbas in 1019/1610, TKA, f. 268a; he is mentioned again in Cemaziyülevvel 1019/August 1610, supervising the distribution of supplies to the war-ravaged populace of Ereğli in Karaman, TKA, f. 270a. I am indebted to Dr. András Riedlmayer for this information.

60. NAIMA, II, p. 10. According to the traveller Edward Grimestone, KNOLLES 1687, II, p. 811, in 1012/1603 the city of Ankara finally paid 200,000 ducats to buy off the rebel besiegers. Some time later, possibly after Kalenderoğlu's defeat, units of the Ottoman army entered the city and executed any citizen who had "joined hands with the rebels," AV, filza 66, f. 454, dispatch of 12 December 1608.
61. MDZ8, p. 60, of Rebi'ülevvel 1016/20 July 1607, "Order to the governor of the sancak of Ankara Kalenderoğlu Mehmed Pasha." Also MDZ8, p. 55, 1016/1607, "Order to the kadı of Ankara, and all the kadis of the sancak of Ankara, you who are the Kadı of Ankara have sent a letter...concerning the military fief of the governor Kalenderoğlu Mehmed Pasha."
62. See above, p. 137.
63. NAIMA, II, p. 11. Here Naima relates the rebels wanted clothes (men's garments, cloth, and so on) more than munitions or money, which indicates either a great need among Kalenderoğlu's troops or his desire to sell or use the materials elsewhere.
64. FEZLEKE, I, p. 294.
65. NAIMA, II, p. 13.
66. FEZLEKE, I, p. 294, says ten days. A letter of Sir Thomas Glover in December 1607 says it lasted fifteen days, and goes on to say Kalenderoğlu intended to take the city and then go to Bursa and to Üsküdar, SANDERSON, p. 244. None of the sources consulted mention the date of the assault. TKA, f. 237a, says the rebels set up camp near Merzifon on the first of Cemaziyülevvel 1016/25 August 1607, after leaving Ankara. If this move occurred a week or so after the siege of Ankara, the latter must have begun approximately 10 Rebi'ülâhır 1016/ 1 August 1607. SALIGNAC, p. 180, in a letter of 20 November 1607, mentions this victory of Kalenderoğlu. NAIMA, II, p. 18, says Kalenderoğlu went toward Bursa at the same time Murad Pasha moved toward Aleppo, after the battle of Oruç Ovası, or mid-Receb 1016/early November 1607.

67. Doubtless a small force of Janissary troops within Ankara gave expert advice in the siege, but much of the fighting force had to be Muslim re'aya merchants and very possibly refugee villagers who had fled to the safety of the city from the Celâli armies.
68. TKA, f. 237a: "Kara Said and Kalenderoğlu, vile enemies, had 70,000 Celâlis. The commander-in-chief Tekeli Mehmed Pasha marched from Konya and collected soldiers and gathered his skirmishers near the village of Lâdik, in the area of Merzifon."
69. SALIGNAC, p. 180. Most of them returned to their barracks, but this act of Kalenderoğlu may demonstrate not only his inability to handle so many prisoners (and his unwillingness to massacre them) but also his need for the skills of the Janissary musket men, despite the reputed dislike of Celâlis for the slave soldiers.
70. AV, filza 66, f. 45, dispatch of spring 1608.
71. FEZLEKE, I, p. 300, who states the Ottomans assigned Nakkaş Hasan Pasha to Bursa as serdar on this day. Hasan Pasha did not go directly to Bursa but waited for reinforcements.
72. SALIGNAC, pp. 182, 185.
73. ANDREASYAN, p. 41. The Armenians and Turks in Istanbul stood as surety for each other when the investigators came looking for suspected arsonists.
74. AV, filza 66, f. 126, spring 1608 (no date).
75. MD76, No. 18, p. 7, of 19 Şaban 1016/10 December 1607, "Some brigands and Celâlis come disguised into the seat of my sultanate...and by night, in various places, light fires."
76. AV, filza 66, f. 126, spring 1608 (no date).
77. SALIGNAC, p. 185.
78. TKA, f. 244b, who asserts the Celâli armies numbered 60,000, including sekbân musket men and levend cavalry.
79. ANDREASYAN, p. 42. The contemporary Grigor of Kemah says the Muslim women and children were singled out for attack more than the Christians. He also mentions Celâlis burning Christian monasteries, churches, and other buildings. The Celâlis seemed impartial to religious differences. The monk Arakel



of Tabriz witnessed the atrocities perpetrated by Celâlis in eastern Anatolian cities and villages, ARAKEL-1, I, p. 307 ff.

