BERLINER ISLAMSTUDIEN BAND 2

LINDA SCHATKOWSKI SCHILCHER

FAMILIES IN POLITICS

DAMASCENE FACTIONS AND ESTATES OF THE 18th AND 19th CENTURIES

FRANZ STEINER VERLAG WIESBADEN GMBH · STUTTGART

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To the emancipation

of scholarship

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FOREWORD

The history of cities has been a favorite subject for historians of the Middle East during the past half-century. They have made radical criticisms of older theories according to which the social structure and physical shape of „Islamic" cities could be seen as expressions of an Islamic ideal of how life should be lived in common, and have insisted on the need for detailed and careful study of particular cities in specific periods of history. This detailed study has by now produced impressive results. Perhaps the first systematic urban history was Jean Sauvaget's *Alep,* published in 1941. In the past twenty years a number of other important works have appeared. Ira Lapidus's *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages,* a study of the main cities of the Mamluk state, tries to define the system of relationships within which specific events can be understood: relationships among different elements of the "notables" (merchants, 'ulama' and masters of crafts), between "notables" and "common people", and between the urban population and the rulers. In *Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious,* Janet Abu Lughod traces the physical development of the city under pressure of economic and political change and the growth of population, and shows how modern Cairo burst out of the limits of the medieval city. André Raymond's *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIe siécle* is a well-documented study of the relationship between wealth and power: of the ways in which urban wealth was created and those who possessed political power tried to obtain their share of the wealth.

In this book, Dr Linda Schatkowski Schilcher has brought these and other themes together in a broad survey of Damascus during two centuries. She shows how the political domination of a local ruling group, the 'Azm family and its dependents, led to the creation of a powerful and long-lived faction, linked with the Ottoman government, having its economic basis in the long-distance trade, and controlling positions of power in local administration and society. Over against it there stood another faction based upon production and trade for local consumption, and having its center of power in another part of the city. In the middle years of the 19th century, the power of the dominant faction was shaken by two processes: the attempt of the Ottoman central government to impose its direct control upon the city and province, and the penetration of European goods, which disturbed traditional patterns of production and trade. The combination of these two processes led, in 1860, to a temporary breakdown of order and social peace, from which the city finally emerged with a new and more solidly based coalition of dominant interests, in which both factions were absorbed, but at a price: its incorporation into the imperial system of government in a subordinate role.

Dr Schatkowski Schilcher's book is full of stimulating ideas and suggestions, and two of them may be of particular value in providing starting points for further research. Her analysis of the impact of European economic expansion upon the local

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economy and society makes a substantial contribution to our knowledge of the economic history of Syria during this period of change; and her study of the rise, cohesion, alliances and power of the leading families is an example of the kind of detailed, painstaking research which is needed if we are to go beyond broad generalizations to a real knowledge and understanding of the social history of the Middle East.

Albert Hourani
Oxford

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PREFACE

If one wished to set a date for the beginning of modern Syrian history, one could suggest the 1660's when a handful of chieftains who came to be known as the 'Azms began to consolidate their position in central Syria around the town of Hama. But the year 1725 when the first 'Azm assumed the governorship of the capital city of Damascus, or 1746 when the 'Azms triumphed over their local opposition and consolidated their factional position in that city are also significant dates. This periodization would have the important consequence that we would thereby be placing the modern social-political development of this central region of the Middle East parallel to, rather than in reaction to or as a consequence of, that of Europe.

This may be the approach we need to escape the distractions and distortions which the occident-orient contrast has since brought to the historiography of the Middle East. Here, I have accepted the invitation of 18th and 19th century Arab historians to view their history by means of a multitude of biographies and have augmented these local sources with information recorded by outside observers, largely westerners. The biographies were then compiled into family chronologies and the families were categorized according to what could be learned in the process about social structure. The results (Chapter VI) can be read first or, alternatively, can be considered as an appendix in contrast to or support of the more conventional earlier chapters on geography, politics, economy and society.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to two professors whose abundant patience and good will have contributed so much to this study. Albert Hourani supervised the research and writing of the dissertation from which this book has sprung. Fritz Steppat initiated and guided the transformation of the dissertation into a book. The long intervals and a variety of extenuating circumstances made both their tasks especially difficult and without their support and encouragement the work would have been immeasurably more difficult.

My thanks go also to Roger Owen, Michael Cook, Butrus Abu-Manneh, Wolf Hütteroth, Eugen Wirth, Michael Meinecke and Hans Robert Roemer for their reading and commentary on the manuscript at various stages of its development.

To the staffs of the Middle East Centre of St Antony's College in Oxford, the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales in Paris, the Institut Français d'Etudes Arabes in Damascus, the American University of Beirut and the Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft in Beirut, the Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz and the Research Library of the University of California in Los Angeles, I would like to express my gratitude as well. For their especially helpful advice and assistance of a bibliographic and archival nature, I would like to thank the staffs of the Public Record Office in London and of the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

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For their help in suggesting and locating materials and sources of information in the Middle East, I am grateful to Stefan Wild, Yusuf Ibish, Abdul-Karim Rafeq, Dad Hakim, André Raymond, 'Ali Armanazi, Abu'l Faraj al-'Ushsh, Chafic Imam, Zafer al-Qasimy, Adnan Mardam Bey, Adib Nouktah, Adnan al-Khatib and Usama Ghazzi. In addition to these, however, many people have helped with the histories of their own families. Wherever possible, these have been named in the relevant family sketches, but my thanks go to all those in Syria and Lebanon who oponed their homes and helped in many ways to make my stay in the Middle East both enjoyable and productive.

For financial assistance I am grateful to the American University of Beirut, the Foreign Area Fellowship Program of New York and the Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz. For a generous grant from the Förderungs- und Beihilfefonds Wissenschaft der Verwertungsgesellschaft WORT GmbH which has made possible the publication of the work in this form I am especially thankful.

L. Schatkowski Schilcher
Georgenborn

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CHAPTER I: GEOGRAPHY

DAMASCUS IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Damascus is one of the oldest continuously occupied urban settlements in the world. Historically, its particular combination of geography, ecology and humanity has been successful. The city lies in a plain south-east of the Anti-Lebanon mountains on the western edge of the Syrian desert which stretches from there to Arabia and Mesopotamia. A large urban settlement at this location could only have been sustained by an abundant water supply. Rainfall which is variable but nearly always meagre has been supplemented by perennial supplies of subsoil water and the water from streams which drain the Anti-Lebanon mountains. The city stands on the banks of the largest of these streams, the Barada or Abana of antiquity. By means of a system of canals and sub-canals already begun in pre-historic times, water was, and to a limited extent still is, conducted to the city's gardens and wells from the hill-side sources. When combined with intensive cropping technics, the system has created an oasis productive enough to support a large population with food and a number of raw materials for industry.

At the beginning of the modern period the city attracted and sustained the trade of the desert routes, functioning as a distributor for this trade with points on the eastern Mediterranean coastal strip, in Asia Minor, Europe and North Africa. These lines of external contact made Damascus one of the more important hubs in the world's trade network. The city's economic importance was reinforced and supplemented, however, by its far-reaching political and cultural ties within the Muslim world. Since the seventh century when Damascus became the capital of the Umayyad empire, the city had been a center for the learned and pious Muslims who came from the Muslim lands of Asia, Africa and Europe to study in its mosques and colleges. The city was also one of the most important gathering points for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and profited from the business the pilgrimage generated and from the military, administrative and logistical tasks related to it which were performed by individuals and groups within the city.

The city relied not only on the grain, fruit and vegetable production of its oasis, it was also within reach of areas of extensive cereal, legume and animal production. The city's oasis formed an inner supply ring while an outer supply ring was formed by dry-farming plains near Homs and Hama in the north, the semi-irrigated Biqa' plain between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon mountains to the west, Wadi 'Ajam and Jawlan to the south-west, the Hawran to the south and south-east and the desert steppe to the east. When control was exerted over

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

Fig. 1

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these, the city was abundantly supplied with food and could support a large non-agricultural population devoted to industrial production and trade as well as to political, cultural and service-oriented occupations.

Since the early 16th century Damascus was a provincial capital of the Ottoman Empire. The city's chief geopolitical importance for the Ottomans lay in its position as the last urban settlement along the pilgrimage route to Mecca before embarkment into the desert. The Ottoman state – if it was to remain the legitimate heir of the Islamic empire – was obliged to ensure the safety and success of the pilgrimage. Therefore, Damascus came to play a special role in the strategy, administration and economy of the Ottoman pilgrimage and with that of the Empire as a whole.

POPULATION

It is impossible to say anything of any exactitude about the size or growth pattern of the population of Damascus in the period stretching from the late 18th until the late 19th century. The scattered figures which are available only help us to gain an impression. The French traveller Volney estimated the city's population in 1783–84 to be 40,000,[1] but the French expeditionary forces of 1799 considered the city to have 90,000.[2] While a number of estimates around the middle of the 19th century appear more consistent (the Bowring Report gives 100,000 in the 1830's,[3] Colonel Lynch obtained an estimate of 110,000 in the late 1840's[4] and Kremer also made an estimate of 110,000 in the 1850's[5]) Porter estimated it to be as high as 150,000 at mid-century. This last estimate seems more reliable because Porter was a more permanent resident in Syria than the others and because he was able to break this figure down into its constituent parts.[6]

1 C.F. Volney, *Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie, les années 1783, 1784 et 1785*, Paris, 1825, II, 141.

2 Friedrich Wencker-Wildberg, *Napoleon, die Memoirien seines Lebens*, Hamburg, 1924–25, V, 16.

3 John Bowring, *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria*, Parliamentary Papers, 1840, 7.

4 Colonel W.F. Lynch, *Narrative of the United States Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea*, Philadelphia, 1849, 489.

5 Alfred von Kremer, *Topographie von Damaskus*, Vienna, 1855, 2 (note).

6 Porter added: "The Government takes a census, it is for the purpose of ascertaining the number of taxable males; but the venality and carelessness of the officers employed, together with the inviolability of the harim and the privacy of Eastern life, render it far from exact or full. There was a census taken a short time previous to the awful visitation of the cholera in 1848; and it was afterwards found, on comparing the returns of the census with those of that fearful scourge, that more people had died in many houses than were returned altogether on the census-lists. The following summary has been drawn up from the last Government census... By those most competent to form a correct estimate... only two-thirds of the Muslim population have been returned, and that consequently fifty per cent must be added to them. The Jews are perhaps about twenty-five percent below the truth; but the number of the Christians given below is correct, as I have obtained it from

Fig. 1

The topography of the city which we shall discuss in detail shortly, demonstrated that the city had grown in area between the 16th and mid-19th centuries. (See Figure 2.) Exactly when and at what rate this growth took place or how it was related to population growth cannot presently be established. Though one of the mid-19th century observers remarked that the city's population was growing due to the contemporary in-migration of peasants from a beleaguered countryside,[7] we cannot know if this was an acute or permanent situation or when and if it was reversed. The same observer also mentioned the positive effect innoculation against smallpox was having on the death rate, but he gives no figures to substantiate his observation.[8]

other and trustworthy sources. The whole population of Damascus I consider to be about 150,000. Muslims: 74,464 [+ 50%]; Druzes: 500; Orthodox: 5,995; Catholic: 6,195; other Christians: 1,900; Jews: 4,630 [+ 25%]; Others (strangers, soldiers, slaves, and protegés): 15,000." J.L. Porter, *Five Years in Damascus*, London, 1855, 138–139.

7 Colonel Lynch wrote: "The population of Damascus was estimated by Dr. Mashaka [Mikha'il Mushaqa] an intelligent Syrian and member of the Asiatic Historical Society of Beirut, at 115,000, and he thinks it is upon the increase. This increase, however, is anything but an evidence of the prosperity of the country, for he attributes it to the desertion of the villages, caused by the frequent forays of the wandering Bedawin. He considers that the deaths are fewer even with the increase population, which he ascribes to the more frequent innoculation of children: for the smallpox has been at times a devastating scourge." Lynch, *op. cit.*

8 *ibid.* The city was periodically struck by epidemics. For the most part, the disease involved appears to have been cholera though typhoid may also have been important. I found no references to smallpox other than that of Lynch quoted in note 7. Epidemics usually lasted from one year into a second. They appear to have come at regular intervals of every ten to eleven years. We have references to epidemics in 1813–14, 1823–24, sometime in the 1830's and in the mid-1840's. According to a local chronicler, the epidemic of 1813–14 must have been especially severe as it carried off one-fourth of the population of the country (*balad*). (See *Tarikh hawadith al-Sham wa Lubnan*, edited by Ahmad Ghassan Sbanu, Damascus, 1981, 57, 74.) The epidemic in the mid-1840's was responsible for the deaths of many prominent citizens and contributed significantly to the scarcity of competent and respected religious leaders in the following decade. See below, Chapter VI, The Second Estate.

9 The Ottoman yearbook of 1316 (1898/99) broke down this figure into the following categories:

	Males	*Females*	*Total*
Muslims	53634	67290	120924
Jews	3483	3366	6849
Greek Orthodox	2397	2281	4678
Greek Catholics	2092	2095	4187
Syrian Catholics	330	215	545
Maronites	124	216	340
Armenian Orthodox	128	121	249
Armenian Catholics	87	89	176
Latins	47	57	104
Protestants	52	38	90
Syrian Orthodox	41	28	69
Salname, 1316.	62415	75796	138211

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

Fig. 2: City's expansion from the classical period until recently (Sauvaget, 1934/Dettmann, 1966)

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By the end of the 19th century, the statistical information had increased but remained contradictory. The official Ottoman census figures give the population to be 138,211 in 1898[9] and 234,796 in 1917.[10] This latter figure was, however, contradicted by the German diplomat Grobba who set the Damascene war-time population much higher at 300,000.[11] The Damascene writer 'Allaf gives a population of 300,000 already at the turn of the century.[12]

If we assume that some of the above-cited figures are a good indication of the population's size, these would suggest that the city was already growing significantly during the first half of the 19th century. This growth, though not necessarily at a steady or always positive rate, continued into the latter half of the century, resulting in a city which was as much as six times more populous at the end of the period studied than at the beginning. As the story of Damascus in this period unfolds many of the economic, cultural and political factors which affected the size and fluctuations of the population will become clear.

TOPOGRAPHY

The reader is referred to four city plans in conjunction with the following discussion and with reference to topographical features as they appear in the rest of the book.[13] Figure 3 is a schematic presentation of the city, showing its wall, the citadel, the central mosque, its thoroughfares and its major concentrations such as quarters and markets. It also indicates some of the topographical features of

10 Quoted in Fritz Grobba, *Die Getreidewirtschaft Syriens und Palästinas seit Beginn des Weltkriegs*, Hannover, 1923, 134.

11 *Ibid*, p. 28.

12 al-'Allaf, Ahmad Hilmi, *Dimashq fi matla' al-qarn al-'ishrin*, Damascus, 1976, 23.

13 These plans have been prepared from a number of sources. The basic plans for Figures 3, 4 and 5 have been taken from Karl Wulzinger and Carl Watzinger, *Damaskus. Die Islamische Stadt*, Berlin, 1924. In order to establish which topographical features were relevant to the period studied here, the following works were consulted: al-'Allaf, *op. cit.*; Karl Baedeker, *Palestine et Syrie, Manuel du Voyageur*, Leipzig, 1893; Klaus Dettmann, *Damaskus. Eine orientalische Stadt zwischen Tradition und Moderne*, Erlangen, 1969; Nikita Elisséeff, *La Description de Damas d'Ibn 'Asakir*, Damascus, 1959; and his "Damas à la lumière des théories de Jean Sauvaget," in A.H. Hourani and S.M. Stern (eds.), *The Islamic City*, Oxford, 1970; 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Haja, Map of Damascus, manuscript, Royal Geographical Society, London; Muhammad Adib Taqi-al-Din Al Hisni, *Kitab muntakhabat al-tawarikh li Dimashq*, Damascus, 1927; Safouh Khayr, *Madinat Dimashq*, Damascus, 1969; Alfred Kremer; Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, *Ghutat Dimashq*, Damascus, 1953; 'Abdul Qadir Rihawi, *Damascus, its history, development and artistic heritage* (translated from the Arabic by Paul E. Cheveden), Damascus, 1977; J. Sauvaget, *Les Monuments Historiques de Damas*, Beirut, 1932; H. Sauvaire, "Description de Damas," *Journal Asiatique*, 1895, 221–313; Johannes Gottfried Wetzstein, "Der Markt von Damaskus," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 1857, 475–525; Eugen Wirth, *Syrien, eine geographische Landeskunde*, Darmstadt, 1971, 278–310.

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major socio-political importance which will be discussed in the text. Figure 4 presents a detailed plan of the city's streets and its identifiable buildings and institutions of social, political, military, economic and cultural importance. Figure 5 presents the Maydan, the southern out-growth of the city in its full extent. (This is presented separately only because it was not possible to publish it together with Figure 4.) Finally, the plan of Damascus drawn by Kremer in the middle of the 19th century is reproduced as Figure 6. It is the earliest plan of Damascus available for the period studied here. All these Figures have their respective keys.

FRONTIERS AND CONFINEMENTS

The city retained substantial traces of its medieval, nearly egg-shaped surrounding wall into the 19th century. It had, however, long since outgrown this confinement. The city's expansion at various stages of its history has been studied by Sauvaget and Dettmann. The latter's results have been presented in Fig. 2. From this we see that settlements had extended beyond the wall only at particular points. To the north the village of 'Uqayba (Oqeybe) had grown towards the city and was joined to it by the growth of a densely settled area called "outer" 'Amara, adjacent to "inner" 'Amara just inside the city's wall. Similarly, "outer" Shaghur (Chaghour) burgeoned outside the south central wall of the city.

To the west and south-west, settlement took place along the city's major trade routes: the quarter of Suq (or Bab) al-Sirija along the route to the Palestinian coast and Egypt; the quarters of Suwayqa and Maydan along the route to Arabia. To the east and south-east, however, little construction extended beyond the city wall probably because of the paucity of fresh water at this extremity of the canal system, but maybe also because the people who lived here were members of age-old urban minority groups who, for one reason or another, remained within the city's wall. Here land beyond the wall was devoted to garden plots, orchards or burial grounds but not to building. Along a large portion of the southern wall gardens had even penetrated within the city's wall suggesting that here the oasis had grown at the expense of the city. In addition to the unsettled areas of the south and south-east, a small region just west of the city's outline between the northern and south-western out-growths remained free of urban construction at this time. This may have been kept available for the use of the Ottoman military as a parade and camping around.

When and why the city wall ceased to exist altogether along its western and south-western foundations, except for a brief remnant in the quadrats D/5–6, cannot be pursued here.[14] With regard to the 19th century it can be seen that the wall, though interrupted and in disrepair nonetheless remained a significant element of topography. Though it in no way served as a barrier to invaders from abroad or

14 A study on the wall of Damascus is presently being carried out by Paul Chevedden, University of California, Los Angeles.

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even from the immediate vicinity in the period studied here, it continued to influence the city's internal settlement patterns. The wall was one of the few absolutes in the city's topography as it provided a relatively solid stone backdrop, up against which the city constructed its impermanent and adaptable half-timbered clay edifices. It provided one and sometimes even two sides of a confinement within which a group of buildings could be enclosed. The way in which the wall thus functioned as a barrier is clear at a number of points, as shown in Figure 4 (e.g. as in quadrats L/3, G/7 or H/2). In some cases, houses presented much more open faces to the outside of the city than to the inside by extending upper story windows and balconies over the city wall.[15]

Another interesting feature of the wall was the way in which it formed the terminus for many streets. The culs-de-sac had become one of the most popular residential forms in Damascus since medieval times. Examples of these walling-up building practices are evident in all parts of the inner-city plan of our period. (See, for example, Figure 4, quadrats G/6 or H/4). Though attempts were made in the 18th and 19th centuries to re-open, widen and straighten many streets, only limited success was achieved and then only along commercial arteries. For the most part the city remained a maze of discontinued alleys and *culs-de-sac* well into the 20th century.

Though the wall had been broken through in earlier centuries, it seems to have been able to demarcate a real limit on urban growth at this time. This is especially evident in the eastern half of the city, as already mentioned. If population grew in areas of the city which had already their backs to the wall – as did the Muslim quarter of Bab al-Salam or the largely Christian quarters of Bab Tuma and Bab Sharqi – this could create tensions within the city. It could result in competition for real estate along inner-city quarter boundaries, as may have been the case between Bab Tuma and Qaymariya in the mid-19th century; or in the formation of satellites of alternative urban settlement at a certain distance from the city, as in the case of Saruja and the lower i.e. northern Maydan; or in the further growth of twin quarters just outside the wall, as in the case of Shaghur and 'Amara with their inner and outer halves.

The wall may also have demarcated at least customary, if not administrative or legal, differentiation between the inner-city population and the suburban and/or rural population. Though this cannot be pursued at length here (chiefly due to the sparseness of evidence), at least two significant examples can be offered. It appears that the inner-city population differed from those outside the wall in that the latter were more likely to be armed and ride about on horseback than the former. That is, the wall at this time may have defined an area of at least de facto disarmament. Secondly, the cafés of the city appear to have been restricted to areas outside the city wall.

15 Photographs of Damascus demonstrating this and further topographical features are reproduced here.

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

Fig. 3

Quadrat	Number	Market (*suq*), Street (*zuqaq*) or familiar topographical point
B/2	1	Suq 'Ali Basha
C/2	2	Suq al-Khayl
	3	Suq al-Jimal
	4	Suq al-Khudra
	5	Suq Khan al-Basha
D/2	6	Suq al-Jalladatiya *(?)*
	7	Suq al-Nuhas
E/2	8	Suq al-Manakhiliya
	9	Suq al-Abdin *(?)*
F/2	10	Suq al-'Amara
C/3	11	Suq al-Nahhasin
	12	Suq al-Qumayla
	13	Suq al-Surujiya
D/3	14	Suq al-Khaymatiya
E/3	15	Suq Taht al-Qal'a
	16	Zuqaq al-Bus
H/3	17	Suq al-Qadi
L/3	18	Zuqaq al-Hadira
C/4	19	Zuqaq Sidi al-'Amud *(?)*
D/4	20	Suq al-Arwam
	21	al-Zuqaq al-Muballat
	22	Bawaba Muhammad Basha
E/4	23	al-Suq al-Jadid
	24	Suq al-Qumash
	25	Suq al-Kashani *(?)*
F/4	26	Suq al-Qabaqib
	27	Suq al-Harir
	28	Suq al-Buzuriya
	29	Suq al-Qamh
G/4	30	Zuqaq al-As'adiya
	31	Sayih al-Qari
	32	Zuqaq al-Ma'iza
H/4	33	Suq al-Ahad
D/5	34	Suq al-'Attarin
	35	Suq al-Khawwasin
	36	Suq al-Jaqmaq
	37	Suq al-Qawwasin
	38	Suq al-Dra'
	39	Suq al-Manjarni *(?)*
E/5	40	Zuqaq al-Qadi
	41	Suq al-Habbalin
	42	Suq al-Nuriya
	43	Suq al-Jawqiya
	44	Suq al-Suf
F/5	45	Suq al-'Abajiya
	46	Suq al-Ruzz
	47	Suq al-Warraqin
	48	Suq al-Tibn
	49	Suq al-'Ulabiya
	50	Zuqaq al-Daqqaqin
G/5	51	Suq Taht al-Qanatir
H/5	52	Zuqaq al-Tullaj
	53	Zuqaq al-Dik
E/6	54	Suq al-Qutn
	55	Taht al-Daraj
F/6	56	Zuqaq Hammam al-Dukkan
G/6	57	Zuqaq al-Nasiri
	58	Zuqaq al-Malihi
I/6	59	Suq al-Jum'a

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On the other hand, the wall appears to have failed to restrict the city's growth only to factors emanating from within the city. This is demonstrated by the remarkable growth in the 19th century of the upper (i.e. southern) Maydan. Growth here appears to have been motivated by rural factors. The settlement of rural notables and the construction of grain warehouses and markets give evidence not only of the intensification of the city's ties to its outer hinterland ring, but also of the importance of rural developments to the city's growth. The transformations, turmoil and crises through which the Hawran – the hinterland area to which the Maydan quarter leads – was passing at mid-century[16] caused migrations which, amongst other things, led to the further urbanization of the Damascus inner ring. The Maydan grew both to accomodate and profit from the growing rural economy but also as a safe-haven for displaced elements of the rural population.

The city's extra-mural growth was to continue beyond the period studied here. The suburban village of Salihiya to the north-west of the city on the slopes and cliffs of Jabal Qasyun was the next area of rapid urbanization. The immigration and settlement there of largely peasant refugee groups from Muslim areas in North Africa, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and central Asia which had come under the control of non-Muslim governments caused significant growth during the second half of the 19th century and provided a certain balance to the growth of the Maydan.

The city's built-up area today (see Figure 2) is vastly extended beyond the city's walls in all directions. The extra-mural growth pattern first established by 'Amara, Shaghur, Saruja and the Maydan in the period studied here, and followed shortly thereafter by Salihiya, was to be repeated time and again as new waves of peasants and foreign refugees migrated to the city. Today the inner city is but a small, archaically beautiful yet acutely threatened historical monument of what Damascus was only a century and a half before.

STREETS AND THOROUGHFARES

The 19th century street plan of inner Damascus is actually a super-imposition and adaptation of the right-angle grid pattern of the classical era. Thanks to the work of Sauvaget, Elisséeff and Dettmann, many traces of the classical age have been found in the city's modern lay-out.[17] (See Figure 7.) However, it would have been difficult for anyone seeing the city from the ground level in the 19th century to notice the classical grid. A typical description of Damascus by contemporary European travellers noted its narrow dead-end streets, its smooth, windowless walls, its mud and its mysteries.[18] Though some of these descriptions may have

16 The situation in the Hawran has been discussed in my article: "The Hawran Conflicts of the 1860's: A Chapter in the Rural History of Modern Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), 159–179.

17 See above, Note 13.

18 A French visitor, for example, wrote in 1860: "Damas ressemble à ces femmes que je vois passer tous les matins devant notre camp, couvrant leurs vêtements brodés d'un misérable

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purposely orientalized the city for a romantic audience back home, there can be no doubt that Damascus devoted little resources to the kind of street repair and cleanliness or the facilitation of traffic circulation which these Europeans had come to expect in their own cities. Resources were more likely to be devoted to maintenance of the canals, repair of clay walls and the necessities of inner-city security.

It should also be noted that wheeled vehicles were not in use in Damascus at this time. The streets did not carry traffic which required wideness, straightness or even pavement. Camel and mule drivers, pedestrians and even mounted troops could all move through the city's gates and along its narrow thoroughfares and alleys directly to their destinations even if these were in the heart of the city. While the 'through' traffic – as we shall discuss in a moment – could circle the city, traffic into the city followed particular and relatively direct routes which functioned as the city's commercial arteries. (Figure 3 is a schematic representation of those features of the city which we shall now discuss. It has been placed just over the detailed plan of the city, Figure 4, with the hope that the reader can best relate the two figures to each other and to the discussion.)

The east-west thoroughfare (D to L/5) called *via recta* or 'the street called straight' in the western tradition (Acts IX, 11) was probably called the *darb al-sharqi* or the 'eastern' route by Damascenes of the 18th and 19th centuries. It was the inner-city extension of the eastern caravan route to Baghdad which threaded its way through the eastern oasis after leaving the city at the Bab al-Sharqi (L/5). This thoroughfare continued from the Bab al-Sharqi to the Suq al-Buzuriya (F/4–5) where a market containing several warehouses formed its terminal. The widening and straightening of the *via recta* beyond (i.e. west of) the Suq al-Buzuriya did not take place until the 1870's. It was thereafter known as the Suq Midhat Basha in honor of the Ottoman governor who had carried through the re-construction.[19] During the period studied here, it is therefore unlikely that the entire *via recta* was as much of a major artery as indicated on the early 20th century plan.

The northern trade route from Aleppo, Anatolia and Istanbul entered the city at Bab Tuma (K/2), making its may southward until it turned into the eastern route just described. It may have been because of the importance of the intersection of these two routes in K/5 that the Ottoman government constructed a military post there. It may, however, just as well have been because this corner stood at the entrance to the city's Christian quarter and, given the sectarian strife of the mid-19th century, an armed presence here was considered necessary to keep the peace. An alternative thoroughfare (cutting diagonally from Bab Tuma

voile de coton: elle cache ses trésors, et se présente sous un triste aspect à l'Européen qui la parcourt pour la première fois. Des maisons basses et sans fenêtres forment des ruelles sales et étroites; nous n'y rencontrons que des chiens galeux couchés en travers du chemin, ou quelques femmes qui se glissent le long de la muraille comme pour éviter notre vue." *Damas et Liban, Extraits du Journal d'un Voyage en Syrie au Printemps de 1860*, (author anonymous) London, 1861, 9.

19 al-'Allaf, 23.

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through I/3 and I/4) slightly to the west of the one just described also joined the northern trade route to the eastern one. The convergence of all the eastern and northern routes in the vicinity of the Bab al-Kanisa and Kharab (G–H/5) and continuing westwardly on the *via recta* into the city's center made this area very congested. Alternatively, the traffic could circumvent the city's wall, taking a northern route parallel to the Barada river and entering the city through the Bab al-Salam (H/2) or the longer southern route, entering the city at the Bab al-Saghir (F/7).

The western trade route from the Biqa', the Lebanese mountains and the Mediterranean coast came along the banks of the Barada river to a large, meadow-like space called the Marja (B/3). From there, four major thoroughfares extended to various points. One passed by the Mosque of Sanjaqdar (C/3) and led to the heart of the city. Along this route a 'new' market (*al-Suq al-Jadid* D/4) was constructed over the existing one by Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm in 1781.[20] Later improvements were made here during the Egyptian occupation in the 1830's, by the Mardam family in the 1850's[21] and by the Ottoman authorities in the 1880's. The last gave the market its present-day name of Suq al-Hamidiya in honor of the contemporary Ottoman Sultan, 'Abd al-Hamid II.

An early 20th century source describes three additional thoroughfares which emanated from the Marja.[22] There was the route which began like the one just described but remained outside the inner city, passing through the area called the Darwishiya (C/4) and continuing southwards into the Maydan. Another route left the Marja in an easterly direction, running parallel to the Barada river but remaining slightly north of it. This route passed through Suq Saruja and a number of markets and industrial concentrations and ended at Bab Tuma where, as just described, the major route from the north entered the city. Yet another route carried traffic from the Marja to Salihiya, though this – because it remained outside the city during the period studied here – cannot be considered one of its thoroughfares.

The south-western route from the Jawlan, Palestine and Egypt came through Bab al-Sarija (B/6) converging with the southern route just before the city wall near Bab al-Jabiya (D/5). The southern routes from the Hawran, Transjordan and Arabia came chiefly through the Maydan. In addition to its steady traffic carrying commestibles this route was the scene of the annual pilgrimage pageant.

The convergence of nearly all the southern and western supply and trade routes along the avenue running from the citadel (C–D/3) to the Sinaniya Mosque (D/5) – a line which deceptively rounds out the inner city's shape here although the original wall was not rounded on its north-western corner – made this thoroughfare one of the busiest in the city. It was, however, again possible to avoid this congestion by taking the northern or southern 'ring' roads. The long southern ring which skirted the city wall in the eastern portion was bordered for a good deal of

20 Abdul Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus, 1723–1783*, Beirut, 1966, 309.
21 See the history of the Mardam family in Chapter VI.
22 al-'Allaf, 17–22.

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the way by gardens, orchards and eventually an important cemetery. It is interesting to note that a mid-19th century European traveller who described this route erroneously translated its name (*darb al-qarawiyin*) to mean route of the caravans,[23] when it actually means route of the villagers. He was possibly misled by the large amount of caravan traffic here.

CONCENTRATIONS

The Central Rectangle

In spite of the 'oriental' character of the city, there remained a nearly-complete rectangle of streets within the city wall which, although not very wide, were quite straight and parallel. This rectangle was roughly formed by four points: the citadel (D/3) though, as we shall see, that building itself belonged to elements of an extra-mural nature, the gates Bab al-Jabiya (D/5) and Bab al-Salam (H/2) and the mosque of the Kanisa (H/5). At mid-century this area was a recognizably distinct entity. Porter noted while proceeding westward on the *via recta* and upon reaching al-Qanatir (G/5) that "the whole north-western section of the city was thus occupied [i.e. with businesses] only intermixed here and there with noble mosks and family mansions of the Damascus nobility."[24]

Within this rectangle, the greater part of the city's Muslim orthodox religious institutions were located. Of special importance was, of course, the Umayyad Mosque (F/3) which dominated the entire area. Here the obligatory Friday prayer ritual was performed by the city's governor, and the preacher – a local Muslim scholar – intoned the legitimacy of Ottoman rule over the city. At all times during the week, the Umayyad Mosque was the meeting place for several learned circles.[25] Numerous other institutions in its vicinity reinforced and supplemented its religious and educational functions. While most of these can be located on Fiure 4 with the help of its key, special attention should be drawn to the five Muslim colleges (*madrasas*) in which students were able to reside. By the mid-19th century these were the only *madrasas* of this type in Damascus: the Badura'iya (G/3, 1) the Sumaysatiya (F/3, 15), the Sulaymaniya (E/4, 6), the 'Abdallah Basha (F/4) and the Khayyatin (As'ad Basha) (E/5, 4) *madrasas.*[26] While areas outside the central rectangle and outside the city wall also had mosques and *madrasas*, it is interesting to note that Sufi *zawiyas* (i.e. mystical chapels and hospices) were found only outside the central rectangle.[27]

23 Kremer, 20.

24 Porter, 57.

25 Further discussion of the city's religious and learned institutions follows in Chapter V.

26 Fleischer, "Michael Meschaka's Kultur-Statistik von Damaskus," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 1854, 346.

27 The absence of *zawiyas* within the central rectangle did not necessarily mean that Sufis did not hold their meetings there. Kremer reported meetings of Sufis within the Umayyad mosque at which recitations, singing and mystical dancing took place. Kremer, 41.

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Name

al-Jaghushiya *(?)*; al-Jarrah *(?)*
not identified further
al-Badawi
al-Sijn

al-Safi
Qadiri-Samadi Sufis
not identified further

al-Najab *(?)*

Sham'aya family

Lasbuna (Zabuna) family
Ahmad Kharab

al-Tabitiya *(?)*

al-Tarazi
not identified further

'Ali al-Baridi (al-Suwayqa)
formerly a *madrasa*;
probably the courthouse for the Maydan

al-Zayn
al-Shaykh Hasan
not identified further

al-Shaykh Mas'ud
al-Najjarin
al-Jarrah
al-Suruji
Sa'diya Sufis

al-Suruji
Sidi Islam
al-'Arabi

al-Suqiya
al-Shaykh Hasan al-Shaybani; possibly of
the Sa'diya Sufis
[See Fig. 5 for further points in the Maydan]

al-Mazzaz

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

Fig. 4

Quadrat	Number	Name
A/1	1	Maktab ʿAbdallah
B/1	1	al-Ward
C/1	1	Suq al-Shamran
	2	al-ʿAwniya; also as al-Madrasa al-Shamiya al-Barraniya
	3	al-Sharifiya
	4	Dawragha
D/1	1	ʿAbd al-Rahman Basha Yusuf
	2	Harat al-Nawfara
	3	Muhammad Basha (possibly al-ʿAzm); possibly the German Consulate in the mid-19th century (Haus Wetzstein)
	4	not identified further
	5	Maktab I'dadi
E/1	1	al-ʿUmari
	2	al-Tawba
	3	probably al-Majnuniya
F/1	1	not identified further
	2	al-Nahhas
	3	al-Sakakiri
G/1	1	al-Jawzi
	2	al-Jadid
H/1	1	Bir al-Kana'is
	2	al-Ashraf
	3	al-Jamiaʿ al-Aqsab (used as a *zawiya*)
	4	Sadat al-Zaynabiya
A/2	1	al-Ta'usiya
B/2	1	Yelbogha
C/2	1	al-Rashidiya
	2	ʿAyn ʿAli
	3	al-Bittikh
	4	Sina'iya; formerly the Khan al-Bittikh
	5	al-Kirmani *(?)*
	6	of the Suq al-ʿAtiq
	7	Khan al-Bittikh
	8	al-Zayt
	9	al-Durumjiya
D/2	1	Lala Mustafa Basha; Mardam family
	2	al-Khalili
	3	al-Mu'ayyad
	4	Khan ʿAli Basha
	5	al-Zabib
	6	not identified further
E/2	1	al-Sayyid
	2	not identifid further
	3	al-Manakhiliya
	4	not identified further
	5	al-Muʿallaq
	6	al-Manakhiliya
F/2	1	al-Sadat
	2	al-ʿUmariya
	3	Sitti Ruqayya
H/2	1	Bab al-Salam
	2	al-Zawiya (possibly of the Sa'diya Sufis)

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Quadrat	Number	Name
A/1	1	Maktab 'Abdallah
B/1	1	al-Ward
C/1	1	Suq al-Shamran
	2	al-'Awniya; also as al-Madrasa al-Shamiya al-Barraniya
	3	al-Sharifiya
	4	Dawragha
D/1	1	'Abd al-Rahman Basha Yusuf
	2	Harat al-Nawfara
	3	Muhammad Basha (possibly al-'Azm); possibly the German Consulate in the mid-19th century (Haus Wetzstein)
	4	not identified further
	5	Maktab I'dadi
E/1	1	al-'Umari
	2	al-Tawba
	3	probably al-Majnuniya
F/1	1	not identified further
	2	al-Nahhas
	3	al-Sakakiri
G/1	1	al-Jawzi
	2	al-Jadid
H/1	1	Bir al-Kana'is
	2	al-Ashraf
	3	al-Jamia' al-Aqsab (used as a *zawiya*)
	4	Sadat al-Zaynabiya
A/2	1	al-Ta'usiya
B/2	1	Yelbogha
C/2	1	al-Rashidiya
	2	'Ayn 'Ali
	3	al-Bittikh
	4	Sina'iya; formerly the Khan al-Bittikh
	5	al-Kirmani *(?)*
	6	of the Suq al-'Atiq
	7	Khan al-Bittikh
	8	al-Zayt
	9	al-Durumjiya
D/2	1	Lala Mustafa Basha; Mardam family
	2	al-Khalili
	3	al-Mu'ayyad
	4	Khan 'Ali Basha
	5	al-Zabib
	6	not identified further
E/2	1	al-Sayyid
	2	not identifid further
	3	al-Manakhiliya
	4	not identified further
	5	al-Mu'allaq
	6	al-Manakhiliya
F/2	1	al-Sadat
	2	al-'Umariya
	3	Sitti Ruqayya
H/2	1	Bab al-Salam
	2	al-Zawiya (possibly of the Sa'diya Sufis)

Quadrat	Number	Name
I/2	1	not identified further
	2	the American Consulate; Mishaqa family
K/2	1	al-Suqayfa
	2	Khalid ibn Walid
	3	Sitti Khawla or al-Sayyida Khawla
L/2	1	not identified further
M/2	1	Shaykh Raslan
A/3	1	Jamal Basha
	2	al-Mawlawiya
	3	al-Mawlawiya
B/3	1	al-Tankiziya; transformed into barracks by Ibrahim Basha
	2	al-Khatuniya of the Khalwatiya-Ahmadiya Sufis
	3	Lutfi Basha
C/3	1	al-Ra's
	2	al-Sanjaqdar
	3	al-Khalili
	4	al-Qajmasiya *(?)*
	5	al-Jisr
	6	Ahmad Pasha Yusuf
D/3	1	al-Nahrayn
	2	al-Surujiya
	3	al-Qal'a
	4	al-Qal'a
	5	not identified further
E/3	1	al-'Aqiq
	2	al-Malik al-Zahir Baybars (al-Zahiriya)
	3	al-'Adiliya al-Kubra
	4	Dar al-Hadith
	5	Dar al-Hadith (al-Ashrafiya)
	6	al-Sab' Qa'at
	7	al-'Asruniya
	8	al-Gumruk
	9	al-Maradina *(?)*
	10	the Persian Consulate
F/3	1	al-Qahfi wal-Dinari
	2	al-Iqbaliya
	3	al-Jarukhiya
	4	Shaykh Hasan al-'Attar
	5	Quwwatli; formerly the British Consulate
	6	al-Silsila
	7	not identified further
	8	Bayt al-Muradi; previously the Madrasa al-Badura'iya
	9	al-Fadiliya
	10	al-Jaqmaqiya
	11	al-Sinjariya
	12	al-Ghazzi
	13	al-Ghazzi; possibly formerly the Madrasa al-Shamiya al- Barraniya
	14	al-Andalusiya

Quadrat	Number	Name
F/3	15	al-Sumaysatiya
	16	al-Kamiliya; posssibly the Tabariya
	18	al-Husayn
	19	Shaykh Qatana
	20	Qubbat al-Nasr
G/3	1	Habs al-Amwat
	2	al-Batrakiya (Sitti Rabiya)
	3	not identified further
	4	'Ata' al-'Ajlani; previously the Madrasa of the Shaykh al-Masha'ikh
	5	al-Nawfara
	6	al-Natta'in
	7	not identified further
H/3	1	al-'Atad
	2	al-Qaymariya
	3	al-Qaymariya
	4	not identified further
	5	al-Jawish
I/3	1	Greek consulate; Qudsi family
	2	al-Bakri
	3	al-Bakri
	4	al-Amidi *(?)*
	5	al-Shaykh 'Abdallah
	6	Protestant
	7	Protestant
	8	Mr Patterson
K/3	1	Jesuit
	2	Bukhran
	3	Sittat Masamiri
	4	al-Hamadi
	5	Franciscans
	6	House of the Spanish Crown
	7	Ma'tuq
	8	Armenian Catholic Patriarchate
	9	Sisters of Charity
L/3	1	al-Matbakh
	2	Ananias
B/4	1	Mawlawi Sufis
	2	al-Qanatir
C/4	1	al-'Adasi; Nashabandi Sufi *zawiya*
	2	al-Darwishiya
	3	al-Malika
	4	possibly Bayt Musabba'
	5	al-Darwishiya
	6	al-Darwishiya
D/4	1	al-Ahmadiya
	2	al-'Adrawiya
	4	not identified further
	5	the German Consulate (Haus Lütticke)
	6	Sitt 'Adra al-Sitt al-'Adhra'
	7	not identified further
E/4	1	al-Sulaymaniya
	2	Shaykh Qatana
	3	al-Juwar *(Jizrar?)*
	4	al-Za'faranjiya

Quadrat	Number	Name
E/4	5	Muristan Nur al-Din; possibly the Bakri family household
	6	Ahmad al-Bistami; possibly also Sulayman Pasha al-'Azm
	7	al-Shamiya al-Jawwaniya
	8	formerly the Madrasa al-Jawhariya
	9	al-Rayhaniya
	10	al-Na'ibiya (al-Khayyatin?)
	11	Nur al-Din (al-Nuriya)
	12	al-Bab
	13	built in 1841; not identified further
	14	not identified further
F/4	1	possibly the residence of Muhammad Basha al-'Azm
	2	al-Sagha
	3	al-Harir
	4	al-Aminiya
	5	al-Tutun
	6	al-Safarjalaniya (or al-Muradi)
	7	al-Sidraniya *(?)*
	8	al-Qaymariya (or 'Abdallah Basha al-'Azm)
	9	Hafiz Bey al-'Azm
	10	Bayn al-Bahrayn
	11	As'ad Pasha al-'Azm
	12	al-Sawwaf
	13	al-Kubra (formerly the Madrasa al-Jawziya)
	14	al-Buzuriya
	15	formerly the Madrasa al-Mu'iniya
G/4	1	al-Qari
	2	al-Maktab al-Sultani
	3	not identified further
H/4	1	Maktab al-Qaymariya; formerly the Safarjalani mosque (Khalwati-Safarjalani Sufis) possibly founded by Fathi al-Falaqinsi
	2	Anglican Protestant Mission House
	3	Greek Orthodox Church
	4	Greek Orthodox Patriarchate
	5	Yusuf Anbar
	6	Banat al-Rum
	7	al-Fuka'ani *(?)*
	8	al-'Ahyan *(?)*
I/4	1	Greek Orthodox
	2	Mr Crawford
K/4	1	Sisters of Charity School
	2	Sisters of Charity Cloisters
	3	The Italian Consulate; Shamiya family
	4	al-Miski
	5	Abu'l-Bayan
	6	possibly of the Misk family
L/4	1	Syrian Orthodox
B/5	1	Abu'l-Fath
C/5	1	al-Ta'dil (built 1883/84)
	2	al-Haddadin
	3	al-Mu'allaq
	4	Maktab al-Baltajiya
	5	not identified further

Quadrat	Number	Name
D/5	1	al-Harrathin
	2	al-Sadat
	3	al-Sakitin *(?)*
	4	al-Muradi
	5	Sitti Sarkis
	6	al-Sinaniya, used by the Rifa'i Sufis
	7	al-Sinaniya, formerly a *madrasa*
	8	al-Sinaniya
	9	al-Sinaniya
E/5	1	al-Duqqa
	2	al-Zayt
	3	Jaqmaq
	4	al-Khayyatin (As'ad Basha al-'Azm)
	5	al-Juwakhiya (al-Qumash)
	6	al-Khayyatin
	7	al-Munajjidin
	8	al-'Ala *(?)*
	9	Hisham
	10	al-Duqqa
	11	al-Khudayriya; possibly of the Khalwati and Shadhili Sufis
	12	not identified further
F/5	1	al-'Amud
	2	As'ad Pasha al-'Azm
	3	al-Nuhas
	4	al-Ruzz al-Kabir
	5	al-Ruzz al-Saghir
	6	al-Shahm; possibly al-Habbalin
	7	Sulayman Pasha al-'Azm
	8	al-Khrisatiya *(?)*
	9	not identified further
	10	Nasif family
	11	al-Siba'i family
G/5	1	"built in the Venetian style"; not identified further
	2	Taht al-Kanatir
	3	al-Kharab
	4	British Consul
H/5	1	al-Kanisa
	2	al-Kharab
	3	Ya'qub Istanbuli family
	4	not identified further
L/5	1	Syrian Catholics
	2	Armenian Patriarchate
	3	Greek Catholic Patriarchate
B/6	1	al-Nabi
	2	not identified further
C/6	1	Ahmad Basha
	2	'Izz al-Din
	3	Shaykh 'Abdallah
D/6	1	al-'Ajami
	2	Muhammad al-Sabuni
	3	Shadhiliya Sufis
	4	al-Zaytuni

Quadrat	Number	Name
F/6	1	al-Jaghushiya *(?)*; al-Jarrah *(?)*
	2	not identified further
	3	al-Badawi
	4	al-Sijn
F/6	1	al-Safi
	2	Qadiri-Samadi Sufis
	3	not identified further
G/6	1	al-Najab *(?)*
H/6	1	Sham'aya family
I/6	1	Lasbuna (Zabuna) family
	2	Ahmad Kharab
A/7	1	al-Tabitiya *(?)*
B/7	1	al-Tarazi
	2	not identified further
C/7	1	'Ali al-Baridi (al-Suwayqa)
	2	formerly a *madrasa*; probably the courthouse for the Maydan
D/7	1	al-Zayn
	2	al-Shaykh Hasan
	3	not identified further
F/7	1	al-Shaykh Mas'ud
	2	al-Najjarin
	3	al-Jarrah
	4	al-Suruji
	5	Sa'diya Sufis
G/7	1	al-Suruji
	2	Sidi Islam
	3	al-'Arabi
D/8	1	al-Suqiya
	2	al-Shaykh Hasan al-Shaybani; possibly of the Sa'diya Sufis
		{See Fig. 5 for further points in the Maydan}
F/8	1	al-Mazzaz

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

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The central rectangle was also the commercial heart of the city. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the number of warehouses or *khans* found there. Of the total of twenty-eight *khans* located in the city[28], twenty-one were found within the central rectangle. The markets here had, moreover, a more permanent character than those found elsewhere. The shops were considerably better built and cared for,[29] and while the markets outside the city wall dealt either in perishables or animals or very often in products produced on the spot, the markets of the central rectangle dealt mostly in finished wares and luxury items. It is also interesting to note that with the important exceptions of precious metals and fibres, all capital goods (i.e. production components, tools, weapons, working livestock and possibly slaves) were traded in markets outside the central rectangle.

Finally, the central rectangle was the location of the households of many of the prominent Damascene Muslim families. Of the twenty-eight important Muslim households which could be located (See Figure 4), nineteen were within the central rectangle. These households were large, usually stone dwellings with spacious courtyards, stables, internal water supplies, larders, summer and winter rooms, private quarters and public reception halls.[30] They were built in very close proximity to and were easily accessible from the markets. As the central rectangle was otherwise not a residential area, the concentration of these households here

28 See Figure 4. This figure does not, however, include the many well-documented grain stores of the Maydan which were, unfortunately, not located in the topographies.

29 Kremer's description of a central rectangle market is worth quoting at length:
"The Bazar is a street along both sides of which stretch long rows of vaulting. Under these the shops of the business people are to be found. The walls of these vaults are 20 to 25 feet high and support a wooden roof which covers the entire market, giving protection from sun as much as from rain. From place to place a ventilating window has been placed in the wall, creating the chance for light and air to enter, as also from place to place an arch has been raised upon which the wooden roof rests. On both sides of the market a Mastabbe or stoop made of stone and clay has been built which is one and a half feet high and two to three feet wide. This stoop provides the shop-keepers with the advantage of displaying their wares and also gives them a place upon which they can spread a carpet upon which they sit to smoke a pipe; it is also an amenity for the shopper who can rest there while sampling the goods and bargaining. Often the Mastabbe is completely panelled with wood and separated from the other shops by two wooden walls which are erected at both ends, whereby one shop is naturally brought out prominently, sitting directly in the street. The Damascenes excell in ornamenting and decorating their shops. And the custom of some shop-keepers of placing large bunches of violets, snow-drops and anemones or other flowers creates a pleasant impression. Inside, the shops are usually painted sky-blue often also green and violet and decorated with gilded Arabesques between which small mirrors are set. At night-time the shop is closed by pulling down a cover which during the day had been pulled up and also by a second which is pulled from below. Kremer, 2 (my translation). A very similar description of Damascene shops is given by George Robinson, *Three Years in the East: Syria 1829–1832*, London, 1837, 260–261.

30 Dorothee Sack, "Damascener Wohnhäuser," Lecture with slides given at Frankfurt University, 1979. We await Frau Sack's publication of her comprehensive study on the architectural history of the Damascene notable houses. See also Dorothea Duda, *Innenarchitektur syrischer Stadthäuser des 16. bis 18. Jahrhunderts*, Wiesbaden, 1971.

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suggests they had some particular functional connection to the economic activities of the central rectangle similar to the commercial 'houses' of European cities at this time,[31] though some were clearly there because of the use of religious foundations as private residences.

The Ottoman Area

In contrast to this religious, cultural, commercial and possibly financial concentration within the city wall, the city's armed elements and a good deal of its production for local consumption were found outside the wall. Taking the first of these, we see that the regular and para-military forces of this period and the infrastructure which supported them were concentrated to the north-west and to the south-west of the inner city. This was true of all armed elements, be they the representatives of the Ottoman government, of an occupying power or of the city's own para-military factions.

An area of heavy imperial concentration – which we shall therefore call the Ottoman area – can be defined roughly in the area north and west of the citadel (A–D/2–3). Here were the government palaces (the *dar al-wizara* and the *seray*), the citadel, adequate space for encampment and parade grounds, and a considerable number of commercial and cultural activities meant to serve the needs of the troops. The Ottoman governor (or *wali*),[32] who could also be designated commander (*sari'askar* or *mushir*) of the troops and always carried the title of *pasha* (in Arabic, *basha*) and usually the rank of minister (*wazir*), was dispatched on orders from Istanbul to Damascus where he established himself and his private entourage (*harim*) in the government palace (*seray*) under the protection of his own private guard. In the late 18th and 19th centuries there were three official buildings used as government palaces. The Dar al-Wizara (D/2) was used during the short Egyptian occupation by Abu'l-Dhahab in 1771;[33] the Ottoman *seray* (C/4) and another *seray* built roughly on the same site by Ibrahim Pasha during the Egyptian occupation of the 1830's served for other governors. New headquarters for the *mushir* were built before the turn of this century in C/4, being used today as the Palace of Justice. The imperial troops under the command of the governor or *mushir*, when the offices were separate, were camped to the north-west of the city near the *seray* and on occasion in the citadel. They were called *qapi-qul*.

During the period studied here, the *seray* and the citadel were for the governor of Damascus what a palace and castle were for rulers of European medieval cities. In times of political instability, the citadel became the refuge for the city's ruler and his entourage. The citadel was, moreover, his fortress and armoury. Here guns, gunpowder and other arms were stored and cannons were mounted on the

31 See below, 64.
32 See also below, 28.
33 Rafeq, *Province*, 269.

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walls overlooking the city. Also here were the governor's mint and possibly his treasury.[34] Within the citadel's walls were a mosque and a Sufi chapel. Otherwise, a bath, a market and a flour mill made the citadel into a "small, self-sufficient city" balanced against the city which the governor ruled.[35]

The Ottoman area had its own centers of worship, study and mystical contemplation. Of these the Takkiya complex for the Mawlawi and Naqshbandi Sufis (which is just off our Figure 4 west of A/2) was probably the most important of these. Other institutions, however, were also important. There were the mosque and school of the Mawlawi Sufis at A/3, the Khatuniya *zawiya* for Khalwati Sufis at B/3 and the Shabikliya *zawiya* for Naqshbandis at B/4, 1. The Turkish names of the major mosques and colleges here – Yilbogha (B/2), Durumjiya (C/2), Tankiziya (B/3), Sanjaqdar (C/3) and Qajmasiya (C/3) – also indicate the especially foreign (as opposed to Arab or Syrian) character of this area.[36] The production and sale of animals, provisions and wares required by the troops dominated the markets of the Ottoman area. There were, for example, the markets for saddlery (D/2 and C/3), tents (D/3), camels (C/2), mules (C/2) and copper utensils (D/2).

A remarkable feature of the Ottoman area was the number of open-air promenades and recreational facilities it offered. Jabha (in C/3), for example, was a popular entertainment area in the mid-19th century. It was a large rectangular piece of land ringed by trees and bushes and partially roofed. Since it was located between the Qanawat and Baniyas canals, water could be channelled to flow around all four sides. There were fountains in the middle of the square and reed chairs were scattered about for those passing their leisure time. Boutiques sold refreshments, mats, blankets and cloaks.

Another similar area was Bayn al-Nahrayn. This was located to the north of the citadel within the Ottoman area, spreading itself over the banks of the Barada river between an enormous plane tree called "the tree of Abraham" (D/2) and the Manakhiliya café (E/2). Here there was a bridge over a channel of the river which reached out to a small island. In the vicinity water wheels turned by the Barada river waters droned and one could find peddlars of sweets, sherbets, fruits, kababs, cheeses and yoghurts. This area was said to be the favorite promenade of the Damascene youth of the mid-19th century.[37]

34 Kremer, 23.

35 *Ibid*; Dettmann, 207–208.

36 In that most of these are pre-Ottoman structures, dating from Mamluk times, one might suggest that the concentration of imperial troops in this area of the city was actually a much older practice.

37 Kremer, 31; Lynch wrote (486):
"The windows of our apartments looked upon the Barada, which flowed immediately beneath them, between two tiny cataracts. On the opposite bank, was a large rural and crowded café, perfectly embowered in a grove of magnificent plane-trees. It was a lively and most attractive sight. There were Turks, Greeks, Arabs, and Syrians, in variety of costume, supinely sipping coffee or smoking, in groups or apart, or attending to the recital of a tale; and on one side a crowd was gathered listening to a musician, and looking upon the feats of a tight-

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Of the notable houses situated in the Ottoman area (see Figure 4), at least one, the Yusuf house (D/1, 1), was not built until the 19th century when the Kurdish *agha* Shamdin established himself there in 1830. A second (D/2) was, according to family sources, built in the 19th century or even later. A third (D/1, 3), however, was in fact built earlier. Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm established his household here at the end of the 18th century, making it one of the first Muslim notable houses to be built outside the city wall in the Ottoman area. Another important Muslim household established in this vicinity also at the end of the 18th century was that of the Sufi *shaykh* Murad, a propagator of the Naqshbandi order and the founder of the Muradi family. But the exact location of this house cannot be established. These personalities and their families will be discussed in later chapters.

The Localist Area

Damascus was the capital of an important province in the far-flung Ottoman Empire. Its connections to the Empire were established along a number of lines through military, administrative, financial and cultural institutions. At the same time, however, there existed a sector of socio-economic activities within the city and between it and its immediate surroundings which occupied a far larger portion of its population and resources. These ties were of a more basic nature, having to do with local production, local social networks and local folk culture. The everyday and folk elements of Damascene life are, of course, more difficult to isolate and study due to their very nature, but also due to the reluctance of contemporary historians to record what appeared at the time to be self-evident or even banal.

Local ties must have played a role in all parts of the city, but the central rectangle could be distinguished from the rest of the city because of its orientation away from localism towards external trade, 'high' Islamic and imperial culture. Also the Ottoman area transcended the world of the local sector. Its high concentration of non-Damascene officials and troop contingents and its disproportionately large and youthful male population gave it a temporary and foreign character. By contrast, the south and south-west of the city had an intense and often aggressive localist character. The quarters of Darwishiya, Suwayqa, Qasr Hajjaj and the lower and upper Maydan represented the specifically local interests and temperament of the city. Having intimate ties with the grain and meat-producing hinterland, the localist region played the role of intermediary in the urban-rural exchange sector of the economy. It supplied the city not only with staples but also absorbed migrant population into this sector of the local economy.

rope dancer, whose figure was at times half concealed from us by the intervening branches. As the day waned, numerous little coloured lamps, suspended in every direction about the trees, were lighted up, which shone beautifully amid the dark green foliage.

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

19th CENTURY
DAMASCUS
The Maydan

MOSQUE
MADRASA
ZAWIYA
NOTABLE HOUSE
BATH

adapted from Wulzinger and Watzinger (1924), by Schatkowski Schilcher

0 200m

Quadrat	Number	Name
D/8	1	al-Suqiya; formerly al-Naqshabandiya *(?)*
	2	Shaykh Hasan al-Shaybani (Sa'di Sufis)
Ð/9	1	not identified further
	2	Sayyid 'Umar
D/10	1	not identified further
	2	Sayyid Juman
D/11	1	Sayyid Shu'ayb
	2	al-Harmali
D/12	1	al-Fathi
D/13	1	al-Rifa'iya; Rifa'i Sufis
	2	al-Rifa'iya; Rifa'i Sufis
	3	Mahmud Pasha al-'Abid
	4	Hilal Bey al-'Abid
	5	Manjak; Rifa'i-'Ajlani Sufis
D/15	1	al-Talibiya
	2	Ya'qub al-Huqli (al-Qa')
C/16	1	not identified further
	2	al-Sa'diya
C/17	1	the Mahayini family
	2	not identified further
	3	al-Rashidiya
D/17	1	al-Kunushliya *(?)*
	2	al-Daqqaq
C/18	1	Shihab al-Din
D/18	1	al-Sa'diya

Fig. 5

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When members of the provincial troops decided to settle permanently in Damascus, for example, they usually established their family ties first in the localist area. This is also where they most easily found work, cheap housing and the contacts necessary to integrate themselves into local society. Around these one-time and/or semi-armed elements, the needs and demands of the local population could crystallize into a faction which, as we shall see in later chapters, was often opposed to the armed forces of the Ottoman area and the interests of the central rectangle.

Economically, the localist area was at least potentially in sectoral conflict with the central rectangle. The producers and merchants of food, essential consumer goods and production components who concentrated in the localist area profited when trade in these items was free of government interference and demand high. The people of the central rectangle who occupied themselves largely as shopkeepers and merchants or in the 'service' sector of administrative, religious and cultural institutions were, as consumers, retailers and exporters, interested to keep the prices of staples and production components low and, whenever possible, to have the government control their supply. If and when there were outbreaks of civil strife between the localist and central areas, the conflict of their economic interests was therefore always a potentially significant element.

Looking at the localist area more closely (See Figure 4: C–D/5–8 and Figure 5), we see that it contained some two dozen mosques, six *madrasas* and five Sufi establishments as well as a large number of baths and at least five notable households. Though all descriptions of this area also mention its many grain warehouses, these were unfortunately never specifically located. Perhaps they were too impermanent and architecturally insignificant-looking edifices for the European travellers to take more than a passing note of them.[38] The same applies to the area's many cafés. The variety of activity, relatively developed infrastructure and very size of the Maydan made it a concentration nearly as important as the central rectangle. Though it cannot in any way be considered an underdeveloped or slum area, the large volume and nature of its business, the large amount of peasants and beduin frequenting its shops, warehouses, cafés and baths and the relatively lax discipline of its para-military elements nonetheless created an atmosphere of turbulence and unrest.

With only a few exceptions, all of the public institutions of the localist area had Arabic names.[39] At the same time, it is important to note that none of the *madrasas* here functioned as hospices nor did any of them, or for that matter any of the vicinity's mosques, appear prominently in the training of the acknowledged religious scholars during the period studied here.[40] By contrast, the established Sufi presence was significant, and of special interest is the type of Sufi orders found here. While Mawlawi and Khalwati Sufi *zawiyas* were found only in the Ottoman

38 The Maydan quarter has not on the whole been as well researched as other parts of the city. In that 19th century visitors often referred to its fanaticism, researchers were perhaps reluctant to spend much time there.

39 See Figure 5: D/11/2; D/13/5; D/17/1; C/5/4.

40 See Chapter V.

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area, the localist area had its own special orders, the Rifa'iya and the Sa'diya. Only two orders, the Naqshbandiya and the Shadhiliya, may have been in both, though the Naqshbandis were more active in the Ottoman area, the Shadhilis more in the localist area.

Another noteworthy topographical phenomenon of possible social and political importance was the fact that a number of institutions here had names associating them with the *ashraf*, that is, the descendants of the Prophet, a group which will be discussed in detail later.[41] Three mosques in the lower Maydan were named for *ashraf*: the mosques of al-Sayyid 'Umar (D/9), al-Sayyid Juman (D/10) and al-Sayyid Suhayb (D/11). In addition, the *zawiya* of the Rifa'iya Sufis (D/13) was associated with the 'Ajlani family, one of the leading *ashraf* families of this era.[42] Though institutions which, because of their names, could also be associated with the *ashraf* were found elsewhere in the city,[43] it is noteworthy that not a single one of these was in the Ottoman area. Only one of the notable households so far located in the Ottoman area can be associated with the *ashraf*, that of the Muradi family, a family which migrated out of Kurdistan and settled in Damascus in the 18th century with the help of Ottoman patronage.[44] While three of the notable houses so far located in the localist area were built by Ottoman Pashas, in each case these were local personalities who had gained the highest Ottoman rank in the latter half of the 19th century and whose ancestors had been leaders of local paramilitary forces.

Finally, in the middle of the nineteenth century, a clearly recognizable area of textile manufacturing was located in Huqla (D/15) within the localist area. As areas of textile manufacture, about which we shall talk next, have on the whole been difficult to locate, this distinct industrial concentration will be given special attention.

INDUSTRY

The industrial establishments of the city are not as easily located as its cultural and commercial centers. It has, for example, been possible to locate only three large flour mills. The mill in the citadel (D/3) must certainly have served the needs of the troops and the high officials. Two other mills, one in the central rectangle (E/2) and one in Shaghur (E/6) were probably run for civilian needs. Since three mills seem very few for a city of upwards of 40,000 people, there must certainly have been more, perhaps in the Maydan, in the vicinity of the grain warehouses. A few exceptionally large households may have done their own milling.

41 See Chapters V and VI.
42 See below, 201–204.
43 See, for example, Figure 4: H/1/4; H/1/2; E/2/1; F/2/1; and Fig. 3 (*Zuqaq al-naqib*).
44 See below, 160–165.

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Other industries requiring an abundant water supply were the tanners, who were concentrated at the Bab al-Salam (H/2) and the slaughterers who were near the Qanawat canal (B–C/4–5) and on the way to the Maydan in (D/7).[45]

The name *masbak* for a region in the Christian quarter (L/3) indicates that metal-working establishments were located there. Additional metal workers were found in the quarters of 'Uqayba and Dahdah and along the route from Dahdah to Bab Tuma.

The city's most important industry, however, was the manufacture of textiles. Besides the area of Huqla in the Maydan already mentioned, we know of a number of additional locations where activities related to this industrial complex were carried on. These were all on the fringes of the central rectangle or outside of it altogether. At mid-century, Kremer found large numbers of weavers in Qaymariya (H/3) and in outer Shaghur (D–E–F/6) as well as in Huqla.[46] In addition, he found cloth printers in the Suq al-Qutn (D/5) and dyers in the Khan al-Dukka (E/5).[47]

All this must, however, be qualified by Dettmann's observation that the traditional crafts had been pushed out of the city's central markets in the course of the 19th century to make space for the ascendant wholesale and retail trade in finished goods.[48] Indeed, in his study of Damascene guilds in the first half of the 18th century, Rafeq found that although silk spinners were normally concentrated in warehouses, weaving took place in locations scattered all over the city.[49] It may well be that in the 18th and early 19th centuries the textile industry was still to be found within the central rectangle, or at least within the city's wall, most probably in the area between the warehouses for silk and wool (F/4) and the cotton market (D–E/5) and extending into Shaghur. The weaving center found by Kremer in Huqla may have been, like its mosque and villas, newly established around the middle of the 19th century.[50]

CEMETERIES

One topographical feature which proved of relevance to our study was the attraction spheres of the city's various burial grounds. Divisions within the city were strikingly reflected in the locations chosen as final resting places. The Muslims used five cemeteries,[51] the two largest of these being Dahdah which lay in

45 Abdul Karim Rafeq, "The law-court registers of Damascus with special reference to craft-corporations during the first half of the eighteenth century," in Jacques Berque and Dominique Chevallier, *Les Arabes par leurs Archives*, Paris, 1976, 149, 153.

46 Kremer, 11, 20.

47 *Ibid*, 11.

48 Dettmann, 229, 270.

49 Rafeq, "Law-court," 54.

50 Kremer, 21.

51 There were, however, a numbe of small cemeteries reserved for particular families, and a number of prominent figures of the period studied here were buried in the citadel.

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the north (F–G/1) and Bab al-Saghir in the south-west (D–E/7). In addition to these were the cemeteries of Raslaniya (or Shaykh Arslan) to the east (M/2), Bab Allah at the southern extremity of the Maydan and Qasyun on the mountainside northwest of the city.[52]

We can roughly establish the residential location of a large number of Muslim families in the city by noting the cemeteries to which their deceased were brought.[53] Bab Allah clearly served for the Maydan. This is indicated by the presence of the family tombs of many famous Maydani families: the 'Abids, Bitars and Jibawis. By the same token, Qasyun served for Salihiya. Here the famous Salihiya families like the Nabulusis, Saqatis, Salahis and Kinanis were buried. The Dahdah and the Bab al-Saghir cemeteries also appear to have served specific areas of the city. Since we find the Taghlibis of 'Amara, the Shattis and 'Attars of Bab al-Salam and the Hasibis of 'Uqayba buried in Dahdah, we may reasonably assume that this cemetery served families from the northern sectors of the city including the central rectangle and the Ottoman area. Similarly, because the Hisnis of Ma'dhanat al-Shahm and the Kuzbaris of Shaghur were buried in Bab al-Saghir, we may conclude that this cemetery served for the southern sectors of the inner city including most of the localist area. Since the Raslaniya cemetery was probably no longer used extensively at this time, Qaymariya families divided themselves. Some like the Tajis used Bab al-Saghir, others like the Ja'faris and the Safarjalanis used both.[54]

Members of the religious minorities were buried in their respective cemeteries to the south-east of the city.

MINORITIES

Due to the large number and variety of ethnic (i.e. 'national', linguistic and religious) groups living in Damascus, it is tempting to see the city as an oriental

52 A study on Damascene cemeteries up till the time of the Ottoman conquest remarks: "Nous n'y trouvons aucun renseignement sur leur création, leur étendue, leur évolution, leur législation, leur entretien. . ." (Khaled Moaz and Solange Ory, *Inscriptions arabes de Damas: des stèles funéraires*, Damascus, 1977, 9. As for the period studied here, it appears that the Raslaniya was little used in the 19th century, possibly because of limitations of space. Members of the Ghazzi family were buried there until the 18th century. At that time, however, the family began using Dahdah and Bab al-Saghir. In the 19th century the Ghazzis appear not to have buried in the Raslaniya at all, using only Dahdah from then on. The latest burial in the Raslaniya found in the sources researched here was one of the Qutb family who died in 1796/97. This family lived within the central rectangle at Bab al-Barid (E/3).

53 References to the burial places of the deceased were made regularly in the biographical sources which will be cited at length in Chapter VI.

54 Here, of course, there is a possibility that the families burying in two different cemeteries had branched and thereafter lived in two different quarters of the city. This is very possibly why the Kaylanis, Ustuwanis and Ja'faris were buried in Dahdah and Bab al-Saghir. In other cases, a shift in the place of residence explains the use of two cemeteries. For example, the Shattis and Hasibis switched residences and cemeteries in the course of the 19th century.

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CODE TO FIG. 6
(Kremer's Transcription)

1. Via recta.
2. Bab-es-Selame.
3. Bab-Tuma.
4. Mah'allet-el-Ferrain.
5. Mezl-el-Kasab.
6. Bab-el-Feradis.
7. Suk-el-Kadi.
8. Antusch.
9. Suk-el-Buzurije.
10. Chan-er-Ruzz-es-saghir.
11. Chan-er-Ruzz-el-Kebir.
12. Haus des As'ad Pascha.
13. Medrese des Abdallah Pascha.
14. Chan des As'ad Pascha.
15. Suk-et-Tutun.
16. Medreset-Suk-el-Harir.
17. Chan-el-Harir.
18. Bazar der Goldschmiede.
19. Kabkabije.
20. Naufara.
21. Moschee.
22. Grab des Melik-ed-Dahir.
23. Medrese.
24. Hamam-el-A'kik.
25. Asrunije.
26. Grab des Nur-ed-Din.
27. Suk-el-Chajjatin und Suk-Bab-el-Berid.
28. Bab-el-Dschabije.
29. Suk-el-Dschedid.
30. Derwischije.
31. Dschami'-el-Charratin.
32. Suk-el-Kumeile.
33. Moschee.
34. Suk-el-Dschemal.
35. Suk-ez-Zerablije.
36. Suk-el-Chermatije.
37. Suk-es-Surudschije.
38. Suk-el-Bawabdschije.
39. Bab-el-Feredsch.
40. Bab-en-Nasr.
41. Hawaslije.
42. Dschami-el-Muallak.
43. Bab-el-Amara.
44. Medreset-en-Nahhasin.
45. Sikket-Kasr-Hadschadsch.
46. Bab-esch-Schaghur.
47. Bab-es-Saghir.
48. Dschami-el-Idein.
49. Dschami-Sidi-Dschunian.
50. Dschami-Mendschek.
51. Dschami-er-Rifai.
52. Mesdschid-Sad-ed-Din.
53. Kaat-el-Ula.
54. Dschami-Schihab-ed-Din.
55. Grabkuppel.
56. Bab-el-Kanawat.
57. Bab-es-Seridsche.

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

Fig. 6

Lith. u. gedr. in d. k. k. Hof u. Staatsdruckerei.

Denkschriften der k. Akad. d. Wissensch. philos. histor. Cl. VI. Bd. 1854.



Fig. 7: Classical traces in the city's street plan
(Sauvaget, 1949/Elisséeff, 1970)

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mosaic, but this would probably be misleading. First of all, the overwhelming majority of the population were Syrian, Arabic-speaking, Sunni Muslim urbanites. Divisions within the numerical mass of the population would, therefore, have been determined by non-ethnic criteria. Secondly, the ethnic minorities were spatially only rarely isolated from the dominant group and only the central rectangle was an area controlled exclusively by the dominant group. All other areas of the city included minority elements of one kind or another, if not several, along with the majority group.

More research needs to be done on inter-personal relationships before the conclusion can be reached that social interaction in Damascus was determined primarily by ethnic considerations. At least in the field of business relationships, for example, the evidence so far available would indicate that at least at the start of the period studied here, patterns were more likely to be determined along lines of clientage, faction and sector and often according to purely market-determined considerations rather than along ethnic lines. As the period progresses, however, two specific ethnic minorities, the Catholics in the quarter of Bab Tuma and the Jews in the 'Jewish' quarter (Harat al-Yahud) demonstrate an increasing tendancy towards isolation while other Christian and all the Muslim ethnic minorities appear to increase their extent of integration. More attention will be given to the structures of Damascene society in Chapter V.

Once the central rectangle, the Ottoman area, the localist area, the minority areas and the cemeteries have been taken into account, one would be tempted to say that the areas which remained, such as Inner Shaghur, Qaymariya and Outer 'Amara, must certainly have tended to consolidate with the dominating areas immediately adjacent to them. But in all three cases, there were important neighbors on two sides. This may have been a major cause of tensions as the mounting pressures to conform to the wishes of one or the other of the larger areas divided loyalites within the smaller quarters. It is at least curious that precisely these areas played important roles in the significant civil outbreaks of this era. Inner Shaghur, between the central rectangle and the localist area, was the base of a largely localist revolt against the Ottoman governor in the first half of the 18th century. In 1831, the revolt against the Ottoman governor broke out first in Outer 'Amara, between the Ottoman areas and the central rectangle. The attack on the largely Catholic quarter of Bab Tuma in 1860 may have been, at least in part, fired by discontent in neighboring Qaymariya which lay between the Christians and the central rectangle.

These and similar events and the social, economic and political relationships from which they sprang will form the major themes of our study. The attempt to reconstruct the main spatial characteristics of the city during the period studied must end, however, with a word of caution. The topography is by necessity a time-composite description with unfortunate but unavoidable historical distortions. Wherever possible, an attempt has been made to indicate changes within the period, but on the whole we have been obliged to use surveys of the late 19th and early 20th centuries to establish the topography of the preceeding decades. On a number

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of occasions, topographical surveys of still earlier centuries have also been consulted to aid in ascertaining the correct nomenclature and the location of institutions named in the 18th and 19th century texts but not located by the modern topographers. Subsequent researchers will no doubt make a number of corrections on many of the details of this topography. It is felt, however, that the topographical aspects relevant to our study, which are well-enough founded, have justified a presentation of the topography in this detailed form.