80. AV, filza 66, f. 27, dispatch of sometime between 8-22 March 1608.
81. GOR, IV, p. 405, fn. b, citing a Relazione.
82. MD76, No. 16, p. 6, of 10 Şaban 1016/10 December 1607, in which the kadis of Tarhala, Nevahi, Ilıca, Gördük, and Kelmiye [towns somewhat east of Manisa] are ordered "to collect a provisional militia (il erleri) in your areas of jurisdiction...[and] send quickly your provisional militiamen with weapons, ready to fight."
83. MD76, No. 46, p. 18, of 11 Şaban 1016/1 December 1607, "Order to the former beylerbeyi of Temeşvar, now governor of the sancak of Silistre...[Dalgıç] Ahmed Pasha" to go against Kalenderoğlu. The same order was repeated (as a third warning) on 19 Şaban 1016/9 December 1607 to the same officer: "Upon receiving this do not wait one moment or one hour, at whatever place or time you receive this, at that time march, make two stages in one day," MD76, No. 13, p. 5. For the attack on Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha, see above, p. 134.
84. SALIGNAC, p. 186, letter of 23 December 1607.
85. TKA, f. 245a.
86. NAIMA, II, p. 23. SANDERSON, p. 245, letter from Sir Thomas Glover, December 1607.
87. GOR, IV, p. 405, fn. b, from a Relazione. NAIMA, II, p. 19. Mihaliç is today called Karacabey.
88. AV, filza 66, f. 15, dispatch of 4 March 1608.
89. See above, p. 150.
90. NAIMA, II, p. 19.
91. SALIGNAC, p. 192, letter of 24 January 1608.
92. SALIGNAC, p. 191, letter of 8 January 1608. Kalenderoğlu's request for clemency also included "Hanild," presumably Tavail.
93. SALIGNAC, p. 192.

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94. NAIMA, II, p. 19, uses the term re'aya not il erleri for these militia who were unaccustomed to the use of arms and fighting. Only under special circumstances were re'aya ever allowed to possess weapons of war.
95. NAIMA, II, p. 19. SALIGNAC, p. 192, letter of 24 January 1608, says Kalenderoğlu had great trouble crossing the river due to the lack of a bridge. The French ambassador also relates many of Kalenderoğlu's men left him during this season due to the severity of the winter.
96. Kirmasti is today called Mustafa Kemâlpaşa. See map, p. 185, above.
97. No source accurately dates the battle. MD76, No. 19, p. 8, of 19 Şevval 1016/9 December 1607, mentions that Kalenderoğlu "passed over the bridges of Pazartepe and Mihaliç." SALIGNAC, p. 194, in a letter of 15 February 1608, wrote the rebels were very strong after having defeated Nakkaş Hasan Pasha in a running battle which lasted four days and three nights. (He also mentioned that the Ottomans used some French troops who had "turned Turk" at the siege of Papa in 1003/1594 and fought for the Ottomans.) The battle at Lake Manyas must have occurred sometime in Şevval 1016/January 1608. The battle probably occurred west of the lake since the east side is a vast marsh area. See also GOR, IV, p. 406.
98. AV, filza 66, f. 45. It will be recalled the ill-fated Dalgıç Ahmed Pasha had been ordered thrice to the battle. See above, fn. 83, Ch. V.
99. NAIMA, II, p. 20.
100. GOR, IV, p. 405.
101. MD76, No. 267, p. 105, of 15 Şevval 1016/2 February 1608.
102. SALIGNAC, p. 214, letter of 27 May 1608, which states, "the defterdar left yesterday for Asia."
103. AV, filza 66, f. 225.
104. FEZLEKE, I, p. 299. This was a less-travelled road.
105. AV, filza 66, f. 225, dispatch of 27 July 1608.
106. NAIMA, II, p. 28, gives the date Rebi'ülevvel 1017/June 1608 as does VASITI, f. 18a.
107. SALIGNAC, p. 214.



108. MD76, No. 31, p. 12, of 14 Muharrem 1017/28 April 1608, ordering the sancakbeyi of Bolu to come to battle against Kalenderoğlu; by June they still had not arrived, a distance of about 700 km.
109. MDZ8, p. 120, of 28 Şevval 1016/15 February 1608, ordering the beylerbeyi of Sivas, Osman Pasha, against Kalenderoğlu who "is still in the environs of Ankara." The name Taviil Avil had been entered, then crossed out.
110. MD76, No. 35, of 29 Ramazan 1016/17 January 1608, ordering the kadı of Edirne to send troops at once.
111. AV, filza 66, f. 225, dispatch of 27 July 1608.
112. SALIGNAC, p. 219, letter of 11 June 1608. TKA, f. 245b, mentions the Egyptian soldiers ("500 good and armed cavalry from the eyâlet of Egypt."). NAIMA, II, p. 54 ff., tells the sequel of the Egyptian troops at Göksun plateau: how they received promise of special tax exemptions by Murad Pasha because of their gallantry in battle, and how this created tensions in Egypt later on, leading to a rebellion.
113. SANDERSON, p. 254, letter of Sir Thomas Glover, of 17 August 1608, which estimated Murad Pasha's forces at 150,000, probably ten times what he actually had.
114. TKA, f. 249b-250a. Nasuh Pasha was fighting a recalcitrant Kurdish bey at this moment. At the same time some Celâlis under Taviil's brother Maymun had to be watched, TKA, f. 249b-250a, in which the author asserts there were 70,000 Celâlis in the Çorum and Bozok area.
115. TKA, f. 246a-249a, a section devoted to the Baghdad campaign of Mehmed Pasha. Mehmed Pasha left in mid-Muharrem 1017/1 May 1608 and successfully drove out Taviilahmedoğlu Mahmud on 17 Rebi'ülevvel 1017/1 July 1608, a major victory for the Ottomans.
116. AV, filza 66, f. 225, dispatch of 27 July 1608.
117. AV, filza 66, f. 225. SALIGNAC, p. 229, letter of 12 August 1608, tells of Taviil's death, possibly in Rebi'ülâhır 1017/July 1608.
118. FEZLEKE, I, p. 306.
119. TKA, f. 250a, who calls it Göksin. Göksun plateau is in the anti-Taurus mountains, northwest of Maraş.

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120. FEZLEKE, I, p. 306.
121. FEZLEKE, I, p. 306. Muslu Çavuş, strongly entrenched in the mountains, had been defeated by Murad Pasha in the previous year's campaign. To strengthen the agreement now reached, Muslu also received the eyâlet of Karaman.
122. FEZLEKE, I, p. 306.
123. Kalenderoğlu wrote these words to Muslu Çavuş, NAIMA, II, p. 29; see also GOR, IV, p. 408. The famous Anatolian epic hero Köroğlu possesses many characteristics of the Celâlis, and may derive from the spirit of those times. See especially CHODZKO, p. 27, who quotes the musing of Köroğlu: "From this day I yield my head to the chances of fortune, like an autumn leaf abandoned to the willful breath of the wind."
124. NAIMA, II, p. 28. VASITI, f. 18a, states as many as 30,000 cavalry and footsoldiers; GOR, IV, p. 409, fn. a, quoting a Relazione, says 60,000 cavalry, 12,000 foot; TKA, f. 249b, states Kalenderoğlu and his cohorts numbered 70,000 to 80,000 brigands. GOR, IV, p. 407, appears in error when he asserts Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha went to Göksun, even though he has changed the dates in the margin to make this seem plausible. By this date the former Aleppo rebel was already beylerbeyi of Temeşvar. Cf. p. 153.
125. NAIMA, II, pp. 29-30; also FEZLEKE, I, p. 306, who says the rebels saw only the camp of the Egyptians under Kansu Bey and mistook these for the entire force of the Ottomans. The Plain of Göksun is about ten km. wide and twenty km. long.
126. VASITI, f. 18b, who states the army got to a place called Bekir Beli (possibly a scribal error for Tekir Beli) which was so difficult of ascent that it was almost impossible to push the cannon uphill. Therefore an advance party was sent ahead, led by the beylerbeyi of Damascus, and several thousand Janissaries to capture and fortify the mouth of the pass. FEZLEKE, I, p. 306, indicates, rather, that Deli Piri Ağa and thirty çorbacıs (a Janissary group) quickmarched ahead when the main Ottoman force had still four days' march to go, to secure the pass.
127. SALIGNAC, p. 230, letter of September 1608.
128. NAIMA, II, p. 28.
129. FEZLEKE, I, p. 307, says all the heavy cannon were on the high ground above the plains, hidden from sight.