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CHAPTER II: POLITICS

THE FACTIONALISM OF THE 'AZM AND POST-'AZM PERIODS

Damascus was a provincial capital of the Ottoman Empire. Under the Ottoman administrative system as applied to geographic Syria (the region which today comprises Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and small portions of Turkey), the territory was divided into a number of smaller districts (called *sanjaqs* or *liwas*) according to geographic, strategic, ethnic and political considerations.[1] These districts were then organized into three, or sometimes four, provinces (called *eyalets*, *pashaliks*, or later *wilayets*) though not always according to the same pattern or with the same city as a provincial capital. Sometimes – as in the case of Mount Lebanon or Jerusalem – a particular district would be given exceptional status and was able to obtain special imperial consideration.[2]

Following the Ottoman conquest in the early 16th century, geographic Syria was first organized into three provinces: a coastal province with its capital at Tripoli; a northern province with its capital at Aleppo, and an interior province with its capital at Damascus. In 1660 a fourth province was created for Lebanon and the southern coastal regions with its capital at Sidon. During the period studied here, a number of reshufflings took place in the districts attached to the province of Damascus.[3] These fluctuations are, however, not of direct relevance to our study because the city remained the capital throughout. The interaction of Damascus with its surroundings were, moreover, hardly restricted by administrative boundaries.

Of equal importance in the geopolitics of the Ottoman Empire was the city's position as the last urban settlement along the pilgrimage route to Mecca.[4] The Ottoman state – if it was to remain the legitimate heir of the Islamic empire – was obliged to ensure the safety and success of the pilgrimage. Therefore, Damascus as the yearly gathering point for pilgrims from all over the Muslim world, came to

1 A discussion of Ottoman administrative districting in Syria is presented in H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Oxford, 1950, Part I, 222; Rafeq, *Province*, 1f.; Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840–1861*, Oxford, 1968, 31f.; Karl Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus*, Princeton, 1980, 16f; 'Abd al-'Aziz Muhammad 'Awad, *Al-Idara al-'Uthmaniya fi Wilayat Suriya 1864–1914*, Cairo, 1969, 61–81.

2 The case of Mount Lebanon is presented in Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, London, 1965, xi f. The case of the sanjak of Jerusalem is discussed in Butros Abu Manneh, *Some Aspects of Ottoman Rule in Syria in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: Reforms, Islam and Caliphate*, unpublished D. Phil. Dissertation, Oxford, 1971.

3 See Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 32f.

4 The importance of the pilgrimage in 18th century Ottoman administration is mentioned by Gibb and Bowen (I, 219) and is discussed in Rafeq, *Province*, 52f. and Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*, 108.

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play a special role in the strategy, administration and economy of the Ottoman pilgrimage and with that of the Empire as a whole.

The Ottoman provincial system was based on the concept of governatorial assignment.[5] In principle, a governor (*wali* or *pasha*) was posted to the city and would be given imperial orders and the necessary financial and military support to carry them out. But these principles were not always applied and would vary considerably with the extent of the central government's power. Checks on the governor were built into the system in the form of additional imperial appointees to fulfill military, financial and judicial functions. The terms of office of these officials fluctuated according to imperial decision. Due to these variables, a governor's support in Istanbul was as crucial to his success in the province as his mastery of the local situation. Because the entire administrative system was flexible and adaptable, it was therefore also open to the influence of developments unconnected to the province involved. Flexibility and adaptability were often transformed into uncertainty and instability.

By the 17th and 18th centuries, the Ottoman Empire had long since reached the limits of its territorial expansion. Its power in the provinces was based on quasi-feudal local administrative, judicial and military institutions. Often, when the central government failed to convince a provincial population of its legitimate authority to rule or failed to impress contesting factions with its ability to do so, outbreaks of localism and anti-Ottomanism occurred.[6]

Towards the end of the 18th century and throughout the period studied here, the Empire's chronic difficulty with controlling provincial populations was exacerbated by external pressures on virtually all its borders and by the economic, political and cultural penetration of its territories by foreign interests. Many confrontations of this period were decided by the simple fact that some states had gained a head-start in industrial technology (and its application to warfare) over the Ottomans and that those who had this head-start strove to make strategic, economic, political and territorial gains at the expense of the Ottomans. By the 19th century the Ottoman Empire had become a field on which the emergent 'great' powers contested with each other for world domination.[7]

5 For general discussions of Ottoman provincial administrative structures see Gibb and Bowen, I, 137f, 200f. and Roderick H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1850–1876,* Princeton, 1963. With specific relevance to Syria see Herbert L. Bodman, *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760–1826,* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963, 18f.; Rafeq, *Province,* 10f.; Maoz, *Ottoman Reform,* 34f. 'Awad, *op. cit.;* Barbir, Ottoman Rule, 13f.

6 See Albert Hourani, "The Fertile Crescent in the Eighteenth Century", *A Vision of History,* Beirut, 1961, 40f.; Bodman, 103f.; Rafeq, "Local Forces", 277–307; Shimon Shamir, "Belligerency in a Disintegrating Society: Factional Warfare in Ottoman Syria on the Eve of the Period of Modernization", *Abr Nahrain,* XII (1972), 75–84; Barbir, *Ottoman Rule,* 65f.

7 Some works on the history of what was often referred to as the 'Eastern Question' are: (for political aspects) Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea,* London, 1936; A Mange, *The Near Eastern Policy of Napoleon III,* Urbana, 1940; J.A.R. Mariott *The Eastern Question,* Oxford, 1940; Davison, *op.cit.;* J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the*

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This chapter is an attempt to follow events in Damascus – a centrally-important provincial city of the Ottoman empire – during this critical period of its pre-modern and early modern history.

THE 'AZM ERA

In the first half of the 18th century, the Ottoman central government experienced a brief period of revival. An attempt was made to restore the Empire to the principles of rule established in the 16th century when the state was at its peak. Though these attempts succeeded only temporarily and were not to be repeated

Near and Middle East, 1535–1914, Princeton, 1956; M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question,* London, 1966; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* London, 1968; S.H. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,* Cambridge, Mass., 1977; (for economic aspects) A. Duvelay, *Histoire financière de la Turquie, depuis le règne du Sultan Mahmoud II jusqu'à nos jours,* Paris, 1903; D.C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire,* New York, 1929; M. Baumont, *L'Essor Industriel et l'Impérialisme Colonial 1878–1904,* Paris, 1937; Rafii-Şukru Suvla, "Debts during the Tanzimat Period", (first published in 1940) in Issawi, *op.cit.*, 95–106; David Landes, *Bankers and Pashas,* London, 1958; R.E. Cameron, *France and the Economic Development of Europe,* Princeton, 1961; J. Ducruet, *Les Capitaux Européens au Proche Orient,* Paris, 1964; O. Anderson, "Great Britain and the beginnings of the Ottoman public debt 1854–55", Historical Journal VII (1964); Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914–1918,* Princeton, 1968; Jukka Nevakivi, *Britain and France in the Arab Middle East 1914–1920,* London, 1969; Werner Zürrer, *Die Nahostpolitik Frankreichs and Rußlands, 1891–1898,* Wiesbaden, 1970; Alexander Schölch, "Wirtschaftliche Durchdringung und politische Kontrolle durch die europäischen Mächte im Osmanischen Reich (Konstantionopel, Kairo, Tunis)", *Geschichte und Gesellschaft,* 1 (1975), 404–446; Andreas Birken, *Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen Europa und dem Vorderen Orient im ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden, 1980;* Roger Owen, *The Middle East.*

With special reference to Syria see N. Verney and G. Dambmann, *Les Puissances étrangères dans le Levant, en Syrie et en Palestine,* Paris, 1900; V.J. Puryear, *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Levant,* Stanford, 1935; M. Emerit, "La Crise Syrienne et l'Expansion Economique Française en 1860", *La Revue Historique,* 1952, 212–232; A.L. Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine 1800–1901,* London, 1961; William R. Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788–1840,* Cambride, Mass., 1963; Herbert Feis, *Europe, the World's Banker, 1870–1914,* New York, 1964; Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843–1914, Church and Politics in the Near East,* Oxford, 1969; Mohammad Sa'id Kalla, *The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Syria 1831–1914,* unpublished Ph.D. thesis, American University, Washington, 1969; C.E. Farah, "Necip Paşa and the British in Syria 1841–1842", *Archivum Ottomanicum,* 2 (1970), 115–153; Dominique Chevallier, *La Société du Mont Liban à l'Epoque de la Révolution industrielle en Europe,* Paris, 1971; L. Schatkowski Schilcher, "Ein Modellfall indirekter wirtschaftlicher Durchdringung: Das Beispiel Syrien", *Geschichte und Gesellschaft,* 1 (1975), 482–505; J.P. Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon 1861–1914,* London, 1977; Alfred Schlicht, *Frankreich und die syrischen Christen 1799–1861. Minoritäten und europäischer Imperialismus im Vorderen Orient,* Berlin, 1981.

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until a century later, a number of measures taken in the province of Damascus at this time were determinant in the history of the city.[8]

The Ottomans countenanced and facilitated economically the rise of a locally-based family, the 'Azms, in the hope that the strength of this family could be used as a base for Ottoman revival.[9] At most times, the 'Azms largely fulfilled this assignment. They reestablished order in the area and gained control over many of its recalcitrant local elements. Revenues were forthcoming and the pilgrimage to Mecca was secured. Most significant was that, as a consequence, many members of the local elite established or reinforced their attachments to the central Ottoman establishment.[10]

The 'Azm family had risen to prominence in the 17th century when the family's forefather, Ibrahim, gained a position of armed strength in the area of Ma'arra on the northern fringes of the province of Damascus.[11] The rise of a locally-based family to power within the Ottoman state can generally be attributed both to its efficiency in influencing the Sublime Porte in Istanbul and its ability to control the contemporary situation in Syria. The 'Azms, like all those who rose to power in the provinces at that time, had to have a faithful and influential agent in Istanbul and the wealth to pursue their interests. On the other hand, they had to be capable of maintaining at least the semblance of Ottoman rule over the area under very difficult circumstances. The 'Azms succeeded remarkably well in fulfilling these criteria. They held simultaneously the governorships of all the Syrian provinces in brief periods prior to 1730 and again in 1755–1756. In Damascus alone, they held the governorship nine times between the years 1725 and 1808. Though during interim years when the family was temporarily out of favor the 'Azm governors suffered the disgrace, confiscations and even execution typical of the fate of fallen Ottoman governors, the family nonetheless managed to regain imperial governorships intermittently even after the turn of the 19th century.

8 This period of Syrian history has been the subject of three major studies: Abdul Karim Rafeq, *Province,* Shimon Shamir, *The 'Azm Walis of Syria, 1724–1785,* unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Princeton, 1960); and Karl Barbir, *Ottoman Rule.* The discussion of 'Azm rule here has been drawn largely only from the first and third of these but also from Albert Hourani, *Vision,* 35–70; 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Azm, *Al-usra al-'azimiya,* Damascus, 1951; S. Shamir, "As'ad Basha al-'Azm and Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1743–1758", in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* xxvi (1963) 1–28; Abdul Karim Rafeq, "Local Forces", (1975).

In addition, a good deal of information for this chapter has been drawn from the biographical sources. As these are given more comprehensive treatment in Chapters V and VI, references are given only there.

9 In addition to the discussion here, the 'Azm family is discussed in Chapter VI.

10 This line of research has been followed by John Voll, "Old 'Ulama' Families and Ottoman Influence in Eighteenth Century Damascus", *American Journal of Arabic Studies.* 3 (1975), 48–59. See also the sketch on the 'Umari family, in Chapter VI.

11 The origins of the 'Azm family are still a theme of historical debate. See Rafeq, *Province,* (1966), 85 f.; Barbir, *Ottoman Rule,* 57f. See also below 136 and my forthcoming article.

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One last 'Azm – 'Abdallah Pasha – was named to his first governorship in 1795 despite the family's declining influence in Istanbul. During this first term, the imperial para-military troops of the north-western quarters,[12] which had previoulsy collaborated in 'Azm rule, revolted in and barricaded themselves in the citadel. Though 'Abdallah Pasha succeeded in besieging the citadel and executed the *agha* or chief of the rebel troops, the incident indicated that the 'Azms were no longer in full control of the para-military groups as they had been in the 18th century.

The 'Azms also failed to block the spread of coastal political influence to the Syrian interior. Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar, about whom more will be said shortly, successfully eclipsed the 'Azms as a local power factor in the 1790's. By the time of the Napoleonic invasion of Syria which was launched overland from Egypt in 1799, the Ottomans relied chiefly on Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar to resist the French, naming him *wali* in Damascus and commander-in-chief of the Ottoman troops. Though subordinate to al-Jazzar, 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm was also active in this struggle. Where al-Jazzar succeeded (with the aid of the British fleet) 'Abdallah Pasha failed and was taken prisoner by the French. After the French had withdrawn from Egypt, he returned to govern Damascus in 1805, but this term was the final 'Azm governorship. He was dismissed when he failed to get the pilgrimage through to Mecca in 1807. This particular defeat was dealt to the 'Azms by the Wahhabite followers of the Sa'ud family in Arabia, yet another of the many challengers to Ottoman hegemony in Syria in the early 19th century.

Contemporary to 'Abdallah Pasha, Nasuh Pasha al-'Azm, who had fled Syria upon his father's death at the end of the century, established himself in the service of Murad, the Mamluk Bey who controlled Egypt at that time. Despite the strain in his relations with the Ottomans, Nasuh Pasha was named Ottoman governor of Egypt. Like 'Abdallah he too was active in the Mamluk and Ottoman attempts to repulse Napoleon. He fled to Syria when the French occupied Egypt in July, 1798. In March of 1800 he returned to Egypt with the Ottoman armies only to witness their defeat at Heliopolis. Escaping to Cairo, Nasuh Pasha al-'Azm is said to have organized popular uprisings against the French which in the end also failed.[13]

12 The para-military troops of Damascus are discussed in detail in Chapters V and VI. See also Gibb and Bowen, 45f, 218f. Rafeq, *Province,* 24f. and "Local Forces"; Barbir, *Ottoman Rule,* 89f.

13 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Azm, *op.cit.*, 42f. Cairo staged two major but unsuccessful uprisings against the French occupation: at the end of October 1798 while Napoleon ruled the city and in March and April 1800 during and following the battle of Helipolis in the period after Napoleon's departure when the French troops were commanded by General Kléber. Kléber was assassinated shortly after the suppression of the second revolt (see Friedrich Wencker–Wildberg, *Napoleon, Die Memoiren seines Lebens,* IV, 425f. and V, 192f. for a detailed account of the uprisings as told in contemporary French sources). Andre Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIe siècle,* Damascus, 1974, II, 819f. considers the social background of the uprisings.

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Both the 'Azm Pashas 'Abdallah and Nasuh died in 1808/09. At that juncture the 'Azms appear to have lost nearly all high-level influence in Istanbul as no mention can be found of the posts they held during the next two decades. The incapacity of 'Abdallah Pasha to overcome the rise of al-Jazzar or to protect Syria from the French or the pilgrimage from the Wahhabis and the failure of Nasuh Pasha to repulse the French from Egypt marked the end of the 'Azms' usefulness in an imperial political context. Nonetheless, the family remained a wealthy and influential enclave in Egypt and Syria and was to play a central role in the political history of Damascus and other Syrian towns till at least the middle of the 20th century.

The 'Azms can be considered a family of imperial *aghawat* (i.e. para-military chieftains)[14] who, upon achieving the rank and offices of *pashas* restored Damascus to a position of strength and centrality in the entire region. Though their goal may have been to create a situation for themselves in Syria similar to that the Mamluk *beys* held in Egypt, their strategy was markedly different and in the end more effective. Settling in the Syrian cities and combining their fortunes with those of particular local groups, they became the core of a Syrian urban elite. In the case of Damascus, trade interests were secured along all the inland trade routes, with Istanbul, Egypt, Baghdad and Mecca. Damascene luxury wares gained expanded markets, and production was increased. As a result, profits grew and fortunes accumulated to be reinvested in trade or put into family and religious foundations, land, villas and a luxurious style of life. But all this the 'Azms did with the military, administrative and financial means at their disposal within the Ottoman system. At no time during 'Azm rule in the 18th century was the sovereignty of the state or the Sultan's hegemony over Syria challenged. On the contrary, the 'Azms were proponents of the Ottomans, servants and defenders of the state.

The 'Azms' use of a local base for wielding power within the Ottoman empire in the 18th century subsequently resulted in their integration within the provincial establishment. On a scale far surpassing the normal run of Ottoman governors, each 'Azm governor had attempted to win local factions to his side. Their local connections can be traced throughout the 18th century.

Isma'il Pasha, the first 'Azm governor of Damascus, for example, had come to power following a local revolt led by the *mufti* Khalil al-Bakri,[15] the city's chief jurisconsult, against the unpopular Ottoman governor 'Uthman Pasha Abu Tawq. He then attempted to conciliate the Damascene *'ulama'*[16] and Sufis by returning exiled and persecuted *shaykhs* to Damascus and by building *madrasas* and fostering Sufism. For the general good. he had a number of public baths, a coffee house and some shops built. Isma'il Pasha also allied with the locally-influential Safarjalani family – who led the Khalwati Sufi order – possibly in trade or in monopolistic activities. He married a daughter of al-Sayyid al-Haraki, giving him a link to

14 See Chapter V and VI.
15 See below, 156–160.
16 See Chapter V and VI.

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the city's *ashraf*, a politically-influential group in Damascus, about which more will be said later.[17]

The second 'Azm governor of Damascus, Sulayman Pasha, the brother of Isma'il, wished himself to be counted amongst the notables of the city.[18] He built a mansion and established his family residence there. He married the daughter of a Damascene religious figure by the name of Shaykh Yunus al-Kaylani who was associated to the Qadiri Sufi Order. Sulayman Pasha formed a council (*diwan*) of local notables under 'Ali al-Muradi, the head of a Damascene family which led the Naqshbandi Sufi Order. He also built a *madrasa* which carried his name (See Fig. 4, E/4).

Sulayman Pasha's immediate successor was his nephew As'ad Pasha, the son of Isma'il Pasha. He carried out the construction of two of the most beautiful private buildings ever built in the city, the famous 'Azm *khan*, (F/5) and inner-city palace (F/4). As'ad also financed the further construction of his father's *madrasa* and provided for Koranic readings and the construction of an adjoining mosque. Additional funds were provided by As'ad for decorations in the Umayyad Mosque, repairs along the pilgrimage route through the southern quarter of Maydan and the construction of an enclosure around the Shiite shrine of Sayyida Zaynab.

As'ad Pasha al-'Azm's enormous wealth had not been accumulated without monopolistic activities, speculation and profiteering. During his rule, the poor and disadvantaged of Damascus objected to the excesses he and his supporters practiced. A serious local challenge to the 'Azms was posed by an imperial treasury official of Syrian origin by the name of al-Sayyid Fathi al-Falaqinsi, who galvanized this discontent into a political faction.[19] Al-Falaqinsi had succeeded in establishing his family's influence within the financial administration of the province. He himself held the post of provincial *daftardar* (or treasurer) and could thereby hamper a governor's exercise of power in the province by means of administrative and financial measures. Himself a *sayyid* (or descendant of the Prophet), Fathi may have gained political influence through his affiliation to the city's *ashraf*. But Fathi also based his power on a mixture of local lower and middle class elements such as insubordinates of the para-military troops, the city's artisans and the *aghawat* of the southern quarters.

The crisis of authority which developed in the city by the 1740's in which Fathi al-Falaqinsi and As'ad Pasha al-'Azm were the chief contenders ended in As'ad Pasha's triumph and the brutal suppression of Fathi and his faction. As'ad's troops stormed the strongholds of the southern para-military groups, looting and burning hundreds of houses. Many of As'ad's rivals were arrested and killed, and Fathi himself was executed; the Falaqinsi family ruined.

17 The *ashraf* of Damascus are discussed in Chapters V and VI.

18 A discussion of this category in Damascene society is given in Chapter V.

19 On Fathi al-Falanqinsi see: Muhammad Khalil at-Muradi, *Silk al-durar fi a'yan al-qarn al-thani 'ashar*, Bulaq, 1301 AH, I 163–167, II, 220–229, III, 135–136, 148–150, 279–287; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, 220; Rafeq, *Province*, 161–169; Shamir, "As'ad Basha" and "Belligerency"; Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*, 73f.

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As a result of the suppression of the southern faction, a number of changes in the city's political economy could be carried further. First, the 'Azms succeeded in altering the hinterland orientation of the city towards the north and west where they and their associates' interests lay. The lands of the 'Azms (and a closely allied family, the Kaylanis)[20] lay in the vicinity of Hama. The lands of the notables who supported the 'Azms lay within the city's inner ring in the oasis itself or to the west and north-west in the Biqa', Wadi 'Ajam, the slopes of the Anti-Lebanon, and in Wadi al-Taym. The grain of the inner-ring regions was of an inferior quality to that produced south of Damascus (and especially in the Hawran), and being more expensive to produce was altogether less competitive. The grain interests of the 'Azm-connected notables were thereby promoted if and when grain produced in the south could be blocked from the Damascene market. Evidence that As'ad Pasha succeeded in doing so is provided by the fact that the 'Azms' profiteering in grains followed the suppression in 1746 of al-Falaqinsi and the Maydanis who controlled southern grain supplies. In the 18th century not only the Maydan but also a market in the vicinity of the 'Azms' main *khan* (in Suq al-Buzuriya, F/4) served the city as a grain market being called at that time Suq al-Qamh, the wheat market. Moreover, in their position not only as governors of the province but also as commanders of the pilgrimage, the 'Azms could themselves replace the Maydani *aghawat* in the southern grain trade or oblige the latter to conform to their wishes. The pilgrimage command provided them with the authority and necessary funds to set prices and acquire vast amounts of grain south of Damascus on advantageous terms.

A second change in the political economy of the city under the 'Azms was to have still longer-range consequences. This change can best be understood in terms of the topographic concentrations of the city as described in Chapter I. For reasons which are not entirely clear, the 'Azms chose to be most closely associated to the interests of the central rectangle, an area inside the city's walls which was devoted largely to the city's export-import trade in luxury and non-comestible goods and to the activities of the 'service' sector of religious and educational institutions. As described in Chapter I, the southern quarters, being devoted to the production of food, livestock, production components and other supplies for local consumption stood in sectoral and potential class conflict with the central rectangle.[21] Its artisans and producers were interested that prices on comestibles and production components be high, whereas the inner-city population, as consumers of these items, retailers and exporters, wished to keep them low. With their accession to power, the 'Azms and their faction succeeded in suppressing the interests of the southern localist sector of the economy in favor of the export-import sector. This development was to have important consequences as European trade penetration increased in the course of the early 19th century.

20 See below, 194–196.
21 See above, 16–18.

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By the time of the fourth 'Azm governor in Damascus – Muhammad Pasha, a second cousin of As'ad Pasha – the 'Azms and their local supporters were well established in the city. Though Damascus was losing control over its southern and western territory due to the rise of Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar in Acre, the Damascene establishment under Muhammad Pasha's rule continued to enjoy economic prosperity. Nor was there any effective opposition to Muhammad Pasha's rule from other sectors of the city's populace.

During their nearly century-long, though intermittent, rule in Damascus, the 'Azms generated a new sense of identity and pride in the city and reinforced a style of life which was to be held as typically Damascene. From a purely material point of view, the city had not only profited from the repair and reconstruction of its infrastructure under the 'Azms, it had also acquired a legacy of monumental stone construction reminiscent of the city's early Islamic and medieval grandeur. Also significant for our study here, the 'Azms, their great family style and their support of the '*ulama*' set a precedent of patrician cosmopolitanism in Damascus which was to be emulated by many other families of the elite which emerged and prospered in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Thus, the historical significance of 'Azm rule in Damascus lay in their having succeeded in awakening, supporting and protecting the interests and position of a particular urban elite. The 'Azm-connected faction of notables included the imperial *aghawat* (of the *qapi-qul*) and private para-military troops based in the northern extra-mural quarters and promoted the interests of the central rectangle's export-import trade and the northern and western hinterland. The consolidation of this faction, and this constellation of interests in the city's political economy led to the suppression of the *aghawat* of the southern quarters and especially those of the Maydan who were displaced in their function as escorters of the pilgrimage and denied the possibility of speculating on the comestibles and production components while the 'Azms were in power.

It also meant neglect or suppression of the localist sector of the economy which produced goods and commodities for local daily needs. The 'Azms had thereby created a local opposition of southern *aghawat*, discontented and impoverished craftsmen, local traders and peasants. As long as the 'Azms were powerful and their interests prospered, it was possible to suppress this opposition or to conciliate some of its members with a share of the economic gains or with the consolations of religious or social prestige. The *madrasas* and Sufi orders sponsored by the 'Azms temporized with plebeian frustrations, deflecting them into religious solidarity and mysticism. Inter-marriage also played an important role.

It should be noted, however, that through similar institutions and social configurations, the local anti-'Azm faction continued to exist and was to consolidate its position in the first decades of the 19th century when the 'Azms had declined. Indeed, resurgence of the localist challenge to the 'Azm-centered elite was to dominate the city's political history in the 19th century.

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AHMAD PASHA AL-JAZZAR

In the latter decades of the 18th century, when difficulties in Istanbul and pressures on the Empire's borders weakened the state's efforts in Syria and the 'Azms no longer held their preeminent position, control over Damascus and its province was contested by a number of rising political centers.[22] One of the first serious challenges came from an alliance between 'Ali Bey of Egypt and a Palestinian chieftain by the name of Dahir al-'Umar. While the Ottomans were at war with Russia, the rebellious vassals received the support of the Russian fleet. But the Ottomans succeeded in placating some of the Egyptian ambitions and suppressing others. With the end of the war, the revolt of Dahir in Palestine was easily crushed. The Ottomans replaced him with Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar, a Bosnian strong-man in the Ottoman service who was to build himself up a position of power in Syria from 1775 onwards.

Al-Jazzar had begun his career in Istanbul and had obtained the rank of Bey while in Egypt. The Ottomans hoped he would restore the Empire's control over the Syrian coastal regions much as the 'Azms had previously succeeded in doing in the interior. He accomplished this task and ruled Palestine for thirty years (1775–1804) in the official capacity of governor of the province of Sidon. He was also named governor of Damascus in the years 1784/85, 1790–1795 and 1799–1803. The Napoleonic invasion and occupation of Egypt in 1798 – which marked the nadir of Ottoman power in the region – did not extend over Syria largely due to al-Jazzar's successful defense of the fortress of Acre which was besieged by Napoleon in the spring of 1799.

Al-Jazzar succeeded in entrenching himself not only militarily but also economically. He obtained most of his province as life leasehold (*malikane*) and dominated the trade relations with the French merchants established on the Syrian coast at Acre. By 1790, al-Jazzar's position was so strong that he could expel the French merchants. He then largely succeeded in controlling the formerly European-monopolized trade via Sidon and Acre, first in cotton and eventually in other goods, including in-land grains.

During al-Jazzar's first tenure as governor of Damascus in 1784/85 he also obtained the position of commander (*amir*) of the pilgrimage. In this capacity he was brought into direct confrontation with the southern *aghawat* and others who dealt in the grain and livestock-producing areas along the pilgrimage route. Al-Jazzar no doubt saw the trade potential of this grain and took steps to develop its

22 This account of the rise of Jazzar Pasha is drawn from Muhammad Jamil al-Shatti, *Rawd al-bashar fi a'yan Dimashq fi al-qarn al-thalith 'ashar*, Damascus, 1946, 28–32; 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar, *Hilyat al-bashar fi ta'rikh al-qarn al-thalith 'ashar*, Damascus, 1961–63, I, 127–132; *Tarikh hawadith*, 14–29; K.S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, London, 1965, 16f.: P.M. Holt, *Egypt*, 129f.; Abdul Karim Rafeq, *Province*, 285f.; Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century*, Jerusalem, 1973.

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export to the coast.[23] He may, in fact, have been the first to succeed in exporting important quantities of in-land Syrian wheat and livestock from the coast in the modern period.

Al-Jazzar's first attempts to monopolize the grain surpluses of the Hawran south of Damascus created massive opposition in the city and led eventually to his dismissal.[24] During his second tenure in 1790–95, however, he again attempted to control not only southern surpluses but to intervene in commercial relations between the 'Azms and their clients amongst the beduin to the north of Damascus. If we can believe the chronicler, 'Ali Bey al-'Azm, the son of Muhammad Pasha, accused al-Jazzar's representative in Damascus of stealing his property and al-Jazzar reacted to this charge by having 'Ali Bey poisoned.[25]

Demand on the coast for agricultural products from the interior was reinforced by the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt. Napoleon often justified his expedition into Syria as a probe at ending al-Jazzar's trade monopolies on the behalf of local trading interests. In fact, Napoleon, stranded in Egypt and successfully blocaded by the British fleet, was obliged to supply his troops locally while the British were obliged to supply their fleet from ports in the eastern Mediterranean not yet occupied by the French. With Napoleon's expedition into Syria, the French army was even cut off from its Egyptian supply centers by the British. But the French General Murat succeeded in finding enough grain stockpiled in Tiberias to supply the entire force. Napoleon himself found 3000 quintaux of grain stockpiled in the port of Haifa which had been destined to supply the British fleet.[26]

The Ottomans were at a loss to stop al-Jazzar's rise to dominance in the area in that they had no competent alternative candidate to fulfil the difficult assignment of defending Syria, governing Damascus and conducting the pilgrimage. It is significant that they did attempt to check his power by occasionally replacing him with a member of the 'Azm family. At the same time, it was the encouragement of al-Jazzar and subsequent governors with similar coastal economic interests, moreover, which bolstered the Maydanis and their suppressed localist constituents in the struggle against the northern *aghawat* and inner-city 'Azm-faction in the late 18th and early decades of the 19th century. Al-Jazzar recognized the advantages of winning this local oppositional faction to his side both to support his coastal trading interests and to undermine his 'Azm rivals.

23 Al-Jazzar had a bridge built over one of the gullies which had obstructed trade in an east-west direction just south of the important grain center of Deraa in the Hawran. (See G. Schumacher, *The Jaulan*, London, 1888, 92 n.)

24 *Tarikh hawadith*, 14.

25 Ali Bey's mother Asma al-'Azm, the daughter of As'ad Pasha, took her protest against al-Jazzar to Istanbul but died under mysterious circumstances along the way. (*Ibid.*, 17–19.)

26 See Wencker-Wildberg, V, 53, 56, 58, 67, 70 and Bonaparte's letters to the Commandant de Césarée and to Grezieu, both of March 18, 1799 (*Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, Paris, 1860, V, 4039 and 4040 respectively).

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The sources give many details of al-Jazzar's relations with the city's leading political figures. These indicate that he gained very little cooperation from members of the 'Azm faction and, in fact, resorted to harsh measures to coerce and suppress them. In addition to the cases of 'Ali Bey al-'Azm and his mother just mentioned, a number of examples can be given. One of the city's leading '*ulama*' and chiefs of a family close to the 'Azms, the *mufti* 'Abdallah ibn Tahir al-Muradi, was hanged in the citadel in 1797/98.[27] His successor As'ad ibn Sa'id al-Mahasini who had been preacher (*khatib*) in the Umayyad mosque was exiled to Acre where he died in prison.[28] Next, the subsequent *mufti* 'Abd al-Rahman al-Muradi was imprisoned and died of neglect in a well in the citadel in 1803.[29] From the *aghawat* of the 'Azm faction, Ahmad Agha, the chief of the *qapi-qul* or imperial *aghawat* was executed[30] while the 'Azm-faction merchants Amin al-Qabaqibi and Muhammad Sawwaf became the targets of al-Jazzar's extortion.[31]

At the same time, some Maydani *aghawat* cooperated with al-Jazzar and were in contact with his financial aides.[32] Al-Jazzar appointed, for example, a number of Maydani *aghawat* to represent him in the city. Muhammad Arfa Amini was his first *mutasallim* in 1770, but he was replaced by Ahmad Agha, the controller (*mutawalli*) of one of the chief Maydani-faction mosques, the Sinaniya.[33] During an insecure period, when al-Jazzar was absent from the city, a certain Abu Hamza[34] assumed control with the aid of a Maydani merchant by the name of Muhammad 'Aqil and his followers.[35] (Muhammad 'Aqil, who was responsible for 'Abd al-Rahman al-Muradi's citadel death, was himself later to be a victim of al-Jazzar).[36] When al-Jazzar began to loose his grasp on the situation in Damascus, chiefly because of the heavy losses his forces had suffered in fighting the French, but also due to old age and illness, he lost the cooperation of the Maydanis and had to rule through a splinter Kurdish faction who were directed by their leader Taha al-Kurdi of Acre. Upon al-Jazzar's death in 1804, an orgy of revenge broke out in Damascus as the collaborators of al-Jazzar were hunted down and killed. Other than the just-mentioned Kurds, all the mob's victims named by the chronicler were Maydanis.[37]

It appears, therefore, that during the rule of al-Jazzar, a pattern of cooperation between at least some Maydanis and interests in the coastal town of Acre had been

27 Bitar, I, 127–132; Shatti, *rawd*, 28–32.
28 *ibid.* See also below, 119.
29 *Tarikh hawadith*, 24–26. See also below, 119.
30 *Tarikh hawadith*, 19.
31 *ibid.*, 27.
32 *Mudhakkirat ta'rikhiya*, an anonymous text edited by Qustantin al-Basha, Harisa, no date, 24–25.
33 *Tarikh hawadith*, 17, 19.
34 *ibid.*, 22.
35 *ibid.*
36 *ibid.*, 26.
37 *ibid.*, 27–29. The victims included, for example, a certain Hashim Agha and his sons and 'Ali Agha al-Sham'a of the Maydan.

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established. This was to be sustained after al-Jazzar's death by their shared interests in grain and livestock export. Though little is known about the organization and control of Syrian agricultural marketing at this time, it is clear that high demand was created for food and livestock on the Syrian coast during the French invasion and the siege of Acre and later when the Napoleonic wars in Europe stimulated export in the entire eastern Mediterranean-Black Sea region. In this initial phase, however, European purchases of Syrian and Egyptian livestock and grain often withdrew supplies from traditional local markets. The resulting social and political tensions concerning the orientation of Middle Eastern resources and surpluses and the control of this profitable trade was to become one of the central strains in the political economy of Damascus during the first half of the 19th century.[38]

It is within this framework that a number of political confrontations can be understood. A serious threat to Ottoman hegemony in the Damascus area was, for example, presented by the continuing rise of the Wahhabis, a powerful Muslim fundamentalist movement led by the Sa'ud family which had spread from the Arabian district of Najd and gained control over the holy cities of the Hijaz. The Wahhabis raided into the province of Damascus in 1810. To deal with the Wahhabis, the Ottomans at first permitted the governor in Damascus, Kanj Yusuf Pasha, to compromise on a number of issues of symbolic importance. When, however, a force was raised by Amir Bashir Shihab and Shaykh Bashir Junblat of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon mountains in collaboration with the Ottoman governor of Acre (Sulayman Pasha) to press their demands on Damascus, the Ottomans considered it more in their interest to make concessions to the coastal forces than to the Wahhabis. Kanj Yusuf Pasha was dismissed and Sulayman Pasha was named his successor.[39]

The Wahhabis, who subsequently withdrew, had been at least partially motivated to raid into Syria by their need to restore and augment their grain supply which had dwindled as surpluses were diverted from the Red Seas ports of Egypt and from the Hawran and Balqa of southern Syria to the Mediterranean.[40] The Lebanese and the Pasha of Acre saw the Wahhabis as a threat to their own supply and to their interests in sustaining the European-oriented grain export trade.

The Wahhabis continued to blockade the pilgrimage route, however, and thereby undermined Ottoman authority and legitimacy. To suppress them, the government turned to Egypt where the Albanian merchant-adventurer Muhammad 'Ali had consolidated a position of strength. Thanks to Muhammad 'Ali, the Wahhabis were

38 Developments in the Syrian economy are discussed further in the following chapter.

39 *Tarikh hawadith* (35, 46) reports that Kanj Yusuf Pasha fled the city in danger of losing his life, taking with him a large amount of treasure which had been left in his safe-keeping by 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm.

40 During the French occupation of Egypt, the Hijaz was said to be totally dependent for its grain and vegetable supply on Egypt and that the Sharif of Mecca was satisfied with French regulation of the Red Sea trade. (Wencker-Wildberg, V, 415)

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decisively suppressed in 1812 and Ottoman control over the pilgrimage route and the Holy Cities was restored.

The years 1812 to 1831 remain an opaque and confusing period in Damascus history, during which a number of rival external and internal forces competed but did not yet succeed in establishing the rule of particular factions or coalitions. With the French withdrawal from Egypt in 1801, the death of al-Jazzar in 1804, the appeasement of the Lebanese and coastal interests and the suppression of the Wahhabis in 1812, Damascus was at least temporarily relieved from direct attacks from outside. But the pressures emanating from the Syrian coast continued and were augmented by pressure from Egypt. These external influences were intertwined with the attempts of the city's local factions to hold their positions and to gain dominance. However, the heavy losses suffered by the local forces in their struggles with the French and the devastating epidemic of 1813–1814 which, according to the local chronicler, carried off one-fourth of the "country's" population, no doubt dampened all political ambitions.

For its part, the central government was absorbed at this time with efforts to reform the Empire's military establishment – a process which led to conflicts and culminated in the destruction of the imperial janissary corps in Istanbul in 1826. Throughout this period, the Ottomans reserved just enough energy to preserve their position in Damascus though not, as we have see in the cases of Kanj Yusuf Pasha and al-Jazzar, without compromise. With the progression of military reforms in the capital in the latter 1820's, the central government felt confident that tighter control could again be exerted over Damascus. This, however, proved to be a miscalculation.

THE REVOLT OF 1831

In the spring of 1831, the Ottoman governor in Damascus, 'Abd al-Ra'uf Pasha, attempted to levy a tax called locally "*al-saliyan*".[41] This tax, which was a personal levy on Muslims and may have indicated a radical change in the province's fiscal system and status, was opposed by the local population.[42] We can summarize here the local chronicler's report of the events which followed:

41 *Tarikh hawadith*, 75.

42 The name of this tax indicates that it was either an annual levy or was intended to raise revenue to pay an annual salary to the Ottoman governor or perhaps both. The word *saleyane*, a Persian word meaning annual, had found its way into Ottoman administrative practices to designate those provinces in which the governor received an annual salary in contrast to those which were based on a feudal revenue system. As Damascus province had, until this time, a feudal revenue system, the introduction of the *saliyane* would have indicated that a change was indicated in the tax-collecting prerogatives of the local feudal notables (see Gibb and Bowen, I, 148, 151). As an annual personal levy on Muslims, the tax would have been in addition to those sanctioned by Islamic law and would, in this case, also have aroused opposition. Later in the 19th century, the Ottomans again levied the *saliyane* in the Syrian provinces (see Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 160, 180).

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The city expressed its unwillingness to pay the tax by closing down the markets. When a large crowd assembled at Bab al-Jabiya (D/5) near the *seray*, the governor sent the chief of his guard with a group of soldiers out to confront it. The soldiers fired on the crowd, killing over twenty persons. The next day, Damascenes of both the Maydan – which had suffered the most casualties – and of the inner city conspired to retaliate on the Ottoman soldiers. They sought out the soldiers individually and murdered those unlucky enough to fall into their hands. Even when the governor sought to conciliate the Damascenes by withdrawing the order for a new tax levy, the city remanined recalcitrant. The markets were opened again, but the murdering of Ottoman soldiers continued. When the time for the pilgrimage arrived, a large number of soldiers were withdrawn from the city to serve as a guard for the pilgrims. Ra'uf Pasha set out on the pilgrimage, and this appears to have calmed the situation. By the time of the governor's return, however, news had reached Istanbul of his failure to collect the new tax in Damascus and he was dimissed.

The new Ottoman governor was to be Salim Pasha, known to the Damascenes for his responsibility for the gruesome suppression of the janissary military corps in Istanbul in 1826. Despite the fact that Salim Pasha named a Damascene local para-military chief by the name of Muhammad Agha Shurbaji-Darani[44] as interim governor until his arrival, the Damascenes remained apprehensive of Salim's intentions. Would he proceed so brutally against the Damascene paramilitary groups as he had done in Istanbul? Would this not cause local disorders? Ominously, an attempt was made shortly thereafter on Shurbaji-Darani's life, and this was generally credited to the Ottoman *agha* of the citadel.

Immediately after Salim's arrival in Damascus with a large contingent of 5000 soldiers, he announced that the government intended to go ahead with its new tax levy. The city again closed down. Shurbaji-Darrani left the government and went to join Abu 'Arabi al-Shamli, one of the leading *aghas* of the Maydan. For this, the Ottomans declared Shurbaji-Darrani a fugitive. Obliged to flee the city, Shurbaji-Darrani took refuge, significantly, in Acre.

Next Salim Pasha summoned the notables of the city (here: *a'yan al-balad*)[45] and ordered them to hold a general meeting in the house of the city's *mufti* at which they should pledge support for and aid in levying the new tax. Diplomatically, the notables agreed to his demands, but made additional plans of their own. Before going to the house of the *mufti*, a large assembly of Damascenes met in a garden on the outskirts of the city. At this gathering, the city's notables (here: *aghawat wa a'yan*) formed a confederation making gallant expressions of solidarity. They swore that the new tax would not be levied as long as they remained united. Proceeding then to the house of the *mufti*, the city's notables nonethless kept their confederation secret while pledging support for the new tax.

Thus deceived, Salim Pasha ordered his scribe[46] to begin writing up the returns expected from each quarter. The scribe began this operation, proceeding from quarter to quarter and accomplished his task in the quarters of Maydan, Bab Sarija and Qanawat. On the next day, he started on 'Amara in the north of the central rectangle. On that evening, however, the people of 'Amara attacked him.[47] He was forced to flee through 'Uqayba to Salihiya finding the population everywhere armed against him. Not until nightfall did the scribe manage to return to the *seray*.

43 This account of the revolt of 1831 is taken largely from *Mudhakkirat Ta'rikhiya*, 2–48. A brief account is also given in Hisni, 257f. and in *Tarikh hawadith*, 76–80.

44 There are some indications that this *agha* was in fact, a member of the Mahayini family. See below, 149–151.

45 Unfortunately, no names are given in the source.

46 Another chronicler (*Tarikh hawadith*, 76) related that the treasurer 'Ali Agha "Khaznakatibi" who was a *mamluk* and an in-law of the 'Azm family performed this function.

47 *Tarikh hawadith*, 77 gives the exact location of the outbreak as the Madrasa al-Badura'iya (F/3).

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Salim Pasha dispatched troops against the people of 'Amara, but they closed the quarter's gates and fired at the soldiers. The battle between the soldiers, who took cover in the Mu'allaq Mosque (E/2) and the Dalatiya Khan (E/2) continued through the night and into the next day. In the meantime, the city's populace prepared for battle, taking up arms and moving into the city's *khans* which were then used as fortresses. Salim's next foray was also turned back. The soldiers sent to attack the Maydan were blocked between Shaghur and Maydan at the Darwishiya Suq (C/4–5). Here the people closed in, overcame the soldiers and established yet another stronghold.

In an apparent attempt to divide and conquer, Salim sent an offer of reconciliation to the people of Qanawat. Rumours spread that Qanawat had accepted his offer and that arms were being surrendered. It was also heard that Salim Pasha had withdrawn the order to collect the tax. On Saturday evening a body of troops went out from the *seray* into Qanawat to disarm the population. By Sunday morning they had reached Zuqaq al-'Adas (B/4). Here fighting again flared up and the soldiers, gaining the upper hand, plundered, abducted and committed crimes against the women of Qanawat.

News of these developments spread quickly from Qanawat to the Maydan and to Shaghur. Soon the whole city knew. The people rose up and proceeded to Qanawat to fight the soldiers. The safety of all the Ottoman authorities in the city was now threatened. The soldiers could no longer defend the *seray*, and Salim Pasha and a body of officials and soldiers had to flee on foot to the citadel. Other officials including the uncle of the governor and a large group of soldiers fled to the Mu'allaq Mosque and to the Dalatiya Khan in 'Amara. The *seray* fell to the Damascenes, was mobbed and plundered.

Next, the Damascenes overcame the Dalatiya Khan by setting it on fire. The soldiers there fled to the Mu'allaq Mosque. During the next several days of fighting, a number of Ottomans were permitted to escape upon the guarantee of Shamli's nephew, Rashid Agha, who had them taken to the house of the *mufti*. But others were killed in revenge for the soldiers' depredations on the local population. The people of Salihiya discovered and murdered Qasim Agha 'Aqili,[48] a Baghdadi merchant who had guaranteed the revenues of the new tax levy for Salim Pasha.

The chronicler writes that for "forty days and nights" Damascus was completely absorbed by the rebellion. The governor and the 1500 troops besieged in the citadel retaliated by bombarding the city. In the meantime, the local para-military chiefs set themselves up in the house of a prominent notable in the inner city to give orders and run the rebellion. All the normal activities of the population had come to a halt. The markets were closed; the artisans hid themselves at home. Only food could be bought or sold, and then only at great risk and expense.

When the siege of the citadel was into its third week an important emissary arrived from Acre. He had been sent by the Damascene Muhammad Agha Shurbaji-Darani who had been holding out there since his flight from Damascus. This emissary brought news of financial support for the Damascene rebels. Credit could be obtained from money-lenders in Damascus upon the guarantee of Hayyim Farhi, an important Jewish financier in Acre.

The citadel was finally overcome after two weeks of siege. In a desperate state, the governor Salim Pasha begged for safe passage. This was granted by the city's notables in writing.[49] Salim was brought out at night to one of the 'Azm houses where he was given food and drink. The soldiers in the citadel who had survived the siege were at first divided up into small groups and sent to the quarters of Maydan, Shaghur, 'Amara, 'Uqayba and Saruja, but shortly thereafter they were all moved by the rebel chieftains to an encampment north of the city near the village of Duma.

48 It has not been possible to find any connection between this 'Aqili and the Maydani family 'Aqil. See the Muradi family history below, 160–165.

49 *Tarikh hawadith*, 78, however, relates that the *a 'ayan* did not offer him security.

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The city resumed its normal activities while Salim Pasha remained three days in the 'Azm house. He was then moved to the Kaylani house in 'Asruniya (E/3) where the remainder of the Ottoman officials were also assembled. Though he was provided with a guard of 500 men, these did not protect him when a group of Damascenes attacked in the night and killed every Ottoman official assembled in the house.[50] The remains of Salim Pasha were buried in the citadel.[51]

There then followed an extended period when Damascus was ruled by the local rebels and their supporters. Two Damascene *aghas*, 'Ali Agha 'Urman and Abu Khalil Agha Daqqaq-Maydani were posted with 200 men in the citadel. Finances continued to be arranged through money-lenders with connections in Acre, but revenues were also collected from members of the city's Christian minority who were obliged to recompense the *aghawat* for the guards stationed for their protection. The *aghawat* also profiteered on the local grain market which they succeeded in monopolizing.

Although an Ottoman vice-governor or *mutasallim* by the name of 'Ali Pasha[52] was assigned to Damascus, he arrived with an inadequate contingent of only 1000 soldiers and quickly made his peace with the rebels. While 'Ali Pasha resided in the *seray*, the rebels ruled from their headquarters which they had moved to the house of yet another inner-city notable. 'Ali Pasha formed a council composed of the city's *mufti* and the leading Maydani *aghawat* like Muhammad Agha Shurbaji-Darani (who had apparently returned from Acre) and his nephew Khalil Agha. Thereafter, 'Ali Pasha spent much of his time performing meditations and did not exert himself to interfere with the rebels' activities.

According to this account of the revolt of 1831, the victorious rebels were chiefly from the Maydani faction. We may surmise, therefore, that the rebelion was motivated not only by fears of a devastating reform of the local para-military troops – which Salim Pasha had surely been sent to carry out – but also by fears of the reassertion of the predominance of the 'Azm faction under the protection of tighter Ottoman control. The Pasha's imposition of taxation on every quarter and every household, rich or poor symbolized the government's intention to exert direct control which would entirely undermine the Maydanis' position to the benefit of their rivals. It seems of significance here that the tax assessor began his work in the southern quarters of the Maydan and Bab Sarija.

Though the rebelion gained the support of some inner-city notables against the Ottoman Pasha, these may have joined in under duress. Eventually, the rebels betrayed the inner-city notables and besmudged their honor by murdering the Ottoman governor and other top officials despite the pledge of safe-conduct. Once the revolt had succeeded, the Maydanis took over and ruled the city. They supplied the city with grain for exorbitant prices and indebted themselves to financial circles in Acre. The situation began in fact to resemble a successful localist revolution. Even the Ottomans appeared to have accepted the *fait accompli* by posting 'Ali Pasha, a passive and introverted figure with pronounced Sufi attachments, as the next governor of Damascus. These were developments and reorientations which could not have been acceptable to the 'Azm-faction notables.

50 *ibid*. 79 holds it is not clear if he was killed by the fire the rebels had set or by them directly.
51 *ibid*.
52 Hisni, 259 refers to this governor as 'Uluw Pasha.

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THE EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION

The rule of the localists was cut short by the advance of Egyptian armies into Syria. Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of Egypt, conquered Acre in May 1832 and advanced towards Damascus with an army of 16,000 men.[53] The resistance organized by 'Ali Pasha of 10,000 men, largely Kurds and the city's youth but also some Druzes, made a poor showing in a brief encounter with the Egyptians. As further resistance appeared useless, a number of Ottoman officials including the Ottoman governor, but also many local notables fled northwards to join the Ottoman army assembling at Homs.

The 'Azms descending from Nasuh Pasha al-'Azm and settled in Egypt had established close ties to the Egyptian ruling family.[54] Recognizing the predicament in which their friends and relatives in Damascus found themselves and the real possibility that their Maydani rivals would succeed in holding the city, the Egyptian 'Azms may have urged Muhammad 'Ali to send an expedition to Syria to reestablish 'order.' The Egyptians had, of course, motivations of a broader scope. Nonetheless, the collaboration of a well-established Damascene faction would be a valuable asset. Once the occupation of Syria was achieved, the Egyptians were to install in Damascus Sharif Pasha, the grandson-in-law of Nasuh Pasha al-'Azm, as governor of all the districts of Syria combined.

The forces of Ibrahim Pasha entered Damascus on June 14, 1832 through the Maydan. This seems of significance as the normal land route from Egypt would have taken them through Qanawat. Amongst the first troops to enter the city were those of Amir Bashir Shihab, the ruler of Lebanon who had also allied with the Egyptians. The remainder of the troops camped at Qabun to the north of the city. Once 'Ali Agha 'Urman had handed over the keys of the citadel, the capitulation of the rebels was complete. In July, Ibrahim defeated the Ottoman force assembled at Homs. He then advanced northwards into Anatolia, scoring a number of victories, and eventually threatened the Ottoman capital itself. But here Muhammad 'Ali Pasha called a halt to his son's ambitious conquests and sought to win political concessions. This and British pressure, stemming from the fear of augmented Russian influence should the Ottomans suffer further defeats, climaxed in the negotiation of an agreement according to the terms of which Muhammad 'Ali Pasha withdrew his forces from Anatolia. For this concession he was ceded Adana province and all the Syrian provinces.

53 This account of the Egyptian occupation of Damascus is drawn from Asad Jibrail Rustum, "Syria under Mehemet Ali", *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, XLI (1924), 34–57; Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, *Al-hukuma al-Misriya fi al-Sham*, Cairo, 1343 (1924/25); Sulayman Abu 'Izz al-Din, *Ibrahim Basha fi Suriya*, Beirut, 1929; F. Charles-Roux, "La domination égyptienne en Syrie", *Revue d'Histoire des Colonies*, xxl (1933) 187–212; Shatti, *Rawd* 8–17; *Mudhakkirat tarikhiya*, 51–240; Bitar, I, 15–29.

54 See 138–139 below.

In the face of such a formidable force, the Damascene rebellion had quickly dissolved. The chronicler related that a number of important individuals made their peace with Ibrahim Pasha, who in turn made no radical changes in local administration, at least not at this early stage.[55] The religious establishment, for example, remained in place. As for the *aghawat*, Muhammad Agha Shurbaji-Darani had fled but Rashid al-Shamli, another of the leading figures in the revolt against Salim Pasha, was amongst the first to pay a visit to Ibrahim.[56] Upon Ibrahim's call for fighting men to join him in his campaign against the Ottomans at Homs and perhaps as a result of this reconciliation, seventy-five Damascene *aghawat* responded, contributing a force of 1,000 men.

At the start of the occupation, four thousand Egyptian troops were posted in the citadel, 180 in the Maydan and about 100 in each of the other important quarters of the city. To curb collaboration, the troops in the quarters were rotated daily and at this stage they caused no trouble for the local population. The city's finances were placed in the hands of Hanna Bey Bahri, a Greek Catholic from the Syrian town of Homs who, after having served under the governors 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm and Kanj Yusuf Pasha as a scribe in Damascus, had joined the Egyptian service and achieved great influence as a financial administrator.[57] Bahri Bey entered Damascus with the Egyptians and established himself in the quarter of Qanawat in the vicinity of the *seray*. Also employed as a financial administrator was a certain 'Ali Agha, a Mamluk Turk who had married Nasuh Pasha al-'Azm's daughter and was the father of Sharif Pasha's wife, Farlan al-'Azm.[58]

Ibrahim Pasha established himself first in the house of the Qabaqibi family in the northern Damascene suburb of Salihiya where he received delegations of the city's notables. He made an appraisal of the local power relationships and took steps aimed at winning cooperation from all factions. From the local rebel camp, Rashid Agha al-Shamli was appointed vice governor in Hama, and a Damascene from the Hamdan family of Shaghur was named vice governor in Homs. With these appointments, the Maydani faction may have been appeased. In Damascus, Ibrahim Pasha named Ahmad Agha Yusuf civilian governor of the city. Yusuf was a Damascene Kurdish chieftain of the northern faction and had close ties to both Amir Bashir Shihab and the 'Azms.[59] Ibrahim then came down to the city from Salihiya and, occupying the house of the Shurbaji-Daranis in Qanawat, created a council

55 An account of Egyptian administration in Syria is given in Yitzhak Hofman, "The administration of Syria and Palestine under Egyptian Rule (1831–1840)" in Moshe Ma'oz, *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period*, Jerusalem, 1975, 311–333.

56 The chronicler relates that Shurbaji-Darrani achieved this through the intercession of Amir Bashir Shihab (*Mudhakkirat tarikhiya*, 54).

57 For background material on Hanna Bey, see: Thoumin, 113; Albert Hourani, "The Syrians in Egypt in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries", *Colloque International sur l'Histoire du Caire*, Cairo, 1972, 225; Hofman, 313ff. More research may one day establish a link between Hanna Bey and the 'Anhuri family of Damascus. See below 63.

58 The 'Azm family's marriage ties are discussed in their family history below, 136–144.

59 See the Yusuf family history below, 151–153.

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upon which Damascene notables were to sit and participate in administrative arrangements.

According to the chronicler, the Damascenes at large were relieved by the bloodless and controlled occupation and by the end to restrictions on trade and inflation of grain prices under the rule of the Maydanis. A great open fair sprung up in the Marja plain northwest of the city where the Egyptian troops were camped. The Damascenes exchanged food and goods for the gold, silver, jewelry and curiosities which the troops had brought with them from Egypt and Acre. For several care-free weeks, the troops were permitted to enter the city in order to buy and sell, and no incidents of violence occurred.

However, the initially good relations between the Egyptians and the local population did not last long. The first of the unpopular measures taken by the Egyptians was the introduction of price controls. While this may have relieved the population in general, price controls were something which the mercantile community in Damascus would eventually oppose.[60]

Next, the Egyptians stationed heavier troop concentrations within the city and, unwisely, in its mosques and *madrasas.*[61] Once Ibrahim's military expansion in the north halted, the camps around Damascus swelled and with the onset of winter, it became necessary to find better quarters for the troops. They eventually were housed in every Damascene mosque (except the Umayyad and Sinaniya Mosques), in its mills, bakeries and cafés and in all the shops and *khans* of the Maydan from Bawwabat Allah in the extreme south to the Sinaniya mosque at the gates of the inner city. The local chronicler remarked that there may well have been more soldiers than civilians in Damascus at this time.[62]

The Damascenes were quite overwhelmed by the presence of so many armed troops in their midst. When the Egyptians seized men in the streets to work as forced labour or raided households to collect recruits for the army, little effective resistance could be raised. On one occasion, however, when the Egyptian officers attempted with only ten men to requisition camels in the Maydan and to seize a fugitive, some hundred Maydanis turned against them and they were forced to flee. The Egyptians immediately reacted by sending troops from the citadel into the

60 Under Ibrahim Pasha, writes Rustum, "large contributions of grain were required annually for the use of the government, and the farmer was compelled to sell his crop at a price which had been arbitrarily fixed by the highest administrative council in the country. The portion claimed by the government had to be delivered at government granaries which might be several days' journey from the farm; and for this no allowance was made. But the climax was reached when the farmer delivered his grain at the government depot; for, contrary to all expectation, he usually found he had to give an additional fourth of the whole quantity he was delivering, the government having used once more two sets of weights depending upon whether she was receiving or giving.

61 For example, in the mosques of Mu'allaq (E/2) one of the important points in the events of 1831, and in those in the Suq al-Khayyatin (E/4), Darwishiya (C/4), Suq al-Buzuriya (F/4) and Bab al-Barid (F/3).

62 The Egyptian occupation of Syria involved nearly 100,000 troops (Maoz, *Ottoman Reform,* 13).

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Maydan. These committed an outrage by raiding the Sa'di Sufi compound (C/16) where they seized a number of men and brought them to the *seray*. Some were executed; others were imprisoned and later sent to the Acre fortress.[63]

As if fanned by the heavy-handed suppression of the Maydan, rebellions flared up against the Egyptians south of Damascus in the Hawran, Trans-Jordan and northern Palestine. Especially troublesome were the Druzes of the Laja', a mountainous area to the south-east of Damascus on the edge of the desert. Though taxation and conscription provoked the rural population to revolt, there is evidence that anti-Egyptian intrigues in Damascus were linked to these rural rebellions. Shaykh Mahmud al-Rifa'i, chief of the Rifa'i Sufi order of the Maydan, went to the Laja and fomented revolt against the Egyptians there.[64] The Maydani al-Busali also fled 'like lightning' to join the Druzes. Opposition to the Egyptians grew as the Druzes succeeded in defeating them in a number of small encounters.

The Egyptians were probably justified in their suspicion of all Maydani *aghawat*, but they reacted very harshly, executing their own para-military chief who was a Maydani as well as a *shaykh* by the name of Diya al-Hajana, when it became known that both of these had been partisans to the Druze uprisings. They also dismissed their infantry chief because he and his men were Maydanis.[65]

The atmosphere amongst the city's notables became tense as local discontent grew. Especially critical was the position of those notables who had collaborated with the Egyptians, the 'Azm family and some *aghawat* of the northern quarters, such as the Kurds Yusuf and Shamdin.[66] At the start of the occupation, the 'Azms and their faction among the inner-city notables and northern *aghawat* were gratified by the flight of the rebels and the reestablishment of their influence in the city. But the Egyptians' military successes against the Ottomans in Anatolia and the threat they posed to the Ottoman state may have created the first doubts in this faction's minds as to the wisdom of their support for the Egyptian intervention. Ibrahim's reconciliation with the Maydani *aghawat* at the start of the occupation and his assignment to them of important district commands even to the north of Damascus and especially in Hama where the 'Azms maintained a family seat, may also have been disconcerting.[67]

Moreover, as the weight of the occupation burdened the population, these notables were hard-pressed to justify the Egyptian presence to their own local supporters.[68] For example, the sensibilities of some Damascene *'ulama'* who

63 The chronicler names the Maydani *aghawat* Shahbandar and Nuri in this connection (*Mudhakkirat tarikhiya*, 222–223).

64 *ibid.*, 222f.

65 *ibid.*

66 In addition to these the chronicler named Karkatli Agha, a commander of North African troops and Husayn Salman, a Shiite partisan of Amir Khalil Shihab. See also the Yusuf and Shamdin family histories below, Chapter VI.

67 See below Chapter VI.

68 The factors leading to Syrian discontent are discussed in Rustum, 39f.; Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 12f.; Owen, 76f.; Schlicht, 32f.

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normally supported the 'Azms were aroused by the violations of Muslim traditions under the Egyptians. Wine shops had been opened, the privacy of the *harim* had not always been respected (when, for example, recruits were sought), and new regulations favoring the relative social and political position of Christians had been introduced.

There were also economic causes of discontent. The market was opened to highly competitive European textiles, and prices on food stuffs once again rose due to the demand created by the nearly 100,000 Egyptian troops now in Syria. Yet, the Damascenes could not profiteer in either the textile or grain trade as would otherwise have been the case because the Egyptians monopolized the trade or permitted only a few protégés to profit from it.

For the lower classes, conscription, taxation and forced labor were becoming intolerable. The Egyptians lack of respect for local religious institutions and their intrusions into the Sufi orders were also a provocation. The troubles with the Maydanis and the rural outbreaks against the Egyptians were ominous developments for those who had at first cooperated with the occupiers. Though the Egyptians appeared to have the situation under control, it was not clear for how long they would continue to be able to do so.

At first, the 'Azm-faction notables who heard of the Maydani-connected anti-Egyptian intrigues either declined involvement (as the *mufti*) or even informed the Egyptians of the conspiracies (as did the Kurdish chieftain Shamdin Agha). The chronicler relates, however, that the 'Azms and the Shihabs eventually became party to a pro-Ottoman conspiracy to oust the Egyptians. According to this account, the turning point for the 'Azms came when Amir Sa'd al-Din Shihab had his son Amir Khalil smuggled Fardaws al-'Azm (another grandchild of Nasuh Pasha al-'Azm) from behind the Ottoman lines into Damascus where he met the Egyptian governor, Sharif Pasha who happened to be his brother-in-law.[69] This, coming at a time when the Ottomans were preparing a new expedition to reoccupy Syria, indicates that the 'Azms were willing to unite with the Ottomans to expel the Egyptians from Syria. The conspiracy was, according to the anonymous chronicler, revealed to Ibrahim Pasha by the Egyptian's treasurer, the Syrian (Greek) Catholic Hanna Bey Bahri. Following the discovery of this meeting, Sharif Pasha was arrested and eventually returned to Egypt as a prisoner. Ibrahim Pasha also had Fardaws al-'Azm's father, the Mamluk financial aid 'Ali Agha executed. The Shihabs' partisan Ahmad Agha Yusuf fled safely to Beirut and joined the Ottoman forces there.

In the end, British and Austrian efforts in support of the Ottomans, including subversive activities amongst the Lebanese, the bombardment of Beirut and the landing of British and Ottoman troops, forced Muhammad 'Ali to recall his armies from Syria. The British and Austrian intervention here was related to developments in the entire eastern Mediterranean which we cannot pursue in detail here.[70]

69 See also the 'Azm family history below, 136–144.

70 See note 7 above.

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Amongst the major factors was the belief that the extension of trade monopolies to Syria under Muhammad 'Ali would be detrimental to British interests. There was also a fear that Muhammad 'Ali, as a protégé of the French, would represent an undue extension of French influence in the Middle East. And finally, the Europeans and especially Russia did not wish to have too successful a ruler in Istanbul, prefering the weaker and therefore manipulable Ottomans.

The political situation during the weeks immediately following the Egyptian withdrawal from Damascus are not entirely clear. The evacuation is said to have spanned three days during which time the citadel and *seray* were turned over to the Damascene *aghawat*, 'Abd al-Qadir Agha and Hasan Bey al-Kahhala respectively. The Ottomans named as *mutasallim* (or temporary governor) the Damascene Ahmad Agha Yusuf who had collaborated with the Egyptians nearly till the end of the occupation but then switched sides. The 20th century historian Rustum has noted that the Sultan promised the reinstatement of feudal lords in Lebanon in his efforts to gain Syrian collaboration against the Egyptians.[71] It seems reasonable to assume that the Ottomans also promised the 'Azms and their faction a similar restoration. The line of alliances from the Lebanese Shihab family through Ahmad Agha Yusuf to the 'Azm faction which existed at this time also supports this supposition.[72]

Yusuf formed a *diwan* (council) once the Egyptians withdrew. He chose northern *aghawat*, inner-city *'ulama'* and *ashraf* as well as some merchants, a representative of the Jewish minority and two Christians to participate.[73] When the Ottoman governor arrived shortly afterwards in Damascus, the 'Azm faction saw their hopes betrayed. The Ottomans posted the very 'Ali Pasha whose tenure had been interrupted by the Egyptian occupation. He reorganized the city's council to include Maydani *aghawat* amongst its members and appointed a relative of the Farhis (the Jewish family mentioned above which had connections in Acre and which had supported the rebels during the revolt of 1831) to be the top treasury official. According to the chronicler, 'Ali Pasha then, as in 1831, retired to his prayer rug and permitted the city to be ruled by an assistant, a situation which played fully into the hands of the Maydani-faction.

Acting upon the complaints of the British consul,[74] whose motivations are not yet clear, the central government soon dismissed 'Ali Pasha, naming Ahmad Agha Yusuf once again as his temporary replacement.

With that, it appeared that the 'Azm faction had won the day after all. But this was only a temporary victory. The massive reassertion of Ottoman direct initiative which soon followed was not altogether to their advantage. In May of 1841, the new governor Muhammad Najib Pasha arrived to rule the city and its province. With his term of office a new phase in Ottoman rule in Damascus was properly

71 Rustum, 53.
72 See the Yusuf family history below, 151–153.
73 *Mudhakkirat tarikhiya*, 235–236.
74 *ibid.*, 240; *Tarikh hawadith*, 83–85.

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launched. The Egyptian occupation of Syria which had lasted just under a decade collapsed under increasing local opposition and ultimately because of pressure applied by the British and Austrians. The Ottomans reoccupied Syria and held the province from then until their collapse in 1918.

THE TANZIMAT

Shortly before the Ottomans reoccupied Damascus in 1840, Sultan 'Abd al-Majid had in 1839 proclaimed the imperial rescript of Gülhane. This proclamation marked the beginning of the Tanzimat, an era of reform from above in Ottoman history. The most important pieces of policy proclaimed during this period in addition to the Gülhane rescript, were the Penal Code of 1840 (augmented in 1851 and 1858), the Commercial Code of 1850, the Hatt-i Hümayun of 1856 and the Land Code of 1858.[75] These expressed the goals of the Tanzimat: to reform and revitalize the Empire's system of government in the interests of improving the economic and cultural standards of its subjects, assuring them security of life and property and the administration of justice. The state was intent on revitalizing itself and regaining effective control over the affairs of its far-flung provinces. An effort was to be made to modernize the army, end corruption in the state bureaucracy, and legitimize a consultative, monarchical system of government with tendencies towards the development of secular legislative processes.

Though the Tanzimat no doubt expressed sincere and altruistic intentions on the part of its proponents, its opponents had weighty arguments for resisting its implementation. A great hindrance to the success of the Tanzimat, for example, was the extent of European interference which accompanied it as European observers and advisors felt justified in meddling in the affairs both in the capital and in the provinces wherever and whenever European interests were involved. These interests were, moreover, often very broadly understood. The British government, for example, felt justified in making sure that Tanzimat measures be carried through as these were to strengthen Ottoman resistance to the expansion of France, Austria and Russia.[76] Another irritating element of the Tanzimat which aroused resentment was that it was strongly motivated by the need to impress the 'Christian' Powers with the Ottomans' intention to end the apparent or real oppressed status of Christian minorities in order to block the further development of European protectorates over these minorities.[77] Finally, opposition to the Tanzimat developed with the extent of corruption and moral laxity many of its proponents displayed.[78]

With the arrival of Najib Pasha in Damascus, a number of Tanzimat measures were introduced to Syria. It is significant that these consisted mainly of efforts

75 Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 21f.
76 Farah, *op.cit.*
77 Concerning French policy in this connection see Spagnolo, *op.cit.*, Schlicht, *op.cit.*
78 See, for example, the biography of Tahir al-Amidi below, 167–168.

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to reduce local autonomy, increase revenues and extend Ottoman rule to rural districts. At this time, therefore, the Tanzimat did not appear to be much of an innovation in Ottoman policy. The large numbers of imperial troops stationed in the area[79] were intended mainly to protect Syria from renewed invasion from Egypt and to insure the safe passage of the pilgrimage from Damascus to Mecca, upon which the prestige and legitimacy of the Ottoman sultan depended now more than ever. They were, however, also a tool in the hands of the Ottoman authorities for exerting direct rule. By installing imperial troops to fulfill the tasks normally performed by the locally-based para-military groups and their *aghawat*, the government hoped to break the power of local factions.

But the troops – some 25,000 by the end of 1844[80] – were initially concentrated in the north of Syria where the military commander established his headquarters. The area around Damascus did not experience heavy troop concentrations until 1845 when the headquarters where transferred there.[81] During the years 1845 until 1852 the troops had some success with conscription and the collection of taxes, and some of the para-military groups were actually disbanded at that time. In 1853, moreover, the commander of the troops was also named governor of Damascus, further strengthening the central authority against the local forces by permitting the consolidation of administrative and military functions.[82] This measure was, on the other hand, undermined when large troop contingents were withdrawn from Syria to participate in the Crimean campaign beginning that year.[83] In 1855, the administrative and military posts were again separated and not rejoined until 1859.[84]

The government attempted to reduce the *aghawat* while building up the regular troops both by administrative and financial measures. In May of 1845, for example, funds alotted to the *aghawat* to protect the frontiers of the province from the beduin were reduced from £22,000 (for 2500 men) by 15% (to support only 1800–1900).[85] But financial difficulties, it should be noted, also plagued the regular imperial forces.[86]

On the whole, the Ottoman military in the area around Damascus failed to undermine the local para-military groups. Its presence was not permanent and the troops were not in good condition. For example, they were called up to serve elsewhere, and though the troops returned, their success in supplanting the para-militaries remained restricted to the regions outside Damascus.[87] A further reduc-

79 Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 44ff.
80 *ibid.*, 48.
81 *ibid.*
82 *ibid.*, 50.
83 *ibid.*
84 *ibid.*, 41–42.
85 Wood, 9, March 7, 1945, FO 78/622.
86 Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 49.
87 *ibid.*, 51.

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tion of the regular army to 8,000 troops for the whole of Syria came in 1858, and the authorities themselves fell back on the local *aghawat* to recruit an auxiliary force in 1859,[88] which they named *'awniya*.[89] These were supposed to be salaried directly from the treasury, but when the treasury defaulted in paying them, the troops turned to their old chieftains, the *aghawat*, for their means of support.[90] In other words, in Damascus the Ottoman attempts to displace the local para-military forces had largely failed. These survived and were to be active in the province of Damascus for yet a number of decades to come.

Writing in 1862 about the situation of the Ottoman regular troops vis-a-vis the local troops, or "*bashi-bozuks*" as Europeans had begun to call them during and after the Crimean War, the French consul in Damascus M. Bertrand noted:

> Le titre pompeux de "Corps d'armée de l'Arabistan" est donné à quelques bataillons du Nizam, deux ou trois mille hommes en tout, répartis entre Jérusalem, Saint-Jean d'Acre, Damas, Beyrouth, Tripoli et Homs. Disséminés au milieu d'un peuple de trois millions d'âmes, on ne peut leur demander autre chose que de défendre leurs casernes. Mal nourris, mal vêtus, plus mal payés encore, il est impossible qu'ils ne cherchent pas à se dédommager quelque part de tant de privations; et lorsque j'apprends les pillages et les crimes de ces soldats que je rencontre tous les jours ici, pieds nus et la souffrance peinte sur tous les traits, je ne puis avoir pour eux que de la pitié; je réserve mon indignation pour les chefs, auteurs de tant de misère.
>
> Tout le mérite, si c'en est un, des Bachi-Bozouks est d'être pittoresques; ils n'aiment a brûler la poudre que dans une fantasia, et ne rachètent même pas par le courage leur indiscipline. On les trouve dans toutes les petites villes de la Syrie, qu'ils sont chargés de protéger contre les Bédouins; mais s'ils ne fuient pas devant ceux-ci, c'est seulement lorsqui'ils se sont entendus avec eux pour piller en commun. Audacieux envers les faibles, ces détestables soldats sont des agents de police pires encore.
>
> Seuls craints, seuls respectés, méprisant de fait le pouvoir du Sultan, dont ils reconnaissent l'autorité nominale, les chefs de bande qui parcourent la Syrie sont les véritables maîtres du pays.[91]

To some extent, especially within the city's inner ring, the *aghawat* may have been replaced by a combination of tax-farmer and regular troops. In May of 1845, for example, some measure of success had been achieved by employing regular troops as escorts for tax-farmers. It is reported that the *miri* (the state tax on rural production) of all the districts of the province was auctioned in that year to tax-farmers.[92] At the root of these changes lay the issue of control over rural land holdings. The government was attempting to supplant some *aghawat* and *'ulama'* by undermining their economic base. Measures taken in the 1850's to absorb the lands held by some local notables in the form of *awqaf* (endowments) and *malikane* (lifetime leases which were often nonetheless inherited) into the state's taxable domains aroused opposition in Damascus. This reached the ears of the British consul in the form of a petition of protest signed by a number of Damascenes to

88 *ibid.*

89 This was the name of a northern quarter of Damascus where para-militaries concentrated. (See Figure 3).

90 Rogers, 71, Nov. 21, 1867; 16, Oct. 28, 1868 and 20, Nov. 28, 1868, FO 195/806.

91 Damas et Liban, 34–35.

92 Wood, 9, March 7, 1845, FO 78/622.

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whom the consul referred to as "inhabitants, nobles, functionnaries, derwishes and ulemas".[93] It is unfortunate that we have neither a copy of this petition nor a further indication of the petitioners' identities as there are indications that Tanzimat measures were applied in Damascus along factional lines. Subsequent reports show that the 'Azm-faction was particularly negatively affected,[94] though the functions of tax-farming were assigned to Kurds of the northern quarters[95] which would indicate that some elements normally associated with the 'Azm-faction were favored.

Though on the whole the *aghawat* definitely survived the Tanzimat, they must, nonetheless, have felt challenged both by these measures and by the introduction of more imperial troops which achieved noticeably impressive results at least in other parts of Syria. The *aghawat* were, moreover, now forced to compete with each other for a reduced number of para-military commands and a reduced amount of financial resources available for their support. The form the government's efforts at direct rule in the province took were no doubt important to the nature of the *aghawat's* survival and positioning in this period.