130. FEZLEKE, I, p. 307. The Egyptians camped in one continuous group from the edge of the hills to the plains.
131. VASITI, f. 18b, who mentions "Ördek beli at the mouth of the pass where nearby is the Gevher River." This place was probably west of the battle, on the road which leads south to Hacin, modern Saimbeyli. FEZLEKE, I, p. 306, calls it Alaca Çayır.
132. FEZLEKE, I, p. 306, says the battle began 22 Rebi'ülâhır 1017/5 August 1608. NAIMA, II, p. 31, states it began two days later.
133. FEZLEKE, I, pp. 307-08.
134. TKA, f. 251b.
135. TKA, f. 251a.
136. FEZLEKE, I, p. 308.
137. TKA, f. 251b. See also MONSHI, II, pp. 966-67.
138. TKA, f. 251b: "And the army of Kalenderoğlu turned their faces and were not able any more to make resistance, so they took to the plain, and began to flee."
139. FEZLEKE, I, p. 308.
140. SALIGNAC, p. 231, fn. 2, to a letter of 11 September 1608, saying the information came from Halil Ağa, the Ağa of the Janissaries. He states 6000 of the rebels were defeated.
141. FEZLEKE, I, p. 308.
142. In this regard, NAIMA, II, p. 43, tells the story of how Murad Pasha assumed the role of didactic preacher as he strangled with his own hands a small boy who had been found among the prisoners, the orphaned son of a Celâli musician. Because even the official executioner had refused to carry out the deed, the grand vizier twisted the child's neck with his own fur neck piece, shouting, "If we don't get them when they're this young, they will grow up to rebel like their fathers!"
143. VASITI, f. 23a.
144. FEZLEKE, I, p. 309, says the Malatya troops were sent along with the beys of Karahisar-ı Şarkî (modern Şebinkarahisar) and Erzurum. Presumably they would

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expend more effort defending the areas through which Kalenderoğlu then marched since they were the officers responsible for the areas. For the Persian view, see MONSHI, II, p. 967.

145. Knowledge of this possibility was known in Istanbul as early as Zi'lka'de/March according to SALIGNAC, p. 24, letter of 16 March 1606. The Ottomans feared the escape of the rebels to aid Shah Abbas almost as much as they feared Abbas himself. Kalenderoğlu suffered another blow by the defeat of Tavilahmedoğlu's Celâli forces in Baghdad. He was thus forced to win a delay with his own armies and those of Maymun, or flee to Persia.
146. VASITI, f. 23a.
147. TKA, f. 252b.
148. SALIGNAC, p. 235, letter of 11 October 1608.
149. SALIGNAC, p. 235.
150. AV, filza 66, f. 331, tells the story in a long letter, dated about Receb 1017/October 1608, from Halil Pasha, the Ağa of the Janissaries, to the imperial Treasurer (hazinedar), and translated for the Doge by the bailo, Borisi.
151. NAIMA, II, p. 35.
152. NAIMA, II, p. 35, who says the battle occurred 17 Cemaziyülevvel 1017/1 September 1608.
153. NAIMA, II, p. 35; see also GOR, IV, p. 410.
154. FEZLEKE, I, p. 309, who states it is in the sancak of Erzurum.
155. FEZLEKE, I, p. 309.
156. SALIGNAC, p. 236, letter of 11 October 1608.
157. SALIGNAC, p. 236. See SARUHAN, pp. 20-22, for Yusuf Pasha's biography.
158. MONSHI, II, p. 967.
159. How many troops he commanded is difficult to ascertain. FEZLEKE, I, p. 309, says about 2000. SALIGNAC, p. 240, in a letter of 26 October 1608, says 5000 to 6000. Salignac's secretary wrote the letter since the ambassador was ill and added, "Kara Said was taken prisoner, we are assured." A Persian



source explicitly states, however, that Kara Said eluded capture and emigrated with Kalenderoğlu to Persia, MONSHI, II, p. 968.