The authorities also compromised their policies of direct rule by absorbing local politically-influential persons into the reformed system. As before, the Ottoman government had little choice but to rely on locally-influential persons. It had reoccupied Syria only with external aid and needed the good will of the local population to hold its position. As in the eighteenth century, several factors – such as the rapid turnover of Ottoman high officials and the posting of officials who were often ignorant of local language and conditions, the incapacities and impermanency of the military, and the financial woes of the Empire – continued to limit the Ottomans' strength vis-a-vis local power groupings. It was hoped that locally powerful persons would, as in the past, cooperate with the authorities, legitimize Ottoman authority, control recalcitrant elements and deliver the taxes and conscripts which the government so badly needed.

The Ottomans chose, during the Tanzimat period, to rely not on a particular powerful chieftain or family as it had done in the past. Rather, a number of the city's notable families were chosen to place representatives on a *majlis* (council). Though not entirely an unknown concept in Damascus – earlier governors and the Egyptians had relied on councils (*diwans*) of local notables – the Tanzimat *majlis* was given a formal structure and formally-designated functions. Meeting on a regular basis, the *majlis* dealt formally and decisively with a number of important administrative, financial and judicial affairs.[96] According to imperial orders, it was authorized to assess and farm rural taxes and to rate customs duties. It was to have a hand in supervising agricultural production and the marketing and pricing

93 Wood, 25, August 27, 1851, FO 78/872.

94 *ibid*. For example, the Muradis, close members of the 'Azm-faction. Due to this measure, the family failed to retain the post of *mufti* which they had dominated since the 18th century. See below, 160–165.

95 Wood, 13, May 31, 1845, FO 78/622.

96 For a discussion of the Tanzimat *majlis* system see Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, 87–107.

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of surpluses. Theoretically, it was also the body which registered land transactions, managed public works, controlled the duration of foreigners' visits in the province, recruited irregular troops for particular actions, investigated disputes and outbreaks and confirmed appointments in the districts.[97] The decisions of the *majlis* were formulated and made public in the form of written *madbatas* (or protocols) without which the governor would have difficulty in taking action.[98] Though the governor could dismiss and harass members of the *majlis* who obstructed his plans,[99] the *majlis* was nonetheless a clear advance over arbitrary governatorial rule in that it presented at least the opportunity for open discussion and the exposure of local, private and factional interests.

It is not yet possible to establish the details of the *majlis*' policy-formation process or its impact. We cannot know how it received each edict sent from Istanbul, how it debated and decided these and the governor's plans or if and when particular factions emerged to dominate the *majlis*. The *majlis* archives are not yet available for study, if they exist at all. We do not even have a register of the *madbatas* which it issued.[100]

Relying on the Arab biographical sources, chronicles and the reports of western observers, however, it is possible to identify at least a good number of the *majlis* members and thereby to place the *majlis* into historical perspective. The membership of the Damascene *majlis* during the years of 1840–1860 included the following:[101]

Ex-officio members:

Hanafi Muftis:	1840–1850:	Husayn al-Muradi (d. 1850)
	1850/51:	'Ali al-Muradi (dates not reported)
	1850/51–1860:	Tahir al-Amidi (d. 1882/83)
Naqibs:	1833/34–1846/47:	'Abd al-Muhsin al-'Ajlani (d. 1847)
	1846/47:	Raghib al-'Ajlani (d. 1846/47)
	1846/47:	Nasib Hamza (d. 1849)
	1846/47–1860:	Ahmad al-'Ajlani (d. 1861)

Appointed members:

'Abdallah al-'Azm (alive in 1860)
'Abdallah Bey al-'Azm (alive in 1860)
'Ali al-'Azm (d. 1879/80)
Muhammad Bey al-'Azma (d. 1904/05)
'Umar al-Ghazzi (d. 1861)
Abu al-Su'ud al-Ghazzi (d. 1865/66)
Muhammad al-Ghazzi (d. 1874/75)

97 *ibid.*, 93f.
98 *ibid.*, 96.
99 *ibid.*
100 The development and impact of the *majlis* cannot be judged on the basis of reports made by European consuls. The latter were neither definitiv nor non-partisan sources. (Compare Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 87–107).
101 The sources of biographical information are cited in the family histories in Chapter VI.

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'Abd al-Hadi al-Faruqi al-'Umari (d. 1865/66)
Ahmad al-Hasibi (d. 1876/77)
Nasib Hamza (d. 1849) (a member also when not holding office of *naqib*)
'Abd al-Qadir Hamza (d. 1862/63)
Mahmud Hamza (d. 1887)
Hasan Taqi al-Din al-Hisni (d. 1847/48)
Raghib al-Hisni (d. 1871/72)
Salih Agha al-Mahayini (d. 1868/69)
Sa'id al-Ustuwani (1822/23–1887/88)
Ahmad al-Maliki (d. 1854)
'Uthman Bey Mardam (d. 1886)
Muhammad al-Jabi (1793/94- 1880/81)

From this list of persons who at one time or another served on the Damascene *majlis*, it can be suggested that the Ottomans drew heavily from notables of both Damascene factions in forming their consultative council. From the 'Azm-connected faction three 'Azms, two Muradis, three Ghazzis, three 'Ajlanis, an 'Umari and a Hasibi were included. From the Maydani faction, four Hamzas, an 'Azma, an Ustuwani, the two Hisnis and a Mahayini. In addition, however, the Ottomans also named a number of persons who had been promoted to important functions as part of Tanzimat policy. These persons (a Mardam, a Jabi and a Maliki) had all been named to newly-created posts and had made their fortunes in the period of economic change during the first half of the 19th century.[102] A fourth group – who do not appear in the Arabic sources but are indicated in the European sources – was formed by the representatives of the minority groups who were placed at least occasionally on the *majlis*.[103]

It may be suggested that the introduction of the *majlis* as a political institution, like the reforms of the Tanzimat in general, presented the Damascene political factions with a number of options. On the one hand, the factions could unite to reject the Tanzimat as they had done to expel the Egyptians, seeing in it the end of a political system they preferred and could at least hope to control. On the other hand, and as the Ottoman promoters of the Tanzimat no doubt most hoped, factionalism could be put to an end through a reorganization of politics to conform

102 See the Mardam family history below, 211–215. The Malikis were a family of north African origin which had held *'ulama'* posts in the city and then advanced during the Egyptian occupation. There most prominent member at this time, Ahmad b. Sulayman al-Maliki, accumulated a great deal of land and, in addition to sitting on the *majlis*, was named to two new Tanzimat posts, director of *awqaf* and overseer of the census. (See Bitar, I, 243–244; Hisni, 873–874; Shatti, *Rawd*, 190–191). Muhammad b. 'Uthman al-Jabi was a religious scholar who earned his living as a merchant. During visits to Istanbul he succeeded in gaining provincial assignments. It is known that in addition to sitting on the *majlis*, he served as *qadi* in Baghdad and Madina during his career. In 1875 he was named *qadi* of Istanbul, a post which, according to the biographer al-Shatti, no Syrian had yet held. (See Hisni, 692–693; Bitar, III, 1347; Shatti, *Rawd*, 207–208).

103 Maoz, *Ottoman Reform*, 198–199; Paton, 34–35.

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to a new administrative system. Notables of both factions were approached individually by the Ottomans in an effort to win them over to the new system. The government's strategy included, as we have seen, challenges to the factions' paramilitary supporters and reforms in the established systems of land holding, but it also encouraged support by extending flattering invitations to Damascene notables to meet top Ottoman officials in the capital[104] and presented opportunities for the acquisition of private land.[105] The Tanzimat fostered a united provincial elite which could play the role of Ottoman proponents in the city in the 19th century much as the 'Azm family and faction had done in the 18th.

A third option opened was the acceptance of the Tanzimat along factional lines. Parodoxically, the Ottomans also encouraged this option in that they, as we have seen, chose Kurdish *aghawat* for tax-farming functions and elevated a number of notables of the Maydani faction to positions of established political authority on the *majlis*. But not only as members of the *majlis* did the Maydanis advance. As we shall see later, the Ottomans also turned to them to fulfil new administrative functions and to fill posts within the top ranks of the '*ulama*' which had, until the start of the Tanzimat, been a preserve of the 'Azm faction.[106] Most remarkable is the fact that no punishment for the revolt of 1831 was ever meted out by the government to the Maydanis.

It is our hypothesis, however, that the economic crises of this period generated the potential for radical political change in Damascus just as much as the measures of the Tanzimat, if not more so. Due to developments in the local economy which included trade and production crises and a serious drain on local capital reserves by the 1850's (both of which we shall discuss in detail in the next chapter),[107] elements of the city's political elite and especially members of the 'Azm faction were obliged to seek new sources of financial backing.[108] At this critical impasse, neither the state nor coastal financiers could compete with the financial resources of Europe.[109]

A number of local economic resources – Syria's silk, its grain and its livestock – were in high demand in Europe. But the export of basic foodstuffs from the interior continued to raise problems of a social and political nature. It is true that the grain trade had already once in the 19th century been organized to meet coastal export demands (under al-Jazzar and during the Napoleonic wars), but the trend had not been sustained. Not only the Ottoman government's fiscal needs but the ever-increasing food needs of the growing local urban populations had inhibited grain and livestock exports. By mid-century, however, with regular

104 See, for example, the biography of Tahir al-Amidi below, 167–168.
105 See the Mardam family history below, 211–215.
106 See the discussion of the Hanafi *ifta'* below, 117–119, 156–169.
107 See below, 62–71, 79–86.
108 Such was the case, for example, of Mustafa Bey al-Hawasili who in 1859 and 1860 obtained the command of most of the city's remaining para-military troops. (Outrey, 117, August 16, 1860, AE ARC/93/4).
109 See below, 70.

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steamship service off the coast, the arrangement of tariffs favoring export, and the coming of the Crimean War and the local trade crisis, pressures to export grain and livestock mounted to fever pitch.

The grain export boom of the mid-1850's was the result. It is, however, not clear who exactly it was who profited from the exports of this period. Not only Damascene and coastal merchants strove to profit from the boom on Mediterranean food, livestock and fodder markets. Hinterland groups such as the beduin, the Druzes and the peasants themselves stood in direct contact with European buyers. The movement of the Lebanese Druzes to the mountains of the Hawran was, for example, especially significant in spreading to the interior knowledge of the grain and livestock trade's potential and of the ways and means of participating in the trade. But the battle for control of rural surpluses did not immediately ensue.[110] It is our theory that in the 1850's the potential of the food export trade was well-enough appreciated and capitalized upon by those who had traditionally been in a position to tap these resources, namely, the Maydanis, for a shift in the balance of political and economic power in Damascus and the Syrian interior generally to take place.

The Maydani *aghawat* and grain dealers clearly held an advantage over the 'Azm faction. While 'Azm faction, inner-city export-import merchants were hardest hit by trade imbalances, they were also the faction with the least export potential. Here, the Maydanis clearly held the trumps with their ties in the Hawran and to the coastal export harbors of Sidon and Acre. Thus the economic crisis took on important local political dimensions. But economic change is subtle and involves decisions on an individual and family level which are not always immediately apparent nor of clear political significance.

In Chapters V and VI we shall discuss the survival of prominent Damascene families of both factions. As will be shown there, it was possible, in many cases for a family to maintain its prosperty and influence when the right economic choices were made. We may hypothesize, moreover, that the resultant local political instability, indecision and flux in the 1850's was intolerable for the numerically-growing constituencies of the elites who vainly sought representation and support in the face of the social problems which the economic crisis had engendered and the rise in food prices was exacerbating. This is the background of the watershed in 19th century Damascene politicial history – the events of 1860 – when a massacre of considerable numbers of one of the city's minority groups provided the Ottoman authorities with the pretext they needed to impose massive state control and to finally reduce local resistance to the Tanzimat to insignificance.

Before taking up the question of economic change and the events of 1860 in detail in the next two chapters, however, it seems of value to summarize here our hypotheses concerning politics in Damascus from the late 18th century until 1860:

110 Serious rural conflict developed into full-scale Ottoman expeditionary wars in the Hawran in the 1860's. See my article "Hauran Conflicts", *op.cit.*

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Since the decline of the 'Azm-familiy from a position of imperial power around the turn of the century, two factions vied for control of the city. The better-established, imperial-oriented 'Azm-connected faction of the central rectangle and northern quarters (with their constituencies of northern para-military groups and inner-city export-import traders, luxury-goods craftsmen and *'ulama'*) had suffered many set-backs. The decline of the 'Azm-family and the growing influence of Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar in Damascus in conjunction with the growth of the coastal trade had emboldened the rival Maydani faction and their localist constituency of southern *aghawat*, the city's poorer workers and semi-urbanized peasants. Al-Jazzar introduced the possibility of diverting Damascene grain to the coast for higher prices. This benefited the Maydanis but endangered the food supply of the inner-city population. It also undermined the economically-based, superior bargaining position which the 'Azm faction had held since the first half of the 18th century.

The Maydanis triumphed over the 'Azm faction in the revolt against the Ottoman governor Salim Pasha in 1831. Their domination of the city was, however, short-lived as the Egyptians (with the support of the 'Azm family) invaded and occupied Syria in 1832, causing the rebellion to crumble. The Egyptians did not, however, restore the 'Azm faction to a dominant position in the city but drew on and favored elements of both the city's factions perhaps out of ignorance, perhaps out of contempt. By the same token, the centralizing and economically-oppressive policies of the Egyptians gradually alienated both factions. Joint or at least parallel actions by Damascenes of both factions contributed to the expulsion of the Egyptians from Syria.

With the restoration of the Ottomans in 1840 and the introduction of the Tanzimat, both factions were challenged by military, administrative and financial reforms. They experienced further attacks on the roots of their power, both military (with the attempts to disband the para-military troops) and economic (with *awqaf* reform, land sales and European economic penetration). While the Maydanis appear to have made some significant advances, on the whole the failure of the city's political elite to make a clear and unified response to the Tanzimat resulted in instability in local politics. Given the growing economic crisis and pressures of a regional and international nature, this instability formed a field for the outbreak of civil strife.

Before closing this chapter, one last event of political importance should be mentioned. In 1855, the Algerian 'national' hero 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri who had been taken captive by the French upon the occupation of Algeria after a long and brutal campaign arrived as an exile in Damascus. He was welcomed and remained in Damascus, the head of a newly-immigrated, sizeable Algerian community, until his death in 1883. In addition to his military record, 'Abd al-Qadir was a man of many attributes and accomplishments. His patrilineage claimed descent from Hasan, the grandson of the Prophet. He was himself well-versed in the Islamic tradition, especially that of the Maliki school, and was a *shaykh* of the Qadiri Sufi order. Upon arriving in Damascus with a large entourage and a sizeable pension from the French government, 'Abd al-Qadir established his economic affairs which

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were to consist largely of grain and livestock interests in the outer supplying to the south and southwest of Damascus. Yet, he chose to live in the northern quarter of Salihiya. He also made many close friends amongst the notables of Damascus of both factions. This extraordinary figure who had advantageous ties to both the Ottomans and the French and who could be associated with any of the city's leading estates – the *aghawat*, the *'ulama'*, the *ashraf* and its richest merchants[111] – was something of an anomaly in Damascene politics and society. He remained, as it were, above the old factional disputes and as a leader represented something of a solution for the city's political dilemma. We will be talking more about 'Abd al-Qadir in coming chapters.

111 The estates are discussed in Chapter V.

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CHAPTER III: ECONOMY

THE EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PENETRATION

This chapter deals with the major force responsible for economic change during this period, European economic penetration and the effects it had on the Damascene economy. Within a general economic framework, the changes described here – in external trade relations, industrial production, grain marketing patterns and control of the Ottoman fiscal system – caused crises and eventually a radical reorientation of the city's political economy. Damascus developed a new social and political order which emerged from the altered pattern of relationships with the Ottomans, the Egyptians, the coastal regions, the Syrian hinterland, and the outside world as a whole. Social divisions within the urban community and between urban and rural inhabitants and majority and minority groups were sharpened.

In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, trade relations with Europe were 'balanced' in the city's foreign trade against areas like Mesopotamia, Persia, Egypt and Arabia.[1] Due to the sectoral hegemony established under the 'Azms, Damascene foreign trade had flourished in the 18th century. This is evidenced by the amount of 18th century stone construction of *suqs* and commercial buildings, especially in the central rectangle, by the success of Damascene merchants in obtaining posts within the Ottoman ruling establishment (posts which were based on wealth) and by the revived vitality of the religious institutions which these merchants patronized.[2]

The 'Azms promoted foreign trade in a number of ways. First they were themselves interested in the success of the trade, having established connections in Egypt and Arabia and having built *khans* and *suqs* to facilitate the trade. They therefore secured trade routes and communications which would further their own trade

1 It is beyond the scope of this study to present more than those features of European economic penetration which had direct relevance to the city of Damascus. For a broader discussion of this topic see: Amir 'Ali al-Hasani, *Ta'rikh Suriya al-iqtisadi*, Damascus, 1343 A.H. (1924/25); I.M., Smilianskaya, "The Disintegration of Feudal Relations in Syria and Lebanon in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century", in C. Issawi, *The Economic History*, 227–247; Dominique Chevallier, "Western Development and Eastern Crisis in the Mid-19th Century: Syria confronted with the European Economy", in W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers, 205–222 and his *Société*; Mohammad Said Kalla, *op.cit.*; L. Schatkowski-Schilcher, "Modellfall"; Charles Issawi, "British Trade and the Rise of Beirut, 1830–1860", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 8 (1977) 91–101; Roger Owen, *op.cit.* See also above, Chapter II, note 7, and further references will be made in the course of the text.

2 See, for example, the 'Azm and Muradi family histories below, 136–144, 160–165.

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interests. Especially important was the pilgrimage trade from which all 'Azm governors as commanders of the pilgrimage could profit. As'ad Pasha al-'Azm, for example, led the *hajj* safely to its destination and back to Damascus during a long series of years. His own trade in the caravan was a year-to-year undertaking with orders made one year and fulfilled in the next.[3]

Secondly, the 'Azms threw in their lot with a group of Damascene merchants and collaborated with them in the foreign trade, sharing in its profits. Here the evidence is often only circumstantial, but nonetheless persuasive: too many of the families who prospered during the 'Azm period had some kind of foreign trade connection, while others whom the 'Azms defeated, represented artisan or hinterland interests.[4]

At the time of the 'Azms' decline around the turn of the century and subsequently, a political struggle between Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar, the governor of the province of Sidon who carried on extensive coastal trade and the 'Azms remained unresolved. As we have seen, a major point of contention was al-Jazzar's aim to control Syrian wheat and export it to the coast.[5] The Napoleonic occupation of Egypt, the Ottoman and British campaigns against him and the subsequent Napoleonic wars in Europe and exhaustion of European agricultural production created high demand for foodstuffs and livestock along the eastern Mediterranean coast.

Following a lull in the 1820's, a new phase in Syria's commercial relations with Europe began in the 1830's when European merchants at Beirut launched great quantities of cheap, industrially-produced textiles on to the Syrian market. Given the good commercial climate of the Egyptian occupation, these gained a hold on the Syrian market and were able to sustain this hold especially after the introduction of regular European steam navigation off the coast of Syria in 1835 and subsequent regular deliveries.

Diplomatic moves were made first by the British, but eventually repeated by most European trading partners to gain tariff agreements with the Ottoman Empire which would facilitate trade penetration. The first of these was the Anglo-Ottoman Trade Agreement of 1838. According to the terms of this treaty, all trade monopolies were lifted, British merchants were permitted to buy goods anywhere in the Ottoman Empire, imported goods would be taxed only 5% while exports were to be taxed 12% and transited goods 3%. Soon, other European countries acceded to the agreement.[6] These treaties were, for the time being, the

3 Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*, 166. At the time of the French invasion of Syria, Napoleon's sources informed him that the Damascene pilgrimage cost the *pasha* some 7,000,000 but that he earned much more on it. (Wencker-Wilberg, V, 16.)

4 In the first group one could place families like the Muradis, 'Ajlanis, Kaylanis, Barudis and Safarjalanis. In the second, the Falaqinsis, Turkumanis, Hamzas and possibly the Ustuwanis. See the respective family histories in Chapter VI.

5 See above, 36–39.

6 The text of the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Trade Agreement is reproduced in Issawi *Economic History*, 39–40.

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"sufficient political function of [the] process of integrating new regions into the expanding [European] economies", which had been described as an imperialism of free trade. Areas of the Ottoman Empire like Syria fell into the sphere of European-controlled economic activities, becoming part of their "informal empires," as long as more direct political action was thought unrewarding and/or unnecessary.[7] The first signs of what was to be a recurring imbalance in trade between Syria and Europe for the remainder of the 19th century emerged by the 1840's, playing havoc with the local mercantile community and engendering widespread reorganization of the Syrian economy.[8]

In Damascus, difficulties subsequent and related to this new phase of commercial relations with Europe can be grouped into four complexes:

- Imbalances in foreign trade leading to a depletion of local reserves and a turning to European capital
- Crises in the local textile industry
- Growing reliance on Syrian grain as an exportable commodity
- Reliance on the capital of European protégés for Ottoman provincial financing.

We shall look at each of these in turn.

Imbalances in foreign trade leading to a depletion of local reserves and a turning to European capital

During the 1830's Damascene export-import merchants at first held their own in the European trade by transiting the goods to destinations further east, south and north, much as they had always done. In fact, the receptivity of these markets for European goods was one of the chief reasons why the European import trade did so well. Trade reports show that during the 1830's the Baghdad trade for one was booming. More than two million Francs worth of goods were in 1833 exported from Damascus to Baghdad and over $4\frac{1}{2}$ million Francs worth of goods imported to Damascus from Baghdad.[9] Moreover, Damascene trade with other points, such as Beirut, Tripoli, or Egypt, dealt heavily in goods brought from Baghdad. Two or three times a year, caravans of normally 100 to 1500 camels would cross the desert via Palmyra to Baghdad. An especially large caravan in 1835 consisted of 6000 camels.[10]

7 See J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade", in Economic History Review, 2nd Series, VI, No. 1 (1953), 5–11.

8 For estimates of Syria's trade balance see: Kalla, 32 and Appendix I, Table I; Chevallier, *La Société*, 192ff. Not only the fact that Syria's balance of trade remained chronically negative for the remainder of the 19th century and after is important. It was the pattern in which deficits were settled, leading to a reorganization of banking practices and a redistribution of capital resources both geographically and socially which had important social and political consequences.

9 MacGregor, "Syria and Palestine", *Commercial Tariffs and Regulations of the Several States of Europe and America*, VIII: Ottoman Empire (London, 1843).

10 Henri Guys, *Esquisse de l'état politique et commercial de la Syrie*, Paris, 1862.

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The Bowring report commissioned by the British government names a number of Muslim and Christian merchants and estimates the extent of their capital.[11] The names were, unfortunately, not carefully transliterated and sometimes given in an incomplete form. Nonetheless, one can, by the process of elimination within a larger sample of names, make an educated guess at who these persons could have been. Amongst the Muslim merchants there were eight firms believed to have a capital exceeding a million piasters. Three of these are named: "Hadji Hussein Chertifchi" (whom I cannot, definitely identify[12]) was said to have a capital of two to two and a half million piasters. "Abderrachman Ashim" who is most probably Hashim ibn 'Abdal-Rahman al-Taji[13] and "Mahomet Said Agha Bagdadi", who is most probably Muhammad Sa'id al-Ouwwatli,[14] were both assumed to have a capital of between $1\frac{1}{2}$ and 2 million piasters. Unfortunately, the other five Muslim merchants with over a million piasters capital were not named. All of these, however, and more than 50 more Muslim merchants were, already at this time (i.e. 1838), trading with Europe. The smaller Muslim firms traded with Constantinople and Smyrna; the larger firms with Europe and Baghdad. Others were engaged in the Egyptian trade, one or two with the Hijaz of Arabia and a few with towns in Palestine. One of the largest firms had established itself in trade as far as India.[15]

Amongst the Christian merchants, twenty-nine were engaged in the foreign trade. The wealthiest by far amongst them was said to be Hanna Hanouri.[16] His capital was estimated at between one and a half to two million piasters. Not only Hanna but a number of other members of the 'Hanouri' family[17] were amongst the most wealthy Christian merchants.[18] Unfortunately, no other Christian merchants are named. These families were all engaged in the European trade, and especially in that with Great Britain. No mention is made of their trade within Syria or the Ottoman Empire, so we might assume that they were chiefly importers of European goods which they distributed or retailed locally.

Amongst the Jewish merchants of Damascus, twenty-four firms were engaged in foreign trade, and nine of these had capital of between a million and a million and a half piasters. Two of these, Mourad (Murad) Farhi and Nassim (Nasim) Farhi (of a family which has previously been mentioned in connection with financiers in Acre)[19] each had a capital exceeding a million and a half piasters engaged

11 Bowring, 94.

12 But the most logical guess would be *al-sayyid* Husayn al-Muradi, the contemporary *mufti* whose family held several *khans* in Damascus. See the Muradi family history in Chapter VI.

13 See Bitar, III, 1575–1576; Hisni, 699.

14 Hisni, 861–862; Outrey, 103, Oct. 31, 1860, AEPol/6; Wrench, 12, April 19, 1861, FO. 195/677.

15 Bowring, 94. These may have been the 'Umaris. (See below 180–181).

16 *ibid.*

17 This is the 'Anhuri family. See Khayr al-Din al-Zirikli, *al-A'lam,* Beirut, 1969, III, p. 178; Guillois, 9, March 6, 1889, AEPol/15; Paton, 200.

18 Bowring, 94.

19 See above, 42.

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in trade.[20] The Jewish merchants dealt mostly in the trade with Great Britain. It appears that they, like the Christians, were mainly importers of goods for local distribution and retailing.

It seems reasonable to assume that these merchants were the mercantile bankers of Damascus as there were no "banks" in the European sense in the city. Rather, trade was handled by anyone with a good credit standing and a system of negotiated rather than cash payments functioned at all levels of the economy. Large-scale and long-range negotiations took place amongst the merchants in the *khans* and the reception halls (*salamliks*) of the great households. The large portion of these were built in the central rectangle and were easily accessible from the markets. (See Figure 4.) At the time of Bowring, for example, only the large-scale Baghdadi merchants appear to have had ready cash for trade and investment.[21]

The business of the *suqs* was not always a cash and carry affair between buyers and sellers. Each shop had a clientèle formed as much by factors of kinship, neighborhood ties, ethnic or religious solidarity as by competition in the selection, quality or prices of the goods offered. In many cases, moreover, a given shop may actually have been designated to the shopper by a third party. In the case of the peasants, for example, harvested crops were brought to Damascus as payment to creditors. These surpluses were negotiated for new capital or consumer goods and liquidated in the *suqs*. These arrangements were facilitated by a system of negotiations, formalized by the presence of a witness or the signing of a note. The limited number of persons compensated in cash (for example industrial workers and soldiers, who received wages of between 3 and 15 piasters a day)[22] meant that little more than daily necessities could have been bought with cash. More costly items were 'bought' by negotiating for goods and credits with one's clients or creditors. For their part, the shopkeepers often relied on their creditors – a wholesaler, a money-lender, or a negotiant – to steer a customer in their direction. In this way a type of cashless exchange between shoppers an shopkeepers took place by means of which debits and credits with third parties were settled.

There were of course the so-called 'bankers' (*sarraf*) who specialized in negotiating notes. Most of these were members of the Christian and Jewish minority communities. Though these may have paid interest on money left in their hands, for the most part they discounted rather than paid accrued interests, and the notes were further negotiated. It is hard to imagine that these money changers and lenders kept large sums of capital with them in their shops in the *suqs* where they would have been poorly protected during the day and to and from which they would have been unlikely to carry it each morning and evening. The finances which

20 *ibid.* For more material on members of the Farhi family see: *Mudhakkirat tarikhiya* 24–25; Paton, 39–40; Tresse, *Le Pélerinage Syrien*, Paris, 1937, 111; Hecquard, 26, Dec. 10, 1863, AEPol/8.

21 Bowring, 92.

22 Ottoman soldiers in Damascus were often paid not in cash but in *hawalas* or government vouchers which were also negotiated in the Damascene *suq*.

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they handled were more likely to be in the form of short-term, small-scale and quickly-moving negotiable notes. The situation in Damascus was probably similar to that in Aleppo at this time, about which the European banker Mr. Farley wrote with the usual mixture of European wonder and disdain:

> The seraff system is the most absurd thing in the world. About ten or twelve seraffs, mostly without capital of their own, hold all the cash of the merchants, and issue cheques, nominally payable at sight, but rarely paid at all except by an exchanging of cheques with other seraffs, and when paid in cash, or even at 15 or 20 days after sight, a discount of at least two per cent is charged. These people thus rule the trade of Aleppo by an unsound system of credit, a currency unrepresented by security, while they carry on all sorts of illicit traffic, usury, etc., for their own advantage, with the money belonging to the merchants, to whom they pay no interest and offer no guarantee. I do not mean to say anything against a system of bank cheques, which is excellent; but let it be a solid system, such as a regular bank would establish to its own greater advantage and that of trade, acting and re-acting on each other.[23]

Mr. Farley hoped, of course, to introduce his bank soon into the country.

The real wealth of Damascus was no doubt hidden away in the *harims* of the great households of the Muslim notables and possibly in the convents and monasteries of the Christians. According to Muslim tradition, for example, savings were not properly invested merely to win interest but put to work in business with 'real' results and benefits. Thus legitimate fields of investment were in agriculture, industry or trade. The *sarrafs* negotiated this wealth and were, therefore, really only front-men.[24]

What savings a shopkeeper or worker might wish to set aside were properly left not with a *sarraf* but in the safe-keeping (*amana*)[25] of a trustworthy and relatively prosperous person known to undertake this service.[26] Relying on the integrity of the members of a great household, a depositor demanded neither that a note be written nor that a witness be present when the deposit was made. Should the head of a great household die, it was sufficient for the depositor to make his claim known to the next of kin to retrieve his deposit.

Due to this highly-personalized and complicated system of banking and mercantile negotiation, a crisis in the trade of a particular Damascene family could

23 J.L. Farley, *Modern Turkey*, London, 1866, 221f.

24 Porter (I, 147) noted the connection between the Jews of Damascus and the Ottoman officials and Muslim merchants. Rafa'il Farhi was officially appointed financier for the Maydanis under the tenure of Sulayman Pasha in the early 19th century. (See *Mudhakkirat tarikhiya*, 242–243). It is also interesting to note that 'Abdallah Bek al-'Azm rescued the Christians of the precious metals *suq* (*suq al-suyyagh*) during the events of 1860 (*Kitab al-ahzan*, an anonymous chronicle, American University of Beirut manuscript collection No. 956.9 K 62 KA, 1864, 97). For similar arrangements in Aleppo, see Barker, I, 141.

25 A chronicler referred to those who practiced *amana* as "*amanji*" (see *Mudhakkirat tarikhiya*, 36); J. Schacht (*Introduction to Islamic Law*, Oxford, 1964, 156–157) discusses these practices.

26 In the biographies of Muhammad Lutfi al-Qudsi of the well-known banking family (see Hisni, 890–891) and Shaykh Hasan ibn Ibrahim al-Bitar (see Bitar, I, 463–475), the term *amana* is used. This may be an indication that they provided this form of banking service.

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have repercussions throughout the mercantile community and the economy as a whole similar to the effect of a bank failure in contemporary European societies.

Serious financial difficulties first hit the Damascene mercantile community with the end of the Egyptian occupation. Thereafter, caravans to Baghdad could not securely cross directly via Palmyra but were obliged to extend the time and expense of their journey by re-routing via Aleppo. The cost of goods consequently rose in the 1840's at a time when other negative factors came into play. For one, a slow drain on exchangeable items, hard currency and precious metals was leading to a situation whereby Damascus and its trading partners further inland could no longer pay for the European goods purchased. The local merchants were not in a position to raise the hard currency European merchants demanded, and the European merchants were unwilling to participate in local credit and exchange practices as described above.

Paton, who visited Damascus at this time, related the following conversation in the Khan of As'as Pasha al-'Azm:

> "Money becomes scarcer every year", said one of the merchants: "the importations of British manufactures have increased frightfully; while you undersell the native Damascus manufactures, you won't take our produce in exchange, and this cuts like a two-edged sword, for it drains the country of gold".[27]

Demonetarization in Syria was indeed becoming a serious hindrance to European trade expansion. It was reported in Beirut that vessels which had initially returned from Syria with specie to pay for the European goods, soon also transported away hard metals, household valuables and even jewelry. By the 1840's, there was not much left and the trade threatened to come to a halt.[28] The obvious solution to the problem was to promote Syrian exports:

> "The balance of trade could easily be redressed by Timback", said an old Baghdad merchant smiling: "every lady in Syria wears some article of British manufacture; now if every lady in England were to return the compliment by smoking a little Timback, we could pay for our women's dresses with produce, and the exchange on England would fall to its natural level!"[29]

Though the Europeans were not particularly interested in *tumbak*, a kind of tobacco used in water-pipes, they were interested in some other local raw materials. While foodstuffs were not presently in demand, industrial raw materials were. In the past, Palestinian cotton had been a major item of local export to Europe, but with the advent of industrial spinning of cotton in America and Egypt, the Palestinian thread was no longer competitive. It was silk which attracted European interest at this time, and as Paton suggested to the Damascene merchants:

27 Paton, 14.
28 See Chevallier, *Société*, 84f.
29 Paton, 14.

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"Make your silk short reel instead of long reel," said I, "and we will take more than your mulberries can produce. Then you cannot expect us to take the bad cotton of Syria, when we can get the good cotton of Egypt and America".[30]

It was in fact about that time that French entrepreneurs began to modernize the silk production and spinning industry of Lebanon with the intention of exporting Lebanese silk to France.[31] They did very well. French capitalists coming from Egypt bought land in the Lebanese mountains and founded there machine-run spinning factories. At first, imported machines and French workers were employed, but Lebanese were soon employed in the factories. Some English entrepreneurs followed the French initiative and by 1847 even five Lebanese-run factories had been opened.

Not until the early 1850's was export established on a significant, regular and profitable basis. In 1853 the export level rose from the 1832–1852 average of 2,800,000 Francs to 4,600,000 Francs. In 1854, 8,000,000 Francs worth of silk were exported, and by 1856 the export had surpassed 10,000,000 Francs worth. The chief destination for Lebanese silk was Lyon. This gave the French entrepreneurs the opportunity to dominate the Lebanese silk trade, if not in spinning which the Lebanese took over, then in tooling the factories, transport and marketing.

With the successful export to Europe of at least one Syrian commodity, the chances for trade revival were improved. Though profits made on silk export were not automatically invested in the import trade, enough confidence was restored in the European trade's future that credits from European shipping companies, merchants and banks were extended to facilitate further import. Beiruti firms benefited particularly from the newly-restored commercial climate, grew and extended their sphere of activities into the interior to older trading entrepots like Damascus.[32]

A rise in the receptivity for those involved in the European trade took place in the 1830's through 1850's. Whereas Robinson, who visited Damascus in 1830, wrote:

Except at the Khan of As'ad Pasha [of the 'Azm family] where an European would be exposed to insult, there is no other place to alight at in Damascus than the Franciscan convent of Terra Santa,[33]

an anonymous French visitor in 1860 wrote that his contact, the Christian merchant called Joseph, actually resided at Khan As'ad Pasha where he used to meet him.[34]

Contemporary political events in Syria also promoted the European trade. In the initial phase, the relatively pro-European Egyptian occupation of Syria in the 1830's gave the European merchants courage to probe Syria's interior markets.[35]

30 *ibid.*
31 The discussion of the silk industry here is drawn from Chevallier, *La Société*, 210–242.
32 See Polk, 163; Chevallier 185–186; Issawi, "British Trade", *op.cit.*
33 Robinson, 138.
34 Ct. de Paris, 29.
35 See Polk, 160–173.

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Ibrahim's ally Amir Bashir Shihab of Lebanon provided a certain shelter for Beirut as a European trading and distribution center.[36] Then there was re-concentration of much of Syria's trading community at Beirut following the sectarian conflicts of the 1850's and especially after the Damascene massacres of 1860.[37] These conflicts resulted moreover in direct European intervention and military occupation which, though geographically limited and short-lived, gave a great impetus to the European-oriented trade.[38]

Once launched, the European goods import trade was sustained by ever-increasing local demand and, to a significant extent, a local marketing network. This was especially the case for British goods. The British boom was first handled by British merchants. However, and as we have already seen, Syrian merchants very early began taking up the trade. They were content with lower profit margins and managed to operate more effectively on much less capital.[39] According to the dismayed British consular representatives, the British merchant was handicapped by his inability to bargain, speculate, discount and bribe as effectively as the Syrians.[40] Moreover, the Syrian merchant went about his working day in a way most Europeans felt they could hardly tolerate. As the British Consul General wrote:

> The native merchant quits his dwelling at early dawn, and betakes himself to his store, where he remains until sunset; he then repairs to the café where traders congregate, where he hears the news of the city, the gossip of the petty traders, and the condition of the markets throughout the country, and thus picks up many useful hints, which he applies to his own profit. In fact, his life is wedded to his business, and he thinks of, and takes interest in nothing else.[41]

36 See Chevallier, *Société*, 185–186.

37 In 1862 the British Consul wrote of the "surprising progress" of Beirut, the rise in its population and prosperity and the concentration there of a large European mercantile community. In comparison, he reported that the previously important distribution centers of Damascus, Zahle, Hasbayya and Dayr al-Qamar were suffering from the loss of a large part of their mercantile communities (see GBPP, LXX (1863), 488–5517). Though Beirut recovered from the events of 1860 rather quickly, the other towns remained back-waters as far as the European trading community was concerned. In 1870, the British Consul wrote from Damascus that only twenty Europeans remained resident and that they were "supplied at great expense" from Beirut (see GBPP, LXII (1872), 393–398). In comparison Beirut had over 4000 European residents at that time (see GBPP, LX (1872), 155–161). Sie also GBPP, LVIII (1872), 863–868 and LXVII (1874), 978–980. See also below, 106.

38 Not only the troops' presence but also large European donations to aid the refugees congregated at Beirut stimulated trade (see GBPP, LXX, (1863), 448–551).

39 For European outrage concerning the bankruptcy proceedings which sustained the native merchants, see GBPP, LXVIII, (1874), 40–44.

40 British Vice Consul Jago wrote: "The competition of the native has driven the Englishmen off the field. Equal if not greater facilities given by the home manufacturer, cheaper modes of living, and consequent requirement of a smaller profit, looser ways of doing business in many instances, have all combined in the face of the increased import trade with Great Britain, to enable the native to compete successfully with the Englishman." (GBPP, LVIII, (1872), 842–863.)

41 GBPP, LXVIII, (1874), 40–44. Things do not appear to have changed as the period went on. British Consular Assistant Hallward wrote in 1893: "Rigidly strict office hours,

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By 1871, the Consul General at Beirut reported that foreign enterprises had largely been replaced and were gradually disappearing. Five English firms remained at Beirut; none in Damascus or Aleppo.[42] In 1873, only one British firm remained at Beirut.[43] The pattern was further reinforced from the 1870's onwards as many Syrian merchants settled in Manchester and London where they effectively operated as intermediaries between British manufacturers and Syrian importers.[44]

The European import trade may have revived in and through Beirut, but the slump continued as far as Damascene merchants were concerned as long as transiting possibilities remained poor.[45] The Baghdad trade had its ups and downs. By the late 1840's four caravans a year usually made the direct journey, representing a total yearly trade of £ 120,000 to £ 160,000.[46] In 1850, for example, a caravan of 4000–4500 camel loads of *mainly* tobacco arrived in Damascus; the Damascenes returned 2000 loads to Baghdad.[47] But in 1857, the direct July caravan was plundered of nearly its entire load of 5,000,000 TP worth of merchandise.[48] In 1858, one Baghdad to Damascus caravan succeeded in crossing directly without incident, but this had only 400 camel loads of tobacco. The remainder of the caravan had turned away to take the safer Aleppo route at a cost of nearly 50% more for transport. It arrived two months later with 1600 loads worth of tobacco, carpets, *kufiyas* and water pipes worth nearly 10,000,000 TP. 1000 camels were returned to Baghdad that year with 1,200,000 francs worth of goods.[49]

With a constant trade deficit but the hope of trade improvement, European capital became important in Syrian commerce and industry already in the 1840's. For the most part this was facilitated through European commercial undertakings and shipping companies. The European capital inflow continued into the 1850's and in 1857, the first European bank in the area – the Ottoman Bank, at this time a British establishment – placed a branch at Beirut.

with intervals for lunch are not observed by native traders, and fixed prices are almost unknown; neither buyer nor seller has the slightest belief in the principle of 'time is money', on the contrary, they enjoy having long discussions over a bargain, and the smallest purchase often calls forth an ingenuity in argument worthy of an accomplished diplomatist". (GBPP, XCVII, (1893), 399–415.) One is here reminded of Wetzstein's descriptions of Damascene business dealings in the 1850's. Then the rule was that if both the buyer and seller were Shafi'is, their bargain was invalid unless both their brows showed signs of perspiration. (Wetzstein, 501–505.)

42 GBPP, LVIII (1872), 842–863.

43 GBPP, LXVIII (1874), 40–44.

44 According to the unpublished research of H.M. Nahmad, Syrians of all religious sects are known to have left Damascus, Beirut and other Syrian towns to settle in England at this time. See also Verney and Dambmann, 502.

45 See my article, "Modellfall".

46 Sandwith, 4, Feb. 25, 1862, FO. 195/724.

47 Rogier, July 9, 1863, AECom/4.

48 Outrey, 27, May 3, 1859, AECom/4; Sandwith, 4, Feb. 25, 1862, FO. 195/724; (Anonymous), *Rambles in the Deserts of Syria*, London, 1864, 157.

49 Sandwith, *loc. cit.*

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It is, unfortunately, impossible to calculate just how much European capital was coming into the area at this time. Trade figures for the period are too unreliable and the diffuse nature of other capital resources makes it difficult to estimate their relative importance. It seems safe to say, however, that, given the difficulties which the local economy was experiencing, these new capital resources were of considerable relative importance. In addition the European capital entering the area enjoyed relatively advantageous terms. The superior facilities afforded to those dealing in European-associated activities, ranged from effective consular representation to easier and longer terms of credit. European currencies quickly replaced the debased Ottoman currencies, European commercial paper in itself became a kind of currency even in purely local commercial dealings, and European capital made its way into many types of local money-lending.[50]

The Damascene merchants interested in continuing in the European import trade were obliged to rely on bills of exchange negotiated in Beirut. Merchants who did so were called "*mal al-fatura*" merchants.[51] Though one might assume that Damascene Christian and Jewish merchants and especially those amongst them who had gained the protection of a European consulate – the so-called protégés – would have dominated in this trade, at least some Muslims called themselves *mal fatura* merchants at this time.[52]

With the shortage of specie, deficits in all Damascene trade, even that with Baghdad, were paid with bills of exchange on European commercial establishments. The French consul Outrey concluded in 1860 that the Damascene balance of trade remained negative, obliging most Damascene merchants to rely on credits from Beiruti firms. He estimated that even with the Baghdad and interior trade

50 European money-lending to the provincial treasury will be discussed shortly.

51 This term is probably from the Arabic *mal* or fund and the Italian *fattura* or invoice. Combined, the words may have referred to the trade in European goods which was facilitated by bills of exchange and other European commercial paper. Since this trade was nearly always in European manufactured goods, it is not surprising that the commercial usuage "*mal al-fatura*" was later equated with "manifattura". See L. Massignon, "Pour une sociologie du travail en Islam", *Opera Minora,* Paris, 1953, 432.

In his study, Kalla found that, before the operations of the Ottoman Bank were established in Aleppo, bills of exchange were bought at Beirut, Alexandria and Smyrna in many cases not by those requiring to remit money overseas, but by a class of "interlopers in trade" who derived a large profit from this unprecedented line of business in large commercial cities. This may have been the *mal al-fatura* trade. Or, it may have been another financial arrangement also described by Kalla: "In order to meet bills arriving at maturity, especially if presented through a bank, import merchants frequently deposited goods with the Imperial Ottoman Bank branches in Beirut or Aleppo and obtained advances of 75 per cent of their value. This method of obtaining credit on warehouse receipts was much practiced by the large importers of Manchester cotton goods and yarns. Importers of copper, Austrian and Russian sugar, jute sacks and petroleum also availed themselves very largely of this financial facility, which materially assisted the development of trade." (Kalla, 131.)

52 Hisni, 818.

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considered, Damascus had a trade deficit in early 1860 of nearly 5,000,000 francs, with exports valued at 10,418,000 francs and imports at 15,318,250 francs.[53]

Crises in the local textile industry

The slump in Damascene mercantile profits was contemporaneous with a decline in the local production of textiles. Amongst the industries of Damascus, the production of textiles employed the most workers and produced the greatest value of goods. In the late 1830's this industry produced nearly £1,000,000 worth of textiles annually. At that time there were 4000 looms weaving cloths of silk or silk and cotton mixed, and about 400 weaving pure cotton cloth. From the figures given, one can calculate that about 5,320,000 square meters of silk cloth and about 851,200 square meters of cotton cloth were being produced annually. This amounted to a value of £800,000 to £900,000 worth of silk and £32,000 worth of cottons.[54]

Difficulties for the local textile industry sprung directly from the heavy importation of industrially-woven cotton cloth. Since local merchants took up any good regardless of its origin and favored those which they could most easily and most profitably sell, the local cloths consequently had difficulty in coping with the European competition. Besides the novelty of the imported cloths and their cheapness compared to the local hand-woven goods, they also had tariff advantages which had been gained by European trade negotiators in Istanbul.[55] While, for example, European cloths were charged a well-supervised, single tariff at the port of entry and no further internal tariffs, local cloths were subjected to a number of legal and 'informal' internal tariffs at several stages of their production, the total of which exceeded the single tariff on European imports.[56]

Secondly, the important raw silk supply of the Lebanon was threatened as the silk spinning industry there was being reoriented for export to France. Consequently, raw silk prices on the local market more than doubled in the period 1840 through 1860, further driving up local production costs.[57]

A third complication arose when some branches of the textile industry adapted their production to the use of imported English cotton yarns and others did not. Though this trend began in the 1830's, its negative effects were first apparent beginning in the 1840's when the general commercial crisis set in.

The early 19th century Damascene textile industry was directed by entrepreneurs who commissioned production as a commercial undertaking. The Bowring Report offered the following information about these entrepreneurs in the 1830's:

53 Outrey, 32, Jan. 10, 1860, AECom/4.
54 Bowring, 94; MacGregor, 148.
55 See above, 61.
56 Outrey, 32, Jan. 10, 1860, AECom/4.
57 Outrey, *loc. cit.*

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Engaged in the stuff manufactures of Damascus are 14 Mahomedans; their capital varies from £ 200 to £ 1,200, and the whole amount engaged is from 600,000 to 750,000 piastres giving on an average from £ 400 to £ 500. The two most opulent of these manufactures are dervishes [Sufis?].

No less than 45 Christian establishments are manufacturers of Damascus stuffs. Their total capital is from 1,100,000 to 1,500,000 piastres or an average from £220 to £335. The largest capitalists among them possess about £1000; but there are many petty manufacturers the extent of whose means does not exceed from £50 to £60.[58]

It may have been possible for roughly sixty entrepreneurs to organize the work of nearly four and a half thousand looms and workers. But even this would have been surprising since, as far as we know, not many large work-shops existed in Damascus at this time, and certainly not dozens with 70 or more looms, the average per entrepreneur at the ratio mentioned. The sum of £20,000 which would be the total capital involved according to the report is even more surprising. Not only would this sum have failed to cover labour costs which can be calculated at between £90,000 and £100,000 from figures given by MacGregor,[59] but it would indicate that a 50-fold return on investment was being made by these entrepreneurs.

A likely explanation for this apparent discrepancy is that these sixty entrepreneurs were persons who specialized in textile production while there were others who employed only part of their assests in this industry. The sixty were the hard core around and through which commercial investment on a much larger scale took place. Their own capital may have been limited to the value of the looms, or the rents they paid for their workshops and their production components.

The greater portion of entrepreneurial investment in Damascene textiles most probably came from the merchants involved in the long-distance inland trade, especially that with Baghdad and Egypt where Damascene silks found good markets. This was certainly the case with Hanna ʿAnḥūrī who, besides being the richest Christian merchant, was one of the most important textile manufacturers.[61] Other export merchants like ʿAbd al-Rahman Hashim [al-Taji?] or Muhammad Saʿid Agha [al-Quwwatli?] or Murad and Nasim Farhi each had nearly as much capital at their disposal as the 60 manufacturing entrepreneurs mentioned by Bowring combined. These, as most of the larger foreign merchants, also traded with Europe. They had then the possibility not only of selling Damascene wares but of supplying raw materials bought in the in-coming trade. Raw silk was supplied partially from Persia through the Baghdad caravan, cotton yarn was, as will shortly be discussed, increasingly supplied by England through the trade via Beirut.

With the aid of a study done by R.J. Joseph,[62] the organization of the textile trade can be further probed. Joseph reports that entrepreneurs were generally

58 Bowring, 94.

59 MacGregor, 53.

60 In the late 1850's silk workshops paid an average rent of only $51\frac{1}{2}$ TP per year and an average tax of only 6 TP per year. Under the Egyptians, however, the latter was reported as high as 300 TP per loom (MacGregor, 129).

61 MacGregor, 147.

62 R.J. Joseph, *The Material Origins of the Lebanese Conflict of 1860,* unpublished B. Litt.

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called *muqaddim kar,*[63] the term used for people who provided employment in the textile industry. The *muqaddim kar* usually owned the premises where work was carried out as well as the necessary implements. He provided the craftsmen with these on a rental basis. The *muqaddim kar's* role was to coordinate the productive processes and to take the risks involved in purchasing raw materials and selling the finished products.

One of the chief items of local production was a mixed-thread cloth called *alaja.* This was a white, black or coloured cloth in which the warp was of silk and the weft of cotton. It was marketed in Syria and along the trade routes of the interior and was one of the chief earners for local merchants. As Joseph explains, a *muqaddim kar* in this trade was often the *alaja* merchant (*alajati*) also. The function of *muqaddim kar* and *alajati* was probably reduced into a single hand when profit margins were too small to support both. When the trade was booming, on the other hand, the two were again likely to be clearly distinct. The *muqaddim kar* or *alajati* provided the reeler (*kabbab*) with silk, transferred the reeled silk to the twister (*fattal*) and to the thread measurer-cutter (*musaddi*). He paid these workers, and if he had not invested his own capital but that of an eventual customer, just under one quarter of the new value of the processed silk yarn was considered his, after which either he or the eventual customer would put the yarn through the further steps in the production process.

The next stage included the work of the dyer (*sabbagh*) which was carried out at various locations according to the colour required, the disentangler-mender (*muzayyik*), and the loom-mounter (*mulqi*). The last performed only the arrangement of the silk warp whereupon the weaver (*ha'ik* or *nassaj*) wove the cotton weft. The weaver cut, washed and starched the cloth and returned it to the *alajati* or *muqaddim kar.* Before the cloth was finally ready for sale, it would be taken to the *daqqaq* for pounding up its sheen.

Until the 1820's, the cotton weft of the *alaja* yarn had been supplied by the local cotton spinning industry carried on by the peasantry or by one of the 14 French cotton spinning factories established at Sidon.[64] At some point during the Egyptian occupation and the 'opening' of Damascus to European trade, English-spun cotton yarn was introduced into *alaja* production. Unfortunately, nothing can be said concerning the identity of the *muqaddim kars* and *alajatis* who took this step.

The *alaja* produced from English-spun yarn and local silk was one of the few Damascene textiles which remained competitive in the 1840's and 1850's. When the imported cotton cloths had been a while on the market, the Syrian consumer

thesis, Oxford, 1977, 20f. It should be noted here that Mr. Joseph's description of the organisation of the textile industry was pieced together from material offered in Zafir al-Qasimi (ed.), *Qamus al-sina'at al-Shamiya,* Paris, 1960, a source which was compiled much later in the 19th century.

63 Here *muqaddim* (an Arabic term meaning offerer or giver) is combined with *kar* (a Persian term meaning work, business or profit).

64 Joseph, 58.

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became disillusioned with their durability and demand revived (at least in Damascus) for the local weaves.[65]

In comparison, pure silk cloths and *alaja* using local cotton declined drastically. Whereas 4000 looms had been in operation producing *alaja* and all-cotton *qutni* in the late 1830's,[66] only slightly over 1000 were doing so in the late 1840's.[67] The number of employed textile artisans dropped from 5000 to 1000 in the same period.[68] Muhammad Said Kalla has made an interesting comparison of the relative economic status of textile workers in England and Syria at this time.

> In the 1830's and even in the 1840's the relative price of labour to wheat and food in general was considerably higher in Syria than in Europe .... Food in England was dear; in depopulated Syria[69] labor was the dear factor. While the cost of living, measured in English currency, was three or four times higher in England than in Syria, the hand-loom weaver, who was already on the retreat in England, was earning only 6s a week in England, but 8s to 9s in Damascus. In time, however, food prices in England dropped relatively after the abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846 and later as a result of massive flows of grain and other food staples.... In Syria, wages declined immediately after the introduction of machine-made Manchester cotton goods, while the price of food staples rose under the pressure of rising home and foreign demands. The inevitable squeeze on income resulted in social unrest....[70]

One of the political consequences of these developments was the action taken by Muslim weavers against Greek Catholic loom-mounters early in 1846.[71] At issue was the Greek Catholics' desire to set up the production of *alaja* in the neighboring and largely Muslim quarter of Qaymariya. Though not specifically stated, we can assume that anyone wishing to begin new production of *alaja* at this time could only have done so, economically speaking, with English-spun yarns. It follows that for some reason the Greek Catholics could obtain these while Muslims weavers perhaps could not.

The Muslim workers approached the Ottoman officials to obtain an injunction against the Greek Catholics, forbiding them to work as warpers and to train their sons in this craft. Neither the *majlis* nor the governor 'Ali Pasha would issue such an injunction. Though the Muslim warpers did obtain the support of the governor's *kakhya* Muhammad Sa'id Agha [Shamdin?], the *mushir* Safveti Pasha proposed that their case be taken before the commercial court (*majlis al-tijara*), and he himself supported the Greek Catholics. By decision of the commercial court, the Greek Catholics were permitted to operate. The Muslim warpers had lost their case before a Tanzimat institution which had already in other respects gained a reputation for protecting minority groups' interests.[72]

65 Joseph, 63f.
66 MacGregor, 148.
67 Joseph, 47.
68 *ibid.*; Kalla, 109.
69 It would be more appropriate to say *re*-populating Syria. As the urban population began to grow, the bargaining position of workers was weakened.
70 Kalla, 220.
71 See Joseph, 48–58.
72 Compare Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, 193–199.

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Despite the signs of impending doom for the local textile industry, it is of interest that an Austrian traveller found a booming area of *alaja* production in the Maydan. On a side-avenue, which Kremer referred to as "Hakla" (Huqla) he discovered a large square and an adjoining alley full of work shops producing *alaja* and *'abayas* and many elegant villas which "testified to the prosperity of the people living there."[73] The Maydanis may, as a consequence of their success in grain export, have been able to pay for the English cotton yarn which was essential to the survival of *alaja* production at this time. If so, their success would have stood in sharp contrast to the decline of *alaja* production and the hardships of textile workers in the inner-city.[74]

Growing reliance on Syrian grain as an exportable commodity

In the 1830's small quantities of a number of commodities appeared in Syria's export tables in addition to silk. These were, for the most part, the production of Syria's rural areas. As discussed in Chapter II Syrian grains and livestock had already found a market in the European trade at the time of the Napoleonic wars. Wheat, barley and millet were eventually to compete with silk as Syria's most important export. Later, other plains crops such as beans, peas, lentils and especially sesame were also exported, as well as the produce of oasis and terrace agriculture such as oranges, lemons, pomegrantes, bananas, pistachios, almonds and olive oil. Although attempts to develop cotton as a major export commodity were unsuccessful, some cotton did appear amongst Tripoli's and Latakia's exports, but not until the 1880's. More success was won in the production of tobacco, madder roots, licorice and hemp, but not until the 1880's on a regular basis. Considerable quantities of wool, skins, hides, intestines, live animals, eggs and albumen were also produced or processed for export throughout the period.[75]

In general, however, silk and grain held their position as the two chief exports of Syria, especially in the trade with Europe. At Beirut, for example, the only important export was silk, representing always more than 80% of the total value of exports. At Haifa and Acre, grain rather than silk held the key position. At Tripoli, grain and silk were equally important. Only at Latakia where tobacco was important, and at Jaffa where citrus fruits were important, were the two chief Syrian exports displaced.[76]

73 Kremer, 1855, 21.

74 More about the consequences of these economic changes will be discussed in the next chapter. For a consideration of the survival of Damascene industry after the crisis of 1860, see my "Modellfall" and Owen, 93–94.

75 For more on Syria's export trade at this time see: Kalla, *op.cit.*; my "Modellfall", 491–497.

76 *ibid.*

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The beginning of the grain-export trade is difficult to document. Though it cannot be doubted that Syria exported grains onto Mediterranean markets at the start of the 19th century,[77] it is not yet possible to establish how much grain was involved. The first figures on grain export I have been able to find are those in the British trade reports beginning in the 1840's. From all of Syria and Cyprus only $28\frac{3}{4}$ tons of wheat were exported in 1842.[78] In 1847, an export of only 376 tons of barley and 264 tons of maize took place.[79] In both cases, these were the exports to the United Kingdom alone, but neither the French nor the British trade reports mention exports to any other destination in this period.[80]

In 1849, however, the area exported 3175 tons of wheat, 531 tons of barley, and 1628 tons of maize and millet, again to the United Kingdom[81]. Either reporting techniques had improved or the trade appears to have made a significant breakthrough. Figures available for the early 1850's indicate that an export trend was increasing.

Grain exported from Syria and Palestine to the United Kingdom 1850–1853[82] (in metric tons)

	1850	*1851*	*1851*	*1853*
Wheat	3300	10390	3090	5225
Barley	253	574	696	451
Maize	1435	1828	64	152

The grain export trade then received a tremendous boost by the demand created in the eastern Mediterranean by the Crimean War. This demand was reflected in the spectacular rise in grain prices on world markets. During the early 1850's when Syrian wheat was available on the coast for as little as £5.00/ton,[83] average wheat prices stood in London at £9.36/ton in 1852 and £12.21/ton in 1853.[84] With the

77 For the local reactions to Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar's export policy, see above, 38–40. During the peak of the Napoleonic campaigns wheat became scarcer and scarcer in the interior. The chronicler reported at that time that wheat was not permitted to come to Damascus because the *pasha* in Damascus was diverting grain to the coast. As a consequence, prices on wheat in Damascus trebled despite an average harvest (*Tarikh Hawadith*, 47). See also Polk, 160.

78 GBPP LII (1854–55), 25–34.

79 *ibid.*

80 *ibid.*

81 *ibid.*

82 GBPP 1854–1855, LI, 569.

83 Outrey, 16, June 17, 1857, AECom/4; GBPP 1856, LVII, 137–139; GBPP 1876, LXXV, 1012–1020; E.M. Delbet, "Paysans en communauté et en polygamie de Bousrah", in M. Le Play, *Les Ouvriers de l'Orient* (Tours, 1877), 352; J. Zwiedenek von Sudenhorst, *Syrien und seine Bedeutung für den Welthandel* (Wien, 1873), 25; Rousseau, 34, Feb. 27, 1860, AECom/4.

84 Statistisches Reichsamt (hrsg.), *Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Berlin, 1935, 286.

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outbreak of the Crimean War, the London prices rose to over £15/ton for the next three years.[85]

Syrian grain exporters responded well to the demand. A British trade report estimated the value of the wheat exported from Syria, Palestine and Cyprus in 1855 to be nearly £169,000 and that of millet to be £30,800.[86] Given current prices in the eastern Mediterranean of £8.30/ton for wheat and about half that for millet, these values represented an export of around 20,000 tons of wheat and 7,300 tons of millet, in both cases a doubling over the highest levels reached in 1851.

Syrian grain production had always been an important sector of the local economy. The cities were fed by their hinterlands, the desert by the plain. In addition to that, the Ottomans were interested in Syrian grain production because it represented the chief taxable item produced in Syria and the grains were indispensible for the provisioning of the pilgrimage to Mecca. Grains had been important on yet a third count because they represented the chief item with which local merchants could speculate and profiteer. With the boom on European markets and the Syrian negative trade balance with Europe, grains now became a staple in the European trade.

Different regions in Syria produced different qualities of wheat.[87] Particularly distinctive was Hawrani wheat which was exceptionally hard and high in protein in comparison to the white and mealy variety produced in the near vicinity of Damascus. The Damascene wheat made good flour and was used for bread, but it was low in yield and therefore expensive to produce. Real competition was posed to Damascene wheat by the Hawrani variety of southern Syria which had much higher yields and could be used for a variety of products in addition to bread. So preferable was Hawrani wheat that, if enough of it was available, wheat of the Damascene vicinity was often fed to animals.

A third wheat-growing area was the Homs and Hama plain. Though not quite as high-yielding as the Hawrani variety, the Homs-Hama grain was of good quality. It had the additional advantage that in its region large chalk caverns existed in which the grain could be stored for years with minimal loss. The Homs-Hama grain could be stored up and brought onto the market when demand was likely to bring the best prices.

As at the beginning of the century, it was the Hawrani (and Northern Palestinian) grain which was brought on to the export market in important quantities in the 1850's and 1860's. It appears that the mid-century grain export boom was launched through the existing marketing network. Firestone, in his research on villages around Nablus in northern Palestine,[88] has shown how the drive to export was managed by those persons and families who had always dealt in the grain trade.

85 *ibid.*
86 GBPP LIV (1857–58), 303.
87 Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine*, Paris, 1901, 346.
88 See Ya'akov Firestone, "Production and Trade in an Islamic Context", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6 (1975).

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M. Delbet, a French observer who spent an extended period collecting materials on the Mikdat family of Bosra in the Hawran in 1855, showed that these rural lords organized export quite independently of influence from Damascus or the coast.[89]

At the same time, at least one voice from Damascus complained of the interference by Christians, especially the Christians of Zahle, a town in the Biqa' which normally fell within the 'Azm faction's sphere of influence.

> The Europeans would advance them [i.e. the Christians of Zahle] money for the storage of wheat, barley and other grain, butter, wool, cotton, and whatever else the Europeans needed. They would buy these and send them to Europe, their business being mostly with the French. This was their regular business. In short, they committed everything that was harmful to people. Moreover, so intrepid were they in buying and selling that they reached Baghdad and other sheep-breeding country in search for sheep; and it happened that, from the time they began to trade in sheep, the supply in Syria became short and prices rose.[90]

In Damascus, where the grain trade had often been monopolized by the *pasha*,[91] the support during the Tanzimat given to particular merchants and especially the notables of the Maydan-faction, ran parallel to the grain-export boom. The *aghawat* families of the Maydan may have finally succeeded in exporting grain to which they had access without the interference of the *pasha* thanks to the reforms under the Tanzimat. Direct profits from the grain trade remains the most logical explanation for the immense wealth accumulated by Maydani families like the Nuris, Mahayinis, 'Abids and Sabbaghs already by the 1860's.[92] It is also possible that the Maydanis collaborated in the trade with local Christians, as these had established close ties to the largely French shippers and could gain protection from Ottoman interference through the European consuls.[93]

The export surpluses did not, as we have seen, help the Damascene import merchants of the 1850's to overcome their trade deficits. Nor, as will be discussed next, did it help the provincial treasury in overcoming its financial difficulties. This fact suggests that the new economic order in the city had not yet established itself and that intermediaries (perhaps foreigners, perhaps coastal merchants) were not yet working in the interest of Damascus. It appears that the old rivalries between the Maydanis and the inner-city merchants prohibited the formation of a community of interests which could have remedied the city's economic woes. Only after the events of 1860 and under strong Ottoman pressure was this breach overcome.

89 Delbet, 307.

90 Kamal Salibi, "Shaykh Muhammad Abu Sa'ud al Hasibi and the events of 1860 in Damascus", in Polk and Chambers, *op.cit.*, p. 191. See also Alexa Naff, "Zahleh", Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1976.

91 See, for example, above xxx and this chapter's note 69.

92 See the family histories in Chapter VI. The grain merchant Sabbagh of the Maydan, for example, spent large sums building mosques. (Hisni, 864).

93 See *Kitab al-ahzan*, p. xxx and also below pp. xxx.

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Reliance on the capital of European protégés for Ottoman provincial financing

While European commercial investment appears to have been accepted if not welcomed locally,[94] other types of financial penetration became sources of friction. Direct European investment in land was perhaps the most sensitive area, but this was an issue which did not surface until later in the 1860's.[95] In the 1850's, it was European investment in the accumulating debts of the provincial treasury which became a highly sensitive issue.

Syria's situation at this time was, in fact, a reflection of the increasingly difficult financial situation of the Ottoman Empire as a whole.[96] The first open signs of this appeared at the time of the Crimean War. Until that time the Ottoman government had avoided dependence on European financial resources. The war made this a political and economic necessity. With the European allies' support, a loan of 2,5 million Turkish Lire was arranged in England in 1854 to pay for the Ottoman military effort. A second, similarly arranged loan of £5 million followed in 1855, this time with an expressed guarantee from the British and French governments to the European private creditors.[97] The Sultan's reform edict of 1856 moreover paved the way for, amongst other things, the establishment of European banks within the Ottoman Empire to facilitate economic reform, commerce and agriculture. With a third loan in 1858, taken to support the value of Turkish money, European financial experts were called in to reform the Empire's financial and fiscal systems.

As the Ottomans fell into deeper financial dependence, they had before them three basic alternatives on which to build fiscal policy: they could cut spending, increase revenues or continue to borrow. Attempts to cut spending were never seriously considered by the government, nor did the Empire's European creditors encourage such steps. It was thought preferable that the Empire, using its presumed vast resources as collateral, increase expenditure, especially on projects which would free resources and expedite their exploitation. Thus a combination of the

94 For a list of concessions granted to Europeans for public works projects in Syria see my "Modellfall", 504. An example of local support for European investment in public works projects is that of the Damascene notables' request for European capital to build railways. (See Burton, November 1869, FO. 195/927.)

95 A large amount of evidence of European attempts to obtain land in Syria and the resultant conflicts can be found in the following volumes of the British and French Consular archives: Series FO. 195/994 (1872), 1027 (1873), 1412 (1882), 1480 (1884), 1548 (1886), 1583 (1887), 1683 (1890), 1687 (1890), 1727 (1891), 1801 (1888 and 1893), 2056 (1891 and 1899), 2122 (1902); Series AEPol/7 (1862 and 1863), 8 (1864), 9 (1866), 10 (1872), 14 (1887 and 1888), 17 (1894); Series AECom/5 (1872).

96 Works dealing with the Ottoman Empire's financial situation are cited in Chapter II, note 7.

97 One observer noted that the Ottoman government had accumulated a state debt of 774,000,000 Francs by 1863. Of this 310,000,000 was owed to external creditors to pay for the expenses of the Crimean War. An even larger portion (464,000,000 Francs), however, was owed to creditors within the Empire (Bleibtreu, 114–115.)

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second and third alternative was chosen. If the state could show improvement in revenue-producing sectors of the economy, this would serve as adequate collateral for loans until the time when the Empire's own capital resources were fully developed and fiscal support would no longer be necessary.

In Syria, a similar policy was followed. Despite numerous attempts to introduce an enlightened tax policy,[98] Damascene revenues remained, for the most part, a pool which the imperial fisc could pump dry. Viewed from Syria, it seems hardly an exaggeration to describe Ottoman administration of the second half of the 19th century as being primarily motivated by fiscal necessities. All other administrative policies were secondary to fiscal needs. On several occasions the Syrian treasury was simply bankrupted. Funds had to be borrowed locally until brief relief was sent out.

Ottoman fiscal difficulties never eased either at the Empire or provincial level. In 1894, for example, as much as three-fourths of Damascene provincial revenues were being transferred to the central treasury.[99] The serious Syrian fiscal crisis of 1894–1897 was chiefly due to Istanbul's ill-timed and ever-increasing demands. In 1895, demands were so excessive, that all local salaries had to be suspended[100] and civil employees and higher officials resigned.[101] Another crisis came in 1904 and led to a military rebellion. Unpaid soldiers mutinied and occupied the Umayyad Mosque protesting for their arrears of pay.[102]

During the initial phases of the Empire's financial dependence on Europe, a number of special conditions existed in the province of Damascus. For one, there was the method by which provincial revenues were raised. For all practical purposes provincial taxes were farmed either to the *aghawat,* who collected taxes in the remote areas of the hinterland, or to other wealthy persons, who guaranteed tax returns from Damascene villages and farms nearer to Damascus. The tax-farmers were called *multazims;* their agents, *subashis.* Since the provincial treasury formulated its budget in March, that is before the annual harvest could be forecast with complete certainty, the bidding for tax-farms was a speculative affair in which the greater part of the eventual surpluses would be retained by the tax-farmers, not by the treasury.[103]

The provincial treasury was also undermined by the necessity of borrowing locally to cover expenses. Here the provincial treasurer (*defterdar*) was especially

98 For Ottoman attempts to alter the system of taxation in Syria see M. Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform,* 78–81; S. Shamir, "The Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of Abdulhamid", in W. Polk and R. Chambers, *op.cit.*, 351–381. Further information is available in the reports of the British consular staff found in the following: GBPP LXIV (1973), 178–185; LXIII (1878), 514–517; LXXVIII (1885), 961–964; LXVI (1886), 729–731; LXXXVI (1887), 487–490.

99 Guillois, 11, May 8, 1894, AEPol/17; Eyres, 49, Nov. 3, 1894, FO. 195/1843.

100 Guillois, 29, Dec. 18, 1897, AEPol (Nouvelle Serie) (henceforth abbreviated: AEPolNS). 105/II.

101 Guillois, 51, Dec. 21, 1895, AEPol/17; Duparq, 34, July 15, 1905, AEPolNS 109/VI; Eyres, 7, Feb. 1, 1896, FO. 195/1940.

102 Richards, 32, June 27, 1904, FO. 195/2165.

103 Compare Ma'oz, *op.cit.*, pp. 69–72, 78–81.

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dependent on local wealthy persons. These participated in the bidding for tax-farms either directly or behind front men, discounted the smaller vouchers (*hawalas*) issued to employees and soldiers instead of salaries and put up large credits for the provisioning of military expeditions or for financial transfers on the part of the *pasha* to the central treasury. Without the credits supplied by local wealthy persons, either directly through tax-farming and advances or indirectly by means of discounting *hawalas* for the government's employees, the Ottoman authorities would have been unable to govern the province. Well aware of their dependency, the Ottomans placed the responsibility for organizing and authorizing tax-farming, borrowing and issuing *hawalas* to a select group of notables who sat on the *majlis*.[104]

In the 1840's and 1850's when there was a drain on local capital resources because of the commercial crisis, bidding for tax-farms was probably deflated, forcing the treasury to float short-term loans. In 1840, for example, the *governor* Najib Pasha gathered the *majlis* at the Treasury and asked all to swear on their respective holy books – an indication that not only Muslims were present – to end fiscal corruption. He then attempted to raise a loan of 1000 purses from the merchants of the city and enlisted the support of the *majlis* in assessing taxes in each of the city's quarters.[105]

In 1855, the province defaulted on loans to a number of its creditors.[106] The large amounts of money earned in Syria due to the high level of profitable grain exports during the Crimean War do not appear to have aided the Damascene government in arranging its local finances. In 1857, many creditors withdrew from the field and discounted their bonds to those with more extensive and securer resources.[107] With that, the province began a period of long-term indebtedness and fiscal crisis.

The method of raising local credits for the provincial treasury which evolved to meet this new situation was the following: as before, the province would issue bonds in the form of written contracts between the money-lender and the province's officials (the governor, *defterdar* and *majlis*). The bonds, which were called *sergis* carried a rate of interest, running usually at $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3% per month. If the treasury itself could not repay the loan, a voucher (*hawala, havalé*) would be signed over to the creditor giving him a claim to the revenues of a particular village or district at the coming harvest. The government would then undertake to enforce the collection of this debt by supplying a military escort when the voucher was to be cashed.[108]

104 Guillois, 23, Aug. 11, 1888, AEPol/14; 5, March 9, 1894, AEPol/17; 19, June 15, 1894, AEPol/17; 23, July 2, 1896, AEPol/18; Geofroy, 28, Sept. 15, 1890; Dickson, 12, May 21, 1889, FO. 195/1648; Richards, 60, May 8, 1902, FO. 195/2122; 12, Feb. 10, 1903, FO. 195/2190; *Rambles*, pp. 55–56.

105 *Mudhakkirat tarikhiya*, 246. A similar procedure in 1831 had led to a full-scale revolt. See above, 40–43.

106 Rogers, 35, 8, 1862, FO. 195/727.

107 *ibid.*

108 *ibid.*

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Let us consider who these fiscal creditors were. Private capital invested in money-lending to the provincial treasury came from three types of investors. First, there were persons who were Ottoman subjects, whether Muslims or members of the Christian of Jewish minority groups. The extent of their dealings would vary with the extent of their capital and their proclivity to this type of business activity.[109] The other two groups of investors were the Europeans and European-protected persons.[110] There were the Europeans who lived in Syria as consuls, missionaries, entrepreneurs or settlers and the 'protégés', local persons under European protection. The latter were persons who, though usually locally-born and assimilated, had managed in one way or another to acquire a European passport. This entitled them to many privileges, such as exemption from taxation and conscription, preferential customs duties, and the right, along with Europeans, to foreign diplomatic representation before the Ottoman authorities. Utilizing their special political status while having advantages such as language, local contacts and experience superior to foreigners, the protégés were often remarkably successful in trade and finance.

The European protégés of Damascus were, without exception, members of the Christian and Jewish minority communities. It is difficult to establish why the Europeans did not grant protection to Muslims. It seems quite likely that the Ottomans would not have tolerated it,[111] or that Muslims with capital felt secure enough to deal with the Europeans without obtaining protected status. It is also possible that the Europeans were prejudiced against the local Muslims. The British Consul Richard Wood, for example – who was responsible for promoting a number of Jewish Damascenes to protégé status – held the notables or "Effendis and Ayans" to be the obstacle to necessary reform[112] and expressed hostility to to Muslim law and its representatives, the '*ulama*'.[113]

As for acquiring protégé status, the British Consul Rogers reported that the initiative was taken very much on the part of the prospective protégés:

109 For example, there may well have been a traditional inhibition for *'ulama'* to participate in this sort of investment because interests were capitalized. This would have been liable to fall under the rubric of usury which is forbidden in Islam. The only examples I could find of Muslims lending to the provincial treasury involved short-term guarantees rather than long-term loans.

110 Ample source material on the activities of the European protégés is available in the British and French consular records. See for example, the sources cited in note 117 below.

111 An exception was 'Abdallah Ghazzi (d. 1898) of Tripoli who served as a British consular agent in the port of that city. He and his father (who had interpreted for the British fleet off the coast of Syria in 1840) remained under British protection despite the challenges of Ottoman officials. Eldridge, 59, July 25, 1872, FO. 195/994; 70, August 24, 1872, FO. 195/994; 23, March 10, 1873, FO. 195/1027; 95, Sept. 13, 1878, FO. 195/1202; Eyres, 56, Oct. 21, 1890, FO. 195/1683; Trotter, 45, August 10, 1891, FO. 195/1723; Crow, 46, July 5, 1898, FO. 195/2024.

112 Wood, 25, Aug. 27, 1851, FO. 78/872.

113 Wood, 13, May 31, 1845, FO. 78/622.

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It is the ambition of every Syrian Rayah [i.e. Ottoman] Jew in affluent circumstances to be protected by a foreign power, and although I am always willing to assist any who may be oppressed I imagine it is not the wish of His Majesty's Government to claim as its subjects persons hitherto looked upon as Rayas. . .[114]

For his part, the French consul took up special ties with local Catholics. Paton described a festival arranged by the French consul in which

"the Consul, Count Ratti Menton, went in procession from his house with all the Catholics to the Latin Convent of Terra Santa, where mass was celebrated. The political role of the Consul here was to identify himself as closely as possible with the Catholics: he wore his uniform, or, as the Arabs call it, "yilbis metl Malek", [dressed like a king] . . . and after coming out of church the Catholic Greeks from the Archipelago amused themselves with firing off muskets and Vive le Roi! was shouted by the people".[115]

The Austrians and Prussians appear to have favored some Jews of Damascus, who according to Porter benefited considerably from their new status.

The Jews of Damascus are not numerous, but they are very influential on account of the vast wealth of some of the great families. These have been for many years the bankers of the successive pashas and great merchants. Until the interference of European powers in the internal administration of affairs in Syria, the changes of fortune and circumstances through which some of these families passed were truly wonderful, and had more of the character of an Eastern romance than of stern and fearful reality. The scene is now changed. Safe under the protection of European consuls, the Jew can buy and sell and make gain.[116]

It was the European protégés who played a leading role in the accumulating indebtedness of the mid-nineteenth century Damascus provincial treasury.[117] Though they were not the only money-lenders who seized the opportunity of borrowing from European sources at relatively low rates and re-lending at the high local rates,[118] they concentrated on transactions with the provincial treasury probably because they fitted into a niche there. On the one hand, the Ottoman officials and the *majlis* felt they had more control over persons who were Damascenes than over those who were bona fide Europeans. On the other hand, the protégés nonetheless had the full representation of the consuls of the countries

114 Wrench 23, May 16, 1863, FO. 195/760.
115 Paton, 36–37.
116 Porter, I, 147.
117 The history of protegé money-lending in the province of Damascus can be followed into the 1890's in the dispatches of the British and French consular staffs. For the most part, information on the protégés in given only in passing, but some reports give background material and detailed explanations of developments as they occurred. See: In Series FO. 195/677 (1861), 727 (1862), 760 (1863), 787 (1864), 806 (1864), and (1865), 903 (1868), 927 (1869), 965 (1870), 976 (1871), 994 (1872), 1067 (1875), 1153 (1877), 1154 (1877), 1201 (1878), 1262 (1879), 1263 (1879), 1264 (1879), 1305 (1880), 1306 (1880), 1369 (1881), 1648 (1889), 1727 (1891), 1801 (1893); in series GBPP/LVIII (1872), LXIV (1873), LXXV (1875), and (1876); in seris AECom/4 (1863), 6 (1889); in series AE ARC/93/4 (1861).
118 Rogers, 2, Jan. 26, 1865, FO. 195/806; Eldridge, 97, Sept. 15, 1878, FO. 195/1202; GBPP LXIV (1873) 178–185.

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by which they were protected.[119] Furthermore, both the Europeans and the Ottomans benefited from the protégés as they facilitated investment and discounted loans which became difficult to liquidate. Even some of the consuls were involved in money-lending and carried on business transactions through the protégés.[120] The bona fide Europeans, however, restricted their activities largely to the private sector.[121]

The pattern as it developed was as follows. Protégés acquired *sergis* independently or by discounting those held by native money-lenders. They then attempted to collect on the *sergis* in villages where taxes were assigned to them. But when the villagers were unable to pay either interest or capital, the loan would be renewed not on the provincial government but on the village, and the interests of between 24% and 30% per year continued to accrue.

The system was open to many abuses. Most of the peasants were illiterate. The protégé kept all the necessary records, usually acquiring only the signature or the seal of the village elders. Fraudulent accounting, inclusion of the village elders' private debts with those of the village and the imposition of usurious interest rates followed. It wasn't long before many of the villages fell into unpayable levels of debt. By 1863, the total claims on villages in the province of Damascus amounted to over $17\frac{1}{2}$ million TP.[122] In many cases, the claim on a village would exceed the entire village's worth were it to be sold.[123]

The level of indebtedness in the near vicinity of Damascus became a serious embarrassment to the Ottoman officials who were obliged to guarantee the loan's collection and a nuisance to the French, British, Austrian and Italian consuls who were obliged to make representations on behalf of their protégés. For his part, the British consul suggested that a loan be floated abroad to set the Damascene situation straight.[124] But the Ottoman officials avoided this and continued to attempt to raise the money locally.

As the local treasury was obliged to reissue *sergis* year after year, the entire provincial administration came under the control of European protégé money-lenders. They began to underwrite not only administrative running expenses including salaries paid locally but also all the expenses related to the pilgrimage.[125] The treasury was increasingly obliged to pay its employees and craftsmen who fulfilled contracts with *hawalas*. But since the Turkish piaster was rapidly depreciating and since the peasantry could not pay, the *hawalas* were discounted at a considerable loss with anyone who would have them. The protégés succeeded in

119 Dickson, 12, May 21, 1889, FO. 195/1648.

120 Lavierre, June 1, 1909, AECPNS 112/IX.

121 By 1890, the French consul reported that capital could be invested in the following ways: into the Ottoman bank at 4% or to a local money-changer (*sarraf*) at 5–6%. Investment in land was restricted to natives and the local *sarrafs* and banks were making 15–25% return on investment (Petitville's Report of 1890, AECom (Beirut), 10).

122 Rogers, 2, Feb. 5, 1863, FO. 195/760.

123 Jago, 16, June 6, 1879, FO. 195/1263.

124 Rogers, 37, Aug. 20, 1861, FO. 195/677.

125 Rogers, 48, Dec. 31, 1862, FO. 195/727; Dickson, 12, May 21, 1889, FO. 195/1648.

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picking up a lot of this business as well. They extended their financial control within the city and outside it. They built on their position as government creditors to lend to the peasantry and to the beduin who transported and escorted the pilgrimage.

In 1859, for example, the provincial treasury had no money to pay the beduin *shaykhs* Jarallah, Salih al-Tala'a and Faris al-Salim who were to provide camels for the pilgrimage.[126] The treasury had in the past advanced these *shaykhs* an amount of money which they were expected to pay upon the return of the *pilgrimage*. But since they never fully repaid, the *shaykhs* remained in the position of debtors to the local government – a situation which it had become customary to countenance and which had definite political advantages for the Ottomans. In 1859, however, the government turned to Europeans to pay the initial sum, and when the *shaykhs* returned, the Europeans demanded full return on their investment. Since the *shaykhs* were not prepared to pay, the government was obliged by the European consuls to arrest and imprison them. Their camels were confiscated and their appointment to the forth-coming pilgrimage was withheld. A local Jew by the name of Shamaya Angelo, "who had extensive monetary transactions with the government" and stood under Austrian protection, bought up the Europeans' claims and became the chief claimant in this financial scrap with the provincial treasury.[127]

Most upsetting to Damascenes with land holdings in and commercial ties to indebted villages was the fact that, with the promulgation of the Ottoman Land Code in 1858, there was a real threat that the ownership of villages in debt to the protégés would indeed be ceded to them.[128] One protégé, for example, was gaining a hold over "fourteen of the richest villages of Damascus" at this time.[129] Others had interests in the Biqa',[130] the Acre plain [131] near Sidon and near Homs.[132] With the exception of the coastal regions, it should be noted, these were all areas within the traditional economic sphere of the 'Azm faction.

It is remarkable in retrospect that, despite the obvious financial crisis developing in the Ottoman Empire from the 1850's onwards and the outrage against a minority group as expressed in the events of 1860 in Damascus, the Damascene *sergis* issued in the late 1850's remained a lively form of local speculation right up until the imperial financial collapse in 1875, when the Ottoman government declared bankruptcy. As late as 1872 it was reported that bonds which had been issued by

126 Rogers, 48, Dec. 31, 1862, FO. 195/727; 49, Sept. 24, 1863, FO. 195/760.
127 Rogers, 48, Dec. 31, 1862.
128 See, for example, Eldridge, 1, Jan. 1877, FO. 195/965.
129 Jago, 16, June 6, 1879, FO. 195/1263.
130 Green, 59, Dec. 11, 1873, FO. 195/1027; Eldridge, 18, May 4, 1874, FO. 195/1047 and 13, Feb. 26, 1880, FO. 195/1305.
131 Eldridge, 31, Aug. 27, 1870, FO. 195/965; Burton, 13, June 27, 1871, FO. 195/976.
132 Eldridge, 48, May 10, 1877, FO. 195/1153.

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the Damascene provincial treasury in 1857 represented capital of 11.9 million TP and were still the object of "healthy" speculation.[133]

133 The provincial treasury's dependence on foreign protégés was reduced from the 1860's onwards. See my "Modellfall", *op.cit.*

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CHAPTER IV: CRISIS

THE JULY 1860 RIOTS IN DAMASCUS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

On July 9, 1860 a mob burst on the Christian area of the inner city of Damascus and began a week's reign of terror during which hundreds (or perhaps thousands) were murdered, women and children were ravished and abducted and property was looted and burned. The course of the events is not yet fully established, though the information we do have indicates a certain pattern.[1] In particular, European institutions were targets of the mob's aggression. The French, Russian, Austrian, Belgian and American consulates were attacked as were the buildings of Protestant and Catholic missions near Bab Tuma (I–K/3–4).[2] The inner-city Christian quarter was destroyed by fire,[3] while thousands of Christians took refuge in the households of Muslim and other notables or in the city's citadel, where they were to shelter as best they could for several weeks with little clothing, water or food.[4] 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, a leading figure of the Algerian resistance living in exile in Damascus since 1855 on a generous French allowance, had warned of the pos-

1 Published accounts of the events of 1860 can be found in the following: Anonymous, *Hasr al-litham 'an nakabat al-Sham,* Cairo, 1895; Mikha'il Mushaqa, *Kitab mashhad al-'iyan bi hawadith Suriya wa Lubnan,* Cairo, 1908; Iskandar b. Ya'qub Abkariyus, *Kitab nawadir al-zaman fi malahim jabal Lubnan sanat 1860,* translated by J.F. Scheltema as *Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860,* New Haven, 1920; Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, *Khitat al-Sham,* Damascus, 1925–28, III, 75–100; 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar, I, 260–280, II, 1009–1010, 1035–1036; Muhammad Abu'l-Su'ud al-Hasibi, "Lamahat min tarikh Dimashq fi 'ahd al-Tanzimat", edited by Kamal Sulayman al-Salibi in *al-Abhath,* 21 (1968), 57–58, 117–153 and 22 (1969), 51–69; Kamal S. Salibi, "The 1860 Upheaval", *op.cit.;* Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform,* 231–240; John P. Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon 1861–1914,* London, 1977, 31f; Gino Cerbella, "L'azione dell'emiro Abd el Qader contro i Drusi, massacratori, nel 1860, dei Cristiani di Damasco", in *Africa* 28 (1973), 51–64; Alfred Schlicht, *France und die syrischen Christen 1700–1861,* Berlin, 1981, 67–69. In addition, two theses have dealt with the events: John King, " 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri", D.Phil., Oxford, 1971, Chapters VI and VII; R.J. Joseph, "The Material Origins of the Lebanese Conflict of 1860", B. Litt. Thesis, Oxford, 1977. For an introduction to a number of manuscript sources dealing with the events of 1860 both in Damascus and in Mount Lebanon see Fritz Steppat, "Some arabic manuscript sources of the Syrian crisis of 1860", in Jacques Berque and Dominique Chevallier (eds.), *Les Arabes par leurs Archives,* Paris, 1976, 183–191.

2 Lanusse, 11, July 17, 1860, AE ARC/93/4; Abkarius, 131–132; A. Schlicht, 274.

3 Outrey, 112, July 28, AE ARC/93/4; Rogers, Jan. 15, 1863, FO 195/760.

4 Outrey, 91, August 14, 1860; 117, August 16, 1860; 121, September 17, 1860, AE ARC 93/4.

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sibility of an outbreak for several weeks and had received money from the French consulate in order to arm 1000 men to protect the Christians. But he had left Damascus on the morning of the outbreak. Though he returned by the third day once news had reached him, and organized his men into groups of thirty to forty men to bring Christians and Europeans to safety,[5] the loss of life and property was nonetheless considerable.

As a direct result of the riots, thousands of Christians left Damascus to seek refuge and aid on the Syrian coast.[6] The para-military troops stationed in the city had been entirely ineffective in halting the riots or protecting those attacked. In fact, many of the irregulars and guardsmen had joined in the looting and killing. To the French consular aide Lanusse, it appeared that the para-military troops had even started the riots in a planned action, invading the Christian quarter at several points within the first half hour.[7]

Once the central government received news of the events, 3000 troops already in Syria to handle the Lebanese crisis were transfered to Damascus.[8] At the head of this force was Fu'ad Pasha, one of the leading figures of the Tanzimat who was at that time Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs and would soon become Grand Vizier.[9] The riots had long subsided before Fu'ad Pasha arrived on July 29. He applied strict security measures, began investigations and facilitated relief operations.

Following the news of the severe Christian defeat in the Lebanese civil war which had already aroused much public concern in Europe, news of the Damascus riots, reaching Paris on July 16,[10] caused new indignation. This presented France with incontrovertible proof of the need of Ottoman Christians for European protection. The negotiations already started amongst the European powers concerning an intervention in Syria were now brought to a conclusion. By July 25 the European states had agreed that France should send an expeditionary force.[11] Approximately 6000 French troops were dispatched, arriving in Beirut during the second half of August at a time, however, when communal strife in Syria had long since ended.[12]

The energetic investigations and disciplinary measures carried out by Fu'ad Pasha in Damascus deprived the French of a pretext for moving their troops further

5 Marcel Emerit, "La crise syrienne et l'expansion économique française en 1860", *Revue Historique*, 207 (1952), 211–232; King, Chapter VI; Gino Cerbella, *op. cit.*

6 Both the men of 'Abd al-Qadir and those of the Druze leader al-'Amar formed armed escorts for escorting thousands of Christians to Beirut. (Outrey, 114, August 1, 1860, AE ARC/93/4; 116, August 9, 1860; August 14, 1860, AE ARC/93/4.)

7 Lanusse, 11, July 17, 1860, AE ARC/93/4.

8 King, Chapter VII, 29.

9 Fu'ad Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier at the end of November 1861 (Outrey, 135, December 2, 1861, AE PD/6; Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd Edition, II, 935.)

10 Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, 107; Alfred Schlicht, 69.

11 John King, VII, p. 2.

12 Jobin, *La Syrie*, Paris, 1880, 232.

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into the interior of the country. Fu'ad Pasha first consulted his military commanders, then 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri and the European consuls.[13] He soon convened the city's notables in a closed session to root out those who might have been the instigators.[14] A list of perpetrators was compiled by the surviving Christians and on August 3 the *majlis* and some leading Muslim figures met in the *seray* to examine this list.[15] They agreed on the arrest of 350 persons and the formation of a special commission to retrieve stolen property from various quarters of the city. The city's gates remained closed during these proceedings.

Of those arrested by October 8, some 170 were executed by firing squad or by hanging.[16] A list published in France in 1861 of those sentenced for their participation in the riots gives a total of 338 guilty of instigation, murder, arseny or pillage, of whom 181 were executed and 157 exiled.[17] Nearly one fourth of the total were identified as members of Ottoman para-military organizations. Of the others, 123 were identified by occupation. These included craftsmen (12%), shopkeepers and traders (10%) and peasants (4%), while members of notable families made up 6–7% of those sentenced. Though some 16% of the total were newcomers to Damascus, 78% were established Damascenes and only 6% were villagers (including Druzes and beduin) present in Damascus at the time of the outbreak.[18]

As long as the protocols of Fu'ad Pasha's investigations are not public record, the events of July 1860 in Damascus will no doubt remain a theme for historical discussion. A clarification of these events would elucidate subsequent inter-communal strife in greater Syria and problems which remain accute until today. A comprehensive study of the causes and effects of the riots without the aid of this central documentation is practically impossible. My intention here is to discuss important aspects with the aid of the details and insights gained in the course of this study.

The highest estimate of casualties I have seen is that of Spagnolo standing at up to 10,000 killed.[19] The anonymous author of *Kitab al-ahzan* gave 6000.[20]

13 Lanusse, 11, July 17, 1860, AE ARC/93/4.

14 Outrey, 115, August 4, 1860, AE ARC/93/3.

15 King (Chapter VII, 1) writes that Fu'ad relied on the European consuls and other informants in the compilation of these lists. *Kitab al-ahzan* relates some of the procedures during this meeting (30f.).

16 As with the numbers of casualties which will be discussed shortly, we also have a problem with the number of perpetrators. Outrey (116, August 9, 1860, AE ARC/93/4) reported 700 having been arrested and (October 8, 1860, AE ARC/93/4) 172 hangings. Al-Hasibi wrote that 1300 Damascenes of all classes had been arrested by mid-August (Salibi edition, 198). Though only some hundreds were identified and sentenced, the mob may have been much larger: King gives a figure of 20,000 rioters (VII, 24–25). As this would have been more than half of the adult male Muslim population of the city, it seems very high. Salibi (*Modern History*, 108) gives 111 shot and 57 hanged.

17 B. Poujoulat, *La Verité sur la Syrie*, Paris, 1861.

18 *ibid.*

19 Spagnolo, 31.

20 As quoted by Steppat, 189.

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Subsequent historians have given estimates of 3000 to 10,000 or even 5500 in one day.[21] On the other hand, there are estimates as low as 600 to 1500.[22] Since the discrepancy between 600 and 10,000 is so great, it might be of interest to take a closer look at the statistical information we have to bring some light on the subject.

We have a relatively reliable estimate of 14,000 for the size of the Damascene Christian population in the 1850's,[23] and for those surviving attack at 11,000.[24] But an important difficulty exists in assessing the number of non-Damascene Christians gathered there on the eve of the riots. The general state of population disruption not only in Damascus but in the entire region at this time makes this a significant complication. The war between Maronites and Druzes in the Lebanon which involved the Anti-Lebanon and affected the Hawran and the Damascene countryside had made the city into a temporary refuge.

We cannot know for exactly how many the city provided refuge. If, as M. Lanusse indicates, the total number of Christians in Damascus in July was some 19,000,[25] this would indicate that 5000 of these were there as refugees, while the figure of a total of 22,000 given in *Kitab al-ahzan* presumes some 7000 refugees having been present.[26] Both these figures seem to me rather high as an increase of 35–50% over the normal Christian population in a short period of time would otherwise have received considerable attention in the consular reports in the months prior to the riots. Furthermore, while it is well established that prominent refugees from the Anti-Lebanese towns of Hasbayya and Rashayya had come to Damascus prior to the events,[27] it is also known that some Christians of these small towns had fled to destinations other than Damascus. Similarly, the Christian refugees from Zahle and Dayr al-Qamar, two other Lebanese regions which suffered massacres, fled to Mount Lebanon and to the coast.[28] As for the villagers of the vicinity of Damascus and the Hawran, they may have come to Damascus, though reports to that effect indicate that this migration took place after and not before the July riots.[29]

It would also be important to establish to which part of Damascus these re-

21 King (VII, 1) reports an estimate of 3000–5000 made on August 8; Schlicht (67) gives 5000 without documenting this figure, although he states elsewhere (100) that he has seen the casualty lists compiled at the French consulate; Spagnolo, (31) gives 5000–10,000; Salibi, (*Modern History*, 107) gives 5500 in one day.

22 Here, King's estimate is taken from the French archives and refers to the numbers dead by the end of the rioting on July 13. (King, VI, 27)

23 See above, Chapter I, note 4.

24 Lanusse estimated that 'Abd al-Qadir had saved 11,000 lives. (11, July 17, 1860, AE ARC/93/4).

25 That is, 11,000 rescued plus 8000 killed. See above note 2.

26 The anonymous Christian author who wrote some years after the events reckoned that of the 22,000 Christians in Damascus at the time of the outbreak, 6000 had been killed. Of those who survived (here, some 16,000), 4000 original Damascenes and 3000 who had come there as refugees remained in the city. The other survivors (some 9000) emigrated immediately following the events to Lebanon and Beirut. (As reported by Steppat, 189.)

27 Outrey, 112, July 28, 1860, AE ARC/93/4.

28 Salibi, *Modern History*, p. 104.

29 This is indicated in the French consular reports.

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fugees had fled as only the inner-city Christian quarter was attacked.[30] If villagers were coming into Damascus from these areas for safety, they would more likely have found refuge where relatives or village acquaintances had established themselves. In fact, it seems unlikely that many of those who sought refuge in Damascus did so in the inner city where rents were high and space and water were limited.[31] Outside the city walls, the Maydan's sub-quarters of Bab Musalla and Qurayshi had traditionally offered the first points of settlement for Christians migrating to the city from the Hawran and the Anti-Lebanon.[32]

As no harm came to the Christians of the Maydan during the riots, it could well be that the number of Christians exposed to the rioters may have been little more than the 8000 to 10,000 who normally lived in the inner city.[33] Given Outrey's observation that 8000 homeless survivors remained after the destruction of the entire inner-city quarter, it therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the remainder of the pre-July 9th Christian population of the inner-city, or up to 2000 Christians, plus a small number of foreigners and an unknown but small number of refugees had died in the events. While many of these may have been killed by the fires which destroyed their homes and many must have succumbed to exhaustion, thirst and exposure in the days immediately following the riots, a no doubt large number had been murdered.

A second difficulty arises when trying to place the riots within the city's historical tradition. It should be noted that Damascus had a long tradition of urban revolt which would fall into a category expressed in Arabic by the term *fitna* or a "being put to the test".[34] We have closely followed the course of such an event – the revolt of 1831 – in Chapter II.[35] But rioting in the residential quarter of a locally-established minority does not appear to fall into this category because *fitnas* were normally directed against the city's rulers and their victims were clearly political protagonists.

Due to the apparently unprecedented nature of the riots, contemporaries and subsequent historians have considered the possibility of a conspiracy. In the re-

30 This emerges from all the accounts and is expressly stated in Thoumin, 114.

31 Thoumin, 105, 108, 112f.

32 *ibid.* See also Klaus Dettmann, 278 for the pattern of population movements in Damascus.

33 The size of the inner-city Christian population has been estimated here by deducting the 4000–6000 Christians of the Maydan ("*Kitab al ahzan*", 102f.; Thoumin, 112f.) from the city's total Christian population of 14,100 (see above, Chapter I, note 4). As the inner-city Christian quarter comprised about one third square kilometer (see Figure 4, quadrats I-K/2, I-K-L/3–4, H/4) and 1800 two-story houses (Sandwith, March 31, 1862, FO 195/727), this seems an acceptable estimate for the spatial realities, i.e. 4–8 persons per household and a total urban population concentration level of 24,000–30,000 per square kilometer. M. Outrey's report of 3000 houses having been destroyed is clearly an exaggeration, as Damascus contained a total of only 15,206 houses prior to the riots and 14,921 once the Christian quarter had been almost entirely rebuilt in 1864 (Rogers, 2, January 26, 1865, FO. 195/806). It would, moreover, be difficult to imagine one-tenth of the population living in one-fifth of the city's houses.

34 *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd Edition, "*fitna*".

35 Other examples of *fitnas* are discussed on pages 40–43, 166.

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mainder of this chapter we want to take a closer look at some of the explanations which have been put forward. Though no one theory can yet be accepted as historically satisfactory, we can play through the various combinations of acceptable fragments with the hope of refining the theories we have and developing new ones.

The Muslim Damascene historian Muhammad Adib Al Taqi al-Din al-Hisni, for example, considered the riots to be caused by a "greedy foreign hand which did not wish the country well".[36] The contemporary French consul pointed a finger at the British, finding it suspicious that their consul 'pretended' the outbreak was not planned and wondering why the British consulate was not attacked and why the murderer of the British missionary Reverend Graham pleaded that he had made a mistake.[37] After some research into the matter, the historian John King explained that the British consulate was not attacked simply because it was not in the Christian quarter. The additional circumstantial evidence seems of little consequence.[38] Close contacts did exist between the British and Mustafa Bey al-Hawasili whose para-military troops were prominent in the rioting. According to the French consul, al-Hawasili had been aided by the British Consul Wood in accumulating a huge fortune and considerable influence in the quarter of Bab Tuma where he lived, the quarter which was the area of Christian settlement attacked.[39] It is nonetheless difficult to imagine what would have motivated the British to instigate the riot.

Following the events, a number of French plans emerged which aimed at making Syria into a French protectorate. The historians Emerit, King, Spagnolo and Schlicht have done research in this connection. Emerit, for example, saw political motives in the wish of Napoleon III to create an armed force in Damascus under 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, and hypothesized that Napoleon III might have been influenced by Ferdinand de Lesseps who, as consul in Beirut in the 1850's, intrigued to obtain the Ottoman government's permission to build the Suez Canal. Once French troops were in Syria, attempts were made to restore Lebanese silk production, important to French industry, and to obtain horses for the French cavalry, a pressing necessity for France's North African campaigns.[40] Yet it is difficult to imagine how these economic interests could have motivated France to instigate anti-Christian riots in Damascus. King found, for example, that 'Abd al-Qadir in fact refused to cooperate with the French in their political intrigues immediately following the events although Napoleon's agents were actively agitating in Syria into the 1860's.[41]

A third foreign intriguer which could be investigated is Russia. The Russian-encouraged Greek Orthodox Christians and the French, Austrian and Vatican-supported Catholics had already been at odds since the 1830's, and given the fact that the largely Orthodox Christian population of the Maydan were left unharmed, perhaps the Russians wished by means of a riot in the inner city to strike a blow

36 Hisni, 266.
37 Schlicht, 72 quoting Outrey's dispatch of August 14, 1860.
38 King, VI, p. 29.
39 Outrey, 117, August 16, 1860, AE ARC/93/4.
40 Emerit, 225.
41 King, Chapter VII.

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at the protégés of its European rivals, or perhaps the local Orthodox Christians wished to do the Russians this service by rousing Muslim sensibilities against the Catholics.[42]

And finally, Egypt as a 'foreign' power since its *de facto* independence from the Ottomans under the Muhammad 'Ali dynasty, may have wished to provoke the European Powers to detach Syria from the Ottoman Empire with the hope that it would again fall under Egypt's control. In 1841, the British Consul Richard Wood wrote of his conviction that the French were intriguing together with Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt in order to gain concessions in Istanbul. This intrigue, according to Wood, included encouraging the Ottoman governor in Damascus to incite the Druzes of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon against the Maronites and other Christians so that the French could have a pretext for exerting their influence on the Ottomans.[43]

The possibility that the outcome of a Christian defeat in Syria would be the attachment of Syria to Egypt was in fact suggested by the French consular aide Lanusse to the Damascene notables just prior to the events.[44] With the Maronite defeat in Lebanon quickly ended by a reconciliation of the two warring parties,[45] the European Powers, and especially France, had no longer an excuse to intervene. Three days later, the riots began in Damascus which provoked the French intervention after all. Even some high Ottoman officials may have continued to support a plan according to which the Egyptians, though remaining vassals of the Sultan, would return to Syria.[46]

Other European observers pointed to instigators in Istanbul.

> The massacre of the Christians at Damascus and Mount Lebanon, in 1860, was altogether a political outbreak; and Fu'ad Pasha in reading the firman which ordered the execution of the officers who had got it up (Achmet Pacha, etc.), treated it as such. It is true the war party, otherwise called the fanatical party at Constantinople, were at the bottom of the plot, which was meant to disgust the Christian European Powers so much by the massacre that they should dethrone the Sultan Abd el Mejeed, and put his brother, Abd el Aziz, the late Sultan, in his place – hoping by this revolution to change the politics at that time in vogue at Constantinople, and to bring their party into power. But this would never have been attempted if the Sultan's Government had been a strong Government. The real cause of the 'Outbreak' was its weakness.[47]

Further implicating the Ottomans, the French consular aide Lanusse wrote a report a few weeks before the outbreak according to which Ahmad Pasha planned first

42 The rivalries between these two Christian communities since the time of the Egyptian occupation are discussed in Thoumin, *op.cit.*

43 Farah, 139.

44 Lanusse, Nr. 107, May 23, 1860, AE ARC/93/4.

45 On July 6, 1860, Khurshid Pasha presented the Maronite and Druze leaders of Lebanon a peace proposal which they immediately accepted. See Salibi, *Modern History,* 106–107.

46 Farah, 115–153.

47 Edward Barker, *Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey,* London, 1876, 43–44.

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to put the Christians in the citadel and permit the Druzes[48] to massacre them while their quarter would be bombarded by the Ottomans and, secondly, to avenge the murder of his father-in-law Salim Pasha who had been killed by the Damascenes in the revolt of 1831.[49] According to this report, the Pasha refused to listen to the opposition to his plan raised by *majlis* members, and 'Abd al-Qadir intensified his efforts to block the plan amongst the '*ulama*', the quarter chiefs and the notables.[50] Three weeks before the outbreak, 'Abd al-Qadir reported to Lanusse that Ahmad Pasha had already attempted to raise the population with the aim of exciting a massacre, but that the notables were opposed to this and passed the information along to al-Jaza'iri so that it would reach the French consulate.[51]

As for the role of the local Muslim notables, the anonymously-written *Tanahhudat Suriya* points to one particular Muslim notable without revealing his identity. This person was said to be instrumental in connection with Ahmad Pasha, in transforming what began as a looting spree into a massacre. It also implicates the contemporary Muslim religious leader and silk merchant 'Abdallah al-Halabi with the information that the mob first consulted him before going on the rampage. It reports that the conspirators wanted to kill off the Christians and then the Jews and had for this purpose armed the helpers of the city's butchers and bakers. Finally, it concludes that the massacre was brought about by a conspiracy amongst the Muslims although not all of them had been informed.[52]

As an inner-city silk merchant and leading member of the '*ulama*', 'Abdallah al-Halabi could be made a central figure of the 1860 massacres. His name was associated with a Koranic commentary dealing with the position of non-believers in Islamic society.[53] Yet, this commentary had been around for a long time, having been written prior to or during the Egyptian occupation. By the same token, another report, that of Abkarius, pointing to 'Abdallah al-Halabi as an instigator may have been misleadingly translated. It reports that when a crowd of rioters reached the Umayyad Mosque,

> "they had an interview with 'Abdallah al-Halabi [which lasted] a quarter of an hour whereupon they left him running and shouting at the top of their voices: Oh, *Zeal* for the [true] religion!"[54]

One might, however, read here that the rioters misunderstood or ignored al-Halabi's advice and went on with the rioting despite him. The Muslim biographers portray

48 The recent account by Cerbella (op. cit.) concerning the role of the Druzes in Damascus cannot be taken seriously.

49 This is the only reference I have seen to any connection between the Damascene governors Ahmad Pasha of 1860 and Salim Pasha of 1831.

50 Lanusse, June 2, 1860, AE ARC/93/4.

51 Lanusse, 109, June 19, 1860, AE ARC/93/4.

52 For information concerning this manuscript, see Steppat, *op.cit.*

53 Rustum, 56.

54 Abkarius, 130.

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al-Halabi as a man of great integrity and influence who was regularly consulted on important matters by statesmen and local notables. They add that he was not heard in 1860 when "people became drunk without drinking" and hold that he was unjustly exiled. The city regretted the treatment he received and rejoiced when he returned to Damascus a few years later.[55] Moreover, the Abkarius account implicating al-Halabi also contradicts al-Hasibi who held that the people who had been in the mosque were first excited into a mob at Bab al-Barid, that is, outside the Umayyad mosque from where it left for the Christian quarter.[56]

Due to the large numbers of para-militaries involved in the riots, suspicion may be turned on these and their *aghawat*. Some conceivable causes of discontent amongst the para-military troops have been discussed in Chapter II. The question must be asked not if but which troops may have been involved. We may reasonably assume that a large contingent of *aghawat* troops were not even in Damascus at the time of the outbreak, due to their participation at that time of the year in the pilgrimage. We learn from the Muslim chronicler Abu al-Su'ud al-Hasibi that a number of local *aghawat* (Salim Agha al-Mahayini, Mustafa Bey al-Hawasili, 'Abd al-Latif Agha and Muhammad Sa'id Shamdin) had just been invested with the leadership of new troops, presumably to fill the resultant power vacuum. One of these *aghawat*, Mustafa Bey al-Hawasili, had already replaced the interloper Hasan Bey O'Reilly (an Irish mercenary in the Ottoman service) as a chief of a corps.[57] With that, at least some of the *aghawat* must have been appeased. The troops of Shamdin Agha along with some Druzes are said to have committed the atrocities. Yet, al-Hasibi exonerates all the *aghawat*: "No officer was able to stop a single one of his men from going to the Christian quarter." Al-Hawasili almost got himself killed trying to do so and had opened his home to refugees.[58] In that case, the punishments dealt these *aghawat* appear unjust: al-Hawasili, some of his relatives and a son of Shamdin Agha were executed.[59] Not only had these *aghawat* no longer the above-mentioned cause to instigate riots, but they actually may have attempted to halt them. If any of these *aghawat* or their sons as 'lieutenants' were at fault, it may have been because they foolishly misjudged the depth of discontent amongst their men and played irresponsibly on their religious sensibilities, realizing the consequences only when it was too late. Al-Hawasili, for example, is described as an opportunist who was "exceedingly stupid and hateful to the people of Damascus".[60]

The possibility also exists that a host of local Muslim notables had fallen into dangerous levels of debt with Europeans and their protégés amongst the Christians and Jews of Damascus and may have wished to settle their accounts in this fashion. The difficulties for Damascene inner-ring land controllers, once the local treasury

55 See Bitar, II, 1008–1010; Shatti, 163–165; Hisni, 667–669.
56 Salibi, "Shaykh Muhammad", 194–195.
57 *ibid.*, 189.
58 *ibid.*
59 Poujoulat, 394–396.
60 Hasibi/Salibi, 78.

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began borrowing from European protégés who were members of the local Christian and Jewish minorities, have been discussed in Chapter III. With special reference to the events, the information provided by the French consul on the financial dealings of the para-military chief Mustafa Bey al-Hawasili may be of relevance.[61] The French consul also pressed Fu'ad Pasha to confiscate the "immense property holdings" of the implicated notables in order to get to the root of the problem.[62]

The French consul was convinced that local notables (in league with Ahmad Pasha) had instigated the riots, and therefore pushed Fu'ad Pasha to investigate them. He also disparaged the British consul for not sharing his view. Yet he provides no evidence of the notables' guilt. Nor did Fu'ad Pasha admit to having found any:

> Je n'ai aucun ménagement à garder et aucune considération ne m'arrêtera quand on m'aura prouvé leur culpabilité. Mais tant qu'il n'y aura que des présomptions ma conscience se réfuse à signer des sentences de mort. Si l'Europe exige leur exécution à titre de satisfaction je suis prêt à faire pendre et le Cheikh Abdallah et tous les autres notables mais il devra être bien entendu que ce sera pour être agréable aux Puissances et non pas à cause de leur culpabilité.

Outrey added in his report that there was in fact no real proof against them because Fu'ad knew he had waited too long to investigate.[63] Later, when Fu'ad asked the French consul if perpetual exile would suffice as a punishment of the notables, Outrey replied that, short of death, this would have to do.[64]

Considered within the context of factional politics, it can be suggested that the notables of both factions had, conceivably, motives for raising a mob against the inner-city Christians. For their part, the 'Azm-connected notables felt insecure in their political power as long as they were threatened by the growing wealth and prosperity of the Maydanis. It is conceivable that the Maydanis were eroding the political constituency of the 'Azm faction because they were able to offer the unemployed and displaced working classes a share in the emerging economic system. As already noted, the prospering weaving center in the Maydan of the 1850's stood in sharp contrast to the beleaguered textile industry of the city as a whole. If the inner-city and northern notables could not meet the economic demands of their constituents, this faction would have been thrown even further into the arms of the Ottomans in order to maintain its position in the city – unless, contrary to the well-established arrangement, the 'Azm faction was to become the faction of the city's poor and discontent, much as the Maydanis had been in the past. The outbreak of a *fitna* in the city may have been a last effort to block an already far-advanced power shift to the Maydanis.

That tensions within the working class in Damascus formed a background to the events is indicated by a number of reports. Displaced Damascene textile merchants (like 'Abdallah al-Halabi) and their disgruntled and unemployed craftsmen

61 See pp. 52–53, 92, 95, 96.
62 Outrey, 116, August 9, 1860, AE ARC/93/4.
63 Outrey, 124, October 15, AE ARC/93/4.
64 Outrey, July 28, 1860; July 30, 1860; August 4, 1860; August 9, 1860, AE ARC 93/3; August 14, 1860, October 15, 1860, AE ARC/93/4; August 14, 1860, AE CPC/6.

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may have wished to strike at the productive capacity of their inner-city Christian competitors. The British consul wrote:

> Of the looms for the manufacture of native silk stuffs there were 3436 in the year 1859–700 in the year 1860 and only 550 in 1861 – thus, one of the sad effects of the 1860 events [was the] destruction of nearly 3000 looms all of which belonged to Christians; but now they are gradually being reestablished and in 1864 there were 3156 looms at work, more than 2000 of them, however, are the property of Mohammedans – native manufacture nearly returned to its normal state.[65]

On the other hand, no weavers appeared in the lists of the Christian craftsmen to be indemnified for their losses.[66] But perhaps the indemnity lists included only those craftsmen who had survived the riots.

It is in this context that the research of R.J. Joseph on the textile industry of Damascus is especially important in that he has found striking evidence of conflict between Muslim weavers and Greek Catholic weavers who wished to set up their looms in a Muslim quarter (Qaymariya) bordering on the inner-city Christian quarter.[67] Yet it appears that this dispute, which was settled in favor of the Christians in 1847, did not arouse further friction. The prosperity of the Christian weavers may nonetheless have continued to irritate their rivals. If (as suggested in Chapter III) it was only possible to continue in production when using imported English cotton yarn, and if not all producers had access to the English yarn – due perhaps to their lack of foreign exchange or their inability to gain European credit as suggested[68] – could not some textile producers and their craftsmen have been squeezed out of production and therefore have had grounds for envy or, in the case that they felt unjustly treated, revenge? The success of the Muslim weavers in the Maydan at this time also points to the importance of sources of foreign exchange for keeping people employed, as it was the Maydani merchants who had the one commodity Damascus could sell at a profit to Europe, namely, grain. It does strike me as significant that, when interviewed in the 1930's, the descendants of the Christians of the untouched Maydan Christian quarter adamantly stressed two important facts in their history: Their quarter "never had any weavers" and "had always taken the necessary precautions to avoid provoking the animosity of their Muslim neighbors".[69]

Along the same lines, the 'Azm faction may have registered the desperation and spirit of revenge of their constituents and instigated them to punish some of those who appeared to be benefiting while they declined. A *fitna* would make heard the extent of their frustration in dealing with the cultural and economic changes disrupting their world which the Ottoman government seemed actually to be promoting. A present-day historian, Moshe Ma'oz, accepts this theory without, unfortunately,

65 Rogers, 2, January 26, 1865, FO 195/806.
66 Rogers, 55, December 26, 1860, FO 195/677.
67 See above, 25.
68 The Muslim al-Hasibi alludes to the credit and commercial advantages offered to Christian merchants and found this a harmful development (Salibi, "Shaykh Muhammad," 191).
69 Thoumin, 111 and 114 respectively.

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directly quoting or establishing the non-partisan nature of the sources of his information:

> . . . a number of Muslim notables, among them the chief 'Ulema of Damascus – the Shafi'i mufti, Sheikh 'Umar al-Ghazzi, and Sheikh 'Abdullah Halabi – and most other members of the *meclis*, had a hand in instigating or backing the riots . . . there are good grounds for assuming that behind this outbreak there was a concealed alliance between Ahmed Paşa and a number of local leaders to punish the Christians for their disobedience; and this by secretly instigating or at least tacitly directing the fatal course of events.[70]

For their part, the Maydani faction may have wished to discredit once and for all the political competence of the 'Azm faction with an urban uprising which would embarrass the authorities. The Maydanis were aware of the frustration and discontent of large portions of the Damascene working class and the ease with which a movement of some kind or other could be instigated. Raising *fitnas* was, after all, the way the Maydanis had so often operated to gain their political ends.

An economic factor with significance to the Maydani's role was the acute food shortage in the summer of 1860. The harvests of 1859 and 1860 had failed and the pilgrimage had come in 1860 at a time when reserves were depleted. Prices of grain were exorbitant on all Syrian markets and had been the cause of bread riots in Aleppo. It was known that persons both in the public sector (the governor Ahmad Pasha and some other officials) as well as in the private sector (some Christian and Maydani merchants) were profiteering. Eventually, £120,000 worth of grain was imported from Egypt through Beirut, though this did not relieve the price situation much. The French consulates were dispensing grain to needy Christians in June and July of 1860. We have no reports of similar action being taken on the behalf of hungry Muslims.[71]

Again, the Christians were one of the easiest targets to deflect the frustrations of a hungry mob. Perhaps the Maydani notables underestimated the city's wrath; perhaps they wished only to threaten but not actually to carry through with an outbreak. Or perhaps they felt they were – with the aid of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri in a position to control the mob and to protect those Christians with whom the faction had particular ties: the Maydani Christians went unharmed; most of the Europeans and literally thousands of other inner-city Christians were rescued by 'Abd al-Qadir. Had he been present on the first day of the outbreak, moreover, the mob might have been subdued in a matter of hours. As it was, 'Abd al-Qadir saved many lives, but only beginning on the third day of the riots, by which time, moreover, little could be done about the devastating fires.

Also of relevance here seems the fact that a remarkably large number of Muslim Maydani merchants were active in the protection and aid of Christians at the time of the riots. For this they were cited and awarded by the governments of France, Russia and Austria, and both Damascene Christians and Europeans pleaded that they should be exempted from paying the indemnity fine. In one Arabic source

70 Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, 238.

71 Trade Reports for 1859 and 1860 from Consul General Moore from Beirut and Mr. Skene from Aleppo, GBPP 1861; Schlicht, 216–217; Salibi, "Shaykh Muhammad", 191.

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

1. Rooftop view of Damascus from the Umayyad Mosque towards the west: markets in the foreground; citadel in the center; Barada river gap in the background. Bonfils, late 19th century.



2. The southern wall of Damascus and the southern ring road. Bonfils, late 19th century.

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3. The interior courtyard of the private quarters of the As'ad Pasha al-'Azm household. Author's photo, 1982.



4. The Khatib family tree. Author's photo, 1972.



5. The Kaylani family tree. Author's photo, 1972.

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

6. The interior courtyard of a notable household. Bonfils, late 19th century.



7. The "street called straight". Bonfils, late 19th century.

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8. The Barada river west of the city with the route to Beirut on the left and the Takiya al-Salimiya on the right. Bonfils, late 19th century.



9. The northern wall of Damascus skirted by the Barada river. Owen Tweedy collection, 1930's.

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the helpful Maydanis are called "*mashayikh*", indicating that some of them may have been guild masters.[72] With Fu'ad Pasha and large numbers of Ottoman troops already in Lebanon, the Maydanis may have felt that the Ottoman government would intervene swiftly should the situation get out of hand. Also coming into their calculation was the fact that once Fu'ad had sufficient grounds he would act in their interests, as this pillar of the Tanzimat was not in sympathy with the 'Azm faction.

There is yet another possibility which would establish the events of 1860 as a tragic milestone in the national history of Syria and explain a good deal of the bitterness which accompanies that history until today. The outbreak of July 1860 may have begun as part of a proto-nationalist intrigue in which notables of both factions joined to instigate a *fitna* with the aim of freeing Syria of all foreign control, actual and projected. Such an intrigue would not have been totally inconceivable within the framework of contemporary European and Ottoman politics. On the one hand, the notables had been informed that a Christian defeat in Syria would bring French intervention, the expulsion of the Ottomans and the unification of Syria with Egypt under French influence. The French consular aide Lanusse had told the notables that this would surely be France's reaction. But the notables also knew that the British would not accept French or Egyptian control over Syria, nor would the French accept continued Ottoman rule in the eventuality of a Christian defeat.[73]

At this impasse, we might hypothesize that 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri who was thought to be or presented himself as acceptable to both the French and the British emerged for the notables as a compromise figure who could collaborate with or even lead them in a bid to win Syrian independence. Here, a 16-page brochure published anonymously in Paris in 1860 with the title "Abd-el-Kader, empereur d'Arabie" may be the indicator we seek of the existence of an intrigue with these goals.[74] The brochure expressed the need of the Arab peoples for a leader and championed 'Abd al-Qadir for the throne of the orient much as Louis Napoleon ruled over the French. 'Abd al-Qadir's princely status, his experiences in Algeria, his ties to both factions and leadership in several estates and his close friendships with a small group of ascendant notables[75] would have placed him in a position to at least propose such a solution.

If this was the notables' plan, the events themselves frustrated its realization. The notables appear to have underestimated the city's potential for civil strife. Once unleashed, what may have been planned as a *fitna* erupted into extensive violence and destruction. To summarize, while many of the socio-economic and political factors which may have led to mob psychosis have been discussed here and in Chap-

72 See Outrey, 103, October 31, 1860 and 105, November 30, 1860, AE CPD/6; Wrench, 12, April 19, 1861; Rogers, 12, June 1, 1861; 13, June 3, 1861, FO 195/677 and 29, October 29, 1862, FO 195/727; Abkarius, 134; *Kitab al-Ahzan*, 102f; *Tanahhudat Suriya, op.cit.*).

73 At one stage during the negotiations of the Powers following the events and the French intervention, the British negotiator proposed that Syria be made into a vice-royalty similar to Egypt (See Salibi, *Modern History*, 109–111).

74 Marcel Emerit, "La crise syrienne", 218–219.

75 See, for example, the Hamzawi family sketch in Chapter VI.

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ter II and III, we must continue to search for and analyse these factors and their direct connection to the events. It may be that we have here, as Spagnolo suggests, the results of "the disorientation that followed the breakdown of semi-autonomous social institutions of an intricately segmented Islamic society",[76] or as Schlicht proposes, the "emotional reaction of the uneducated masses to the effects of an unknown and difficult to imagine world which was making itself felt in all spheres of life".[77] More detailed study of both social and social-psychological developments in Damascus of the mid-19th century are necessary before conclusions on the motivations of the mob can be made.

There are so many possibilities that one may even consider the events of 1860 in Damascus as one of those over-determined events in history. Yet we must certainly continue to search for the particular and central mechanism(s) which triggered the riots on that July morning. One thing should be clear: we have here an outbreak of social, socio-economic, socio-psychological and political conflict but not of a religious war. Both the facts that a specific group of Christians were attacked while others were left in peace, and that only some Muslims attacked while others protected and aided, establish this point.

THE CONSEQUENCES

Fu'ad Pasha's stay in Damascus was terminated when he was called to Istanbul to be Grand Vizier in November 1861. During his 18-month stay he had accomplished many tasks. Though the riots had subsided before he arrived, he carried out security measures and set about to arrest suspected ring-leaders. Steps were also taken to care for the immediate needs of the homeless. The inner-city Christian quarter was to be immediately rebuilt but, in the meantime, houses in the Muslim and 'Azm faction quarter of Qanawat were abruptly evacuated to provide shelter for the homeless. Fu'ad also saw to it that many of the participants in the riots were executed and large numbers of the remaining Muslim youth of Damascus were marched off into the ranks of the regular Ottoman army. Amongst those executed was Ahmad Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Damascus at the time of the events. A harsh penal fine of 20,000,000 piasters was then assessed on the non-Christian population. Those Muslim notables who were held responsible for the riots were exiled to Cyprus, and a portion of their lands confiscated and auctioned.

To what extent was 1860 a watershed as far as the Damascene factions were concerned? A look at the *majlis* members is indicative. Of the 26 men serving at one time or another on the 1840–1860 *majlis*, only 18 were living in 1860.[78] From the 'Azm faction, 'Abdallah Bey b. Nasuh Pasha, 'Abd al-Qadir and 'Abdallah al-'Azm, 'Umar al-Ghazzi, 'Abd al-Hadi al-'Umari and Ahmad al-Hasibi were all exiled to the Maghusa fortress on Cyprus where, under harsh conditions, the elderly Ghazzi and 'Ajlani died. Only two *majlis* members of the 'Azm faction were not exiled, Muhammad and Abu al-Su'ud al-Ghazzi. From the Maydani faction,

76 Spagnolo, 32.
77 Schlicht, 271.

by contrast, only one member, Muhammad al-'Azma, was exiled. Three further Maydani-faction notables, 'Abd al-Qadir Hamza, Raghib al-Hisni and Sa'id al-Ustuwani, do not appear in the events or their aftermath. This faction's two remaining *majlis* members, Mahmud Hamza and Salih Agha al-Mahayini, were cited for their aid to Christians and celebrated by the Europeans as heroes.

It seems clear that the 'Azm faction was held responsible for the events and duly suppressed, while the Maydani faction remained unaffected or were even promoted. Furthermore, the council established to help the inner-city Christians recover some of their property and return to normal activity was formed not only of Catholic and Orthodox Christians but also of a number of Muslim notables who were, with one important exception, members of the Maydani faction.[79] The Maydanis were Mahmud Hamza, Muhammad al-Bitar and Khalil al-Khayyat. The exceptional figure, 'Uthman Bey Mardam, was a newcomer to the Damascene factions and cannot be placed in that framework.

In February of 1861 the new governor, Amin Mukhlis Pasha, called upon 'Uthman Bey Mardam to choose thirty Damascenes who should come to the *seray* and elect a new *majlis.*[80] We are not, unfortunately, informed of the names of the electors Mardam chose. Elected to the *majlis* were 'Uthman Bey himself and a supporter, a certain Khalil Bey. Also elected was Darwish Efendi Manjak-'Ajlani of the Maydani branch of the otherwise 'Azm-faction 'Ajlani family. The remainder of the *majlis* was appointed directly by the governor, who chose Turkish Ottoman officials and Tanzimat appointees as exofficio members and one additional Damascene, Mahmud Hamza of the Maydani faction. Fu'ad Pasha had named new men to fill the vacated posts of *mufti* and *naqib*. The new *mufti,* Amin al-Jundi, and the new *naqib,* Ahmad al-Kuzbari, were both from families which had never held either of these posts in Damascus. Al-Jundi was not even a Damascene and clearly a man who had made his career through the Tanzimat.[81] Al-Kuzbari came from a well-established *'ulama'* and *ashraf* family of Shaghur, in the south of the inner city, and was said to have been named to the post because he prohibited his people from participating in the riots.[82]

However, the Ottoman government remained ambiguous in its support for one faction or the other. In February, shortly after the new *majlis* was formed, Fu'ad Pasha made several gestures in honor of the old local notables and especially those of the *'ulama'*. A few 'Azm-faction notables remained in positions of influence in the early 1860's. Though 'Umar al-Ghazzi was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment and died on Cyprus, his son Muhammad, who had been a *majlis* member, immediately took over the Shafi'i *ifta'* and does not appear to have been contested in this office locally or in Istanbul. The 'Azms themselves also remained in politics

78 Material of a biographical nature in this chapter is drawn from the family histories presented in Chapter VI.

79 *Kitab al-ahzan,* 289–290.

80 Wrench, 4, Feb. 7, 1861, FO 195/677.

81 See the Jundi family history below, 168–169.

82 See the Kuzbari family history below, 207–209.

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in the early 1860's, appearing as the protectors of the Druze chieftain Isma'il al-Atrash when he returned booty to Damascus during the Hawran clashes of 1861 and as incumbents in many important public positions in subsequent years. And finally, representations made by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri in Istanbul succeeded in gaining an early release of the exiles. Their return was celebrated in Damascus in 1866.

While the Tanzimat Ottomans appeared to have come in fully on the side of the Maydani faction immediately following the 1860 events, this was only temporary. As we shall see in Chapter VI, not a single family which had been represented on the 1840–1860 *majlis* was entirely suppressed as a consequence of the events of 1860. As the decade progressed, notables of both factions succeeded in remaining prominent and influential. The aftermath of the 1860 events was, however, important in the politics of Damascus in that, at a time when external intervention was threatened, the Ottomans succeeded not only in retaining and pacifying the city but also in severely disciplining its most powerful faction. The events of 1860 presented the Ottomans with an opportunity to demonstrate the extent of their commitment to control the province, but also the extent to which many Damascene notables had been reconciled to the Tanzimat. As these amenable notables came largely from the traditionally-localist faction of the Maydan, a quieter and more cooperative phase in the relationships between the Damascenes and their imperial government ensued.

Nonetheless, a number of problems remained at the time of Fu'ad's departure. Of particular concern to the Ottomans were the chronic budgetary deficits of the provincial treasury and the disproportionate and in the end negative role European protégés had come to play in fiscal finance and village taxation. Another concern was the on-going struggle to obtain a greater measure of control over the Hawran and other districts to the south of Damascus. In the years immediately following the events of 1860, these two concerns, which have been pursued elsewhere,[83] became the focuses of Ottoman policy in the province of Damascus.

At the end of the 1860's an important refinement in the political relationship of Damascenes to their government took place under the governorship of Rashid Pasha. Like the governors of the early 1860's, Rashid Pasha first devoted his energies to establishing Ottoman control in the Hawran. By dealing directly with the Druzes and the beduin, he undermined the position of the city's *aghawat* who still struggled to maintain clienteles amongst these groups. But Rashid knew that direct control would not hold once he and his troops withdrew – an inevitability given the Empire's problems elsewhere – and as long as local factions continued to battle over control of the hinterland. It was his policy to further reinforce the Damascene factional consensus by reasoning that Ottomans and Damascenes need not dispute over control of Syria's rural zones when there were so many resources to be exploited and that, working together, they could best check the interference of the Europeans.

83 See my "Modellfall" and "Hauran Conflicts", *op. cits.*

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Rashid inaugurated in addition to the administrative *majlis* (*majlis al-idara*) for the province, a municipal council (*majlis al-baladiya*) for the city. To demonstrate good faith to the notables of the previous era he arranged that Muhammad 'Ali al-'Azm was given the title of *pasha* (without a district) and Mahmud Hamza (of the old *ashraf* family) was appointed *mufti*. He also created a new salaried post for the commander of the pilgrimage and guaranteed that this post would always be reserved for a Damascene, a sop to the *aghawat*.

If we are to believe the British Consul Richard Wood, who returned to Syria in the late 1860's, the situation was like this:

> Rashid Basha, knowing that his Government is looked upon as an alien by the inhabitants of Syria, is endeavoring to attract them to its rule, by removing the impression that they are governed for the purpose merely of increasing the revenue and of filling the ranks of the army, without a thought being bestowed for conferring on them those benefits which they are taught to expect from a Government. His Excellency has done much towards repressing corruption and injustice, but there is still a vast field for improvement. The Government standard of education here is painfully low; and many send their children to schools maintained with the funds of European nations, which are respectively drawing to themselves that sympathy which the Government should endeavour to draw to itself. Material improvements have begun but should be carried on with greater vigour. If the local authorities were to persevere in their ameliorations but with increased energy, they will not fail to induce into the population a sense of community of material, social and political interests – a national spirit, in fact, of which the Government will be regarded as the highest expression.[84]

On the whole, Wood's appraisal seems to be accurate because notables of both the Damascene factions responded favorably. The *majlis* in Damascus began discussion on the possibilities of constructing new roads and bridges to assure access to rural areas, of reopening the direct Baghdad caravan route, and on ways of encouraging the extension of agriculture. Personalities like 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, 'Abdallah and Muhammad al-Halabi, 'Ali al-'Azm, Sa'id al-Ustuwani, Muhammad al-Manini, Mahmud Hamza, Antun Shami and Ibrahim Tannus[85] approached the British Consul and, as the latter put it: "earnestly requested me to interest the English public in forming a company for making railroads through Syria as being the sole means of bringing about the civilisation of their country".[86]

At the same time, Rashid Pasha encouraged private capital investment in land and the implementation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. Vast tracts of state land in the Biqa' and in the Hawran were put up for auction and steps were taken to push ahead with registering land holdings and creating some order in the 'chaos' of rural land tenure.[87] In all these steps, Rashid Pasha promoted urban capitalists'

84 Wood, 20, Oct. 26, 1869, FO 195/927. A similar program was being inaugurated in Iraq at this time by the Ottoman reformer Midhat Pasha. See A. Jwaideh, "Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq", St. Antony's Papers, XVI, 106–108.

85 Some of these are discussed in Chapter VI.

86 *ibid.*

87 Hecquard, 17, July 20, 1866, AE Pol/9; Consul Rogers, 27, May 7, 1867, FO 195/806; Eldridge, 64, Beirut, September 30, 1868, FO 195/903.

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interests often to the obvious detriment of the interests of the peasantry.[88]

Of course, not all Damascene notables were in a position to grasp the opportunities Rashid Pasha presented, and many may have cooperated in the spirit of self-preservation and not without bitterness.[89] There were, for example, the difficulties in raising adequate funds to acquire land, and where these should come from if not from Europe. The Mediterranean trade depression of the early 1870's following the Franco-Prussian War had the effect, however, of freeing local mercantile capital for investment in land.[90] This reorientation came together with hardships of the 1870's in the hinterland. Successive years of drought, pestilence and epidemics reduced the peasantry's bargaining position and their will to resist. In consequence, the economy began to permit the accumulation of large, private land holdings in the outer ring. For its part, the government undertook to bring law and order to the hinterland, to break uncooperative alliances amongst rural groups and to improve the infrastructure.[91]

Hardly a family of the pre-1860 period refrained from participating in these opportunities. One of the most spectacular moves was made by the Mardams. 'Uthman and his younger brother 'Ali travelled to Istanbul where they obtained official approval of their rights to the *awqaf* lands of Lala Mustafa Pasha (the Ottoman conqueror of Cyprus) and his wife Fatima Khatun, the daughter of the defeated Mamluk ruler Qansawh al-Ghawri.[92] According to the description of these *awqaf* published by 'Uthman's grandson Khalil Mardam Bey in 1925,[93] they were composed of lands and properties in four different regions of Syria and Palestine: Damascene urban real estate, agricultural land in the northern and southern Biqa' valley and in the Shuf of the Lebanon, agricultural lands in the foot hills of southern Lebanon, around Sidon and Safad, and agricultural lands at a considerable distance to the south of Damascus in Sha'ra, Hula, Jawlan, Jaydur and the Hawran.

88 See the dispatches of Eldridge, *loc.cit.* and his 29, Aug. 2, 1869; 30, Aug. 2, 1869, FO. 195/927 and those of Consul Wood, 5, April 10, 1869, FO.195/927; Eldridge, 7, April 5, 1870; 17, May 12, 1870; 27, Aug. 11, 1870; 30, Aug. 27, 1870; 41, Nov. 5, 1870, 49, Dec. 16, 1870, FO.195/965; Green, 59, Dec. 12, 1873, FO.195/1027; Eldridge, 18, May 4, 1874, FO.195/1047 and his 31, June 20, 1874, FO.195/1047; Robin, 1, April 18, 1872, AECom/5.

89 Abu al-Su'ud al-Hasibi, the son of a prominent Muslim family and a member of the *ashraf*, objected to Rashid's program and the people he promoted. He was irritated by the cooperation of the ['Azm-faction] notables 'Ali Bey al-'Azm and Muhammad al-Halabi and the [Maydanis] Husayn al-Mahayini and Muhammad Agha al-Nuri. (Hasibi/Salibi, 70–72.)

90 The trade depression at the time of the Franco-Prussian war was sustained locally by a decline in agricultural exports, brought about chiefly because of poor harvests and the outbreak of a silk-worm epidemic.

91 See my "Hauran conflicts."

92 The line of descent was officially acknowledged as existing through the Mardam brothers' great-great-great-grandmother Rabiya who was the great-great-granddaughter of Lala Mustafa Pasha.

93 Khalil Mardam Bek (ed.), *Kitab waqf al-wazir Lala Mustafa basha wa yalihi kitab waqf Fatima Khatun*, Damascus, 1925.

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Through exploitation of these extensive holdings it is said that the Mardams gathered "a fortune unequaled in its age".

Similar steps were taken by other notables. Salim al-'Umari, the son of 'Abd al-Hadi (who had been exiled in 1860), travelled several times to Istanbul and finally succeeded in arranging the guardianship of valuable *awqaf* in Palestine with which his father's name had been associated.[94] Amongst the 'Azms, As'ad (known as the "little Pasha") "withdrew from the offices of state" finding it more interesting to work in agriculture. He founded two great farms, one in Duma and one in the near-by village of Masraba.[95] Other notable families who grew "a long hand in agriculture"[96] around this time were the 'Azmas and the Ghazzis. Some notables may have been introduced to agriculture in the course of fulfilling administrative functions. Husayn al-Ghazzi, for example, served as director of the Properties Commission, Mahmud al-Hamza was a member of the Village Debt Commission.

The second development which took place under Ottoman rule at this time was the large-scale admission of the notables of both factions into the expanding local bureaucracy. The Mardams, 'Azms and Yusufs dominated the *majlis al-idara* of the 1870's. The *majlis al-baladiya* provided openings for families of both factions. Amongst its members were representatives of the 'Azm, Ghazzi, Muradi, Hasibi, 'Ajlani, 'Umari, Barudi, Ayyubi, and Kaylani families of the old 'Azm-faction as well as representatives of the Hisni, Sukkar, Mashdani and Ilshi families of the Maydan.[97]

Thus, to a very considerable extent Ottoman policy in the late 1860's and 1870's appears to have succeeded in finally consolidating Damascene support for the Tanzimat with the help of economic and political incentives. Following the shock of 1860, the Damascene notables were carried on the crest of Ottoman centralism in opposition to European expansionism. The two factions consolidated into a single land-holding and bureaucratic Ottoman elite, united by common economic interests on the one hand and an appreciation of the dangers of increased European interference on the other. If the tenor of the Tanzimat edicts continued to disturb many Damascenes – and in particular the *'ulama'* of both the older factions – this last pocket of resistance was probably brought into line by the pan-Islamic policies of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid beginning in the 1880's when the *'ulama's* finances were restored and Sufi orders were promoted. Some attempts were also made to refurbish the Damascene *ashraf*.

By the last quarter of the 19th century, localist politics in Damascus had come to an end. Not because the local elite had been suppressed or were in decline: on the contrary, the greater portion of the old families of Damascus remained prominent and influential not only in the city and its province; some – as we shall see in

94 See the 'Umari family history in Chapter VI.

95 See 'Azm family history in Chapter VI.

96 I.e. *al-yad al-tula*. This is an expression often used in the modern biographical sources. (E.g. Hisni, 849.)

97 The membership of the *majlis al-idara* and the *majlis al-baladiya* were reported in the annual yearbooks (*Salnames*) of the Ottoman empire.

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Chapter VI – even succeeded in climbing into the highest levels of state politics. But they no longer represented the local interests of their lower and middle class factional constituents. The city's elite suppressed its sectoral and factional differences and were gradually to become – through the connections of business and family – a closely inter-connected upper class of bureaucrats, palace courtiers and absentee landlords. Their role as localist politicians had been finally erased by the intentional and unintentional successes of the Tanzimat and the necessity of reacting to European economic and political penetration.

It would be a mistake, however, to end the discussion of the riots of 1860 without mentioning the impact they had on subsequent relations between Christians and Muslims in Syria. Too many defenseless persons had been murdered and molested and too much property stolen or destroyed for the events not to form an important part of the psychological landscape in which both popular appreciation and intellectual discussion of national identity and state composition developed in Syria at this time and henceforth. The implications of the riots in Damascus were convincing enough to persuade thousands of Christians of Damascus and its province to reestablish their homes, crafts and businesses elsewhere. The age-old Christian community of Damascus had received a shock from which it only partially recovered under the establishment of the French Mandate after the First World War, maintaining its numbers in the 19th century only because new waves of villagers continued to migrate to the city. In the meantime, the dispersal of the Damascene Christians in the eastern Mediterranean served to sow seeds of anxiety to many other parts of Syria and the Middle East.

The Christian defeat in Lebanon and the attack on the inner-city Christians of Damascus had resulted in French intervention. But the subsequent protracted negotiations of France, Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia under the presidency of Fu'ad Pasha resulted in a new status only for the mountainous, largely Christian and Druze districts of the Lebanon. The province of Damascus was placed under even tighter Ottoman control as a consequence of the events. While outrage in Europe had aroused the Europeans to improve the administrative organization of the Lebanon, the threat of extended foreign intervention aroused the Ottomans to more determined efforts to hold on to their territory in the interior.

The Syrian coast now received thousands of new Christian settlers from the Syrian interior. The transformation of Beirut into the major entrepot for Syria's trade in the Mediterranean and with Europe – which had already begun in the 1830's – was given renewed impetus by this demographic change. As a consequence 'Christian' Lebanon, until then restricted to regions of Mount Lebanon, reinforced its territorial claims to larger portions of the Syrian coast and especially Beirut. The character of the Lebanon as a Christian refuge was not only emphasized, but the Christian Lebanese claim to the Syrian coast at the cost of the Province of Damascus acquired some elements of historical legitimacy.

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CHAPTER V: SOCIETY

DAMASCENE ESTATES

The absence of formal political institutions in Damascus was a typical feature of Middle Eastern cities of the pre-modern and early modern periods and one which continues to influence social and political organization into the contemporary period. If we are to understand politics and social processes in these societies, therefore, more research must be done to identify the social structures and processes which nonetheless expressed cohesion and momentum or opposition and conflict.

Both during periods when the city was ruled by a faction and at times when suppression or reconciliation had taken place and a precarious 'peaceful unity' was achieved, the city continued to form and sustain social and socio-political structures. These were both more comprehensive than and on another level to the factions, though they could emerge politically in the form of small-scale intra-factional 'insubordination' or, when more successful, as a more generalized alternative to the factional system. On the whole, however, the factions relied on and exploited these structures and their traditions using them to regulate political identity and legitimacy and to resolve internal disputes and conflicts. Their very lack of formal institutional frameworks and procedures gave the factions the freedom to operate politically on all levels of social organization. This appears to have been a relatively durable political mode until the external influences of the 19th century proved overwhelming.

With the aid of the Arabic biographical sources a search for more information on the structures of Damascene society during this period has been undertaken. Given the limitations of these sources, it is unavoidable that the following discussion presents ideas which are at once conclusions and working hypotheses for further research. It is hoped that the broader discussion will not falter because of inaccuracies of some details and the as yet unresolved inconsistencies and gaps in our knowledge.

If we follow the lines of power collection in Damascus of this period we see that the 'politicians' were defined first within their own families which were often large and complicated socio-economic structures, then within a particular estate, then within a faction and then, by virtue of the historical situation and only, it appears, in brief and extreme outbreaks of class consciousness, within a particular class. The entire system had, therefore, a number of highly-developed internal socio-political structures which formed and regulated political expression and mobility and inhibited outright class conflict.

The most comprehensive categories of Damascene political economy in the

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period extending from the early 18th century into the middle of the 19th century were defined by the tensions between the local exchange sector and the long-distance trade sector. We have already discussed how sectoralism underlay the city's far more obvious factionalism and could be used to explain much of its political history at this time.[1] Between the family and factional levels, the estates appear to have been the most important socio-political structures. Whereas the families will be considered in the form of case studies in the next chapter, we shall deal with the estates here.

THE ESTATES

Our definition of estates conforms roughly to that of the central European concept of *Stände.*[2] These are social segments based on the actual or presumed contribution made of a productive or professional nature and the socially and historically-determined estimation of the importance of this contribution according to generally-accepted views of the society's interests. Damascene society of the 18th and 19th centuries can be seen as a formation of seven estates. These can be described as follows:

1. The para-military groups can be more broadly defined as the legitimately and permanently armed elements in society. These were the most politically obvious groups in the city. The para-military troops were institutionalized under the leadership of *aghawat* (singular: *agha*) who administered their payrolls and were responsible for the fulfillment of police and military assignments. This was the only local estate from which the central government drew provincial and district governors at this time.[3] Success in this estate often carried the bonus of economic power through the control over rural surpluses and urban real estate. An outstanding example of a successful career pattern here is presented by the 'Azm family. But there were others who followed along the same path through the state's military service into the local elite and vice versa.[4]

2. The *'ulama'* or the educating, law-interpreting and prayer-leading Muslim religious men with their families formed a second estate. The *'ulama'* could grant or withhold political legitimacy from local factions, local rulers or even empires, or at least claim to be in a position to do so. An informal hierarchical organization within each school of jurisprudence (*madhhab*) led to the rise of certain individuals and families to eminence as teachers and *muftis*. Also important were the careers opened by the state for *'ulama'* as judges and deputy judges in the city's and province's courts. Successful *'ulama'* gained control over religious endowments and

1 See above 16, 18.

2 See *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften*, Stuttgart, 1956–68, VI, 1f.

3 One exception proving the rule was Fathi al-Falaqinsi who unsuccessfully attempted to move from the *ashraf* through the financial administration of the province to the governorship.

4 See the discussion as it continues on page 110.

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were granted stipends and salaries by the state and local patrons. There was, however, no paramount *shaykh al-islam* in Damascus as in Istanbul. Rather, a number of families established as '*ulama*' over several generations vied for religious and political influence with each other and with those attempting to enter their ranks.

3. The *ashraf*, or those Damascenes carrying an accepted claim to genealogical descent from the Prophet, formed a third estate. The *ashraf* were at least theoretically privileged to a number of amenities and an exceptional judicial status. During the early part of the period studied here, however, their social prestige was not as great as their political influence among the lower and lower-middle classes. But this influence was diffuse. In a number of cases, members of an *ashraf* family succeeded in being included in the second estate as well, while others gained positions of leadership in the fourth and fifth estates. Members of families which acquired sustained leadership positions were eligible for the post of *naqib al-ashraf* (syndic) through which the state dealt not only with the *ashraf*, but also with the fourth and fifth estates as well.

4. The local Sufis or Muslims of the mystical path who were organized into orders or brotherhoods might be considered a separate estate because of their importance as basic units of religious identification, social and political integration and mobilization. More research need be done before their status as an estate can be concluded, but at least at the start of the period studied, they should not be confused with the '*ulama*' whose social and political functions were quite different. Both the state and the '*ulama*' succeeded in the course of the 18th century in making in-roads within this estate by means of the formation of imperial and 'orthodox' orders in Damascus which were intended to draw membership away from or to balance the influence of the older local orders. Nonetheless, both the new and the old orders remained important integrative mechanisms especially among the rank and file of the para-militaries, among the artisans and among the ever-increasing numbers of newly-urbanized rural migrants. If we are to view the Sufis as an estate even into the 19th century, then only as a status category of temporary duration from which membership in another estate normally succeeded.

5. The artisans' estate was both the largest and economically most essential category within the settled urban population. Its members were organized through their workshops into occupationally-specific guilds headed by *shaykhs*. The paramount *shaykh* and representative of the guilds before the authorities was the *shaykh al-mashayikh*, but this post was usually combined with that of *naqib al-ashraf* in the 18th and 19th centuries and filled by a member of the *ashraf*.

6. The trading community could also be isolated from these five estates in the period studied here to form a sixth estate. In the early 18th century persons involved in the local exchange sector or in the export-import trade sector and those who dealt between these two sectors as creditors, negotiators or simply as money-changers came from all estates. The trading community was probably not as distinct an entity as is usually assumed. While other estates stagnated or even went into decline in the course of the period studied, this estate emerged more distinctly and grew rapidly, becoming an important separate group which often functioned as an

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integrator much as the Sufis had done in earlier times. We also find here a significant number, though not all of the city's non-Muslims and also many of its more economically successful migrants and 'foreigners' as well as those who had transcended the artisan estate socially and economically and who had not yet joined or were not permitted to join the first three estates.

7. Finally, a seventh estate composed of migrant and semi-urbanized beduin, mountaineers, peasants and villagers formed a residual but large category in Damascene society of the 18th and 19th centuries. In this period, this estate was an ever-increasing pool of human capital which the established Damascene estates could exploit but only partially or marginally absorb. Until the middle of the 19th century, this estate was for the most part peopled by the tens of thousands of Muslim and Christian peasants from the Syrian countryside and mountains who migrated into the city. In the second half of the century, immigrants and refugees from Muslim lands which had fallen to 'Christian' powers increased its ranks further. Largely unsuccessful in their attempts at integration into the established estates, persons of this estate were obliged to squeeze a living from odd-jobbing and by attaching themselves as clients of the elites of the estates or factions. They often did so whenever and wherever a claim of community could be made according to criteria such as language, religion, origin, kinship or one-time estate membership elsewhere or in the past. To survive, however, many were also obliged to return to the countryside seasonally or to serve in the ranks of the regular Ottoman army which recruited in Damascus. Many left the city permanently, settling in the entrepots on the Syrian coast or emigrating to the western hemisphere.

The sources used here permit a detailed consideration only of the first three of these seven estates. With that, the assumptions presented here and in the following discussion can remain only tentative until more research is done on the remaining four estates and the socio-political development of Damascus beyond 1870.

THE FIRST ESTATE: THE PARA-MILITARY TROOPS

Since the decline of the Ottoman feudal system in the 17th century, imperial feudal troops had struck local roots and established themselves and their families especially amongst the artisan population of the city's peripheral quarters.[5] At first the payment of an exemption fee (*badal*) had excused them from participation in imperial campaigns.[6] Eventually, many feudal fiefs under the control of para-military chieftains (*aghawat*, sing.: *agha*) were reabsorbed into the state domains and auctioned annually as tax-farms.[7] Their previous controllers may have been awarded an annual stipend in compensation.[8] Change had also occurred in the

5 For a discussion of the 18th century para-military groups see Rafeq, *Province*, 24–26: Barbir, 89–97.
6 Rafeq, *Province*, 25.
7 Barbir, 93.
8 Wood, 9, March 7, 1845, FO. 78/622.

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membership of the corps as artisans and others 'bought' their way onto the para-military payrolls.