160. FEZLEKE, I, p. 309; NAIMA, II, p. 33; GOR, IV, p. 410.
161. MONSHI, II, pp. 957-1004, gives a full report.
162. MONSHI, II, p. 968.
163. MONSHI, II, p. 970, according to whom there were 10,000 Celâlis.
164. The rebels followed three of the important Celâli leaders, Kalenderoğlu, Kara Said, and Ağactan Piri, whose assistant was Kurd Haydar (possibly the "Kor" Haydar found in NAIMA, II, p. 28). Cf. MONSHI, II, p. 969. The most rebellious were those who followed Ağactan Piri; Kalenderoğlu and Kara Said later worked out their differences and remained together until Kalenderoğlu's death.
165. MONSHI, II, pp. 978-79.
166. DAVIES, pp. 172, 220 ff.
167. SALIGNAC, p. 240, letter of 26 October 1608.
168. SALIGNAC, p. 244, letter of 12 November 1608.
169. AV, filza 66, f. 454, of 12 December 1608. "Some great changes among the important people of the Porte are expected, perhaps with some severe results, because in taking the loot from the rebels we have reason to believe that the mentioned pasha-general [Kuyucu Murad Pasha] has found papers very important which incriminate many personages in the government and in the Court."
170. AV, filza 66, f. 425. Also NAIMA, II, p. 47.
171. DANIŞMEND, III, p. 252.
172. SALIGNAC, p. 245, letter of 27 November 1608. Yusuf Pasha had been kethuda (a kind of steward) to the beylerbeyi of Anadolu, Üveyşoğlu Mehmed Pasha. According to GOR, IV, p. 418, fn. b, Murad Pasha sent sixty loads of silver to aid in buying off Yusuf Pasha's various associates. Also AV, filza 66, f. 329, dispatch of October 1608.
173. MONSHI, II, p. 970.

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174. NAIMA, II, p. 66. Also SALIGNAC, p. 300, letter of 22 August 1609.
175. SALIGNAC, p. 315, letter of 3 October 1609.
176. SALIGNAC, p. 312, letter of 3 October 1609.
177. MONSHI, II, p. 1004.
178. MONSHI, II, p. 1004.
179. MONSHI, II, p. 1004.
180. NAIMA, II, p. 37. Cf. İNALCIK-2, p. 48, and AKDAĞ-2, p. 118.
181. Murad Pasha died on 25 Cemaziyülevvel 1020/5 August 1611, probably of old age, although according to a well-known story circulated thereafter he was poisoned by his successor, Nasuh Pasha, KNOLLES 1687, II, p. 905.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. SHAW, I, pp. 290-91, the Kavanin-i Âl-i Osman der hulâsa-i mazâmin-i defter-i divan (Essay on the Duties and Ranks of the Servants of the House of Osman; the Risâle-i asâkir-i Osman (Essays on the Soldiers of Osman); the Kanun-u Osmaniye (Ottoman Law); and the Kanun-u Mali-i Mîsîr (the Financial Law of Egypt)).
2. The edition used in this study was published in Istanbul, 1280/1863. BELIN, pp. 222-301, is a French translation.
3. MONSHI, II, p. 1002, who says Nasuh Pasha was one of Kuyucu Murad's chief enemies. Nasuh had urged the Celâlîs of Kalenderoğlu Mehmed to return freely to Ottoman territory. On Nasuh Pasha's previous dealings with the Celâlîs see above, pp. 52-53.
4. MONSHI, II, p. 1058, "on the basis of the Treaty of Amasya." See also p. 1076.
5. SIMEON, p. 163.
6. CSP-VENICE, XII, p. 465, of 23 December 1612. A 1 percent ad valorem tax was imposed to be "applied to the upkeep of the Janizzaries."