The Ottoman government was unable to curb the local political influence of the para-militaries as it was obliged to rely on them for police functions and to convoy and protect the annual pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. In the second quarter of the 17th century, the state had begun to appoint Damascene *aghawat* as commanders of the pilgrimage.[9]

The para-military troops and their *aghawat* dominated in the extra-mural quarters of Saruja, Qanawat and the Maydan. In that they posed an immediate armed threat to the authority of the state and were critical in the preservation or disruption of factional balances, their *aghawat* were of primary political importance. Though the government made repeated attempts to assert centralized control over these groups, their ties to the local lower and middle classes of the urban population and to the rural populations in the areas through which the pilgrimage passed,[10] continued to frustrate the government's efforts. On the whole, the state was obliged in the 18th century to tolerate the *aghawat's* control over urban quarters, agricultural land, villages and the urban-rural exchange economy.[11]

Even within the city the *aghawat* were assigned spheres of interest by means of 'police' jurisdictions at the city gates, in particular quarters and particular markets or at other strategic points. Thus, in addition to their rural strength, the *aghawat* had gained control over a number of urban economic resources. They dominated the urban grain market and could practice both legal and illegal forms of exchange, market and financial control.

Around 1660, the Ottoman authorities dispatched fresh troops to Damascus in an attempt to suppress the local *aghawat*. The new forces were considered locally to be "imperial" troops and were therefore referred to as *qapi-qul*.[12] They were henceforth used as a counter-weight to the locally-established troops which then came to be known as the *yerliya*.[13] Although the *qapi-qul* also established themselves locally and occasionally caused similar problems for the central government, they nonetheless remained in opposition to the *yerliya*. The most obvious distinction between the two was their geographic division into northern and southern quarters, with the *qapi-qul* in the northern quarters of Saruja, 'Awniya and Sanjakdar; the *yerliya* in the southern quarters of Qanawat and the Maydan. The *qapi-qul* also held their position with the aid of fresh recruits dispatched to Damascus by the central government from Adrianople, Caesarea, Urfa and Kurdistan in the 17th century and from Baghdad and Mosul in the 18th century.[14] They benefited from the rise of the 'Azms as together they were strong enough to dominate over the

9 Rafeq, "Local Forces", 278.
10 Barbir, 149–151.
11 *ibid* and Rafeq, "Local forces".
12 The Turkish term *qapi qulu* (pl. *qapi qullari*), meaning slave of the Porte, is used in Arabic as a collective noun, *qapi-qul*.
13 Rafeq, "Local Forces", 278–279.
14 *ibid*.

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southern *yerliya*. The 'Azms' collaboration with the para-militaries of the north had, as we have seen, decisive effects on the city's political history.

All the para-military troops lived on the periphery of the city not only in a spatial sense but also in a social sense. Much is reported by inner-city writers about their corruptions, armed conflicts and the public nuisances they caused. By the very nature of their functions, the members of para-military groups were, in principle, a transient element in society. They were often expended while performing their functions in escorting the pilgrimage[15] or in the battles between factions within the city[16] or by the actions of especially powerful governors.[17] In addition to losing their lives, the para-militaries were also in danger of losing what property they had. Upon an *agha's* demise, for example, his property could be confiscated, leaving his relatives neither prestige nor wealth upon which to reestablish itself.[18] The illegal economic practices of some of the *aghawat* gave the entire group a bad reputation. They were as a group sometimes referred to as 'swindlers'[19] and could be regarded as outlaws as soon as they fell from legal authority.[20]

Despite their vulnerability, the para-militaries were powerful. Relative to the size of the population as a whole and to the limited number of private troops the Ottoman governors were able to bring with them, the Damascene para-militaries amounted to a considerable political armed element in the city. In 1770/71 when the city's population stood at approximately 40,000, for example, the *qapi-qul* numbered no less than 2000 men and the *yerliya* slightly more than 2000.[21] Added to this was the fact that the ranks of the para-militaries could be constantly replenished during this period of heavy urban in-migration from the countryside.

Despite their importance, the *aghawat* are only marginally treated in the Arabic biographical sources of the 18th and 19th centuries. It is nonetheless possible to gather a considerable amount of information about them from the chronicles, from the more modern biographical sources and from the observations of westerners. In these sources the *aghawat* are, in fact, often of central political importance.

In the early 19th century the city's *aghawat* probably numbered over a hundred individuals with a few thousand men under their control.[22] These were probably the elements referred to by the chronicler at the time of the 1831 revolt as the "*awlad al-balad*" (sons of the town) and their chieftains as the "*aghawat al-balad*".[23] Though no further reference in the 19th and 20th centuries sources are made to *yerliya* or *qapi-qul*, it is clear that the rift among the para-military groups survived

15 Muradi, II, 63–64.
16 *ibid.*, 107–112.
17 See 'Azma family history, 144–146.
18 Muradi, IV, 14.
19 *Tarikh hawadith*.
20 See above, 41.
21 Rafeq notes, however, when reporting these figures that the roles from which he drew these numbers may have been artificially inflated ("Local Forces", 281).
22 This is an assumption drawn from the study of the *aghawat* families (See Chapter VI.)
23 *Mudhakkirat*, 60–61.

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in its 18th century form well into the 19th century. This is apparent at the time of the 1831 revolt and during the Egyptian occupation.[24] That they continued to prosper well into the Tanzimat cannot be disputed. In 1845, the British Consul Richard Wood reported 2500 horsemen being allotted a salary as irregular troops to protect the frontier of the province.[25] It should also be noted that the quarters of Maydan, Qanawat and Saruja in which the *aghawat* dominated were described as prosperous at mid-century.[26] The English visitor Paton remarked on the strength of the Maydan:

> No Turkish Pasha, how well soever his authority might be seated in the town of Damascus itself, dared at any time to apprehend a roysterer of the Maydan: the only authority recognised by this unruly populace was that of the Masha'ikh al Harat, or Agas of the quarter, whom the government always took care to choose from the most influential of their chiefs.[27]

The government's main lever over the *aghawat* in the 19th century remained its granting of jurisdictions, both urban and rural. One can often find reference to these jurisdictions in the sources. Named in connection with the Homs-Hama area in the 19th century were 'Ali Agha al-Kumurli,[28] Da'as Agha al-Jarudi,[29] and Shamdin Agha.[30] Connected to the Biqa' were Ahmad Agha [al-]Yusuf,[31] Ahmad Agha [al-]Buzu,[32] and Amir (sic!) Assin(?) al-Sha'ab.[33] Connected to the Hawran were 'Ali Agha al-Basili,[34] Razzul Agha,[35] 'Umar Agha al-'Abid,[36] 'Abd al-Ghani al-Shamli,[37] and Hasan Agha al-Yaziji.[38] It is very unlikely, however, that these were the only *aghawat* with ties to these areas or that these *aghawat* were not occasionally moved to other jurisdictions. Other *aghawat* families of the Maydan such as the Nuris,[39] the Mahayinis,[40] the Shurbaji-Da-

24 *ibid.*
25 Wood, 13, May 31, 1845, FO. 78/622.
26 Kremer, 20.
27 Paton, 168–169.
28 Bertrand, 4, June, 1862, AEPol/9. This name could be al-Kamarli. The Syrian names appearing in European reports were often inaccurately transliterated. In cases where the name is a clearly recognizable name, the transliteration has been corrected. It other cases caution is called for. See also the individual footnotes.
29 Rogers, 71, Nov., 1867, FO. 195/866; Wetzstein, 494–495. This name could be Da"as.
30 See sketch on the Shamdins, 147–149.
31 See sketch on the Yusufs, 151–153. The family name was not always preceded by the definite article.
32 Wood, FO. 195/226.
33 Hecquard, 7, June 15, 1862, AEPol/7. This may be a member of the Lebanese Shihab family.
34 *Mudhakkirat,* 122.
35 Hecquard, 6, June 31, 1862, AEPol/7.
36 See sketch on the 'Abids, 153–156.
37 Hisni, 884.
38 Rogers, 3, Feb. 5, 1863, FO. 195/760.
39 See ***Mudhakkirat***, 222–223; Hisni, 864; Abkarius, 134; Outrey, 103, Oct. 31, 1860, AEPol/6; Wrench, 12, April 19, 1861, FO. 195/677.
40 See sketch on Mahayinis, pp. 149–151.

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ranis,[41] the Sukkars,[42] the Hakims,[43] the Jubaynas[44] and the 'Asalis[45] were all probably active in the Hawran, though no mention of this could be found in the sources. In a few cases (e.g. the Tillus[46] of Saruja, the Hawasilis of Bab Tuma or the 'Azmas[47] of Shaghur), the quarter mentioned does not lead one to assume a rural connection but perhaps a newly-created urban police function under the Tanzimat. They may have been solely quarter *aghawat*, a category about which we know very little. For *aghawat* such as the Shahbandars,[48] the 'Awdahs,[49] the Barudis,[50] the Khattabs,[51] the 'Urmans,[52] the Tinawis,[53] and the Aghri-Yabuzis[54] no mention either of quarter or rural area has yet been found.

Despite the military and administrative reform attempts of the Tanzimat,[55] it is clear that the *aghawat* remained powerful and politically important. Even after 1860, some of them were to play a key role in the affairs of the Hawran.[56] We shall consider the careers of politically important *aghawat* and their families in the next chapter.

THE SECOND ESTATE: THE *'ULAMA'*

The *'ulama'* (sing.: *'alim*) of Damascus were of obvious political importance by virtue of the moral, religious and intellectual influence they exerted on the Muslim population at large and especially as a consequence of the endeavor in Islam to combine the power of state and religion. Of primary importance was their expertise in Islamic law but they were also influential as teachers and preachers. Among his peers an ambitious *'alim* strove to gain a following of students and initiates and to be heard in the counsels of the city's leadership. As far as the government was concerned, he strove to be included on the *diwans* and *majlises* of the authorities

41 See *Mudhakkirat*, 6–7, 33, 77.
42 Guillois, 9, March 6, 1889, AEPol/15; Husni, 883.
43 Hisni, 859.
44 Bitar, I, 497–498; Shatti, *Rawd*, 28.
45 Hisni, 883–884.
46 Hisni, 686-687, 879; Shatti, *Tarajim*, 207; Zirikli, VII, 121.
47 See sketch of Turkumanis-'Azmas, 144–146.
48 *Mudhakkirat*, 222–223; Hisni, 901–902.
49 Shatti, *Rawd*, 250.
50 See sketch of Barudis, 146–147.
51 *Mudhakkirat*, 234.
52 *Mudhakkirat*, 33, 56.
53 Outrey, 91, Aug. 14, 1860, AEARC/93/4; Poujoulat, 393, 396, 401.
54 Hisni, 872–873; Guillois, 28, Aug. 6, 1895, AEPol/17. Muradi gives this spelling. See also Gabriele Wallbrecht, *Die Gelehrten des Osmanischen Reiches im 17./18. Jahrhundert anhand von al-Muradi*, Dissertation, Saarbrücken, 1970, 296. The family today holds that they are of Greek origin. Their name is associated to a channel beside the Greek island of Euboea, also called Negroponte.
55 See above, 51–53.
56 See my "Hauran Conflicts", *op.cit.*

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and to obtain appointments to positions of control in the city's judicial, religious and learned institutions.

Most of these institutions were not formally arranged into a hierarchy. Yet some were more esteemed than others and these were, not surprisingly, the ones with control over extensive economic resources and having considerable social and political impact. In addition to the religious courts there were the leading mosques and *madrasas* and the properties of endowments (*awqaf*) attached to them. About a dozen posts in the city thus presented members of the *'ulama'* with the opportunity to exercise significant social, economic and political influence. These were the *na'ibs* (deputy judges), the *muftis* (jurisconsults), the *khatibs* (preachers) in the Umayyad mosque and the *mutawallis* of the most important *awqaf*. Let us look more closely at each of these posts.

The *qadis*, *na'ibs* and *katibs*

The central government sent only one chief judicial official to Damascus, the *qadi*. He deputized *na'ibs* and appointed *katibs* (secretaries) to assist in the courts. The *qadi* held office on an annual basis and was the official head of the city's (and province's) judicial system.[57] He held a rank which was inferior only to that of the *qadis* of Istanbul, the Holy Cities, Bursa and Edirne, and was considered of higher rank than the *qadi* of Cairo.[58] Besides presiding at the chief court in Damascus, he also acted, at least theoretically, as a check on the executive branch of the provincial administration. In addition to the appointments of local *naibs*, he commissioned the administrators of local *awqaf* and was authorized to regulate the affairs of the guilds.[59] He may also have been authorized to confirm the *muftis*[60] about whom we shall talk shortly.

The *qadi* served as the chief judge over the entire system of religious law courts which, in the 18th century, handled practically all affairs of the Muslim community and to a large extent those of the minorities as well. The religious law covered commercial and financial transactions, cases concerning the sale and rental of real estate, the protection of religious institutions and their *awqaf* and matters concerning personal status such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the affairs of widows, divorcees, heirs and orphans. All these matters came before the courts under the *qadi*'s jurisdiction if not in litigation, then for notarization and

57 A list of *qadis* in Ottoman Damascus up to the year 1156 AH (1743/44) is given in Salah al-Din al-Munajjid, *Wilat Dimashq fi al-'Asr al-'Uthmani*, Damascus, 1949, 1–69. The biographical dictionaries for the 18th and 19th centuries also mention a number of *qadis*: Bitar, I, 322–23, 378–79, 526–33, 553, 588; II, 863; Shatti, *Rawd*, 53–54, 77–78, 206; *Tarajim*, 22, 44, 74; Hisni, 820. During this period one Damascene held the post, Khalil al-Bakri (d. 1759/60). Another Damascene, Muhammad al-Jabi (d. 1880/81) was *qadi* of Mecca, Baghdad and Istanbul, see Shatti, *tarajim*, 207–208, Hisni, 692–93.

58 Rafeq, *Province*, 43–50.

59 *ibid.*; "Law Courts", 147; Barbir, 104; Paton, 205.

60 Muradi, III, 58–59, IV, 55.

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registration of arrangements achieved informally outside the courts.[61] As the records of the courts demonstrate, members of non-Muslim minority groups took recourse to the Muslim religious courts unless the matter concerned was entirely internal to their group. Even then, decisions might be registered in the Muslim court records to increase their authoritativeness.

It is not clear how many courts (*mahkama*, pl. *mahakim*) existed in 18th and 19th century Damascus. A few of the eight courthouses found by Kremer in 1850[62] were probably established towards the middle of the 19th century when the Ottomans were effecting judicial reforms. Prior to that the situation was probably what it had been in the 18th century when there were only six courts. Of these, the court of al-Bab, located opposite the Madrasa Nuriya (E/4)[63] was the chief court where the Hanafi *qadi* resided. There were in addition, the Mahkama al-Kubra located in the Madrasa al-Jawziya (F/4) in the Suq of Buzuriya[64] and four other courts which were district courts presided over by the *qadi*'s deputies (*na'ibs*). These were placed in locations which indicate that they served four major concentrations of the city outside the inner city: the Mahkamat al-Salihiya was found in that suburb; the Mahkamat al-'Awniya was in 'Amara, the Mahkama al-Sinaniya in Qanawat and the Mahkamat al-Maydan at Bab al-Musalla in the Maydan.[65]

The position of the *qadi* does not appear to have been of central political importance. This is indicated by a lack of information about him in the biographical sources and the fact that he does not appear in political events as related by the chroniclers. On the other hand, Damascene families could enhance their political importance on the few and very exceptional occasions when the Ottomans chose a member of the local '*ulama*' to fill the post. The Bakri family, which historically had considerable influence in many Muslim capitals, entered the modern political scene in Damascus with the career of Ahmad b. Kamal al-Bakri (d. 1695/96) who held the post of *qadi* in the city. At that time the court was even moved to the Bakris private residence. The position was, however, not retained by the Bakris or any other Damascene family as a patrimony. Ahmad al-Bakri's son As'ad (d. 1715/16), for example, subsequently obtained only the post of *na'ib*.[66]

The *qadi*'s political influence in the city was limited by a number of conditions of his tenure. The Damascene '*ulama*' who held the positions of *na'ibs* held their posts for longer periods than the *qadi*,[67] and nearly always came from families of considerable political influence. We can establish that in the 18th and 19th centuries members of the Bakri, Hamza, 'Umari, Ayyubi, Ghazzi and Mahasini families held this post. There was, however, a period at the beginning of the 19th century when the

61 U. Heyd, "Some Aspects of the Ottoman Fetwa", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 32 (1969) 56.
62 Kremer, Topographie, 6, 19, 21.
63 Rafeq, *Province*, 6 and "Law Courts". 143–144; Muradi, I, 200. See Fig. 4.
64 Rafeq, "Law Courts",
65 See Figure 4 for the exact locations of these courts.
66 See the Bakri family sketch, 156–160.
67 See Gibb and Bowen, II, 124.

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courts appear to have been altogether vacant. This may have been one of the consequences of the political disruptions of that period and the failing authority of the state, or the biographical sources may be suppressing the names of the those appointed to serve as *na'ibs* for reasons of a factional nature. In the course of the 19th century, other families were appointed to posts in the judiciary, but the 'Umari family remained especially prominent.[68]

The courts also employed secretaries (*katibs*) who wrote the results of court proceedings in registers and prepared court documents for signature and sealing. Little is known about the persons who fulfilled this function. In a number of cases, however, the biographical sources indicate that a career within the state bureaucracy for and '*alim* began with the post of *katib*, though most of *the katibs* who have been identified came from families which were otherwise already well established '*ulama*'.[69]

As a result of judicial reform during the Tanzimat, the position of *qadi* was weakened. The introduction of more secular courts began with the mixed commercial courts of the 1840's which did not follow Muslim law and introduced non-Muslims and foreigners on a par with Muslim litigants. The court of the *qadi* in Damascus was replaced by the *majlis al-tamyiz* or appeal court in the 1860's and the position of *qadi* was relegated to the purely traditional Muslim religious law courts. The president (*ra'is*) of the *majlis al-tamyiz* came to be considered the *qadi*'s modern counterpart. At the same time that this transformation occurred, a member of an old Damascene '*ulama*' family, the Ustuwanis, was appointed to the new post perhaps in an effort to ease the transition.

The *muftis* and *amins*[70]

Islamic law had been augmented by Ottoman state secular law (*qanun*), and its practice and administration had been assumed by Ottoman judicial officials. Though the *qadi* was posted from Istanbul was theoretically the chief judge in Damascus and could appoint *na'ibs* of his choice, a potential limitation on the jurisdiction of the Ottoman courts existed within the functions of the office of *mufti* (jurisconsult). Damascenes or their intermediaries often relied on the opinions of the *muftis* when the normal informal chanels of dispute-resolution failed before they would open litigation in the Ottoman courts. Cases normally came before the *qadi* or *na'ib* already resolved. They were brought into the court merely to be registered so that the decisions would acquire full legal force.

In principle, anyone could ask the *mufti* for his legal opinion (*fatwa*) on any legal issue. The procedure was facilitated by the formation of a question in writing which would be answered "yes" or "no" by the *mufti* or his appointed assistant,

68 Sketches of the Bakri, Hamza, 'Umari, Ghazzi and Mahasini families are presented in Chapter VI.

69 See, for example, the Mahasini family.

70 This description of the *ifta'* in Damascus is taken largely from U. Heyd, *op.cit.*

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the *amin al-fatwa.* In many cases an additional question which was contingent upon the answer to the first was added at the bottom of the formular. This would also be answered "yes" or "no".

The *mufti* or his *amin* would be required to give an opinion in the case of a dispute in the courts which a *qadi* or his deputies felt incompetent to decide. They might also be consulted by persons living in villages or remote areas where the necessary law books were not available for consultation. And finally, they might be consulted by persons who wished to settle their affairs outside of the courts. It is, moreover, possible that the *muftis* and *amins* participated in more abstract questions of legal interpretation and that they offered their replies verbally. In each case the *muftis* were expected to give opinions according to the *madhhab* (school of jurisprudence) to which they adhered and to cite the authorities upon which they had drawn.

According to Muslim tradition no fee at all was to be charged, but it had become accepted practice in the Ottoman Empire for some remuneration to be paid. A Christian Damascene source reported that the *mufti* of Damascus in office in 1840 accepted only a few paras or at most a few piasters for his *fatwas*.[71] It is of course possible that the *mufti* of Damascus, like that of Jerusalem sometimes accepted gifts rather than or in addition to fees for his services.[72]

Because the office of the *mufti* was uniquely paramount within each *madhhab* and appears, in this period, often to have effectively checked the authority of the Ottoman *qadi,*[73] the men who served in this capacity were amongst the most important and influential '*ulama*' in Damascus. The appointment of the Hanafi *mufti* was one of the most disputed decisions taken in Damascus of this period. In that the *mufti* normally held his post for life a crisis would develop in the city upon the death of a *mufti* with parties forming in support of the various candidates. Though the actual appointment of a *mufti* remained the prerogative of the *shaykh al-islam* in Istanbul and appears to have been carried out by the *qadi,* there was an understanding that the choice would conform with preferences of the Damascene '*ulama*'. In this way the Ottoman authorities endorsed certain members of the local '*ulama*' and expected that the *mufti* chosen be in a position to influence the '*ulama*' and the population at large in the interest of the Ottoman state. By the same token, rapid or abrubt changes in the tenure of the *ifta'* are indications of political instability. (This theme will be elaborated in the prosopography of the families who held the *ifta'* in the next chapter.) We can identify the following persons in the position of *mufti* for each of the three major schools of jurisprudence in Damascus of this period:

71 *Kitab al-ahzan,* 193–94.

72 Heyd, 52–53.

73 Kremer, *Mittelsyrien,* 246. This may not, however, always have been the case. In the early 18th century, for example, the Hanbali *mufti* was obliged to obtain the endorsement of the *qadi.* That he did this with symbolic protest is perhaps an indication of the strains in their relationship. See 174–175.

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Hanafi *muftis*[74]

–1722/23:	Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-'Imadi (d. 1722/23)
1722/23–1725:	Khalil ibn As'ad al-Bakri (d. 1759/60)
1725–1758:	Hamid ibn 'Ali al-'Imadi (During this period, a ten-month interruption in Hamid's tenure took place. At that time the post may have been filled by Khalil ibn As'ad al-Bakri)
1758–1771:	'Ali ibn Muhammad al-Muradi (1719/20–1771)
1771–1774:	Husayn ibn Muhammad al-Muradi (1725/26–1774)
1774 (briefly):	Muhammad As'ad ibn Khalil al-Bakri (dates not given)
1775 (briefly):	Isma'il ibn Ahmad al-Manini (1726/27–1800/01)
1775–1776:	'Abdallah ibn Tahir al-Muradi (d. 1797/98)
circa 1777:	The post appears to have been temporarily vacant.
1778–1791:	Muhammad Khalil ibn 'Ali al-Muradi (1719/20–1791)
1791–1810/11:	This is a period when incumbencies in the post are not well reported in the biographical sources. The little information available gives the following:
	1802/03: 'Abd al-Rahman al-Muradi (d. 1802/03)
	1803/04: As'ad ibn Musa al-Mahasini (d. 1803/04)
	1804/05: Hamza ibn 'Ali al-'Ajlani (d. 1813)
	1805/06: Sa'id ibn Hamza al-'Ajlani (1756/57–1842/43)
	1810/11: Sa'id ibn Muhammad al-Bakri (1727/28–1810/11)
1810/11–1814/15:	'Ali ibn Husayn al-Muradi (1749/50–1814/15)
1814/15–1846/47:	Husayn ibn 'Ali al-Muradi (1756/57–1850/51). This tenure interrupted for five (or twelve) months by Sa'id ibn Hamza al-'Ajlani sometime between 1815 and 1829 and possibly during the 1831 revolt by Hasan Taqi al-Din al-Hisni (d. 1847/48).[75]
1847/48–1860:	Tahir ibn 'Umar al-Amidi (1800/01–1882/83)
1860–1868:	Amin ibn Muhammad al-Jundi (1814–1878)
1868–1887:	Mahmud ibn Nasib al-Hamzawi (1820/21–1887)
1887–1898/99:	Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Manini (1833/36–1898/99)
1898/99–1908:	Salih ibn Muhammad Qattan (d. 1916/17)

74 References to each of these incumbents are presented in the family sketches in Chapter VI.

75 Due to a number of contradictions and the similarity of circumstances, it is not possible to establish if al-Hisni was *mufti* in 1830/31 or in the late 1840's. See the Hisni family history below, 204–207.

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For the most part, the *'ulama'* of Damascus belonged to three of the four schools (*madhhabs*) of orthodox Muslim jurisprudence. Most were either Hanafi or Shafi'i, but a not unimportant group of Hanbalis also existed. Malikism at this time was adhered to only by the north African emigrants who settled in Damascus, largely in the second half of the 19th century. Adherence to Hanafism, Shafi'ism or Hanbalism in Damascus implied more than acceptance of a particular school of legal interpretation. Prior to the Ottoman conquest, the Damascene *'ulama'* had been chiefly Shafi'i, Hanbali and Hanafi[76] in that order, with urban concentrations sometimes being associated to these particular *madhhabs*.[77] During the long centuries of Ottoman rule, localism probably continued to be expressed by adherence to the first two of these schools while Hanafism was sanctioned and fostered by Istanbul.[78] During the 18th century, when the Hanbali Wahhabis of Arabia became a real threat to the Ottoman Empire, little connection to Damascene Hanbalism can be found. However a considerable number of important Damascene Shafi'is switched to Hanafism at this time.[79] This may have been a demonstration of their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and part of the process of Ottomanization in Damascus which took place under the rule of the 'Azms.[80]

Though Hanafism was the dominant *madhhab* in the Ottoman Empire, the Shafi'i and Hanbali *madhhabs* continued to maintain *muftis* in Damascus.[81] In particular, the Shafi'is appear to have had a relatively influential position amongst the *'ulama'* of the city. Not only was their *mufti* an important figure, but several of their number held important *'ulama'* posts,[82] and their leading teachers were recognized as equal if not superior to their Hanafi contemporaries.[83]

76 I.M. Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Massachusetts), 1967, p. 112.

77 Salihiya was a Hanbali concentration; 'Amara, Shafi'i (*ibid.*, 86). See the Ghazzi family history below 169–174.

78 For a study of this development see J. Voll, *op.cit.*

79 More about this will be said in the family sketches presented in Chapter VI.

80 The role of the 'Azm governors is discussed in Chapter II and Chapter VI.

81 U. Heyd (56) wrote that the non-official (i.e. non-Hanafi) *muftis* issued *fatwas* "on limited subjects".

82 For example, some of those who held the prestigeous positions of readers of *hadith* under the Nasr Dome of the Umayyad Mosque and in the Takkiya al-Salimiya were Shafi'is. See the biographical sketches of Muhammad al-Kuzbari (in Chapter VI) and Hamid al-'Attar (Bitar, I, 462–463; Shatti, *Rawd*, 62–63; Hisni, 646).

83 The biographical sources suggest which *'ulama'* were actually influential as teachers among their peers and successive generations by listing the names of teachers of each *'alim*. Those most often mentioned can be grouped according to generation and *madhhab* as follows: It should be kept in mind, however, that most students studied with the leading figures in all three *madhhabs*, though they usually identified with a particular school in the end.

	Shafi'is	*Hanafis*
1.		
	'Ali al-Kuzbari (circa 1688–1752/53)	Ahmad al-Manini (1669/70–1758/59

Shafi'i *muftis*[84]

During this period the Shafi'i *ifta'* was monopolized by the Ghazzi family. The post went through the Ghazzi line as follows:
Ahmad ibn 'Abd al-Karim (1697/98 until his death in 1730/31)
Mustafa ibn Ahmad (1730/31 until his death in 1742/43)
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Rahman (1742/43 until his death in 1753/54)
Muhammad Sharif ibn Muhammad (beginning date not given;[85] term ended with his death in 1788/89)
Kamal al-Din ibn Muhammad Sharif (1788/89 until his death in 1799/1800)
'Umar ibn 'Abd al-Ghani (1801/02 until his death in 1860/61)
Muhammad ibn 'Umar (1807/08–1877/78)

footnote 83 continued:

	Shafi'is	*Hanafis*	
2.			
'Abd al-Rahman al-Kuzbari (d. 1780/81)	'Abd al-Rahman al-Kurdi (d. 1780/81)	'Ali al-Daghistani (d. 1784/85)	Ahmad al-Ba'li (1696/97–1784/85)
3.			
Muhammad al-Kuzbari (1727/28–1806/07)	Ahmad al-'Attar (1725/26–1803/04)	Mustafa al-Rahmati al-Ayyubi (1722/23–1791/92)	'Ali al-Sham'a (1745–1804/05)
		Shakir al-'Aqqad (1744/45–1803/04)	Najib al-Qila'i
4.			
'Abd al-Rahman al-Kuzbari (1770/71–1845/46)	Hamid al-'Attar (d. 1845)	Sa'id al-Halabi (1774/75–1843/44)	
	'Abd al-Rahman al-Tibi (1770/71–1848/49)		

84 See the family sketch in Chapter VI for references.
85 Around 1765/66 the Ghazzis may have temporarily lost the *ifta'* when 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad of Kafr Susiya, a village two kilometers south-west of Damascus, is said to have obtained the post. See Muradi, II, 324; Shatti, *Tarajim*, 261.

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Hanbali *muftis*[86]

–1661:	'Abd al-Baqi ibn 'Abd al-Baqi al-Hanbali (1596/97–1661/62)
1661/62–1714/15:	Abu'l-Mawahib ibn 'Abd al-Baqi al-Hanbali (1634/35–1714/15)
1714/15–1722/23:	'Abd al-Qadir al-Taghlibi (1642/43–1722/23)
probably 1722/23–1735/36:	Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Jalil ibn Abi'l-Mawahib al-Hanbali (1689/90–1735/36)
circa 1774/75:	Ahmad al-Ba'li (1696/97–1775/76)
1774/75–1787/88:	Isma'il ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Jira'i (1722–1788)
1797/98–1827/28:	Mustafa ibn Sa'd al-Suyuti (1750/51–1827/28)
(briefly):	Salih al-Suyuti (d. 1830/31)
1827/28–1840/41:	Sa'id ibn Mustafa al-Suyuti (1781/82–1844/45)
1840/41–1871/72:	Sa'id ibn Mustafa al-Suyuti (1818/19–1871/72)
1871/72–1898/99:	Ahmad ibn Hasan al-Shatti (1835/36–1898/99)
1898/99–1918/19:	vacant (?)
1918/19–1925/26:	Tawfiq ibn Sa'id al-Suyuti (d. 1925/26)
1925/26–1929/30:	Mustafa ibn Ahmad al-Shatti (d. 1929/30)

The *khatibs* of the Umayyad Mosque

The *khatibs* preached in the Umayyad Mosque at the time of the Friday noon prayer which was traditionally obligatory for all free, adult male Muslims resident in the city. In principle, the Ottoman officials and thousands of pious Damascenes performed their prayers together on this occassion. The *khatib* traditionally pronounced his sermon (*khutba*) with an invocation to the name of the contemporary ruler of the city. He was therefore important as a legitimizer of the power relationships over and within the city. Should he fail to mention the ruler's name, this would be a clear indication that the city was in a state of insurrection. If the *khutba* could not be held, this would indicate that a state of anarchy obtained. But even in times of political stability, the *khatib* was of symbolic political importance. The rulers, their contestors and the city's factions would all take pains to have a particular man in this post who symbolized the extent of their respective political strengths. Though no information has yet come to light which would indicate that the Damascene *khatib* exercised his political influence formally through the *khutba*, a number of facts indicate that he was exploited as a political symbol during this period.

86 See Chapter VI for references within the respective family histories.

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In the 18th century, the post of *khatib* was held by members of three different Damascene *'ulama'* families.[87] The Ustuwanis, the Mahasinis and the Maninis. Though the dates of their incumbencies cannot always be culled from the sources. we can gain an idea of the rough order in which members of these families were incumbents. Mustafa ibn Muhammad al-Ustuwani (d. 1713/14) was followed by Sulayman ibn Isma'il al-Mahasini (dates not given), and he by Ahmad ibn Sulayman al-Mahasini (1683/84–1733/34).

At some point towards the middle of the 18th century, three members of the Manini family obtained the post. This despite the fact that the Mahasinis appear to have continued to hold the post as well. From the Mahasinis, Sulayman ibn Ahmad (1726/27–1733/74) and As'ad ibn Musa (d. 1803) were *khatibs*; from the Maninis, Ahmad ibn 'Ali (d. 1758/59, 'Umar ibn Ahmad (d. 1765/66) and Isma'il ibn Ahmad (1728/29–1778/79). The confusion here may stem from the fact that a particular teaching post in the Umayyad Mosque took on new importance at this time. Whoever held the Qubbat al-Nasr teaching post in the mosque during the 18th century was also considered to be *khatib*. The elevation of the respected teaching *'alim* al-Shihab Ahmad ibn 'Ali al-Manini by this means to a par with one of the families which had held the *khitaba* as a patrimony may well have reflected the increased political impetus given to particular Damascene *'ulama'* under the 'Azms. As we shall see in Chapter VI, the Maninis were closely tied to families of the 'Azm faction and especially to the Muradis who dominated the office of *mufti* under the 'Azms.

Around the turn of the 19th century, however, this political impetus appears to have waned. Though the Maninis and the Mahasinis remained in the office of *khatib*, it was not (as was usually done) noted that they actually preached. Here we have an indication that some kind of 'anarchy' had intervened in Damascene political relationships. The imprisonment and death of the *khatib* As'ad ibn Musa al-Mahasini by Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar can perhaps be understood within this framework.

The *khitaba* revived possibly in the 1820's or even later as a consequence of, or in reaction to the revolt of 1831. Beginning about then the city produced many active *khatibs*. Not only the Mahasinis and the Maninis but even the Ustuwanis who had held the post of *khatib* prior to the 'Azm era began preaching again, and a new family, the Halabis, also contributed incumbents.

The Egyptian occupiers did not interfere with this post nor with any other *'ulama'* posts. Ibrahim Pasha made it specifically clear that the *khatibs* should continue to invoke the name of the Sultan in the *khutba*. Nor was he offended by the indifference showed him by Sa'id al-Halabi when Ibrahim Pasha attended the Umayyad Mosque.

Two important modifications can be noted during the Tanzimat. First, the *khitaba* was switched within some of the old families to a secondary branch and finally away from these families altogether. In 1870/71 a new family, the Khatibs (sic!), were appointed *khatibs* after which the post was no longer held by the

87 *ibid.*

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families which had so long been associated to it. Secondly, all these families, old and new, were appointed to positions in the Damascene courts. The connection between preaching and service in the courts was especially promoted by the Khatib family whose members made it their practice to preach in all the localities where they were appointed as judges.

Leading members of the '*ulama*' estate and their families will be discussed in the next chapter.

THE THIRD ESTATE: THE *ASHRAF*

The *ashraf* were Muslims who held a locally-accepted claim to descent from the Prophet Muhammad.[88] Individually, they were referred to as "*al-sharif*" (fem.: "*al-sharifa*") or "*al-sayyid*" (fem.: "*al-sayyida*") with the latter formulation being far more prevalent than the former. It cannot be established within the framework of this study whether or not the *ashraf* were at some point in the past a more clearly succinct social and socio-political entity than they were in the 18th and 19th centuries. We can only suggest that as a group they experienced a marked and progressive decline during the period studied. The attempts made by Istanbul towards the end of the 19th century to revive the status of the *ashraf* may have served the interests of particular families, but they did not revive the *ashraf* as an estate. One of the most telling indications that we have that the Syrian *ashraf* have declined is the now socially-accepted practice of using the form of address "al-sayyid" as "mister" as widely as this is used in western societies. The formerly precise connection of this form of address to the *ashraf* has been lost. We shall talk shortly of the diffusion of the *ashraf's* influence and connections in society.

During the period studied, only a few hundred *ashraf* were mentioned in the sources. Most of these were members of otherwise prominent families while others appeared individually. As they amounted to some thirty families we may speculate that the *ashraf* were a sizeable group of perhaps 500 persons in the 18th century, growing by the end of the 19th century to number about 2000.

Not only did the *ashraf* have something of the social prestige in Muslim society which might be compared to that enjoyed by the nobility in European societies, they held, at least theoretically, a number of legal and economic privileges. Chief among these was their exemption from military service. In addition, they were entitled to revenues drawn from particular properties endowed for their benefit and were the recipients of annual donations from the state made at the time of the pilgrimage. The *ashraf* may also have stood outside the jurisdiction of the Damascene Ottoman courts and have come for litigation to their own syndic (*naqib*).[89] But

88 For an historical survey of the development of the *ashraf* with relevance to Syria and especially Aleppo see H.L. Bodman, *Political Factions in Aleppo 1760–1826,* Chapel Hill, 1963, 81f. See also *Mudhakkirat,* 176–77; al-Hasibi, *op.cit.;* Bitar, I, 146.

89 See below 194–207.

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more systematic research is required to establish to what extent these privileges were actually applied to the *ashraf* in the period studied here. It can be noted that at least in 1860, *ashraf* were amongst those executed by Fu'ad Pasha for their role in the events without the benefit of a trial before their *naqib*,[90] but this may have been an exceptional event. Abu Manneh has found in his work in Ottoman documents that Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid granted the important *ashraf* family, the Kaylanis, exemption from military service, which would indicate that they were not privileged to this exemption previously.[91] It would seem reasonable to expect that privileges once enjoyed by the *ashraf* were undermined in the course of the 19th century with the introduction of regular armies and general conscription and the extension and reform of the judicial system. Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid may have been attempting not to revive the *ashraf* but to gain the political support of particular provincial families by granting them the privileges formerly held by the *ashraf*.

Genealogy nevertheless remained of central importance among the *ashraf* well into the 20th century. It was the proof of their nobility and their 'license' to belong to this still prestigeous estate in Damascus regardless of geographic origin, occupation, level of education or wealth. In this connection some of the *ashraf* appear to have held a superior claim to others. In the 18th century some *ashraf* were, in addition to *al-sayyid*, also entitled al-Hasani or al-Husayni. This additional designation indicated that the line could be traced to one or the other of the brothers Hasan and Husayn (Muhammad's only grandsons) through the entire patrilineage. The sudden appearance of *sayyids* in a number of families which were otherwise not considered *ashraf* indicated that a marriage with a woman of the *ashraf* had taken place and that the noble blood had been passed matrilineally. Children of such marriages were considered *sayyids*, but not given the title al-Hasani or al-Husayni. With the arrival of grandchildren, moreover, the noble blood was considered to have dissolved and they were not even entitled *sayyids*. If recognition was given to the fact that noble blood was also passed through a multigenerational female line of *sayyidas* descending from the Prophets's daughters Zaynab, Fatima, Rukaiya and Um Kalthum, this did not receive any notice in the sources used here.

The designation of many *ashraf* as "Fatimid" by the biographers al-Hisni and al-Sayyadi cannot be explained in this connection because these *ashraf* were also presented in patrilineages.[92] The Damascene al-Hisni may have been using this device to indicate an older, and perhaps nobler, group of *ashraf* who emigrated from Egypt to Damascus in Mamluk times.[93] Al-Sayyadi, writing from Istanbul, may have been using the adjective Fatimid to bridge over the distinctions made between Hasani and Husayni *ashraf* in Damascus, stressing the point that both were also descendants of Fatima. These distinctions had taken on political overtones in

90 Salibi "Shaykh Muhammad", 199.
91 Abu Manneh, 139.
92 al-Hisni, 817, 825–26.
93 W. Brinner, "The significance of the *harafish* and their sultan", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 6 (1963) 211. See also 'Ajlani family sketch, 201–240.

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Damascus where the overwhelming majority of *ashraf* were Husayni *ashraf* and only two (but very important and politically controversial) families were Hasanis. It is interesting that of the two biographers only al-Sayyadi considered the Kaylanis to be Fatimids; al-Hisni did not. The Kaylanis were at the center of the 'Azm faction and closely tied to al-Sayyadi's own family; the Hisnis came from the localist faction. Further, neither al-Hisni nor al-Sayyadi considered the Jaza'iris as Fatimids. The members of this family were also Hasani *ashraf* and were very active in politics. They were considered a threat to Ottoman rule in Damascus because of their ties to the French[94] and were never fully accepted into Damascene society.

Unlike the *aghawat* but even more so than the '*ulama*', the *ashraf* had diffuse influence in the city. They cannot, for example, be identified with a particular topographical region of the city. *Ashraf* lived both in southern and northern quarters and both inside and outside the city's walls. Also to be noted is that a few *ashraf* in Damascus were there newly or only temporarily and did not have the ties of longer-established Damascenes. In this respect, they were not different from many members of other Damascene estates. Newcomers among the *ashraf* usually came from villages of the Damascene hinterland but also, in a number of important exceptions, from distant lands of the Muslim world.[95]

Within the Damascene religious community, the *ashraf* were dispersed not only among three of the major schools of jurisprudence – the Shafi'i, Hanafi and Maliki (while none appear as Hanbalis),[96] a few of them also had been and/or continued to be associated with Shiism. Many of them excelled as religious scholars, teachers and jurists while many were also leading figures amongst the Sufis, both as guides and as patrons of particular orders. Nearly all the families which produced an incumbent in the *naqaba* (syndic) of the *ashraf*, for example, maintained *zawiyas* (chapels) for Sufi meditations. But this close connection to Sufism needs more research before implications can be drawn: was Sufism the *ashraf* link to the artisans?

In contrast to families of the first and second estates, the locally-established *ashraf* appear to have been closer to the artisans. Some names show that they or their families were or had at some time in the past been artisans. The sources also reveal that families like the Falaqinsis had once been weavers; the Sultans were *mu'adhdhins* (callers to prayer). Further evidence of ties between the *ashraf* and artisans is indicated by the connections between the leaderships of the two groups, about which we shall talk shortly. The following lists of *ashraf* named in the sources used here includes, wherever possible, indications of further identifying characteris-

94 See the Kaylani and Jaza'i sketches in Chapter VI.

95 Only when a certain degree of permanency had been achieved, have these new-comers been included on the list below. Thus, persons like al-Sayyid Rafi' al-Azbaki or al-Sayyid Mustafa al-'Alwani have not been included (see Muradi, II,116, and IV,142–154, respectively).

96 In recent correspondence with the Suyuti family, who are important Hanbalis, the attribute "al-Husayni" has been used. As this title is, however, not acknowledged by the 18th and 19th century biographers of the family, I have not included them amongst the *ashraf* in the discussion here. See their sketch in Chapter VI.

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tics. Following the family names, indications are given to lineage, *madhhab* (school of jurisprudence), quarter of residence, occupation, and association, when relevant, to Shiism or to a Sufism. The first group are families which were fully accepted as members of this estate; the second group are families in which isolated individuals were entitled *al-sayyid*.

Some *ashraf* families of 18th and 19th century Damascus:

al-Iji[97]	Husayni, Fatimid, Hanafi, '*ulama*'.
al-Ilshi[98]	Husayni, Hanafi, from a southern quarter, merchants, then '*ulama*'.
al-Jaza'iri[99]	Hasani, Maliki, from Salihiya quarter, para-military chieftains, landholders and '*ulama*', Qadiri Sufis.
al-Hajjar[100]	Husayni, Fatimid, 'Asruniya and Sinaniya quarters, merchants, later in military careers.
al-Hasibi[101]	Husayni, Hanafi, from 'Uqayba and Qanawat quarters, artisans, '*ulama*', landholders.
al-Hisni[102]	Husayni, Fatimid, Shafi'i, later Hanafi, Shaghur and Ma'dhanat al-Shahm quarters, patronized a Sufi *zawiya*, some members in the Naqshbandi Order, others in the Safarjalani and Rifa'i Orders.
Hamza[103]	(also known as Ibn Hamza and later as al-Hamzawi) Husayni, Fatimid, Hanafi, 'from 'Amara quarter, '*ulama*' and property holders, later in the Khalwati and Shadhili Orders.
Zayn al-'Abidin[104]	Husayni, Fatimid, Shafi'i and Hanafi, from a southern quarter, Khalwati Order.
al-Dasuqi[105]	Husayni, Fatimid, Shafi'i, from a southern quarter, '*ulama*', leaders of the Khalwati-Dasuqi Order.

97 See Muradi, I, 254; Hisni, 814.

98 See Bitar, II, 637–639; Shatti, *Tarajim*, 97; Hisni, 880-81.

99 See below, 215–218.

100 See Hisni, 814–15; Voll, 51.

101 See Bitar, I, 164 (note), II, 1093, III, 1375–1381; Shatti, *Rawd*, I, 187–188, 232–233; Hisni, 828–829; Salibi, "Shaykh Muhammad", 185–202 and below 209–211.

102 See Muradi, II, 5–6, IV, 128; Bitar, I, 33, 413–414, 488–489 Shatti, *Rawd* 60, 73, 105, 162–163 and *Tarajim*, 49; Hisni, 600, 618–649, 817–819; *Mudhakkirat*, 87.

103 See Hamza family sketch, 197–200.

104 See Bitar, II, 719–20, III, 1230–1239, 1335–1337; Hisni, 680–682, 702–706, 754, 816; Shatti, *Rawd* pp. 220–223 and *Tarajim*, 24–25, 38–39; Khalil Mardam Bek, *A'yan al-qarn al-thalith 'ashar fi al-fikr wa-l-siyasa wa-l-ijtima'*, Beirut, 1971, 7, 37–39; Khayr al-Din al-Zirikli, *al-A'lam*, Beirut, 1969, I 147; VI, 267–268; VII, 152.

105 See Muradi, I, 52–53, II, 82–83; Bitar, II, 724–726, III, 1352–1353; Shatti, *Rawd*, 33, 125–126, 212; Hisni, 814–664.

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al-'Ajlani[106]	Husayni, Fatimid, Shafi'i and Hanafi, from a central quarter and from the Maydan.
al-Sumadi[107]	Husayni, Shafi'i, later Hanafi, from the Maydan and Shaghur quarters, traders and landholders, leaders of the Qadiri-Sumadi Order.
al-Kaylani[108]	Hasani, Fatimid, Hanafi, from 'Asruniya quarter in the central rectangle, merchants, landholders, *'ulama'*, leaders of the Qadiri Order.
al-Muradi[109]	Husayni, Hanafi, from Suq Saruja and a central quarter, *'ulama'*, leaders of the Naqshbandi Order.
al-Murtada[110]	Husayni, Fatimid, Hanafi, from a southern quarter, associated with Shiites.
al-Munayyir[111]	Husayni, Shafi'i, from a southern quarter, merchants and later landholders.
al-Muwaqqi'[112]	Husayni, from the Maydan, *'ulama'*, craftsmen and merchants, Qadiri Order.
al-Nasri[113]	(also known as al-Husri) Husayni, Fatimid, Shafi'i, *'ulama'* and later as army officers and doctors, Khalwati Order.

18th and 19th century Damascene families with ties to the *ashraf*:

al-Bakri[114]	Hanafi, from a central quarter, *'ulama'* and landholders.
al-Bahnasi[115]	Hanafi, from a northern quarter, *'ulama'* and landholders.
al-Bayazid[116]	Shafi'i, merchants and *'ulama'*.
al-Khatib[117]	Shafi'i, from a northern quarter yet closely associated to the Sinaniya mosque in Darwishiya, merchants, *'ulama'*.
al-Khayyat[118]	silk merchant circa 1860.

106 See 'Ajlani sketch, 201–204.
107 The vocalization of this name is not established. See Muradi, I, 172–173, III, 60, IV, 179–183; Bitar, II, 921; Shatti, *Rawd*, 161-162; Hisni, 854–856.
108 Source material for this family is cited in the family sketch, pp. 194–196.
109 See Muradi family sketch, 160–165.
110 See Bitar, 674–675; Shatti, *Rawd*, 118–119; Hisni, 813–814. The Murtadas were not specified as Shiites but administered an important Shiite shrine in the vicinity of Damascus.
111 See Muradi, I, 220–221, 227, III, 5–6; Bitar, I, 311, III, 1346–1347; Shatti, *Rawd* 49, 234; Hisni, 643, 678–679, 860–861.
112 Hisni, 911; Zirikli, VIII 54.
113 Hisni, 815–16.
114 See the sketch of the Bakri family, 156–160.
115 See Muradi, I, 192–196, 199; II, 240–243, III, 21–25, IV, 3–5; Voll, 50.
116 See Shatti, *Rawd*, 144; Hisni, 669, 860; Rogers, 22, June 12, 1861, FO. 195/677.
117 See Bitar, II, 918; Shatti, *Rawd*, 150–159; Hisni, 826–827, 669–670 and 191–193 below.
118 *Kitab al-ahzan*, 290.

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Daqqaq al-Duda[119]	Shafi'i, caller to prayer.
al-'Atiki[120]	(also called Siwar al-'Atiki) Shafi'i, from Qabr 'Atika quarter.
al-'Azm[121]	from northern and central quarters, *aghawat* and governors, landholders and merchants.
al-'Ani[122]	Shafi'i, originally from the Maydan, landholders, farmers, '*ulama*', ties to Sufism.
al-Sarmini[123]	Hanafi, from a northern quarter, '*ulama*'.
Sultan[124]	Hanafi and Shafi'i, from a northern quarter, callers to prayer.
al-Ghazzi[125]	Shafi'i, from the 'Amara quarter, '*ulama*', *muftis* of the Shafi'i.
al-Falaqinsi[126]	Hanafi, from Qaymariya quarter, originally weavers, in mid-18th century obtained the post of *defterdar*, landholders.
al-Kuzbari[127]	Shafi'i, from the Shaghur quarter, '*ulama*' and merchants.

The top position among the *ashraf* was that of *naqib* (syndic). Theoretically, the *naqib* was the final reference on matters related to the *ashraf* and the guarantor of their noble standards.[128] But he was also their protector and representative before the Ottoman authorities and the arbitrator of disputes involving *ashraf*. It is remarkable, however, that evidence of the *naqib* actually fulfilling these functions is lacking in the sources used here.

In addition to the *niqaba* a *naqib* often held the position of *shaykh al-mashayikh*, or the two posts would be held by different members of the same family.[129] This second post was recognized by the authorities as the paramount office over the guilds and the Sufi orders as well. In the sources used here, the post was mentioned only on a few isolated occasions and not in a way which elucidates its functions or political significance. In that neither the *naqib* nor the *shaykh al-mashayikh* emerged

119 Shatti, *Rawd*, 197–98.
120 See Muradi, I, 112–113; II, 159–160; III, 142; IV 218f; Shatti, *Rawd*, 215; Hisni, 907.
121 See 'Azm sketch, 136–144.
122 See Muradi, I, 214 and IV, 28–29; Bitar, III, 1339, 1487–1489, Shatti, *Rawd*, 223, 241; Hisni, 695, 879.
123 See Muradi, II, 56–58; Hisni, 872.
124 See Shatti, *Rawd*, 214–215; *Tarajim*, 197.
125 See the sketch of the Ghazzi family, 169–174.
126 See Muradi, I, 163–167, II, 220–229, III, 135–136, 148–150, 279–287; more about this family, 61, 126, 182.
127 See sketch on the Kuzbaris, 207–209.
128 For a late 19th century description of the functions of the *naqib al-ashraf*, see Bitar, II, pp. 1042–1044.
129 The following were named as *shaykh al-mashayikh:* Husayn b. 'Umar Manjak al-'Ajlani (d. 1827/28) (see Bitar, I, 340–341); Hashim ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Taji (d. 1846/47); Amin b. Husayn Manjak al-'Ajlani (1803/04–1866/67); Ahmad b. Amin Manjak al-'Ajlani (d. 1895/96). See Bitar, I, pp. 340–341; Shatti, *Rawd*, 56–57; *Tarajim*, 55; Qudsi, 43–44.

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with independent political importance in the events of the 18th and 19th centuries, we may speculate that they were subordinated at this time to other political entities. But further research need be done to draw conclusions here. The possibility that the *naqib* may have been of political importance in the past must be considered seriously.

The list below is an attempt to establish the incumbents in the post of *naqib al-ashraf*.

18th and 19th century *naqibs* of the *ashraf*:[130]

Years of Office	*Incumbent*	*Life Span*
	'Abd al-Karim ibn Muhammad Hamza	1641/42–?
	Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Hamza	1644/45–1708/09
	Hasan ibn 'Abd al-Karim Hamza	dates not given
	Yahya ibn Hasan Hamza	dates not given
	Hasan ibn Hamza al-'Ajlani	d. 1719/20
beginning 1737/38	'Ali ibn Isma'il al-'Ajlani	1715/16–1770/71
intermittently between 1737/38 and 1758/59	Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Qadir al-Kaylani	d. 1772
briefly in 1753/54 and 1758/59	Hamza ibn Yahya Hamza	1730/31–1802/03
1758/59–1769/70	'Ali ibn Isma'il al-'Ajlani	1715/16–1770/71
1770/71	'Abdallah ibn Isma'il al-'Ajlani	dates not given
1770/71–1802/03	Hamza ibn Yahya Hamza	1730/31–1802/03
1785/86	Khalil ibn 'Ali al-Muradi	1759/60–1791/92
1802/03–1812/13	Hamza ibn 'Ali al-'Ajlani	d. 1812/13
1812/13	Sa'id ibn Hamza al-'Ajlani	1756/57–1829/30 or 1842/43
1812/13–?	'Abd al-Muhsin ibn Hamza al-'Ajlani	d. 1846/47

130 See Chapter VI, the respective family sketches, for references.

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1830/31 (?)	Darwish ibn Muhammad Hamza	1785/86–1833/34
	Isma'il ibn 'Abd al-Ghani al-Ghazzi	1792–1831/32 or 1834/35
	Hasan ibn Taqi al-Din al-Hisni	d. 1830/31 or 1847/48
	'Abd al-Muhsin ibn Hamza al-'Ajlani	d. 1846/47
until 1846/47	Raghib ibn Sa'id al-'Ajlani	1820/21–1846/47
shortly in 1846/47	Nasib ibn Husayn Hamza	d. 1849
1847/48–1860	Ahmad ibn Sa'id al-'Ajlani	d. 1860
1860–1881	Ahmad Muslim al-Kuzbari	(dates?)
1881	Darwish Manjak-'Ajlani	1813/14–1881
1881–1889	Ahmad Manjak-'Ajlani	d. 1895
1889–1893	Salih ibn 'Abd al-Qadir Taqi al-Din al-Hisni	1840/41–1892/93
1893–1898	unnamed members of the 'Ajlani family	
1898–1908	Abu al-Su'ud al-Hasibi	d. 1913/14
1908–1918	Muhammad Adib Taqi al-Din al-Hisni	1874–1940
1920	Muhammad 'Ali ibn Abi al-Su'ud al-Hasibi	1874–1922/23
	Ahmad ibn Abi al-Su'ud al-Hasibi	
post –1920	members of the Hamza family	

Individuals and families of the *ashraf* estate will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

THE ESTATES AND THE ELITE

It would be reasonable to assume that a position within the city's political elite would have been determined by accession to leadership within the estates. Thus the *aghawat*, the *muftis*, *na'ibs* and *khatibs*, the *naqibs* and the *shaykhs* of the guilds and Sufi orders, the wealthiest merchants and, once in a while, a charismatic figure among the city's 'riff-raff' would have been the city's politicians.

In fact, persons in these positions often did play a key role in politics, and there were few persons of political importance who did not hold one of these posts or come from a family which did so. But their political activities were only minimally based on their position within their respective estates. The estates were neither internally united, nor were they viable political entities. They were unsuccessful in disciplining their members and failed to block the influences of factionalism, external forces and class conflict. The estates simply did not transcend other political

influences in the city. As we have seen in Chapters II and III factional rivalries within the estates were fierce, and external interference on the part of the state and foreign powers added considerably to the political confusion.

When, beginning in the 1870's, prominent representatives of the leading estates appeared to be cast in a more 'ideal' pattern of political activity, they did so at a time when the estates were anyway defunct as political structures. Their new functions were rather administrative in nature. The Hamidian Ottoman government resuscitated the *'ulama'*, *ashraf* and Sufis as groups but only in order to gain the support of particularly influential provincial family contingents of the emergent elite which had formerly identified with these estates. Most telling was the amount of juggling and switching the late 19th century elite families went through in order to reap the benefits of attachments to several different estates.

As we shall see in the coming chapter, economic change, the Ottoman Tanzimat and western political pressure which resulted in an increase in central state control and the establishment of western dependency in the economy promoted an elite of local notable families who were amenable to a new estateless, factionless order. These changes were ushered in on factional, not estate or class, lines due to the 'accident' of one faction (the Maydanis) being economically and politically the most amenable to them. But eventually the leading families of the new order were drawn freely from both factions, from families which had once played leadership roles within the estates, and from families which were totally new in Damascus With economic, administrative and demographic expansion there was, as it were, enough room at the top to placate them all.

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CHAPTER VI: PROSOPOGRAPHY
THE LEADING FAMILIES OF THE FIRST THREE ESTATES

The following is an attempt to deal with both sociological and historical questions at an individual and family level. Initially, it was my hope to identify the elite(s) of Damascus, that is, to actually name a significant number of the elite's members, to present their personal and family histories and to formulate these as a basis for more general historical theories. Given the size of Damascus in the period 1785–1870 – from about 40,000 to about 150,000 inhabitants – and the extensive nature of the Arabic biographical sources, this at first appeared a manageable task. I undertook the translation and codification of the biographical dictionaries and compiled an index of biographies of all Damascenes mentioned who lived during the period studied. This amounted to a file of some 4000 individuals, representing some 200 families.

Yet my attempts to write history on the basis of this material were wrecked between the scylla of 'ask-little, tell little' biographies and the charybdis of my inability to define historically the concept of elite. It seemed unobjective to say, "this man," perhaps a poor Sufi, an Agha or the biographer's own father-in-law, "was a member of the Damascene elite" because he was mentioned amongst the *Embellishment of Mankind* of al-Bitar, the *String of Pearls* of al-Muradi or the *Garden of Humanity* of al-Shatti. Nor could I believe that being a member of the elite had only rarely and marginally to do with being wealthy as this interpretation of the Arab biographers would lead us to accept.

Only following a broader study of events, topography and economy did a number of small but encouragingly significant pieces begin to fall into place. It was then possible to see increasingly more substantial connections between individuals and a number of structures in Damascene society, and to hypothesize both the times at which and the episodes by means of which significant shifts, developments, conflicts and their resolutions would be of relevance to politics.

The following is a presentation of those biographies and family histories which emerged as relevant. An effort has been made to present as much material as possible, even when this material was not of central significance to the study as it developed. The family histories can, therefore, be read as a prosopographical appendix as much as an integral chapter of the study.

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NOTE ON SOURCES

The Arabic biographical dictionaries[1] are not a comprehensive guide to local socio-political history. It would be clearly inappropriate to expect them to be as they were, at least ostensibly, written by *'ulama'* for *'ulama'* concerning *'ulama'*. Nonetheless they are invaluable as a primary historical source, permitting us to follow structures within the Muslim tradition and, when closely and critically read, giving indications of social and political relationships between the prominent persons of this tradition and the society as a whole. On not a few occasions, moreover, persons of purely political importance are also discussed.

There are, however, other primary sources. A vast amount of social and socio-economic material can be found in the thousands of local court registers which have now been made accessible to researchers in the Damascene National Archives. This source was, unfortunately, not fully available when the research for this study was done. In the meantime many researchers have had the opportunity to study the court registers and I have particularly benefited from the results published by Abdul-Karim Rafeq.[2] I was able to see a limited amount of court records and *awqaf* records in the Palace of Justice and National Archives, respectively, and some *sufi* materials and genealogies at the 'Azm Palace museum, all of which provided useful information.

Another primary source of information are the unpublished and published observations of contemporary western observers. However impressionary or biased they may have been, western travellers, missionaries and offical representatives have left us a significant amount of biographical and socio-political information on Damascenes.[3] To a certain extent they compensate for some of the short-comings of the biographical dictionaries. But they, too, cannot be considered as comprehensive guides even for the Jewish and Christian communities with whom the westerners were most intimately associated.

Finally, the living descendants of prominent persons are often helpful sources of rich and useful information. In some cases an effort has been made to publish a family history.[4] In others the families have preserved important biographical, genealogical and property records and are often generously cooperative in sharing this information with historians.[5]

1 A full list of the Arabic biographical sources is given in the bibliography under a separate heading.

2 Abdul Karim Rafeq, "Local Forces", "Law Courts".

3 A full list of European published and archival sources is given in the bibliography.

4 See for example: 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Azm, *al-Usra al-'Azmiya*, Damascus, 1951; 'Abd al-Qadir Badran, *al-Kawakib al-durriya fi tarikh 'Abd al-Rahman Basha al-Yusuf*, Damascus, 1920.

5 The names of modern sources of family information are given in each of the family sketches.

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NOTE ON THE GENEALOGIES

Most of the following family sketches are accompanied by a genealogy. The genealogies vary greatly in comprehensiveness depending on the source material available. In many cases, it was possible to gain more information than was provided in the published sources by means of interviews or correspondence with present-day members of the family. In some cases the families provided a genealogy in graphic form which was then adapted to the framework of this study. Sources for the genealogies are cited in the general footnote for each family.

An effort has been made to transliterate individual names as completely as possible. Where uncertainties remained, the name has been marked with an (*). Additional information of a biographical nature is often provided in an abbreviated form to aid in locating specific individuals discussed in the text. When known, the family name of the spouse is given following the symbol (+).

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THE FIRST ESTATE: THE *AGHAWAT*

In the mid-17th century, a certain Ibrahim, the recognized forefather of all the 'Azms of the 18th through 20th centuries, participated in an Ottoman campaign to quell Turkomani tribes in the region around Ma'arra between Hama and Aleppo in central Syria. By the beginning of the 18th century, Ibrahim's son Isma'il had obtained the governorship of Ma'arra and Hama, and the state granted him control over extensive lands in that region as life leasehold (*malikane*).[6] At this stage, the 'Azms also arranged a marriage between an 'Azm and the daughter of a local *ashraf* family called al-Haraki, giving the children of the marriage the right to call themselves *ashraf*. A marriage with the Kaylani family of Hama, which was closely associated with the Qadiriya Sufi order, was also arranged at this time.[7] The 'Azms soon had a palace in Hama and were successful in accumulating the wealth necessary to arrange more important provincial appointments.[8]

It has not yet been possible to establish the history of the 'Azm family prior to Ibrahim with any certainty. Rafeq presents evidence that they may have been of Syrian origin, and that many 18th century sources accepted their local identity. This hypothesis is consistent, moreover, with a number of circumstances such as the fact that the 'Azms were not trained in the Sultan's *saraya* nor did they hold non-Syrian provincial appointments before governing in Syria.[9]

Behind the discussion of the 'Azms origins and rise to power lays the significant question of their contribution to Ottoman decline and localism. Gibb and Bowen noted that this "remarkable family whose members and clients all but monopolized the Paşaliks of southern Syria for some sixty years" aroused Ottoman fears: They "could not overcome the suspicion with which the Dîwân looked upon the dynastic tendency".[10] Investigating the local response to 'Azm rule, Rafeq attributes their success not only to Ottoman weakness but to "the nature of these territories which made possible their lengthy rule".[11] Holt wrote that the "traditional system of Ottoman provincial administration was weakened and had become a mere facade for anarchy and extortion" . . . which was "checked by the emergence of a powerful family, the 'Azms".[12] Barbir reinforced this line of interpretation by presenting the argument "that the 'Azms were appointed to Damascus precisely because they possessed the qualities the Ottoman state required for its attempt to reorganize the province".[13]

6 Rafeq, *Province*, 8.
7 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Azm, 40.
8 Rafeq, *Province*, 8.
9 *ibid*, 85–92
10 Gibb and Bowen, I, 219–220.
11 Rafeq, *Province*, 7.
12 Holt, 107.
13 Barbir, 56.

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
Munīra
ʿĀdila Jihān
ʿArabīya


Kawthar
Najlān
Hishām
(lawyer)
ʿArabīya

ʿAẒM FAMILY


Ibrāhīm
Fāris
Muṣṭafā Pāshā +al-ʿAẓm
ʿĀbidīn
Muḥammad Pāshā 1731-1783 (fourth ʿAẓm governor of Damascus)
Ḥanīfa
Ruqayya
ʿAlī
Laylā
Sulaymān Pāshā
Zaynab
Yūsuf Pāshā (governor of Tripoli)
ʿĀʾisha
ʿAbdallāh Pāshā (final ʿAẓm governor in Damascus) +al-ʿAẓm
Āsiya +al-ʿAẓm
Muḥammad
Fāṭima "al-Miṣrīya"?
Salīm
Muḥammad
Muḥammad
Fāṭima
Aḥmad
Fāṭima Ḥājja Nīnā
Fāṭima "al-Ḥalibīya"
Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ
Fāṭima "al-Shāmīya" +al-ʿAẓm
ʿĀʾisha
Muḥammad Abū Bakr
Muḥammad Ayshilī?*
Muḥammad Yaduwa* +al-ʿAẓm
ʿAbdallāh
ʿAbdallāh
Nafīsa
ʿĀʾisha
Fāṭima
Khalīl
Khadīja
ʿAbd al-Nabīy
Muḥyī al-Dīn
Rushdī
Zakīya
Fāṭima
Maḥmūd d. 1878/79
Bahīya
Zahīya
ʿĀdila
Khadīja
Maḥmūd
Muṣṭafā
Jamīl
ʿAlī +al-ʿAẓm
ʿAbd al-Qādir
Muḥammad Ḥamdī Pāshā d. 1888
Sāmiya +al-Miṣrī
Khalīl
ʿAzīza
Fāṭima
Ḥāfiz
ʿĀrif
Ismāʿīl (majlis al-baladīya)
Badrīya
Asmā +al-Mardam
Salwā +al-Būẓū
Muḥammad
Amīn
Aḥmad
Fāṭima
Khadīja +al-Kaylānī
Nafība
Shamsa +al-ʿAjlānī
Laylā +al-Tillū
Āmina
Bahīya +al-ʿAẓm
Makkīya +al-ʿĀbid
Laylā +al-ʿAẓm
Zaynab
ʿĀʾisha
Fāṭima
Ḥasan
Ṣāliḥ
Salīm +al-ʿAẓm
Maḥmūd (majlis al-baladīya)
As ʿad Pāshā b. 1825 (majlis al-ʿIlwā') +al-ʿAẓm, Sayyida Zakīya
Muṣṭafā
ʿAlī Pāshā d. 1879/80 (majlis)
Āsiya
Najlā
Lutfīa
Wajīha
Wadīʿa
Farzāt
Ṣafūt
ʿĀdila
Ḥasan
Ḥanīfa
Salwā
Raʾīfa
Fāṭima
Nāẓim
Naẓūh
Waṣfīa
Nadīma
Anwar
Salmā
Shamsī
Jamīl
Amīn
ʿIṣmat
Shāmia
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
Firlān
Ḥasan
Ḥusayn
Tharyā
Ṣādiq
Fāʾiqa
Rushdī
Tawfīq
Raʾīf d. 1952
ʿAbdallāh +al-ʿAẓm
Ṣāliḥa
ʿAbd al-Qādir d. 1930+ (mutasarrif Hama, Minister)
Ṣāliḥa
Zakīya
Zahīya
ʿIzzat
Muḥammad Rifʿat
Ḥasan
Ḥusayn
ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd
Zahrā
Khalīl
Nafība
Ḥanīfa
Shafīqa
Aḥmad Shafīq d. 1917 (al-maḥkama al-ʿadlīya)
Khalīl Pāshā d. 1905 (raʾīs al-baladīya) + Yūsuf
Muḥammad Fawzī Pāshā d. 1920 (majlis, raʾīs al-baladīya) (wazīr al-awqāf in Istanbul)
Ḥūrīya
Nazīra
Firlān
Āmina + al-ʿAẓm
Raḥma
Ruqayya
Nafīsa +al-ʿAẓm
Aḥmad +al-ʿAẓm
Muḥammad
Khadīja al-Kaylānī
Zaynab
Ismāʿīl Pāshā d. 1723/24 (first ʿAẓm governor of Damascus) + al-Harākī
Zulaykhā +al-ʿAẓm
Nasīkhān* +al-ʿAẓm
Muṣṭafā
al-Sayyid Ibrāhīm Pāshā d. 1746
Laylā (founder of the Laylā branch) + ?
Fāṭima
Maryam
Ṣāliḥ
Āmina
ʿAbdallāh
ʿUthmān
Ruqayya +al-ʿAẓm
Yāsīn
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
Muṣṭafā
Salīm (alive circa 1816)
Sulaymān Pāshā +al-ʿAẓm
Ḥusayn
Ismāʿīl
Aḥmad +al-ʿAẓm
Mārya +al-ʿAẓm
Kharmā +al-Kaylānī
ʿAbd al-Raḥīm
Muṣṭafā
Fāṭima +al-ʿAẓm
Saʿīd
Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ (4 children)(2 children)
As ʿad (born in Maʿara) +al-ʿAẓm
Khiḍr
Yumna +al-ʿAẓm
Shafīqa +al-Yūsuf of Maʿara
Wajīha
Asmā
ʿAbdallāh (1 child) 1876-1939
Muḥammad (7 children)
Aḥmad (10 children)
ʿAbd al-Qādir +al-ʿAẓm
ʿĀʾisha
Fāṭima
Asmā
Khadīja +al-Kaylānī
Khalīl
Khadīja
ʿĀʾisha
Zulaykhā*
Nafīsa
Ḥanīfa
Ḥusayn
Ḥalīma +al-ʿAẓm
Muḥammad
Aḥmad (3 children)
ʿAbd al-Qādir
Khawla
Āsiya +al-Kaylānī
Sharīfa +al-Kayyāl, al-ʿAzm
Fāṭima
Khadīja
Ruqayya
Zaynab
Āmina +al-ʿAẓm
ʿUmar
Yaḥyā +al-ʿAẓm
Muḥammad
Khalīl
ʿĀbidīn
ʿAlī
Sharīf
Asmā
Fāṭima +al-ʿAẓm
Aḥmad
Zakīya al-Turkumānī (Hama)
ʿĀlīya +al-ʿIlwānī (Hama)
Saʿīd (17 children) +al-ʿAẓm
ʿAlī (2 children)
Maḥmūd
Laylā
Khusrew
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
Sharīfa +al-ʿAẓm
Nāʾilān
Ibrāhīm
Zahīya +al-ʿAẓm
Darwīsh
ʿĀdila +al-ʿAẓm
Nafīsa
Muṣṭafā +al-ʿAẓm
Qāyid (2 children)
Ḥarqūṭ (natio (Prime
Sa'd al-Dīn Pāshā 1717/1
Fāṭima
Ḥafṣa
ʿĀyida
Nasūḥ Pāshā d. 1808/0 (military commander) +al-Kaylānī
Khadīja (founder of the Khadīja branch) +ʿAlī Āghā
ʿAbdallāh
Fardaws +al-ʿAẓm
Firlān +Sharīf Pāshā al-Miṣrī
ʿĀṣif
Ṣāli
ʿAbdallāh
Ḥasan
Ḥusayn
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

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

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Interpreting the role of the 'Azms in the modern history of Syria therefore presents us with problems of defintion: what, for example, actually constitutes localism? To this question, which is really of a polemical nature, answers can be offered which, with the present state of knowledge, would only reflect an author's own biases. If one wished to see the preservation of the estates system, one might call the 'Azms the enemies of localism; if one wished to honor their local origins and ethnicity, one could propose them as proto-nationalists. If one wished to see the maintenance of social justice among the society's estates *and* classes, they would have to be seen as opportunistic and elitarian. Regardless of one's views on such issues, however, it remains essential to stress that the 'Azm era undoubtedly marks the emergence of 'modern' Syria, and that the beginnings of modernity must be pushed back to some point during their rise in the early 18th century.

The role the 'Azms played in the formation of modern Syria cannot be circumvented either by the historian or the polemicist. Their significance arises out of the paradox which they embodied. Their success clearly rested on a complex of both local *and* imperial resurgence, and this complex development was occuring at many points in the entire eastern Mediterranean in the 18th century. Albert Hourani suggested already in 1961 how not only western influences but movements in the Arabian desert, resurgence of local religious attachments and fervor, and the general ferment of local society were characteristic of this period. His subsequent work on local political development has greatly influenced all study on the period 1760–1860.[14]

The issues of Ottoman decline, the ethnic origins of the 'Azms or the source of the strategy which initiated their rise are not as important to the history of this latter period as the impact their era had on local politics and society. The 'Azms broke down older constrictions in society, reduced the political influences of the estates system and replaced them with factionalism. They consolidated local notables and families from a variety of topographical, social and economic categories into a powerful and prosperous faction. This faction was not only more imperially inclined but it coincided with a particular sector of the local economy and defeated a rival local faction which had emerged to represent the interests of those which the 'Azm faction exploited and suppressed. Expressed in perhaps oversimplified terms: the 'Azms and their faction created a brand of localism but this was patrician in nature and contributed to the suppression of localism of a more plebeian form. That was the situation in the 18th century.

The early 19th century must have been a time of reorganization for the declining 'Azms.[15] No longer governors, they could not profit from the pilgrimage, tax collection and the grain

14 See Hourani, "Fertile Crescent", *op. cit.* and his "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables" in W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (eds.), *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, Chicago, 1968, 41–65.

15 The discussion of the 'Azms of the 19th and 20th centuries which follows is drawn from the following sources in addition to those already mentioned in notes 6–14:
Damascus Palace of Justice, *sijillat*, Mahkamas 'Awniya (1303 A.H., 1321 A.H.) and Bab (1308 A.H. and 1309 A.H.); Ottoman Empire Provincial Almanac (*Salname*) Ottoman years: 1286, 1288, 1289, 1291, 1293, 1294, 1296, 1302, 1305, 1310, 1311, 1316; *Kitab al-ahzan*, 97–100; *Mudhakkirat*, 28, 30, 220–221, 231–232; Bitar, II, 630–634, III, 1479–1481; Shatti, *Rawd*, 238–240, *Tarajim*, 29–30; Hisni, 660, 694–695; Zirikli, II, 134, VIII, 45, V, 370; Mardam, 210–211; Jundi, I, 185–187, 187–189, 190–195; Poujoulat, 393, 395, 402, 403; K. Daghestani, *La Famille Musulmane Contemporaine en Syrie*, Paris, 1932, 184; Baedeker, 321; R.B. Winder, "Syrian Deputies and Cabinet Ministers", *Middle East Journal*, 16 (1962) 411, 413, 416–417; C.E. Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria", *Middle East Journal*, 16 (1962) 164–165; P. Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, Oxford, 1965, 91–92, 92n, 107n, 114n, 166, 182–183; 214; Tibawi, 93, 199, 203;

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trade on the scale they had done in the past. State confiscations had also denied them of accumulated wealth in movable property, precious metals and money. In the 19th century, the family had to fall back on the exploitation of its *awqaf* properties and on trade. In both respects the 'Azms' resources and opportunities were nonetheless considerable. They had *awqaf* not only in Syria but also in Egypt, and their two large city *khans* (the As'ad Pasha *khan* and the Sulayman Pasha *khan*) were capable of handling large-scale, export-import trade. The settlement of 'Azms in Hama, Aleppo and Egypt no doubt also facilitated this trade.

At the outset of the 19th century, the family had about 150–200 members. Though closely knit by endogamy, it was geographically spread with branches in Damascus, Hama and Egypt. Due to the extent of marriage within the family, it is misleading to describe the family in terms of patrilineal branches as this would suppress the importance of ties through the female line, but this is a distortion which we will have to tolerate until more research can be done on the women of the family.

Curiosity concerning the role of the women of the family is justified already by the fact that two important (otherwise patrilineal) branches were, in fact, founded by women. Possibly due to a shortage of men within the family or, more likely, due to the family's need to reconcile itself to particular power centers outside the family, two 'Azm women, Layla bint al-Sayyid Ibrahim al-'Azm and Khadija bint Nasuh Pasha, were married to men outside the 'Azm lineage. These men were most probably Turkish Mamluks in the family's service as the off-spring retained the 'Azm family name and were considered part of the 'Azm lineage.

The marriage of Layla bint Ibrahim al-'Azm probably took place in the mid-18th century. This supposition seems reasonable in that her father died in 1746 and she would have been at least twenty years old by 1766. One of her grandsons, Salim b. 'Abd al-Rahman, was an adult already in 1816. Biographical information on the lineage descending from Layla indicates that this branch of the family was concentrated around Hama. Many were born or married there, held government posts there, or are mentioned in the Hama law court records. Though some members of this branch of the family became prominent as poets and also as district governors, the Layla al-'Azms did not play a particularly important political role in Syria of the 19th and 20th centuries.

The marriage of Khadija bint Nasuh Pasha al-'Azm probably took place around the turn of the 19th century. In fact, the family historian refers to hers as the third family branch, that is, subsequent to that of Layla. Khadija's father died in 1808/09, probably in Hama. But he left a considerable fortune in properties (in the form of *awqaf*) in Egypt. The family historian reports that these all came under the control of Khadija. This branch of the family formed, therefore, the Egyptian concentration of the 'Azms. Though Khadija's husband 'Ali Agha was said to have been a Turk in the Ottoman service in Damascus, he nonetheless established close ties to the Egyptian ruling house and, as we have seen in Chapter II, was a functionary of the Egyptians during their occupation of Syria in the 1830's.

Khadija and 'Ali Agha's daughter Farlan (who is also called Fatima Barlanta) was married to the Egyptian plenipotentiary in Syria, Sharif Pasha al-Misri. This was an eminently important political marriage and may be seen as evidence of the 'Azms' collaboration with the Egyptians

T.E.A.M. Harran, *Turkish-Syrian Relations in the Ottoman Constitutional Period*, unpublished D. Phil thesis, London, 1969, 23, 24, 87, 125n, 196n, 200, 213, 237, 302.
See also dispatches from Damascus of the French consuls in AEPo1/6, AECom/4, AEpo1/16, AEPol/15, AEPol/16, AEPol/17, AECPNS/9, AECPNS/116/13, AECPNS/118, AECPNS/120/17, AECPNS/120/17, AEARC/69, AECPNS/116/13 and of the British consuls in FO. 195/927, FO. 195/927, FO. 195/1583, FO. 195/1984, FO. 195/2075, FO. 195/2097, FO. 195/2122, FO. 195/2144, FO. 195/2190, FO. 195/2190, FO. 195/2277, FO. 195/2311, FO. 195/2343, FO. 371/6455.

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at the outset of the occupation. The line of family connections goes further, however, in that Sharif Pasha's sister was married to Ibrahim Pasha, the commander of the Egyptian invasion. The 'Azms' connections through in-laws to the Egyptian ruling house led Ibrahim Pasha to refer to 'Ali Agha as 'father'. This did not, however, stop Ibrahim from having 'Ali Agha executed when he was suspected of treachery towards the end of the occupation.

It has not yet been possible to establish where Khadija al-'Azm lived during the occupation, if she joined her husband and daughter in Damascus or remained in Egypt. The intrigues and family set-backs of the period eventually entered the folklore of 'old' Damascus. The story of 'Ali Agha's demise was, for example, related to European travellers in the 1840's by Farlan al-'Azm as a tragedy of epic dimensions. It appears, however, that the 'Azms were again acceptable to Ottoman ruling circles very shortly after the Egyptian occupation. On her way to Mecca in the early 1840's, for example, the wife of Sultan Mahmud chose to stay at the 'Azms' house.

Farlan probably remained in Damascus when her husband Sharif Pasha left. A few years later we have information that she was married to a certain 'Uthman Efendi and lived in Damascus. If this 'Uthman Efendi can be identified as 'Uthman Bey Mardam, this would be further proof of the 'Azms' reconciliation to the Ottomans. If would also demonstrate their new ties to the politics of the Tanzimat, as Mardam was a leading proponent of the Tanzimat and was being promoted by the Ottomans for these ends.

A further indication of the 'Azms' breach with the Egyptians is given by the fact that, following the occupation, the Egyptian branch of the family largely consolidated within the Syrian branches. Of the seventeen grandchildren of Khadija (born to her sons 'Akif, Salih 'Izzat and Fardaws), eight were married to Syrian-branch 'Azms: only the grandsons Ziwar and Mahmud married outside the family; three granddaughters and four grandsons did not marry at all. This extent of consolidation of Egyptian 'Azms within the Syrian branches of the family indicates that the 'Azms considered their future in Egypt as precarious. Perhaps they had been disciplined in some way or other by the Egyptian ruling house. Nonetheless, the family historian indicates that the family continued to have property interests in Egypt. Its *awqaf* there fell under the control of Farlan.

Following their dramatic involvement in history in the first half of the 19th century, it is remarkable that this branch of 'Azms produced no particularly prominent persons in the second. In this respect, a revival took place in the early 20th century when Haqqi b. 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Azm of the Khadija branch began to make a career in public life. Haqqi had been educated in Ottoman and French schools and had worked in the *daftar-i khaqani* (land registry office) in Damascus and then in the customs of Istanbul. For a short period he moved to Egypt where he served in educational administration. He returned to Istanbul in 1909 to hold a high office in the Ottoman *awqaf* bureacracy but returned to Egypt when, it is said, he became disillusioned with the policies of the Young Turks. He was among the founders of the Lamarkaziya (or decentralization) movement in Egypt and the Islah (or reform) movement in Syria. As his political activities were considered treasonous, he was sentenced to death in absentia by Jamal Pasha, the Ottoman plenipotentiary in Damascus. Returning to Syria after the First World War, Haqqi al-'Azm was named president of the consultative council under Amir Faysal and then governor general of Syria for the Arab government. Later he was elected a member of the Syrian parliament and served as prime minister in 1932. Eventually Haqqi retired from politics and returned to Egypt to administer the family *awqaf* there. It seems reasonable to assume that these were seriously affected by the land reform policies of 'Abd al-Nasir, though they, as others in a similar position, may haven been able to transform their assets into commerce. industry or finance before the reforms struck.

There were three additional branches within the 'Azm family in the first half of the 19th century. Of the seven brothers and sisters of the above-mentioned Layla, only Yasin was to establish a sustained line through his two sons Khalil and 'Abd al-Qadir. All the biographical information we have on the 'Azms descending in the Yasin line indicates that they were large landowners active in the vicinity of Hama. Similar to the 'Azms of the Layla branch, they

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played no prominent political role in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 1950's, however, 'Abd al-Rahman Bey of this 'Azm branch was the leader of the so-called 'independent' list of notables from Hama. The list was defeated in the 1954 elections by the revolutionary leader Akram al-Hawrani and his Ba'thist collaborators. 'Abd al-Rahman Bey was then posted as Syrian ambassador to Egypt and remained there until the union between Syria and Egypt in 1958. We may assume that the 'Azms of this branch were severely affected by the land reform measures which ensued as at least two of their leading members' lands (in excess of the limit of 120 irrigated and 460 unirrigated hectares allowed by the Land Reform Act of 1958) were confiscated.

A fourth 'Azm family branch was founded by the brother of the above-mentioned Khadija. Ahmad Mu'ayyad (1806–1888) fathered a 19th and 20th century branch of 'Azms which were later to carry the name of Mu'ayyad al-'Azm.[16] The full name does not, however, appear to have been used by this branch's members in the 19th century. It was, for example, not applied to them when they appeared in the Ottoman yearbooks. Curiously, the full name seems to have been used only in the early 20th century. It again fell into disuse after the Second World War.

Though Mu'ayyad al-'Azm could be translated as 'ally of the 'Azms', no reason has yet arisen to doubt the geneological link as published in the family's history. The name may, in fact, indicate some additional tie with Egypt where Ahmad's father Nasuh Pasha had – as discussed in Chapter II – been politically active in the years just prior to Ahmad's birth. The 18th century Egyptian currency was called '*mu'ayyadi*', and perhaps Nasuh Pasha had succeeded in rescuing some Egyptian treasure from the French invaders with which it was possible for him to revive the family's fortunes in Syria.

Ahmad Mu'ayyad was born in Hama in 1806. His mother was Umm al-Khayr al-Kaylani of the famous Hamawi *ashraf* and Sufi family. She and Ahmad moved from Hama to Damascus in 1823/24 when Ahmad was 18. They first resided in Bab al-Sarija where the 'Azms had a house, but later, when Ahmad married, he built a new residence in Salihiya. This was to become the main seat of the Mu'ayyad branch of the family.

Ahmad's first wife came from the famous '*ulama*' family, the Muradis, a family which had held a central position within the Damascene 'Azm-faction of the 18th century. Eventually, however, the family's ties were considerably extended as Ahmad Mu'ayyad married nine additional women. The seventeen children of these marriages were raised not only in the family compound in Salihiya but also in houses in Ras Beirut and in the Lebanese mountain village of 'Arayya. The children and grandchildren were married into a number of prominent Damascene, Hamawi, Aleppine, Egyptian and Beiruti families. In Damascus, the Mu'ayyads became linked again to the Muradis but also to the Maydani faction's Hakim family, to the Hasibis and 'Ajlanis of the *ashraf*, to the Buzus and 'Azmas who had been *aghawat* and to many

16 Information on the Mu'ayyad al-'Azms can be found in the following: *Salname*, 1872/73, 1877/78, 1884/85, 1890/91, 1891/92, 1893/94; Shatti, *Tarajim*, 29–30; Hisni, 755, 795, 846–847; Jundi, I, 189–190, 195; Daghestani, 189; 'Alaf, 63; Dawn, "Rise", 164; E. Pech, *Manuel des Sociétés anonymes fonctionnantes en Turquie*, Paris, 1902, 44; Harran, 71, 79, 131, 135, 137, 151–152, 167–175.
See also dispatches from Damascus from the French consuls: AEPo1/6, AEPo1/15, AEPo1/15, AEPol/16, AEPol/17, AEPol/17, AECPNS/106/4, AECPNS/114/11, AEARC/63, AECPNS/117, AECPNS/118, AECPNS/120/7, AECPNS/119/16, AECPNS/120/17, AECPNS/120/17, AECPNS/120/17; and of the British consuls: FO. 195/1448, FO. 195/1801, FO. 195/2075, FO. 195/2075, FO. 195/2097, FO. 195/2122, FO. 195/2190, FO. 195/2277, FO. 195/2342, FO. 371/6455.

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others. In Hama they were linked to other branches of the 'Azm family but also to the upcoming Shishaklis; in Aleppo, to the Jabiris; in Egypt, to the Rettas; in Beirut, to the Yafis and Bayhums. In the 20th century, the Mu'ayyads were so numerous that they occupied an entire street of Damascus. Indeed, upon Ahmad's death, he left eighty-two direct descendants and the family remained associated with Salihiya as quarter leaders even as late as the 1940's.

Two of Ahmad's sons were municipality presidents ('Abdallah, d. 1911/12) and 'Abd al-Qadir (d. 1920). Two others, Mukhtar (d. 1920) and 'Ali, sat as members on this council. It was, however, the tenth son, Shafiq al-Mu'ayyad (d. 1916), who had a remarkably successful career in the Ottoman civil service. Educated in Turkish, French and English, Shafiq began his career by sitting on the Damascene district council. In 1886 he was named a functionary in the Beirut customs, and in 1891/92 he sat on the Damascene *majlis al-baladiya*. At some point, however, he had been named director of the *daftar-i khaqani* (land registry) for the province. Following some subdued representations of his father before the Sultan, he was appointed as a translator in the *ma-bayn* (i.e. in the apartments immediately adjacent to the harem in the Sultan's *seray*). In 1896–1901 he served as a Commissioner of the Ottoman public debt and in 1901-1908 on the Ottoman tobacco commission. From 1908 onwards he represented Damascus in the Ottoman parliament where he was an opponent of the Young Turks. Like his cousin Haqqi al-'Azm he was also a leader of the Egyptian *La markaziya* which advocated decentralization of the Ottoman Empire and was one of the forerunners of the Arab nationalist movement of the World War I period. He joined the secret Arab nationalist society *al-Ikha'*, and, being in Damascus at the time of Jamal Pasha's investigations, did not escape the charges raised against him. Shafiq al-'Azm was amongst the nationalists executed by Jamal Pasha in 1916 for treason.

Contemporary cousins of Haqqi and Shafiq, by the names of Sadiq and Sa'id (the sons of Salih al-Mu'ayyad) had entered the Ottoman military in the 1880's. Sa'id, who also sat on the *majlis al-baladiya* in the early 1870's, made little progress in the military. At some stage he experimented with Sufism, but he later distinguished himself as one of the first entrepreneurs in Syria to drill for oil in the desert. Sadiq rose in the military to be the Sultan's aide-de-camp by 1900. He was the state commissioner who organized the laying of the telegraph, and later the railway, from Istanbul to Madina. A third brother, Iklil, began his career as secretary in the commercial courts. He later was named *qa'immaqam* to the small districts of Duma, 'Ajlun, Nabak and Ba'albek within the province of Damascus. In 1915 he was exiled by Jamal Pasha for presumed political activities. Under Amir Faysal he was named governor of the Hawran but refused public office once the French Mandate was imposed. Yet another brother, Safuh, became inspector of police, director of prisons and was named governor in some provincial districts.

Three other grandsons of Ahmad Mu'ayyad held administrative positions in Syria or in the capital. Dhu'l-Nun ibn 'Abd al-Qadir began in the military in the 1890's and was later named director of the six special taxes administered under the Ottoman public debt commission. Wasil ibn Wajih was an educational functionary in Beirut and Istanbul. Badi' sat on the public debt commission in the early 20th century and worked for the Istanbul customs. He then represented Damascus in the Ottoman parliament of 1914, was a member of Amir Faysal's consultative *majlis* and held important posts during the French Mandate. Also during the Mandate, some Mu'ayyads were active in the nationalist movement and were considered to be partisans of 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar of the Maydan. Shahbandar, who was the victim of a political murder in 1940, was married to a daughter of the Mu'ayyads already during the First World War. Today, the Mu'ayyad al-Azm family branch is represented by the prominent scholar and philosopher Sadiq ibn Jalal al-'Azm, who does not use the Mu'ayyad part of the family name.

To follow the history of a final and actually most central 'Azm-family branch, we must return again to the early 19th century. The last 'Azm governor in Damascus, 'Abdullah Pasha al-'Azm, the son of Muhammad Pasha, who had also been a governor, founded a fifth 19th and

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20th century branch of 'Azms. This was a numerous branch already by the mid-19th century, existing parallel to the growing Mu'ayyad branch in Damascus. 'Abdullah Pasha left nine children – five sons and four daughters. The eldest son, called Muhammad Yadu, married his paternal first cousin 'Asiya and thus further consolidated the family's assets into his lineage. Parallel to the Muhammad Yadu line, an important line within this branch descended from his brother Muhammad Hafiz. Of the four sisters, only the so-called 'Damascene' Fatima was married, namely to 'Akif, the son of Khadija al-'Azm of the Egyptian branch of the family.

The 'Abdullah Pasha branch of the family was the only branch which remained continuously in Damascus throughout the disruptions of the early 19th century. They were also the branch most closely tied to the notables of the 18th century 'Azm-faction and the economic and cultural activities which occupied this faction. Of the five schools or *madrasas* for Islamic learning in the city still active and rich enough to support students in 1848, for example, three were tied to *awqaf* of these Damascene 'Azms. These *madrasas* employed a number of contemporarily prominent Shafi'i *'ulama'* including 'Abd al-Rahman al-Tibi, 'Abd al-Qadir and Abu al-Fath al-Khatib and members of the Kuzbari family.

Of the Damascene 'Azms, 'Abdallah Bey and his son 'Ali of the 'Abdallah Pasha branch and 'Abdallah, the son of Ahmad Mu'ayyad were chosen to sit on the Tanzimat *majlises*. All three were exiled for their responsibility in the events of 1860. In addition to these 'Azms, however, two further family members were punished for their role in the events. From the Khadija branch of the family, two sons of 'Akif Bey by the names of Mustafa Bey and Ibrahim Bey were executed for murder and arson, respectively. Both these men were probably in Damascus despite their membership in the Egyptian branch of the family, because their mother, the so-called 'Damascene' Fatima, was from the Damascene ('Abdullah Pasha) 'Azms. Mustafa Bey, moreover, had married into the Damascene Mu'ayyad al-'Azms, giving him another reason to be in the city.

It was from the 'Abdullah Pasha branch that the Ottomans chose to appoint a *pasha* in their endeavor to conciliate the remnants of the 'Azm-faction following the events of 1860. In 1869 and a few years after his return from exile 'Ali b. 'Abdallah Bey al-'Azm was declared a *pasha* by the Ottoman governor Rashid Pasha. This entitlement did not, however, include any administrative powers or responsibilities beyond membership on the *majlis al-idara* which 'Ali al-'Azm could have held without carrying a *pasha* title. The entitlement was, therefore, a pale comparison to the opportunities presented by the Ottomans to the 'Azm *pashas* of the 18th century.

It is interesting to note that the 'Azms of this branch married a daughter into the 'Abid family of the Maydan at about this time, perhaps as a conciliatory gesture, but surely evidence of the consolidation of the city's elite. On the whole, the extent of exogamy among the post-1860 Damascene 'Azms of both the Mu'ayyad and 'Abdallah Pasha branches indicates that the family tried to make its peace with notable families not only of both Damascene factions but from all over Syria.

Other sons of the 'Abdallah Pasha branch obtained public office beginning in the 1870's. Mahmud and As'ad (known as 'the little pasha') sat on the *baladiya* (municipality) and *liwa'* (district) *majlises*, respectively. The latter worked in agriculture and is said to have paid little attention to ranks and posts. He founded two large farms, one in the village of Masraba near Duma and one in Duma itself. Otherwise, he devoted his life to fulfilling religious and humanitarian duties.

Only from the 1880's onwards, did this branch of the 'Azm family once again become active in the Ottoman civil service. The sons of (Muhammad) 'Ali Pasha did especially well in this respect. Ahmad Shafiq (d. 1917/18) was a member of the *'adliya* courts. Khalil Pasha (d. 1905) began as a judicial and educational functionary but also sat on the court of appeals. He was then named procurer general of the province and from 1901 through 1905 served as president of the municipality. 'Ali Pasha's son Muhammad Fawzi Pasha (d. 1920) began as an educational functionary, was named *nazir nufus* (overseer of the census) around 1889, sat

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on the *majlis al-idara* during the 1890's, was president of the municipality in 1895, director of the Hijaz railway works in Damascus, represented Damascus to the Ottoman Parliament of 1908 and in 1911 was named director of *awqaf* for the entire Ottoman empire. He and his cousin Shafiq Mu'ayyad al-'Azm were members of a small but highly influential group of Syrians to rise to imperial ministerial ranks in the Ottoman empire under Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid.[17] As late as 1918, Muhammad Fawzi Pasha was considered by a British observer to be "the most influential man in Damascus". He died, however, in 1920, before his influence could be translated into power. This task had to be assumed by his son Khalid whom we will follow in a moment.

Otherwise, the 'Abdallah Pasha branch of the family produced Isma'il b. 'Ali Hafiz who sat on the *majlis al-baladiya* in the 1880's; Khalil ibn Mahmud who entered the Ottoman military; 'Abd al-Qadir ibn As'ad Pasha who served as a district governor in Syria and was also president of the council of state formed by Amir Faysal and later President of the Syrian University.

The full recovery of this branch of the family is best exemplified by the career of Khalid Bey al-'Azm, the son of the above-mentioned Muhammad Fawzi Pasha. Khalid Bey was one of the most important politicians of the World War Two and early independence periods, holding the posts of cabinet minister and prime minister and leading the country through the crises at the end of the French Mandate, the union with Egypt (1958–1962) and the critical period just prior to the assumption of power by the Ba'thist army officers.

The extraordinary resiliency of the 'Azm family in all its branches which restored them time and again to prominence, wealth and power over a period of three centuries places them in a position of communal importance which far transcends all other Damascene families of this period. An astute strategy of familial, factional and external alliances always placed them at the center of the matrix of socio-economic and military power. Their faction was suppressed in the early 19th century and defeated decisively in the aftermath of the 1860 events. But the 'Azms both diversified and consolidated their position and in both cases restored the family to politics and administration within a generation. In doing this they never hesitated to draw strength from external alliances. Both in Egypt and in Istanbul they succeeded in exerting influence at the very centers of power throughout the 19th century. But the 'Azms' style of politics became overshadowed by the growth of nationalist and socialist ideologies and the mobilization of the masses these engendered in the 20th century.

During and subsequent to the French Mandate, the family appears to have stagnated into petty cliques and intrigues and was subsequently unable to cope with the threats to its position in the form of renewed social struggle from within and Nasserism, Zionism and the struggles of the Cold War from without. The pathos of the decline of their estate, their faction and the elite which formed around them is often apparent in the memoires of their last great man, Khalid Bey al-'Azm, who died in 1970.

Presently the family holds no prominent political positions and appears to be suppressed. But this may be a phase of political reconsolidation and diversification for the 'Azms similar to that of the 1790's, the 1820's or the 1860's. Now as then their decline may result not only in a revival of the family's power but in a new Syrian synthesis. A few lines of verse about the 'Azms repeated by the 20th century biographer al-Jundi express this hope:[18]

يا قائلا ان العظام تكسرت ابداً ولا يعلو لهن مقام
اقصر فهم باقون في أوج العلا ابد الورى ان العظام عظام

17 Two others were Ahmad 'Izzat Pasha al-'Abid, also from Damascus and Abu al-Huda al-Sayyadi from Hama. See the 'Abid family history, below.

18 Adham al-Jundi quotes this well-known verse, attributed to the 18th century scholar and Sufi 'Abd al-Ghani al Nabulusi (al-Jundi, Vol. 1, 191).

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Oh you who say that the 'Azms [here, a double pun: bones or great ones] are crushed
Forever, and a place is not raised for them,
Be still, for they remain the summit,
The eternity of mankind. Indeed, the 'Azms are great.

The Turkumani ('Azma) Family[19]

Only a few additional *aghawat* families succeeded in producing notables over a number of generations. The most prominent of these in the 18th century were probably the Turkumanis, a family of Maydani *aghawat* whose forefather Musa (d. 1670/71) had gained the title of *pasha* and had served as commander of the pilgrimage and district governor of 'Ajlun, south of Damascus. His son Husayn (d. 1719/20), who is referred to as one of the chiefs of the troops in Damascus (*ahad ru'asa' owjaq al-jund bi Dimashq*), held the post of *kethkhuda* (i.e. second in command to the *agha* of the janissary corps) in 1679/80. This Husayn became an associate of learned persons, wrote a great deal and was eulogized by the *shaykh* of the Khalwati Sufi order. In the generation which followed, two persons called Turkumani became '*ulama*'. (It should be noted, however, that the genealogical link between these and the *aghawat* Turkumanis has not yet been established.) These were Ahmad (d. 1737/38) who settled in Istanbul as a teacher (*mudarris*) and 'Ali (1691/92 – probably 1766/67) who served as *amin al-fatwa* under the *muftis* 'Imadi and Muradi. Were these Turkumanis attempting a reconciliation with the Ottoman establishment?

The Turkumani *aghawat* fell suddenly from power in 1746 when they were suppressed by As'ad Pasha al-'Azm for their collaboration with the rebellious financial official Fathi al-Falaqinsi.[20] Five of the Turkumani family were executed, and no member of the family appeared in public life in Damascus for many generations thereafter. But the family continued to exist. It is curious that they later became known by the name of 'Azma, the feminine form of the word 'azm.[21]

The family resided at mid-century in Suq al-Qutn (D/5) and were probably active in the interior trade between Damascus, Istanbul and Mecca where members were established. Muhammad Bey al-'Azma (1820–1904/05) sat on the Damascus *majlis* sometime in the 1840–1860 period and was among the notables exiled for their role in the events of 1860. He probably returned from exile with the others in the late 1860's. During the years 1879 through 1883, he sat on the Damascene municipal council.

It appears that the 'Azmas, as many merchants, began to invest in land in the 1870's. About that time, Mahmud al-'Azma (d. 1919/20) became very successful in agriculture and with that, the family's fortunes appear to have taken a turn for the better as they were very wealthy by the early 20th century. Yet, the 'Azmas of this and the following generation are still not mentioned by the biographer Bitar. They were not mentioned as '*ulama*', Sufis or civil adminis-

19 Material presented here on members of the Turkumani family is drawn from the following: Muradi, I, 218; II, 63–67; III, 229; Bitar, I, 168; Shatti, *Tarajim*, 107; Hisni, 849; Zirikli, IX, 282–283; Harran, 176–177; Ottoman *Salnames* of 1879/80, 1880/81, 1881/82, 1882/83, 1886/87, 1888/89, 1892, 1894/95; and the dispatch of Outrey, 91, August 14, 1860, AEARC/93/4.

20 See also 33–34.

21 The genealogical link between the Turkumanis and the 'Azmas alluded to in Hisni (p. 849) is corroborated by 'Aziz al-'Azma, a present-day member of the family who has seen documents in which the link is expressly stated. In that the 'Azma family name is the feminine form of 'Azm, the name may at first have indicated submission to the 'Azms. It can be noted in this connection that just prior to the successful suppression of the Maydani-faction, anecdotes of ridicule circulated in the city in which As'ad Pasha al-'Azm was referred to as Sa'diya Kadin, a feminization of his name. (See Rafeq, *Province* 165.)

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Turkumānī (ʿAẓma) Family



trators. Rather, the 'Azmas, like a handful of Syrian families whose roots lay in the Maydan faction of the 18th century, sent their sons into the Ottoman military. Yusuf ibn Ibrahim (1884–1920), for example, attended the Istanbul military academy around 1906. He was sent to Germany for two years of training and then, as an officer, joined an Ottoman commission sent to Egypt, served in Bulgaria, Austria and Rumania, and eventually in Syria. He was amongst those Arab-Ottoman officers who joined Sharif Husayn's revolt against the Ottomans and was appointed by Amir Faysal first as Arab commissioner in Beirut, but later as minister of war for the Arab government in Damascus. In this post he created a 10,000-man Syrian national army which he led to Maysalun to defend Damascus against the approaching French occupying troops. Yusuf al-'Azma died in that battle.

There were other 'Azmas in the Ottoman military. 'Izzat ibn Mahmud, for example, was an Ottoman army officer. He participated in the formation of the Arab Club (*al-muntada al-'arabi*) which became a center of nationalist thought in the pre-war-period in Istanbul. Nabih and 'Adil, the sons of 'Aziz, the Ottoman district governor of Yemen and Tripoli (Libya), established themselves in Egypt during the French Mandate and worked there for the Arab nationalist cause.

In 1925, when the French bombarded Damascus, the 'Azma household in Suq al-Qutn burned down, and the family moved to Shaghur. In the post-Second World War period, a number of 'Azmas were prominent in the government and politics of independent Syria.

The Shamli Family[22]

In the early half of the 19th century, the Shamlis, a family said to belong to the Shammar beduin, were among the most powerful *aghawat* in the Maydan. 'Abd al-Ghani Agha (d. 1834/35) was called upon by the Ottomans to serve as commander of the pilgrimage and as vice-governor in Damascus. It is reported that he had had much influence among the *'ulama'*. Abu'l-'Arabi and his cousin Rashid Agha were in a strong enough position to raise successful opposition to unpopular Ottoman measures. They were, as described in Chapter II, among the leaders of the revolt of 1831 which was sparked by the Ottomans' attempts to raise more taxes in Damascus but eventually developed into a full-scale revolt and the rule of the Maydanis.

Possibly because of their role in 1831 and their later collaboration with Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt, the Shamlis did not appear in the Ottoman civil and military administrative structures of the middle or late 19th century. The sons of 'Abd al-Ghani Agha al-Shamli were, however, famous for their wealth and continued to be considered as prominent persons of the Maydan. They were among the few who retained the title of *agha* even into the 20th century.

The Barudis[23]

Hasan Agha Barudi came to Damascus from Egypt in 1795–98. He was then employed by 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm, governor of Damascus, as his *mutasallim* or deputy and as *ketkhuda* (or *kikhya*) of the para-militaries. In this capacity, it is said he amassed a great fortune. An

22 Material presented here on members of the Shamli family is taken from: *Mudhakkirat ta'rikhiya*, 3, 7, 15–16, 24–25, 59, 69; Hisni, 884.

23 For material on the Barudi family see: *Tarikh hawadith*, 21; Hisni, 862–863; Shatti, *Tarajim* 40; Jundi, I, 227; Poujoulat, 398; Zwiedenek von Südenhorst, 25; Guillois, 9, March 6, 1889, AEPol/15; "Who's Who", May 19, 1919, FO. 371/6455; Philip David, *Un Government Arabe à Damas, Le Congrès Syrien*, Paris, 1923.

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anonymous chronicler of this period also relates that Hasan Agha carried out the execution of the Maydani leader 'Umr Agha. The Barudi family settled in Damascus and eventually built a large compound in the quarter of Qanawat.

Hasan Agha Barudi probably died before the Egyptian occupation of Damascus, passing on his fortune to his son Muhammad (d. 1889/90). The latter, it is said, put this to work as a creditor and eventually acquired a good deal of land, some of which was in the vicinity of Halbun in the Anti-Lebanon. Through some unexplained process, Barudi also acquired lands which Sharif Pasha abandoned when the Egyptians withdrew from Syria. It is, presumably, the Barudis who by 1872 appear as the firm "Paroudi" in the Austrian consul's list of the nine most important wheat exporting firms in Syria. At some point in the latter 19th century, a politically significant marriage was arranged between them and the Bakris, the Damascene '*ulama*' family already prominent prior to the 'Azm era. Mahmud al-Baroudi was one of the leading notables of Damascus at the time of the First World War.

The Shamdin Family[24]

The Kurdish chieftain Shamdin Agha (d. 1860) who led this important *aghawat* family in early 19th century Damascus was the son of a certain Shaykh Musa. The latter, it is said, served the governors of Acre[25] and then settled in Damascus as the most powerful chieftain (here: "*za 'im al-qawm*") among its Kurdish community in the quarter of Akrad north-west of the city. Shamdin Agha himself, however, was said to come from the northern quarter of Saruja. The family may have already then built the opulent family compound at D/1.

By the 1830's, however, he was assigned particular districts by the Ottomans and used his own men in carrying out police and tax-collecting functions. At least some of these areas lay in the Biqa', but the family's influence spread to many other rural areas of the province later in the century.

Shamdin Agha remained one of the most powerful para-military chieftains in Damascus. He did not, however, appear in the revolt of 1831 which was, as discussed in Chapter II, dominated by Maydani *aghawat*. During the Egyptian occupation, he was considered to have remained loyal to the Ottomans and was thanked for that by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid. Yet the local chronicler reported that he informed the Egyptians of Druze intrigues against them. (With that, we have an indication of one of the most irreconcilable yet ambiguous 19th century antagonisms in Damascus, that between the Kurds and the Druzes). Shamdin remained a commander of irregular troops throughout the 1840's and 1850's, and was very possibly the *kakhya* to whom the Muslim artisans of Qaymariya addressed their protests in 1846–1847.[26]

When the Ottomans attempted to reorganize the local forces in the late 1850's, they called on Shamdin's son Muhammad Sa'id to head the *'awniya*, one of the new corps which was to perform police functions within Damascus. Muhammad Sa'id Shamdin was, in fact, one of

24 For material on the Shamdin family see: Hisni, 899, Shatti, *Tarajim* 88–89; Tresse, 85; Poujoulat, 394; Abu Manneh, 153–154. Further research may one day link the Shamdins with the Shamsan Agha al-Kurdi who served as *mutasallim* of Damascus under Kanj Yusuf Pasha (1807–1810) and who was executed by him. (See *Tarikh hawadith*, 37–38, 43.) See also dispatches from the British consuls in FO. 195/927, FO. 195/976, FO. 195/976, FO. 195/1263, FO. 195/1027, FO. 195/1153, FO. 195/1201, FO. 195/1448, FO. 195/1514, FO. 195/1765, FO. 195/994, FO. 195/1027; of the British consuls AEARC/93/3, AEARC/93/4, AEPol/6, AEPol/9, AEPol/10, AEPol/10, AEPol/10, AEPol/12, AEPol/17, AEPol/11, AEPol/13, AEPol/15.

25 Salibi, Modern History, 183, 193–194.

26 See above, 74.

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Shamdīn Family



the few local *aghawat* called upon to head a new force at this time. In July of 1860, the *'awniya* joined in the riots in the Christian quarter instead of halting them. They were subsequently disbanded, and Muhammad Sa'id was exiled to Istanbul, not, it may be of significance, to Cyprus along with the other exiles.

Details of the role of the Shamdins in the events of 1860 cannot be clarified with the sources available. It is said, on the one hand, that the elderly Shamdin Agha died in these events, and since his name does not appear on the lists of those condemned for their criminal acts, one might ask if he was perhaps himself a victim of the mobs. On the other hand, the name of Isma'il ibn Shamdin Agha, a 'captain' of an Ottoman corps did appear on the list of those tried and condemned.

In any case, at least Muhammad Sa'id did not remain in disfavor very long. Within a matter of months he left Istanbul to accompany Namik Pasha, who had been named governor in Baghdad to his new post. He was, moreover, among those who returned to Damascus in 1865 under the general amnesty, named district governor of Nablus in 1869 and was the key figure in the ill-fated formation of a new Ottoman province east of the Jordan river, where he served shortly as district governor in 1872/73. In the meantime he had gained the title of *pasha*, was often named commander of the pilgrimage in the period 1870 to 1892 and was often included on the Damascene *majlis al-idara*. Some years prior to his death, he married his only heir, a daughter, to Muhammad Pasha al-Yusuf, the son of Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf (whom we shall discuss shortly). Muhammad Sa'id eventually transferred all his wealth to his grandson 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf who was born to this marriage. He also arranged that this youth succeed him as the commander of the *hajj* in 1892. The Shamdin-Yusuf family complex was an important element of the elite style of life concentrated in Saruja at the end of the 19th century.

Other members of the Shamdin family also served in administrative capacities under the Ottomans in the latter half of the 19th century. 'Abdallah Agha, another son of Shamdin Agha, was a para-military *agha* in the 1850's and early 1860's. At that time his position was challenged by Tanzimat reforms. He is possibly the 'Abdallah Agha who was named chief of police in Damascus in 1871 and who became the chief of the Beirut police in 1879.

The Mahayini Family[27]

The Mahayinis were (circa 1860) considered the "richest and most influential family of the Maydan". Their title of *agha* indicates that they were linked to some sort of military or para-military group, but the only mention of this was in connection to a new group of police formed in the late 1850's. Perhaps the Mahayinis' name and title stems from an earlier land grant made by the Ottomans in the vicinity of Nabak to the north of Damascus where the village of Mahayn was located. Or they may have represented those who carried on a practice by which, even in the late 19th century, the leaders of city quarters were referred to as "*aghawat al-hayy*" (or *aghawat* of the quarter).

The Mahayinis were not mentioned by the 18th and 19th century biographers Muradi and Bitar, but they obviously held a controlling position in the Maydan. Salih Agha (d. 1868) and his son Salim, it was reported, hindered the Maydanis from being drawn into the riots of 1860. They brought Christians to the safety of their home and provided them with food and lodging for twenty days. For his humanitarian services Salih was awarded a gold snuff box embellished with the initial "N" surmounted by a crown of brilliants by Napoleon III. The

27 For material on the Mahayini family see Hisni, 863–864; Abkarius, 134; Poujoulat, 393–395; Dispatches of French consuls, AEPol/15, AECPNS/112/9. Dispatches of the British consuls FO. 195/677, FO. 195/727, FO. 371/6455.

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Maḥāyinī Family



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acting Russian consul awarded him the order of St. Stanislas on behalf of the Russian government. Napoleon III awarded Salim a gun made in the Algerian fashion, embellished by elaborate gilt decorations.

The family remained notables of the Maydan into the 20th century. Throughout the 1870's and 1880's, for example, they were well-represented on the municipality: Yusuf Agha in 1871/72; Husayn Agha in 1874/75, 1879–1882 and again 1886–1890; Hashim, the son of Salim in 1883/84, and Kamal, the son of Husayn (years unknown). Otherwise, the Mahayinis appear to have held to their chief occupation as grain merchants. They appear to have kept to their business and to the affairs of their own quarter, perhaps even preferring to remain away from the larger political scene. Even after the war, the Mahayinis did not hold high public office, though the French may have barred them from office because of their aid to rebel Druze chiefs during the 1925 revolt. Yet, the Mahayinis remained, if only marginally, connected to the elite of Damascus through a number of marriage ties. Around the First World War, they were thus connected to both the Dalatis and the Bakris (the latter about whom we shall talk later). One incidental point of interest, however, is that many Mahayinis of the late 19th century (for example Kamal, Hisni and Zaki) dropped the title of *agha* and were called Efendi, a title which was traditionally associated with members of the Ottoman establishment in Damascus.

The Yusuf Family[28]

According to remarks made on the family's history published by 'Abd al-Rahman Badran in 1920, Ahmad Agha ibn Muhammad (al-)Yusuf (circa 1790–1863/64 arrived in Damascus around the turn of the 19th century as a nine-year-old boy accompanying his father, a Kurdish sheep merchant from Diyarbekr. The business went well and the family settled in Damascus. Later, when Ahmad had matured, he joined the service of Amir Bashir of the Lebanon and eventually became his *wakil* (agent). Ahmad continued in his father's business but also, through his connection to Amir Bashir, acquired control over lands in the Biqa' and the Anti-Lebanon mountains.

Though there is no indication in this source that the Yusufs were active in Damascus in the 18th and early 19th centuries, more research may one day establish a link between them and Kanj Yusuf Pasha, an important figure in the early part of the century and a partisan of the northern faction.[29] Of all the *aghawat* who passed through the 1830–1870 period of crisis, the Yusufs along with the 'Abids (about whom we shall talk next) survived as the most powerful: first, due to the 'accident' that Ahmad Agha had been in the service of an ally (Amir Bashir) of the Egyptians and then because he also succeeded in successfully switching his allegiances to the Ottomans in 1839 just as the Egyptians withdrew. Ahmad al-Yusuf was named *mutasallim* in Damascus until the arrival of the new Ottoman *pasha*. He was named to

28 See 'Abd al-Qadir Badran, *al-Kawakib al-dhurriya fi ta'rikh 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf*, Damascus, 1920; *Mudhakkirat*, 177n, 235–236, 240; Hisni, 851–853; Tresse, *Pèlerinage*, 85–86; Shatti, *Tarajim*, 59–61; Harran, 302; Dispatches of the French consuls, AEARC/93/5, AEPol/8, AEPol/9, AEPol/10, AEPol/11, AEPol/15, AEPol/16, AEPol/17, AECPNS/111/8, AECPNS/112/9, AEARC/63, AECPNS/116/13, AEARC/69 those of the British consuls, FO. 195/1202, FO. 195/1305, FO. 195/1368, FO. 195/1765, FO. 195/1984, FO. 195/677, FO. 195/927, FO. 195/965, FO. 195/976, FO. 195/1262, FO. 195/1843, FO. 195/2165, FO. 195/2024, FO. 195/2144, FO. 195/2165, FO. 195/2075, FO. 195/2097, FO. 195/2097, FO. 195/2144, FO. 195/2144, FO. 195/2165, FO. 371/6455.

29 See *Tarikh hawadith*, 32f. Descendants of Kanj Yusuf Pasha still lived in Damascus at the end of the 19th century.

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Yūsuf Family



two of the most important posts in the command of the pilgrimage (*amin al-kilar* and *muhafiz*). He was probably on the pilgrimage when the events of July 1860 took place in Damascus, as July was the pilgrimage month that year. Eventually entitled a *pasha* and named governor of a number of sub-districts in the province of Damascus, Ahmad al-Yusuf played a key role in negotiating a political settlement in the Hawran conflicts of the 1860's which have been discussed elsewhere.[30]

Ahmad Pasha married a daughter of the Kurdish Barazi family which also had members in the Ottoman military. This marriage, which probably took place in 1839/40, may have been symbolic of his restored allegiance to the Ottomans. When he died in 1863/64, he left two sons and three daughters. Of these, Muhammad (1839/40–1896/97) who established himself in the family's compound in Sanjaqdar (C/3) had an active career in the Ottoman service. (A second son, Mahmud, served as a district governor of Baalbek shortly before his early death in 1880/81.) Muhammad began as an *agha* of a para-military troop, having command over as many as 400 men while working in collaboration with his father in the Hawran in the early 1860 conflicts. He also served at this time as commander of the pilgrimage relief expedition and as district governor in Homs (circa 1863). Following that he was named district governor of Ba'albek (c. 1866) and after a visit to Istanbul in 1868/69, obtained the title of *pasha* and was named district governor of Acre in 1870/71 and again in 1878 of Hama, in 1884/85 of Tripoli. After that it appears he remained in Damascus, serving on the *majlis* and as director of *awqaf*, a post which in pre-Tanzimat days, had always been filled by a member of the '*ulama*'.

Muhammad Pasha al-Yusuf knew Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish and had studied with the Damascene Hanbali '*alim* Muhammad al-Shatti. He acquired a reputation for charity and was said to have fostered "people of learning and literature". He was also responsible for the construction of a new *suq* in Hama. Upon his death, he left thirteen sons and daughters born to him by his seven wives. His most propitious kinship tie was that to the commander (*muhafiz*) of the pilgrimage Muhammad Sa'id Pasha Shamdin (mentioned above) whose only child was Muhammad Pasha's fourth wife. From her the son 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha was born to whom all the wealth of the Shamdins and the leadership of the Kurdish community of Damascus fell. 'Abd al-Rahman also assumed from Shamdin the post of commander of the pilgrimage though only a youth of 19. During the political developments of the 1908–1914 period, 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf was the leader of the Young Turks (CUP) in Damascus. He also maintained friendly relations with the Germans and upon their request generously donated grain during the First World War to help relieve those starving in the Lebanon.

Perhaps the grandest of all Damascene notables at the turn of the 20th century, 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf lived in the ornate family compound in Saruja which he had enlarged and redecorated. The house shared a common rear wall with the 'Azm's Saruja dwelling, and 'Abd al-Rahman was connected to this family by his marriage to the daughter of Khalil Pasha al-'Azm. His own daughter was engaged to marry Sami al-Bakri in 1919. In connection with political struggles which we cannot go into here, 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf was assasinated while on a government mission to the Hawran in the fall of 1920. The family did not remain politically prominent beyond that date.

The 'Abid Family[31]

The family's historian today accepts as reliable the information that the 'Abids sprung from the Mawali beduin of Syria. Their ancestor by the name of Muhammad, who had settled in

30 See my "Hauran Conflicts."

31 For information of the 'Abid family see: Joseph Pomiankowski, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches*, Vienna, 1928, 386; Harran, 22, 79; Tresse, *Pèlerinage*, 57; Lewis,

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ʿĀbid Family



the Maydan in 1700/1701, was the son of the Amir Qans al-'Abid, one of the princes of the Masharifa Arabs (a branch of the Arabs known generally as Mawalis) whose illustrious ancestor was Bakr b. Wa'il al-Hijaziya al-Qurayshiya (i.e. of the tribe of the Prophet). A number of 19th century sources confirm the main lines of this account. It is nonetheless difficult to find any detailed information on the activities of this family in the 18th century.

The first indentifiable 'Abid of prominence is 'Umar Agha of the Maydan who was active at the time of the Egyptian occupation. His son Hawlu Agha (1824/25–1895/96) began a successful career during the Tanzimat. One of his first provincial assignments was as district governor (*qa'imaqam*) in the Biqa'. In this area, which was normally within the 'Azm-faction's sphere, he was accused of rapacious methods of levying taxes and of enriching himself to a sum of 300,000 Francs in one year. A complaint of mal-administration was got up against him, and it was thought to have succeeded. But Hawlu Agha went to Istanbul and returned with the rank of *pasha* and the governorship of the Nablus district in northern Palestine.

During the events of 1860, 'Umar Agha and his son Hawlu Pasha protected Christians. They were rewarded for this with the order of St. Stanislas by the acting Russian consul in Damascus.

In the 1860's and 1870's, both Hawlu and his younger brother, Mahmud Pasha (d. 1909), held several district governorships in the province. In these decades, Hawlu Pasha was especially important in the development of rural administration. Time and again he was accused of mal-administration, but he always regained the government's faith. In the 1870's, he was one of the chief opponents of the European protégés and was called "the terror of foreign land holders" by the French consul. Under the governor Midhat Pasha, Hawlu was once again dismissed for mal-administration, but Midhat had, nonetheless, to rely upon him in tracking down brigands in the Marj'Ayun district. Midhat's successor, Hamdi Pasha, actually imprisoned Hawlu Pasha for mal-administration, but again also used him to raid out brigands, this time in the Jabal Ansari area north of Damascus.

During the inconclusive French intrigues of the early 1880's, Hawlu Pasha was referred to as one who had been "toujours un protégé de la France" by the French consul and was expected to be able to raise the support of 1000 men in the Maydan. At some point, however, he had become acceptable enough to the 'Azm-faction to be able to marry Makiya bint 'Abdullah al-'Azm (a granddaughter of the last 'Azm governor of Damascus). Though he maintained his ties in the Maydan, Hawlu also built a large family compound in Saruja, the traditional quarter of the 'Azm-faction's *aghawat*. One of his daughters was married to Amir 'Ali al-Jaza'iri on condition that the Jaza'iris relinquish their ties to the French, which some of them subsequently did. These marriages and the placement of 'Abid households in the city are some of the best indicators we have of the dissolution of factional politics and the consolidation of a city-wide elite in the decades after 1860.

As an elderly man, Hawlu Pasha presided over the provincial *majlis*. One of his sons, Ahmad 'Izzat (1851–1924) was launched from the Maydan into one of the most successful Ottoman political careers for any Damascene ever. At first being schooled in Muslim schools in the Maydan, Ahmad 'Izzat was then sent to Christian-run schools in the Lebanon and Beirut. He then served as a secretary (*katib*) for the Damascene *majlis* and in some of its courts but was subsequently appointed president of the commercial court of the city. In the 1870's he edited

Emergence, 239–240. Poujoulat, 395, 397; Shatti, *Rawd*, 121 and *Tarajim* 54–55; Hisni, 853–854; Jundi, I, 229; Zirik li, VII, 197. See also the dispatches of the French consuls, AECom/4, AEPol/8, AEPol/9, AECom/5, AEPol/10, AECom/5, AEPol/12, AEPol/14, AEPol/15, AEPol/17, AEARC/63, AEARC/63, AECPNS/9, AECPNS/116/8 and British consuls FO. 195/2075, FO. 195/2056, FO. 195/2075, FO. 195/2097, FO. 195/2122, FO. 195/2165, FO. 371/6455. I am also grateful to Dr. Bourhan Abed for his help in gathering information on the family's history.

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the official provincial newspaper called "Suriya" and in 1878 brought out his own newspaper called "Dimashq". Upon obtaining the post of a judicial inspector, he moved to Salonika and soon to Istanbul where he served as president of the mixed (i.e. Ottoman and European) court of appeals. In 1894 he attached himself to the Sultan's favorite Abu al-Huda al-Sayyadi (another Syrian of eminent political importance) and eventually became one of the men closest to Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid is his capacity as a member of the council of state.

At the time of the Young Turk revolt, 'Izzat Pasha was obliged to flee to Egypt as a member of the *ancien regime* and remained very active in political activities of the First World War period. He was said to have advised against the Empire's entry into the war. When the Young Turk cabinet resigned at the end of the war, Ahmad 'Izzat al-'Abid was appointed Grand Vizier and given the task of negotiating an armistice. He accomplished this but was soon replaced. Shortly after his death in 1924, the Austrian-Hungarian Field Marshal Joseph Pomiankowski who held the command of the troops in Turkey wrote in praise of al-'Abid's "knightly character" and integrity and noted the extent to which he had been generally respected. More research need be done, however, on this central figure of the late Ottoman period in connection with developments in Damascus. It is known that he was instrumental in a number of imperial public work projects in Syria. Of special note is his support for the Hijaz railway but also for the Damascene tramway (which was violently resisted by the Maydani population) and its electricity works. But little is known concerning al-'Abid's role in Syrian and Damascene politics of this period.

Ahmad 'Izzat's son Muhammad 'Ali Bey (1867–1939) was educated in Istanbul and Paris and was posted as Ottoman ambassador to the United States in 1905–1908. During the French Mandate, he was instrumental in ending the Druze revolt of 1925 in the Hawran. He subsequently held the post of Minister of Finance and in 1932, was elected president of the Republic of Syria by the Syrian parliament, a post which he held until 1938. During his tenure, negotiations began on the terms of Syrian independence from the French. Muhammad 'Ali al-'Abid died in 1939 at a time when the National Bloc was pressing for full and unconditional independence.

During and following the Second World War, the 'Abid family remained represented in Syrian politics. Of note, for example, are the activities of Ratib al-'Abid who, as chief political agent of the prominent post-war politician and prime minister Khalid al-'Azm, held a number of top administrative posts.

THE SECOND ESTATE: THE *'ULAMA'*

The Hanafi *Ifta'*

The Bakri Family[32]

The Bakris are a Hanafi family which has had branches in the Hijaz, Egypt, Istanbul and Damascus. Their full name is al-Bakri al-Siddiqi which indicates their claim to descent from the

32 For information on members of the Bakri family, see: Muradi, I, 149–156, 223–225, 241–249, II, 83–97, IV, 190–200; Shatti, *Rawd*, 26, 72, 117 and *Tarajim*, 46–48; Hisni, 650–651, 663, 675, 819–820, 820–821; A.H. Hourani, Fertile Cresent 55, and his *Syria and Lebanon*, London, 1946, 206, 214; Antonius, 149f., 190–191; Rafeq, *Province*, 77–85, 97–101. Harran, 79; Dispatches of French consuls, AEPo1/15, AEPo1/16, AECPNS/112/9, AECPNS/115/12, FO. 195/1202, FO. 195/6455. I am also grateful for the information provided by Mr Baha al-Din al-Bakri.

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Bakrī Family



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first caliph of Islam and one of the Prophet's first converts Abu Bakir al-Sadiq. Documents dating from the fourth Muslim century and certifying this genealogical link are still in the family's possession today.

The family's historian holds that the Syrian Bakris are a branch of the Egyptian family and were first established in the city by a certain Badr al-Din (of roughly the 14th century). The scattered elements of the family's genealogy which appear in the biographical sources indicate, however, that all prominent Damascene Bakris of the 18th and 19th centuries descended from a single 16th century ancestor. It appears, therefore, that the Damascene branch of the family began its modern rise following the Ottoman conquest.

In the late 17th century, their position in Damascus was founded on the career of Ahmad b. Kamal al-Din (1632/33–1695/96) who had risen to a high judicial rank and had served as *qadi* in Damascus, a remarkable attainment for a Damascene which indicates that the Ottomans were condoning the rise of local families already in the 17th century. During his tenure, the city's chief court was even transferred to the Bakri residence in Maristan al-Nuri (E/4). Ahmad was also authorized to administer the Madrasa al-Jaqmaqiya (F/3), a post which appears to have become a patrimony of the Bakris as the school continued under the family's control into the 20th century.

Ahmad's son As'ad (1662/63–1715/16) was appointed *na'ib qadi* in the Damascene courts of Bab and Kubra. The biographers indicate that As'ad was a key political personality, calling him *maqbul al-shafa'a 'inda'l-hukam* and *sahib al-hall wa'l-'aqd*.[33] He was, in fact, exiled to Sidon in 1706/07 for political reasons. In addition to ranks and titles, As'ad was granted extensive lands and control over *awqaf* in the vicinity of Damascus. He built a palace in Salihiya and a fine house and garden in the village of Jarmana as a second residence. Though as a large land-holding family the Bakris probably refrained from carrying on trade themselves, they may have put their good credit standing and family connections in other parts of the Ottoman Empire to work in this trade through others.

As'ad's son Khalil (1686/87–1759/60) was one of the leading Damascene notables of the 18th century. He had established close ties at the very top of the Ottoman establishment while in Istanbul with his father, having been a close companion of the *shaykh al-islam* Faydallah Hasan and a supporter of the *shaykh al-islam* Abul'l-Khayr Ahmad Damadzada. Khalil became *mufti* in Damascus during the first quarter of the 18th century. Later he also held the posts of *qadi* in Tripoli, Jerusalem, Mecca and Damascus. While *qadi* in Damascus, the court was again transferred to the Bakri residence. Shortly before his death, Khalil was named *qadi* of Istanbul, a rank which, according to al-Hisni, no other Arab had until that time attained.

Earlier in his career Khalil had led a Damascene revolt against the governor 'Uthman Pasha Abu Tawq in 1723. Abu Tawq had ruled the city through a deputy governor being himself chiefly concerned with his position in the province of Sidon. His deputy-governor's chief supporters were para-military groups drawn from Qubaybat, a settlement just beyond the Maydan to the south and from Salihiya, a suburb to the far northwest. These groups were said to have oppressed the city by making illegal exactions. The first Damascene revolt against them was unsuccessful. But, following the rejection of Damascene representations for relief from the Sultan, another more violent revolt broke out. This second revolt was led by Khalil who was then *mufti* and influenced the Sultan to dismiss Abu Tawq. The affair ended in Isma'il Pasha al-'Azm being assigned the governorship. As he was the first 'Azm to be named governor of Damascus it appears that the revolt led by al-Bakri benefited the 'Azms. However, the historian Abdul Karim Rafeq – who has studied this event closely – did not find any evidence of a conspiracy between the Bakris and the 'Azms. Nor could I find anything in the course of my research which would link the two families.

33 These terms can be translated respectively: "one whose intercession was accepted by the rulers" and "the one who unbinds and binds."

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Quite to the contrary, and as Rafeq notes, shortly after Isma'il Pasha's arrival, al-Bakri was dismissed from the *ifta'*. The 'Azms had thus "removed a potential leader who might once more have rallied the Damascenes."[34] Though the Bakri family may have remained sympathetic to the localists and in opposition to the 'Azms, Khalil himself set out on a career as *qadi* in provincial capitals of the empire and eventually became *qadi* in Istanbul. The leadership of the Damascene localists diverged thereafter upon the city's southern quarters and especially upon the *aghawat* of the Maydan. The Bakris were largely replaced by the Muradis in the *ifta'* during the 'Azm era.

At roughly the same time, Mustafa b. Kamal al-Din al-Bakri (1687/88–1748/49) emerged as one of the most influential intellectual and religious figures of the early and mid-18th century. Being raised in the inner-city household of his uncle Ahmad, Mustafa then studied with the famous Muslim scholar and Sufi 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi. He lived in the Badura'iya Madrasa (F/3) where he led the ceremonies (*dhikr*) of the Khalwati Sufis. Travelling to other Muslim capitals, his influence spread throughout the region, to Jerusalem, Cairo, Aleppo, Baghdad and the Hijaz. The Khalwatiya Bakriya Sufis presented something of a contrast to the Naqshbandis who were also prominent at this time and whom we shall discuss shortly.

In his survey of 18th century trends, Albert Hourani has linked the rise of the Sammaniya order in the Hijaz – an order which in turn gave rise to the Tijaniya movement of North Africa and the Mahdiya in the Sudan – to Mustafa al-Bakri's influence.[35] In that all these movements had local bases and goals and on occasion were anti-Ottoman, the Bakris may again be linked with the decentralist trends in especially Arab Ottoman society of the 18th and 19th centuries,[36] though here, admittedly, only by the force of intellectual developments of an extended and indirect nature.

Other than the short incumbency of a Bakri by the name of Sa'di b. Muhammad (d. 1810/11), whose genealogical relationship to the earlier Bakris has not been established, and the possibility that Khalil returned to Damascus briefly in 1774, the Bakris are practically invisible in Damascene politics of the 'Azm era. This may be by virtue of the fact that the biographer al-Bitar refrained from mentioning any Bakris whatsoever. But even the biographers al-Shatti and al-Hisni name only this Sa'di, his grandson Ahmad (d. 1844/45) who was *shaykh* of the Qadiri Sufis in the southern quarter of Shaghur, and *al-sayyid* (sic) Hasan al-Bakri (d. 1817/18). Their quiescence at this time indicates once again that the Bakris may have been at odds with the 'Azms and their faction. Yet, the Bakris were active elsewhere and had not ceased to be of political importance in Damascus. In 1831, for example, during the revolt against the Ottoman governor Salim Pasha, the localist *aghawat* set up their provisional headquarters in the Bakri household. Whether they were welcome there or not is not clear.

The Damascene Bakris do not appear in politics during the Egyptian occupation although the branch of the family in Egypt were politically-important *'ulama'* there. Neither in the early Tanzimat nor during the events of 1860 were the Bakris prominent.

As for the latter half of the century, a grandson of the *mufti* Khalil al-Bakri called As'ad ibn 'Atallah (d. 1892/93) is mentioned by the biographer al-Shatti but only as one who did well without connections to the government, keeping himself busy working on his farm in Jarmana near Damascus. He was the *mutawalli* for the Bakri *awqaf* there and elsewhere in the vicinity of Damascus. It seems significant that it cannot be established that the Bakris, like the Muradis and a number of *'ulama'* families of the 'Azm faction, were adversely effected by *awqaf* reforms during the Tanzimat. This may be further evidence that the Bakris did not belong to the 'Azm faction and that the Tanzimat was applied along factional lines.

34 Rafeq, *Province*, 97.
35 Hourani, "Fertile Crescent", 55.
36 For the especially strong Arab tone of Mustafa al-Bakri's thinking see *ibid.*, 55.

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Finally, with 'Atallah (d. 1915/16), the son of the just-mentioned As'ad, the Bakris reappear as politicians at the end of the century. He served on the provincial *majlis* and was president of the Damascus municipality. At some point he was honored with the title of *pasha* by the Ottoman state, but this entitlement was not accompanied by an administrative assignment. In 1890 he was arrested in connection with a tax-farming dispute and may have been exiled. Perhaps this was the beginning of the political revival of the Bakris for by 1912, 'Atallah was considered by the French consul to be a collaborator of 'Izzat Pasha al-'Abid in a plan to arouse support for Syria's union with Egypt. Here, the Bakris' old ties to Egypt may have played a role, or perhaps once again, they joined with 'Abid of the Maydan in an on-going struggle against the 'Azm faction in an effort to gain the political initiative.

'Atallah Pasha died before the end of the First World War, but both he and his sons were active in the politics of the war period in which the Arab Revolt developed. The family's relations with the Sharif of Mecca formed a background against which anti-Ottoman conspiracies could develop. 'Atallah's son Fawzi Bey (1883–1963) was sent on a mission by his brother Nasib and other members of the secret nationalist society called "Fatat" to be the Damascene Arab nationalists' early contact man with Sharif Husayn. He was later elected to the first Syrian congress, the body which named Amir Faysal ruler of Syria. In 1928, he was a member of the constitutional assembly. Amir 'Abdallah of Transjordan granted Fawzi the thitle of *pasha* in 1941 in honor of his long struggle for the Arab cause.

Fawzi's brother Nasib (1888–1966) was Amir Faysal's closest Syrian advisor and was among the first to enter Damascus amongst the Arab troops as the Ottomans withdrew. He remained Faysal's chief counsellor until the French forced Faysal to withdraw. Following the installation of the French Mandate, Nasib Bey al-Bakri continued to agitate for national independence, forming a link between the Damascene nationalists and the Druze rebel leader Sultan Pasha al-Atrash of the Hawran. He remained strongly opposed to the French as a member of the National Bloc while a deputy in the Syrian Parliament, a post to which he was repeatedly elected from 1932 until 1962, long after the French had left Syria. He also held the post of governor of Lattakia and of Jabal Druze, was Syrian Ambassador to Jordan and headed the Ministries of Justice and Public Works.

The Muradi Family[37]

The Muradis were established in Damascus by Muhammad Murad al-Bukhari (1640/41–1719/20) who was a Kurd by origin but who had travelled extensively before finally settling in Damascus in 1669/70. It is reported in the biographical sources that he was received as a great *'alim* and as a descendant of the Prophet. He had studied with the famous *'ulama'* of Bukhara, India, Baghdad, Isfahan, Mecca, Cairo, Rumelia and Istanbul. It is related that he could draw from a store of more than 10,000 *hadith* while his Koranic commentaries and scientific and philosophical works in Turkish, Persian and Arabic attested to the scope of his intellectual activity. Muhammad Murad was best known, however, for his success in spread-

37 For information on the Muradis see Muradi, I, 25–30, 145–148, II, 70–72, 218–219, III, 219–228, IV, 114–116, 129–131, 215–228; Bitar, I, 323–324, 533, II, 1007–1008, III, 1393–1405; Shatti, *Rawd*, 75–76, 87–94, 165–166, 184–187 and *Tarajim* 48; Hisni 652, 655, 665, 752–753, 841–842, 963; Mardam, 7, 229–230; *Tarikh Hawadith*, 25–26 34–35; Rafeq, *Province*, 49, 162, 329; *Salnames* of 1872, 1874, 1877, 1880, 1885, 1890; Dispatches of French and British consuls, FO. 78/872, AEPol/15, FO. 195/976, AECPNS/112/9. I am also grateful to Prof. Taher al-Mouradi, M.D. for his helpful remarks and additions.

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Murādī Family



ing the Naqshbandi Sufi order in Syria and Palestine where, until that time, it was known only to a few scattered adherents.[38]

The Ottoman Sultan Mustafa granted Muhammad Murad a number of villages in the vicinity of Damascus as *malikane* for which he was obliged to pay a yearly amount to the state treasury. Though it is said that his extraordinary wealth sprang from these villages, subsequent Muradis no doubt set the family's wealth to work in commerce as well. One notes that by the beginning of the 19th century, the Muradi family owned three Damascene *khans* in the central rectangle, one at Bab al-Jabiya (D/5), one at Bab al-Barid (E/3) and one in Suq al-Buzuriya (F/4).

During Muhammad Murad's lifetime, the family's residence was established in Suq Saruja, i.e. outside the city's walls to the north where, according to the family historian, Muhammad Murad also built a mosque and a *madrasa*. In this compound, which came to be known as the Naqshbandiya "al-Barraniya" (i.e. the outer or extramural), the family also maintained a sepulchral shrine. In addition, the biographical sources relate that Muhammad Murad acquired a *khan* which had harbored immoral persons and converted it into a *madrasa* with a prohibition written into its founding document against "beardless, unmarried or drinking (or, perhaps, smoking) persons" living there.[39] This Naqshbandi compound would possibly have been the Naqshbandiya "al-Juwwaniya" or the inner-city Naqshbandiya.

At some point the family also established a residence within the central rectangle, probably sometime subsequent to family members having been appointed *muftis*. A "badly deteriorated" building known as the *bayt* (or house) of the Muradis was found by Watzinger and Wulzinger in the 1920's in F/3. This building had served earlier as a Shaf'i *madrasa*, being called the Badura'iya and had been the site of the famous early 18th century scholar and Sufi Mustafa al-Bakri's Khalwati Sufi *dhikr*.[40] It was also the location at which the revolt of 1831 had broken out, and is likely to have been the house of the *mufti* referred to by the chronicler of that event.[41] The family's historian today also accepts the explanation that the Muradis maintained two residences, one in Suq Saruja and one in the central rectangle.[42]

The first Muradi to obtain the post of *mufti* was Muhammad Murad's grandson 'Ali (1719/20–1771). He was named to the post sometime in the first half of the 18th century but was not accepted by all Damascenes, being attacked and even fired upon by a Maydani protégé of Fathi al-Falaqinsi. His marriage to the niece of the chief *agha* of the Maydan (a certain Darwish b. 'Abdullah), which came at about the time of the 'Azms triumph over the Maydani faction, may have represented the Maydanis political submission to the 'Azms or at least a reconciliation.

Following the 'Azms' triumph, the Muradis practically dominated the Hanafi *ifta'*, holding the post well into the 19th century with only a few short interruptions. Their influence over the post is further indicated by the close connections which existed between the Muradis and the Maninis, one of the few other 18th century families who on brief occasions also held the post. The biographer Khalil al-Muradi writes in his sketch of the *mufti* Isma'il al-Manini that

38 For the significance of the Naqshbandiya, see Hourani. "Fertile", 56–57 and his "Shaykh Khalid and the Naqshbandi Order", in Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order: A preliminary survey of its history and significance", *Studia Islamica*, 44 (1976); Abu Manneh, "Naqshbandiyya".

39 Muradi, IV, 129–131. The family historian rejects any connection between the Muradis and the semi-fortified mosque described by Wulzinger and Watzinger (96–97) in Suwayqa (D/8) at the mouth of the Maydan and associated by them with the Naqshbandi order.

40 See above Bakri sketch.

41 See above Chapter II.

42 Later in the 19th century another Muradi house was built by 'Abd al-Muhsin ibn Salih (d. 1913/14) in Muhajirun on the way to Salihiya. (For references to the location of the Muradi households see: Muradi, I, 145–148, III, 215–228, IV, 129–131; Shatti, *Rawd*, 75–76; Hisni, 752–753.)

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there existed an "old love" between the two families. Both Isma'il's father and uncle had been close followers and travelling companions of Muhammad Murad. Isma'il's two sisters (Umm al-Khayr Khadija and Umm al-Yaman) were married to Muradis. Here again is evidence that family prerogatives could be passed through the female line as well as the male, though the women themselves did not directly exercise these prerogatives.

During the period when the 'Azms had passed their peak and al-Jazzar was extending his control over Damascus, the Muradis suffered a number of set-backs. In 1775 'Abdallah ibn Tahir al-Muradi was named *mufti*, but his tenure was terminated after only eleven months for reasons which are not explained in the sources. In 1797/98, when al-Jazzar was reaching the peak of his power, 'Abdallah was strangled in the Damascene citadel. Another Muradi, 'Abd al-Rahman (whose genealogical connection to the family cannot as yet be established) who was named *mufti* during the second governorship of 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm was also killed. The anonymous chronicler (Michael "the Damascene") related that 'Abd al-Rahman assisted for 'Abdallah Pasha when the latter left Damascus to participate in the campaign against the French. He was arrested by Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar's Damascene supporter 'Aqil Agha of the Maydan and imprisoned in a dry well in the citadel. Possibly because 'Aqil Agha was himself imprisoned shortly afterwards in Acre by al-Jazzar, he never gave the order to release 'Abd al-Rahman whose body was not discovered until two years later.

It is interesting to note that 'Abd al-Rahman would have been the "Mullah Murad-Zadeh" to whom Napoleon addressed a letter on March 27, 1797. Napoleon hoped to find sympathizers in Damascus by pretending his campaign into Syria was motivated by the need to end the agressions of al-Jazzar against Egypt. He requested al-Muradi to explain this to the *aghawat*, *'ulama'* and *ashraf* of Damascus and expressed his intention to preserve local religion, traditions and property relationships and to protect the pilgrimage. He suggested that al-Muradi convince the people of Damascus to behave as cautiously and as wisely as the population of Cairo had done.[43]

Confusion in the office of the *mufti* continued for a number of years. Not until 1810 did the Muradis regain the *ifta'* for an extended period:[44] first, 'Ali ibn Husayn (d. 1814/15) then his son Husayn. The latter held the post with only slight interruptions from 1814/15 until his death in 1850/51. During his tenure as *mufti*, Husayn al-Muradi invited Mawlana Khalid al-Naqshbandi, the famous Naqshbandi shaykh, to settle in Damascus. It appears, therefore, that in the 1820's the Naqshbandi order welcomed a reviver and that the Muradis had become its patrons rather than its spiritual leadership by that time.[45]

Husayn al-Muradi remained *mufti* during the Egyptian occupation and was head of the consultative *majlis* set up by the Egyptians. His son 'Abd al-Rahman (who died during the devastating epidemic of 1847/48) had been, with the son of the Shafi'i *mufti*, taken into Ibrahim Pasha's service as a *binbashi*, perhaps as a measure to assure their father's cooperation.

At the start of the Tanzimat, the Muradis, under the leadership of the *mufti* Husayn al-Muradi, were still one of the city's leading families. Their standing was noticed by a contemporary European observer who described the *mufti*'s participation in the annual pilgrimage procession through the city in the following terms:

43 See Wencker-Wildberg, V, 76.

44 In the interim the 'Ajlani family held the *ifta'*. See their history below.

45 In support of this interpretation one notes that Mawlana Khalid did not rely on any of the Muradis in propagating the order or establishing new *zawiyas* but moved into those already in existence. Even in the mosque referred to as the "Muradiya" another Naqshbandi *shaykh* – 'Abdallah al-Khani (d. 1862/63) was named *khalifa* to Mawlana Khalid. (See: Bitar, III, 210–215; Shatti, *Rawd*, 209–210; Hisni, 689.)

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> Last of all in this group [of officials and notables] came the Cadi and the Mufti, the former, as a matter of course, a Turk from Constantinople, the latter the head of the ancient house of Moradi, which, in Damascus, ranks next to the Vizierial house of Adm ['Azm]. The Mufti was by far the finest figure in the procession. A silvery beard, a finely chiselled nose, and an eye that bespoke the repose of conscious power, almost made me suppose that some senator of Titian or Giorgione had been recalled to life.[46]

Prior to Husayn al-Muradi's death in 1850, however, the Muradis became the victims of *awqaf* reform measures about which we unfortunately know too little. The *ifta'* fell to Husayn's son 'Ali, but he withdrew from the post. Attempts made in Istanbul by his younger brother Abu al-Su'ud to regain the post failed. After more than a century of leadership in the *ifta'*, the Muradis were never again to serve as *muftis*. While the contemporary English consul wrote that the loss of their *awqaf* properties and the lack of adequate compensation for these had compelled 'Ali al-Muradi to step down,[47] Hisni relates, perhaps ironically, that it was their ignorance of Turkish which was decisive.[48]

The Muradis suddenly no longer held the *ifta'* or sat on the *majlis*. They do not appear again in public life until a generation later. In the 1870's, when many of the old notables or members of their families were reinstated in the Ottoman reformed bureaucracy, Musa b. Abu al-Su'ud (d. 1897/98) became a member of the provincial *majlis*, the Damascene municipality and its courts of first instance and appeal. His son Murad was, paradoxically, named Director of *awqaf*. But these modest assignments seem to have been the extent of the Muradis' rehabilitation. Nor do the Muradis emerge as active participants in the politics of the World War One period or thereafter. The family appears, therefore, to have gone into serious political decline after the crisis of 1850 and as a result of particular Tanzimat measures. It seems also important that a large inner-city property held by the Muradis just west of the Umayyad Mosque was at about that time acquired by the Mardam family which, in contrast to the Muradis, rose during the Tanzimat period.[49] This land was transformed by the Mardams into a market and became one of the most successful commercial undertakings of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, known, following subsequent improvements, as the Suq al-Hamidiya.

A number of elements in the Muradi family's history indicate that they were politically closely allied to the 'Azms in the 18th century and that they belonged to the 'Azm faction following the 'Azms' decline. In reviewing these, it can be suggested that the Muradis were the '*ulama*' counterpart to the 'Azms in that their fortunes were comparable and even ran parallel to those of the 'Azms. Though a few decades earlier, the Muradis support had also come from Istanbul, and it is clear that they remained in good imperial standing throughout the 'Azm period. The Muradis settled in Suq Saruja where the 'Azms' constituents were concentrated. In that they were Kurds, it would have been natural for them to settle to the north of the city but not necessarily in Saruja. Once there, however, their position *vis-a-vis* the 'Azms could only have been reinforced. The Muradis' own economic interests – investments in the inner-city long-distance trade and real estate within the city's walls and within its inner-ring – would have been the same as those of other 'Azm-connected notables. Next, the Muradis were closely integrated within the inner-city '*ulama*' circles obtaining the leading position among them as Hanafi *muftis* just at the time when the 'Azms obtained the governorship.

Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar, the 'Azms' chief challenger towards the end of the 18th century struck out at the Muradis and two of their leading members died violent deaths. Finally, the

46 A.A. Paton (writing anonymously), *The Modern Syrians*, London, 1844, 156–157.
47 Compare this to Bitar's explanation as related in the next sketch.
48 Hisni, 665.
49 See their sketch below.

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Muradis like the 'Azms appear to have collaborated with the Egyptians at the start of the occupation, and like other elements of the 'Azm faction, suffered materially during the Tanzimat.

More research needs to be done on the Naqshbandi Sufi order which the Muradis first led and then patronized if the family's influence and political position in the city and within the 'Azm faction is to be better understood. This pronouncedly Sunni order which benefited from official Ottoman patronage may, in the late 17th and 18th centuries, have been a vehicle of political integration and mobilization in favor of the central government and the 'Azms. Were the Naqshbandis intended to neutralize the localism of the link between Sufis, *ashraf* and artisans in Syria which dated from Mamluk times and remained an avenue of Egyptian influence? More research need be done here. Following the suppression of the Shiite Baktashi Sufi order and the destruction in 1826 of the Istanbul janissaries among whom the latter order had thrived, the central government had given its support fully to the Naqshbandis.[50] This new surge of imperial support, however, does not appear to have benefited the Muradi family. Not only did the Muradis suffer under the *awqaf* reforms to the Tanzimat but the leadership of the Naqshbandi order was transferred to a newcomer, the Mawlana Khalid al-Naqshbandi, and eventually through his female heirs to the Ghazzi family.[51]

In this connection, it should also be noted that the beleaguered Ottoman governor Salim Pasha fled during the localist revolt of 1831 to the Mu'allaq mosque just north of the citadel (E/2) which was one of the main centers of the contemporary Naqshbandis under the Muradi family's leadership. On the other hand, the localist rebels occupied the house of the *mufti* who was at that time a Muradi. Were they violating its privacy and its sacred and judicial functions, or were the Muradis cooperating with the rebels?