7. KNOLLES 1687, II, p. 913, who says Nasuh sent 16,000 Janissaries to Anatolia for disciplinary reasons.
8. KNOLLES 1687, II, p. 905, that gossips asserted Nasuh had poisoned Murad Pasha.
9. GOR, IV, pp. 471-72. A contemporary report by a French resident of Istanbul is Copie d'une lettre écrite de Constantinople à un Gentilhomme François, contenant la trahison du Bascha Nassouf, sa mort estrange, & des grandes richesses qui luy ont esté trouvées (Paris, 1615). Thanks to my colleague, András Riedlmayer, who gave me this information, and who tells me the report "suggests that his death was caused mostly by the many enemies he had made in his short and violent tenure and by the excessive wealth he had amassed through speculation." See also ALDERSON, Table XXXIV, facing p. 170, fn. 5.
10. MD80, No. 203, p. 78, of 23 Zi'lkade 1020/27 February 1612, order to the sancakbeyi of Karahisar-ı Sahib, mentioning the continuation of Celâli raids, damaging the lives and property of the re'aya of the region. The numbers of these directives tend to diminish by 1030/1620.
11. İNALCIK-1, III, p. 214, mentions the increase of customs duties by Ottoman officials, indicating a revitalization of economic life.
12. SIMEON, p. 4 ff., referring to life in Anatolia immediately following the Celâli wars.
13. SIMEON, pp. 21-22, 86-89.
14. SIMEON, p. 88.
15. MONSHI, II, p. 967.
16. MONSHI, II, pp. 1002-04.
17. KOÇUBEG, especially the third section (pp. 297-82), and the eleventh section (pp. 307-09).
18. I.M. Kunt in BRAUDE & LEWIS, p. 63, points out that Muslim re'aya as well as non-Muslim re'aya often received timar appointments in the provinces prior to 1600. After that, times and conditions changed. The government needed fewer landed cavalry and more musket men, the latter being paid in cash as daily-wage soldiers.
19. It is interesting to speculate how much the young treasurer (hazinedar) of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha in

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Aleppo, one Abaza Mehmed, learned of the art of rebellion from his famous mentor. On Abaza Mehmed's extraordinary revolt at the time of Murad III, see DANIŞMEND, III, p. 315 ff. Also de GROOT, pp. 74-79, for Abaza's relationship with the twice grand vizier Halil Pasha.

20. GOR, IV, p. 442.
21. UZUNÇARŞILI, III/2, p. 554, fn. 3. For the "campaign" of 1018/1609, see above, p. 203 ff.
22. CSP-VENICE, XIII, p. 75, of 19 December 1613, noting that the Kadı of Istanbul demanded all merchants (including those of Cairo and of Aleppo) pay a special tax for the erection of the mosque.
23. GOODWIN, p. 344. See also pp. 342-50 for a complete description of the architecture of the mosque of Sultan Ahmed.
24. I am grateful to Dr. Necdet Özyuvacı of Istanbul for obtaining this information for me.

ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. Caution must be exercised in using Volumes 72-75, wherein a ten-month hiatus exists between Volume 72-73 and 73-74, and seven years between Volume 74 and 75.
2. My colleague András Riedlmayer has drawn my attention to several errors on pp. 231-32 of my dissertation, Political Unrest and Rebellion in Anatolia, 1605-1609 (UCLA, 1966), in which I mistakenly found Vasiti's Telhisat to be a destan or epic poem, which it clearly is not. I also state the work covered the years 1606 to 1611 which is wrong; the dates are 1606 to 1608. Most importantly, the MS is not dedicated to Sultan Ibrahim I. By internal evidence Riedlmayer places one of the document's dates in the reign of Sultan Murad III and suggests that the title given by the library is therefore misleading. The various handwritings indicate the document has three separate sections: the first, Vasiti's history of Kuyucu Murad Pasha; the second, some twenty-two summaries (telhis); and the third, some four religious anecdotes. Dr. Riedlmayer has made a thorough analysis of this important manuscript, and hopefully will publish his findings.

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3. A very valuable analysis of Naima, his history, and his time is L.V. Thomas, A Study of Naima, ed. by N. Itzkowitz (New York, 1972).
4. Ibid., p. 5.

ENDNOTES TO APPENDIX I

1. A Turkish transliteration as well as two photographs of AET 616 exist in my unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Political Unrest and Rebellion in Anatolia, 1605-1609 (UCLA, 1966), pp. 266-73.
2. AET 459 is a ferman giving not Maarra but Bitlis to Ebu Zeyd.
3. AET 456 is a ferman giving not Malatya but Suruc to Derviş Bey.
4. AET 457 is a ferman giving not Birecik but Matlah to Cuma Bey.
5. To understand the scope of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha's objectives in northern Syria and southeastern Anatolia, see the map on p. 119, above, in conjunction with this document.

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