After the Muradis abrupt decline in 1850, a period of uncertainty as to the choice of a new Hanafi *mufti* ensued. If the Muradis would or could not continue, the authorities would normally have searched amongst the *'ulama'* of Damascus for a personality who had gained the respect of the local religious community and who would, therefore, be able to act authoritatively. One difficulty, however, was that many of the senior *'ulama'* of this generation had died in the course of the 1840's[52] and most families which had been associated with the *ifta'* in the past century were no longer producing the most respected *'ulama'*.[53] It is remarkable that the first of the not yet well-established *'ulama'* to emerge as candidates for the *ifta'* came from the Maydan and from families known for their attachment to Shafi'ism. One of these was Hasan Taqi al-Din al-Hisni, whose family we shall discuss shortly; another was Hasan al-Bitar.

Hasan al-Bitar[54]

According to the leading biographical source for the 19th century, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar, the new *mufti* 'Ali al-Muradi called on al-Bitar's father Shaykh Hasan ibn Ibrahim (1791/92–1855/56) to facilitate his resignation. Al-Bitar, whose family came to Damascus in the 19th century from Wadi al-Taym of the Anti-Lebanon mountains to the south-west of Damascus,

50 Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders of Islam*, 239.

51 See Ghazzi sketch below.

52 The epidemic of 1847–48 was responsible for the deaths of many *'ulama'*, but also, age had taken its toll amongst this generation.

53 See the discussion of this development, Chapter V, note 83.

54 Information on Hasan al-Bitar can be found in Bitar, I, 463–475 and II, 748–749; Hisni, 651; Shatti, *Rawd*, 67–70; 'Izz al-Din, 217, 219. Concerning other members of the Bitar family, see: Bitar, I, 6–7, 9–20, 192–193, 342–343, 380–407, II, 873–881, III, 1421–22, 1483; Shatti, *Rawd*, 4, 5; *Tarajim*, 50, 65, 113; Hisni, 707, 760–761, 768, 858–859; Zirkili, IV, 4: *Kitab al-Ahzan*, 290; 'Adnan al-Khatib, *Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar, Hayatuhu wa Atharuhu*, Damascus, 1972.

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had served since 1820 at the request of the notables of the Maydan as *imam* and *khatib* of the Karim al-Din mosque (later known as the Daqqaq mosque) deep in the 'upper' Maydan (D/17).[55] He married a woman from the Sa'di family which patronized and led the important Sa'diya Sufis of the Maydan. He had distinguished himself politically in the negotiations between the Druzes and the Egyptians during the local revolts at the end of the Egyptian occupation and in 1847/48 had spent an extended stay in Istanbul at the invitation of Sultan 'Abd al-Majid. During this visit, al-Bitar carried on extensive discussions with the pro-Tanzimat *shaykh al-islam* 'Arif Hikmat Bey.

When, shortly afterwards, the post of *mufti* was vacated by 'Ali al-Muradi, al-Bitar was offered the post. The biographer relates the episode as follows: The disquieted 'Ali al-Muradi came to Hasan al-Bitar's house following a frightening dream in which an ancestor appeared to him in chains and admonished him to beware. (Given the number of imprisonments and executions amongst the Muradis over the previous decades,[56] the implications of 'Ali's dream, would have been apparent to all Damascenes.) 'Ali then told al-Bitar that he wished to be relieved of the post of *mufti* and that he would not leave the house until this had been arranged. There is no indication in this account of why al-Bitar, an important but not yet officially influential *'alim*, was in a position to be able to arrange the matter. But the implication is clear: he is meant to be considered in some way superior to 'Ali al-Muradi, a scion of one of the most important inner-city 'Azm-faction families. The account continues that al-Bitar attempted to find another candidate but that the situation was complicated due to the many contestants and factions involved. In an interview with the *majlis* president 'Uthman Bey (Mardam Bey?),[57] al-Bitar was told that he should himself assume the post. According to this account, al-Bitar was quite shocked by this suggestion and said he could not do so as he was uninterested in positions from which one could be appointed and dismissed. Misunderstanding al-Bitar's implication, 'Uthman Bey then offered him the post as a patrimony for the Bitar family. "No", al-Bitar replied cogently, "I meant a post of knowledge over which no one can make decisions of appointment and dismissal".

This episode is interesting in that it shows to what extent the Tanzimat officials were willing to upset the established balance of power in the city. The Maydani al-Bitar had come very near to introducing his family into what had been a preserve of the inner-city '*ulama*' since at least the beginning of the 'Azm era.

55 Though the Bitars' origins would have placed them in the 'Azm-faction, the Bitars made numerous references to their attachments in the Maydan. For example, al-Bitar is portrayed as a Maydani leader by his son. This is done by means of the relation of an incident in which the Ottoman officials confronted al-Bitar. In this episode, the *qadi* of Damascus, encouraged by his aide (who remains unnamed), accused Hasan al-Bitar of attracting the people's interests into his sphere, of interfering between the government and the people and of corrupting them. Al-Bitar was beaten and imprisoned with common criminals. While he passed his time reciting the Koran, a *fitna* rose in the city's streets on his behalf. Armed Damascenes blockaded the streets throughout the day, obliging the *qadi* to confer with the local notables (here: *sadat* or *ashraf*). Their outrage over Bitar's arrest was expressed in sharp terms, and the *qadi* regretted his action, blaming it on the misinformation of his aides. He conceded that he would have to follow the notables' demands, upon which, a body of '*ulama*' and *a'yan* went with the *naqib al-ashraf* to release al-Bitar from prison, bringing him to the house of the *naqib*. While the crowd celebrated in the streets, shooting off their guns and dancing with their swords, the *qadi* hastened to greet al-Bitar, to apologize to him and to kiss his hands. The report ends on an ominous note with the information that both the *qadi* and his assistant soon after "drank God's cup of death". (Bitar, I, 464f.)

56 See above, 38.

57 See Mardam sketch below.

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Tahir al-Amidi[58]

Tahir ibn 'Umar al-Amidi (1800/01–1882/83) was the next *mufti*. In sharp contrast to al-Muradi, Amidi was a newcomer to Damascus. He appears to be the only one of the *majlis* members who had no substantial family connections in Damascus. He was a Kurd born in Kharput and brought as a youth to Damascus by his father in 1811/12. His father had been a respected *shaykh* and *imam* of the Hanafi in the Umayyad mosque. Tahir assumed this position upon his father's death in 1845/46. Sometime thereafter the *mufti* Husayn al-Muradi appointed Tahir to be *amin al-fatwa*, whereupon he joined a group of prominent Damascene *'ulama'* who also held the post under al-Muradi: Muhammad Amin 'Abidin, Husayn al-Kabisi, Hashim al-Taji, Sa'di al-'Umari, 'Abd al-Qadir ibn Darwish Hamza and Mustafa ibn Khalil Qazziha. Tahir remained in the post when the *ifta'* was passed to 'Ali ibn Husayn al-Muradi. When 'Ali left the *ifta'*, Tahir was considered for the post. He remained *mufti* until 1860.

The choice of Tahir al-Amidi, a relatively new personage in Damascus, to succeed 'Ali al-Muradi indicated a modification of the arrangement between the Damascene *'ulama'* and the central government which had been in force for many generations. Not only were the Muradis set aside, but also other families – such as the Imadis, Bakris, Mahasinis and Maninis who had periodically held the *ifta'* during the previous centuries. Nor does Amidi appear to be the representative of either of the factions.

As noted in Chapter V, however, with the exception of the Maninis, none of these old-established *ifta'* families were active at this time as teaching *'ulama'*. Other learned men had ascended to hold the most prestigious teaching and preaching posts in Damascus. Others were also named as the authorizers of the younger generation of *'ulama'* in the biographical sources.

It may well be that the *'ulama'* of Damascus were impressed by the reform teachings of 'Arif Hikmat, the contemporary *shaykh al-islam* with whom some key Damascene *'ulama'* (for example, Hasan al-Bitar, Muhammad Amin 'Abidin and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Tibi) had recently been in personal contact, and were keen to have a *mufti* who was himself an *'alim*, not simply a patron of the *'ulama'*. It may also be, however, that the Ottomans were imposing their will and purposely ignoring the older, better-established *'ulama'* families.

In addition to the account given by al-Bitar related above, Amidi's nomination is mentioned by an anonymous Christian chronicler and by al-Hisni. According to the latter of the two, Tahir had been advanced in his career through the good recommendation written on his behalf by 'Abdallah al-Halabi, the contemporary *imam* of the Hanafis in the Umayyad Mosque and holder of the Qubbat al-Nasr teaching post who was well established in the inner-city quarter of al-Qaymariya.[59]

This account does not necessarily contradict that of al-Bitar repeated above, as al-Halabi's recommendation was possibly parallel to or immediately following the Bitar affair. In any case, it appears that the *majlis* paid attention to the recommendations of the inner-city *'ulama'* and that these in turn proposed Amidi as a compromise figure. It seems strange, though, that al-Halabi did not himself become *mufti*.

According to the Christian chronicler, Amidi used his office to enrich himself. First, he introduced new fees for *fatwas* which both by their very existence as well as their level must have been astonishing. Amidi, who is referred to in this source as "this hungry one", raised the fees for *fatwas* to as high as 10,000 piasters. The Muradis had taken a small fee of only between 60 paras of silver up to 20 piasters. In addition, the chronicler relates that Amidi took advan-

58 See Hisni, 671, 737; Shatti, *Rawd*, 190; *Tarajim*, 4; Bitar, II, 748–749, 1132; Poujoulat, 402–403; Dispatches of French consuls, AEPol/6, AEARC/93/4, AEPol/8.

59 See the sketch on the Halabis below.

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tage of his position on the *majlis* to practice other corruptions. This account would tend to indicate that al-Halabi's recommendation in Istanbul on Amidi's behalf may have been of a pecuniary nature.

In 1860, *mufti* Tahir al-Amidi, like his patron 'Abdallah al-Halabi, was sentenced to 10 years exile, but he was released with the others in the mid-1860's. Unlike the other exiles, he did not return directly to Damascus but was appointed *qadi* in Izmir and then in Benghazi. After a stay in Istanbul he obtained an appointment as *na'ib qadi* in Kharput, his province of origin. From there he returned to Syria where he served as *na'ib* for two terms in the city of Hama, and, upon the representations of *mufti* Mahmud Hamza, as *na'ib* of the Bab court in Damascus in 1880/81. The octagenarian died shortly thereafter. Nothing more is mentioned about his or his family's activities in Damascus in the sources used here.

Amin al-Jundi[60]

The Hanafi *mufti* installed after the events of 1860 was Amin ibn Muhammad al-Jundi (1814–1878). He was again from the outside, a Syrian but not a Damascene. Born in Ma'arrat al-Na'man in the north, he spoke Turkish as well as Arabic and was one of the first Syrians to be placed in a number of Tanzimat positions.

After receiving a traditional religious education in Homs and Aleppo, Jundi had been appointed *qadi* of Ma'arra in 1837 while his father held the *ifta'* there. He and his father may have been active in some political activities in Damascus in 1845/46, after which they returned to Ma'arra to their former positions. When his father died in 1847/48, Amin al-Jundi became *mufti* of Ma'arra with the full support of the pro-Tanzimat *shaykh al-islam* 'Arif Hikmat Bey. In 1849/50, he was recruited by Muhammad Amin Pasha (*mushir* (commander) of the Ottoman 5th Army corps posted in Syria) to be Arabic scribe in Damascus, a position which he first refused but eventually accepted and retained under several *mushirs* until 1856/57. Al-Jundi was then employed in the private business affairs of *mushir* 'Abd al-Karim Pasha in Ajarbayjan. He travelled to Trebizond on the Black Sea and finally to Istanbul. He was then appointed to his old position as Arabic scribe in Damascus.

Al-Jundi was present during the events of 1860. Fu'ad Pasha first employed him as a translator during the investigations, then he placed him on the 1860 *majlis* and appointed him *mufti* of Damascus. He remained in that office until 1868 when, as a result of some as yet unexplained quarrel with the governor Muhammad Rashid Pasha, he was dismissed.

Jundi was perhaps only a year unemployed, being called to Istanbul under Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha to participate in some judicial reform commissions, presumably occupied in compiling the modern religious law code known as the *majalla.* In 1870/71, he was appointed *qadi* and commissioner on the Ottoman expedition to quell the revolt in the Yemen where he was instrumental in forming a new Ottoman province there. He returned to Damascus, was named to the appeals court and nominated a deputy to the 1876 Ottoman Parliament. He refused the latter post probably because of poor health of which he had complained since 1870. Al-Jundi died in 1878.

Al-Jundi, whose family claimed descent from 'Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet and had branches in many Syrian towns, does not appear to have established his family in Damascus. Nothing more about his descendants is mentioned in the sources used here. He is an interesting figure and it is unfortunate that the British consul, contemporary to his disputes with the governor Rashid Pasha who found al-Jundi unsympathetic ("corrupt and immoral"), reported

60 See Bitar, I, 343–364; Jundi, I, 31–34; Shatti, *Rawd*, 54–56; Hisni, 643–645; Zirikli, I, 361; R. Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, Baltimore, 1963, 268n; Dispatches of the British consuls FO. 195/806, FO. 195/1153.

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nothing more of his activities. It is quite clear that Jundi made an impression on the Damascene *'ulama'*. Al-Bitar, for one, related his career in great detail, even noting the 75,000 Piasters Jundi had at his disposal during his assignment to the Yemen.

When al-Jundi was dismissed from the *ifta'* in 1868, the authorities again turned to a well-established Damascene family to fill the post. But the choice was not from among the *'ulama'*. The Hamza family had until then been chiefly associated with the *ashraf*. The assumed the *ifta'* in 1868 and held the post until 1887. The family's history will be presented within the discussion of the *ashraf*.[61]

The Shafi'i *ifta'*

The Shafi'i *ifta'* was held by the Ghazzi family for the entire period studied here.

The Ghazzi Family[62]

The Ghazzi family had been established in Damascus in 1368 AD by al-Shihab Ahmad ibn 'Abdallah al-Ghazzi al-'Amiri (1349/50–1419/20). Ahmad claimed descent from 'Amir ibn Lu'ayy, a pre-Islamic personality of the Qurayshi tribe from which the Prophet also came. He came from Gaza and was shortly thereafter named head of the Shafi'i *'ulama'*. He taught in a number of Damascene *madrasas* and was the administrator of a number of religious *awqaf*.

Three generations later, and about the time of the Ottoman conquest, Badr al-Din (Muhammad) ibn Rida al-Din al-Ghazzi (1498/99–1576/77) is said to have been *shaykh al-islam* (presumably in Damascus), an indication of the preeminent position held by the Shafi'is at that time. Throughout the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, the Ghazzis continued to hold the Shafi'i *ifta'* and to produce teachers, preachers and *imams* for Damascene *madrasas* and mosques. Of particular importance was their connection to the Madrasa al-Shamiya al-Barraniya near the Umayyad mosque (probably the Madrasa Bayt al-Ghazzi which is located in F/3).

Also important was the establishment of a *waqf* in the middle of the 17th century for the readings of *hadith* held by Najm al-Din al-Ghazzi (d. 1650/51). This *waqf* was established by Bahram *Agha*, the *ketkhuda* of the mother of Sultan Ibrahim. The readings were thereby elevated to a salaried teaching post which became one of the most, if not the most prestigious teaching post in Damascus, the Qubbat al-Nasr *hadith* readings from the Sahih of Bukkari following the Friday noon prayer during the Muslim months of Rajab, Sha'ban and Ramadan in the Umayyad mosque under the Nasr dome. Su'ud ibn Najm al-Din al-Ghazzi succeeded to the post upon his father's death and held it until his own death. Otherwise, the Ghazzis are said to have held posts in the Atabakiya, Turijiya and Kamaliya Madrasas in Damascus. No fewer than fourteen Ghazzis are mentioned by Muradi as among the leading *'ulama'* of his century.

61 See Hamza sketch below.

62 See Muradi, I, 117–119, 172, II, 97, 243–244, 309–310, III, 64–65, 215–216, IV, 39–40, 41, 53–58, 126, 127–128, 166; Bitar, I, 153, II, 863–864, III, 1133–1135, 1331–1333; Shatti, *Rawd*, 20, 52–53, 107–108, 136–139, 150, 188–190, 199–202, 209–210, 226–227; Hisni, 645, 659, 671, 672, 675–677, 843–844; Mardam, 7; A.K. Rafeq, *Province*, 50; Zirikli, IV, 24; See also: Bitar, II, 629, 1133–1135; 'Azm, 27; Hisni, 660, 671, 732; Shatti, *Tarajim*, 12–13, 24, 106–107, 107–108, and *Rawd*, 107–108, 188–190; Zirikli, V, 370; Dispatches of the French consuls, AEPol/16, AEARC/93/4, AEPo1/15, AECPNS/112/9, AEPo1/15, AEARC/63, AEPo1/17. I am grateful to Usama and Musbah al-Ghazzi for their help in compiling information on the Ghazzis.

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Ghazzī Family



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

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In the first half of the 18th century and as the 'Azms began to establish themselves, it appears that the Ghazzis began to probe influential circles in addition to those of the Shafi'is. A number of Ghazzis, for example, the *muftis* Ahmad ibn 'Abd al-Karim (1667/68–1730–31), Mustafa ibn Ahmad (1688/89–1742/43) and Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Rahman (1684/85–1753/54) studied with *shaykhs* of the Hanafi, Hanbali and Maliki *madhhabs* in addition to those of the Shafi'i. Also at this time some Ghazzis, for example, 'Abd al-Hayy ibn 'Ali (1676/77–1724/25) and his son 'Ali (1704/05–1781/82) participated in Sufi orders: the former in the Naqshbandi, the latter in the Qadiri. Others married into *ashraf* families such as the Siddiqis of the Hijaz, and some into Hanafi families such as the Rahmati-Ayyubis and Nabulusis of Damascus.

After the turn of the 18th century, the family's leadership fell to 'Abd al-Ghani's two adolescent sons, 'Umar and Isma'il. The elder, 'Umar (1785/86–1861) became Shafi'i *mufti* though he was only seventeen years old. It is said he had already studied with his father and uncle and had obtained certificates from leading '*ulama*' in Damascus and the Hijaz. At some point he also joined the Shaybani, Naqshbandi and Bakri Sufi orders. Maturing into a man with "awe-inspiring demeanor" and "magnificent stature", 'Umar, who became the head of the Ghazzi household, held the Shafi'i *ifta*' for the rest of his life. His younger brother Isma'il (1791/92–1831/32) became the guardian for the descendants of Mawlana Khalid al-Naqshbandi, as their sister 'A'isha had been married to the famous Sufi following his settlement in Damascus.

Isma'il was also named briefly to the post of *naqib al-ashraf* though the Ghazzis were otherwise not considered to be *ashraf*. This was probably during the political disruptions around the turn of the century. The family's historian today reports that Isma'il's brother, the Shafi'i *mufti* 'Umar al-Ghazzi, was a political leader (*za'im*) of the Shafi'i and had opposed Ottoman rule in the early 19th century. This, he holds, is demonstrated by the Shafi'is heavy involvment in the revolt against Salim Pasha in 1831, a good deal of which did, in fact, center around the Ghazzis' quarter, 'Amara. It may be of significance here that Isma'il died at about the time of the 1831 revolt although he was only in his early forties, more work need be done here.

Moving to the time of the Egyptian occupation, it is interesting to note that, though Shafi'ism was the dominant *madhhab* in Egypt, there is no indication that Ibrahim Pasha attempted to promote the Damascene Shafi'is over others. The Egyptians do not appear to have been moved by the needs or interests of the Muslim religious and learned community of any persuasion. Nor do the sources report that the Shafi'i community of Damascus showed any particular inclination to support Ibrahim over the Ottomans. The Shafi'i *'alim* and biographer al-Bitar, for example, vilified the Egyptians for their sacrilege in Damascus. The only small indication of Ibrahim Pasha's use for the *'ulama'* was in his naming the sons of the Hanafi and Shafi'i *muftis* as his *binbashis*, which may indeed have been a form of taking hostages. The possibility of connections between the Egyptians and the Ghazzis cannot be rejected altogether, however, as the family's historian today holds this to have been an important factor in the Ghazzi family's history.[63]

When the Ottomans returned, 'Umar al-Ghazzi was still one of the most influential men in Damascus. The biographer Bitar, who was only a youth in the 1840's, later wrote how impressed he had been with him. He called al-Ghazzi the "chief of the *a'yan*" (*'ayn al-a'yan*), the celebrated mountain (*al-tawd al-shahir*), the great support (*al-'umda al-kabira*). He wrote how he had gone as a lad to a session of the *majlis* and had sat beside al-Ghazzi. There he saw the full *majlis* and was impressed by al-Ghazzi's importance in it. He saw how al-Ghazzi swept aside the papers before him and declared in a loud voice that these papers from the Sultan

63 Per correspondence with Musbah al-Ghazzi.

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did not concern them and that he had no fear of rulers, judges or ministers. Here, Ghazzi clearly appears as a local notable who dared to oppose Ottoman policy. Al-Ghazzi is said to have remained a member of the *majlis* for an uninterrupted term of twenty years, i.e. for the entire Tanzimat period up till 1860. Due to his influence, other members of the Ghazzi family also obtained positions of considerable importance. His son Muhammad (1807/08–1877/78) and his nephew Abu al-Su'ud (1815/16–1865/66) also sat on the *majlis* at one time or another in the years 1840 through 1860. His nephew Rida (1826/27–1869/70) was named to the post of *mutawalli* for the *awqaf* of the Umayyad Mosque in 1847/48, despite the fact that this post had been dominated for some decades by the Hanbali al-Suyuti family.

The Ghazzis did not go untouched by the events of 1860 and their aftermath. 'Umar al-Ghazzi was condemned to ten years imprisonment for his role. He died in 1861 under the harsh conditions of his imprisonment in the Cyprus fortress and was buried in a nearby mosque. About his son Sa'id, who voluntarily accompanied his father to Cyprus, no more information is available in the sources consulted here. Another son, Muhammad (1807/08–1877/78) took over the Shafi'i *ifta'* upon his father's death, a step which does not appear to have been contested locally or in Istanbul. Not until the 1870's however, when the old notables were being revived, did a member of the family, the Shafi'i *mufti* Muhammad al-Ghazzi, sit on the *majlis al-idara*. 'Abd al-Rahim al-Ghazzi sat on the *majlis al-baladiya* in 1872/73. The Shafi'i *ifta'* remained, moreover, in the Ghazzi family into the 20th century. From Muhammad it was passed to his son Amin (1840/41–1904/05); from Amin to Salih b. Abu Su'ud (d. 1908/09); from Salih to Tawfiq b. 'Abd al-Rahman (1863–1943), who was the last Ghazzi to be Shafi'i *mufti* in Damascus.

But the sons of 'Umar's brother Isma'il appear to have fared better. Rida ibn Isma'il (1826/27–1869/70), who had aided Christians during the events of 1860, remained in his position of *mutawalli* of the Umayyad Mosque for the rest of his life. Husayn ibn Isma'il (1824/25–1904/05), who was an adherent of the Naqshbandi, Shaybani, Khalwati and Qadiri Sufi orders entered the Ottoman civil service as a member of the *majlis* for education and sat on the local Ottoman properties commission in the 1880's. He was also named *na'ib* in several religious law courts. Tawfiq b. 'Abd al-Rahman served as *qadi* of Yemen, in Palestine and finally in the Biqa' before assuming the *ifta'* in Damascus. The *mutawalli* post passed, however, in the early 1870's to the Halabis whom we shall discuss shortly.

The Ghazzis appear to have established a very satisfactory economic base upon which they could prosper in the latter part of the 19th century. There are, for example, indications that Rida was a man of considerable wealth. The family today says that Rida's son 'Id was by far the wealthiest in the family. The *mufti* Amin (d. 1905) was said to have been an agricultural expert which indicates that he had some success with land holding and exploitation.

It is said, however, that the family lost their wealth in land during the First World War when mortgages had to be taken on much of their property. Nonetheless, the law professor Fawzi ibn Isma'il (d. 1929) was prominent in the Arab nationalist movement of the First World War period and afterwards as a leading member of the National Bloc. He sat in the constitutional assembly and suffered arrest and exile under the French authorities. In the late 1940's and 1950's, the lawyer Sa'id b. 'Abd al-Wahab al-Ghazzi (1897–1967) played a leading role in the first governments of independent Syria, as Minister of Justice in 1936, 1945 and 1947; Minister of Finance in 1946; Minister of National Economy in 1947 and Foreign Minister in 1955. He was Prime Minister in 1954 and President of the National Assembly in 1961. Sa'id al-Ghazzi's son Ghazi upheld the family's tradition as a lawyer; his daughter Nadiya, who is also a lawyer, is prominent as a writer.

Other prominent members of the Ghazzi family since the Second World War are: Majid b. Khalil al-Ghazzi who has served as a judge and Controller General (*amin 'aman*) of the Ministry of Justice and as a district governor of Lattakia and Damascus; Nabih b. Tawfiq who has served as a *qadi*, Director General of Customs, President of the Council of State and finally Overseer of Health and Public Works (1954); Hisham b. Farid who has served as Controller General of the Ministry of Finance and Inspector of the Ministry of National Economy.

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The Ghazzis of the contemporary younger generation have entered the professions of law, engineering, medicine and journalism and are also active in politics.

The Hanbali *ifta'*

The Damascenes who held the post of Hanbali *mufti* in the early 18th century are presented by the biographer as men who dared to stand firm when dealing with Ottoman officials. It was, perhaps, as a consequence of the Hanbalis' stand that families like the Hanbalis (sic!) and Taghlibis did not survive into the 19th century as notables. One might hypothesize that local Hanbalis, at the time of the rise of the (Hanbali) Wahhabis of Arabia as a challenge to Ottoman hegemony and legitimacy, were not tolerated in official functions or that they perhaps refused to be drawn into the Ottoman system.

In any case, the Hanbali *ifta'* did not remain in any one particular family for the greater part of the 18th century. In the 19th century the Suyutis and Shattis often held the post, but the Hanbali *ifta'* was not secure. Information about it is much less reliable than about other '*ulama*' posts. It appears, for example, even to have stood vacant for two decades, 1898/99–1918/19, though the biographers may be misleading us here.

The Hanbali Family[65]

The Hanbalis originated from a village in the vicinity of Ba'albek. It is not mentioned in the sources used here when they came to Damascus, but it is indicated that Abu'l-Baqi, the father of the Hanbali *mufti* Abu'l-Mawahib, taught in the Umayyad mosque around the middle of the 17th century. The family appears to have earned its living through trade and agriculture.

A localist refrain amongst the Hanbalis even prior to the 'Azm era is evident in the following anecdote, related by Muradi: the *mufti* Abu'l-Mawahib al-Hanbali was a merchant whose activities centered on Ba'albek. While his brother Sulayman was one of the merchants who financed the marketing of particular products (especially silk) in collaboration with trade interests in Istanbul, Abu'l-Mawahib himself carried on his commercial affairs locally and was in contact with the peasantry – on whose behalf he once prayed for rain.[66] Prior to 1713, the production of Ba'albek fell under the control of the *shaykh al-islam* in Istanbul and local merchants like the Hanbali family had been receiving only a cut of this business. In that year, however, the Porte ordered the governor in Damascus to seize the production of Ba'albek and forward it directly to Istanbul. By this action, the local merchants were cut off and petitioned through *mufti* Abu'l-Mawahib for redress. In correspondence with the governor, the *mufti* declared the governor's actions to be corrupt and tyrannous. According to Muradi, the governor's greed had been aroused when he learned of the extent of the wealth of the Hanbali merchants. But a Damascene *agha* present in the governors council at that time indicated that action against the Hanbali *mufti* would not be tolerated locally. Fearing an uprising the governor yielded to the demands of the local merchants.[67]

Abu'l-Mawahib's son did not, however, obtain the post of Hanbali *mufti* upon his father's death. This was given to 'Abd al-Qadir al-Taghlibi (1642/43–1722/23) a Damascene bookbinder whose family was closely associated with the Shaybani Sufi order in the quarter of 'Ama-

65 See Muradi, I, 67–69, II, 234–238, IV, 61; Hisni, 687–689. For Taghlibis see: Muradi, III, 58–59, IV, 55; Bitar, II, 1135–1136.

66 Muradi, I, 67.

67 *ibid*, I, 68–69.

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ra. He too made a point to assert his independence from the Ottoman officials if only symbolically. Upon his first meeting with the Ottoman *qadi* at which he was to receive his appointment officially, al-Taghlibi twice refused to accept the *qadi*'s hospitality – in this case, in the form of a cup of coffee.

Following al-Taghlibi's death, the grandson of Abu'l-Mawahib al-Hanbali was named *mufti* until his death in 1735/36. Little is known about his successor Ahmad al-Ba'ali. The latter may have been associated to the Hanbali family as his name indicates that he too was from Ba'albek. Whoever he was, his tenure of office appears to have extended through most of the 'Azm era. Information on this important figure is, unfortunately, wanting.

Isma'il ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Jira'i[68]

In contrast to the localism of the Hanbalis and Taghlibis, Isma'il ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Jira'i who became Hanbali *mufti* in 1774/75 appears to have been far more dependent on the Ottomans. He was named *mufti* by virtue of his success in gaining influential supporters in Istanbul, to whom he had made a number of visits. Besides gaining the Hanbali *ifta'* in Damascus, he also succeeded in obtaining Ottoman administrative posts, something which no other Hanbali *mufti* had done or was to do. The lack of information on this man and his family in the Damascene sources tend to indicate that he may have been an outsider.

The Suyuti Family[69]

Isma'il al-Jara'i's successor was Mustafa ibn Sa'd al-Suyuti (1750/51–1827/28). His family was to control the Hanbali *ifta'* until 1871/72. The family name indicates a connection to the Egyptian town of Asyut. Indeed, the family today takes pride in their ancestor Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, a famous Egyptian Koran and *hadith* scholar, and consider themselves related to several other Suyuti families who similarly left Egypt to settle in other parts of the Arab world. Research carried out by a present-day descendant, Mustafa Adnan al-Suyuti, established that a 17th century ancestor by the name of 'Abd al-Rahman came from Asiyut to Syria where he settled in the village of Ruhayba about fifty kilometers north-east of Damascus. Three generations later, members of the family were still living in Ruhayba but with Shaykh Mustafa, the first al-Suyuti to become Hanbali *mufti*, the family was considered Damascene. Further efforts by Mustafa Adnan al-Suyuti to establish the nature of the family's ties to Ruhayba were frustrated by the present inaccessibility of the relevant *awqaf* registers and the fact that even the oldest residents of Ruhayba were not able to recall what was told them concerning events in the early 19th century. It is certain that once in Damascus, Shaykh Mustafa ibn Sa'd appears to have remained there. He was buried in Dahdah near the tomb of the above-mentioned Abu al-Muwahib al-Hanbali. The family lived within the central rectangle in the close vicinity of the Umayyad mosque at first in the quarter called al-'Attar (most likely, al-'Attarin in D/5) and then in al-Nawfara (D/1 or G/3). At the time of the First World War, they lived in Qaymariya, but beginning in 1938, they resided in the new quarter of Muhajirun near Salihiya.

In addition to the post of Hanbali *mufti*, the Suyutis often served as administrators (*mutawalli*) of the Umayyad mosque and its endowments. In 1807/08, Mustafa ibn Sa'id was named

68 Shatti, *Rawd*, 50–52.

69 See Bitar, II, 664, 717, III, 1541–1543; Shatti, *Rawd*, 109, 113–114, 243–244; Hisni, 662, 678, 724; Zirikli, VIII, 135. Other information has been drawn from correspondence with the descendant Mustafa Adnan al-Suyuti to whom I am grateful.

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al-Suyūṭī Family



to this post and held it until his death in 1827/28. He was succeeded by his younger brother Sa'id in 1840/41. The family also controlled the Hanbali Muzaffir mosque in Salihiya.

It is interesting to note that the Suyutis were not mentioned by the biographer al-Muradi. It has not, moreover, been possible to learn if they had any special connections to the 'Azms or the notables of that era. On the other hand, the Suyutis may have collaborated with the *aghawat* during their rule of Damascus in 1831. The chronicler wrote that the *aghawat* ruled the city from the house of the *mutawalli.* But, of course, this may well have been a reference to any of the hundreds of *mutawallis* administering Damascene endowments at this time. It should be noted, however, that Salih al-Suyuti, who was only briefly *mufti*, died in 1830/31.

Whatever the case, the Suyutis held their position as Hanbali *muftis* throughout the Egyptian period, the Tanzimat and beyond the events of 1860. It does not appear that Ibrahim Pasha or the Ottomans made a point to suppress the Hanbali *ifta'* of Damascus as if it were somehow connected to the Arabian Wahhabis. This indicates that if that connection existed at all, it was probably not of a political nature.

The Suyutis were, however, not entirely spared during the Tanzimat. In 1847/48, the post of *mutawalli* was withdrawn from the *mufti* Sa'id ibn Mustafa and given to Rida al-Ghazzi, a cousin of the contemporary Shafi'i *mufti.* Sa'id then left for Istanbul but, despite his representations there, did not retrieve the *mutawalli* post for his family. He himself was appointed deputy judge of Salt, a frontier, grain-growing district far to the south of Damascus along the pilgrimage route where hardly any year-round Ottoman authority had been established. Upon his death in 1871/72, moreover, the family also lost control of the Hanbali *ifta'*. After that, when the Hanbali *ifta'* was at all occupied – which, it appears, it often was not – a member of the Shatti family held the appointment. In 1918/19, however, under the Arab government of Amir Faysal, a Suyuti was again appointed Hanbali *mufti* only to be replaced later, again by a Shatti.

Sa'id al-Suyuti, the son of the last Suyuti to be Hanbali *mufti*, became a medical doctor and was extremely active in this field, being a chief initiator of the Arab faculty of medicine under Faysal's government at the end of the First World War and active in the field of medical administration for the pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia in the 1920's. He also organized a number of voluntary associations within the medical profession, wrote a great deal on public issues and also on the medical miracles of the Prophet Muhammad.

The Shatti Family[70]

The Hanbali Shatti family was established in Damascus by the three brothers Khidr, Mahmud Jalabi and 'Umar, all of whom migrated from Baghdad to Damascus in 1766/67. They were merchants in the Baghdad trade and were closely associated with the *khan* of As'ad Pasha al-'Azm. They were, moreover, *mutawallis* for *awqaf* created by the 'Azms. While two branches of the family probably remained wholly occupied with trade at that time, the descendants of 'Umar established themselves amongst the *'ulama'* of Damascus. Hasan ibn 'Umar al-Shatti established a household at Bab al-Salam (H/2). Though he was considered a reference for the Hanbalis, he earned his living as a merchant. His descendant, the biographer Muhammad Jamil al-Shatti wrote that he supported himself entirely through trade. It is to be noted, however, that Hasan al-Shatti probably also had economic ties to the villager of Duma in the vicin-

70 See: Bitar, I, 33, 478–480, II, 849–850, III, 1625–1626, 1516–1517, 1539–1540, 1623–1624; Shatti, *Rawd*, 64–67, 146–148, 171–173, 245–247, 267–269 and *Tarajim*, 36, 62, 72–74, 100; Hisni, 647, 673–674, 713, 878; Zirikli, IV, 129, VI, 129, VI, 324; Mardam, 58–59.

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Shaṭṭī Family



ity of Damascus, which he praised in poetry.[71] Hasan preached in the Hanbali *mihrab* of the Umayyad Mosque and in the Madrasa al-Badura'iya (F/3) for which he was named *mutawalli*. He also joined the Naqshbandi Sufi order. Though a good deal younger, he succeeded in establishing himself within a small group of contemporary *'ulama'* who were the principle teachers of most of the mid-19th-century Damascene *'ulama'*.[72]

Not until after 1870, however, did the Shattis begin to hold notable positions in Damascus. Hasan's son Ahmad (d. 1892/93) was named *mufti* of the Hanbali in 1871/72. Since 1857/58, when his father had died, he had taught during Ramadan in the Hanbali *mihrab* in the Umayyad Mosque and had also given private lessons in his home. In addition to the Hanbali *ifta'* he was, in 1878/79, named *na'ib* in the 'Awniya court in 'Amara, and after the death of the *qadi* al-Barqawi, briefly held the position of Hanbali *qadi*. This position was shortly thereafter (circa 1881) suppressed by the Ottomans,[73] and Ahmad was named a legal expert for the Damascus municipality. He appears to have held all these posts until his death in 1898/99.

Mufti Ahmad's brother Muhammad (1832/33–1889/90) shared the post of *mutawalli* of the Badura'iya Madrasa. He was a close follower of 'Abdallah al-Halabi (circa 1857/58), but no mention of his involvement in the events of 1860 has been found. Muhammad, like many other *'ulama'* of the 'Azm faction was also named again to positions after 1870. He was appointed to the council for education in 1872, to the council for religious endowments in 1876/77, as a legal expert for the municipality in 1878 and as chief scribe in the court of the Maydan in 1888/89. He was commissioned by the *mufti* Mahmud al-Hamzawi to do a study on the distribution of Damascene waters and often served as a representative in Damascene court cases.

Contemporary to the *mufti* Ahmad and his brother Muhammad, a distant cousin 'Abd al-Salam ibn 'Abd al-Rahman (1840/41–1878/79) who descended from one of the other two Shatti brothers who settled in Damascus in the late 18th century, had also joined the ranks of the *'ulama'*. He was prayer leader (*imam*) of the Hanbali in the Umayyad mosque,[74] and he joined the Qadiri Sufi order. He travelled to the Hijaz, Egypt and Istanbul.

In the generation of Shattis of the early 20th century, most members sustained the family's *'ulama'* status. None, however, appears to have been active in political movements.

The *na'ib qadi* at *mahkamat* al-Bab, the chief court of Damascus

It is difficult to find the names of any Damascenes who served in the post of *na'ib qadi* around the turn of the 19th century. Given the political disruptions of this period and the frequent replacements of *muftis*, one could imagine that this post may have simply stood vacant. The activities of the courts may have fallen to their *katibs*. (The two *katibs* known to have worked in *mahkamat al-bab* in the early 19th century were Sa'id ibn Ahmad al-Ayyubi (d. 1820/21) and Khalil al-Mahasini (d. 1834/35), both representatives of otherwise well-established *'ulama'* families.) In the course of the 19th century many Damascene families were to become associated with the post of *na'ib qadi*. Yet, one family, in particular the 'Umaris, remained prominent throughout the century.

71 Bitar, I, 478.

72 This group included the *'ulama'* Sa'id al-Halabi, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Tibi, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kuzbari and Hamid al-'Attar. See Chapter V, note 83.

73 Some information on the suppression of the Hanbali *qada'* – which fell beyond the period studied here – can nonetheless be found in the biographical sources. See: Shatti, *Rawd*, 206 and *Tarajim*, 73; Bitar, III, 1625–1626.

74 Shatti, *Rawd*, 146.

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The 'Umari Family[75]

Like the Bakris, the Ghazzis and a number of families yet to be discussed, the 'Umaris were amongst the oldest Muslim families not only in Damascus, but in the entire Fertile Crescent. They claimed descent from the second caliph of Islam, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. There were a number of families in Damascus with this *nisba*, and still others were found in Mosul, Baghdad, and Palestine. The Damascene 'Umaris all called themselves not only al-'Umari but Abna' (or descendants of) 'Abd al-Hadi. This second name was derived from 'Abd al-Hadi al-'Umari, a common ancestor who, it is said, brought the family from the village of Sufariya to Damascus. This event which coincided with or only just slightly preceded the Ottoman conquest marks the beginning of the family's modern period.

All the 'Umaris mentioned by the biographers are best classified as *'ulama'* and they were closely attached to the Sufi tradition. Until the mid-18th century, they were all Shafi'is. While some taught in or administered Damascene *madrasas*, many joined and eventually led the Khalwati and Qadiri Sufi orders. The Shafi'i *'alim* 'Abd al-Latif ibn Muhammad al-'Umari (1678–1751), for example, had been a *shaykh* of the Khalwatiya. One of his sons, Ahmad (1718–1760), taught in the Umayyad Mosque; another, Husayn (d. 1785/86), joined the Khalwati and Qadiri orders. While all the members of this branch of 'Umaris remained Shafi'i in the 18th century, Shakir ibn Mustafa al-'Umari (1727/28–1780/81) of another branch of the family became a Hanafi. He remained for seven years in Istanbul and obtained positions and favors from the government being appointed by the *shaykh al-islam* as a salaried judicial official with the military in Damascus. He was given half of the Damascene village of Bismiya as a life leasehold (*malikana*) and named *na'ib* of the Bab court. These few examples are the only indications we have of the 'Umaris position during the 'Azm era.

Beyond that time, very little is reported in the sources used here about the 'Umaris. The Shafi'i branch of the family appears to have sustained its association to the Khalwati Sufi order. Ahmad ibn Muhammad (1857–1839), a descendant of the Khalwati *shaykh* 'Abd al-Latif al-'Umari, migrated first to Istanbul where he lived in the Khalwati *zawiya* for five years, then to the Hijaz on the pilgrimage and also to Tunis where he remained for five years. He finally returned to Damascus, succeeding his grandfather 'Abd al-Qadir as *shaykh* of the Khalwati order upon the latter's death, the date of which is not given.

Also in this generation, however, the trend towards Hanafism spread to the Shafi'i branch of the family. Mustafa ibn 'Abdal-Jalil (d. 1848/49) and Sa'di ibn Muhammad Kamal (d. 1863/64) switched to Hanafism. The latter succeeded, moreover, in regaining the post of *na'ib al-bab* for the family. He also served as Hanafi *amin al-fatwa* under the *muftis* Husayn al-Muradi (d. 1850) and Tahir al-Amidi (*mufti*, 1850/51–1860).

A Hanafi 'Umari by the name of 'Abd al-Hadi (d. 1865/66) was named to the Tanzimat *majlis*. It is said that this 'Abd al-Hadi al-'Umari made claim to the ancient *awqaf* of the Sayyid 'Ali ibn 'Alil in Palestine, but it was not until the 1870's that the claim was activated.

As a result of the events of 1860, 'Abd al-Hadi was sentenced to three years in exile and was sent to Cyprus with the other exiles. Though he probably returned with the others, he died shortly thereafter.

'Abd al-Hadi's son Salim (d. 1905/06) and his cousin 'Abd al-Latif b. Sa'id went about to reestablish the family's position. They travelled several times to Istanbul and finally succeeded in activating their claim to the valuable *awqaf* of 'Ali ibn 'Alil in Palestine (especially around Jaffa). Salim also entered the civil administration. He sat briefly on the Damascene

75 I am grateful to Mr Samih Omari for his help in verifying information concerning the 'Umari family. See Muradi, I, 119–124, II, 151–156, 183–189, III, 133, IV, 68–69, 109, 186–190; Bitar, I, 556, II, 663, 1046, III, 1540–1551; Shatti, *Rawd*, 36–37, 76–77, 109–110, 131, 173–174, 225; Hisni, 662, 822–824; Mardam, 161–162. See also my "Islamic Maqased."

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
Jalāl al-Dīn
d. 1587
Taj al-Dīn
Bahā' al-Dīn
'Abd al-Qādir
'Umar
Muṣṭafā
1685-1730
Muḥammad Shākir
(qādī, nā'ib)
1727 - 1780
Muḥammad Sa'dī
Muṣṭafā
Khalīl
'Abd al-(?)
'Abd al-Laṭīf
'Abd al-Raḥmān
Muṣṭafā
'Ārif
Muḥammad Sa'dī
Muḥammad Khayr
Muḥammad Sālih
Ṣādiq
Musallam
(glass manufacturer)
Maḥmud
(?)

ʿUMARĪ FAMILY



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

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
mmad Abū al-Safā'
d.1574/75
Maḥmūd
Abū al-Safā'
d. 1649/50
Muḥammad
d.1666/67
Ḥasan
Ibrāhīm
Najīb
Muḥammad
Sa'īd
Amīn
'Ārif
'Umar
Salīm
Sa'adī
Tawfīq
Muḥammad
'Abd al-Razzāq
Amīn
Burhān
Adnān
Najīb
'Abd al-Qādir
Sha
'Abd al-Qādir
1850-1902
As'ad
1851-1911
Sa'īd
Muṣṭafā
Rif'āt
'Izzat
1871-1938
Nūr al-Dīn
Ṣubḥī
Muṣṭafā
Ḥusnī
'Abd al-Qādir
Nasūḥ
As'ad
Burhān al-Dīn
'Ākif
Muẓaffar
Muwaffaq

USTUWĀNĪ FAMILY



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

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municipal council in 1879/80 and then served in the civil courts of first and second instance. He also participated in the *jam'iya maqassid al-khayriya* i.e. the "benevolent intentions" local reform movement of the 1870's which the Ottomans subsequently absorbed. His son Farid became district governor of the Hawran in the 20th century. 'Abd al-Latif also held a number of civil court posts and sat on Damascus *majlises*. He became quite wealthy. His sons Sharif, Nasib and Rafiq all sat on the Damascus district *majlis*.

At about the same time, another cousin, Sa'di ibn Muhammad Kamal (d. 1863/64), remained *amin al-fatwa* to the new *mufti* Amin al-Jundi but died shortly thereafter. His son Sadiq (d. 1878/79) was *ra'is al-kuttab* in two religious courts, al-'Awniya and al-Buzuriya. Another son Rashid (d. 1885/86) taught in the Umayyad Mosque.

In summary, the 'Umaris appear to have reestablished themselves by regaining the favor of the Ottoman authorities after the 1860 events. They came into the 20th century as wealthy land owners and merchants. Muhammad Sa'di b. Rashid (d. 1940), for example, settled in India as a merchant. It is also interesting to note that Shaykh Muslim ibn Husayn al-'Umari, a contemporary cousin of 'Abd al-Latif, who was among the leading merchants of Damascus, attempted the modern manufacture of glass. Muhammad Subhi b. Ahmad (d. 1973) pursued a military career, a remarkable step for a member of an old *'ulama'* family to take. He was active in the Arab nationalist movement and became a member of the Syrian parliament after independence.

The *khatib* of the Umayyad Mosque

The Ustuwani Family[76]

The Ustuwanis were a family established in Damascus as *'ulama'* prior to the Ottoman conquest. We have a relatively large amount of information about them thanks to their having been extensively treated in the published sources, the information about them in the records of the Syrian National Archives and the assistance of present-day descendants.

A modern published source holds that they originated from Jabal Nablus in northern Palestine and traced their line to Ibn Muflih al-Hanbali, a student of the famous Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiya of the early 14th century and that they settled in Salihiya, the north-western suburb of Damascus. Information received from the family today holds that their ancestors came from Palestine in 1156 as a result of the first crusade (though the date mentioned would indicate that it was more likely the second). This account holds that the Ustuwanis arrived along with a large number of Hanbalis whose settlement in Salihiya established that suburb as an important Hanbali concentration. The connection to Ibn Muflih, however, came later due to an Ustuwani's marriage to a woman of the Damascene *ashraf* family al-Iji, who were in turn connected by marriage to descendants of Ibn Muflih.

With the Ottoman conquest the family appears to have begun its modern period. Not only does the modern genealogy date back to a single late 15th century ancestor by the name of Sulayman, but the family name – which the family's historian translates as 'pillars' – came into use at that time. The Ustuwanis – who at that time held *'ulama'* posts in the inner-city – began to adopt Hanifism, the *madhhab* favored by the Ottomans. The first to do so appears to have been Muhammad Abu al-Safa (d. 1574/75), but the transformation was wide-spread in the family and there may have been others earlier on.

76 My thanks go to Dr. Ibrahim Istouani and my correspondent Dr. As'ad Istouani for their help in writing the family's history. See Muradi, IV, 200–201, 229–231; Bitar, I, 154–156, 342, 535, II, 626, 729; Hisni, 647, 658–659, 661, 665, 720–721, 750–751, 837–839; Mardam, 7; Shatti, *Rawd*, 57, 70–71, 104, 112, 167, and *Tarajim*, 21, 43, 56. See also B.G. Martin, "A Short History of the Khalwati Order of Derwishes", in N. Keddie, (ed.), *Scholars, Saints and Sufis*, Berkeley, 1972, 289, note; dispatches of British and French consuls, AECPNS/112/9, FO. 195/927, FO. 195/965, FO. 371/6455.

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By the 17th century most Ustuwanis were Hanafis. One interesting example is Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Ustuwani (d. 1661/62) who served as an *imam* in important mosques in Istanbul in the 1630's. He switched first to Shafi'ism and then, upon arriving in Istanbul, to Hanifism. He is most probably the Ustuwani who disputed with the Ottoman *shaykh al-islam* over the lawful consumption of coffee and tobacco. In any case, he was exiled to Cyprus. Returning to Damascus in 1656/57, he competed with a member of the Mahasini family for the Qubbat al-Nasr teaching post in the Umayyad mosque. Though Muhammad al-Ustuwani did not succeed in obtaining the post, his son Mustafa (d. 1713/14) obtained the post of *khatib* in the mosque, the first of the Ustuwanis to do so.

During the years stretching from the Ottoman conquest through the 'Azm period, there were two main family branches, each founded by a son of Sulayman of the late 15th century. The Ustuwanis already mentioned descended from Husayn (d. 1526/27). Following the *khatib* Mustafa, however, this branch died out. A parallel branch, descending from Sulayman's second son Muhammad, is the branch from which all the Ustuwanis of the later 18th and 19th centuries descended, being divided into two main lines descending from the brothers Ahmad Shihab al-Din (d. 1633/34) and Shams al-Din (d. 1626/27).

The descendants of Shams al-Din were heavily intermarried with two other prominent Damascene families, the Safarjalanis and the Falaqinsis. According to the family historian, the attachments to the Safarjalanis were so strong that members of this line even called themselves Safarjalani in the 19th century despite the fact that their connection to them ran through their mothers.[77] Through these ties this line of Ustuwanis came to control a considerable number of *awqaf*, the records of which can today be studied in the Syrian National Archives.

Links to the Safarjalanis, who led the Shadhili Sufi order in Damascus, and to the Falaqinsis, whose most prominent member Fathi led the agitation against the 'Azms in the 1740's and was brutally suppressed by them, might have placed the Ustuwanis within the localist Maydani faction. Other marriages demonstrate close ties between the Ustuwanis and the *ashraf* families Hamza, Iji, Hisni and Kaylani and to other '*ulama*' families such as the Ayyubis, Nabulusis and Risamas. As a sizeable number of these families came from the southern quarters of the city and specifically from the Maydan, these marriages provide persuasive evidence of the Ustuwanis' association to the Maydani faction. By extension, we may also suggest that the quarter of Salihiya from which the Ustuwanis came, although to the north of the city, was also part of the localist faction. It seems noteworthy that, though the Ustuwanis may have been wealthy and respected during the 'Azm period, they did not gain the top '*ulama*' positions as they had done formerly. The one exception, Yahya b. Ahmad, who served as a court scribe and a teacher in the Jaqmaqiya *madrasa* and finally as *amin al-fatwa*, died in 1746, the year when the 'Azms suppressed Fathi al-Falaqinsi and the localist faction. But the sources give no indication that he died a violent death.

Also of significance is the fact that the Ustuwanis, like many members of the Maydani faction, reemerged prominently in public life in the early 19th century. The family's historian today draws attention to the three brothers Hasan (d. 1820/21), Mustafa and 'Ali (dates not given) who led this revival. While the descendants of 'Ali attempted to uphold the family's religious tradition, those of Hasan devoted their energies to trade and those of Mustafa to agriculture. Though there were a number of individual exceptions, this appears to have been the general rule in the first generation of descendants. The Ustuwanis who regained the *khitaba* in the 19th century, for example, were all from the 'Ali branch, while the 'trade branch' produced a successful merchant in 'Abdallah (d. 1845/46).

In the 'religious branch', it is interesting to follow the career of Sa'id al-Ustuwani (1822/23–1887/88). Sa'id studied with the Damascene '*ulama*', including the *shaykhs* Hashim al-Taji, 'Abdallah al-Halabi, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kuzbari, Hamid al-'Attar and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Tibi

77 This kinship link appears in *awqaf* documents of the Safarjalani family preserved in the Damascus National Archives (*mutafarriqin* series).

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who, as the biographical dictionaries demonstrate, were amongst the most respected teachers of the early half of the 19th century. Although not yet twenty, he became *khatib* of the Umayyad mosque in 1840/41. Being the first Ustuwani to regain this post in the 19th century, his appointment appears to have been a Tanzimat measure to elicit a factional balance in the city. Sa'id had travelled to Istanbul where he learned the 'Alawiya Sufi *dhikr* from Sayyid Fadl Pasha and returned to Damascus as *khatib*. However, he soon passed the office on to his older cousin Salih and himself joined the Tanzimat *majlis*. With that the Ustuwanis once again held political influence in the city comparable to that which they had held prior to the 'Azm period.

We have as yet no information on the role of Sa'id or any other Ustuwani in the events of 1860 and their immediate aftermath. It is unlikely, however, that Sa'id was among the exiles because he was appointed to the post-1860 *majlis* and in 1865/66 became a member of the new court of appeal. In 1868 he was named *qadi* of Tripoli, in 1869/70 *ra'is majlis al-tamyiz*, a post which came to represent the modern secularized counterpart of the *qadi*. Shortly thereafter, he left the latter post and withdrew from public life because of a dispute with the governor Rashid Pasha which involved the land rights of Europeans. His sons were employed in only minor judicial posts and the family appears to have returned to a status of lower-ranking *'ulama'*. Its wealth was nonetheless assured as it continued to exercise control over extensive *awqaf*.

Two decades after Sa'id's abrupt 'retirement' from public life, Ustuwanis of the 'trade branch' began to fill *'ulama'* positions, and one of these again represented the family in the political arena. Of note were the three sons of 'Abd al-Qadir: 'Abd al-Hadi was a religious court *qadi* in Damascus, 'Abd al-Razzaq was a deputy religious court *qadi* in Beirut and 'Abd al-Muhsin, who began his career as *amin al-fatwa*, was sent as a deputy for Damascus to the Ottoman Parliament of 1908. He was to become chief *qadi* in the Damascus religious courts of the 1920's but, though the French offered him the candidacy for the presidency of Syria in the 1930's, he refused to be considered.

A 20th century political revival of the Ustuwanis was preceeded by an important change in the pattern of educating their sons. While some Ustuwani children continued to attend the mosques and *madrasas* of the older tradition, others attended the new Ottoman secular secondary schools and travelled to Istanbul and later to Europe for higher education. Following 'Abd al-Ra'uf (d. 1968) no Ustuwani pursued a career in religion. The young Ustuwanis of the late 19th and early 20th centuries who were introduced to secular education were scattered among all three branches of the family. 'Izzat b. As'ad (1871–1938), though born into the 'religious branch', for example, was probably the first of the secularly-trained Ustuwanis. He and his cousin Rushdi b. Amin (1875–1935) attended the Ottoman Rushdiya secondary school in Damascus and then the Ottoman military college in Istanbul. It is an astonishing development of the late Ottoman period to see members of this old *'ulama'* family becoming officers in the Ottoman army. We may presume, moreover, that the initial decision to school the boys in this way was at least condoned by their grandfather Sa'id, who had been a member of the Tanzimat *majlis*, as he did not die till 1888.

In the previously 'agricultural branch' of the family, Sadiq b. Hasan (1885–1965) also obtained a secular education. He worked as a judge in the civil courts and eventually became president of the highest civil court in Syria, a post from which the French dismissed him in 1939. Although (or perhaps because) he was a brother-in-law of President Shukri Quwwatli, he refused any additional public posts and did so demonstratively.

Some other 20th century examples: 'Abdullah b. 'Abd al-Muhsin (1890–1950) obtained a law degree in Istanbul and practiced law in Damascus. Wajih b. Ahmad (1893–1974) also obtained a law degree in Istanbul and subsequently held some judgeships during the French Mandate and high judicial posts following Syria's independence. 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Majid (b. 1895) studied medicine and participated in the Syrian revolt against the French in 1925.

Ibrahim b. Yahya (1901–1975) was sent in 1915 by the Ottoman government to study in Vienna. He remained there after the Ottoman collapse, obtaining a doctorate in political economy in 1928. Upon his return to Damascus he served as Consul General for Austria.

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Following Syrian independency, he was one of the founders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served many years as Secretary General of this Ministry. In the 1950's and 1960's he was also posted as Syria's ambassador to West Germany.

These secularly-trained Ustuwanis gave the family a new lease on public life in the second half of the 20th century despite revolutionary developments in Syria. Though the family's religious career pattern was not immediately or entirely suppressed, the secularist trend proved to be the way into the future. As evidence of this, one contemporary example, As'ad b. 'Izzat (born 1921), the son of the first Ustuwani to pursue a secular education, is especially interesting. As'ad studied medicine in Paris and was very active in the Arab political movements of the 1950's, being one of the founding members of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath political party. After years of political struggle which included his imprisonment under the Shishakli regime, As'ad emerged with the Ba'ath's accession to power in 1963 as one of Syria's leading officials, especially active in the Ministry of Health and within the medical profession. In that the Ba'ath had sprung from the ideological formulations of two Maydani intellectuals, we may have here evidence of the renewal of the Ustuwanis' ties to the Maydani faction, and – what would be very exciting indeed – the continued political importance of Damascene factionalism in modern Syrian political life, with the Ba'ath inheriting the legacy of the localist faction of the 18th century.

The Mahasini Family[78]

The Mahasanis were an '*ulama*' family claiming descent from the Bani Tamim of northeastern Syria. They first came to Damascus in the 13th century. In the early 14th century their ancestor Mahasin al-Sharabishi al-Tamimi, from whom they take their name, established their renown presumably in trade. By the 18th century, they were famous in Damascus as one of the families which controlled the post of Hanafi *khatib* in the Umayyad Mosque. Though they may have held this post earlier, it appears that their control there was not officially recognized until sometime in the early part of that century. At that time a dispute had arisen between the Mahasinis and the Ustuwanis over the *khitaba* (and between the Mahasinis and 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi over a related teaching post). Both posts had fallen vacant after the death of Isma'il ibn Taj al-Din al-Mahasini in 1690/91. Thanks to a friendship struck up between Isma'il's grandson Ahmad ibn Sulayman al-Mahasini (1683–1733) and the *shaykh al-islam* in Istanbul – and very possibly due to the wealth the family had accumulated as merchants – an arrangement was made according to which the Mahasinis were to regain and continually hold the post of *khatib*. The post of *khatib* then became a life-time tenure of the eldest male Mahasini. Ahmad followed his father Sulayman. Then came Sulayman ibn Ahmad (1726/27–1773/74) and As'ad ibn Musa (d. 1803).

As'ad ibn Musa al-Mahasini who was *khatib* of the Umayyad Mosque around the turn of the 19th century, was also named *mufti* of Damascus. He was then exiled by al-Jazzar to Acre where he died. In the years which followed, the post of *khatib* may have stood vacant. Not until the time of As'ad's grandson Amin ibn Salim did a Mahasini again preach in the Umayyad Mosque. Beginning during the Egyptian occupation and the early Tanzimat the Mahasinis were also prominent as secretaries (*katibs*) in Damascene courts: Khalil ibn Sulayman (d. 1834/35) served a long period as *katib* in Mahkamat al-Bab. His sons the *khatib* Rashid (d. 1869/70) and 'Ali (d. 1878/79) were *ra'is al-kuttab* of the *qassam* court and *ra'is al-kuttab* of Bab respective-

78 See Muradi, I, 112, 250–254, II 163–167, IV, 222–225; Bitar, I, 309; Shatti, *Rawd*, 48–49, 100, 120, 150; Hisni, 839–840; FO. 371/6455.

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Maḥāsinī Family



ly. A cousin, Salim ibn As'ad (d. circa 1863), was *ra'is al-kuttab* of the Buzuriya and *qassam* courts. All of Salim's sons – the *khatib* Amin (d. 1867/68), the *khatib* Sa'id (d. 1883/84), Abu'l-Su'ud (d. 1896/97), Ahmad (dates not given) and Hasan (dates not given) – also served in Damascene courts. Also, a cousin 'Abd al-Qadir ibn Rashid (d. 1911/12) was a *katib* in the Bab court.

When the post of *khatib* was transferred to the Khatibs in 1870, 'Ali ibn Khalil al-Mahasini went to Istanbul perhaps with the hope of retrieving the position. He returned to Damascus, however, not with the *khitaba* but with the position of *qadi* of 'Akkar, a frontier region in the northern hills of the Lebanon. Though he was later given the more important post of *qadi* of Gaza, neither he nor any other Mahasini were again to preach in the Umayyad Mosque. Their decline in the 19th century was similar to that of many *'ulama'* families which had prospered in the 'Azm era.

The Mahasinis sustained their association to the judiciary into the 20th century. Besides the many clerical positions, one Mahasani, Muhammad ibn 'Ali (d. 1924/25), was named *qadi* (sic!?) of the city. His sons Fu'ad and Shawkat worked for the Ministry of Justice in the mandate period. Abu'l-Khayr ibn Sa'id served in the Ministry of Finance, and Sa'id ibn Abu'l-Khayr, a law professor, became Minister of the Interior.

The Manini Family[79]

The Maninis were a family claiming descent from the Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet. They originated in the vicinity of Tripoli (Syria) and settled in Manin, a village to the northwest of Damascus, from which they took their name when coming to Damascus in the first half of the 18th century. The Hanafi *'alim* Ahmad ibn 'Ali al-Manini (1669/70–1758/59) obtained the post of teacher (*mudarris*) in the Madrasa al-Sumaysatiya. Upon the death of a certain Abu'l-Mawahib (probably al-Hanbali), he taught in the latter's corner in the Umayyad Mosque and was then named *mudarris* in the Madrasa al-'Adiliya al-Kubra. He was a highly respected *'alim* given the title of *shihab* (comet) by his contemporaries. He appears time and again in the sources as one of the most influential teachers of the mid-18th century.

Once established in the 'Adiliya post, Ahmad went to Istanbul and attempted to obtain the teaching position under the Qubbat al-Nasr which had been until that time held by the Mahasinis. In this he succeeded and, though the Mahasinis continued in the post of *khatib*, the Maninis also carried the title of *khatib* from then on.

Shihab Ahmad al-Manini's sons 'Umar (d. 1765/66) and Isma'il (1726/27–1800/01) also held the *khitaba*. In addition, Isma'il taught in the 'Adiliya Madrasa and was named *mufti* of Damascus for a short term in 1774/75.

It should be noted that the Maninis were a relatively new family in Damascus which, as the biographer al-Muradi takes pains to show, were patronized by the older families. Al-Muradi says that they began as loyal followers of the Naqshbandi Shaykh Muhammad Murad and eventually became connected to that family through marriage. Yet their founder Shihab Ahmad was an exceptionally influential teacher, and his elevation to tenure of the *khitaba* and *ifta'*, posts which had been dominated by older families until that time, again indicates that the merit of the learned may have carried influence in the 'Azm era. It may also be evidence of the 'Azms' success in factionalizing the *'ulama'* of the 18th century.

Muhammad ibn 'Umar al-Manini (dates not given) held the Qubbat al-Nasr teaching post around the turn of the 19th century, but it is not recorded that he, like his predecessors, also

79 See Muradi, I, 119, 133–145, 241–249, II, 275–281, III, 204–205; Bitar, I, 238–239, 318–319; Shatti, *Rawd*, 40–41; Hisni, 640, 824, 788–789; Bitar, III, 1183–1188; Shatti, *Tarajim*, 67–68; dispatch of French consul AEPo1/15, dispatches of British consuls, FO. 195/927, FO. 195/1583.

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Manīnī Family



preached. He was succeeded by his cousin Ahmad ibn Isma'il (1762/63–1840/41). The latter, however, withdrew after giving only one lesson because of some unclarified incapacity. Ahmad named a contemporary *'alim* by the name of Sa'id al-Halabi (1774/75–1843/44) to be his deputy. Sa'id al-Halabi (whose family we will discuss next) was succeeded in the post by his son 'Abdullah in 1843/44, a man who remained very active in the post until 1860. At that point the post was restored to the Maninis. Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Manini (1835/36–1898/99) not only actively undertook the teaching responsibilities of the post but was the first Manini to again preach in the Umayyad Mosque in the 19th century. He also reactivated the teaching of Arabic and the religious sciences in the 'Adiliya Madrasa.

It was probably not until the early 1870's when the Khatib family took over the *khitaba* that Muhammad al-Manini was named to the Tanzimat courts. Eventually, he was named president of the criminal court (*mahkamat al-huquq al-'adliya*) where he remained for fifteen years. In 1887 he was named *mufti* by the *shaykh al-islam*, despite the local *majlis* having supported As'ad Hamza, the brother of the deceased *mufti*. Al-Manini's appointment appears to have signified a triumph for the *'ulama'* estate and possibly for the 'Azm faction. It was greeted with the commentary that "the lion had returned to his copse; the *imam* to his pulpit". The Hamzas, whom the Maninis replaced and whom we shall discuss shortly, were members of the *ashraf* estate and had been connected closely to the Maydani faction.

Al-Manini remained *mufti* until his death in 1898/99. His son Ahmad (d. 1895/96) sat on the municipality (*majlis al-baladiya*) and on a Damascene appeal court. A second son Tawfiq (dates not given) maintained the family's teaching tradition under the Qubbat al-Nasr and in the 'Adliya Madrasa. Neither of these succeeded their father in the *ifta'*. The post was assumed by Salih ibn Muhammad Qattan (d. 1916/17) who held it until 1908 when the Young Turks came to power. It appears from the sources used here that following *mufti* Muhammad al-Manini's death in 1898/99 no member of the family succeeded in holding an important political position. They, like the other key *'ulama'* family of the 'Azm faction, the Muradis, had gone into decline.

The Halabi Family[80]

The Halabis were, relative to the other families who held the *khitaba* at this time, newcomers in Damascus. Though his family possibly originated in Mosul in Iraq, Sa'id ibn Hasan (1774/75–1843/44) arrived in Damascus in 1792/93 from Aleppo and was therefore called al-Halabi. He established himself in the Umayyad Mosque and began his studies with the Damascene *'ulama'*. He studied with the most popular Shafi'i, Hanbali and Hanafi *'ulama'* of the day (for example, the Shafi'is Ali Shama'a, Muhammad al-Kuzbari, al-Shihab al-'Attar; the Hanbali Isma'il al-Mawahibi and the Hanafis Mustafa al-Ayyubi, Shakir Muqaddam Sa'd, Muhammad Najib al-Qila'i). He also had close contacts with some of the city's *ashraf* (e.g. al-Sayyid Husayn (al-Muradi? al-Husayni). With time he became one of the most respected Hanafi *'alims* in Damascus with whom nearly every Damascene *'alim* of the mid-19th century was to have had some contact. It was presumably due to his qualifications that he was the most obvious candidate to deputize for Ahmad al-Manini when the latter proved incapable of fulfilling his duties teaching under the Qubbat al-Nasr of the Umayyad Mosque.

When the Egyptians occupied Damascus Sa'id al-Halabi did not – like other *'ulama'* – go to welcome Ibrahim Pasha. He continued teaching in the mosque and eventually Ibrahim came to

80 See Bitar, I, 246–247, II, 667–668, 108–112; Shatti, *Rawd*, 12–13, 110–111, 163–165 and *Tarajim*, 12; Hisni, 640, 662, 667–669, 706, 754–755, 877; Mardam, 7; Poujoulat, 395; Abkarius, 130; Paton, 196; Cte. de Paris, 23–25; dispatches of the French consuls AEARC/93/4, AEPo1/6, AEARC/93/4, AEPo1/8, AEPo1/10, AECPNS/112/93, dispatch of British Consul FO. 195/927.

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Ḥālabī Family



him. On that occasion, al-Halabi preached and Ibrahim listened. When Ibrahim sent him a large purse of gold, he refused it and said the money should best go to the treasury.

In 1840, an English visitor, who was otherwise not especially sympathetic to the Damascene '*ulama*' wrote:

> There are many eminently pious and virtuous persons among the Moslems, who adhere strictly to the precepts of their religion; and a really good Moslem must be a good man. One of these was Sheikh Said-el-Halabi, one of the Ulema of the Grand Mosque, a man of boundless charity and incorruptible integrity, who went every morning to the mosque before daybreak, and remained in it the greater part of the day.[81]

When Sa'id al-Halabi died in 1843/44, the Qubbat al-Nasr teaching post was taken by his son 'Abdallah (1808/09–1869/70), this time in place of Muhammad al-Manini who was too young to begin teaching. 'Abdallah was in many respects very different from his father. Though he too was called the chief of the '*ulama*' (*ra'is al-'ulama*') and presented favorably by the biographers, he had not studied quite as extensively as his father. He had, in fact, only studied with his father and his father's students. Rather than spending all his time in the mosque, 'Abdallah opened his house in the evenings to the city's '*ulama*' and merchants (*tujjar*) and concentrated on his role as a notable. The biographers called him the "chief of the notables whom rulers respected and relied upon to resolve difficulties among all peoples and all classes".

'Abdallah al-Halabi, though not appointed to the *majlis* or named to a Tanzimat court or bureau, was nonetheless an important political figure of the early Tanzimat era. His influence lay with the *shaykh al-islam* in Istanbul with whom he corresponded and on at least three occasions succeeded in arranging appointments. While he refused the positions of *mufti* or *qadi* which were offered him, his recommendations advanced the careers of Damascenes who eventually obtained these offices: Tahir al-Amidi (*mufti* in 1850/51–1860); Sa'id al-Ustuwani (*na'ib* and eventually *qadi*); Mahmud al-Hamzawi (*na'ib* and later *mufti*); Rida al-Ghazzi (*mutawalli* of the Umayyad Mosque). It is, however, unfortunate that no evidence can be found in the sources used here to explain the nature of 'Abdallah al-Halabi's influence with the *shaykh al-islam*.

Al-Halabi remains an especially important but enigmatic figure in that he was considered by the French consul to be one of the "most compromised" in the events of 1860. His connection to the *shaykh al-islam* lends therefore support to the theory that these events were directed by anti-Tanzimat forces in Istanbul. But again, there is no evidence. In fact, even the French Consul M. Outrey, who was so convinced of al-Halabi's sinister role in the events, had concluded this only circumstantially: "Il est matériellement impossible qu'aucun mouvement ait lieu à Damas sans son consentement", and later noted that Fu'ad Pasha could find no hard evidence with which to condemn al-Halabi.

While on the one hand, an anonymous Christian chronicler wrote:

> . . . a crowd of rioters rushed to the great Mosque and they had an interview with 'Abdallah Halabi (which lasted) about a quarter of an hour whereupon they left him, running and shouting at the top of their voices: 'O Zeal for the (true) religion.[82]

the Muslim biographers wrote that his efforts to stem the mob went unheeded.

New material will perhaps one day bring more light to this problem. Here, however, it can be added that 'Abdallah al-Halabi was probably one of the Muslim merchants who were suffering from the financial crisis of the late 1850's. He was a rich silk merchant who, unlike his father, attempted to deal with the peasants who supplied him with raw silk according

81 Paton, 195–196.
82 Abkarius, 130.

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to the principles of European market capitalism. This we know from the following anecdote related by Paton who visited Damascus in 1840:

[Shaykh Sa'id] has a son named Abdullah, who is a merchant in good circumstances. It is related of him that having made a contract with some peasants, who were to deliver him silk at 140 piastres, the current price rose in the interval of the bargain and delivery to 160. Abdullah gave the peasants 145, being five piastres more than the contract price. His father, who was standing beside him told him to give the current price. Abdullah called them aside and gave 150 piastres. On learning this his father, using his paternal and saintly authority in a way which we Westerners can scarcely comprehend, struck his son two blows on the neck with his stick, and ordered him to pay the 160 piastres in full. Abdullah is no loser by his father's virture, for he puts a mark on the fabrics he exports, which, on being sent to Smyrna, obtain a ready sale, as they come from the son of a man of such learning and piety.[83]

'Abdallah al-Halabi was exiled to Izmir and when he returned to Damascus under the general amnesty arranged by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, was a broken man. When he died a few years later, a great funeral took place in his honor.[84]

About the time of 'Abdallah's death, other members of the Halabi family were given new posts under the restoration of the old notable families in 1869–70. 'Abdallah's brother Muhammad, to whom the Qubbat al-Nasr post might have fallen upon 'Abdallah's exile had the Maninis not been restored in the post, became a member of the 1869 *majlis*. 'Abdallah's son Ahmad (1836/37–1885/86) who had been *amin al-fatwa* became *na'ib mahkamat al-bab* and *mutawalli* of the Umayyad Mosque. The latter post, which had until then been held by the Ghazzi family, remained in the Halabi family well into the 20th century: first Rida al-Din ibn Ahmad (d. 1910/11) then Muhammad 'Ali ibn Ahmad (d. 1915/16) and then Hamdi ibn Muhammad 'Ali (dates not given) were *mutawallis*. Members of the Halabi family were, like others associated with the *khataba*, also given positions in the city's courts. Both Ahmad ibn 'Abdallah and his son Rida were *na'ib al-bab*. Rida's brother Muhammad 'Ali was also a *na'ib* (in another *shari'a* court). His son Fu'ad graduated from the Damascene Faculty of Law.

The Halabis do not appear to have been active in the politics of the 1908–1920 period or afterwards.

The Khatib Family[85]

The Khatibs monopolized the *khitaba* after 1870/71. Though they do not appear as patrilineal *ashraf*, one of their ancestors was called *al-sayyid* and another traced his line to the Sufi saint 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani. Abu al-Khayr al-Khatib was the first *sayyid* to hold the *khatib* post in the Umayyad mosque. The Khatibs were, moreover, the first Shafi'is to be named *khatibs* there. As they had formerly been *khatibs* in the Sinaniya mosque at the mouth of the Maydan, their move into the Umayyad mosque might be considered further evidence of the Maydan's rise in the Tanzimat. The only indication of their origins is given by the biographer al-Bitar who gives their genealogy back to 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaylani. But no connection can be found between the *khatibs* and the Kaylanis, the other Damascene family who traced their descent to this Sufi saint.

83 Paton, 196.

84 For more on Halabi see Cte. de Paris, 23–25.

85 See Bitar, I, 96, 126–127, II, 918; Shatti, *Rawd*, 158–159, 635 and *Tarajim*, 42–43, 48–49, 65, 112–113; Hisni, 669–670, 703–704, 709–710, 826–827; Zirikli, V, 331, VIII, 82; Harran, 22–25, 178–179, 184n, 216, 237; Dawn, "Rise", 162; Dispatches of the British consuls, FO. 195/1306; dispatches of the French consul AECPNS/119/16, AECPNS/120/17, FO. 371/6455.

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Khatīb Family



In the 19th century, it appears that the Khatibs were an artisan-merchant family which succeeded in trade and simultaneously entered the ranks of the '*ulama*'. Their two branches were formed by the descendants of Salih and those of 'Abdallah, both sons of 'Abd al-Rahim. The cousins 'Abd al-Qadir ibn Salih (1806/07–1871/72) and al-Sayyid Muhammad (1810/11–1868/69) were merchants. The first was an '*attar* or drug and perfume merchant who had studied in Egypt. The second was one of the most successful pilgrimage merchants and guides, a trade which, it is said, he had learned from his father. Both were Shafi'is.

The *hajj* merchant al-Sayyid Muhammad continued to occupy himself mainly in trade and his descendants did not obtain public offices. 'Abd al-Qadir, on the other hand, began teaching in the Umayyad Mosque and in the Khayyatin Madrasa (probably in Suq al-Khayyatin at E/4) where he gained a large following. When his sons were born and began their education in the 1840's 'Abd al-Qadir took a most unusual step. He had each of his four sons schooled in a different *madhhab*. The eldest, Abu'l-Faraj (1828/29–1893/94), was to be a Hanafi; the second, al-Sayyid Abu'l-Khayr (1831/32–1889/90), was to be a Shafi'i; the third, Abu'l-Fath (1834/35–1897/98), was to be a Hanbali and the youngest, Abu'l–Nasr (1837/38–1906/07), was to be a Maliki. At some point, however, the father had a dream in which he saw the *imam* al-Shafi'i who ordered him to return his sons all to Shafi'ism, which he did.

The sons of 'Abd al-Qadir remained active in the religious life of Damascus and the province. Abu'l-Faraj taught in the Umayyad Mosque and in the Madrasa al-Nuriya in 'Asruniya (E/3); Abu'l-Khayr was *khatib* in the Madrasa al-Qalbaqjiya and Abu'l-Fath was *khatib* in the Ahmadiya Mosque (D/14) and later *nazir* of the Zahiriya (E/3). Abu'l-Nasr, who moved his family to the village of Harasta where the Khatibs presumably had some land, travelled often to Istanbul and was eventually employed as *na'ib qadi* in a number of district courts. He joined the branch of the Shadhili Sufi order which was revived in Syria by Shaykh 'Ali al-Yasruti beginning in 1849. He was famous as a reciter and preacher and made it his custom to preach in the mosque of all the towns where he was posted as *qadi*.

The *khitaba* of the Umayyad Mosque was first obtained by a member of the Khatib family in 1870/71. It is said that al-Sayyid Abu'l-Khayr ibn 'Abd al-Qadir al-Khatib (1831/32–1889/90) obtained the post upon Rashid al-Mahasini's death and held it in rotation with the Ustuwanis and the Maninis. He gained the biographer Husni's praise as one in whom the elite and the common people firmly believed and who gained the special esteem of the '*ulama*' and "rulers". He was succeeded by his eldest son Jamal al-Din (d. 1911/12) who had been serving as *qadi* in Basra. The *khitaba* then passed to a cousin, 'Abd al-Qadir ibn Abu'l-Faraj (no dates given).

By the time of the nationalist era in the early 20 century, the Khatibs had between the two branches of the family more than a dozen young and active men. In the 'Abdallah branch, the *hajj* merchant al-Sayyid Muhammad had had seven sons. Of these Rashid (d. 1898/99) was also often in Istanbul where he was "respected by the *a'yan*". As already mentioned, this branch of the family appears to have remained principally active in trade, with the exception that Rashid and his son 'Abd al-Rahman (dates not given) held the post of *khatib* in the Sinaniya mosque (D/5) into the 20th century.

In the Salih branch, which had held the *khitaba* in the Umayyad mosque, Salah al-Din and 'Abd al-Qadir were chief of the court of first instance and *khatib* of the Umayyad Mosque respectively; Jamal al-Din and Zaki were both *khatibs*. The latter was active among the Arab nationalists while studying in Istanbul. Muhibb al-Din ibn Abu'l-Fath had migrated to Egypt where he was also active in Arab nationalist activities during the pre-war period. Sayf al-Din ibn Abu'l Nasr was a founder of the Arab Literary Club (*al-muntada al-adabi*) which was important in the nationalist movement. It was this Sayf al-Din al-Khatib who was hanged by Jamal Pasha in Damascus in 1915 for his political activities. Kamal ibn Ahmad died at Maysalun when the Syrians attempted to block the French occupying forces in 1920.

The Khatib family remained active in politics in the post-war period and were prominent in 20th-century commerce and industry.

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THE THIRD ESTATE: THE *ASHRAF*

The *niqaba*

The Kaylani Family[86]

Similar to the Bakris, the 'Umaris, and a number of other families considered here, the Kaylanis had family ties in the Muslim world outside Syria. They claimed descent from 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, the 12th century Iraqi Sufi with whom the Qadiri Sufi order was linked. The name Jilani is pronounced Kaylani in Syria, Gaylani in Egypt. Though the family had been Hanbalis in Baghdad, they became Shafi'is when coming to Syria in the 17th century. In the course of the next two centuries, the majority of Syrian Kaylanis remained Shafi'is, but a number who functioned within the Ottoman administration became Hanafis. One is led to believe that they were already wealthy upon their arrival in Syria, possibly as a result of their activities in the overland trade between Mesopotamia and Syria. Contemporary to the rise of the 'Azms, they were named governors (*mutasarrifs*) and tax farmers (*multazims*) of the district of Hama.

'Abd al-Qadir al-Kaylani (1669–1744) and possibly his father Ibrahim (dates not given) held these posts and increased their wealth considerably. 'Abd al-Qadir also succeeded in being named *naqib al-ashraf* in Hama. However, a revolt of the local population against him in 1730 forced him and his sons to flee to Damascus. There he was aided by a certain al-Sayyid Yasin al-Qadiri, who may well have been his uncle Yasin ibn 'Abd al-Qadir or a member of the 'Azm family.[87]

A further Damascene connection was made when this Yasin succeeded in marrying a daughter to Sulayman Pasha al-'Azm, the contemporary governor in Damascus. (Here, however, it must be noted that present-day Kaylanis say the connection was different: Yasin married a granddaughter to 'Abdallah ibn Khalil al-'Azm.) Also at this time, Khadija bint Muhammad al-'Azm, a great-granddaughter of Sulayman Pasha al-'Azm was married to a Kaylani. She was, it should be noted, the very first woman of the modern 'Azm line to be married outside of her own family. Her marriage therefore represented a significant concession on the part of the 'Azms, the terms of which must remain of interest until more material emerges. It can be suggested, however, that the reciprocity of the ties between these two centrally-important and ascendant local families of widely-separated and often conflicting estates – the *aghawat* and the *ashraf* – represented an important watermark at the beginning of the factionalist era in Syria.

The Kaylanis were called Hasani *ashraf* by the Damascene biographers, a designation which had until then not appeared in the biographies of 18th century Damascene *ashraf* (who were all Husayni *ashraf*) and was not again to appear until the mid-19th century (with the arrival of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri). This may indicate that the Kaylanis were not fully acceptable among the Damascene *ashraf*, perhaps because they came from Hama and represented a Sufi order which was not especially popular in Damascus, perhaps because of their ties to the

86 For material on the Kaylani family see: Muradi, II, 294–302, III, 46–48, IV, 235–236; Bitar, II, 755, 1013–1014, III, 1315, 1327–1328, 1338–1139; Shatti, *Rawd*, 120, 129, 133–134, 229; *Tarajim*, 69–70, 116; Hisni, 825–826; Rafeq, *Province*, 51; Trimingham, 41.
See also the dispatches from Damascus of the British consuls FO. 195/2144, WO. 371/6455; from the French consuls AEPol/14, AEPol/15, AEPol/17, AEARC/93/4, AEPol/6, AEARC/63.

87 Difficulties in establishing the genealogical ties among the 18th century Kaylanis and 'Azms stem from the contradictions between the written sources and information offered by present-day members of the families.

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Kaylānī Family



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'Azms. Perhaps they, like the 'Azms, appeared to be exercising power over the local population with support from Istanbul. Though two Kaylanis were named *naqib al-ashraf* in Damascus, these appointments were resisted. The pro-'Azm biographer al-Muradi reported that some Damascene notables (*a'yan*) raised the "rabble of the *ashraf*" in a *fitna* against the Kaylani household in 'Asruniya during the tenure of 'Abd al-Rahman.[88]

On the other hand, the Kaylanis used their influence in Istanbul to aid particular Damascene *'ulama'*. A second son of 'Abd al-Qadir by the name of Ya'qub (d. 1771/72) settled in Istanbul where he arranged posts for Damascenes. For example he arranged with the aid of 2000 gold (pieces)[89], the post of *mutawalli* of the Umayyad mosque for 'Ali ibn Muhammad al-Muradi (1719/20–1770/71). As we have seen above, al-Muradi also had to overcome localist resistance, but the nonetheless was thereby launched on one of the most successful *'ulama'* careers of 18th century Damascus.

While at least one branch of Kaylanis – that descending from 'Abd al-Qadir's son Ishaq – returned to remain in Hama, the others remained in Damascus where they had a family compound in 'Asruniya, within the central rectangle. They patronized the Ashrafiya Madrasa (which was also called Dar al-Hadith, E/3, 4). The sources give no indication that the Kaylanis did not remain in close connection with the 'Azms. On the contrary, the two families often intermarried during the remainder of the period studied. Nor is much heard about politically active Kaylanis during the period of 'Azm decline towards the end of the 18th century. Nonetheless, the Kaylanis were still considered of political significance. It was in their household that the Ottoman governor Salim Pasha was killed by the rebels of 1831, despite the promise of the notables that he would be protected. We have interpreted this incident as motivated by the rebels desire to discredit the notables of the 'Azm faction.

Around mid-century, the Kaylanis had arranged marriages into several Damascene *'ulama'* families like the Ayyubis, Nabulusis and 'Attars. Two great-grandsons of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Kaylani, who had brought the family to Damascus, Salih and Muhammad Sa'id, held posts under the Tanzimat; the former as a *na'ib qadi*, the latter as a member of the *majlis*.

In 1860, Muhammad Sa'id was exiled for his role in the events of that year. He returned to Damascus as many of the other exiles and was named *ra'is al-baladiya* in 1881/82, a post which his son 'Atallah was also to hold and which was often to be given to "old" *niqaba* families.

Into the latter part of the 19th century, the family's connection to the Qadiri Sufi order was sustained, and a reminder of the Kaylani's Ottoman ties was reflected in the fact that the Qadiri order often supported Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid's pan-Islamic policies. (Sulayman al-Kaylani, a contemporary Baghdadi Kaylani who was *naqib al-ashraf* and chief of the Qadiri order in that city was reported to be one of the chief supporters of the Sultan's policies.)

In the early 20th century, a few members of the Kaylani family remained prominent in public affairs. 'Atallah was, as mentioned, *ra'is al-baladiya* and a member of the *majlis*. Ha'il ibn Muhammad Faris was honored with the title of *pasha*. However, the Kaylanis do not appear to have been active in the political movements of the 1908–1920 period or prominent in public life thereafter. Having withstood the political changes of two centuries, their political capital may have been exhausted. They were not as adept at adjusting themselves to political change as other families of the 'Azm faction or as the 'Azms themselves.

88 Muradi, II, 294–295.

89 The currency is not mentioned. See Muradi, IV, 235–236.

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The Ibn Hamza (Hamzawi) Family[90]

The Hamza family may be the oldest Damascene family considered in this study. It is said they came from Harran in the vicinity of Baghdad to Damascus sometime in the early 10th century when an early ancestor Isma'il b. Husayn held the *niqaba*. They were always Hanafis. The Hamzas lived in the northern inner city in 'Amara where they built a family compound and a *masjid* (or small mosque) in the street which came to be known as Zuqaq al-Naqib in their honour (F/3). In the 18th century, they exercised their influence in Istanbul and obtained posts in addition to the *niqaba*. They held, for example, teaching posts in the Qaymariya, Murdaniya, and Jawziya Madrasas. Ibrahim ibn Muhammad Ibn Hamza (1644/45–1708/09) was also named *na'ib qadi* in the Damascene military court and in Mahkamat al-Bab.

All the prominent Hamzas of the 18th through 20th centuries descend from the *naqib* Yahya ibn Hasan Ibn Hamza (dates not mentioned). His sons Hamza (1730/31–1802/03) and Husayn (1748/49–1788/89) were *naqib al-ashraf* and *mutawalli* of the Umayyad Mosque, respectively. It is unfortunate that the biographer al-Muradi devotes little attention to the Hamzas and we are, therefore, left with little additional information about them during the 18th century. It is, by the same token, possible that they were eclipsed by the 'Ajlanis, a family which established close ties to the 'Azms and which we shall discuss shortly.

Nasib ibn Husayn Ibn Hamza (1786/87–1848/49) wrote a poem praising Khedive Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of Egypt. He was, nonetheless, appointed to the *majlis al-idara* when the Ottomans returned to Damascus after the Egyptian occupation. He obtained the *niqaba* for a brief interval during the struggles for that post in 1846/47 and then remained on the *majlis* until his death. Nasib, who had obtained a religious education from some of the most prominent Damascene '*ulama*' (including 'Abd al-Latif al-'Umari who initiated him into the Khalwati Sufi order) taught in the family *masjid* in Zuqaq al-Naqib (F/3) and composed a number of works which were preserved in the *masjid* of Husayn in the Umayyad Mosque after his death.

At the time of Nasib's death at least three of his five sons were adult and ripe for the opportunities of the mid-century period. The eldest son, Salim, never became *naqib al-ashraf*; nor did he hold any other public office. He, it is said, devoted his energies to caring for the material needs of the family. Of special interest is the information that he struck up a friendship with 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri upon the latter's arrival in Damascus in 1855 and was known to have been one of the Amir's intimate companions.

The second son, Mahmud (d. 1887) also did not become *naqib*. He was schooled by his father Nasib and learned religious sciences from the *shaykhs* 'Umar al-Amidi and Sa'id al-Halabi, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kuzbari, Hasan al-Shatti and Mulla Abu Bakr al-Kilali. It is said that Mahmud was certified by all these. He became famous for his literary accomplishments in Turkish and Arabic and especially for his calligraphic skills. It is said, for example, that he could write the entire Fatiha of the Koran on a grain of rice.

Though only in his twenties, Mahmud was appointed in the course of the early Tanzimat years to be *na'ib qadi* in the Damascene courts of Buzuriya, Sinaniya and finally Bab.

90 For material on the Hamza (Hamzawi) family see: Muradi, I, 21–22, II, p. 156–158, III, 66–80, 206–208, 318; Bitar, I, 310–311, 558, II, 672, 675, 920, III, 1328–1330, 1467–1477, Shatti, *Rawd*, 52, 74–75, 78–79, 101, 157–158, 251–254; *Tarajim*, 3, 35–36, 285; Hisni, 667–669, 673, 698–699, 729, 730, 737–738, 768–772, 772–787, 810–813; Mardam, 7, 21–22, 23, 24, 26; Rafeq, *Province*, 51, 166, 210, 226; Kremer, 141. See also the dispatches of the French consuls, AECPNS/112/9, AEPo1/15, AEPo1/7, AEPo1/6, AEPo1/11, AEPo1/13, AEPo1/14; CNF 62, 1942/43. See also the dispatches of the British consuls, FO. 195/677, FO. 195/806, FO. 195/927, FO. 195/1648, FO. 195/1583; FO. 371/6455.

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Ḥamza Family



He then travelled to Istanbul where he obtained the favors of the government and returned a member of the *majlis* in 1849/50 where he remained until 1860 (except for an interruption when he travelled with an out-going *wali* to the latter's new post in Kharput). Mahmud was possibly one of the first members of the old prominent Damascene families to pursue a career within the Tanzimat administration. In addition to sitting on the *majlis* he was appointed to a number of Tanzimat positions such as president of the council for agriculture and overseer of the property tax commission. Most significantly, however, Mahmud al-Hamzawi (as the family began to be called) was placed in charge of the property registers of the province in 1856/57.

During the riots of 1860, Mahmud aided Amir 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri in bringing Christians to safety and was, therefore, protected by the Amir in the events' aftermath. For his aid to the Christians, he was awarded a double-barrelled gun embellished with gold ornaments by Napoleon III. (Al-Bitar, however, reports that the gift was golden riding accoutrements in recognition of his love of sport and hunting.) Mahmud sat on the commission formed by the Ottoman minister Fu'ad Pasha to investigate the massacres. He was also named to the commission to regulate the indemnities to be paid to the Christians for their loss of life and property.

When the governor Amin Mukhlis Pasha arranged through 'Uthman Bey Mardam to reestablish a *majlis* in February 1861, Mahmud Hamza was the only Damascene appointed directly by the governor. In 1864, he was again named to the important commission being formed by the authorities to regulate the indebtedness in Damascene villages, which has been discussed in Chapter III, this time upon the suggestion of the British consul.

He remained a member of the *majlis* throughout the 1860's and, in 1868, was named *mufti*, a post which no member of the Hamza family had yet held. He held this post until his death in 1887. Yet, as time went on, and especially into the 'Abd al-Hamidian era, Mahmud was no longer as totally-persuaded a supporter of the Ottoman state as he appears to have been as a young man. Sometime in the mid-1880's he was implicated in political intrigues which lost him the favor of the Ottoman authorities. Following a 'slight' he had received from the governor Hamdi Pasha, Mahmud retired from public life and never again attended a meeting of the *majlis*. His estrangement began with the Ottoman suppression of the local reform activities which had been promoted by Midhat Pasha in the fields of education and philanthropy, under the auspices of the *jam'iyat maqasid al-khayriya* or the "benevolent intentions" societies. The Ottomans imposed upon these local voluntary societies a council for education (*majlis al-ma'arif*) which was to be closely observed and controlled from Istanbul.[91] Though Hamza, as *mufti*, was named to this council, he was disappointed with the limitations imposed by the government on its activities.

During the political intrigues of this period, which were closely observed by the French Consul Monsieur Flesch, Mahmud Hamza and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri were considered to be in accord with Hawlu Pasha al-'Abid,[92] who was referred to as the head of the allegedly French-inclined "local liberal party". The French consul attributed Hamza's fall to the Sultan's having uncovered this plot, according to which an insurrection beginning in the Hijaz would spread to the Syrian and Mesopotamian beduin tribes and eventually join with the Mahdi of the Sudan. It was, according to the French consul, to impede this plot that the Sultan sent out emissaries to Damascus to choose Damascene *'ulama'* who would work among the tribes to thwart Hamza's efforts. Unfortunately, nothing more is heard about these intrigues.

91 The philanthropical and reform movements of this time represented an important movement amongst notables in many parts of Syria. See: F. Steppat, "Eine Bewegung unter den Notabeln Syriens, 1877–1878", in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Supplementa I: XVII. Deutscher Orientalistentag (Wiesbaden, 1969) and my "Islamic Maqased".

92 See sketch on the Jaza'iris below and the 'Abids above.

Upon Mahmud's death, a dispute arose in Damascus over the choice of his successor. The notables (here: *a'yan wa wujuh*) formed a faction in favor of Mahmud's brother As'ad who had until then been a prominent figure in Ottoman administration in Damascus, holding posts such as president of the municipality and sitting as a high-ranking member of the civil courts. The *majlis al-idara* approved As'ad's appointment, but the decision was not accepted by the *shaykh al-islam* in Istanbul who named Muhammad al-Manini to the post. While the contemporary British Consul Mr. Dikson reported that the *shaykh al-islam*'s decision had caused dissatisfaction among the Damascene notables and was viewed as part of the Ottoman plot to undermine the position of the great provincial families, al-Bitar informs us that the *wali* had received a second petition from another group of notables which had proposed al-Manini and that he had sent his own opinion to the *shaykh al-islam* in support of al-Manini. The biographer al-Shatti's remarks, though written long after the events, also indicate that a struggle among the local notables had taken place. Al-Shatti holds that the resolution in favor of al-Manini and against the Hamzas, was generally accepted: "the prevalent opinion in Damascus . . . was that our attributes had been returned to us: the lion had returned to his copse, the *imam* to his *mihrab*". The Hamzas were, in fact, an *ashraf* family which had only recently assumed the top *'ulama'* status of *mufti* while the Maninis had long been affiliated only to the *'ulama'*. But Shatti's interpretation is better understood as an attempt to use the restoration of the estates system as a pretext for the restoration of an 'Azm-faction family. Paradoxically, it had been the rise of the 'Azm faction which had undermined the estates system in the first place.

A third Hamza, As'ad – the younger brother of Mahmud and Salim – had died in 1890. He had been a hunting companion of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, who also had passed from the scene by this time. With the death of As'ad, the Hamzas disappear from prominence for two generations. In the 1920's, however, and under the French Mandate members of the family were again to hold the *niqaba*.

The Hamzas reflected the political dilemma of Damascene notables of the end of the 19th century. At a time when the Damascenes were nearly completely harnessed by the Ottoman state, they naturally accepted the posts offered them in the Ottoman administration, but the Hamzas nonetheless dared to maintain contacts with potential or actual rivals of the Ottomans. In this sense they are exceptional and, therefore, attract our attention. Mahmud Hamza, for example, followed closely the activities of the Mahdi, shared political information with the French consul, took a "great interest" in the political activities of the Sufis and may have planned an insurrection with the Sharif of Mecca already in the 1880's. His brothers Salim and As'ad were close friends of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri. Perhaps further research will link these relationships with the events of 1860 and developments of the late 19th century.

Though several of the next generation of Hamzas held positions in the religious courts of Damascus, and one was named director of orphanages and another to a brief term on the municipality, a Hamza was never again to be *mufti, naqib*, or to sit on the *majlis* in the Ottoman period. In 1909, the French consul wrote of Shakir ibn As'ad (d. 1910) as a "descendant of an old and formerly very influential family". Yet in 1919, the British consul listed the Hamzas among the 45 principal Muslim families of Damascus. They were, nonetheless, not prominent in the political events at the time of the First World War.

In the French Mandate period, members of the Hamza family again held the post of *naqib al-ashraf* following 75 years detachment from the post. In 1942 a certain Sa'id Hamza (b. 1879) held this post and was also named president of the chamber of agriculture. It was reported that he was the son of a small cultivator from the village of 'Ain Tarma in the oasis of Damascus and was a half-brother to Shaykh Kamil al-Qassab, president of the association of Damascene *'ulama'*. Hamza had been appointed to his posts by the prime minister Hasan al-Hakim (of the Maydan), despite the fact that he previously supported the rival National Bloc politician Jamil Mardam Bey, because al-Hakim hoped to consolidate the *'ulama'* by this measure. The fusion of the *ashraf* and *'ulama'* estate had, of course, by this time become complete.

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The 'Ajlani Family[93]

The 'Ajlanis were a Husayni *ashraj* family claiming descent to important personages in Damascus from about the time of the Ottoman conquest. One of their ancestors, Husayn Abu'l-Jinn, was buried in the chief Damascene court of al-Bab. They also maintained an important sepulchral shrine just outside Bab al-Saghir. The biographer al-Muhibbi reported that the 'Ajlanis came from Egypt and settled in the Maydan beside the Rifa'i Order's *zawiya*. Brinner has suggested that their move to Syria may have been motivated by the persecutions of the Rifa'i Order there. But they may also have been encouraged to settle in Damascus by the country's new rulers, the Ottomans, in order to help replenish the city's productive population which had severly declined since the visitations of the plague in the 15th century. Under the Ottomans, the Beni 'Ajlan were given the office of *shaykh al-mashayikh* (chief of the guild *shaykhs*). This title was a clear improvement over the status of *sultan al-harafish* (leader of the vagabonds), the contemporary counterpart of this office in Egypt. The silk weaver Kamal al-Din Muhammad 'Ajlan (d. 1596) was the first member of the family to hold the post which remained closely associated to the family into the period studied here.

The 18th century family had two important branches. One branch lived near the Umayyad mosque (probably at G/3), was Hanafi and produced those 'Ajlanis who held the post of *naqib* in the 18th and early 19th centuries. The other branch was Shafi'i and lived in the Maydan in the vicinity of the Rifa'i Sufi *zawiya* (D/13) with which they were historically associated. The second branch, known as Manjak-'Ajlani, often held the position of *shaykh al-mashayikh* or overseer of the city's guilds and Sufi orders. According to information provided by 20th century descendants of the first branch, they descended from a certain Manjak Pasha (perhaps Wazir Manjak of 14th century Cairo) who had married an 'Ajlani woman, thus casting doubt on the (patrilineal) purity of the Manjaks' nobility.

The 'Ajlanis of the central rectangle were rich, well-established and close to the notables of the 'Azm-faction. For example, the *naqib* 'Ali ibn Isma'il al-'Ajlani who had held the *niqaba* often in the 18th century had been raised in the 'Imadi household of his paternal grandmother because of his father's untimely death. (The 'Imadis held the *ifta'* in the 1730's.) He became "like a brother" to the contemporary *mufti* 'Ali ibn Muhammad al-Muradi (1719/20–1770/71), his closest companion for many years. 'Ali al-'Ajlani acquired from the state the rights of tenure of valuable lands in the form of feudal grants (*iqta'*) and life leaseholds (*malikane*). It is said his success in farming these struck an unprecedented example in Damascus and that he was extremely rich. In addition to receiving some Ottoman ranks he was, in 1761/62, named *na'ib* of the Bab court. Later in the 18th century, the 'Ajlanis intermarried with the 'Azms.

By contrast, there is practically no relevant information available on the Manjak-'Ajlanis of the Maydan during the 'Azm period. It is tempting to suggest that the 'Azms succeeded in holding the Manjak-'Ajlanis as their candidates in the office of *shaykh al-mashayikh* and thereby succeeded in exercising control over the guilds and Sufi orders. Perhaps further research will turn up evidence in support of this hypothesis.

Hamza ibn 'Ali al-'Ajlani (d. 1812/13) held the *niqaba* around the turn of the 19th century. He was also named *mufti* for a short term sometime after Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar had removed the *mufti* As'ad ibn Musa al-Mahasini in 1803/04. He died a presumably natural death in

93 For material on the 'Ajlanis and Manjak-'Ajlanis see: Muradi, III, 206–208; Bitar, I, 168, 340–341, 536–537, 559, II, 626, 668–669, 1042–1044, III, 1247; Shatti, *Rawd*, 36, 56–57, 63, 79, 101–102, 104, 112–113; *Tarajim*, 100; Hisni, 658–659, 661, 666. 809–810; Rafeq, *Province*, 51; Watzinger und Wulzinger, 100; Ibish, 41–44; Harran, 155; *Kitab al-Ahzan*, 308; Dispatches of the French consuls, AECom/4, AEPol/15, AEPol/6, AEARC/93/4. See also FO. 371/6455; Brinner, *op. cit.*, 199, 202f.

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ʿAjlānī Family



Manjak-ʿAjlānī Family



1812/13 and was succeeded in the *niqaba* by his son Sa'id (1756/57– death given variously, 1829/30, 1833/34 and 1842/43) who also held the *ifta'* for a short period after which the Muradis regained the latter post.

In 1830/31, and therefore very probably during the 1831 Damascene revolt against the Ottoman governor Salim Pasha, Sa'id's incumbency in the *niqaba* was interrupted by that of Darwish ibn Muhammad Hamza (1785/86–1833/34). This development is, however, not acknowledged by every biographer. Al-Bitar, for example, does not even mention Darwish Hamza. For him, Sa'id remained *naqib* until his death in 1842/43 and was succeeded by his son Ahmad (d. 1860). But Ahmad's incumbency was challenged in a dispute over the *shaykh al-mashayikh* post in 1846/47.

Ahmad was sentenced to three years imprisonment for his role in the 1860 events, though there was no evidence reported against him. He died during his exile and was buried on the island of Cyprus. He had no (male) heirs. The *niqaba* was transferred out of the inner-city 'Ajlani family not to the Hamzas but to another *ashraf* family, the Kuzbaris. The inner-city 'Ajlanis' influence went into decline following the 1860 events. We find, for example, nothing more about them for the remainder of the period studied here and into the 20th century.

The Manjak-'Ajlanis of the Maydan, however, ascended prominently into public affairs after 1860. The biographer al-Shatti mentions that al-Bitar wrote of Darwish ibn Husayn Manjak-'Ajlanis that "he went into the house of government at the time of the events of 1860". Though one cannot find the biography al-Shatti is referring to, the information is no doubt interesting and would lead us to identify Darwish Manjak-'Ajlani with the Darwish Effendi who was appointed to the 1860 *majlis* under the influence of 'Uthman Bey Mardam and with the Manjak who served on the 1860 Christian indemnity commission to assess the reparations to be paid by Muslim household contributions. It is certain that he was named to the post of *ra'is al-baladiya* or president of the municipality, and that he was president of the newly-created appeals court (*majlis al-tamyiz*). He was considered to be an expert in the laws of inheritance and in the art of dividing the proceeds of *awqaf* among their entitled descendants. He was, moreover, the first of this branch of the family to be designated as a Hanafi by the biographers, a change which is reminiscent of those made by Damascene notables of the 18th century as they moved closer to the Ottomans.

While the Hanafi Darwish Manjak-'Ajlani and his off-spring took over, as it were, the political functions of the now discredited main branch of the family, his Shafi'i brother Amin al-Manjak (d. 1866) inherited the post of *shaykh al-mashayikh*. And so it was that the Manjak-'Ajlanis split into two new branches which roughly resembled those of the pre-1860 period when inner-city Hanafi 'Ajlanis could be distinguished from Maydani and Shafi'i Manjak-'Ajlanis.

In the 1880's, by which time a new political and economic order had been established, the family succeeded in recovering the *niqaba*. By this time, however, neither the *naqib* nor the *shaykh al-mashayikh* played the same role they had in the earlier period. Not only had the estates lost their political role but, according to a contemporary source,[94] the reforms beginning under Sultan 'Abd al-Majid (i.e. prior to 1860) had "immeasurably reduced" the prerogatives of the *shaykh al-mashayikh* within the artisan and Sufi estates. He now only gave his endorsement to a *shaykh* of a guild after the masters of the guild had held an election. It was the endorsement from the *majlis al-baladiya* (or Municipality), a Tanzimat institution which now took precedence over that of the *shaykh al-mashayikh*. The *shaykh al-mashayikh* continued to hold only formal and procedural duties such as performing investiture ceremonies of new guild *shaykhs* at his home. He was, however, still instrumental in mediating disputes within the guilds.

94 It is unfortunate that so little could be found on the functions of this office in the 18th and 19th centuries. See Ibish, *op. cit.* For material on the *shaykh al-mashayikh* in earlier centuries see Brinner, *op. cit.*

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The *niqaba* had become a post for which otherwise established notables vied in order to attain prestige and possibly to demonstrate the influence they had acquired in Istanbul. The member of the Kuzbari family who was named to the *niqaba* following Ahmad al-'Ajlani's exile was considered of a "second rank" (here: *al-tabaqa al-thaniya*), at least by al-Bitar possibly because he was simply an Ottoman appointee. When al-Kuzbari died, the 'Ajlanis attempted to regain the post. For a short time, the above-mentioned Darwish al-'Ajlani of the Hanafi branch of the Manjak-'Ajlanis held the post, but upon his death, a dispute arose between 'Ata and Ahmad of the Shafi'i branch of the family. 'Ata (d. 1931/32) held that he was the proper candidate to restore to the post its former distinction. But his elder brother Ahmad travelled to Istanbul and the *firman* was issued in his favor.

The Manjak-'Ajlanis were, however, not permitted to pass the post as an inheritance as the 'Ajlanis had done prior to 1860. When Ahmad died, Salih ibn Taqi al-Din al-Hisni became *naqib* after quite clearly having exerted personal pressures in Istanbul. From 1893 until 1898 the 'Ajlanis again held the post, but were again succeeded by another family, the Hasibis, whose family ties to many notables may have swayed the decision in their favor.[95]

Thus the Manjak-'Ajlanis struggled to maintain their key position over the *ashraf* and over the artisans. They were not always successful and when successful were nonetheless forced to relinquish much of the powers of the post under the administrative reforms of the post-1860 period. It is, however, significant that if the family did not always hold the *niqaba*, they often controlled the municipality, the body to which many of the powers of the *naqib* and *shaykh al-mashayikh* had been transferred.

These two posts at the head of the *ashraf*, Sufi and artisan estates which might well have served as focal points for localism, for class struggle or for the rise of nationalism were no longer able to do so during the end of the Ottoman period. Having once been swallowed by the 'Azm-connected, inner-city '*ulama*', they were, in the latter half of the 19th century swallowed by the reformed local administration. The opportunity for a come-back in the 1880's when Damascene industries and the economy as a whole were experiencing a qualified recovery was not seized. At that time both posts were held by Ahmad Manjak-'Ajlani who was an old man. He was described as being "candid but well-mannered" and of having "no great knowledge of the exact sciences and even less of craft or trade." But there is nothing to indicate that his younger brother 'Ata, who disputed Ahmad's tenure and fought for the post for thirty years might have wished to handle the situation otherwise.

The Hisni Family[96]

By the middle of the 19th century the Hisnis had been established in Damascus for at least five generations. The family had been brought to Damascus from the village of Hisn in 'Ajlun, a rural area south of the city, on the eastern slopes of the Jordan valley. By the end of the 17th century they patronized a Sufi *zawiya* in the quarter of Shaghur al-Barrani and had established *awqaf* there and in Ma'dhanat al-Shahm, an inner-city quarter otherwise known as a Shiite concentration. Two of their ancestors were mentioned by the biographer al-Muradi: Taqi al-Din (d. 1716/17) and Muhibb al-Din (d. 1701/02). From the latter descended the Hisni line.

95 See Hasibi sketch, below.

96 For material on the Hisnis see: Muradi, II, 5–6, IV, 128; *Mudhakkirat* 87; Shatti, *Rawd*, 60, 72, 105, 162–163 *Tarajim*, 45, 49, 84: Hisni, 649, 660, 728–729, 800–801, 817–819; Zirikli, VI, 252; Bitar, I, 33, 413–414, 488–489, II, 734–735; FO. 371/6455.

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Ḥiṣnī Family



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Hasan ibn Taqi al-Din al-Hisni (d. 1847/48) was the patriarch of the branch of the family which was thereafter known as Taqi al-Din al-Hisni. This branch remained resident in Ma'dhanat al-Shahm, while the main Hisni branch remained in Outer Shaghur of the localist area.

Hasan succeeded in being named *mufti* for a short period possibly at the time of the 1831 revolt or in the late 1840's. (The dates are, unfortunately, not given in the sources and circumstances are in both cases too similar to cancel either possiblity.) As *mufti* he made his way through the streets of Damascus to the *seray* accompanied by the corps of armed men. He was, however, dismissed after only a brief tenure and the previous *mufti* Husayn al-Muradi was reestablished in the post. Hasan also held the *niqaba* for a brief period, after which the 'Ajlanis were reestablished. It is, unfortunately, not mentioned which years Hasan sat on the *majlis*, or what other activities he was involved in at that time.

A son of Hasan Taqi al-Din al-Hisni was arrested by the Egyptians. It would seem logical that this took place under the measures to suppress the Maydan. About the same time Hasan's two second cousins and contemporaries Mahmud (d. 1893/94) and Salih (d. 1892/93) became active as a *mal al-fatura* merchant[97] and a merchant in the trade with Istanbul and the Hijaz respectively. These, however, dropped at least the *mal al-fatura* part of their activities sometime in the 1850's. It is quite possible that the family then consolidated their interests in the trade with Egypt. Raghib (d. 1871/72), the surviving son of Hasan, after having served on Ibrahim Pasha's staff during the Egyptian occupation, returned for a short period with Ibrahim to Egypt. Though he may have returned to Damascus in the late 1840's to sit on the *majlis* following his father's death, he maintained his connections in Egypt becoming a travelling companion of Mustafa Fazil Pasha, the pretender to the Egyptian throne who was responsible for a good deal of political intrigue in Syria in the 1860's.[98] Later in the 1860's Raghib joined the entourage of Khedive Isma'il and remained there until his death in 1871/72. But Raghib's son Salim Bahjat (d. 1899/1900) lived in Damascus and joined the civil administration first as a *qadi* in Suwayda in Jabal Druze then as *qa'immaqam* in Salimiya and elsewhere. He appears to have died without a male heir.

During the lifetime of Salim Bahjat, a dispute arose between the Taqi al-Din and Hisni branches of the family over the *awqaf* attached to their *zawiya* in Shaghur. These *awqaf* consisted of urban market property in Ma'dhanat al-Shahm. The governor at that time established a commission to arbitrate the dispute with the outcome that the *awqaf* proceeds were divided 14 portions for the Taqi al-Dins and 10 portions for the Hisnis.

In the Hisni branch of the family, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Qadir (d. 1893/94) who had already given up *mal al-fatura* activities sometime in the 1840's or 1850's became a Hanafi *shaykh* and rose to be the Hanafi *imam* in the Umayyad Mosque for the remaining fifty years of his life. His first son Yasin Hilmi (d. 1915/16) joined the Safarjalani Sufi order and was named *naqib al-ashraf* for the small town of Duma to the west of Damascus. He later served as a *katib* in the Bab court and received an Ottoman rank.

A second son, Adib (1874–1940) was named *naqib al-ashraf* of Damascus under the Young Turks but was replaced under Amir Faysal. To him we are indebted for one of the major sources for the history of Damascus which has often been cited here.

The brother of Muhammad al-Hisni, Salih (1840/41–1892/93) continued to work as a merchant. Some time in the late 1860's or early 1870's he joined the Rifa'iya Sufi order and was named a successor (*khalifa*) to his guide (*murshid*) Shaykh Hasan al-Sayyadi (the father of the famous Abu'l-Huda one of the most influential figures at the court of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid in the late 19th century). In 1872/73 he went to Istanbul and obtained the post of *naqib al-ashraf* for Jerusalem and was, in addition, granted an Ottoman rank. Yet he did not personally fill this post, remaining in Damascus for a while. In 1889/90 he was named *naqib al-*

97 For a discussion of "*mal al-fatura*", see above, 70.

98 See Butros Abu Manneh, *Some Aspects*, Chapter IV; Sharif Mardin, *Genesis*, 276–282.

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ashraf of Damascus, a post which he held until his death in Mecca while on the pilgrimage in 1892/93. Although it was his brother Mahmud and not Salih who was Hanafi *imam*, Hisni writes that this post was to be transferred to Salih's son upon his death because the governor at that time requested the Porte to do so. The outcome of this request is, however, unknown. Salih's son Salah al-Din became governor (*hakim al-sulh*) for Aleppo after the First World War.

Another Hisni, 'Abdallah ibn Ahmad ibn Hasan (d. 1899/1900), who sat on the *majlis al-baladiya* in the late 1880's and on the *majlis al-awqaf*, broadened the family's economic interests from commerce into agriculture. It was said he owned a large farm in Muhammadiya.

The Hisnis and the Taqi al-Dins produced important local political figures from the end of the 'Azm period into the 20th century. Beginning as members of the Maydani faction their attachments subsequently varied widely and perhaps inconsistently from being adherents of the Egyptians Ibrahim Pasha, Mustafa Fazil and Khedive Isma'il, to joining in the state-organized Sufi movements of the 19th century. Then, surprisingly, they regained the post of *naqib al-ashraf* in Damascus under the Young Turks and were elevated to high administrative positions following the First World War.

The Kuzbari Family[99]

Ahmad Muslim al-Kuzbari (1825/26–1881/82) was the first member of this family to hold the *niqaba*. In the 18th and19th centuries, the Kuzbaris were chiefly known as Shafi'i *'ulama'*. (Their name –meaning corrianderer – suggests that they were spice producers or traders). The founder of the fame and influence of the family was 'Ali Kuzbar (1688/89–1751/52) who was often referred to as "the little Shafi'i. Both he and his nephew 'Abd al-Rahman taught in the Umayyad mosque in the 18th century. It is reported that an ancestor by the name of al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Karim had brought the family to Damascus from Safad in northern Palestine in 1604/05, but that their family name al-Kuzbari was taken from 'Ali Kuzbar, who was a maternal uncle. Since 'Ali Kuzbar himself was not a *sayyid*, this branch of the family was no longer included amongst the patrilineal *ashraf*, and no further indication that they belonged to the *ashraf* appears in subsequent biographies. The choice of Ahmad Muslim al-Kuzbari in 1860 as *naqib* is therefore especially remarkable, for the Ottoman authorities here reached outside the ranks of the patrilineal *ashraf* and beyond the established *niqaba* families to take a family otherwise known as *'ulama'*. Normally families which moved from the *ashraf* into the *'ulama'* (as here the Kuzbaris or the Muradis had done) remained there. Here, the process was reversed and is, therefore, a noteworthy example of changes in Damascene socio-political patterns which took place during the Tanzimat period and especially as a result of the events of 1860.

The prestigeous and well-paid teaching post known as the Qabbat al-Nasr *Sahih al-Bukhari* post[100] (because of the location and subject matter of the lessons – the Qabbat al-Nasr was under the central dome of the Umayyad mosque; the Bukhari collection of *hadith (al-Sahih al-Bukhari*) was one of the basic texts of the Islamic tradition) had been held through generations of the Kuzbari family since 1795 when Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kuzbari (1727/28–1806/07) first obtained the post. The Kuzbaris were also associated as teachers to the *madrasa* built by Sulayman Pasha al-'Azm. Ahmad Muslim al-Kuzbari had in fact held both these posts prior to being named *naqib* and continued to do so until his death despite his new

99 For material on the Kuzbaris see: Muradi, II, 326, III, 205; Hisni, 666, 679–680, 692, 828–830; Bitar, I, 146–150, 241, II, 682–683, 833–836, 917, 1003–1004, III, 1227–1229, 1345, 1593–1594; Shatti, *Rawd*, 38–39, 139–141, 161, 167–168, 227–229, 258; Mardam, 27; FO. 195/2075; AEPD/15, AECPNS 112/10.

100 See *Encyclopedia of Islam* article: Sahih; Bitar I, 147 f.

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Kuzbarī Family



assignment. The family also maintained their household in Shaghur, one of the localist areas to the south of the central rectangle.

Hisni attributes Ahmad Muslim's appointment to the *niqaba* to his having prohibited the members of his (presumably large) household in Shaghur from participating in the riots of 1860. As the riot spirit spread through Shaghur, al-Kuzbari, it is said, locked the iron gates of his house and forbade those inside from participating.

Following Ahmad Muslim's death, the *niqaba* returned to the 'Ajlanis while the Kuzbaris retained, as before, the Qabbat al-Nasr teaching post into the 20th century (despite incompetency in subsequent generations, according to al-Bitar.) Also after 1860, other members of the family served in Damascene courts and on the municipal council and were directors of the city's orphanages. The family was also involved in a scandal involving counterfeiting around 1900 which is only briefly mentioned in the consular records. It has not yet been possible to establish if they are related to the Kuzbaris who were prominent in industry and the military of post-World War II Syria.

The Hasibi Family[101]

Relative to all of the *ashraf* families thus far mentioned, the Hasibis were a family more recently established in Damascus. It appears they had gained their influence through administrative service, the accumulation of control over land and intermarriage with the 'Azms. The first Hasibi in Damascus was probably 'Abdallah ibn 'Askar al-'Attar, who came there at the end of the 17th century from Qara, a town to the north of Damascus. His name would tend to indicate that he was a herb or drug merchant, and that his father was attached to the military. Some sources indicate that his son Ibrahim was named *qadi* in Gaza, and that a grandson, Muhammad was the first of the family to pursue scholarship seriously. Muhammad's son 'Ali (1742/43–1826/27) served in the courts of Damascus as a *na'ib*, was accepted as a member of the *ashraf* and adopted the name "al-Hasibi", denoting nobility, in place of al-'Attar.

In the early 19th century i.e. at a time when the 'Azms were in decline, 'Ali succeeded in marrying two daughters into the 'Azm family. His daughter Zaynab was married to Salih Bey (probably ibn 'Abdallah) al-'Azm and his daughter 'A'isha was married to Muhammad 'Ali Bey ibn Muhammad Hafiz al-'Azm. At that time the Hasibis lived in 'Uqayba to the north of the city's walls and were probably Hanafis. 'Ali's son Ahmad (1791/92–1876/77) was favored by the Ottoman government with a grant of land in different villages in the vicinity of Damascus, probably around Qatana, a short distance to the south-west and on the slopes of the Anti-Lebanon facing Damascus. It was he who was named to the *majlis* and remained there until 1860. It is, unfortunately, not revealed in the sources why the government favored Ahmad in this way. We may suppose that the land grant was similar to previous measures the government had taken to reward faithful service and to gain influential allies in Damascus. In any case, Ahmad became wealthy, moved the family residence from the quarter of 'Uqayba to that of Qanawat and reinforced ties with the 'Azms by marrying his daughters into that family, one to an 'Azm and one to a Mu'ayyad al-'Azm.

Ahmad Hasibi was transported into exile with the others in October of 1860. He also returned with the others after being transferred to Izmir and Istanbul where they were released. Nothing more appears in the sources about him in the years before his death in 1876/77 while on the pilgrimage.

101 See: Bitar, I, 100, 164n, 241–243; III, 1093, III, 1375–1381; Shatti, *Rawd*, 32–33. 187–188, 232–233, 233; Hisni, 828–829; Salibi, "Shaykh Muhammad", 185f. See also the dispatches of the French consuls, AEARC/93/4, AEPo1/6, AEPo1/8, AEPo1/15, FO. 371/6455.

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Ḥasībī Family



His son Abu al-Su'ud (d. 1914) was imprisoned in Damascus in 1860–1861 for one year, during which time he wrote one of the most valuable accounts of the events of 1860 which we have, as few Muslim accounts have yet come to light. He appears to have been restored to favor along with many others by the governor Rashid Pasha in 1869. He then sat on the municipal council (*majlis al-baladiya*) though probably only for one term. He married the daughter of the *mufti* Muhammad al-Manini, and through the latter's representations (at least according to al-Shatti) was appointed *naqib al-ashraf* in 1898. Under the Young Turks, however, he lost this post to Adib Taqi al-Din al-Hisni.

Abu al-Su'ud's two sons were briefly called into prominent positions under Amir Faysal. 'Ali Rida al-Rikabi, the military governor of Damscus following th Arab Revolt, whose son was married to Abu al-Su'ud's granddaughter, appointed his in-laws *naqib al-ashraf* and *ra'is al-baladiya*.

By the time of the First World War, in fact, the Hasibis had established kinship connections to many very prominent families of the *aghawat*, *'ulama'* and merchant estates. In addition to the 'Azms, Mu'ayyad al-'Azms, Maninis, and Rikabis, they had also intermarried with the Haddads of Beirut, the Sham'as and Barudis of Damascus and the Turkish Ottoman family of Nazif Pasha who was military commander in Damascus in 1878 and governor in 1888/89. Though they had joined the 'Azm faction late in the day, their multiple ties within the faction and their success with the Ottomans after 1860 retained for the Hasibis their notable status well into the 20th century.

MID-19TH CENTURY NEWCOMERS TO THE ELITE

As a consequence of political and economic developments in the course of the 19th century, a few families could disregard the confinements of the estates system and attain considerable political influence in the second half of the century and henceforth. Of these, two are considered here in detail.

The Mardam Family[102]

The 20th century biographer al-Hisni refers to the Mardams as an old Damascene family whose ancestry can be traced to Lala Mustafa Pasha, the 16th century Ottoman grand vizier responsible for the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus. The family was to capitalize on this connection in the post-1860 period in order to establish control over extensive inner and outer-ring properties about which we shall talk shortly. According to the family genealogy published in the 20th century, the Damascene Mardams' common patrilineal ancestor was a certain Yahya ibn Ibrahim who lived around the turn of the 18th century and married Rabiya, the great-great-granddaughter (and presumably sole heir) of Lala Mustafa Pasha.

The family tree also shows that the Mardams were a relatively large family by the beginning of the 19th century. All the Damascene Mardams of the 19th and 20th centuries descend from the four sons of 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad, a direct descendant of the above-mentioned Yahya. To Muhammad (d. 1834), the eldest of these four, were born 'Uthman (1819/20–1886) and 'Ali (approx. 1825–1887/88), newcomers to the elite who were to increase the family's fortune considerably and who established the basis of its modern political influence.

The story of 'Uthman's rise remains, however, an enigma. According to al-Shatti, he was a rather idle youth "inclined to *futuwa*" – a term which normally refers to ties to fraternal associations but, being so rarely used by the Damascene biographers, is difficult to interpret in

102 See Shatti, *Tarajim*, 14, 23; Hisni, 891–892; Mardam, 15–20; Harran, 290, 302; *Kitab al-ahzan;* FO. 371/6455.

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Mardam Family



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this context except perhaps that it was somehow reprehensible. The turning point in 'Uthman's life, according to al-Shatti, came when he was invited to join the circle of Hashim ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Taji (d. 1846/47). There he studied with the *'ulama'* and established personal commitments to them by marrying two women from *'ulama'* families.

By mid-century 'Uthman's importance among the city's commercial community was considerable. He had acquired a property at Bab al-Barid in the central rectangle from the Muradi family for a trifling sum and built there a highly-profitable market, the Suq al-Jadid (see Fig. 3, E/4), for which he became famous. Al-Shatti continues that 'Uthman served as an employee in a *shar'i* court, but soon assumed a post on the commercial court (*majlis tijara*). This is substantiated by the contemporary source, the *Kitab al-Ahzan*, which refers to him as 'Uthman Bey ibn Mardam Pasha (*sic*!) and reports that he was president (*ra'is*) of the commercial court. This last source names him also as a member of the commission created to assess indemnities due to the victims of the events of 1860.

With that, however, doubts concerning the Mardams local origins are raised and are sustained by the information reported in May of 1850 by the British consul who wrote: "... His Excellency Osman Bey, who has been commissioned by the Porte to re-organize the Municipal Council and the Commercial Tribunal of this city has arrived here." In another consular report the same "Osman" is further described as an Ottoman functionary who planned to carry out reforms by dissolving the Damascene *majlis*, retaining only four of its Muslim members and inviting members of the Catholic, Greek Orthodox and Jewish communities to send representatives to the new *majlis*. The circumstances would then also identify 'Uthman Mardam as the politically-decisive personality ("*sahib al-hall wa'l-'aqd*") who, as already discussed, presided over the choice of a new *mufti* in 1850 at the time of the Muradi family's decline/suppression and as the Ottomans of the Tanzimat turned decisively to the Maydanis for local support.

It seems, therefore, most likely that 'Uthman Mardam Bey was not a Damascene but an Ottoman official sent to the city to push through a number of Tanzimat measures. It is possible, though not yet verifiable, that he settled in the city by marrying Farlan al-'Azm. Farlan had, during the Egyptian occupation, been married to the Egyptian general Sharif Pasha al-Misri; her father 'Ali Agha, a Mamluk in the Egyptian service, had been executed by Ibrahim Pasha at the end of the occupation for presumed treasonous contacts with the Ottomans, and her husband Sharif Pasha had returned to Egypt a prisoner.

'Uthman Mardam Bey remained a key figure beyond the events of 1860. When the governor Amin Mukhlis reorganized the *majlis* in February of 1861 he called on 'Uthman Bey to suggest thirty notables as electors. These gathered in the *seray* and chose 'Uthman Bey and his supporter Khalil Bey (whose identity is uncertain) and a certain Darwish Effendi (who is probably a Manjak-'Ajlani). The rest of the *majlis* was appointed directly by the governor.

Sometime after 1860 'Uthman and his younger brother 'Ali travelled to Istanbul where they obtained the authorities' approval of their rights to the *awqaf* created by the above-mentioned Lala Mustafa Pasha and his wife Fatima Khatun, the daughter of Qansawh al-Ghawri, the last Mamluk ruler of Syria over whom the Ottomans had triumphed. The line of descent was established through the above-mentioned Rabiya, the heir of Lala Mustafa and Fatima Khatun. According to the description of these *awqaf* published by Uthman's grandson Khalil Bey in 1925, the properties were composed of lands and properties in five different regions of greater Syria: Damascene urban real estate; agricultural land and gardens in the vicinity of Damascus; agricultural land in the northern and southern Biqa' valley and in the Shuf of Lebanon; agricultural land at a considerable distance to the south of Damascus, in Sha'ra, Hula, Jawlan, Jaydur and Hawran; agricultural lands in the foothills of southern Lebanon, around Saida and Safad. From these extensive holdings and their exploitation, it is reported that the Mardams gathered a "fortune unequalled in its age."

Al-Shatti relates that while 'Ali dressed in the robe and turban of the old days, 'Uthman wore a European-style suit and a fez. 'Uthman is described by this biographer as an "innovator" and a "man of action" who sat on the *majlis* in the 1870's and was *mutasarrif* of the Hawran in 1878.

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Yet, 'Uthman Bey was possibly not altogether accepted in Damascus. In the early 1870's the British consul reported:

> This notorious person bears the worst of characters . . . His name along with that of his brother, was registered at the great Zaya [!] Mosque . . . all the Notables of the place, and the members of the chief tribunal signed a mazbata and swore upon the Koran that these men and sundry others convicted of gross malversation should never again be employed under Government.

But 'Uthman and 'Ali remained active on the *majlis* well into the 1880's. 'Ali also sat on the appeals court (*majlis al-tamyiz*).

'Uthman Mardam had five sons: the first, 'Abd al-Qadir, was probably the 'Abd al-Qadir Effendi named *mutasarrif* of the Hawran in 1879 when 'Uthman died. The second son, 'Abdallah, sat on the *majlis* from 1874/75 through 1877/78. The third, Ahmad Mukhtar, was named *ra'is al-baladiya* sometime in the 1860's. Marrying Fatima, the daughter of the *mufti* Mahmud Hamza, he established a link between the Mardams and one of the most important pre-Tanzimat Damascene families. The fourth son, Rashid, who was born around 1870, acquired the title of *pasha* and served as a judge. He was elected to represent Damascus on the Ottoman Parliament of 1908 and was a member of Faysal's consultative assembly when the Arab government was established following the Ottoman collapse. The fifth son, Rida, was alive in the 1940's.

'Uthman's grandsons Jamil ibn 'Abd al-Qadir and Khalil ibn Ahmad Mukhtar (1895–1959) were both prominent figures in the 20th century. Both completed their studies abroad: Jamil in Paris, Khalil in London. In Paris, Jamil Mardam was one of the five Arab students who conceived of the Arab Congress which was held there in 1913. He was later elected prime minister of Syria several times and was a central figure of the mandate period. Khalil was active in the Arab Academy, an important Damascene cultural institution, and was elected its president in the 1950's. He was one of the most celebrated Arab poets of the nationalist era.

'Uthman's brother 'Ali had only one son, Hikmat Pasha, who died in the early 1900's. Not much is know about Hikmat except that he was considered by the French consul to be a "notable of secondary importance" in the late 1880's and that he made further arrangements concerning the administration of the family's *awqaf* properties during the administration of governor 'Uthman Nuri Pasha.

Hikmat Pasha's only son, Sami, was active prior to the First World War when he represented Damascus in the Ottoman Parliament. He also sat on the Damascus appeals court. His only son, Dr. Haydar Mardam, studied law in Paris and was later active in public life.

By the turn of the century when the family probably numbered nearly one hundred, the Mardams appeared to be one of the grand old families of Damascus. Not only the descendants of 'Uthman and 'Ali but the descendants of their cousins Mustafa (d. 1852), 'Abdallah (d. 1827) and Sa'd al-Din (d. 1875) lived in Damascus and made it a large and extended structure of diverse economic and political influence. The continued to control a number of key urban properties both inside the central rectangle and without. They also held properties both in the traditionally localist region near the Sinaniya *suq* and in the traditionally Ottoman area at the site of one of the Ottoman *serays*.

Though the Mardams may have been an old Syrian family whose fortunes took a turn for the better again in the mid-19th century, they first appear prominently in Damascus in the mid-19th century when they carried the rank of *beys*, a rank which until that time only the 'Azms, the Kahhalas and the Kanj Yusufs had held in Damascus. But they, unlike the 'Azms and the Kanj Yusufs, do not figure in the history of the province or region in the 17th and 18th centuries, nor can they be associated with a position of leadership within the earlier estates system as *aghawat*, *ashraf* or *'ulama'*. Their success in modern times begins clearly during the Tanzimat as a consequence of commercial and agriculultural successes and their leading role in Ottoman administrative reform. Their political influence climaxed during the mandate period both as quarter leaders in the inner-city and in the suburb of Salihiya and as leading personalities of the National Bloc. Following the Second World War and Syrian independence, their rivalry with the 'Azms, which

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had clear historical continuity, took on an especially sharp tone and was one of the devisive elements which accompanied the disintegration of the rule of the great families of Damascus from the 1950's onwards.

The Jaza'iri Family[103]

The Jaza'iris were welcomed to Damascus in the fall of 1855 when their family head Amir 'Abd al-Qadir (1807/08–1883), the defeated hero of the fifteen-year war against the French in Algeria, moved the family from Bursa in Asia Minor to Syria. Damascus was to be their final exile as arranged between the Ottoman and French governments. The Jaza'iris were a large extended household of some 200 persons including the families of 'Abd al-Qadir's brothers and cousins and a number of family retainers. To support these 'Abd al-Qadir had been receiving a pension from the French government of 200,000 Francs annually, but about a year before he moved to Damascus this had been increased to 300,000 Francs. 'Abd al-Qadir needed this sum to help support the hundreds of Algerian emigrees who were otherwise destitute. The French also arranged that he be assigned lands in Syria by the Ottoman government and the Ottomans provided another 100,000 Francs for housing. A few years later and just prior to the events of 1860, additional funds were provided by the French consulate in Damascus to enable 'Abd al-Qadir to arm a para-military troop of 1,000 Algerians in case civil strife should break out.

Almost immediately after his arrival in Syria 'Abd al-Qadir travelled to the outlying districts of 'Ajlun, Safad, Jerusalem, the Biqa', and Homs and Hama with the aim of ascertaining where the resettlement of deserted villages with Algerians would be tolerated by the beduin and nomadic chieftains of these regions. He intended to arrange that the Algerian emigrees work on these lands as share-croppers. As the lands which eventually came under his control were important wheat-growing districts, it seems reasonable to assume that 'Abd al-Qadir participated in the profitable grain export trade which was booming just as he arrived in Syria. It is known that over the years he developed a close friendship to Shibli Abela, a Maltese Christian living in Sidon who was one of the most important grain-exporting dealers on the Syrian coast. 'Abd al-Qadir's travels and the contacts he had made in France would have placed him in a position to understand the importance of Syrian grains for Europe. He may, in fact, be responsible for the change of orientation of the Damascene grain trade which took place about this time. From the mid-1850's onwards, the trend to exploit the city's outer ring and especially the Hawran as a resource in sustaining the city's trade with Europe became irreversible.

As usual, the biographical sources do not provide much information about these or other mundane activities of their subject, dealing rather with the personality and cultural level of 'Abd al-Qadir. The Damascenes were impressed by his learning and piety as well as by his integrity and generosity. He was well-versed in the Islamic tradition and was a *shaykh* of the Qadiri Sufi order. He frequented the Ashrafiya Madrasa (also called the Dar al-Hadith, see figure 4: E/3/4) in the inner-city quarter of 'Asruniya, a *madrasa* closely associated to the Kaylani family, who were also Hasani *ashraf* and Qadiri Sufis but closely integrated into the 'Azm-faction.

103 See: Bitar, II, 883–915, III, 1433–1449; Shatti, *Rawd*, 153–157, 210–211, 211–212, 213 and *Tarajim*, 96–97; Hisni, 673–674, 696, 704–705, 740–748, 756, 793–795, 799–800; Zirikli, VII, 82; Jundi, I, 219–220, 238, 240; J. King, *op. cit.*; M. Emerit, *op. cit.*; Harran, 51, 189; 'Abd al-Jalil al-Tamimi, "al-Amir 'Abd al-Qadir fi Dimashq (1855–1860)," *Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine*, 6 (1979), 5-32; AEARC/93/4, AEPo1/7, AECom/8, AEPo1/10, AEPo1/11; AEPo1/12, AEPo1/13, AEARC/93/4, AEPo1/14, AEPo1/14, AEPo1/14, AEPo1/15, AEPo1/17, AECPNS/105/2, AEARC/63, AECPNS/106/4, AECPNS/112/9, AECPNS/114/9, AECPNS/115/12, AECPNS/119/16; FO. 195/677, FO. 195/976, FO. 195/994, FO. 195/1067; FO. 195/1843, FO. 195/2056, FO. 195/2097, FO. 195/2122, FO. 195/2165, FO. 371/6455.

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Jazā'irī Family



Arriving in Damascus abruptly in the mid-1850's with a huge personal entourage, a huge independent income and a formidable contingent of para-militaries, 'Abd al-Qadir sent shock waves through the city. The fact that he could qualify for not only membership in but leadership of five different social estates made him an extraordinary phenomenon with which none of the older Damascene families, not even the 'Azms, could compete. A hero on the field of armed resistance to Europe, a wealthy economic innovator, an acknowledged descendant of the Prophet, an *'alim*, a Sufi and a man with contacts in high places both in Istanbul and in France, and eventually in Egypt, 'Abd al-Qadir seemed destined to play a central political role.

That he did not do so remains one of the puzzles of Damascene politics of the late 19th century, which deserves further research. We have touched on his known and possible role(s) in the events of 1860 in Chapter IV. The historian 'Abd al-Jalil al-Tamimi has published many interesting facts and documents concerning 'Abd al-Qadir and is continuing to work on these and other problems. Within the framework of this study, it should be noted that in his activities 'Abd al-Qadir clearly threw in his lot with the group of notables who ascended under the influence of Tanzimat reforms and economic expansion at mid-century, but either avoided or was excluded from the politics of the older factions. Perhaps as a consequence, 'Abd al-Qadir worked to forge new lines of affiliation amongst the city's notables across factional lines. One of his closest friends, for example, was Mahmud al-Hamzawi, whose family's fortunes were similarly transformed in this period. It is also significant that 'Abd al-Qadir used his influence in Istanbul to win an amnesty for the exiles of 1860 who were nearly all from the 'Azm-faction. Yet by the time 'Abd al-Qadir died in 1883, this initiative seems to have lost its momentum. He left nine sons. Only one of these, 'Umar, was to remain dependent on a French pension. All the others eventually acclaimed their allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan and thus reflected the Ottomanist trend which overtook Damascus in the late 19th century. The careers of 'Abd al-Qadir's sons can be sketched as follows.

The eldest son, Amir 'Ali, established early ties to the beduin of southern Syria. He was considered by the Druzes of the Hawran during the conflicts of the 1860's to be a patron of the beduin. Nothing could be found concerning his activities in the 1870's during which time he probably devoted himself to land administration in the Hawran. In 1888, however, he became engaged to the daughter of Ahmad Pasha al-'Abid, the chief of the powerful Maydani *aghawat* family which also worked with the Ottomans after 1860. At the time of the engagement, al-'Abid was in Istanbul. In that one of the conditions of the marriage was that 'Ali should relinquish his ties to the French, it appears that the Ottomans were somehow pressuring al-'Abid for concessions to be won from this, the eldest of tha Jaza'iris.

In 1900/01, 'Ali mediated between the beduin and Druzes of the Hawran on behalf of the Ottomans and led a successful campaign against the beduin. In 1903 he was named temporarily district governor (*mutasarrif*) and then a financial official in the province of Hama, though he resigned this post shortly afterwards. During his sojourn in Hama, he had unsuccessfully attempted to attract the peasants of Fayyad Agha of Qaryatayn to work for him. We shall talk about Amir 'Ali's son Sa'id in a moment.

Amir Muhyi al-Din (1843/44–1917/18), the second son, was given a rank and decoration by Sultan 'Abd al-Aziz in 1864/5 although he apparently continued to draw a French pension. In 1865, he travelled to Rome, Switzerland and Paris where he was entertained by Napoleon III. He returned to Damascus via Egypt. During the Franco-Prussian War he smuggled himself to Tunis and later to Tripoli (Libya) where it is said he launched anti-French activities which, however, seem to have gone unnoticed by the French who continued to pay his pension. Muhyi al-Din returned to Syria, remaining in Sidon for a while where he probably worked in the family's grain-export business. He does not appear again until the late 1870's. After his fathers's death, be broke with France and obtained instead a pension of 50 Ottoman Lira a month from the Sultan and the rank of *pasha*. It was also reported that he had been granted lands in the village of Kafrin, four hour's ride from Damascus. In the late 1880's, he moved to Istanbul where he obtained positions very close to the Sultan. He held, for example, a military post in the Sultan's entourage referred to by the French consul as *aide de camp*. As he was instrumental in

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arranging a pension from the Porte for Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bitar, he may have done this for other Damascene *'ulama'* as well. He was particularly active in the Sultan's attempts to win all the sons of 'Abd al-Qadir over to the Ottomans from the French, and returned to Syria to arrange this in 1888.

A third son of 'Abd al-Qadir, Amir Muhammad (d.1913), also switched his allegiance to the Ottomans and obtained the title of *pasha*. He was appointed to the Damascene *majlis* in most of the years between 1884–1889. After that he joined his brother Muhyi al-Din in Istanbul and died there in 1913.

Possibly due to the efforts of Muhiy al-Din, the fourth son, Amir Ahmad al-Jaza'iri, switched his allegiance to the Ottomans. To that end Muhyi al-Din offered Ahmad lands in the districts of Salt and 'Ajlun and permission to form two groups of Algerian gendarmes which would be exempt from the usual Ottoman military service. These negotiations may have remained inconclusive, since the French consul says all but the promise of military service exemption were empty promises. But at some point Ahmad also renounced his dependence on France.

Little is reported about the fifth son, Amir Hashim, except that he got into financial trouble with the Ottoman Imperial Bank in the 1880's and that the French government granted him 4000 Francs in 1888 to pay off the interest he owed on his debts to the bank. At some point he probably returned to Algeria.

Finally, the Amirs Ibrahim, 'Abdallah and 'Abd al-Malik also declared Ottoman allegiance. 'Abdallah remained in Damascus, 'Abd al-Malik joined Muhammad and Muhyi al-Din in Istanbul. Nothing is related about 'Abd al-Razzaq, a ninth son, who may have died young.

During the early 1890's, the Jaza'iris quarrelled violently with the Mu'ayyad al-'Azms about the rights to certain villages. The relations between these two families appear to have been strained. The biographer and Maydani al-Bitar may have wished to emphasize the Jaza'iris ascendancy over the 'Azms by relating how Amir 'Abd al-Qadir had patronized the poverty-stricken Mahmud ibn Khalil al-'Azm (1832–1876) who had dissipated his wealth and had turned to handicrafts to make his living. It is also interesting to note that, though the 'Azms married their women into other Maydani-faction families, no record of a marriage between the 'Azms and the Jaza'iris prior to the First World War can be found.

At the time of the First World War the Jaza'iris deputized for the Ottomans when the British, Australian and Arab forces captured Damascus. Amir 'Ali's son Sa'id handed over the city to Amir Faysal, but there followed a brief struggle which resulted in the death of Sa'id's brother 'Abd al-Qadir and Sa'id's being exiled by the British.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS

While it is true that the 'Azms created for Syrians a new sense of local pride and identity and initiated a modern sense of prosperity and continuity in Syrian life at a time when the organization of power in the region and at the center of the Empire was in a state of flux, their affiliation to and promotion of particular combinations within the local elite undermined the general solidarity of the society and led to factionalism, hardship and social strife. The 'Azm era cannot, therefore, be seen as a triumph of localism.

Localism would be only inadequately defined as the concentration of power in local hands. As long as all sectors of the local economy and society and how they fare are not taken into account, local rule can remain flawed and inhibited from full realization. True localism expresses the degree of self-sufficiency, self-determination and solidarity in a society, not just the origins of its rulers or the degree to which external control is successfully resisted.

Significant portions of the population which could also have contributed to localism or at least profited from it were undermined by the 'Azms and soundly defeated in the clash between As'ad Pasha al-'Azm and Fathi al-Falaqinsi in 1746. The northern para-military groups which were loyal to the 'Azms were promoted; those of the south and especially those of the Maydan were suppressed. The 'Azms also aroused the oppositon of the artisans and grain producers by their efforts to subordinate them to the interests of the export-import merchants and inner-city consumers who formed the heart of the 'Azm-faction. The dominance of the export-import sector in the city's economy proved, moreover, to be a liability once Syria had to compete with an ascendant industrial Europe.

Finally, the triumph of factional interests under the 'Azms accelerated the decline of the weaker estates and with that of the entire estates system which had presented at least the opportunity for the representation of lower and middle class interests.

Following the military decline of the 'Azm family, a period of political and economic insecurity ensued as not only the suppressed Maydani faction attempted to gain the field but remnants of the estates system continued to struggle for the restoration of the pre-'Azm political order. But the consecutive external threats posed by the Napoleonic, Wahhabite and Egyptian invasions into the province of Damascus as well as the tyranny of Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar, the penetration of European trade interests from the coast to the rural interior and a devastating epidemic all inhibited and distorted local political achievements. Neither was the pre-'Azm political system restored nor was it possible for the localists to sustain the victory they achieved in the revolt of 1831. Exhausted by these multiple drains on its human and economic resources, Syria had also not the time or energy to establish a new local order. The Egyptian occupation sealed the fate of localism.

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As a consequence, some notables of the Maydani faction gradually began to relinquish their support for the suppressed and exploited elements of the local sector of the economy. The grain and livestock trade off the Syrian coast gave them new wealth and influence independent of developments in Damascus. While enriching themselves, they appear also to have shared their successes with important but limited segments of their faction and to have found useful collaborators among the inner-city's Christians. Some of the hardships the Maydanis had come to know under 'Azm rule were thereby alleviated. For reasons not yet clear, moreover, the Maydanis also benefited most from the Tanzimat reforms introduced by the Ottomans from 1840 onwards. By contrast, hardest hit by the Tanzimat reforms and by European economic penetration was the 'Azm faction.

By mid-century, therefore, a paradoxical reversal of the 18th-century Damascene social-political relationships had resulted. The faction which had initiated and benefited most from patrician cosmopolitism was now expected to placate local unemployed textile workers and check their insurgency. The events of 1860 may have been the result. But whether the riots against inner-city Christians and Europeans were a spontaneous upheaval, the result of a factional, foreign or proto-nationalist conspiracy cannot yet be clarified. Whatever the case, the events were used as a pretext to finally overcome Damascene factionalism and to punish and suppress those local elements which had resisted the Tanzimat. Though the 'Azm faction suffered most, a not insignificant number of its families, or tangential branches of these, reappear within the late 19th century bureaucracy.

Ottoman efforts of the later Tanzimat and Hamidian periods to exclude an Egyptian or European alternative for Syria required local support and this, in turn, required the consolation of a large number of local families. The Ottomans drew upon those families of the older estate and factional elites (and a few mid-19th century newcomers) whose economic success made them most attractive. Among these the fear of further European political or cultural intervention appears to have been an important factor in the resurgence of a pro-imperial alignment. What is most interesting, however, is that the new political synthesis was facilitated by factional and sectoral realities. The city's economic crises of the 1840's and 1850's were solved because the Maydan controlled and delivered the very commodity critical to the resolution of the city's balance of trade woes – grain. For their part, the 'Azm faction saw to it – with the help of the Ottomans whose fiscal interests were at stake – that a substantial portion of the grain trade circulated through Damascus. In this way (and paradoxically) the Maydanis proved to be the saviors of the export-import sector of the city's economy and many of the families it supported.

It appears that the formula worked at least into the 1890's. In those years, however, the fall of grain prices on world markets destabilized the region's political economy once again. The suppress resurgent localism in those years and thereafter, the Ottomans resorted to harsher methods, usually of a military nature which left the notables of all estates and factions little alternative but to collaborate. The Damascene families which had maintained ties to Egypt and Europe were driven further into the underground.

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When the Empire collapesd in 1918, the Damascene elite appeared to be a provincial administrative and land-holding *grande bourgeoisie* with at most only a proto-nationalist character. The local administrative and municipal councils – the Tanzimat innovations which had institutionalized the positions of the elites of at least the top three estates regardless of their factional connections – were on the whole ineffective and often corrupt bodies which only rarely and superficially represented local interests or achieved the realization of local demands. Though remnants of the estates system and of factionalism survived (and their survival helps to explain many political episodes even into our times), the presence of Ottoman and later French troops and agents made the political activation of older ties or the successful development of nationalism very difficult. Yet, those radical and militant movements which surfaced came, not surprisingly, out of the Maydan.

A large number of Damascene elite families survived these developments. Familiar family names appeared prominently in the leadership of early independent Syria. There was also in that respect a certain political continuity from the 'Azm era into the age of Syrian nationalism. But once factionalism had undermined the estates system, the vulnerability of local society to outside interference had increased. The estates system was no longer in a position to control the structure of power collection in the city, and the demographic, economic and political changes of the 18th and 19th centuries reinforced this trend. By the middle of the 19th century, characteristics not controlled by the estates system such as extraordinary wealth or the influence of Europe, Egypt or Istanbul could catapult individuals and their families into key political positions in desregard of the estates system or even in a parody on it.

The political processes accompanying and resulting from the rise of the 'Azms marked, therefore, a significant break with the past and the beginning of modern times in Syria. The 'Azms' use of factionalism in ruling much of greater Syria during long stretches of the 18th century and in dominating the cities of Damascus and Hama – not entirely unlike royalty – had important consequences for the country's future political development. Most important of these was the tension between the localist and cosmopolitan factions and the triumph of the latter over the former. The qualified rectification of this imbalance from the mid-19th century onwards was, however, largely the result of external political and economic forces and in most respects actually belied localism. The precariousness of the consolidated elite, whose wealth and influence rested on the success of grain farming and trade on the one hand and bureaucratic connections on the other, was to have important ramifications for the development of nationalism and the formation of an independent Syria in the 20th century. Following the withdrawal of the French, this elite failed to sustain its hold. For one, a greatly-increased and politically-awakened population obliged its members to concur more actively with each other. At the same time, a new form of organization, the political party, added another dimension to Syrian politics. In this respect, the elite was seriously handicapped by their loss of control over the kind of estate and sectoral institutions – which the 18th century 'Azms had mastered – in order to consolidate a faction.

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Well into our times, the fate of localism was to run parallel to the fate of families in politics. Both themes, having begun their modern history in the 18th century, remain central to an understanding of Syria today.

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